CASE#1

[A.C. No. 2349. July 3, 1992.]

DOROTHY B. TERRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, Respondent.

Public Attorney’s Office for complainant.

SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT; PENALTY OF DISBARMENT IMPOSED
IN CASE AT BAR. — We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had
cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own
child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to
the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM, J.:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant
remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court’s Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such
that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is
after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent’s success in
evading service of the complaint and the Court’s Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty.
Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in
the instant case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977
upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain
Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove
him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A.
Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good
faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at
Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that
Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason’s Birth Certificate and physical resemblance
to Respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the
fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.chanrobles law library
The Court denied respondent’s Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred, by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another
hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not
appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still
another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail
once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and
declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.
The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met
for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she
was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital
status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p.
10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he
[respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first
cousins (ibid. p . 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-
laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant’s]
objection, he [respondent] wrote ‘single’ as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there
was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the
City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on
June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent]
disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that
respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of
the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case
for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a
prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative
case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated from the
service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29)." 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage
on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscila Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981,
respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondent’s prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of
nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio
(Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the Respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded
as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted,
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent
went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent’s parents.
After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a
hospital.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not
only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9 .
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does
not speak well of respondent’s moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code)." 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made
"a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his
studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . ." The Court held
such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first
place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant’s Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall
be circularized to all the courts of the land.
CASE#2
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower
court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76
with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she
has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-
month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered
that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother
Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the
possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and
effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void
marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being
void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that
private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited
cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that may
be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the
absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground
that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no
identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for
separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent
distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital
relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order
to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together
with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that private
respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their
marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in
refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer,
proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether
the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and
personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People v. Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous
marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had
earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is
noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is
not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus,
in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the
nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting
the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of
her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime
of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there
was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other,
for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring
the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it
is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage
and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in
some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be
made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable
marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice
Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they
change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is
void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void
and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed.
Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated
that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof.
Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void
marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage.
He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista.
He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab
initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in
turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same
can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's
theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed,
the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need
for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it
finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause
"on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a
party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage
which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only
legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception
of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as
diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily
verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of
the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and
annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable
her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy
stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner
suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged
to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere
special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition,
he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties
were acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one
of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason
that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and
the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in
a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their
nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action
or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family
Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully
discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity)
and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and
recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the
judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership
of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage
settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been
extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological
incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long
and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.

# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in
a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their
nullity, except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party thereto was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action
or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family
Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully
discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the consequences of a valid
marriage, saving only specific instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity)
and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and
recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the
judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership
of gain under the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage
settlement), will apply; instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional
effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been
extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term "psychological
incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long
and literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.

CASE#3
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he
is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did
not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of
his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for
him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his
arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of
the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De
Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations,
14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he
went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad
faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no
duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing
v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#4
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting
way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.
He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner)
received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner
failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster
her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN
NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees
in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS
TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages
in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits”
of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according
to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions
in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig,
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased
as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article
147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only
one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death
benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining
to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established
by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether
as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in
the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed
by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution
in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

CASE#5
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months ofprision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to
get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day ofPrision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt
him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since
no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to
be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis
for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria,
joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was
validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL.
817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held
that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner
was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether
all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of
bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC
of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered
into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local
Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the
law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from
the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#6
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet
Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract
as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son.
The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his
lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law
Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother
replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that
she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but
when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December
1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6,
1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis
to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief on the part
of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case of the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that
his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil
Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already
dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of
whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion
only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent.
. . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to look for her I could
not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London and Liverpool,
for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in England, the port where his ship
docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay
City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent
error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were
all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence
cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before,
there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place
of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . .
. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave
the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an
ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas the strongest
interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution
there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

CASE#7
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13
January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and
Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all
the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been
dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought
priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent
Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein
petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant case despite the fact that the
controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-
appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed
decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal
partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's
estate as of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her husband's estate, and
Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of
Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to determine
who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the decision of the
trial court is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law
in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of
the Family Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which
provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than
seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions
from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be
held valid, the spouse present(not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good
faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of
the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find
these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of
proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had
been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code,
should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James
Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property
regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right
of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to
the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles
and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who
predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia
who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only
as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of
the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#8
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877,
affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel
where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on
several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to
build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce
and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo,
he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he
stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in
Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the
marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations
Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa,
but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he
noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He
did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00
by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant
had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the
time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.
He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally
liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of
his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts
ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further
posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State
and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought
the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of
the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention
of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent spouse. The
appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] andDomingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its
ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect,
as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said
Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE
CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21
years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that,
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not
he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers
to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to
prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule
therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it
require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He
further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is
in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law
were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an
absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is
that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential
element of a felony bydolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of
bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical
effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three
(3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting
the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all
codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no
crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if
this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage
in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed
since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the
crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article
3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such
phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from
which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law
that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was
not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on
the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present,
as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged
and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order,
comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that
the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the
first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To
sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make
the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be
treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known
for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41
of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the
Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this
Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law
and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and
comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantumonly, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that
proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring
a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the
Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court
reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings is erroneous and
should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not
been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court
proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second
marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial
decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith
will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give
rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent
spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will
have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first
ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because
with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With
the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some
cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was
held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that
there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which,
however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed.
In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to
prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court
ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil
de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato,
y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para
adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers
that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award
for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any
reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion,
relation, etc.)[68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may
be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to
the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article
21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that
he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made
the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even
stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner
heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of
being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband.[72]

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain
any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p.
38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound
to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.,
supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant
publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific
headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298
(App. Div.[74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right
of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such
act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the
plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact
that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said
to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an
injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8
Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by
herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in
other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash.
626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and
that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal
on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to
be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CASE#9
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which
dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the
petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They
had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On
January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40,
against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a
plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the
petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together
with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all
improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the
petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent
vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the
petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by
substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons
and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6,
1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the
herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons.
Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to
Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said
date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no
objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting
the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality
of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No.
NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent
committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a
resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and
in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According
to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure
a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the
service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio
M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the
order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and
(2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis
for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that
she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the
affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by
petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition
is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition
in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer
available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only
available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was
null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether
there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the
Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or
final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of
hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or
relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own.
The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in
the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits
thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not
be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she
received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the
fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material
allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662
were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause
of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of
the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments
therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of
the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She
claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however,
failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima
facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person
of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed
against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or
the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case
against him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the
summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected
by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him
and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should
be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because
substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of
summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc.
No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff
on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable
time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that
Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas,
where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the
complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the
said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the
adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since
then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see
me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read.
Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my
father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the
amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. However,
we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that
for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent
herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no
objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-
parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The
actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9,
Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the
Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a
true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such
party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13,
2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-
G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of
this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#10
[G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003]
JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, petitioner, vs. MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Due process is the very essence of justice itself. Where the rule of law is the bedrock of our free society, justice is its
very lifeblood. Denial of due process is thus no less than a denial of justice.[1]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Decision[2] dated July 13, 2001 and the Resolution[3] dated August 30, 2001, both rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64733, Margie Corpus Macias vs. Hon. Wilfredo G. Ochotorena and Hon. Judge Mariano
Joaquin S. Macias.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On February 6, 2001, Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Margie Corpus Macias
(herein respondent), docketed as Civil Case No. S-695.
The sheriff exerted earnest efforts to personally serve copies of the summons and complaint upon the respondent,
but to no avail. Hence, the trial court, upon petitioners motion, issued an Order dated March 7, 2001 directing that
summons be effected by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zamboanga del Norte
and the twin cities of Dapitan and Dipolog and thereafter requiring the respondent to file her answer within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
Subsequently, the summons and complaint were published in the March 11 to 17, 2001 issues of the Dipolog-based
newspaper Tingog Peninsula.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the following grounds: (1) the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the trial court has no
jurisdiction because it is not among those designated to act as a family court under Resolution A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC;
and (3) the parties failed to resort to barangay conciliation prior to the filing of the petition.
On April 19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion to dismiss. Incidentally, in the same
Order, the trial court granted respondents request (via long distance telephone call) to set the hearing on April 30,
2001.
The hearing set on April 30, 2001 was cancelled for failure of respondent and counsel as well as the expert witness to
appear. On the same day, the trial court issued an Order setting the hearing anew on May 2 and 3,
2001. Respondent received a copy of this Order only on May 8, 2001. Thus, when the case was called for hearing as
scheduled, respondent and counsel, not being duly notified, did not appear. Surprisingly, the trial court allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
After the petitioner rested his case, the trial court issued an Order dated May 3, 2001 (1) directing the public
prosecutor to submit a Certification containing his assent or opposition to the petition; (2) directing the petitioner
and the public prosecutor to submit their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days;
and (3) declaring the case submitted for decision.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case had been submitted for decision, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying her motion to dismiss. The trial court merely noted the
motion for reconsideration in his Order dated May 16, 2001.
Consequently, on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction challenging the trial courts Order
dated April 19, 2001 which denied her motion to dismiss; and Order dated April 30, 2001 cancelling the April 30,
2001 hearing and resetting it on May 2 and 3, 2001.
Acting thereon, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, enjoined the trial court from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. S-695.
Meanwhile, on May 15, 2001 or barely twelve (12) days from submission of the case for decision, the trial court
rendered its Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage between the parties on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of herein respondent. Thereupon, she filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion has not
been acted upon.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting respondents petition for certiorari,
thus:
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the Petitioner was deprived, by the Respondent Court, of her
right to due process enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, via its Orders,Annexes L and O of the
Petition, and its Decision.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present recourse, the hearings of the complaint of the Private Respondent, on its merits, before the issues
were joined was a farce, a blatant transgression by the Respondents of the fundamental right of the Petitioner to
due process. Taking stock of the antecedental milieu in the present recourse, We are convinced, beyond cavil, that
either the Respondent Court was ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure or if he was aware of said Rules
as he should, he simply ignored the same, ran roughshod over the rights of the Petitioner, railroaded the hearing of
the case and rendered judgment even before the Petitioner had the opportunity to defend herself and adduce her
evidence.
xxxxxxxxx
There is no evidence on record when the Petitioner was served with the complaint and summons by registered
mail. However, the Petitioner learned of the complaint and summons about the first week of April, 2001 on the basis
of the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the Tingog Peninsula. Even if the thirty-day period fixed by the Respondent Court
was reckoned from the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the Tingog Peninsula, the Petitioner had until April 16, 2001
within which to file a Motion to Dismiss under Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an
Answer to the complaint. However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to
suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying
theMotion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Petitioner
had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the
complaint:
xxxxxxxxx
The Petitioner may file a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order conformably with Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court.
Until then, a hearing of the case on its merits is impermissible and a travesty. However, even before the Petitioner
could be served with a copy of the order of the Respondent Court (Annex L of the Petition) denying her Motion to
Dismiss, the Respondent Court proceeded with the hearing of the case on its merits and received the evidence of the
Private Respondent on May 2 and 3, 2001. As it was, Petitioner, through counsel, received only on May 3, 2001 the
Order of the Respondent Court (Annex L of the Petition) denying her Motion to Dismiss and, on May 5, 2001, the
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Respondent Court, dated April 19, 2001.
What is so trite is that the Respondent Court violated its own Order dated February 27, 2001, declaring that the
hearing of the case on its merits will ensue only after the Petitioner shall have filed her Answerto the complaint.
Equally worrisome is the fact that the Petitioner reminded the Respondent Court, in her Manifestation and Motion,
dated April 18, 2001, that the case was not ripe for hearing on its merits and prayed that the hearing of the case on
its merits be suspended until after final resolution by the Respondent Court of her Motion to Dismiss:
xxxxxxxxx
Even if the Petitioner failed to file her Answer to the complaint, after the period therefor had lapsed, the
Respondent Court was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. This is so because Section 3 (e),
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that:
(c) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that
the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (idem, supra.)
The Report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non to further proceedings of the case on its merits. The
Respondent Court ignored the aforequoted Rule. It bears stressing that the Petitioner had already filed her Motion
to Dismiss and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.
xxxxxxxxx
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The hearings of the case on the
merits on May 2 and 3, 2001, including the Decision of the Respondent Court, are NULLIFIED. The Respondent Court
is hereby ordered to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner dated May 5, 2001, after the Private
Respondent shall have filed his Comment orOpposition to said motion and, thereafter, to proceed with the case as
provided for by the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
From the said Decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner vehemently asserts that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that the trial court deprived
respondent of her right to due process; and in nullifying, not only the May 2 and 3, 2001 hearings, but also the trial
courts Decision dated May 15, 2001.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
This Court will not countenance a denial of ones fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our
legal system.[4]
In the case at bar, the trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of due process enshrined in our
Constitution. Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural rules.
More to the point, the trial court, without even waiting for respondents motion for reconsideration of the April 19,
2001 Order denying her motion to dismiss, hurriedly set the case for hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent
to file her answer to the petition and knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet, the trial court hastily authorized
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.
Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, where the defending party fails to
file his or her answer to the petition, the trial court should order the prosecutor to intervene for the State by
conducting an investigation to determine whether or not there was collusion between the parties. Here, the trial
court disregarded such procedure. Obviously, the summary proceeding is a patent nullity.
And assuming arguendo that there was an answer filed by the respondent, still, the hearing of the case on May 2 and
3, 2001 is a procedural flaw. As stated at the outset, respondent received the notice of hearing only on May 8,
2001. So how could she be present in court on May 2 and 3?
We are convinced that respondents fundamental right to due process was blatantly transgressed by the trial
court. And resultantly, the proceedings conducted, including the trial courts Decision, are void for lack of due
process.
We have consistently held that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of
the government the impress of nullity. [5]
In Uy vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that (a) decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party (as in this
case) is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either
directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where
it is invoked.[6]
Indeed, in depriving respondent her constitutional and procedural right to due process, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion. It is, therefore, imperative that the instant case for declaration of nullity of marriage be
litigated anew in accordance with the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001 and Resolution dated August 30, 2001
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#11
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years
ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint
or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her
desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with another case3 filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation
rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify
the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without
requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and their lawyers to
initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of
October 11, 2000.10
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio
be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her arguments that
have been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have
her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were
illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She
claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of
Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and
control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had
no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court
so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or
not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed
out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason
why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the
lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over
again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We
agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and
board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest
in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by
the death of subject.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#12
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C.
TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A.
COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No.
4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its
subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on
October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,7 the latter's
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the
store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia
Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11another
niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said
she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that
Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.14 Cirila
testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for
the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and
he became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from
his lot near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her
family with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall
be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under
this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an
application for a business permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the
signature "Cirila Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the
signature "Cirila Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A.
Comille" written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page
No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the
Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within
thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As
already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia,
Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a
pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the
fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is
not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain
of circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent or
hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243
and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39
SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there
is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.27 It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both
parties, the general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct
indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a business
permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,34 and the death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's
common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of
rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not
demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to
the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is
void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#13
G.R. No. 120154 June 29, 1998
HEIRS OF SPOUSES BENITO GAVINO and JUANA EUSTE represented by AMPARO G. PESEBRE and BELEN G.
VERCELUZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JUANA VDA. DE AREJOLA represented by FLAVIA REYES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In a conflict of rights over registered land subject of intestate proceedings which is sold without express authority of
the court, which right should prevail: those of the innocent purchasers for value in good faith, or those of the heirs of
the estate?
This petition emanates from a case for Annulment of Fraudulent Sales of Registered Property with Reconveyance and
for Damages filed in 1968 with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), Naga City, by Juana Vda. de
Arejola, Justiniano R. Exequiel and Dominador Aureas, as administrators of the Intestate Estate of Luis P. Arejola,
against Atty. Jacobo Briones and his spouse Natividad Olivan, and the spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste. 1
In 1976 the original records of the case were burned in a fire which gutted the old Provincial Capitol Building housing
Branch 22 of the court. 2 The records were eventually reconstituted although partially. Five (5) judges successively
presided over the case: Judges Delfin Vir. Sunga, Jorge S. Imperial, Juan B. Montecillo, Ignacio S. Calleja, Jr., and
Angel S. Malaya. Several substitutions of counsel also took place. In 1977 plaintiff Juana Vda. de Arejola died.
Defendants Jacobo Briones and the Gavino spouses also died some years later.
Culled from the reconstituted records, in 1953 a parcel of land measuring 9.3540 hectares covered by TCT No. 896 of
the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur and originally registered in the name of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) 3 was sold by the corporation on installment basis to Luis P. Arejola under a Deed of Conditional
Sale. The vendee however died on 25 September 1958 without completing his payments. 4
Subsequently, a petition for settlement of his intestate estate was commenced by his surviving spouse Juana Vda. de
Arejola who on 11 October 1958 was appointed special administratrix and on 2 February 1959 as regular
administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. R-9 (771). Atty. Jacobo Briones was engaged as lawyer of the estate. 5 However, the lot
purchased from the RFC was not included in the inventory of properties submitted by Juana to the intestate court,
although she reserved the right to include in the list all other properties belonging to her husband's estate that
would come later to her knowledge. 6
In April 1960, after being informed that the land bought by her deceased husband from the RFC was about to be
foreclosed for non-payment of amortizations, Juana made arrangements with the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), successor in interest of RFC, to save the property. After proper negotiations, she executed with the
bank a "Revival and Re-amortization of Deed of Conditional Sale" and signed the document in her own behalf as
vendee and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. This transaction in effect revived the
conditional sale entered into by the RFC with her husband Luis 7 with the imprimatur of the intestate court. 8
On 3 September 1962 Juana was granted judicial authority to sell properties of the decedent's estate. However, with
her removal as administratrix on 3 October 1962, this authority became functus oficio.
On 14 February 1963, armed with the authority to sell earlier granted to her by the court, without revealing however
that her appointment as adminstratrix had already been revoked, Juana sold to the Gavino spouses the subject
property by way of pacto de retro for P6,650.00. 9
Meanwhile, upon full payment to DBP of the purchase price, a final Deed of Sale was executed on 15 February 1963
between Juana and DBP which resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 896 and the issuance of TCT No. 4873 in the
name of Juana Vda. de Arejola. 10 On 6 March 1963, despite her earlier sale of the land to the Gavino spouses, Juana
fictitiously sold the same property to the estate's lawyer, Atty. Jacobo Briones, so that the latter could secure a
mortgage thereon in her behalf. 11 At any rate, the sale to Atty. Briones was registered; accordingly, TCT No. 4873
was cancelled and TCT No. 4874 was issued in the name of Atty. Jacobo Briones. 12
On 22 April 1963 Juana Vda. de Arejola asked for and was given by the Gavino spouses an additional amount of
P1,000.00 and a new deed of pacto de retro with option to buy was executed thus formalizing the earlier sale to the
spouses and indicating therein the actual purchase price of P7,650.00. However, the certificate of title described in
the contract of sale was still TCT No. 896 13 despite the fact that it had already been cancelled and substituted by TCT
No. 4873 in the name of Juana, and then by TCT No. 4874 in favor of Atty. Jacobo Briones.
On 18 July 1963 Atty. Briones mortgaged the property to PNB for P4,000.00, 14 and a month later, the amount was
increased by P700.00. 15
On 15 October 1963 Atty. Briones sold the property to the Gavino spouses. The latter alleged that they were
constrained to buy the land because of their apprehension that they might lose their earlier investment of P7,650.00
on the same land under the sale by Juana in their favor on 22 April 1963. As a consequence, TCT No. 4874 was
cancelled and TCT No. 5244 was issued in the name of Benito Gavino married to Juana Euste. 16
On 12 January 1968 Juana Vda. de Arejola together with the other judicial administrators of the estate of Luis P.
Arejola, namely, Justiniano Exequiel and Dominador Aureas, manifesting that all of the foregoing sales executed by
Juana were done without judicial authority to sell through the manipulations of Atty. Briones who acted for his own
benefit, filed the instant case against him, his wife and the Gavino spouses.
On 31 March 1969, during the pendency of the case, one Sulpicio Lovendino filed a complaint-in-intervention
alleging that on 25 February 1969 the property was sold to him by the Gavino spouses for P15,000.00 and that by
virtue thereof TCT No. 5244 was cancelled and TCT No. 10503 was issued in his name. 17
After Lovendino died his heirs manifested that they were not interested in substituting him because the lot had
already been sold to a certain Gerardo Pesebre in 1971. 18 Be that as it may, it is undisputed that the property is now
in the hands of Amparo Gavino Pesebre and Belen Gavino Verceluz, daughters of the spouses Benito Gavino and
Juana Euste.
On the basis of the antecedent facts a decision was rendered by the trial court on 29 August 1991 declaring the sales
of the land to defendant spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste valid and lawful. It ordered that in the final
distribution of the intestate estate of Luis P. Arejola the subject property be excluded from the estate chargeable
however against Juana Vda. de Arejola's share, interest and participation therein, and that the Gavino spouses be
granted attorney's fees of P5,000.00. 19
The plaintiffs (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of Appeals asserting in the main that the sale of the
property by Juana Vda. de Arejola and Atty. Jacobo Briones to the Gavino spouses was invalid and unlawful so that
the property must be included in the final distribution of the intestate estate of Luis P. Arejola. 20
Respondent appellate court upheld the validity of the sale to the Gavinos but only insofar as the individual share of
Juana Vda. de Arejola was
concerned. 21 Consequently, the two (2) daughters of Benito Gavino, namely, Amparo G. Pesebre and Belen G.
Verceluz, then already the registered owners of the property, were ordered to convey the remaining undivided
portion thereof to the estate of Luis P. Arejola, retaining in their name only the undivided portion equivalent to the
share of his widow Juana. It also directed the estate of Luis P. Arejola to refund to the Gavino spouses a
proportionate share of the amount of P7,650.00 which they paid to Juana for the land. The appellate court denied
the claim for damages and deleted the award of attorney's fees.
Petitioners now pray for the adjudication of the entire lot to them, Juana Vda. de Arejola being the sole owner of the
property as evidenced by the transfer certificates of title shown to them and, consequently, had full authority to sell
or otherwise dispose of it. They also ask that since they simply relied on the information contained in the certificates
of title they should be declared innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. 22
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that the entire lot should be considered part of the estate of Luis P. Arejola
because the sale by Juana Vda. de Arejola to the Gavinos was invalid considering that the property was incustodia
legis and could not be disposed of without the imprimatur of the intestate court. They suggest that Juana was a
victim of the malicious machinations of the estate's counsel, Atty. Jacobo Briones. 23
We do not agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals nor of the Regional Trial Court that the contested parcel of
land belonged entirely to Luis P. Arejola, ergo, formed part of his estate. In the proceedings before the trial court,
plaintiffs presented the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by the RFC describing vendee Luis P. Arejola asmarried to
Juana Arejola, ineluctably showing that he acquired his right over the land during his marriage to Juana. This being
the case, the land is presumed to be conjugal, hence, Art. 160 24 of the New Civil Code will have to be applied, i.e., all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although this presumption is rebuttable, it can only be overcome by
strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In the case at bar, the quantum
of proof demanded by law has not been satisfied. For nowhere in the exhibits presented by both parties,
documentary or testimonial, has it been demonstrated that the land in question was inherited by Luis nor acquired
by him with his own capital or exclusive funds. The presumption not having been overthrown, the conclusion is that
the contested land is conjugal property.
It is this conjugal nature of the property that vested in Juana Vda. de Arejola, as surviving co-owner, the right to
agree to a revival of the conditional sale. This should explain why the Deed of Revival and Re-amortization of
Conditional Sale was signed by her not only as administratrix of her husband's estate but also in her own behalf.
There should be no doubt that the property in question is not entirely owned by the estate of Luis for what rightfully
belongs to it is only one-half, the other half being Juana's share as conjugal partner. It must be recalled that when
Juana and the DBP (formerly RFC) agreed on reviving the conditional sale, Juana was still the administratrix of the
intestate estate. Thus, where an executor or administrator receives by virtue of his representative capacity property
to which the decedent became entitled after his death, he holds such property as asset of the estate and is liable
therefor in his representative capacity. 25 He cannot acquire by purchase, even by public auction, the property of the
estate under his administration. 26 Consequently, with regard to the portion of land held by Juana for the estate of
her late husband in her capacity as administratrix, she had no right to acquire ownership over it and have the entire
lot titled in her name alone.
After the DBP had been fully paid the purchase price of the property Juana Vda. de Arejola ceased to be the
administratrix of the estate. As a result, if that portion of the land pertaining to the share of Luis in the conjugal
partnership had been held by Juana beyond the period of her judicial administration she only did so in trust for the
estate. 27 But this trust was breached when after the land had been fully paid for, Juana deliberately caused the
issuance of a new certificate of title in her name as sole owner thereby depriving the estate of Luis P. Arejola of its
rightful share therein.
Private respondents insist that the sale of the land by Juana Vda. de Arejola to the Gavino spouses was illegal and
invalid because her lawyer, Atty. Jacobo Briones, manipulated her into selling the property. This is difficult to accept.
The evidence on record shows that while Juana may have been improperly and improvidently advised by her lawyer
on the matter, the ultimate decision was still hers. It was with full knowledge and consent that she entered into the
sale transaction with the Gavinos.
The claim of respondents that the invalidity of the sale is aggravated by the absence of judicial imprimatur cannot be
sustained. If the sale was without judicial approval, it could only be attributable to Juana's own fault because she
knew very well that she was no longer administratrix of the estate and therefore could not be empowered by the
intestate court to sell the property. And yet, despite this knowledge, she proceeded with the sale. Justice and reason
therefore dictate that she, not the Gavinos, should suffer the consequences of her foolhardy act. Aproposto this, we
quote the findings of the Regional Trial Court 28 —
. . . . the vendee Gavino acted in good faith when he purchased the subject property from one who Gavino knows to
be an heir and entitled to a share of the land under administration, of course subject to the final distribution of the
estate . . . .
and the findings of the Court of Appeals 29 —
. . . . When they purchased the same from Juana R. vda. de Arejola, they were made to believe that she had court
authority to sell. They cannot be faulted for not knowing that the said authority had already lapsed. When they
purchased the same property from Atty. Jocobo Briones, to protect their investment as aforesaid, they relied on the
certificate of title in his name. Hence, it cannot be said that they were purchasers in bad faith.
The above factual findings of the courts below that the Gavinos were innocent purchasers for value cannot be
disturbed. It is axiomatic that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect and carry more weight
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 30
Insofar as the contract of sale executed by Atty. Briones in favor of the Gavinos is concerned, the Court of Appeals
also ruled that the vendee spouses could not be considered in bad faith for they simply relied on the vendor's
Torrens title. In so concluding, the appellate court considered three (3) varying situational accounts:
First, the Gavinos claimed that they employed adequate safeguards in verifying the real owner of the land by
checking with the PNB and the Register of Deeds. Benito Gavino recounted that Juana Vda. de Arejola always came
up with what appeared to him to be an alibi why she could not turn over to him the documents covering the land in
litigation. 31 In the first week of August 1963 Atty. Briones went to their house and asked them if it was true that they
bought the land from Juana by way of pacto de retro. When they confirmed that they did, Atty. Briones told them
that he was already the owner and, if they wanted, they could check with PNB and the Register of Deeds to ascertain
who the real owner was. 32
Upon verification with PNB, the Gavinos learned that the property was mortgaged with the bank to secure a loan of
P4,700.00 in the name of the registered owner, Atty. Jacobo Briones. The spouses also learned from the Register of
Deeds that the land was indeed registered in the name of Atty. Briones. Benito Gavino then approached Juana Vda.
de Arejola and asked her why the property that was already sold to them by way of pacto de retro was also sold to
Atty. Briones, but the latter simply assured him that she would take care of the matter including the P7,650.00 which
the Gavinos gave her in consideration of the sale. 33
In October of 1963 Atty. Briones approached the Gavinos and told them that he wanted to sell the land. Petitioner
Gavino went to his lawyer, a certain Atty. Catimbang, and explained the matter to him. Atty. Catimbang told him that
the papers appeared to be in order so petitioners could buy the property if they had the money. Upon this advice,
the Gavinos bought the property. The parties agreed on the purchase price of P14,350.00 with Gavino imposing the
condition that the mortgage indebtedness of P4,700.00 be deducted from the
consideration. 34
Second, Atty. Briones alleged that Atty. Catimbang, then representing the Gavinos, informed him that the property
mortgaged by him with the PNB was also sold to the Gavinos. 35 Thereafter, Atty. Briones went to see Juana Vda. de
Arejola and recommended to her that to avoid an estafa suit the sale should be consolidated in the name of the
Gavinos provided the latter assumed the mortgage indebtedness, to which the widow agreed. For purposes of
convenience, Atty. Briones was designated as vendor instead of Juana because at this point the latter no longer had
the personality to sell. 36
Third, Juana Vda. de Arejola claimed that she was a victim of the manipulative designs of Atty. Briones and the
Gavino spouses. But her acts and omissions adequately supported by evidence demonstrate that she had a hand in
the transactions that transpired. It seems reasonable therefore to infer that the sale by Juana to Atty. Briones was
only simulated in order for the latter to mortgage the same with the PNB for Juana's own benefit after she had sold
the property by pacto de retro to the Gavinos.
We are convinced, more than ever, that all the problems over the land were caused by Atty. Jacobo Briones and the
widow, Juana Vda. de Arejola, whom Atty. Briones described as "always strapped for cash and living beyond her
means." 37 As admitted by him in his testimony, this was not the first time that he entered into shady deals with and
for the widow. 38
In determining whether the Gavinos were purchasers in good faith, we call to mind the edict in Fule v. de Legare39 —
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price of the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.Good faith consists in an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (emphasis supplied).
When the Gavinos learned that after all Atty. Briones' predecessor in interest was Juana Vda. de Arejola, a person
known to be an heir of her late husband Luis P. Arejola and a logical transferee of the property, the Gavinos could
not have sensed any foul play. In fact, despite such knowledge, they checked with Juana herself who confirmed
having sold the land to Atty. Briones. The transfer certificate of title covering the land was in the name of Atty.
Briones. The tax declarations were in the name of Juana Vda. de Arejola and, later, in the name of Atty. Jacobo
Briones. 40 The records with PNB and the Register of Deeds, as already adverted to, confirmed that Atty. Briones was
the registered owner of the land. The Gavinos also sought the advice of Atty. Catimbang who found all the papers to
be in order and consequently advised them to buy the land.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Gavinos did not exert efforts to ascertain the legality and fairness
of the transaction they entered into. According to the Court of Appeals, citing Macquiling v. Umadhay, 41
. . . 'she took all the necessary precautions to ascertain the true ownership of the property having engaged the
services of a lawyer for the specific purpose, and it was only after said counsel had assured her that everything was
in order did she make the final arrangements to purchase the property." The appellate court's conclusion that
respondent . . . was a purchaser in good faith and for value is correct, and the title she has thereby acquired is good
and indefeasible.
Resolving now the core issue, we hold that the rights of innocent purchasers for value should prevail. Even assuming
that the sale by Atty. Briones to the Gavinos was void — being based on a fictitious transfer from Juana to Atty.
Briones — as the former did not own the property in its entirety when sold, the general rule that the direct result of
a previous void contract cannot be valid, is inapplicable in this case as it will directly contravene the Torrens system
of registration. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. 42 The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The
sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under
the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued,
contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate
to determine the condition of the property. 43
The Court can do no less. The philosophy of the Torrens system must be upheld. The present registered owners of
the land cannot be disturbed in their ownership and possession thereof and be ordered to return the property for
inclusion in the final settlement of the intestate estate of Luis P. Arejola. It is for this reason that we cannot entirely
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. This is not to say however that Juana Vda. de Arejola is not liable to the
estate for willfully causing the transfer to her of the sole ownership of the entire land including that pertaining to the
share of her husband in their conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals awarding to petitioners only
a portion of the disputed property as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City awarding the entire property of 9.3540 hectares
originally covered by TCT No. 896 to the petitioners; declaring valid, lawful and binding the sale of subject parcel of
land to the late Luis P. Arejola and Juana Vda. de Arejola and later to petitioner Benito Gavino married to Juana
Euste; ordering the exclusion thereof in the final distribution of the estate of Luis P. Arejola in Sp. Proc. No. R-9 (771)
but chargeable against respondent Juana Vda. de Arejola's share, interest and participation in the estate; and,
granting to petitioners P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE#14
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered "for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in "Spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632, 1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal
partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the
debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a clear understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's
indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-
husband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled "Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May 12, 1982
was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case
No. 42228, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982
on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, 3 questioning the order of the lower court enjoining
the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower
court 4 from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondents-
spouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is granted and the challenged order of the respondent Judge
dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is hereby set aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as it seeks to
enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is
here made as to costs. . . . 5
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of
Rizal (Pasig) on the ground that the same had become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale.
Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among others, that where a third party who claim is
ownership of the property attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, two
(2) of the real properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits proceeded. Private respondents presented
several witnesses. On the other hand, petitioners did not present any evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void.
Petitioners appealed to the respondent court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the regional
trial court. It held that:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the New Civil Code or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice it
to say that the two provisions are substantially the same. Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the Family
Code is the applicable law on the matter . . . . . . .
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains . . . ." The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant
AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. 6
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the respondent court in a Resolution dated
November 28, 1994. 7
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal
partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband."
Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent court are as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE OBLIGATION INCURRED RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID NOT
REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT HUSBAND IN SECURING THE SUBJECT
LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS INDUSTRY, BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE SUPPORTS HIS FAMILY.
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of
the partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must
have contracted the debt "for the benefit of the partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership . . . .
There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" (on the one hand) and
"for the benefit of (on the other). The former require that actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires
only that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
whether or not actual benefit accrued. 8
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article
161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the
benefit of." On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs counter to the pronouncement of this Court
in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 9 that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not applicable in the case at bar. This Court
has, on several instances, interpreted the term "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmeña, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 12 and G-
Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 13 cited by the petitioners, we held that:
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes toward the support of his family, are not his personal and private debts, and the
products or income from the wife's own property, which, like those of her husband's, are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil Code), has a right to embark the partnership in
an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, and the fact that the wife may not approve of a venture does not make it
a private and personal one of the husband. (Abella de Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate
business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted
to the prejudice of his family. (G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance & Luzon Insurance Co., 14 Liberty Insurance
Corporation vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia, 16 cited by the respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the
payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty
agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the
family." (Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by the husband redounded to the benefit
of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for such
"debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as
a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial
stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation
will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
"obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the three other companion cases, on the one
hand, and that of Ansaldo, Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the husband contracted the
obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by
another for the latter's business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan
contracted on behalf of PBM. petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent
court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of petitioners-appellees — this despite the fact that the members
of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with
the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the
debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is apparent
from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of the Corporation Philippine
Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only signed as surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and
respondent-appellant's right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of petitioners-appellees. . . . . . . 17
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal partnership. To support this contention, they
cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes' authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety Company case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in my opinion, the words "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for which the conjugal partnership is liable do not require that
actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership from the husband's transaction; but it suffices that
the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio behind
our ruling in Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336, that obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession
are collectible from the conjugal partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision that the conjugal partnership should not be
made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of a third party. Such opinion merely
registered an exception to what may be construed as a sweeping statement that in all cases actual profit or benefit
must accrue to the conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual benefits to the family need
be proved in some cases such as in the Javier case. There, the husband was the principal obligor himself. Thus, said
transaction was found to be "one that would normally produce . . . benefit for the partnership." In the later case of
G-Tractors, Inc., the husband was also the principal obligor — not merely the surety. This latter case, therefore, did
not create any precedent. It did not also supersede the Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of the previous
accommodation contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the benefit of third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for
the family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husband's employer.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the
following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly
salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through the
loan obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted should PBM survive because
of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly
resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, 18 we underscored the requirement that:
"there must be the requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or
"benefits to his family" or "that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the
petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was prolonged and
for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock
appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings of the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in the value of stocks) might have been
already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into. But would
those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the "obligations . . . for the benefit of the conjugal partnership"?
Are indirect and remote probable benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of Appeals
in denying the motion for reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt granted to PBM,
with petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing as surety. While such petitioner-appellee-husband, as such surety,
is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted
by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable may not be charged against
conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — "The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in question falls under the exception laid down in said Article
122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation),
only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits, are not the "benefits"
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The "benefits" contemplated by the exception in Article
122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate
loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged benefit,
if any, continuously harped by respondents-appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative. 19
We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a large amount
(P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable prolongation of employment in PBM and increase in value of its stocks, would
be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a
degree of certainty, that the said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not contested by the petitioners) that the provisions
of the Family Code is applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the law for the
conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to
dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses
must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to
"the extent that the family is benefited." 20
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the
spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. 21 Thus, when co-respondent Alfredo
Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case,
including the family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in cases of donation.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business or
profession of the respondent-husband.
This theory is new as it is novel.
The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, hence the cited cases ofCobb-Perez
vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the instant case. Signing as a
surety is not embarking in a business. 22
We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his
own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or
guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often asked to stand as surety for their
company's loan obligations. This is especially true if the corporate officials have sufficient property of their own;
otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in order to bind the conjugal partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require the signature of the wife and the husband
signed alone does not mean that being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be presumed to
have acted for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the
extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing
as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the
family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision should be upheld as we now uphold it.
This is, of course, without prejudice to petitioner's right to enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM
receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation program and payment schedule approved or to be approved by the
Securities & Exchange Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#15
[G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998]
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA
CORPUZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent
of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review of the Decision[1] dated January
30, 1996 and the Resolution[2] dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758,
affirming the Decision of the lower court and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint[3] against her husband Judie Corpuz
and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain
deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void. The case
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the trial court
rendered a Decision[4] dated September 9, 1992, disposing as follows:[5]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. A) and the amicable settlement dated
March 16, 1990 (Exh. B) as null and void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the remaining one-half
portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A);
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants Luzviminda and Antonio Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the
unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing one-
half of the amount of realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal
interests thereon computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged
Decision, ruled as follows:[6]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this Court. No
costs considering plaintiff-appellees failure to file her brief, despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution:[7]
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration of Our decision in this case of
January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same issues which We have already passed upon in the said decision,
and there [being] no cogent reason to disturb the same, this Court RESOLVES to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts

The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking
employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision of Respondent
Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial court, as follows:[8]
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on December
24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in
their answer, and also admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p..3, June 9, 1992),
although the latter says that they were married in 1967. The couple have three children, namely: Junie 18 years old,
Harriet 17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her mother
testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee,
bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in installment, with
right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive installments (Exh. 2, tsn. p. 6,
February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8,
(LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since then occupied
the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of
the Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in [the]
Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go
abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, x x x on March 11,
1990. Plaintiffs departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle East was with the consent of her husband Judie
Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug.12, 1990; p. 10, Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed
most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter
Harriet Corpuz went to school at Kings College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time
working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her
younger sister Jodie (Joji) was going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991).
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion
including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She
[Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but
instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept.
6, 1991).
4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant Luzviminda
Guiang thru a document known as Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) the remaining one-half portion of their lot and
the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June ,
1990. Transferor Judie Corpuzs children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witnesses.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie
Corpuzs title over the lot transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as vendee executed another agreement over Lot
9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. 3), this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered
owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot (Exh. 2), who signed as vendor for a
consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale (Exh. 3-A). The new sale (Exh. 3)
describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct
lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children
together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that
their father had a wife already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang
and her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1),
Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was docketed by the barangay
authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for trespassing. On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a document
known as amicable settlement. In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the
house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7,
1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Officer-In-
Charge at the time, a certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter
(tsn. p. 31, Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point was not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz
approached him for the annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had
approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the Barangay
Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in her house
and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of the amicable
settlement, filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato. The proceedings [are] still
pending before the said court, with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights, Exh. A; P9,000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the remaining obligation
of the Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. 3); P100.00 for the preparation of Exhibit 3; a total of P759.62 basic tax and
special educational fund on the lot; P127.50 as the total documentary stamp tax on the various documents; P535.72
for the capital gains tax; P22.50 as transfer tax; a standard fee ofP17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for
the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.
Ruling of Respondent Court

Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial courts ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the
husband of the conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null and void as provided under Article 124 of
the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners contention that the amicable settlement ratified said sale, citing Article
1409 of the Code which expressly bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly those prohibited or
declared void by law.
Hence, this petition.[9]
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following errors:[10]

I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the
impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the amicable settlement by the
contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which recognized as
lawful and valid the ownership and possession of private respondent over the remaining one half (1/2) portion of the
subject property.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely
voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement
with them.
This Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?

Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good
faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondents consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondents consent to the
contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination,
testified thus:[11]
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Maam.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which arose concerning the ownership of your
residential house at Callejo Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose regarding my residential house and lot because
it was sold by my husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was
correctly applied by the two lower courts:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.(165a) (Italics supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory
effect of the above provision in this wise:[12]
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same
with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband
cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may
bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion.[13] In any event, its execution
does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be
discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents consent. To constitute a
valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3)
consent,[14] the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement

Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending
parties through the amicable settlement they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private
respondent. The trial court correctly held:[15]
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) cannot be
ratified, even by an amicable settlement. The participation by some barangay authorities in the amicable settlement
cannot otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the amicable settlement (Exh. B)
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed
of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A). By express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to
wit:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent. (Civil Code of
the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) and the amicable settlement (Exh. 3) are null
and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.[16]
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the
barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of
such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch
of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#16
[G.R. No. 118784. September 2, 1999]
HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIENA MALABONGA, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, asking this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 23, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38232,[1] which overturned the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City in Civil Case No. 90-33.
At the outset, we note that Christina Ayuste, the plaintiff in the lower court and the original petitioner herein, died
on November 21, 1995.[2] In his Comment dated January 14, 1998 to private respondents Manifestation informing
the Court of Christina Ayustes death, petitioners counsel re-affirmed such fact of death and informed the Court of
the names of Christina Ayustes legal representatives.[3] The claim not having been extinguished by the death of
Christina Ayuste, we ordered the substitution of her heirs Marlon Ayuste and Arlaine Ayuste-Yu for Christina Ayuste
in our Resolution dated August 11, 1999.
Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. Although the couple resided in Manila, they
operated a machine shop in Barangay Iyam, Lucena City, which was managed by Rafael Ayuste. In order to serve as a
temporary residence for Rafael Ayuste while in Lucena, the couple purchased on August 26, 1982 a parcel of land
with an area of 180 square meters on which a residential house was built situated at Yale Street, University Village,
Barrio Ibabang Dupay, Lucena City from spouses Pedro and Aida David. A deed of sale[4] was executed and signed by
the parties and filed with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City. On October 23, 1983, the Register of Deeds of Lucena
City issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-42972 in the name of RAFAEL T. AYUSTE, married to Christina Ayuste.[5]
On February 27, 1987, a deed of absolute sale[6] was executed by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private respondent
whereby the former sold the abovementioned parcel of land to the latter for P40,000, which amount Rafael Ayuste
acknowledge having received in the deed. On page 2 of this deed appears the signature of Christina Ayuste below
the phrase With my conformity. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of deeds of Lucena City on March
5, 1987 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50046 was issued in the name of private respondent.[7]
After Rafael Ayustes death on October 13, 1989, Christina Ayuste discovered, in the course of an inventory of their
properties, that the title to the land in Lucena was missing. She searched for it in the office of her husband in Lucena
City and it was then that she learned from her employees about the sale of the house and lot by her husband to
private respondent.
On March 2, 1990, Christina Ayuste filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City for the annulment
of the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name of private respondent and for the payment of moral,
exemplary and actual damages. In her complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was
forged and that her husband Rafael Ayuste sold the property without her knowledge and consent.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on June 20, 1991, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows-
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of House and Lot (Exhibit C') executed by defendant and
plaintiffs husband, the deceased Rafael Ayuste, on February 27, 1987;
(2) Ordering defendant Viena Malabonga to return to plaintiff Christina Ayuste the possession of the house and lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50045, now in the name of defendant Viena Malabonga, together with
the improvements thereon;
(3) Directing the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50046 and to issue in
the name of plaintiff and her children by the late Rafael Ayuste new Transfer Certificate of Title in lieu thereof,
subject to all/any liens and encumbrances annotated on the memorandum of the title to be cancelled;
(4) Ordering plaintiff Christina Ayuste to pay the defendant Vienna Malabonga the sum of P258,200.00 for the
improvements introduced on the lot and house as well as for maintenance of the premises; and
(5) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of rents received from the premises starting March, 1990 until
such time that she finally turns-over (sic) the possession of the house and lot to plaintiff, at the rate of P2,700.00 per
month.
With costs against defendant.[8]
Both parties appealed the trial courts decision. On January 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
ruling by holding that Christina Ayustes right to bring an action for the annulment of the sale is barred by laches
because of her failure to file it during the existence of the marriage in accordance with article 173 of the Civil
Code. Also, it found private respondent to be entitled to the protection of a buyer in good faith and for value. The
pertinent portion of the public respondents decision provides-
Record shows that plaintiff-appellant wife (sic) instituted on March 2, 1990 her action for annulment of the sale
executed by her husband on February 27, 1987 long after said vendor-husband died in 1989. It is thus clear that the
action for annulment of the sale was not instituted during the marriage as required by Article 173, the very provision
of law which grants the wife the privilege/right to have the sale executed by her husband annulled, in derogation of
the suppose (sic) vested right of the buyer. The two periods provided for in said Article 173 during the
marriage and within 10 years should concur.
We find no merit in plaintiff-appellants claim that she discovered the sale, only after her husbands death, when she
made an inventory and found out that the pertinent titles to the land subject of the sale were missing. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that registration with the Register of Deeds is notice to the whole world. The questioned deed of sale
has long been registered with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City on March 5, 1987- and in fact the said property
was registered in the name of defendant-appellant under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50046. Said TCT in the
name of defendant-appellant is now indefeasible.
The peculiar circumstances that militates in favor of defendant-appellant buyer are as follows: The questioned deed
of sale was not actually without the wifes signature signifying marital consent, so to speak.Evidently, defendant-
appellant was led to believe by the husband-vendor that plaintiff-appellant gave her marital consent to the sale, as
said husband presented a deed of sale supposedly pre-signed by his wife, plaintiff-appellant. Defendant-appellant is
therefore undoubtedly a buyer in good faith and for value, with vested rights equally entitled to the protection of
the law. The questioned deed of sale was duly registered In the name of defendant-appellant who was issued a
Transfer Certificate of Title.
xxx xxx xxx
Unlike the statute of limitations, laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity on
unfairness of permitting a stale right to be enforced or asserted. (Marcelino vs. CA, 210 SCRA 444). For failure of the
plaintiff-appellant wife to institute her action for annulment of sale, while her husband-vendor was still alive as
required by Article 173 of the New Civil Code, plaintiff-appellant wifes right under Article 166 of the same Code has
become stale and is now barred by laches.
In view of the foregoing findings, We rule that the trial court erred in giving due course to the action for annulment
of sale. With the foregoing findings and resolution the other issues raised in this appeal are now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the appeal of defendant-
appellant, -and- dismissing the appeal of plaintiff-appellant.
The decision dated June 20, 1991 rendered by the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed on February 27, 1987 by and between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-
appellants husband is declared VALID and BINDING upon the plaintiff-appellant.[9]
Both the trial and the appellate court decisions have established that Rafael Ayuste sold conjugal property without
the consent of Christina Ayuste, his wife. This factual finding shall not be disturbed because only questions of law are
reviewed in an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court subject to certain well-defined exceptions none of which
are present in the instant case. The only issue which remains to be resolved is whether petitioners are entitled to the
annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.
Petitioners claim that since the law expressly prohibits the husband from alienating real property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without his wifes consent, the contract of sale in question is a nullity pursuant to article 1409 of
the Civil Code which provides that contracts expressly prohibited by law are inexistent and void from the
beginning. It is further averred by petitioners that the present action is not barred because the action to declare the
nullity of a contract does not prescribe. Futhermore, Christina Ayuste cannot be faulted for having brought the
action only after the death of her husband, despite the periods stated in article 173 of the Civil Code, since she had
no knowledge of the sale during his lifetime as he concealed the same from her. Finally, it is contended that article
166 is the relevant provision, not article 173.[10]
Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership,[11] he cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wifes consent,[12]subject only to certain
exceptions specified in the law.[13] The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of their
conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that-
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (emphasis supplied)
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the
husband without the consent of his wife is voidable[14] The action for annulment must be brought during the
marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.[15] Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical languange, there is no room for interpretation there is room only for application.[16]
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October 13,
1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court asking
for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was
not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in
1989.[17] Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material. We affirm
public respondents ruling that registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole
world.[18] Precisely, the purpose of the legislature in providing a system of registration is to afford a means of
publicity so that persons dealing with real property may search the records and thereby acquire security against
instruments the execution of which have not been revealed to them.[19] Since the deed of sale was registered on
March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such date.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#17
[G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002]
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO
CAMAISA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wifes written consent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C.Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the
Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.
As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was
interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker,
Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses.[1] Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the
real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and
vicinity maps relating to the properties.[2] Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be
respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the
knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.[3] After
some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property
and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property[4] to be paid on installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00
and P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as follows[5]:
Taytay Property Makati Property
6th month P200,000.00 P300,000.00
12th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.00
18th month 500,000.00
This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.[6] When petitioner pointed out the conjugal
nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale.[7] The formal
typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate
broker and Edilberto met in the latters office for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to
Sell.[8] After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807
dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the
presence of the real estate broker and an employee in Edilbertos office.[9] The contracts were given to Edilberto for
the formal affixing of his wifes signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions
of the contracts.[10] To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and
Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.[11] During the meeting, handwritten notations were made
on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of
the contracts.[12]
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilbertos office for the formal
affixing of Normas signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out
of the agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration.[13] Petitioner reminded
respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint
for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
136 on April 29, 1992, to compel respondent NormaCamaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
A Motion to Dismiss[14] was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court in its Resolution of July 21,
1992.[15]
Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that it was an agreement between
herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties was still subject to the
approval and conformity of his wife Norma Camaisa.[16] Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the
sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.[17] The checks issued by petitioner were returned
to her by Edilberto and she accepted the same without any objection.[18] Respondent further claimed that
the acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject
properties.[19] Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the subject
properties and that she gave her consent and conformity to the same.[20]
On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment[21] asserting that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that
the wifes written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to
respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under
Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of
the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive portion
of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT
Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 of
the Registry of Rizal.
2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fees.
Costs against plaintiff.[22]
Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such,
the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale.Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused
to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent spouses
and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals also stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or
encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the
said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF REAL
PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE LATTER PAID
P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER,
RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX G IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR
PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN
CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT OF SALE
IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403, 1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.[23]
The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent
spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell
between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an
expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that
there are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.[24] A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no genuine
controversy as to the facts involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and
respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and
the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused
to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the contracts to
sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were already perfected such that the latter could no longer back
out of the agreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to
sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.[25]
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell,
court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other
spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if
the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124
is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.[26] In this case, petitioner
failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the
absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell
involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#18
[G.R. No. 143826. August 28, 2003]
HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES AND FLORENTINA
MIJARES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal real property requires the consent
of the wife. The absence of such consent renders the entire transaction[1] merely voidable and not void.[2] The wife
may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, bring an action for the annulment of
the contract entered into by her husband without her consent.[3]
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the January 26, 2000 Decision[4] and June 19, 2000,
Resolution[5] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28464 which declared respondents as purchasers in good faith
and set aside the May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in
Civil Case No. Q-48018.
The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot No. 4349-B-2,[6] approximately 396 square meters, previously
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205445, located in Balintawak, Quezon City and registered in the
name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes.[7] Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of
the spouses conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business.[8]
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974.[9] Sometime in 1984, Ignacia
learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares
for P40,000.00.[10] As a consequence thereof, TCT No. 205445 was cancelled and TCT No. 306087 was issued on April
19, 1983 in the name of respondent spouses.[11] She likewise found out that Vicente filed a petition for
administration and appointment of guardian with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXI. Vicente
misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22, 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were
her only heirs.[12] On September 29, 1983, the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor
children.[13] Subsequently, in its Order dated October 14, 1983, the court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of
Ignacia.[14]
On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the return of her
share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint[15] for annulment of
sale against respondent spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to include Vicente Reyes as one of the
defendants.[16]
In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid
because it was duly approved by the court.[17] Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the
spouses was only his share in Lot No. 4349-B-2, excluding the share of his wife, and that he never represented that
the latter was already dead.[18] He likewise testified that respondent spouses, through the counsel they provided
him, took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment
of guardian without his knowledge.[19]
On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 void with respect
to the share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return
thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent spouses. The dispositive portion of the said decision, reads-
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale,
dated March [1,] 1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares NULL AND
VOID WITH RESPECT TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE SAID PROPERTY;
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the names of defendant
spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares and to issue a new TCT in the name of the plaintiff Ignacia Aguilar-
Reyes as owner in fee simple of one-half (1/2) of said property and the other half in the names of defendant spouses
Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares, upon payment of the required fees therefore;
Said defendant spouses Mijares are also ordered to allow plaintiff the use and exercise of rights, as well as
obligations, pertinent to her one-half (1/2) ownership of the subject property;
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to reimburse P55,000.00 with legal rate of interest from the execution of
the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983, to the defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina
Mijares which corresponds to the one-half (1/2) of the actual purchase price by the said Mijares but is annulled in
this decision (sic);
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby further ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages, plus costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that
the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-
B-2 computed from March 1, 1983.
On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente
Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of P110,000, thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated
March 1, 1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant Cipriano Mijares as null and void ab
initio, in view of the absence of the wifes conformity to said transaction.
Consequent thereto, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the
name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares and issue a new TCT in the name of the plaintiff and defendant
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente Reyes as owners in fee simple, upon payment of required fees therefore.
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to pay the amount of one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000.00)
with legal rate of interest at 12% per annum from the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale on March 1,
1983.
Further, defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages, plus costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[21]
On motion[22] of Ignacia, the court issued an Order dated June 29, 1990 amending the dispositive portion of the May
31, 1990 decision by correcting the Transfer Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of Cipriano Mijares
and Florentina Mijares, from TCT No. 306083 to TCT No. 306087; and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to issue a new title in the name of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente Reyes. The Order likewise specified that Vicente
Reyes should pay Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes the amount of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.[23]
Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.[24] Pending the
appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.[25]
Petitioners contended that they are entitled to reimbursement of the rentals collected on the apartment built on Lot
No. 4349-B-2, while respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in good faith. On January 26, 2000, the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of Ignacias
consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondents because they were innocent purchasers for
value.[26] The decretal potion of the appellate courts decision states
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from and the Orders dated May 31, 1990 and June 29,
1990, are SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof a new one is rendered
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 1, 1983 executed by Vicente Reyes in favor of spouses Cipriano
and [Florentina] Mijares valid and lawful;
2. Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and legal expenses;
and
3. Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares P50,000.00 as moral damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration,[28] petitioners filed the instant petition contending that
the assailed sale of Lot No. 4392-B-2 should be annulled because respondent spouses were not purchasers in good
faith.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses?
(2) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of
Ignacia? (3) Are respondent spouses purchasers in good faith?
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code,[29] the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was contracted, provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several
cases[30] the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however,
is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void.[31] This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code
pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its
annulment.[32]
In the case of Heirs of Christina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals,[33] it was categorically held that
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the
husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage
and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation there is room only for application.[34]
Likewise, in Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[35] the Court quoted with approval the ruling of the trial court that
under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real property by the husband absent the wifes
consent, is voidable and not void. Thus
Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and
void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus,
the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and void
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using the
conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of
said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the
March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive
period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date
when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action
would still be within the prescribed period.
Anent the second issue, the trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its
entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino,[36] a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by
the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its
entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction
in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction
is the same thus
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the
husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in
so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not
the legitimate concern of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo
C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, [t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello
vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430, in which cases annulment was held to refer only
to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife
The necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of the wife, is not
without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162
and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership
exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities
in Article 161 have been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable
share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the
conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by
the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article
166.[37]
With respect to the third issue, the Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. A
purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the
person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.[38]
In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on guard. The death
certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals that (1) it
was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia
was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be
on March 8, 1982.[39] These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate
further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she asked for the death
certificate of Ignacia because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.[40] Moreover, respondent spouses had all
the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower because it was their lawyer, Atty. Rodriguito S.
Saet, who represented Vicente in the special proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged court approval of the sale. Note that the Order issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, appointing Vicente as guardian of his 5 minor children, as well
as the Order authorizing him to sell the estate of Ignacia were issued only on September 29, 1983 and October 14,
1983, respectively. On the other hand, the sale of the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses appears to
have been made not on March 1, 1983, but even as early as November 25, 1978. In the Agreement dated November
25, 1978, Vicente in consideration of the amount of P110,000.00, sold to Cipriano Mijares Lot No. 4349-B-2 on
installment basis, with the first installment due on or before July 31, 1979.[41] This was followed by a Memorandum
of Understanding executed on July 30, 1979, by Vicente and Cipriano (1) acknowledging Ciprianos receipt of Vicentes
down payment in the amount of P50,000.00; and (2) authorizing Florentina Mijares to collect rentals.[42] On July 14,
1981, Vicente and Cipriano executed another Memorandum of Agreement, stating, among other, that out of the
purchase price of P110,000.00 Vicente had remaining balance of P19,000.00.[43] Clearly therefore, the special
proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, could not have been the basis of
respondent spouses claim of good faith because the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 occurred prior thereto.
Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente was married to Ignacia and
that the latter did not give her conformity to the sale. This is so because the 1978 Agreement described Vicente as
married but the conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear in the deed. Obviously, the execution of another
deed of sale in 1983 over the same Lot No. 4349-B-2, after the alleged death of Ignacia on March 22, 1982, as well as
the institution of the special proceedings were, intended to correct the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale. Even
assuming that respondent spouses believed in good faith that Ignacia really died on March 22, 1982, after they
purchased the lot, the fact remains that the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 prior to Ignacias alleged demise was without
her consent and therefore subject to annulment. The October 14, 1983 order authorizing the sale of the estate of
Ignacia, could not have validated the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 because said order was issued on the assumption that
Ignacia was already dead and that the sale dated March 1, 1983 was never categorically approved in the said order.
The fact that the 5 minor children[44] of Vicente represented by the latter, signed the March 1, 1983 deed of sale of
Lot No. 4349-B-2 will not estop them from assailing the validity thereof. Not only were they too young at that time to
understand the repercussions of the sale, they likewise had no right to sell the property of their mother who, when
they signed the deed, was very much alive.
If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between parties
in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair
dealing. Hence, for the sake of justice and equity, and in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at
anothers expense, the Court sustains the trial courts order directing Vicente to refund to respondent spouses the
amount of P110,000.00 which they have paid as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2.[45] The court a quo correctly
found that the subject of the sale was the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 and that the consideration thereof is not
P40,000.00 as stated in the March 1, 1983 deed of sale, but P110,000.00 as evidenced by the (1) Agreement dated
November 25, 1978 as well as the July 30, 1979 Memorandum of Understanding and the July 14, 1981 Memorandum
of Agreement which served as receipts of the installment payments made by respondent Cipriano Mijares; and (2)
the receipt duly signed by Vicente Reyes acknowledging receipt of the amount of P110,000.00 from respondent
spouses as payment of the sale of the controverted lot.[46]
The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents. In Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[47] it was held that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the complaint
was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui v. Loy,[48] involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by
the first buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the
second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase
price of the lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of the
complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the
amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.[49]
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which could be determined with certainty at
the time of the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this
decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate
shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it
is fully satisfied.
Petitioners prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. Other than the allegation of Ignacia in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay that the apartments could be rented at P1,000.00 a month, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate her claim. In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.[50] None, having been presented in the case at bar, petitioners claim
for rentals must be denied.
While as a general rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than the ones granted
in the decision of the court below, law and jurisprudence authorize a tribunal to consider errors, although
unassigned, if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower courts jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors
not specified, and (3) clerical errors.[51]In this case, though defendant Vicente Reyes did not appeal, the plain error
committed by the court a quo as to the award of moral and exemplary damages must be corrected. These awards
cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial court.[52] Moral and exemplary damages are different in nature,
and require separate determination. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the act complained of.[53] The award of exemplary damages, on the other
hand, is warranted when moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages were likewise awarded by the
court.[54]
Hence, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages should be modified. Vicente
Reyes should be ordered to pay the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Since Vicente Reyes was among the heirs substituted to the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, payment of moral
and exemplary damages must be made by Vicente to his children, petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 26, 2000 Decision and
June 19, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28464 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 31,
1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-48018, which annulled the
March 1, 1983 Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 4349-B-2, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel TCT No. 306087 in the name of respondent spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares covering the
same property; as well as the June 29, 1990 Order correcting the typographical errors in the order dated March 1,
1983, are REINSTATED, with the followingMODIFICATIONS
(1) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the
name of petitioners as co-owners thereof;
(2) Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 as purchase price of
Lot No. 4349-B-2, with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of this decision. After this decision
becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be
imposed until full payment.
(3) Defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#19
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October
18, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida.
The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802.
The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to
the exclusion of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured
by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount
of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution
of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[4]
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor
of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner,
through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[5]
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property,
respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her
car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97)
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was
the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations of the Complaint, the
Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his
notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the residential lot located at Brgy.
San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III,
Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption
that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.[7] The
appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the
knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, it upheld the trial
courts order to reconvey the subject property to respondent.[8] With respect to the damage to respondents car, the
appellate court found petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or
omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task.[9] All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial
courtsDecision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.[10]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.[11]
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that
Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the
mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from
exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-
ownership.[12] Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[13] it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife.[14] In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband
who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family
Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations
between respondent and her late husband.[15] With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gainsin the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.[16]
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.[17] Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,[18] the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.[19] Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only
when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.[20] Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are
correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family.[21]
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
. . . . For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability
that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to
show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[22]
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such.[23] Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove).[24] Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the
records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to
the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the
subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial
court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner
never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[25] A
party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.