TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA A.C. No.

9000, 5 October 2011

Facts:
Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and offered the parcel of land registered in her fath
er’s name as security. She even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to sell or encumber t
he property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite repeate
d demands. So, Mr. Tan went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that the SPA did not
give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely
to banks.

Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions considering that the deception was made in h
er private capacity.

Ruling:
Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. Cano
n 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integr
ity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to en
gage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her
through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and complaina
nts ignorance in legal matters.
However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. Disbarment will be impose
d as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the law
yer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.

Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin A.C. No. 10758, 5 December 2017
Facts: Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita
Pascual, a clerk at the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review,
however, the alleged amorous relationship was not adequately proved (The quantum of proof in
administrative cases is substantial evidence). Also, Atty. Dalangin was said to be misquoting
jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court. In addition, he took an immediate recourse to the
Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’ resolve to affirm the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding
the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be held administratively liable.
Held: Yes. While he vehemently denied any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted
demonstrating closeness with the latter’s family, including her children. It was such display of
affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and
belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more
prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public,
particularly because he and Pascual were both married. The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant
Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice under the
circumstances. Also, while the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the
statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his
attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate. A suspension for the lone incident
would be too harsh a penalty. Lastly, the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty.
Dalangin’s suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering
that the Court still had to release its final action on the matter.
Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in handling his
personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin A.C. No. 10758, 5 December 2017
Facts: Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita
Pascual, a clerk at the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review,
however, the alleged amorous relationship was not adequately proved (The quantum of proof in
administrative cases is substantial evidence). Also, Atty. Dalangin was said to be misquoting
jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court. In addition, he took an immediate recourse to the
Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’ resolve to affirm the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding
the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be held administratively liable.
Held: Yes. While he vehemently denied any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted
demonstrating closeness with the latter’s family, including her children. It was such display of
affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship and
belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more
prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public,
particularly because he and Pascual were both married. The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant
Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice under the
circumstances. Also, while the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the
statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his
attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate. A suspension for the lone incident
would be too harsh a penalty. Lastly, the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty.
Dalangin’s suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering
that the Court still had to release its final action on the matter.
Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in handling his
personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, AC. No. 8313, 2015-07-14
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-Andrade and
Clare Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan.
complainant Pilar Andrade, stockholder and Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case...
when she was... illegally suspended by Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel Lukban and respondent Atty.
Eva Paita-Moya... respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya appeared as counsel for all respondents.
Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal case against
Mabini College Inc.
respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc. and co-respondent Luz I.
Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade... respondent acted as
counsel for Mabini College, Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.
After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that... the Honorable
Supreme Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled Wilson Cham versus Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya... suspending respondent from the practice of law... for one month.
despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite knowledge of her
suspension from the practice of law... respondent... continued to practice law in wilful
disobedience of the Supreme Court's suspension order in A.C. No. 7494.
respondent filed the following papers and pleadings as counsel
Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law and
respondent clients in other cases before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial Court
Issues:
whether Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law
despite the clear language of this Court's suspension order.
Ruling:
The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We adopt the
same, with modification.
The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008.[10] Despite this, she
continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and the
certifications noted by the Report.[11] In fact, she... continued receiving various fees for her
services throughout the duration of her suspension.[12]... her sole defense is ignorance of the
resolution that suspended her.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice
of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack of authority to practice law
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY of violating
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for an additional period of six (6) months from her one (1) month... suspension, totaling seven (7)
months from service of this resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Principles:
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law
MAXIMINO NOBLE III v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, AC. No. 10628, 2015-07-01

Facts:
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint[2] for damages against his
own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes,... Orlando stated... the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE
Compliance No. II-0008689[3]/Issued on March 10, 2008."[4] Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of
the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have... already reflected payment of his IBP annual
dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.

Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa[5] against
Orlando... he discovered that, through text messages,... Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading
Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged
exorbitant fees... saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you]
with his... unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even
once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a
lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong... polpol."[6]

Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel
In his defense,[11] Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third
MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and
Compromise Agreement were all made upon the... request of Marcelo... he insisted that the allegedly
offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication"
and were uttered in good... faith.

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded
to unjust vexation

Issues:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against
Orlando.

Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
morality.

It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their clients and the
society such that a... lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote
the public's faith in the profession.[21] Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private
life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially... when dealing with fellow lawyers.[22]
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful... counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of the judicial forum

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly... intended to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in
violation of the... above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust
vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that
he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the... judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.
 With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his
failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his... violation shall only be cause for the
dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as
well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional... colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco
(complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary
action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over
their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the registered owner of
a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A,
B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong City,
notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a
minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother
of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
complainant’s husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled
TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T.
Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in
connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law.
Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation executed by the
donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in the person of
Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street,
Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something
with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in
full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of
the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his
presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a document, he did not
bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the
signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the
same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and informed him that
Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation.
Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he
notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed the deed of
donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not
the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation
only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.81avvphi1
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared before him and
signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of
donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know
that the parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it
was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a
day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent
acknowledged that Atty. Linco "personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is
also violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary
public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-
2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying
complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require
complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in his motion for
reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that
respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus,
should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already
dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he
knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent
notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked
to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have
put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged
need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his
act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco
personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have
appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a
false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of
notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.17Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility is placed
upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not
only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in undermining the
integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also
as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation
of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the
same penalty.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial
commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of
the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

In Keld Stemmerik, represented by Attys. Herminio. Liwanag and Winston P.L. Esguerra vs.Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C.
No. 8010, June 16, 2009, Keld Stemmerik, a Danish national, expressed interest in buying land in the Philippines
and Atty. Mas advised him that he can legally acquire and own land in the Philippines.
Keld gave Atty. Mas PhP3.8 million as purchase price of the property and returned to Denmark. Atty. Mas
then prepared a contract to sell between Keld (with Atty. Mas as representative) and a certain Bonifacio de
Mesa, who allegedly owns the property. Atty. Mas then prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de
Mesa sold the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for PhP3.8 million. Atty. Mas also drafted an agreement
between Keld and Gonzales stating that it was Keld who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.
After the various agreements were signed, Keld tried to get in touch with Atty. Mas, who never replied to
Keld’s calls and email messages. When Keld returned to the Philippines, he learned that he could not own
land in the Philippines. In addition, a verification made at the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the
property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation.
Keld tried to locate Atty. Mas but never found him. It appears that Atty. Mas abandoned his law practice in
Olongapo City. Keld then filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mas with the Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The CBD and the IBP Board of Governors
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Mas. The Supreme Court agreed that Atty. Mas should be
disbarred. According to the Supreme Court:
This Court has interpreted [Article XII, Section 7], as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, to mean that
“under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands.” The provision is
a declaration of imperative constitutional policy.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the
Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and
illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the
property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and
knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.
Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire
real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted
a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead,
he deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and
unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of
the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Mas showed “gross ignorance of the law.” Based solely on the facts
recounted in the ruling, it is likely that Atty. Mas knew that aliens could not own land, and for that reason, the
deed of sale he prepared was between de Mesa and Gonzales. If Atty. Mas was not aware of the
constitutional prohibition against alien ownership, then he would have likely placed Keld as the purchaser in
the deed of sale. In asking Gonzales to acknowledge that the funds for the purchase of the property came
from Keld, it seems that Atty. Mas was using Gonzales as a “dummy” for Keld.
In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin
December 7, 2012
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics – Moral Turpitude – Disbarment
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of
Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual).
It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order
to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds.
In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate
administrative actions against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But
it has always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolin’s situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has
been affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.
[A.C. No. 7940 : April 24, 2012]
RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF
THE RULES OF COURT, VS. ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving
moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice of law under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.cralaw
The Facts and the Case
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote
Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor
Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for
processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the
P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it,
filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against
Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached
to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that
it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against
Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.[1] On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan
found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the
accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction. [2] Since the
Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the
administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Issue Presented
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.
The Court’s Ruling
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses
he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims that the A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015
Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was “factually
infirmed”[3] and contained “factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation,” [4] and
was “too adventurous.”[5] TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas’ RESOLUTION
letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a
satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the falsified Abastillas’ letter, this
Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who LEONEN, J.:
falsified the letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant
therefore guilty of falsification.[6]
Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera
committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
This Court’s decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re:
dishonor of several post-dated checks.
Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called
upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final. The review of the conviction
no longer rests upon this Court. Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court.
The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in
relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly
Atty. De Vera.3cralawred
or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice,
honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. [8] Moral turpitude includes P20,000.00 per month until fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De
Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check
No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
more checks to cover the interest agreed upon. 7cralawred
man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9]
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No.
317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe
her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred
form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear
cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks
court and a member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that
"bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was
moral turpitude.[11]
closed.9cralawred
Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations,
his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting
22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession. [12]
The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most
cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
sacredly bound to uphold the law.[13] The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon
Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As
the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently,
such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11cralawred
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [14]cralaw
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 12cralawred
the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records and
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint.13cralawred
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.
SO ORDERED.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and
Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe'
Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon. 15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus,
they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while
Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her
P195,000.00 per site.16cralawred
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006. 17 At that time, Teresita
had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the
funds required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell
site.19cralawred
Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita
approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan.
The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband
regarding the loan.20cralawred
Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister. 21 She only lent Teresita
another check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]" 22cralawred
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for
value. The checks were not meant to be deposited.23cralawred
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points
out that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation
since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint. 24cralawred
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative
complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as
a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant." 25cralawred
26
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused. In addition, "[a] 11 the bare
allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property
and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute
deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]." 27cralawred
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]" 28cralawred
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked
exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to
submit their respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the Order."30.
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The
Investigating Commissioner ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the
loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is
contrary to the ordinary experience.
...
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent
incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter
as security for the payment of the loans.
Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious
misconduct.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . .
worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A
check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has
the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
...
[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also
for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke
her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following
provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation36 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is
recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of
law.37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawlawlibrary
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated September 17, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion
for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties' respective
motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
.subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the
original)
cralawlawlibrary
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and
approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans
alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for
the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the
pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are]
intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of." 44cralawred
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing
worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for
issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for
payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against
respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised
against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the
disbarment charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when
she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot
be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; 47 it is serious or
gross when it is flagrant.48cralawred
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined
and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from
Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her
liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show
checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for
P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that
there was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved
the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only. 54 Mary Jane merely claimed that
she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita and Atty. De
Vera.55cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending"
her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is
presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value
that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him.'"57cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

...

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in
character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. 49(Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for
the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property
subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as
counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel.
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would
accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the
minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February
2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s
collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue
misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in
the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa
was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284.
The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there
was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as
well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated
that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the
notices and pleadings would not reach him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging
Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted
that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she
actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that
Macasieb was still working at Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a
Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela
Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to
illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa’s connivance
with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD
gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his
signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the
time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On
26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente’s suspension to six
months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the signature in
the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were
not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of
Governors denied Busmente’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court
further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded
on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on
his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself
as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly
or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s
staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet,
Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s
office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb
left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December
2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the
preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela
Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI
report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures
submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only
submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that
there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and
Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14
August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of
the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other
documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know
about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted
the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith
that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic),
she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she
filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not present, to
wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
 4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of
facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the
instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been
unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed
her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal
assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he
allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente
was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO A.C. No. 6116, 1
August 2012
Facts:
According to complainant, respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to
10%, of the attorney’s fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Yap whom he referre
d, in an action for partition of the estate of the spouses relative. Their agreement was reflected in
a letter dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission not
withstanding receipt of attorney’s fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P 40 million.
Instead, he was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the s
ame after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney’s fees from 25% to 17%. He then demand
ed the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards requir
ed of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and coh
abited with another with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in
money-lending business without the required authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas
In his defense, he disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Ya
p assumed to pay.
Ruling:
Respondent’s defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was b
elied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant’s com
mission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for lega
l services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in
the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to coha
bit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character
as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled r
ule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considere
d disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, SC find no r
eason to disturb the IBP’s finding that respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Can
on 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or de
ceitful conduct.”
However, SC find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently es
tablished.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO was found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and
SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, CompIaint vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6116
Facts:
According to complainant, respondent promised to give him 20% commission, which later
reduced to 10%, of the attorney’s fees that he would receive in representing Spouses Yap whom he
referred. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required
of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with another with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging
in money-lending business without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
Issue:
Whether or not dividing commission with a non-lawyer is proper.
Held:
No. Respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from
dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO was found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and
SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR.
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the
Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his
name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some
minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by
his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has
read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading,
it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to
the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v.
Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.
RODRIGO TAPAY vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013, 674 SCRA 1
FACTS: A complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document and graft and
corrupt practices was filed against Tapay before the Office of the Ombudsman by a certain
Divinagracia. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had to meet him
yet in person and his signature appearing in the complaint against Tapay was signed by his
secretary in his law office.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bancolo violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
responsibility.
HELD: YES. With Atty. Bancolo’s admission that the complaint he filed against Tapay before the
Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office is clearly a
violation of Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides in Canon 9 that
“A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly, Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of Law” and Rule
9.01 which states that “a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.”
The lawyer’s duty to prevent or at the very least not to assist in the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individual found only qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred in the law is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice of law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-
lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017
LITO V. BUENVIAJE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint dated December 28, 2007 filed by Lito
Buenviaje1 (Buenviaje) against respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo (Atty. Magdamo),
docketed as A.C. No. 11616 for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the instant Complaint dated December 28, 2007, Buenviaje alleged that he was married to
the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued Marriage Contract Register No. 87-
13503-A.2 Fe died on September 17, 2007.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed
a criminal case for bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a
certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making him guilty of bigamy.
In an attempt to protect the rights and interests of his clients in securing the monies of their
sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor 3 dated October
11, 2007 to the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe
appeared to have a joint account. The pertinent portion of said Notice reads as follows:
"x x x x
FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in Switzerland
whose lifetime savings is now in an account in BPI-Dagupan. She came back to the Philippines
to spend the last days of her life with her family in San Fabian, Pangasinan.
Unfortunately, while she was terminally ill and while residing in Manila so as to be near
Saint Luke's Hospital, a clever swindler by the name of LITO BUENVIAJE made it
appear on spurious documents that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and
in fact LITO BUENVIAJE is married to AMALIA VALERA.
xxxx
Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V. BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from justice
as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus Lito
Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila.
xxxx
Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life. x x x" (Emphasis ours)
Aggrieved, Buenviaje filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Magdamo for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 , Rule 7.03 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Buenviaje averred that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death of Depositor dated
October 11, 2007 sent to the BPI-Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully and maliciously quoted the
following statements: (1) "a clever swindler by the name of Lito Buenviaje made it appear on
spurious document that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact Lito Buenviaje
is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since August 24, 2007, Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive
from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus
Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of Manila", and (3) "Fe
never had a husband or child in her entire life" to his prejudice.
Buenviaje alleged that he discovered the Notice's existence sometime in December 2007 when
he inquired about the remaining balance of his joint account with Fe. He lamented that he was
shocked upon reading the letter and felt humiliated at the words written against him as the
bank manager and the other bank personnel might have really thought that he was a swindler
and a fugitive from justice.4
Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation that Fe was never married as they were in fact
married in a public civil rites in the presence of many relatives of Fe. As to his alleged marriage
with a certain Amalia Valera, Buenviaje admitted that he had extramarital relationship with her
and that they had two (2) sons. When they separated and he subsequently worked overseas, it
did not stop him from fulfilling his responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was then advised
to remit money to Amalia but he was told that he needed a marriage contract to be able to do
so, thus, he asked someone to make a marriage contract for remittance purposes and that he
was told that there would be no record of it. Buenviaje claimed that at that time, he really
believed that no valid marriage took place between him and Amalia and that he was single up to
the time he married Fe.
Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo employed dirty and dishonest means and tactics to
ensure that BPI will prevent him from withdrawing money from the joint account that he has
with his late wife. He averred that in referring to him as a "swindler", Atty. Magdamo succeeded
in intimidating BPI-Dagupan into extrajudicially "freezing" the joint account and in not
transacting with him.
Buenviaje also pointed out that Atty. Magdamo, in referring to him as a fugitive from justice, in
effect, made BPI-Dagupan believe that a criminal complaint was already pending against him
when in truth and in fact, the August 24, 2007 complaint for bigamy filed by Lydia and Florenia
was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila at the time that they wrote
and served the Notice to BPI-Dagupan.
Buenviaje further added that Atty. Magdamo even made threats to him as evidenced by his text
messages to him, to wit: "Sometime in the morning of 1 October 2007, I sent text messages to
Lito's last known Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) number (+639062097612) requesting him to
stop his merciless plunder and to voluntarily surrender to the rule of law."
Finally, Buenviaje questioned Atty. Magdamo's fitness to continue in the practice of law as he
has displayed lack of ability to distinguish a fugitive from justice and a respondent in a criminal
investigation; employed of dirty and unprofessional tactics of calling him a "swindler"; and by
referring to his marriage contract with his wife as "spurious document". He, thus, prayed that
considering Atty. Magdamo's actuations, he should be disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law.
On January 9, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed Atty. Magdamo
to submit his answer on the complaint against him.5
In its Report and Recommendation6 dated October 23, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that
Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his unethical actuations.
However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-717 dated
October 10, 2014, resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead suspend Atty. Magdamo from the practice of law
for three (3) months.7
Aggrieved, Atty. Magdamo moved for reconsideration. However, in Resolution No. XXII-2016-
3268 dated May 28, 2016, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to deny Atty. Magdamo's motion
for reconsideration and affirm the latter's suspension.
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
In the instant case, Atty. Magdamo's actuations do not measure up to this Canon. The records
show that he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice
for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities. Even if he was
suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have refrained from making such malicious reference or
name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that the mere filing of a complaint against a person
does not guarantee a finding of guilt, and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty. Here, other than the criminal complaint for bigamy which Fe's siblings filed before the
prosecutor's office, there were no other cases decided against Buenviaje.
Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that
said imputation was made in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe's
siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just informed BPI-Dagupan of the death of its client and
that there is a pending litigation regarding their client's estate, and he did not have to resort to
name-calling and make unnecessary commentaries in order to support his cause. Undoubtedly,
his malicious imputation against Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was unnecessarily exposed to
humiliation and shame even as there was no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.
Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage
documents of Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a
husband or child in her entire life". He should know better that without the courts'
pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to draw conclusions and pass judgment as to
the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. That is not his job to
do. While his statements in the Notice given to BPI-Dagupan might be prompted by a good
cause, it were nevertheless careless, premature and without basis. At the very least, Atty.
Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis ours)
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been
a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People vs. Lito
Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila". Upon review, it
appears that case number 7H-103365 is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings filed against
Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the
subjects statement in the Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there was no final resolution yet
from the prosecutor's office, no case has yet to be filed in the courts, there was no warrant of
arrest against Buenviaje, and more importantly, there was no evidence that Buenviaje had any
intent to flee prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the proceedings
hereto. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. 9 As to
why Atty. Magdamo made such malicious statements is beyond this Court's comprehension.
We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements by an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's
oath and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics.10 The Court has constantly
reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of
our legal system.11 Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Magdamo
ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession
in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.12
In this case, Atty. Magdamo's statements against Buenviaje were not only improper but it also
undoubtedly tended to mislead BPI-Dagupan into thinking that the latter is a swindler and a
fugitive as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary
support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.
As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos.
145817 & 145822:13
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their
cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or
even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of
the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause
with which they are charged. (emphasis ours)
Finally, it must be emphasized anew that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have
the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. However, a client's
cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. 14 The lawyer's
duty to its clients must never be at the expense of truth and justice. As explained in Choa v.
Chiongson:15
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's case with the end in
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as it appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within
the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.
Based on the foregoing, We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and
disrespectful language in his Notice addressed to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8
and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his actions erode the public's perception of
the legal profession. We, thus, sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of
Governors.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 08-2141
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Magdamo's personal record as an attorney with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.

SO ORDERED.