BEUMER VS BEUMER
were acquired with the money he received
FACTS:
 Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married
Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980.
 Their marriage was declared null by the RTC
on November 10, 2000 by reason of
psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a
petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership and distribution of properties
which he claimed were acquired during their
marriage.
BY PURCHASE:
a.Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of
Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house constructed
thereon
b.Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house constructed
thereon
c.Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
d.Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of
Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre
BY INHERITANCE:
a. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete
Cadastre(the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
b. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete
Cadastre(the area that appertains to the
conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
 The respondent averred that she and
petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties during their marriage, the truth
being that she used her own personal money
to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of
her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and
2055-I by way of inheritance.
 During trial, petitioner testified that while
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in
the name of respondent, these properties
from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
 He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
 During trial, petitioner testified that while
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in
the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received
from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
 He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision
of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners
may not own lands in the Philippines.
However, there are no restrictions to the
ownership of buildings or structures on lands
of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots
1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the
parties.
While admitting to have previously executed
a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he
likewise claimed that his personal disability
funds were used to acquire the same. The
Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity,
grant reimbursement to petitioner given that
he acquired no right whatsoever over the
subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase
A contract that violates the Constitution and
the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all.
PATRICIO VS DARIO III
G.R. No. 170829 November 20,
2006
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated December 9, 20051 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner for
being contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died
intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two
sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school
building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford
corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao,
Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731
(175992) of the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred
fifty five (755) square meters, more or less.2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino
Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992)
was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was
issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc
formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property
hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038
and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,3 the trial court ordered
the partition of the subject property in the
following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6;
Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court
also ordered the sale of the property by
public auction wherein all parties concerned
may put up their bids. In case of failure, the
subject property should be distributed
accordingly in the aforestated manner.4
Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the
trial court on August 11, 2003,5 hence he
appealed before the Court of Appeals, which
denied the same on October 19, 2005.
However, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent on December 9,
2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision.
In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino
Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family
home should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could
not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
The appellate court also held that the minor
son of private respondent, who is a grandson
of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the
family home.6
Hence, the instant petition on the following
issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING ITS EARLIER
DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005
WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002
GRANTING THE PARTITION AND
SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
 ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159
IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF
THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY
HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494
IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 495
AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP.7
The sole issue is whether partition of the
family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on
the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject
property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla
Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his
12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent. He argues that as long as the
minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary
becomes of age. Private respondent insists
that even after the expiration of ten years
from the date of death of Marcelino on July
5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject
property continues to be considered as the
family home considering that his minor son,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a
beneficiary of the said family home, still
resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that
the subject property remained as a family
home of the surviving heirs of the late
Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997,
which was the 10th year from the date of
death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that
the brothers Marcelino Marc and private
respondent Marcelino III were already of
age at the time of the death of their
father,8 hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family
love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one’s lifetime.9 It
is the dwelling house where husband and
wife, or by an unmarried head of a family,
reside, including the land on which it is
situated.10 It is constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family.11 The family home is
deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of
the family home either by the owner thereof
or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be
actual. That which is "actual" is something
real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something
which is presumptive or constructive. Actual
occupancy, however, need not be by the
owner of the house specifically. Rather, the
property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of
the Family Code, which may include the in-
laws where the family home is constituted
jointly by the husband and wife. But the law
definitely excludes maids and overseers.
They are not the beneficiaries contemplated
by the Code.13
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates
who are the beneficiaries of a family home:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal
support.
To be a beneficiary of the family
home, three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code
provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of 10 years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in
situations where death occurs to persons
who constituted the family home. Dr.
1âwphi1
Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect
of death of one or both spouses or the
unmarried head of a family on the
continuing existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who
consented to the constitution of his or her
separate property as family home, the
property will remain as family home for ten
years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary living in it. If there is no more
beneficiary left at the time of death,
we believe the family home will be
dissolved or cease, because there is
no more reason for its existence. If
there are beneficiaries who survive
living in the family home, it will
continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is
still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the family home continues until
that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may
be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs
who are beneficiaries of the family home
keep it intact by not partitioning the
property after the period provided by this
article? We believe that although the
heirs will continue in ownership by
not partitioning the property, it will
cease to be a family home.14 (Emphasis
supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the
import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist
despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family.
Thereafter, the length of its continued
existence is dependent upon whether
there is still a minor-beneficiary
residing therein. For as long as there
is one beneficiary even if the head of
the family or both spouses are
already dead, the family home will
continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If
there is no minor-beneficiary, it will
subsist until 10 years and within this
period, the heirs cannot partition the
same except when there are
compelling reasons which will justify
the partition. This rule applies regardless
of whoever owns the property or who
constituted the family home.15 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code
may thus be expressed in this wise: If there
are beneficiaries who survive and are living
in the family home, it will continue for 10
years, unless at the expiration of 10 years,
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the family home continues until that
beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr.
Tolentino that as a general rule, the family
home may be preserved for a minimum of 10
years following the death of the spouses or
the unmarried family head who constituted
the family home, or of the spouse who
consented to the constitution of his or her
separate property as family home. After 10
years and a minor beneficiary still lives
therein, the family home shall be preserved
only until that minor beneficiary reaches the
age of majority. The intention of the law is to
safeguard and protect the interests of
the minor beneficiaryuntil he reaches legal
age and would now be capable of supporting
himself. However, three requisites must
concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered
as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of
the family home are: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the
head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term
"descendants" contemplates all descendants
of the person or persons who constituted the
family home without distinction; hence, it
must necessarily include the grandchildren
and great grandchildren of the spouses who
constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondent’s minor son, who is also the
grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor
beneficiaries must be actually living in the
family home to avail of the benefits derived
from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent
Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years
from the death of the decedent, hence, he
satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him.
The liability for legal support falls primarily
on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents,
especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation
of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in
their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent
on legal support not from his grandmother,
but from his father. Thus, despite residing
1âwphi1
in the family home and his being a
descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154
because he did not fulfill the third requisite
of being dependent on his grandmother for
legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must
now establish his own family home separate
and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support,
is that which is provided by law, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the
family.16 Legal support has the following
characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on
family ties which bind the obligor and the
obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It
cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be
compromised; (5) It is free from attachment
or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount.17
Professor Pineda is of the view that
grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they have
parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who
are capable of supporting them. This is so
because we have to follow the order of
support under Art. 199.18 We agree with this
view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by
Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the
tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the
order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives
and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent
is without means to support his son; neither
is there any evidence to prove that
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was
willing to voluntarily provide for her
grandson’s legal support. On the contrary,
herein petitioner filed for the partition of the
property which shows an intention to
dissolve the family home, since there is no
more reason for its existence after the 10-
year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal
impediment to partition the subject
property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships
among individuals as oftentimes it results in
inequitable situations such as in the instant
case. Co-owners should be afforded every
available opportunity to divide their co-
owned property to prevent these situations
from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,19 no co-
owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-
ownership indefinitely, and may insist on
partition on the common property at any
time. An action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property.20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a
partition, the court a quo should have
ordered a partition by commissioners
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court. Not more than three competent
and disinterested persons should be
appointed as commissioners to make the
partition, commanding them to set off to the
plaintiff and to each party in interest such
part and proportion of the property as the
court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the
commissioners that the real estate, or a
portion thereof, cannot be divided without
great prejudice to the interest of the parties,
the court may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he
pays to the other parties such sum or sums
of money as the commissioners deem
equitable, unless one of the parties
interested ask that the property be sold
instead of being so assigned, in which case
the court shall order the commissioners to
sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same
accordingly.21
The partition of the subject property should
be made in accordance with the rule
embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil
Code.22 Under the law of intestate
succession, if the widow and legitimate
children survive, the widow has the same
share as that of each of the children.
However, since only one-half of the conjugal
property which is owned by the decedent is
to be allocated to the legal and compulsory
heirs (the other half to be given exclusively
to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share
of the property), the widow will have the
same share as each of her two surviving
children. Hence, the respective shares of the
subject property, based on the law on
intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa
Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II,
1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,23 we
held that an action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and
for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the court after trial should find
the existence of co-ownership among the
parties, the court may and should order the
partition of the properties in the same
action.24
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated
December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
78, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION
BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual
physical partition of the subject property, as
well as the improvements that lie therein, in
the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6;
Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is
DIRECTED to appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons,
who should determine the technical metes
and bounds of the property and the proper
share appertaining to each heir, including
the improvements, in accordance with Rule
69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to
the commissioners that the real estate, or a
portion thereof, cannot be divided without
great prejudice to the interest of the parties,
the court a quo may order it assigned to one
of the parties willing to take the same,
provided he pays to the other parties such
sum or sums of money as the commissioners
deem equitable, unless one of the parties
interested ask that the property be sold
instead of being so assigned, in which case
the court shall order the commissioners to
sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same
accordingly, and thereafter distribute the
proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just
share of each heir. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
DE MESA VS ACERO, JR.
[ G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
] which was secured by a mortgage over the
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA
AND ERNESTO S. DE MESA,
PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D.
ACERO, JR. AND MA. RUFINA D.
ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE AND REGISTRAR ALFREDO
SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by the Spouses Araceli Oliva-
De Mesa (Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa
(Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals'
(CA) Decision[1] dated June 6, 2008 and
Resolution[2] dated October 23, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled "Spouses
Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De
Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al."
The Antecedent Facts
This involves a parcel of land situated at
No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which was formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M)
issued by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered
under Araceli's name. The petitioners
jointly purchased the subject property on
April 17, 1984 while they were still merely
cohabiting before their marriage. A house
was later constructed on the subject
property, which the petitioners thereafter
occupied as their family home after they
got married sometime in January 1987.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli
obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Claudio) in the amount of P100,000.00,
subject property. As payment, Araceli
issued a check drawn against China
Banking Corporation payable to Claudio.
When the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored as the account
from which it was drawn had already been
closed. The petitioners failed to heed
Claudio's subsequent demand for
payment.
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with
the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan
a complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the
petitioners. After preliminary
investigation, an information for violation
of B.P. 22 was filed against the petitioners
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan.
On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a
Decision[3] acquitting the petitioners but
ordering them to pay Claudio the amount
of P100,000.00 with legal interest from
date of demand until fully paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was
issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte
(Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject
property. On March 9, 1994, the subject
property was sold on public auction;
Claudio was the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was
issued to him.
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio
leased the subject property to the
petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva
(Juanito) for a monthly rent of P5,500.00.
However, the petitioners and Juanito
defaulted in the payment of the rent and
as of October 3, 1998, their total
accountabilities to Claudio amounted to
P170,500.00.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final
Deed of Sale[4] over the subject property
was issued to Claudio and on April 4,
1995, the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No.
T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-
221755 (M)[5] in his favor.
Unable to collect the aforementioned
rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma.
Rufina Acero (Rufina) (collectively
referred to as Spouses Acero) filed a
complaint for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against the
petitioners and Juanito. In their defense,
the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero
have no right over the subject property.
The petitioners deny that they are mere
lessors; on the contrary, they are the
lawful owners of the subject property and,
thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a
Decision,[6] giving due course to Spouses
Acero's complaint and ordering the
petitioners and Juanito to vacate the
subject property. Finding merit in Spouses
Acero's claims, the MTC dismissed the
petitioners' claim of ownership over the
subject property. According to the MTC,
title to the subject property belongs to
Claudio as shown by TCT No. T-221755
(M).
The MTC also stated that from the time a
Torrens title over the subject property was
issued in Claudio's name up to the time
the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of
the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the
regularity of the public sale that was
conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Claudio's Torrens title that was resultantly
issued.
The petitioners appealed the MTC's July
22, 1999 Decision to the RTC. This appeal
was, however, dismissed in a Decision
dated November 22, 1999 due to the
petitioners' failure to submit their
Memorandum. The petitioners sought
reconsideration of the said decision but
the same was denied in an Order dated
January 31, 2000.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a
petition for review[7] with the CA assailing
the RTC's November 22, 1999 Decision
and January 31, 2000 Order. In a
December 21, 2006 Decision,[8] the CA
denied the petitioner's petition for review.
This became final on July 25, 2007.[9]
In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999,
the petitioners filed against the
respondents a complaint[10] to nullify TCT
No. T-221755 (M) and other documents
with damages with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted
that the subject property is a family home,
which is exempt from execution under the
Family Code and, thus, could not have
been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of
execution.
On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
a Decision,[11] which dismissed the
petitioners' complaint. Citing Article
155(3) of the Family Code, the RTC ruled
that even assuming that the subject
property is a family home, the exemption
from execution does not apply. A
mortgage was constituted over the subject
property to secure the loan Araceli
obtained from Claudio and it was levied
upon as payment therefor.
The petitioners sought reconsideration of
the RTC's September 3, 2002 Decision but
this was denied in a Resolution[12] dated
January 14, 2003.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's
disposition in its Decision[13] dated June 6,
2008. The CA ratiocinated that the
exemption of a family home from
execution, attachment or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code is not
automatic and should accordingly be
raised and proved to the Sheriff prior to
the execution, forced sale or attachment.
The appellate court noted that at no time
did the petitioners raise the supposed
exemption of the subject property from
execution on account of the same being a
family home.
The petitioners then sought
reconsideration of the said June 6, 2008
Decision but the same was denied by the
CA in its Resolution[14]dated October 23,
2008.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant
petition for review, praying for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-221755 (M).
They insist that the execution sale that was
conducted is a nullity considering that the
subject property is a family home. The
petitioners assert that, contrary to the
disposition of the CA, a prior
demonstration that the subject property is
a family home is not required before it can
be exempted from execution.
In their Comment,[15] Spouses Acero
claimed that this petition ought to be
denied on the ground of forum-shopping
as the issues raised had already been
determined by the MTC in its July 22,
1999 Decision on the complaint for
ejectment filed by them, which had
already become final and executory
following the petitioner's failure to appeal
the CA's December 21, 2006 Decision
affirming it.
Issues
The threshold issues for resolution are the
following: (a) whether the petitioners are
guilty of forum-shopping; and (b) whether
the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel
Claudio's Torrens title TCT No. T-221755
(M) over the subject property.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Forum-Shopping
On the first issue, we find that the
petitioners are not guilty of forum-
shopping.
There is forum-shopping when as a result
of an adverse decision in one forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a
favorable opinion in another forum
through means other than an appeal
or certiorari. Forum-shopping exists when
two or more actions involve the same
transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances; and raise identical causes
of action, subject matter, and issues.[16]
Forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present,
and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other.
The elements of forum-shopping are: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties
as would represent the same interest in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
of the two preceding particulars such that
any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.[17]
There is no identity of issues and reliefs
prayed for in the ejectment case and in the
action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M).
Verily, the primordial issue in the
ejectment case is who among the
contending parties has a better right of
possession over the subject property while
ownership is the core issue in an action to
cancel a Torrens title.
It is true that the petitioners raised the
issue of ownership over the subject
property in the ejectment case. However,
the resolution thereof is only provisional
as the same is solely for the purpose of
determining who among the parties
therein has a better right of possession
over the subject property.

Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an
ejectment case is not a bar to action
between the same parties respecting title
to the land or building. Neither shall it be
conclusive as to the facts therein. This
issue is far from being novel and there is
no reason to depart from this Court's
previous pronouncements. In Malabanan
v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.,[18] this
Court had previously clarified that a
decision in an ejectment case is not res
judicata in an annulment of title case and
vice-versa given the provisional and
inconclusive nature of the determination
of the issue of ownership in the former.
Forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present,
namely: (a) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amounts to res judicata in the
other.
Petitioner and respondent are the same
parties in the annulment and ejectment
cases. The issue of ownership was likewise
being contended, with same set of
evidence being presented in both cases.
However, it cannot be inferred that a
judgment in the ejectment case would
amount to res judicata in the annulment
case, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel one. It has
been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating
the principle that a judgment rendered in
an ejectment case shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title
to the land or building nor shall it be
conclusive as to the facts therein found in
a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving
possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment
suits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. However, the issue of ownership
may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is
entitled to possession de facto. Therefore,
the provisional determination of
ownership in the ejectment case cannot be
clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether
a pending action for annulment would
abate an ejectment suit must be resolved
in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of
the same property does not bar the filing
or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor
suspend the proceedings. This is so
because an ejectment case is simply
designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to
one who has been illegally or forcibly
deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims
of juridical possession in appropriate
proceedings.[19] (citations omitted)
Second Issue: Nullification of TCT
No. T-221755 (M)
Anent the second issue, this Court finds
that the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for nullification of
TCT No. T-221755 (M).
The subject property is a family
home.
The petitioners maintain that the subject
property is a family home and,
accordingly, the sale thereof on execution
was a nullity. In Ramos v.
Pangilinan,[20] this Court laid down the
rules relative to exemption of family
homes from execution:

For the family home to be exempt from
execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must
be complied with by the judgment debtor
or his successors claiming such
privilege.Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable.
If the family home was
constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3,
1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-
judicially as provided under Articles
225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Judicial constitution of the family
home requires the filing of a verified
petition before the courts and the
registration of the court's order with the
Registry of Deeds of the area where the
property is located.Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and
involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered
with the Registry ofProperty.Failure to
comply with either one of these two modes
of constitution will bar a judgment debtor
from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there
is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the timeit was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually
resides therein. Moreover, the family
home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have beenwithconsent of the other,
and its valuemustnotexceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where
it is located. Further, the debts incurred
for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must
have been incurred after August 3,
1988.[21] (citations omitted)
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters
Products, Inc.,[22] we stressed that:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code (August 3, 1988) are
constituted as such by operation of
law. All existing family residences as
of August 3, 1988 are considered
family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family
Code.[23] (emphasis supplied and citation
omitted)
The foregoing rules on constitution of
family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution, could be summarized as
follows:
First, family residences constructed
before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted
as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed
to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a
family residence sometime in January
1987. There was no showing, however,
that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family
home in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became a family home by
operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The
petitioners were thus correct in asserting
that the subject property was a family
home.
The family home's exemption from
execution
must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public
auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property
is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, we
nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in
dismissing the petitioners' complaint for
nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We
agree with the CA that the petitioners
should have asserted the subject property
being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it
was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:
In the light of the facts above summarized,
it is evident that appellants did not assert
their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable
time, for purposes of the law on
exemption, does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period provided
for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court for judgment debtors to redeem the
property sold on execution, otherwise it
would render nugatory final bills of sale on
execution and defeat the very purpose of
execution to put an end to litigation. x x
x.[24]
The foregoing disposition is in accord with
the Court's November 25, 2005 Decision
in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,[25] where
it was categorically stated that at no other
time can the status of a residential house
as a family home can be set up and proved
and its exemption from execution be
claimed but before the sale thereof at
public auction:
While it is true that the family home is
constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence
and is exempt from execution or forced
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code,
such claim for exemption should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of
the property at public auction. Failure to
do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption. As this Court
ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not
prescribe the period within which to claim
the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless,
well-settled that the right of exemption is
a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
debtor himself at the time of the levy or
within a reasonable period thereafter;
"In the absence of express provision it has
variously held that claim (for exemption)
must be made at the time of the levy if the
debtor is present, that it must be made
within a reasonable time, or promptly, or
before the creditor has taken any step
involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time
before sale, or within a reasonable time
before the sale, or before the sale has
commenced, but as to the last there is
contrary authority."
In the light of the facts above summarized,
it is self-evident that appellants did not
assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable
time, for purposes of the law on
exemption, does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period provided
for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court for judgment debtors to redeem the
property sold on execution, otherwise it
would render nugatory final bills of sale on
execution and defeat the very purpose of
execution to put an end to litigation. We
said before, and We repeat it now, that
litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. We now rule that claims for
exemption from execution of properties
under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court must be presented before its sale on
execution by the sheriff.[26](citations
omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing
in Spouses Versola v. Court of
Appeals,[27] this Court stated that:
Under the cited provision, a family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family
residence; there is no need to constitute
the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to
exemption or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it
must be claimed not by the sheriff,
but by the debtor himself before the
sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home. This
claim for exemption must be set up
and proved to the Sheriff. x x
x.[28](emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)
Having failed to set up and prove to the
sheriff the supposed exemption of the
subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are
barred from raising the same. Failure to
do so estop them from later claiming the
said exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred
symbol of family love and is the repository
of cherished memories that last during
one's lifetime.[29] It is likewise without
dispute that the family home, from the
time of its constitution and so long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
is generally exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment.[30]
The family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special
cases.[31] However, this right can be waived
or be barred by laches by the failure to set
up and prove the status of the property as
a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the
petitioners allowed a considerable time to
lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its
exemption from execution and forced sale
under the Family Code. The petitioners
allowed the subject property to be levied
upon and the public sale to proceed. One
(1) year lapsed from the time the subject
property was sold until a Final Deed of
Sale was issued to Claudio and, later,
Araceli's Torrens title was cancelled and a
new one issued under Claudio's name,
still, the petitioner remained silent. In
fact, it was only after the respondents filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer, or
approximately four (4) years from the time
of the auction sale, that the petitioners
claimed that the subject property is a
family home, thus, exempt from
execution.
For all intents and purposes, the
petitioners' negligence or omission to
assert their right within a reasonable time
gives rise to the presumption that they
have abandoned, waived or declined to
assert it. Since the exemption under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same
within the prescribed period and it is not
the sheriff's duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family
home.
The petitioners' negligence or omission
renders their present assertion doubtful; it
appears that it is a mere afterthought and
artifice that cannot be countenanced
without doing the respondents injustice
and depriving the fruits of the judgment
award in their favor. Simple justice and
fairness and equitable considerations
demand that Claudio's title to the property
be respected. Equity dictates that the
petitioners are made to suffer the
consequences of their unexplained
negligence.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT
No. 221755 (M) and other documents, and
the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SALAZAR VS FELIAS
[ GR No. 213972, Feb 05, 2018 ]
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR v.
REMEDIOS FELIAS +
DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
The movant's claim that his/her property
is exempt from execution for being the
family home is not a magic wand that
will freeze the court's hand and forestall
the execution of a final and executory
ruling. It is imperative that the claim for
exemption must be set up and proven.
This treats of the petition for review on
certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision[2]dated December 62013, and
Resolution[3] dated August 7, 2014,
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97309, which affirmed
the execution of the final and executory
judgment issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan
(RTC Branch 55).
The Antecedent Facts
On February 28, 1990, private respondent
Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of
Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages against the
Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo)
and Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former
sought to recover from the latter four
parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno,
Pangasinan (subject property).
On March 3, 1997, during the trial of the
case, Romualdo died.
Consequently, on July 6, 1998, a Motion
for Substitution[4] was filed by the
decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children
Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa,
Recto Lastimosa (Recto), Rizalina Ramirez
(Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino
Lastimosa (Heirs ofLastimosa).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55
rendered a Decision,[5] declaring the Heirs
of Nivera as the absolute owners of the
parcels of land in question, and thereby
ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate
the lands and to surrender possession
thereof. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the RTC Branch 55, reads:
WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court
renders judgment:
a. Declaring the [Heirs of Nivera] absolute
owners of the parcels of land in question
as described in the Amended Complaint,
and ordering the [Heirs of Lastimosa] to
surrender possession thereof and vacate
the same;
b. Ordering the [Heirs of Lastimosa],
jointly and severally, to pay the [Heirs of
Nivera] actual damages in the amount of
Php 270,000.00 for 1975 to 1995, and Php
10,000.00 annually from 1996 and
through all the subsequent years until
actual possession shall have been restored
to the [Heirs of Nivera]; attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in the amount of
Php 21,000.00; and costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Heirs of Lastimosa did not file an
appeal against the trial court's ruling.
Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas),
daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto
and Rizalina filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment dated June 22,
2006 with the CA. Felicitas sought the
nullification of the RTC Branch 55's
Decision dated March 16, 2004, and the
corresponding Writs of Execution and
Demolition issued pursuant thereto.[7] In
her Petition for Annulment of Judgment,
Felicitas claimed that she was deprived of
due process when she was not impleaded
in the case for Recovery of Ownership,
before the RTC Branch 55.[8]
On June 5, 2008, the Former Tenth
Division of the CA rendered a
Decision,[9] in CA-G.R. SP No. 95592,
dismissing the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment. The CA refused to give
credence to the contention that the Heirs
of Nivera are at fault for failing to implead
Felicitas as a party defendant in the action
for recovery of ownership. Rather, the
failure to include Felicitas in the
proceedings was due to the fault of the
Heirs of Lastimosa, who neglected to
include her (Felicitas) in their Motion to
Substitute. The CA further ratiocinated
that since the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the original defendants
Romualdo and Felisa, the outcome of the
case is binding on all their heirs or any
such persons claiming rights under
them.[10]
On June 3, 2009, this Court affirmed the
CA decision in the Petition for Annulment
of Judgment.[11] The Court's ruling became
final, as per Entry of Judgment, on
October 5, 2009.
Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed
with the RTC Branch 55 an Urgent Motion
to Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making
Demolition dated April 24, 2010. The
Motion to Desist was premised on the fact
that the Sheriff cannot execute the lower
court's decision considering that Felicitas
had an aliquot share over the property,
which had not yet been partitioned.[12]
At about the same time, the Heirs of
Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and
Demolition dated May 28, 2010. The
Motion for Execution was anchored on the
fact that the Decision dated March 16,
2004, in the case for recovery of
ownership, possession and damages had
long attained finality.[13]
On July 9, 2010, the RTC Branch 55 issued
an Order granting the Motion for
Execution and Demolition, and denying
the Motion to Desist.[14] The dispositive
portion of the order reads:
After going over the allegations in both
motions, the Court resolves to deny the
motion, to order the Sheriff to desist from
making demolition filed by the defendants
through counsel, it appearing that the
grounds raised in the said motion are
already mooted by the subsequent filing of
the motion for execution and demolition
filed by plaintiff through counsel.
The motion for execution and demolition
is hereby granted.
Accordingly, let [a] Writ of Execution and
Demolition issue to satisfy judgement
rendered in this case.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Heirs of
Lastimosa[16] filed an appeal before the CA,
questioning the Writ of Execution and
Demolition issued by the lower court.
On December 6, 2013, the Fifteenth
Division of the CA rendered the assailed
Decision[17] dismissing the appeal on the
following grounds, to wit: (i) the Heirs of
Lastimosa availed of the wrong remedy by
filing an appeal, instead of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65; (ii) the
matter pertaining to the non-inclusion of
Felicitas is already barred by res judicata,
as it has been settled with finality in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95592, and affirmed by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 185056; and
(iii) the execution of the decision rendered
by the RTC Branch 55 is proper
considering that case has long attained
finality. The dispositive portion of the
assailed CA decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED.
The assailed Order dated April 6, 2011 is
AFFIRMED.[18]
Felicitas filed a Motion for
Reconsideration against the same
Decision, which was denied by the CA in
its Resolution[19] dated August 7, 2014.
Undeterred, Felicitas filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari[20] under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the assailed CA
decision and resolution.
The Issue
The main issue for this Court's resolution
rests on whether the CA erred in ordering
the execution of the Decision dated March
16, 2004.
In seeking the reversal of the assailed
decision, Felicitas claims that the Writ of
Execution and Demolition issued by the
RTC Branch 55 was executed against the
wrong party.[21] She points out that she
was not impleaded in the case for recovery
of ownership and possession, and thus the
decision cannot bind her.[22] Felicitas
argues that she was deprived of her
property as an heir without due process, as
she was left out of the proceedings,
"completely unable to protect her
rights."[23] In addition, Felicitas contends
that the execution cannot continue as the
Writ of Execution is being enforced
against property that is exempt from
execution, as what is sought to be
demolished is her family home. In this
regard, Article 155 of the Family Code
ordains that the family home shall be
exempt from execution.[24]
On the other hand, the Heirs of Nivera
counter that the petition for review
on certiorari is nothing but a dilatory
tactic employed by Felicitas to overthrow
and delay the execution of the judgment
rendered in as early as March 16,
2004.[25] The Heirs of Nivera maintain
that Felicitas' claim that she was deprived
of her property as an heir without due
process of law has already been settled
with finality in the Petition for Annulment
of Judgement, which was dismissed by the
CA, and this Court.[26] Likewise, anent the
claim that the subject property is exempt
from execution, the Heirs of Nivera aver
that Felicitas failed to present an iota of
evidence to prove her claim. On the
contrary, Felicitas herself admitted in her
pleadings that she does not reside in the
subject property in Alaminos, but actually
lives in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[27] Moreover,
the subject property belonged to the Heirs
of Nivera in as early as the 1950s, thereby
negating Felicitas' claim that it is her
family home.[28]
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that
a judgment that is final and executory is
immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in any respect, except
when the judgment is void, or to correct
clerical errors or to make nunc pro
tunc entries. In the same vein, the decision
that has attained finality becomes the law
of the case, regardless of any claim that it
is erroneous. Any amendment or
alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, including the
entire proceedings held for that
purpose.[29] Accordingly, the court cannot
refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a
final and executory judgment, or quash it,
or stay its implementation.[30]
Concomitantly, neither may the parties
object to the execution by raising new
issues of fact or law. The only exceptions
thereto are when: "(i) the writ of execution
varies the judgment; (ii) there has been a
change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust;
(iii) execution is sought to be enforced
against property exempt from execution;
(iv) it appears that the controversy has
been submitted to the judgment of the
court; (v) the terms of the judgment are
not clear enough and there remains room
for interpretation thereof; or (vi) it
appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the
writ was issued without authority."[31]
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that
in as early as March 16, 2004, the RTC
Branch 55 of Alaminos, Pangasinan
rendered a Decision in the case for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages, ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa
to vacate the subject properties and
surrender them to the Heirs of Nivera.
There is no dispute that this ruling of the
RTC had become final and executory.
Pursuant thereto, the lower court issued a
Writ of Execution and Demolition.
This notwithstanding, Felicitas seeks to
prevent the execution of the same order,
arguing that the writ was issued against
the wrong party; and that the property
sought to be executed is exempt from
execution.
The Court is not persuaded.
It must be noted at the outset that the
matter of whether Felicitas was deprived
of due process of law for not having been
impleaded in the case for recovery of
ownership and possession has long been
settled with finality.
In the decision of the CA in the case for
Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-
G.R. SP No. 95592),[32] the Former Tenth
Division of the CA squarely and
judiciously passed upon the issue of
whether the. judgment of the lower court
in the action for recovery of ownership
and possession was void for failure to
implead Felicitas. The CA held that:
Finally, the intimation of the petitioners
that private respondent is at fault for
failing to implead [Felicitas] as party
defendant in this case is patently without
basis. It must be recalled that the lower
court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the original defendants Romualdo and
Feliza Lastimosa. Hence, the outcome of
this case is binding on all the heirs or
persons claiming rights under the said
defendants. When [Romualdo] died on
March 3, 1997, the defendants filed an
Urgent Motion to Substitute Other Heirs
of the said defendant listing the names of
the heirs to be substituted. It is therefore
crystal clear that if [Felicitas] was not
impleaded in this case as party defendant
being the daughter of [Romualdo], that
omission could not be attributed to the
private respondent but the defendants
themselves.[33] (Underscoring in the
original)
This ruling of the CA was affirmed by this
Court in the Resolution dated June 3,
2009, and attained finality as per Entry of
Judgment. Markedly, it is crystal clear that
the issues pertaining to Felicitas' non-
inclusion in the proceedings, and the
consequent validity of the lower court's
judgment have long attained finality. It
bears reiterating that a judgment that is
final and executory cannot be altered, even
by the highest court of the land. This final
judgment has become the law of the case,
which is now immutable.
Additionally, as an heir of the original
defendants in the action for recovery of
ownership, Felicitas is bound by the
decision rendered against her
predecessors-in-interest. Thus, there is
nothing that exempts her from the
enforcement of the Writ ofExecution.
In another attempt to thwart the execution
of the RTC's final and executory judgment,
Felicitas claims that the execution cannot
proceed, as the subject property is her
family home and is therefore exempt from
execution.
Indeed, the family home is a real right
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated. It confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such
properties.[34] It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.[35]
However, the claim that the property is
exempt from execution for being the
movant's family home is not a magic wand
that will freeze the court's hand and
forestall the execution of a final and
executory ruling. It must be noted that it is
not sufficient for the claimant to merely
allege that such property is a family home.
Whether the claim is premised under the
Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the
claim for exemption must be set up and
proved.[36]
In fact, in Ramos, et al. v. Pangilinan, et
al.,[37] the Court, citing Spouses Kelley, Jr.
v. Planters Products, Inc., et al.,[38] laid
down the rules relative to the levy on
execution of the family home, viz.:
No doubt, a family home is generally
exempt from execution provided it was
duly constituted as such. There must be
proof that the alleged family home was
constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or by an unmarried head of a family.
It must be the house where they and their
family actually reside and the lot on which
it is situated. The family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, or
of the exclusive properties of either spouse
with the latter's consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the
family. The actual value of the family
home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural
areas.[39]
In addition, residence in the family home
must be actual. The law explicitly
mandates that the occupancy of the family
home, either by the owner thereof, or by
any of its beneficiaries must be actual.
This occupancy must be real, or actually
existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely
presumptive or constructive.[40]
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential
tenets, it becomes all too apparent that
Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that
the subject property is her family home,
sans sufficient evidence proving her
allegation. It bears emphasis that it is
imperative that her claim must be backed
with evidence showing that the home was
indeed (i) duly constituted as a family
home, (ii) constituted jointly by the
husband and wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, (iii) resided in by the
family (or any of the family home's
beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with
the latter's consent, or property of the
unmarried head of the family, and (v) has
an actual value of Php 300,000.00 in
urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural
areas.
A perusal of the petition, however, shows
that aside from her bare allegation,
Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate
her claim that the property sought to be
executed is indeed her family home.
Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her
Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 23, 2013, and her Petition for
Annulment of Judgment dated June 22,
2006, that she is, and has always been a
resident of Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija.[41] Similarly, the address indicated in
Felicitas' petition for review
on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[42]
Equally important, the Court takes judicial
notice of the final ruling of the RTC
Branch 55 in the case for recovery of
ownership, that the subject property has
belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the
1950s.[43] This automatically negates
Felicitas' claim that the property is her
family home.
Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the
property subject of the writ of execution is
a family home, is an unsubstantiated
allegation that cannot defeat the binding
nature of a final and executory judgment.
Thus, the Writ of Execution and
Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55
must perforce be given effect.
In fine, an effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that
once a judgment has become final, the
winning party should not be deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. The case at bar
reveals the attempt of the losing party to
thwart the execution of a final and
executory judgment, rendered by. the
court thirteen (13) long years ago. The
Court cannot sanction such vain and
obstinate attempts to forestall the
execution of a final ruling. It is high time
that the case be settled with finality and
the ruling of the RTC Branch 55 be given
full force and effect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated
December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated
August 7, 2014, rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97309
are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.