Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 9

Debt crisis

Sinapore only spend 6.1% of its revenue while malaysia used 12.5% to pay inter
est in 2016.(even worse when Najib become PM)

and in 2018 malaysia expected to pay RM31 billion in interest double the amoun
t of 2009

Federal government debt of 686.8 billion ringgit, or 50.8 percent of gross dom
estic product

Government guarantees of 199.1 billion ringgit, or 14.6 percent of GDP. The go


vernment is committed to paying the debt of entities which are unable to do so,
including 42.2 billion ringgit for Danainfra Nasional Bhd, 26.6 billion ringg
it for Prasarana Malaysia Bhd and 38 billion ringgit for 1MDB.

Lease payments for public-private projects of 201.4 billion ringgit, or 14.9 p


ercent of GDP. The government is obligated to pay for rental, maintenance and
other costs on a number of projects, such as construction of schools, hospital
s and roads.

That takes the total debt to 1.087 trillion ringgit, or 80.3 percent of GDP, w
hich Lim said was a number Malaysians are “rightly concerned” about and that
the government will take action to fix.

The RM1 trillion threshold has almost certainly been crossed, and the debt-to-
GDP ratio is about 68%.

The main reason is that the federal government also stands as guarantor for de
bts contracted by many government-linked companies and entities. If they are u
nable to service their loans, the Government is legally obliged to step in and
pay, as the 1MDB case has painfully shown.

Thus, government-guaranteed loans should be added to direct government loans.


And the outstanding amount of the loans of both should be counted as federal g
overnment debt.

At the end of 2017, the total government-guaranteed debt was RM238bil. If this
is added to the RM687bil of direct debt, the total federal government debt was
RM925bil as at Dec 31, 2017. This was 68% of the 2017 GDP of RM1,352bil. This
exceeds the 55% limit, if the broader definition of federal debt is taken.

From January to May, the national debt has further increased. Latest data from
Bank Negara show the direct federal government debt rose to RM705bil at end-Ma
rch 2018, so the latest publicly-known figure for federal debt (direct and gua
ranteed) is at least RM943bil (without counting the increase since December of
government-guaranteed debt).

On top of this are other new direct or guaranteed loans received or contracted
in April-May 2018.

Moreover, there might be outstanding debt that the federal government has that
it may not even have been aware of. Prime examples are the billion-ringgits of
loans taken by 1MDB and its related companies, the exact nature and full statu
s of which are not known and may be revealed only after an audit.

If we add on the increase in government-guaranteed debt since December 2017, t


he new direct debt since March, and also the debts that have hitherto been unk
nown and uncounted, the total federal government debt is almost certain to hav
e reached or exceeded RM1 trillion.

Which institutions are included in debts guaranteed by the Government? Not muc
h is publicly known. However, in an answer to a parliamentary question, the Fi
nance Ministry in November 2017 stated that guaranteed loans were given to fou
r statutory bodies and 26 companies under the Ministry of Finance Inc. Their n
ames were not given.

Since the debts of state governments do not seem to be included in the list of
federal-guaranteed debt, the total debt of the government as a whole (federal
plus state governments) would be higher than if only the federal government de
bt is counted. The Auditor General’s Report of 2016 revealed that state gover
nments’ arrears in debt repayment to the federal government totalled RM4.23bi
l in 2016.

Should the narrower or broader definition of government debt be used? It depen


ds. If one wants to know the extent of legal liability of the federal governme
nt to service and repay its loans, then it is useful to consider the broad def
inition of government debt.

If there is an exercise to ensure the federal government is able to service it


s own debt and that it does not spend too much on debt servicing at the expens
e of allocations for health, education and other sectors, the narrower definit
ion could be more useful. However, as shown in the 1MDB case, government-guara
nteed debt can also lead to large federal debt servicing.

Another pertinent issue is that when the 55% limit rule was made, the definiti
on probably was meant to cover only direct federal debt. It may be preferable
to retain this definition in relation to the rule, to enable continuity and co
mparability, while also to set targets and policies to reduce the broadly-defi
ned government debt.

What needs to be done? For a start, the rapid growth of both components of the
government debt should be urgently reversed.

At the end of 2005, federal government debt was RM229bil, rising to RM407bil i
n 2010. From end-2011 to end-2017, it jumped from RM456bil to RM687bil, while
in the same period government-guaranteed debt jumped even faster from RM117bil
to RM238bil. Thus, during 2011-2017, the total debt (direct and guaranteed) ro
se from RM573bil to RM935bil, a big increase of 63% in just six years.
There is a case for increasing government loans in certain circumstances, such
as to offset an economic recession, cope with a natural disaster or fund proje
cts that can yield returns to repay the loan cost. However, a large part of th
e recent debt increase seem to have funded projects and expenses of questionab
le economic viability or social value.

A high increase in debt means the Government has to set aside a larger and lar
ger share of its budget to repay the loans. Debt servicing (payment of interes
t and repayment of loan) rose from RM6.4bil in 1997 to RM28.9bil in 2017, acco
rding to an article in The Edge (Jan 6, 2018).

It adds that in 2018, RM30.9bil is projected to be spent on debt servicing, eq


uivalent to 13% of government revenue, or 96% of the RM32bil personal income t
ax or 71% of the then expected RM44bil GST collection.

Two examples show the adverse consequences of inappropriate loans. In the infa
mous 1MDB case, the company accumulated RM43bil in loans in just five years (2
010-2014); by October 2015 its outstanding debt was RM55bil, according to the
declassified Auditor-General’s Report.

It estimates that 1MDB will need to pay at least RM42.6bil to service its loan
s between November 2015 and May 2039 (assuming no new loans after November 201
5), of which RM12.7bil is repayment of principal and RM29.6bil is interest pay
ment.

Worse news: RM20.3bil of the 1MDB debt is government-guaranteed, which means t


ax payers’ money will have to be forked out, if 1MDB and its companies cannot
pay up.

In the case of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), the original cost estimate was
RM30bil but the eventual award given to the Chinese company CCCC was RM55bil,
with China’s Exim Bank financing 85% and the Government 15%. Another RM10.5bi
l was expected to be added to the cost after the elections, jacking up the pro
ject cost to RM65.5bil, according to a report in The Star (May 19, 2018). Alre
ady, RM13bil of loans have been drawn down.
The Star article exposed how the project is mired in controversies, including
why the cost escalated to such a high level and rate (ringgit per kilometre);
the economic viability of the project (ECRL would have to carry 60 million ton
nes of freight yearly to break even, when KTM nationally carries only 6 millio
n tonnes annually); and speculation that some of the RM13bil of loans already
disbursed has been diverted to service 1MDB debts.

These cases show how inappropriate use of loans can cause debt problems and ho
w the federal government can end up in big debt even though it may not have ta
ken the loans directly.

The following now needs to be done:

Carry out a thorough assessment of the actual situation regarding federal gove
rnment debt and government-guaranteed debt, identify causes of the recent huge
increases, and have a strategy to deal with each of the major causes.

Assess the debt sustainability of each major loan-financed project (whether ap


proved, being considered or proposed), its economic viability and social benef
it, and work out if the bad projects can be terminated or have their terms ren
egotiated and their size and financing cost reduced.

Put on hold all major projects, approved or proposed, whether at federal or st


ate level, until a reassessment is done, according to worked-out criteria.

Conduct an exercise to review all government expenditure in each ministry, age


ncy and state, to eliminate or reduce wasteful or unnecessary activities and c
osts.

In doing so, re-prioritise expenditure items, so that more allocation is given


to basic necessities such as amenities for the poor and for vulnerable groups,
healthcare, environment protection, flood prevention and mitigation, while all
ocation for mega projects that are not a priority for the bottom half of the p
eople can be cancelled or postponed.
Examine ways to increase government revenue, although not by creating extra bu
rden to the poorer sections of society.

Several of the above measures are already being worked out by the new governme
nt and its advisory groups. While getting to the truth of the situation is har
d enough, taking actions that call for elimination and cuts to projects and ac
tivities will be more difficult.

Most difficult of all is a change of mindsets and habits that have come to be
acceptable and routine. The country has for too long been accustomed to econom
ic growth fuelled by huge flows of debts, with too little care for whether the
y are honestly contracted and used, whether the schemes they fund are economic
ally viable or socially beneficial, and whether overall the nation can absorb
the cost.

The financially and politically unsustainable party has come to an end, we hop
e. It is fortunate we are given the opportunity to relook at the situation bef
ore it is too late, and still save ourselves from a nightmarish national debt
trap.

国家破产的概念,是国际货币基金 2002 年提出的,指一个国家无力偿还其债务,或者没


有充足外汇支付进口商品。冰岛这个北欧富国,2008 年受到经济海啸重创宣告破产,全球
讶然,原来国家也会破产。

民联自 2008 年也开始一直向人民渲染“国家破产”的论调,指政府债务已经直逼 55%债务


顶限,并称若继续由国阵执政,国家债务将在 2019 年达 100%,届时国家将宣布破产。

无可否认,这论述的确帮反对党赚取不少的廉价政治筹码,但人民被告知“国家将破产,
必须由下一代承担”的说法,真的是事实真相吗?一个国家破产以后人民会怎样?是很多
人感到好奇的问题。

现在让我们逐一了解,我国是否存在这种风险
(i)债务长期可提高经济产能和生产力

政府的收入主要来自直接和间接税务,税率由政府决定,因此政府收入在应付债务上主要
面对人民可承担的税务水平的软性局限。不过,即使政府面对调整税务的局限,但是还是
可以通过印钞来解决债务。只要大部分政府债务以马币计算,并拥有印钞的绝对权力,政
府可以随时解决债务。

其实在某种程度上,债务是不可或缺的部分。更重要的是,若政府举债支付公共开支,是
用在有生产性的投资上,譬如软硬体的基建投资、教育和保健投资,这样债务既推动经济
增长,又让闲置存款变成具经济价值的活动,这最终将会带来更高的经济增长,更多的政
府税收,间接抵消当前偏高的政府债务负担。

因此,政府债务问题的关键,不在于政府债务顶限或者印钞能力,而是政府债务是否用来
提高经济生产力。

(ii) 高政府债务不等于未来高税务负担

只要国家一天存在,政府就永远都存在。正因如此,政府债务实际上可以是没有届满期,
因为可以通过发售新债券取代到期债券。

目前,我国所背负的内债占 96%,而外债 4%。政府债务的累积是否会变成下一代的负担,


更重要的是取决于政府的债主是谁。在马来西亚,政府债券的最大买家是雇员公积金和保
险公司,等于是公积金会员和投保者的代理。简单来说,政府债务的主要持有者是人民。
因此,即使政府未来提高税务来偿还债务,这些钱最终还是流回人民的口袋。

这点也可以解释到,为何日本的公共债务占国内生产总值比例可以维持在超过 200%水平,
但日本得以避免债务危机的主要原因,全是因为国内储蓄远高于国内投资,以及民众和投
资者较强的本土情结,使日本的政府债务融资对国外投资者的依赖性不大。

(iii) 政府有能力避免债务危机

马来西亚人的储蓄率高、国内投资者愿意以偏低的利息长期持有政府债券、政府长期维持
经常账盈余,以及庞大的外汇储备金,减少政府外债的需要。
尽管截至 2013 年,马来西亚政府债务总额估计达 5413 亿令吉,但是,政府有能力应付债
务,避免陷入债务危机,包括:

截至 2014 年 5 月 30 日,我国的国际外汇储备金高达 4270 亿令吉,向等于 1.3 倍的短期外


债(政府与私人)。此外,政府外债仅占政府总债务的 3.1%(167 亿 6300 万令吉),相较
庞大的外汇储备金,政府迎刃有余。历史证明,政府债务危机来自外债压力,而非国内债
务。

政府有能力承担债务利息。债务承担能力取决于实际利率与经济增长率之间的差异。实际
利率越高,经济成长率越低,政府债务负担也越大,反之亦然。

政府有意愿和能力控制未来的财政赤字。全面就业、工资增幅稳定及可控制的通胀水平,
让政府可以通过削减津贴和重整税务制度来开源节流,长期内有利于降低财政赤字。

民联选择性玩弄数据 ,各国国债逐个看

无可否认,民联在经济课题上的大事炒作,并选择性地发表有关数据,使到人民忧心仲仲。
民联不惜危言耸听宣称大马国债占国内生产总值的 54%,会使国家走向破产。

但民联从来都不提,2014 年日本国债占 GDP 的 229.6%,新加坡则是 105%,英国 101%,法


国 115%,德国 83%,美国也有 106%。如果说大马国债占 GDP 53%会破产,那么这些民联口
中的“模范国”,岂不早已破产了?若是以数字计算,那究竟是那个国家的国债较高呢?

朝鲜的国债只是 0.4%,但是你认为朝鲜的经济会比我国来的好吗?新加坡的国债较大马来
的高,但是该国经济不比我国来的差,因为大马的储备金和国民总收入,没有新加坡来的
多和高。有鉴于此,我们绝对不能单纯取巧的以某个数字,需综合所有数据才可以衡量整
个国家的经济成长。

此外,在最新公布的第 11 大马计划,政府也详细探讨将会确保 2020 年达到平衡开支状况,


意即开销与收入达到平衡。

看完所附的图表,你还会觉得马来西亚的国债占国内生产总值的比例高吗?数据是不会说
谎的,但许多人却总是喜欢玩数字游戏,选择性的玩弄数据,因此在了解事情的真由之前,
我们也必须掌握基本的知识,这样才不至于轻易被糊弄。