"Appellant Wilson G.
Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
Psychological Incapacity
RENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There
is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage
between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig
City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best
interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this
Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu
at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh.
A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
1
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command
in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on
the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine
Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a
discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702
Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired
from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in
1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not
however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that
their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and
a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat
her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling"
and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make
deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994,
when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she
did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she
saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat]
her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the
children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them
(Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D.,
for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the
appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find
work to support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and
their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not
been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated
in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of
the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code
and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any
psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about
the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the
interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the
parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged
in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at
all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity
which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the
incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's
consideration the following issues:
2
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set
aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the
demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various
tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been
brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had
not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the
application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to
in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -
not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
 given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of
the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
3
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner,
the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced
that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which
the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law,
this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation
in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
 In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for
her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed
Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
decision 1
Before us is a petition for review of the dated August 20, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family.
After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded.
Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no
longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996,
respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12,
1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio
15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive
pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
4
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report
finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that
the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the
trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex
parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named
parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his
daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the
needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the
Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his
wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such
behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability
of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter
a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with
the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to
"observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party
to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution?
Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them
cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina 8and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case
involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of
error:
I the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove
the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and
his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations.
Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the
ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
5
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved
Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for
and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He
made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule,
there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that
medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements
in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves
a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an
alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application
of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical
rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
6
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable
social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we
commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband
may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to
the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational
as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty
spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26
years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their
first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the
Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December
1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly
died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage
was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of
her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted
to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the
same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that
effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales
of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from
Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise
realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected
with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought
a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it
from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items
and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no
longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991.
He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change,
he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede
(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests
they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective,
shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed
that respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They
further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological.
It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
7
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she
was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because
she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling
her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson,
and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her
and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the
Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos
was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was
the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her
husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child
prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself
conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated
that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence
of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good
liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and
held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of
the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment.
While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest
with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of
the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by
the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of
petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions
of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony
which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of
the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as
the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the
state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards
set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s
1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there
was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court
definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated
under Article 36.
8
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that
the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as
the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous
on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose
the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar
for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground
for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a
ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was
cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was
permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of
the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring
a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a
party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of
consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of
the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the
Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent
to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent
to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of
the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of
the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential
marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to
the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
"[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase
reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it
has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the
Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency
in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment
of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity
may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even
canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the
deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
9
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not
set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall
rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the
interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged
that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon
law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem
of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent
under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon
law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of
the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t],"
and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject
of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it
may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted
by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed
as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages
ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present
petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized
in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The
Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and
the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation
in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
10
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to
our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding
on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event,
both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough.
Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a
preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is
impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even
if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among
the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further
linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of
psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at
least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I
can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the
standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent,
constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on
11
assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of
the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations
of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is
also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship
is based on communication between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far
as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the
third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been
calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of
the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes,
what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in
extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the
fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity
of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that
[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity
on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s
testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these
witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already
held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by
the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version
as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the
veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s
expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She
has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not
in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner.
In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love,
trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage.
More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly
be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less
its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly
tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability
to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the
12
nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the
marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend
what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be
accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the
consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of
respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68,
in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the
trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which
held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated
30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In
fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective
when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly
inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or
serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent
made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts
that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined
the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient
evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not
only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify
the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case.
They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the
trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate
court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this
matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that
such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that
Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable
feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert
witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial
court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired
well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not
expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January
1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family
Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before
13
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during
the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the
view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether
respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the
courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply
because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and
the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we
apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those presently on
appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their
expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It
would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or
clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no
impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case
was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the
petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an
integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it
does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision [1] of the
with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the
the January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the
Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a reconsideration of the challenged decision.
desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No
costs. Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of

SO ORDERED. respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the

Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a

boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January

1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No. 161793
freshman.[3]
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood
Chairperson, one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO, other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting,
Respondent, NACHURA, and
Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that
PERALTA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent.
Oppositor. Promulgated:
Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their
February 13, 2009travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their

pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And

they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
DECISION Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home.

NACHURA, J.: As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,

threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject

of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however,

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to
with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has
get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity
continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a
should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was
prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also
formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At

one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who

14

suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward
talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that
he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas
uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena
and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by
his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106,
for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11,
2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to
investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. [12] In the
meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and
assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both
parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and
conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino
male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian
at Manila. He finished two years in college
at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently
15
unemployed. He is married to and separated from
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at
my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to
his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He
is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in
business and one deceased sister. Both his parents
are also in the business world by whom he [considers]
as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues
are said to be handed to each of the family
member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be
afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck
in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as
well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in
the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a
full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is]
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and
hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite
having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is
said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and
shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend
prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness
to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly
retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they
would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent
seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already
bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not
able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job
but could not find any so it was suggested by
respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioners parents.When the parties arrived at
the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all
out of the country so respondent decided to go back
to her home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at their home. After a few days of
separation, respondent called petitioner by phone
and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner
responded immediately and when he arrived at their
house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why
he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally
and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner
got scared so he went home again.Respondent would
call by phone every now and then and became angry
as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case
against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be
able to make amends and at this point in time[,]
respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,]
out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify
her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle
brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very
same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never
applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at
their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways
with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should
perish, the authorities should look for him at his
parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.Sometime in June
of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went
home. He told his parents about his predicament and
they forgave him and supported him by giving him
military escort.Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner
was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner
offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioners parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed
that she would only live with him if they will have a
separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he
should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that]
the petitioner already settled his differences with his
own family. When respondent refused to live with
petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing
the home of his parents. He told her already that he
was disinherited and since he also does not have a
job, he would not be able to support her. After
knowing that petitioner does not have any money
anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner
and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is
said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both
parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young
age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and
16
fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,]
is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the
search of what he wants in life.He is absconded as an
introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a
lack of interest in social interactions and mingling
with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind
of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the
respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious
type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she
thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring
her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used
force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that
there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds
her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really
get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be
taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the
case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it
is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the
point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her
strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
 suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it
started since childhood and only manifested during during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the
marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for trial court orders and notices.[27]
them to take.[15]

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the

Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The

ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the

with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported

OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18] incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements

Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological

incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on

examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and

by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be void.[31]

I.
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the

evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and
Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the
charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower

court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or

opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. [23] The CA later denied Article 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
2004 Resolution.[24]
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant

petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds
memoranda.[25]
available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero

elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]

In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in

substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the However, as a member of both the Family
Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then
incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro

17
traced the background of the inclusion of the present conjugal
Article 36 in the Family Code. and family
life. It is an
During its early inviolable
meetings, the Family Law social
Committee had thought of institution
including a chapter on absolute whose
divorce in the draft of a new nature,
Family Code (Book I of the Civil consequenc
Code) that it had been tasked by es, and
the IBP and the incidents
UP Law Center to prepare. In are
fact, some members of the governed
Committee were in favor of a by law and
no-fault divorce between the not subject
spouses after a number of years to
of separation, legal or de facto. stipulation,
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then except that
requested to prepare a proposal marriage
for an action for dissolution of settlements
marriage and the effects thereof may fix the
based on two grounds: (a) five property
continuous years of separation relations
between the spouses, with or during the
without a judicial decree of legal marriage
separation, and (b) whenever a within the
married person would have limits
obtained a decree of absolute provided by
divorce in another country. law.
Actually, such a proposal is one
for absolute divorce but called With the above
by another name. Later, even definition, and considering the
the Civil Code Revision Christian traditional concept of
Committee took time to discuss marriage of the Filipino people
the proposal of Justice Reyes on as a permanent, inviolable,
this matter. indissoluble social institution
upon which the family and
Subsequently, society are founded, and also
however, when the Civil Code realizing the strong opposition
Revision Committee and Family that any provision on absolute
Law Committee started holding divorce would encounter from
joint meetings on the the Catholic Church and the
preparation of the draft of the Catholic sector of our citizenry
New Family Code, they agreed to whom the great majority of
and formulated the definition of our people belong, the two
marriage as Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea
a of absolute divorce and, instead,
special opted for an action for judicial
contract of declaration of invalidity of
permanent marriage based on grounds
partnership available in the Canon Law. It
between a was thought that such an action
man and a would not only be an acceptable
woman alternative to divorce but would
entered also solve the nagging problem
into in of church annulments of
accordance marriages on grounds not
with law for recognized by the civil law of the
the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
establishme requested to again prepare a
nt of draft of provisions on such
18
action for celebration of as well as the following
invalidity of marriage. Still later, implementing provisions:
to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as A
found in the present Civil Code rt. 32. The
and those proposed by Justice absolute
Reyes on judicial declaration of nullity of a
invalidity of marriage on marriage
grounds similar to the Canon may be
Law, the two Committees now invoked or
working as a Joint Committee in pleaded
the preparation of a New Family only on the
Code decided to consolidate the basis of a
present provisions on void final
marriages with the proposals of judgment
Justice Reyes. The result was the declaring
inclusion of an additional kind of the
void marriage in the marriage
enumeration of void marriages void,
in the present Civil Code, to wit: without
prejudice to
( the
7) those provision of
marriages Article 34.
contracted
by any A
party who, rt. 33. The
at the time action or
of the defense for
celebration, the
was declaration
wanting in of the
the absolute
sufficient nullity of a
use of marriage
reason or shall not
judgment prescribe.
to
understand x
the x xx x xx x
essential x
nature of
marriage or It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
was in our country today may already be dissolved or
psychologic annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
ally or Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
mentally annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
incapacitat divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
ed to with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as
discharge well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
the of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
essential Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the
marital Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null
obligations, and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for
even if such causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear
lack or grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
incapacity is marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
made personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a
manifest family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by
after the an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
celebration. woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or
who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
19
 informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness,
drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986,
the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing
discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding
formulation above has dropped any reference to
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage and to
mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these
phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being
a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
My own position as a member of the
Committee then was that psychological incapacity is,
in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use
the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the
20
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .
Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the
majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T.
Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is
incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they
will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the
bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under special cases and special situations,
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family
Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on
Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to
circumstances existing at the time of the marriage,
such marriage which stands valid until annulled is
capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public
policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
 Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that
the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model
for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law,
Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not
recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties
as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down
by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found themselves in
limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of
the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid
civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory
solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground
for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon
Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to
be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at
least not ignorant of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
related grounds for annulment called lack of due
21
discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the
ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of
due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the
Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time
in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent
at the time of marriage was probably not present in
persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself
had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came
after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof
of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
 are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the impel a person towards sexual activities which are
marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
Law, thus: activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A
higher faculties remain intact such that a person so
sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
afflicted continues to have an adequate
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment
of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage
and the incapacity to assume the essential
freely. The question though is whether such a person
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot
the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
fulfill, although he may be able to understand
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and
them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
on the assumption that they are capable according to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not
down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of
taken by church courts were not too clear whether
the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with
this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
the psychological process of giving consent because it
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
has been established a priori that both have such a
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is
object of their consent [the house and its
prevented from properly deliberating and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning
the consent/contract which does not exist. The
supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent,
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion,
object. The consent as a psychological act is both
with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision,
valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however,
made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the
is directed towards an object which is not
necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this
a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
positing of consent but with positing the object of
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
consent. The person may be capable of positing a
intellect is always and continuously under such an
free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely
the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the
possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that
consent he elicits.
there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it
Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with
implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective
respect to marriage arising from pathological
for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of
conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in
understand as ground of nullity different from others,
a normal way and with usually regularity. It would
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
seem more correct to say that the consent may
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from
indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because
sexual anomalies.Nymphomania is a sample which
the party is consenting to an object that he cannot
ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
rubric.
fire.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous
sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a
Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
grave psychopathological condition which affects the
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did
higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and
a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to
freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are
give consent on the one hand, and the inability to
purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system,
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to
the higher faculties however, so that these persons
evaluate its implications. They would have no
are still capable of free human acts. The evidence
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
from the empirical sciences is abundant that there
22
consent. However, such persons, capable as they are
of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of
the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting
and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects
is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object
of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is
to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in
the same person with the ability to make a free
decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature
evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a capable of assuming them because of his
nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the moment of
consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes
that a person in such a condition is incapable of
assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although
she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and
evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law
in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in
some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the
faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as
moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the
impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt
with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render
the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology:
nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity
when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know
how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to
maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses
are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
23
substance of matrimony.Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good
of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks,
not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing
or contributing to the good of the other party qua
persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed
incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the
case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial
security of the other, but not capable of realizing
the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general
strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the
concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious
sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent
may have understood, on the level of the intellect,
the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of
the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment
of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is
applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a
person was in a position to assume the obligations of
marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the
inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri,
but also and especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to
assume the essential obligations of marriage in the
psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the
basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably
disturbed in the presence of this personality
disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize
and experience how others feel) is common. A sense
of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which
others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered
as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is
the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered
around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not
have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the
incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of
these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity,
narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not
very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to
say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage,
or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978,
Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said
to be unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only
to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon
that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not
necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of
full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a
mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather,
the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of
consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs
to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified
by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the
contractant. In other words, there must be a
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only
when there is something in the psyche or in the
psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated
by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to
have something rooted in his psychic constitution
which impedes the assumption of these
obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom,
however remote, in the development of the habit,
while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists
24
that the source of the incapacity must be one which
is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a
case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the
findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. [44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its
decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under
oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's
own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as
legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
 (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
25
regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the
evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate
and apart from each othershall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the
result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains
to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R.
Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic

of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to violence and incestuous rape.

its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for

annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys

another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of

milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it

substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[48] refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who

cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of

Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or

the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic

courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no

experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very

disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article

36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to

impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses

psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost,

the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial

sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson

procedure in the world.[50] The unintended consequences of Molina, learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant,

however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other

behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk

termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.

basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the

Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the

bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly

applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to

nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition

pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being

marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be

individuals.[51] judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or

generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by

remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological

contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or

fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court should rather be alarmed by the II.

26

We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital
vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship.
Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses
to give themselves to each other and to accept the
other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be
other oriented since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of
marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind,
professional opinion of a psychological expert became lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the relationship:
person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they The courts consider
were asked to give professional opinions about a the following elements crucial to
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. the marital commitment: (1) a
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to permanent and faithful
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid commitment to the marriage
consent. partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4)
The Church took pains to point out that its emotional maturity; (5) financial
new openness in this area did not amount to the responsibility; (6) an ability to
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather cope with the ordinary stresses
was an accommodation by the Church to and strains of marriage, etc.
the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
all-important connecting link between a marriage psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
breakdown and premarital causes. of a marriage:

During the 1970s, the Church broadened At stake is a type of

its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal constitutional impairment
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was precluding conjugal communion
that it could no longer be assumed in annulment even with the best intentions of
cases that a person who could intellectually the parties. Among the psychic
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily factors possibly giving rise to his
give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp or her inability to fulfill marital
and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong obligations are the following: (1)
commitment are now considered a necessary antisocial personality with its
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values;
Rotal decisions continued applying the (2) hyperesthesia, where the
concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only individual has no real freedom of
27
 sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
personal responses consistently conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
fall short of reasonable
expectations. psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it

fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute

xxxx
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an
The psychological
grounds are the best approach option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
for anyone who doubts whether psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the
he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no
A situation that does not fit into
experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the
into the psychological category.
parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
As new as the
psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment,
shift in their use. Whereas
which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties
originally the emphasis was on
the parties' inability to exercise are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality
proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
discretion), recent cases seem to
for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses
be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry personality disorders as follows
out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that
due competence). An advantage
are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
to using the ground of lack of
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are
due competence is that at the
not usually limited to isolated episodes but are
time the marriage was entered
deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe
into civil divorce and breakup of
enough to cause the individual mental stress or
the family almost always is proof
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
of someone's failure to carry out
relationships and normal functioning. Personality
marital responsibilities as
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
promised at the time the
earlier, continue through adulthood and become less
marriage was entered into.[58]
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have
more than one personality disorder at a time.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of The common factor among individuals who
have personality disorders, despite a variety of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys character traits, is the way in which the disorder
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal,
that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
without an awareness of their behaviors.Such
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other
people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such
traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced
self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for Causes of Personality Disorders Different
mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough
28
of personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that
fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his
oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and
passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were
thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships. However, later researchers have found
little evidence that early childhood events or fixation
at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found
that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of
other personality disorders. Some family, adoption
and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality
may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who
have borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is
the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at
least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19
percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into
three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric
habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.
29
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent,
obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality
disorder not otherwise specified, that can be used for
other specific personality disorders or for mixed
conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific
personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as
where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of
behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse
abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even
sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse
for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe
criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of
self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
 During the 19th century, this type of personality manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term suicide.
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
According to the classification system used in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23,
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality
disorder is one of the four dramatic personality 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19,
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30,
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage
2001, REINSTATED.
of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological

incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
SO ORDERED.
view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, G.R. No. 166579

Petitioner,
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
Present:
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he BRION,
is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), PEREZ, JJ.
JEANICE PAVON PAZ,
tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
Respondent.
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are Promulgated:
February 18, 2010
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
x--------------------------------------------------x
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears

of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed

DECISION
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,

weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive

self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. CARPIO, J.:

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the The Case

respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes

her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes
into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case,
This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November
2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its
9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner
Jordan Chan Pazs (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted
respondent Jeanice Pavon Pazs (Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied Jordans motion for reconsideration.

respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in

The Facts

30
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19
years old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a
couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their
civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September
1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February
1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their conjugal home on 23 February
1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to
Jeanice, Jordans psychological incapacity was manifested by his
uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well
as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims
and caprices were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts
and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with
his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would
allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie
to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan
was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to
their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more
time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan
also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for
their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but
that the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly
violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair
of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan
subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with
a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any financial
support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted
with Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive
behavior, delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that
Jordans psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in
his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation,
Jordans personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT
JEANICE EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS AGAINST HIM. JORDAN SAID
THAT JEANICE HAS HER OWN PERSONAL INSECURITIES AND THAT HER
ACTIONS SHOWED HER LACK OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND
EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE STRUGGLES AND CHALLENGES
OF MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.
JORDAN ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT OFFERED BY
JEANICE. JORDAN POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY
INTERVIEW OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS BY GATES. JORDAN ARGUED THAT
GATES CONCLUSIONS WERE MERE SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND
SUPPOSITIONS FROM THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY JEANICE. JORDAN
ALLEGED THAT IT WAS PATENTLY ONE-SIDED AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AS IT WAS BASED ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JEANICE
WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY SELF-SERVING. JORDAN SAID HE WANTS
JEANICE BACK AND PRAYED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
31
ON 13 MAY 2003, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED JEANICES PETITION. THE
TRIAL COURT DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY,
WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
DISORDER, DEPRIVED HIM OF THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE MARITAL BOND. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH
THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, PARTICULARLY ARTICLES
68[6] AND 70[7] OF THE FAMILY CODE. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO DECLARED
THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, BEING ROOTED IN HIS
FAMILY BACKGROUND, ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE AND THAT WITHOUT
ANY SIGN OF REFORMATION, FOUND THE SAME TO BE GRAVE AND
INCURABLE.
THE DISPOSITVE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURTS 13 MAY 2003 DECISION
READS:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY
RENDERED DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JEANICE PAVON PAZ AND RESPONDENT
JORDAN CHAN PAZ CELEBRATED ON JULY 3, 1997
AND SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
WITH ALL THE EFFECTS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE
COUPLES ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTIES
[SIC] SHALL BE DISSOLVED IN THE MANNER HEREIN
PROVIDED. AND THE CUSTODY OVER EVAN SHALL
REMAIN WITH THE PETITIONER, WITHOUT REGARD
TO VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT AS THE
FATHER OF THE CHILD. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTIES
ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF
THEIR MINOR CHILD EVAN GUABERT PAVON PAZ.
LET COPIES OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRARS OF QUEZON CITY AND PASIG CITY RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO, CRP, LEGAL DEPARTMENT) EDSA,
QUEZON CITY.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The trial court promptly
approved Jordans appeal.
ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER MOTION, JEANICE SOUGHT THE
IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OF JORDANS APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT
JORDAN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO.
02-11-10-SC[11] WHICH PROVIDES:
SEC. 20. APPEAL.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall
be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion
for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days
from notice of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED JORDANS
APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE RULES STATE IN
MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION IS ALLOWED. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ADDED THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT ADMITS
NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION BUT MERELY FOR APPLICATION.
JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26 NOVEMBER
2004 RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED THE MOTION.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2005, WE DENIED JORDANS
PETITION FOR FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY SHOW THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE CHALLENGED
RESOLUTIONS AS TO WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS
DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION.[12]
On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While
Jordan admits that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC should not have been strictly applied against him because it
took effect only on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the
rendition of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan
enjoins the Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the
sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
JEANICE ALSO FILED AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2005.[13]
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005, WE GRANTED
JORDANS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REINSTATED THE
PETITION.[14]
JEANICE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN A MINUTE
RESOLUTION DATED 5 JUNE 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT.[15]
ON 7 AUGUST 2006, JEANICE FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2006, WE DENIED
JEANICES SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT
AND REMINDED JEANICE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING.[16]
THE ISSUE
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
THE RULING OF THIS COURT
THE PETITION HAS MERIT.
32
JEANICE FAILED TO PROVE JORDANS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
JEANICES PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
ANCHORED ON ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE WHICH PROVIDES:
A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT
THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION, WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE, SHALL LIKEWISE BE VOID EVEN IF SUCH
INCAPACITY BECOMES MANIFEST ONLY AFTER ITS
SOLEMNIZATION.
IN SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS,[17] THE COURT FIRST DECLARED THAT
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY (A) GRAVITY;
(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE; AND (C) INCURABILITY. IT MUST BE
CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO
GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE.[18]
IN DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. COURT OF APPEALS,[19] THE COURT
EXPLAINED:
(A) GRAVITY IT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS SUCH
THAT THE PARTY WOULD BE INCAPABLE OF
CARRYING OUT THE ORDINARY DUTIES REQUIRED IN
A MARRIAGE;
(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE IT MUST BE ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF THE
PARTY ANTEDATING THE MARRIAGE, ALTHOUGH THE OVERT
MANIFESTATIONS MAY EMERGE ONLY AFTER THE MARRIAGE; AND
(C) INCURABILITY IT MUST BE INCURABLE, OR EVEN IF
IT WERE OTHERWISE, THE CURE WOULD BE BEYOND
THE MEANS OF THE PARTY INVOLVED.[20]
IN GRANTING JEANICES PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT GAVE CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF GATES TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT JORDAN
WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. GATES DECLARED THAT JORDAN WAS
SUFFERING FROM BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER AS MANIFESTED
BY HIS BEING A MAMAS BOY AND THAT SUCH WAS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE, ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND, [AND] ANTEDATES
THE MARRIAGE.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE DECLARED
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED SHOULD BE PERSONALLY EXAMINED
BY A PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO
PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PERSON ALLEGING SAID DISORDER.[21]
CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF PRESUPPOSES
A THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTIES BY THE
PSYCHOLOGIST OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE,
SEVERE AND INCURABLE PRESENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[22]
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF
GATES ON JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WERE BASED
EXCLUSIVELY ON HER INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT
OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF JEANICES TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT.[23] GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED JORDAN FROM THE STATEMENTS OF
JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER CAUSE CANNOT BE
DOUBTED. GATES DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND EVALUATE
JORDAN. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q- AS A LAST QUESTION MADAM WITNESS. SO ALL IN
ALL YOUR CONCLUSIONS HERE ON PAGE 1 TO PAGE 5
OF YOUR REPORT ARE ALL BASED ON
THE STATEMENT AND PERCEPTION OF THE
PETITIONER (JEANICE) ON THE RESPONDENT
(JORDAN)?
A- YES MAM.[24]
Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she
had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying
on.[25] Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for being
unscientific and unreliable.[26]
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT, JORDANS
ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SO
GRAVE AND SO PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE AWARENESS OF
THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST,
JEANICES ALLEGATIONS SHOWED THAT JORDAN WAS IRRESPONSIBLE,
INSENSITIVE, OR EMOTIONALLY IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY
JEANICE DO NOT SHOW THAT JORDAN SUFFERED FROM GRAVE
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT PARALYZED JORDAN FROM COMPLYING
WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY,
NOT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[27] THE
MERE SHOWING OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING
PERSONALITIES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[28]
33
IN PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS,[29] WE SAID:
AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND
IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR ISOLATED
CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN
PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE IS HARDLY A
DOUBT THAT THE INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS
BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS
CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR
INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO
MARRIAGE.[30]
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior
which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality
Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality disorder
made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as
a husband.
LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT
JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR
CLINICALLY PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE
MATTER WAS VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q - NOW IS THIS DISORDER CURABLE?
A - IF ITS CONTINUING TO THE PRESENT THEREFORE ITS
PERSEVERERATIVE BEHAVIOR. THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COUNTERING
THE SAME MIGHT BE NIL.[31]
GATES DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN HOW SHE CAME TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT JORDANS CONDITION WAS INCURABLE.
IN SUM, THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY JEANICE FAILED
TO SHOW THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS AND THAT SUCH
INCAPACITY WAS GRAVE, INCURABLE, AND EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE
SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.
IN REPUBLIC V. CABANTUG-BAGUIO,[32] WE SAID:
THE CONSTITUTION SETS OUT A POLICY OF
PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING THE FAMILY AS
THE BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION AND MARRIAGE AS
THE FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY. MARRIAGE, AS
AN INVIOLABLE INSTITUTION PROTECTED BY THE
STATE, CANNOT BE DISSOLVED AT THE WHIM OF THE
PARTIES. IN PETITIONS FOR THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO
SHOW THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE LIES ON THE
PLAINTIFF. ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE AND CONTINUATION OF
THE MARRIAGE AND AGAINST ITS DISSOLUTION AND
NULLITY.[33]
WHEREFORE, WE GRANT THE PETITION. WE SET ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST CARPIO, J.:

2004 AND 26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

WE REVERSE THE 13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF PASIG, BRANCH 69. THE MARRIAGE OF JEANICE PAVON PAZ TO The Case

JORDAN CHAN PAZ SUBSISTS AND REMAINS VALID.

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006
SO ORDERED. Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice The Antecedent Facts

ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and
Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
Petitioner, They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994.
In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
P January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
resent: Las Pias City.

C On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of

ARPIO, J., Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article
Chairperson 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
, marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
- versus - NACHURA, gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him.
P
ERALTA,

A
BAD, and Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at
the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States
of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an
M
answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
ENDOZA, JJ.
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated: California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
Respondent. January 19, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there
were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was
set for trial on the merits.

DECISION

34
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from their information and guidance.
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder
was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
SO ORDERED.4
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the
marriage.
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion
and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court
ruled that even without Dr. Tayagspsychological report, the allegations in WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case rendered:
of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and
the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code.
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and
The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its
obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning;
and

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered:
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff

ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD
L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
from the beginning; and Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for
their information and guidance.5
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute
community of property.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be

The Issue
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of
the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City
The Ruling of this Court
35
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
The petition has merit. forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
We agree with petitioner.
be present:

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
other;
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. is void.9

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to petitioner and respondent.
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
co-ownership.
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted
after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his

or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the
Rule are:

36

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper
cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute
community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it
is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property,
may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed
shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the
children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered
as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
37
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of
the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated
June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision4 dated
October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte,
Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665 declaring the marriage of
respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem
(Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of
St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma.
Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma.
Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972,
respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration
of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. S-665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the
Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted
an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and
Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then
ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first
met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of
Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into
their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He
had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo"
and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the
army,12 Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without
his consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived
with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie
Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio
Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro
City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left
to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest
efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during
trial, despite service of summons.18Nonetheless, she informed the court
that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T.
Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo also
underwent the same examination.20
38
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both
Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from
"utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct."22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the
willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding
too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that
the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was bereft of the
mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an
opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by
Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated
by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family
Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage
between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding
that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern
which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed
at the time of the parties’ marriage but manifested only thereafter. It
likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that Natividad’s condition
is incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality.
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much
more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that
Natividad’s personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as
envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of
the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC,
finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological
incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to
render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations."30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a
Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article
3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely
physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 33 of the
Family Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence
(i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage);
and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). 37 The Court
laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, 38 whose
salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein
respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be
equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. 42 In the
same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against
a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that
the petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;
that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert;
and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1âwphi1 Based on the
evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even
sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail
how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted,
and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity
jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological
tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in
her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it
39
existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform
the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's
report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of
Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific
basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even
self-serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is
essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of
her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily,
although expert opm10ns furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable
weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still
be proven by independent evidence.45 After poring over the records, the
Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to
uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind,
Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife
and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would
justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared
clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 46 In the final
analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in
the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the
recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005
and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed
the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon
the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not
been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying
premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of
the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played
mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly
played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and
always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were
with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that
the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade,
he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children
were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute
that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove
her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these
nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men,
but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men.
Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent
had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in
the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for
concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the
totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and
parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected
by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It
appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
40
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial
duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,
both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s
reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the
veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which
can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves
to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to
take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the
testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to
perform their respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that
had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were
not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law
"allow some resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less
specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code
Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that
would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the
principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon
Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and
the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological
incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
41
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less
specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours"
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely
on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter,
and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or
non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final and
binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the
appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own
judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation
by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an
inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be
accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable
social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the
more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. 16 The position and
role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
42
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the
opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard
Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
petitioner’s version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and
unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead,
we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article
36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two
expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself
had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the
petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to
be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the
findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own
opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of
the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts
must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages,
for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable
the trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity
of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of
personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the
findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos 19 that
there is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an
aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should
be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that
any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her
psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’ upbringing and
psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be
considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented
here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the
trial court was expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr.
Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the
respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of
being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s
psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and
seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around people,
she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but
she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be
quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear,
critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions
contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will
abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous
value on having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy
and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that
she was the most important person in his life. She became
relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that
the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and
compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental
round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high
score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and
compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the
acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant.
So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under
compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated
the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had been
43
afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial
Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar
with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more
layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is
self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her
childhood background, her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she
was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to
partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that
paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the
fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties
and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering
that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that
Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot
blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is
a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to
indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency
to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind
of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life
when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not
satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even
though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he
could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the
part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is
self-centered and narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a
deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In her several
boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another.
There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of
neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of
the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an
advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a
consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father
Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current
trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of
psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was
derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s
level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children
and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not
psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the
records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that
claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her
immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own
children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not
psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent
pattern has been manifested running through their life made a doubt that
this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was
dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence
and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her
own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few
responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact.
How about the impact on the relationship of the respondent with her
husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her
obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her own priorities,
her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with
friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of
marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the
husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated
to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were
their priorities in her life.
44
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a
myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a
dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became
known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so
concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it
becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do
you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and
that causes serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly
esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle.
Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting
respondent was already existing at the time or marriage or even
thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological
incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes
manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And
now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of
fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or
what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the
family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and
then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the
top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even
expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the
marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically
curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found
in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure would be
incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and
her beauty was so important to give in her job and money and influence
and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her
position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and
therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure,
in going along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s
opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his
opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the
parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would
warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto
the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts
as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his
opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates
and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the
all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
45
must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice;
(3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the
time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of
strictly applying the standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider
the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the
result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took
pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all
fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied
the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina,
however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina
has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
46
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence
and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological
incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of
in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge
in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she
played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their
relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the
frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these
two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is
no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture
of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong
playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio
Teodoro Kalaw37– the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the
son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on
playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you
remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged in,
before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play
mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How
frequent, do you remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains
and I think we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think
it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She
brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by
herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling.
Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the
current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her
own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral
and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to
safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209
and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority
and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children
for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being.
47
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have
with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights
and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them
by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with
the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental
health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration
the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the
respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have
found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who
had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was
substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was
behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed
already some of those short temper of the petitioner but she was very
much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they
were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his
psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship
work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr.
Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally
immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly
stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got
pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time
he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry
lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the
petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was often out
seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also
admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my
questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite
this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer?
Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the
marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after
marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his
marriage with the respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the
petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his duties as a
husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be
fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether
the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a
husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and
that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question
again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
48
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the
nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could
establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised
the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it
is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated
with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone
or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By
now, they must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful
truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was
already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It
would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void
marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more
damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in
her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a
much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner
to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her
marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the
Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly,
facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which
he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction
for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to
non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his
marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never
existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence,
the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage
between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic
foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union
that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All
too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject
of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it
may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action
in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CF
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the
49
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which
dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C.
Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang,
Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).[2] Three children were born to them,
namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),[3] Lyra, born on May
22, 1985 (Exh. C),[4] and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).[5]
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity
of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the
time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his
obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the
duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the
family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be
awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the
sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the
jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal
home on June 12, 1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file
his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion
between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on
November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of
collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.[8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as
follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine
Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years
older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching
zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her
student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in
February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents teacher.On
January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His
parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances
and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioners salary
as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner
augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as
engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice andpolvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable
job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by
delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a
spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private
respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and
betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child,
petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena
to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose
husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private
respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with
private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the
affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home
and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came
back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents
infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent
was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin,
Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed
only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early
retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in
retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the
family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the
entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his
smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner
discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different
women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie,
who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay,
a secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite,
with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he
had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his
relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was
confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite
on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).[11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private
respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both
received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote,
Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G &
H).[12]
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument,
private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year
old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was
never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh.
J)[13] with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the
latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On
May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of
interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh.
K)[14] was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)[15] was duly
issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter[16] to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact
that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter,
petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type
jeepney[17] and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of
them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to file a
petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to
petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and
their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent
left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had
been unknown.
50
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the
Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition
for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner
introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers
sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent
who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to
be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In
November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary
sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade
petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then
unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during
the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private
respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at
night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a
habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and
continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner
was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private
respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk
to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their
marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his
children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing
the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by
the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as
valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family
Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of
the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the
petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years
after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The
provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in
conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful
reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of
this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground,
as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by
the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing
the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage,
must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic
sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are
not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to
prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly,
petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the
psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her
respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was admittedly
several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to
be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant
even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened
after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court
of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO
51
THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER
CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner
and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
petitioner failed to show that private respondents psychological incapacity
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the
fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest
only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the
annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
 In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations,
petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no
evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not
cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely
physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private
respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private
respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college.After
his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the
early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire
amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life,
private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look
for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later
abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents
condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and
defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the
appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra)
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity,
if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent
Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with
regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
52
even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass
upon petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of
children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of
exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters
may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal
separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children
which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130,
which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be
null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met
sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod
City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March
1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still
a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country
on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six
months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City
until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they
finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two
months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on
vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old
Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to
perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and
violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.When cautioned
to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap
and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the
conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they
could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner
decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a
chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent
assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the
children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to
medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which
diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against
respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of
imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for
good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an
apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological
incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children
and prayed for support pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As
respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the
reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look
into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on
03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no
evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of
court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the
court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with
petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of
Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal
property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he
was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial
court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there
was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his
motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and
subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the
appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article
68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital
responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in
Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as
53
the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be
applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to
be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner
argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant
only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and
not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not
err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has
been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has
been so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been
explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court,
in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who
have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is
an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively
recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped
jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court
has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided
procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases
for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina
has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State
cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in
her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to
it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner vs. MANUEL
SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January
2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco (respondent Manuel).
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco (Petitioner Juanita) and
respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before
the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could
not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married
life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged
that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering
and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents,
the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other
trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige
and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that
she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house
within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she
perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even
54
if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond
the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured
and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is
still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he
invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his
paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent
Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she
supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy
childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,[3] the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took
the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He
testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still
harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.[4] The early years of
their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted
as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife
started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental[5] to him and
his parents.[6] She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the
common source of their quarrels.[7] He, however, characterized their
union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to
Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house. [8] In 1981,
when he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift
apart.[9] He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were
greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;[10] when she would visit him in his
office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked
a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his
table;[11] when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he
was away;[12] when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused
the tenant of having an affair with him;[13] and other incidents reported to
him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to
be a source of bitter quarrels.[14] Respondent Manuel could not forget that
he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife
did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very
generous when it came to celebrations of their parish
priest.[15] Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer[16] or
that he had a mistress.[17] Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their
conjugal properties and obligations.[18]
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified
that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels office. [19] But
when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the
curtains and the cleanliness of the office.[20] One time, witness
remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels
drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending
a conference.[21] When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer
she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone
number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was
requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the
locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998,
witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent
Manuel sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?[22]
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA
GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted
by petitioner Juanita.[23] From her psychiatric evaluation,[24] Dr. Garcia
concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner
relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital
bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is
secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita
had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence
to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who
are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and
differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative,
depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance
and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine
ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused
to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize
the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological
repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately
empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and
feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the
fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of
maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not
otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will
bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid
sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be
pervasive and impervious to recovery.[25]
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels
allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their
own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent
Manuel started having extra-marital affairs[26] which he had admitted to
her.[27] Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her
marriage and that she truly loved her husband.[28] She stated further that
she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him
while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he
already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.[29] She
remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway,
respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.[30]
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel,[31] testified that he conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were
embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco,
was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly
55
intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough
psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful
of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage.
She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing
woman who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in
her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore
capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to
be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.[32]
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992
described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.[33] The
couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.[34] Both were likewise leaders in their community.[35] Witness
then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and, as
late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.[36]
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita
holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married
and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life
together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the
early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the
plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to
the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as
our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes
may sound like a firetruck. [37]
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order
dated 04 May 2001.[38]
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision,
relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both
Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.[39] Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there
is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amore gignit
amorem, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set
aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have
his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity,
not only of defendant but also of himself.[40]
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH
IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION
UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN
BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V.
MOLINA
IV.IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag[41] is apropos. There, we
held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially
on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on all fours with
another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming
Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In
Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed
from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their
separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed
the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife
for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code
is procreation such that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue
herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly
embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his
wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet irritants
and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and
56
his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of
petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her
do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals[42] where we declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant
to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability.[43] In Republic v. Court of Appeals[44] we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.[45]
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve
the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita
and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.[46]With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals[47] that the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own
evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in
the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the
essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador In spite of what he
has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra
marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl
now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file
the petition. She feels that the problems in the relationship is
[sic] paulit-ulit, but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family. She answered and said,
Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin.[48]
57
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as
from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only
essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.[49]Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.[50] It must be shown that respondent
Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state[51] and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a
child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has
admitted that: I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a
child at that particular point.[52]
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at
bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability
to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that
paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these defects were already present at
the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. [53] In fact, Dr.
Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.[54]
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia,
on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports
the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically
incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root
cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of
their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to
enter the priesthood,[55] her husbands philandering, admitted no less by
him,[56] and her inability to conceive.[57] Dr. Garcias report paints a story of
a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who
pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier,
ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was
confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.[58]
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we
have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived
therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.[59]As we stated in Marcos v.
Marcos:[60]
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
 We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent
Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like of Pasig where it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.[61]
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED the National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial
psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and
effect. No costs. Manolito, whom she did not personally examine, to be psychologically

SO ORDERED. incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,

JJ., concur.
Dr. Tayags May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition

of LAILA T. SAN JOSE[8] was submitted in evidence. The pertinent portions

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 168328
PHILIPPINES, of the Report read:
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE
and MANOLITO SAN JOSE, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 28, 2007 xxxx

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x . . . [Lailas] association with [Manolito]

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San
Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila was 19 years and 4
months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10 months old.[1]
The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on
January 3, 1989,[2] and Norman who was born on March 14, 1997.[3]
For nine years, the couple stayed
parents. Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As
for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.[4]
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her
parents house.[5]
On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage,[6] under Article 36[7] of the Family Code on the ground of
started with the game of basketball. As a
youngster, petitioner often spent her free time
seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then
beginning to cast her interests on basketball
games and eventually became one of the avid
spectators when a minor league was staged at
their place. Respondent happened to be one of
the cagers who, with his hardcourt skills, greatly
impressed petitioner. The latter then became a
fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper
hand, respondent introduced himself personally
to his admirers and their initial encounter with
petitioner proved to be a milestone for both of
their fates. Courtship followed and after a short
period, they were already steadies.
Savoring the momentum, petitioner
with Manolitos
and respondent decided to formally seal their
union. They entered marriage on June 12,
1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig.
After the occasion, the newlyweds then went on
to lead a life of their own making. However,
contrary to what was expected, their marriage
turned out to be rocky right from the very start.
Claimed, respondent refused to get
himself a job. Instead, he spent most of his
available time with his friends drinking
intoxicating substances and gambling activities.
Petitioner was left without much choice but to
flex her muscles and venture on several areas

58
which could be a source of income. She tried to
endure the situation with the hope that
respondent would change for the better in no
time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born
of January 3, 1989. Petitioner was apparently
happy with the birth of their first born, thinking
that her presence would make a difference in the
family, particularly on the part of respondent.
Years had passed but no improvement
was seen on respondents behavior. He turned
out to be worse instead and it was only later
that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs.
Said, he prefers to be with his friends rather than
his own family. He seemed oblivious to the
efforts rendered by petitioner just to make ends
meet. She was the breadwinner of the family and
whenever an argument occurred between her
and respondent, she often received the brunt of
her husbands irrationality. On one of such
incidents, she decided to separate from
respondent. The latter however pursued her and
pleaded for another chance. He promised that he
would change his behavior if only petitioner
would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity and
unwilling to give up the marriage, petitioner
agreed to the compromise.
They reconciled and she did gave birth
to a son, Norman, on March of 1997. Respondent
was happy but his show of good nature was
superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second
child, respondent resumed his old ways and
made them even worse.
Still, petitioner remained hopeful that
something will turn out right in their union.
However, with respondents continuing
irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts
proved nonsense to him. On August 20, 1998,
respondent went out of their dwelling for his
usual late night stints but he never came back the
following morning. They never lived together
since.
Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE,
31 years old with last known address at 14-D
Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. He is
unemployed and stayed in school only to finish
his secondary education. He was described to be
a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his
time hanging out with friends. Considered to be a
bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking
sprees and prohibited drugs as well.
xxxx
REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data,
correlated with clinical interviews and
description of their marital plight, it is the
59
opinion of the undersigned that the
disintegration of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was caused primarily
by the latters psychological incapacity to
perform the essential roles and obligations of a
married man and a father.
His behavioral pattern characterized
mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of
concern for the welfare of others, self-centered
orientation, absence of remorse, violent
tendencies and his involvement in activities
defying social and moral ethics; suits under the
classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is considered to be grave
and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It
continues to influence the individual until the
later stage of life.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[10] and Leouel Santos v.
CA, et al.[11] denied Lailaspetition in this wise:
In the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel
Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme
Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of
[Leouel] Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA
20), to the effect that psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage and that such
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Viewed in the light of the above
guidelines, the present petition must necessarily
be denied.
Petitioners portrayal of respondent as
jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the
Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra),
(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
Petitioners case is not in any way
enhanced by the psychological evaluation and
assessment done by psychologist Nedy Tayag as
 per her Psychological Report (Exhs. C to C-1).
Although the body of the report mentions that
the respondent is affected with Anti-Social
Personality Disorder, the same cannot sway this
Court from its above disposition. There is no
showing that [Dr.]
Tayag was able to interview the respondent or
any of his relatives in order to arrive at the
above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon
which the finding or conclusion was based is
inadequate.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Lailas motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was,
by Order of November 13, 2001,[13] denied. Laila thus appealed to the
Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No. 73286, faulting the
trial court in holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines
enumerated in Molina.
By Decision dated February 15, 2005,[14] the appellate court,
finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering the
totality of the evidence, reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared the marriage between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the
appellate court held:
. . . We perused the records of the
present case and unearthed that the totality of
the evidence presented in the present case
including the testimony of the petitioner, were
enough to sustain a finding that Manolito San
Jose is psychologically incapacitated within the
contemplation of the Family Code. We believe
that his (respondents) defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. If being jobless (since the
commencement of the marriage up to the filing
of the present petition) and worse, a gambler,
can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill what then can We describe such
acts? Are these normal manners of a married
man? We are not at all swayed that a union
affirmed in church rites and subsequently having
children, are proofs that either of the spouses is
mature and responsible enough to assume
marital responsibilities.
Accordingly, We can safely conclude
that said deficiency is so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity
of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of
60
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but to declare the
marriage between the herein petitioner and the
respondent herein dissolved. While the law
provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family
Code), however, what is there to preserve when
the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as an
inviolable social institution. In fine,
Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise
from the ashes and begin a new lifefreed from a
marriage which, to Us, was hopeless from the
beginning and where the bonding could not have
been possible.
xxxx
While We may not have strictly
adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in
arriving at Our present conclusion We have
reason to deviate from the same. In view of the
peculiar circumstances attendant in this case, We
were constrained to take exception from the
Molina case. Note that the (c) ommittee did not
give any example of psychological incapacity for
the fear that the giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to apply the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decision of Church tribunals which although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. (page 37, Handbook of the
Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991
reprinted). Hence, whether or not psychological
incapacity exists is for Us to establish, as there is
no hard and fast rule in the determination of
what maybe considered indicia of psychological
incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient
grounds for Us to conclude that indeed
psychological incapacity exists so as to warrant
declaration of the marriage void ab
initio.[15] (Italics and underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[16] of the appellate courts decision which was denied, by
Resolution dated June 2, 2005,[17]hence, its present Petition for
Review,[18] positing that:
I
IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED
DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
 INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND THAT THE SAME
HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE[, AND]
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE
MOLINA CASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS.[19]
Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as she
merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the
psychological examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a
declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the evidence
presented does not show Manolitos psychological incapacity.
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in
believing that the defects of Manolito already existed at the inception of
the marriage or are incurable; and in any event, belief cannot substitute
for proof which the law and jurisprudence require.
Petitioner finally contends that a deviation
the Molina ruling is not proper in the present case.
Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has
been succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida
Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),[20] thus:
The term psychological incapacity to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.]
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion
about Manolitos psychological incapacity was based on the information
supplied by Laila which she found to be factual. That Laila supplied the
basis of her conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the witness stand:
Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion,
what w[ere] your findings with
respect to the respondent?
A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by
[Laila], which I found the narration
to be factual, regarding her marital
relationship with the petitioner
(should have been respondent), I
came up with a conclusion that
respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. The one which I
found in him is his anti-social
personality disorder because of the
following overt manipulations: the
from presence of drug, the absence of
remourse [sic], the constant
incapacity in terms of maintaining
the marital relationship, the lack of
concern to his family, his
self-centeredness, lack of remourse,
in addition to the womanizing,
respondent which clearly connotes
the defiant of moral and personality
disorder, he is tantamount to a
person under the level, under our
diagnostic criteria labeled as
anti-social personality disorder, sir.
Q: So you would like to impress this Court that
your findings with respect to this
case were only base[d] on the
information given to you by [Laila],
is that correct?
A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by
[Laila] to be factual,
sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the doctors conclusion is hearsay. It is unscientific
and unreliable, so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa[22] where the
61
 your family, what other reasons do you have for
assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychologically saying that your husband is psychologically
incapacitated was based merely on the information communicated to the incapacitated from performing his marital
obligations?
doctor by the therein respondent-spouse:
A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter
. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by future because he is jobless, your honor.
Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor Q: Apart from these two reasons which
never conducted any psychological examination is for alleged use or possession of drugs and his
of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. inability to get a job and support his family
In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the you have no other basis to show for the
statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his declaration of nullity of your marriage?
wife Leni is true, . . .
A: Yes, your honor.[25] (Underscoring
xxxx supplied)

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal

knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these
had merely been relayed to him by respondent. Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on
The former was working on pure suppositions
his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his
and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.[23] (Emphasis and underscoring of marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
supplied)
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or

debilitating psychological condition.

Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even

show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend

already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is more time with his friends than with his family, this Court found the same

incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged to be more of a difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the

disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that [s]uch disorder is performance of some marital obligations.

considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system [and]

continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life. In Ferraris,[26] this Court held:

We find respondents alleged mixed

personality disorder, the leaving-the- house attitude
There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such to spend more time with his band mates than his
declaration.[24] If it can be proven by independent means that one is family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or
psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Underscoring supplied)
be credited.

In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim
Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like
that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated is the following testimony of
sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment, does not by itself
Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions propounded by the trial
constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
court:
Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what incapacity.[27] Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.[28] Or
you said that your husband is a drug user and failure or refusal to meet duties and responsibilities of a married man if it
that he is jobless and was not able to support
is not shown to be due to some psychological (not physical) illness.[29]
62
While Molina then is not set in stone,[30] the facts and circumstances

attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation from it. The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005 Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in

Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. medical school.[5] They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975

CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 17, 2001 Decision of in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 4862

is REINSTATED. At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in

Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple

SO ORDERED. decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In September

1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and thereafter

proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the

preceptorship program for the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working
BENJAMIN G. TING, G.R.for
No.Velez
166562
Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active
Petitioner,
staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,*
December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
born onandApril 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles
PERALTA, JJ.
Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
Promulgated:
1991.[12]
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent. March 31, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18

years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
DECISION
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
NACHURA, J.:
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family

Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity

even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,

only became manifest thereafter. [13]

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage,
aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble
(CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903.
occasionally with his friends.[14] But after they were married, petitioner
The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the
continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or
January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to
and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[4]

63
have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun 4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown

and shot the gate of their house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, by his failure and refusal to give regular financial

Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often support to his family.[24]

had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task

to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically

services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers

tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic

Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.[16] clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure.

He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to support his family financially,

give financial support to their family and would even get angry at her Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his

whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing professional fees from VelezHospital when he was still serving there as

support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that

would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could

home[18] and even neglected his obligation to his children.[19] and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his

hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while

gambling.[20] He would gamble two or three times a week and would Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]

borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had

no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins

finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the spouses had drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by

to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987

from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts. [22] Benjamin to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when

only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.[30]

for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed

so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.[23]

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a

consisted of the following manifestations: psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates

evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to

family relationship and his profession; work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins

excessive and regular drinking; compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality

Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car disorder.[32]

twice and the property he inherited from his father in

order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.

money to pay the same; and Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry

64
in Don Vicente Sotto MemorialMedical Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration,

Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since

of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more

prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. [42] She

the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively,

with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA

observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the

considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining

good track record as anesthesiologist.[35] compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied

for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003,

Decision[36] declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens

null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the motion for reconsideration.[45]On review, the CA decided to reconsider its

admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended

him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts

obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an decision.[47]

excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his

extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the

tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]

even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision Hence, this petition.

reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered,

judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage For our resolution are the following issues:
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the
xxxx guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
SO ORDERED.[37]
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the
requirement of proof of psychological
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA incapacity for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
rendered a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial the Family Code has been liberalized; and

courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the

III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void [is] in accordance
married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories with law and jurisprudence.
and not on established fact,[39] contrary to the guidelines set forth

in Santos v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals

We find merit in the petition.
and Molina.[41]

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

65
 as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis,
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not
a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
It is also instructive to distinguish the two
issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51] decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution
while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was
of statutes. The distinction is important for courts
applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis'
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the view on the binding effect of the doctrine in
historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In
soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is
in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening: not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule
of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be
followed or departed from, is a question entirely
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta
within the discretion of the court, which is again
movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb
called upon to consider a question once decided. In
the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts.
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th
opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality
century, it is an established rule to abide by former
is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
precedents where the same points come again in
about it. In contrast, the application of stare
litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
application were recognized: (1) it would not be
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute
followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where
has been construed, either by this Court or by a
courts of equal authority developed conflicting
consistent course of decision by other federal judges
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
was the actual principle or principles necessary for
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for
reach the decision.
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts'
limited resources.
The doctrine migrated to the United States.
It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
In general, courts follow the stare
Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and
decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial
discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed
economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare
of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.
decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates
Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and
illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it
Madison disagree about the countervailing policy
cannot accommodate changing social and political
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn
precedent. He added that their ideas reveal a deep
bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress;
internal conflict between the concreteness required
and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in
future courts while judges that respect stare
error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over
two centuries.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme
Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
Indeed, two centuries of American case
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous
law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
although stare decisis developed its own life in
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate
the United States. Two strains of stare decisishave
but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a
been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known
state law requirement that races be segregated on
as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower
public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme
courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to
Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is
cases involving the same facts. The second, known
66
 inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
freed the colored Americans from the chains of marriage under Article 36.
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has
likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare
decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Molina doctrine.
the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly,
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our
first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, We have not.
that a private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez
An examination of decisions on stare Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate
decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
before overturning prior rulings. These are resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of
workability, reliance, intervening developments in
the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket,
the balance the following determinants: closeness of
forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic
The leading case in deciding whether a
court should follow the stare decisis rule in as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
considered as on all fours with another.[57]
Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the
cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
principles of law have so far developed as to have the
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned
doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or declaration of nullity of marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such
justification.[53] opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the

merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual

prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not

being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case presented

argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions

again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in

interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the the course of the proceedings.

law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of

this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize

doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be

relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,

therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.

Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by

67
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological significance to the marriage.[61] The psychological illness that must have

disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so

grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. [62]

relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the

explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects

rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would

occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
To require the petitioner to allege in the
petition the particular root cause of the psychological itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They to be incurable.
adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is
also a fact that there are provinces where these
experts are not available. Thus, the Committee The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage
for the examination of a party or parties by a between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents
determined by the court during the pre-trial
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
conference.[60]
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified

that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in
gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then
Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by
Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into
the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another

psychiatrist in South Africawho personally examined Benjamin, as well as

his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers. [64] Logically,
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife.
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband,
There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much
as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we
as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the
respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application
pursuant to Article 36.
of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and

68
 It should be remembered that the presumption is always in nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil

favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro Case No. 02-6428.

matrimonio.[65] In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted

and must, perforce, prevail. Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer

despite service of summons upon him. Because of this, the trial court

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there

on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002,

the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between

No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the parties.

SO ORDERED. On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered

its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and submitted a written
MARIETA C. AZCUETA, G.R. No. 180668
authority for the City Prosecutor to appear in the case on the States behalf
Petitioner,
under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General.
Present:
versus
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed
CARPIO,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CORONA, that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply
THE COURT OF APPEALS, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
with the essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner,
Respondents. BERSAMIN, JJ.
Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to
Promulgated:
May 26, 2009 adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
and duties of a husband.

DECISION

Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. When

they were married it was Rodolfos mother who found them a room near

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly rental.

the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31, 2007,[1] and its Resolution dated Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her

November 20, 2007.[2] husband to find employment. She even bought him a newspaper every

Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old and most jobs have an

Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. To inspire

1993. Less than two months after their first meeting, they got married on him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave

July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of PaduaChurch, Antipolo City. At the time of him money. Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already

their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was 28. They found a job and petitioner was overjoyed. However, some weeks after,

separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children. petitioner was informed that her husband had been seen at the house of

his parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered

On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he gave her

(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, a petition for declaration of absolute (which was supposedly his salary) came from his mother. When she

69
confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and
told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop
nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can
support their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on
his mother and that all his decisions and attitudes in life should be in
conformity with those of his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every
time Rodolfo would get drunk he became physically violent towards
her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex
once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this
problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not
be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because
he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner requested that
they move to another place and rent a small room rather than live near his
parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced to leave
their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first
cousin, Florida de Ramos, as a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of
Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family. She corroborated
petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed
when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given
by his mother. This witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother
who was paying the rentals for the room where the couple lived. She also
testified that at one time, she saw respondent going to his mothers house
in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he
has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was
still residing at the house of his mother and not living together with
petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after examining petitioner for her
psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature, independent,
very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also
observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore,
she was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based on the
information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that
he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy
related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder were those whose response to ordinary way of life
was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self-confidence,
constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency
on other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological
problem was a cross-identification with the mother who was the
dominant figure in the family considering that respondents father was a
seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem began
during the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration
of his marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also
severe because he will not be able to make and to carry on the
responsibilities expected of a married person. It was incurable because it
started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality.
Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
dated October 25, 2004, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence
presented by the petitioner, the court finds that
respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no
showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have
sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result
of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual
relationship since he could not distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore sex
a relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from
dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot
make his own decision and cannot carry on his
responsibilities as a husband. The marital obligations
to live together, observe mutual love, respect,
support was not fulfilled by the respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the
petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to
comply with his marital obligations.
70

Thus the marriage between petitioner and
respondent should be declared null and void on the
account of respondents severe and incurable
psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the
marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B.
Azcuata is hereby declared null and void abinitio
pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the parties
pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the
Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision[4] to
correct the first name of Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as
Gerardo in the caption of the original Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that
(a) the psychiatric report of Dr. Villegas was based solely on the
information provided by petitioner and was not based on an examination
of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged psychological
defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects
were grave, permanent and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially
ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently prove the psychological
incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological disorder existed
prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting aside the
factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to
demonstrate that respondents alleged
irresponsibility and over-dependence on his mother
is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above
explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is
petitioner-appellees failure to prove that
71
respondents supposed psychological malady existed
even before the marriage. Records however show
that the parties were living in harmony in the first
few years of their marriage and were living on their
own in a rented apartment. That respondent often
times asks his mother for financial support may be
brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that
he cannot contribute at all to the family coffers,
considering that it was his wife who is working for the
family.Petitioner-appellee likewise stated that
respondent does not like to have a child on the
pretense that respondent is not yet ready to have
one. However this is not at all a manifestation of
irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has
shown that he has a full grasp of reality and
completely understands the implication of having a
child especially that he is unemployed. The only
problem besetting the union is respondents alleged
irresponsibility and unwillingness to leave
her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this case
to be psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent
was caused only by his youth and emotional
immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute
psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court of Appeals,
421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events,
petitioner-appellee has utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356
SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the Supreme
Court:
Psychological
incapacity must be more than
just a difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
(Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro,
G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72
in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee
Marietta C. Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B.
Azcueta remains VALID.[5] (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the
totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that
the appellate court correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented
by petitioner failed to prove her spouses psychological incapacity pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[6] Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.[7]
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals and Molina[8] stringent guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
72
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100,
108), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
 personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage. although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from

(6) The essential marital obligations must the Molina doctrine.

be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that
regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision. the parties marriage under Article 36.

(7) Interpretations given by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.[9](Emphasis supplied) psychological incapacity of her husband.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court declared that The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical report, highlights the lack of personal examination of Rodolfo by said

antecedence, and (c) incurability.[11]It should refer to no less than a mental, doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners version of

not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the events. In Marcos v. Marcos,[17] it was held that there is no requirement

basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by

discharged by the parties to the marriage.[12] The intendment of the law a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration

has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters is

serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding

insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the of psychological incapacity.

marriage.[13]

It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that psychologist, petitioner testified in court on the facts upon which the

notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified under oath before

to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence

disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. [14] Each in the form of testimony.[18] Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was

case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative of

predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report

psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite and fully explain the link between the manifestations of Rodolfos

to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled

take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding

much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate

court.[15] With the advent of Te v. Te,[16] the Court encourages a courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the

73

demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their
candor or lack thereof.[19] Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity
of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion
of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witness.[20]
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently
proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts
decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage,
Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he
could not be persuaded to even attempt to find employment; that from
the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo
relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and
Rodolfos refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition
linked to his relationship to his mother.
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his
marital obligations were linked to medical or clinical causes by an expert
witness with more than forty years experience from the field of
psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a
portion of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the
psychodynamics of the case of petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose
parents has very limited education. Being the eldest,
she is expected to be the role model of younger
siblings. In so doing, she has been restricted and
physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on
the other hand, she developed growing resentments
towards her father and promised herself that with
the first opportunity, shell get out of the
family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married
1 months after they met, without really knowing
anything about him. Her obsession to leave her
family was her primary reason at that time and she
did not exercise good judgment in her decision
74
making in marriage. During their 4 years marital
relationship, she came to realize that Rodolfo cannot
be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in
terms of loving, caring, protection, financial support
and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the
3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to
be weak, and his two elder brothers were all working
as seaman. Rodolfo who was always available to his
mothers needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed
into her system. The relationship became symbiotic,
that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to
his mother. The mother, being the stronger and
dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but the
reversal of roles became confusing that led to
ambivalence of his identity and grave
dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked
up to his complexities, producing so much doubts in
their capabilities in a heterosexual
setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed. His
inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is referable to an
unconscious guilt feelings of defying the mothers
love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating
between the wife and the mother, so that his
continuous relationship with his wife produces
considerable anxiety, which he is unable to handle,
and crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family
background and outcome of their marriage, it is the
opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta
Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and responsible
and is psychologically capacitated to perform the
duties and obligations of marriage. Due to her
numerous personal problems she has difficulty in
handling her considerable anxiety, at present. There
are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta
is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical
condition is due to a strong and prolonged
dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a
period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This
situation crippled his psychological functioning
related to sex, self confidence, independence,
responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to
marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is
considered as permanent and incurable in nature,
because it started early in his life and therefore
became so deeply ingrained into his personality
structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it
hampered and interfered with his normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustment.[21]
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during
her testimony, the relevant portion of which we quote below:

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the
petitioner, what was your psychological
evaluation?
A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta
Azcueta as matured, independent, very
responsible, focused, she has direction and
ambition in life and she work hard for what
she wanted, maam, and therefore, I
concluded that she is psychologically
capacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the marriage, maam.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness,
what was your psychological evaluation
with regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the
husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage
suffering from a psychiatric classification as
Dependent Personality Disorder associated
with severe inadequacy related to
masculine strivings, maam.
Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you
please explain to us what do you mean by
Dependent Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those
persons in which their response to
ordinary way of life are ineffectual and
inept characterized by loss of self
confidence, always in doubt with himself
and inability to make his own decision,
quite dependent on other people, and in
this case, on his mother, maam.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a
psychological problem of respondent,
Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, maam.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and
disrupt his duties and responsibilities as a
husband and as a father, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what
is the root cause of this psychological
problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a
cross identification with the mother who is
the dominant figure in the family, the
mother has the last say and the authority
75
in the family while the father was a
seaman and always out of the house, and if
present is very shy, quiet and he himself
has been very submissive and passive to
the authority of the wife, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness,
under what circumstance this kind of
psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality
development and therefore, during his
early stages in life, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of
problem existed to Rodolfo Azcueta, the
respondent in this case, before the
celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And it became manifested only after the
celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it
became manifested with thethat the
manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the
history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was very
mild, no stresses, no demand on his life, at
24 years old despite the fact that he
already finished college degree of
Computer Science, there is no demand on
himself at least to establish his own, and
the mother always would make the
decision for him, maam.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of
psychological problem severe?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem
severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry
on the responsibility that is expected of a
married person, maam.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in
development and therefore it became so
deeply ingrained into his personality, and
therefore, it cannot be changed nor cured
at this stage, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is
Permanent?
 obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
A: It is permanent in nature, sir. respect, support was not fulfilled by the respondent.

Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the Considering the totality of evidence of the
effect of the psychological problem as far petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to
as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo comply with his marital obligations.
Azcueta is concerned?
Thus the marriage between petitioner and
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage respondent should be declared null and void on the
relationship because standard expectation account of respondents severe and incurable
is, the husband has to work, to feed, to psychological incapacity.
protect, to love, and of course, to function
on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to
the wife, but in this case, early in their
marriage, they had only according to the
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have
wife, experienced once sexual relationship
every month and this is due to the fact that clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
because husband was so closely attached
to the mother, it is a result of the marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties lived harmoniously
unconscious guilt feeling of the husband in
defying the mothers love when they will be and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were
having heterosexual relationship and
therefore, at that point, he will not be able united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos
to distinguish between the mother and the
wife and therefore, sex relationship will irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual
not be satisfactory according to
expectation, maam.[22] reticence were already evident. To be sure, these manifestations of

Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to

In Te v. Te, we held that [b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite the marriage being rooted in his early development and a by product of

having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not his upbringing and family life.

discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert

opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[23] Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be

sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential

Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly obligations of marriage.

explained the basis for its decision, which we reproduce here for

emphasis: The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual

findings of the trial court on this point. The CAs reasoning that Rodolfos
With the preponderant evidence
presented by the petitioner, the court finds that
requests for financial assistance from his mother might have been due to
respondent totally failed in his commitments and
obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that
immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no
showing of improvement. He failed likewise to have his motive for not wanting a child was his responsible realization that he
sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result
of the unconscious guilt felling of having sexual should not have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative.
relationship since he could not distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore sex There is no evidence on record to support these views. Again, we must
relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
point out that appellate courts should not substitute their discretion with
The respondent is suffering
from dependent personality disorder and therefore that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in instance where
cannot make his own decision and cannot carry on
the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.
his responsibilities as a husband. The marital

76
 We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos

irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be attributed to Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential

his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at the time of marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.[25] As

his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos dependent personality

expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his

abnormal behavior. responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital

obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support under

In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature Article 68. Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife;

of a dependent personality disorder and how one afflicted with such a one who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most

disorder would be incapacitated from complying with marital obligations, basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot

to wit: contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his

spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to
deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around peculiar predicament it finds itself in those instances when it is tasked to
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point in time and apply
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in
life.[24] them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the

concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not

only developments in science and medicine but also changing social and
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with
cultural mores, including the blurring of traditional gender roles. In this
dependent personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
day and age, women have taken on increasingly important roles in the
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. We realize that
financial and material support of their families. This, however, does not
psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical cases of
change the ideal that the family should be an autonomous social
patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different
institution, wherein the spouses cooperate and are equally responsible for
in their symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the
the support and well-being of the family. In the case at bar, the spouses
duty of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion,
from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive unit
to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same
based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to
before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
perform the essential duties of marriage.

77
 DECISION
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te: QUISUMBING, J.:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of This petition for review on certiorari assails the
either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is Decision[1] dated September 9, 2005 and the
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
Resolution[2] dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or CV No. 68179, entitled Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga.
assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed
that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional The facts culled from the records are as follows:
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very they were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively.Rodolfo courted her and five
burial to a stillborn marriage.[26] (emphasis ours) months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left

for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the

distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.

In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity

of the parties marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and

under the premises. Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their

marriage was tumultuous. He described Aurora as domineering and

frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision
that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and
dated July 19, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added
72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as

evidenced by the latters filing against him a criminal case (concubinage)

SO ORDERED.
RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, G.R. No. 170925
and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March
Petitioner,
Present: 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,* that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
BRION, and
ABAD, JJ. Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo

gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching
Promulgated:
AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon
Respondent. October 26, 2009
her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo

brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his

concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led

to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

78
 comply with their marital obligations. Dissolution of
May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children. mind. [3]

During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his On May 31, 2000,[4] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the
psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his recommendation that parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
the petition be granted. In this report, he stated,

xxxx On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision

dated September 9, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga,
showed that he is an intelligent adult male, who is declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner
egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy,
helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied in a
projects himself as dominant person, to cover his Resolution dated December 20, 2005.
deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends to
be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He
claims for adulation, reassurance and attention from
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy
familial relationship during the early maturational
[WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY
development specifically in the form of a
APPLIED THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
domineering and protective maternal image.
INCAPACITY TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF
THE PARTIES DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THEIR
Self-esteem was fragile.
MARRIAGE.[5]

Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon

Aspillaga, showed history of traumatic childhood
experiences. Her parents separated when she was Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is
about one month old and was made to believe that
she was the youngest daughter of her disciplinarian void on the ground of the parties psychological incapacity.
grandfather. Her surrogate sister maltreated her and
imposed harsh corporal punishment for her slightest
mistakes. She felt devastated when she accidentally The petition must fail.
discovered that shed been an orphan adopted by her
grandfather. Attempted incestuous desire by an
uncle was reported. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[6] we

Psychological test results collaborated the clinical categorically said that:

findings of sensitivity to criticism. Tendency for self
dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses in
judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was
projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to regress to a
lower level of development were likewise
projected. Self-esteem was also low. Deep-seated
sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper
her objectivity.
In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor
psychological handicaps which could be traced from
unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict,
domineering, disciplinarian role models. However,
respondents mistrust, shallow heterosexual
relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability
to comply with the obligation of marriage.
It is recommended that the petition to annul their
marriage be granted, on the grounds existing
psychological incapacitation of both petitioner and
respondent, which will hamper their capacity to
79
Psychological incapacity required by Art.
36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.[7] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, while the psychological examination
conducted on respondent found her to be mistrustful, to possess low
self-esteem, given to having shallow heterosexual relationships and
immature, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or
psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined

incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. sales activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very

Maaba was able to establish the parties personality disorder; however, he capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and

failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they abroad. It was only when Rodolfos acts of infidelity were discovered that

are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband the marriage started to fail.

and wife. We cannot see how their personality disorder would render

them unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the

the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and same likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on money matters

discharged by the parties to a marriage. The fact that these psychological would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of ones marriage as to make the

conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba puts it) their performance of their wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and

marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological void.[11] In the present case, petitioners disagreement with his wifes

incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere handling of the familys finances can hardly be considered as a

difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under

to prove that each partys condition is so grave or is of such nature as to Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the

render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even

marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.[12]

incurable and permanent.

At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless,

with respondent,[8] but failed to discharge it. there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient

to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. We must

It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly

than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is

obligations.[9] The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Even assuming their

psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an

clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent

and significance to the marriage.[10] them from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. At

the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only

Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated

Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.

years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church

rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family

of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at

respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a

during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration

each other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to

comply with their obligations to each other and to their deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the

children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13]

80
 As regards respondents claim for support, we find no basis to Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985;

award the same as it was not passed upon by the trial court in view of the they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship,

agreement of the parties on the issue presented for resolution, which Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone

agreement, however, was not put into writing. for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding

them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3,

merit. The assailed Decision dated September 9, 2005 and Resolution 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179

are AFFIRMED. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with

Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped

SO ORDERED. schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493
Petitioner, household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
Present: most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter

Promulgated: found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have

children.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, March 10, 2010
Respondents.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with

the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of

the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of

marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,

she alleged in her complaint:

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION xxxx

BRION, J.: 8. That from the time of their marriage up to their

separation in July 1987, their relationship had been
marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable
physical and emotional pains on the part of the
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries
from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. upon her every time they had a troublesome
encounter;
CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No.
the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence
97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with and his excessive drinking which makes him
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological obligations making life unbearably bitter and
incapacity. intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in
fact in July 1987;
THE FACTS
10. That such psychological incapacity of the
defendant started from the time of their marriage

81
 and became very apparent as time went and proves
to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit
himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that
no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane
Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in
her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she
received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these
declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with
the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to
court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after
celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come
(sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern
composing of violent nature before you got married
(sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not
sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you
also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation
of the respondent during the time of the marriage
82
the respondent is suffering from anti-social
personality Disorder this is a serious and severe
apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and
long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on
the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination
wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined
her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive,
coherent, relevant to marital relationship with
respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is
your report there is a statement rather on the last
page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical
opinion of the undersigned that marriage between
the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even
before the actual celebration of
marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and
callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the
possibility of having blissful relationship. His general
behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person
suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such
disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic)
in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and
responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic
and long-standing in proportion and appear(s)
incurable. The disorder was present at the time of
the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to
stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently
grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain
what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which
means incurable it has been there long before he
entered marriage apparently, it came during early
developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological
behavioral help to cure such because psychological
disorder are not detrimental to men but to others
particularly and this (sic) because the person who
have this kind of disorder do not know that they have
this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological
disorder is present during the wedding or at the time
of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality
Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder
(sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage
(sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner
also correlated without any employment exploitative
and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is
clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has
that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?
A. Usually a person suffering that
psychological disorder will not admit that they are
suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder
the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of
hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder
also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner,
respondent never give due respect more often than
not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason
(sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder
incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is
tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time
she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
83
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again
because the person itself, the respondent is not
aware that this kind of personality affect the other
party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the
petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more
often than not the respondent is under the influence
of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious
relationship during the less than one year and one
thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to
work as housemaid instead of he who should provide
and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her
earning for the five months that she work and it is
also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices.
(sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder
he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has
no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but
what he need is to sustain his vices thru the
petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological
incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my
clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he
is good for nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she
prepared. The Report pertinently states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for Nullity of
Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
 BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old
reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle
driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine
operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer
and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales
agent. It was a common knowledge within their
vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit
relationship. Familial relationship was described to be
stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were
part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person
whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much
so that it does not create inner tension and
anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her
socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect
of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic)
who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is
fully aware of external realities of life that she set
simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her
capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to
prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy
toward specific goals.Her tolerance for frustration
appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that
she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony
quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of
the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about
enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC
him was purely hearsay.
concluded:
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance
setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be
considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as
84
(sic) some admitted grounds that would render a
person to be unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group
approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition
by which a person lives for the next drink and the
next drinks (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia
Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner
and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag,
points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to
establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not
shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested
by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless,
gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The
petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior
and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one
year and four months of messy days, to leave the
respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to
prove that right from the start of her married life
with the respondent, she already suffered from
maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon
her and that she was the one who worked as a
housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the
latters niece (sic) and because they were living with
her husbands family, she was obliged to do the
household chores an indication that she is a battered
wife coupled with the fact that she served as a
servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had
underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the
time of their marriage, she and her husband are still
young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had
never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners
family for said early marriage and not to his own
liking.
The above findings of the psychologist
[referring to the psychologist testimony quoted
above] would only tend to show that the respondent
was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity
which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth
in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
 Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court
held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the
pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence
presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this
case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting
that there is psychological incapacity on the part of
the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven
and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief
prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is
no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral
certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the
surname of the respondent, although they are now
separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her
husband who made here a slave and a punching bag
during the short span of her marriage with him. The
law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise
said law will be an instrument to protect persons with
mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of
herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343
SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of
Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not
require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted
the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from
evidence that medically or clinically identify the root
causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied
in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the
aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social
worker were not found to be sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity, in the absence of any
evaluation of the respondent himself, the person
whose mental and psychological capacity was in
question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer
evidence to hold that the respondent was
85
psychologically incapable of entering into the
marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties
of marriage due to an underlying psychological
illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on
the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent
may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is
still necessary to show that they were manifestations
of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically
or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist
that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was
not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that
the behavior of the respondent was due simply to
causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs
Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work
could have been the result of rebelliousness on the
part of one who felt that he had been forced into a
loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was
not under a permanent compulsion because he had
later on shown his ability to engage in productive
work and more stable relationships with another. The
element of permanence or incurability that is one of
the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity
is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period
that they were under the same roof, the married life
of the petitioner with the respondent was an
unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason
be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates
in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage
institution in our country and the foundation of the
family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to
legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of
parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek
the reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what
the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis
of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and
void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate,
should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the
finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity
at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us
(the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents
 witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous;
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define
psychological incapacity; this omission was
intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to
interpret the term without being shackled by
statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which gives three conditions that would make a
person unable to contract marriage from mental
incapacity as follows:
1095. They are incapable of
contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of
reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties
which are to be mutually given and
accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming
the essential obligations of matrimony due
to causes of a psychic nature.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms
to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions,
applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing
jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates
enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On
the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without
being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that
actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to
nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no
reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists
to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
86
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended
application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept psychological
incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of
marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an
illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the
concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It
decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties or one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
87
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
xxx
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic
requirements of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and
its gravity, juridical antecedence, andincurability can be duly
established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even
to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts
interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus
constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is
only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d)
of the Rules pertinently provides:
 (d) What to allege. A petition under Article
36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the
Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in
the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36
when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited
the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted
the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.[19]
88
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its
interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is
the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings
and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating
children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the
resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v.
Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the
 This is not to mention, but we mention
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the

rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current
petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative
also a fact that there are provinces where these
experts are not available. Thus, the Committee of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need
for the examination of a party or parties by a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
conference.
assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be

psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal
from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.[26] Mere
which it expounded on as follows: difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
despite having the primary task and burden of
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties. and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological

incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons
xxxx
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [27]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes
the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is
Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
proof of Santoscontinuing doctrinal validity.
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
The Present Case
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish

Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform essential marital

89
obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist,

evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could

the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have

evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence. conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos

psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for

Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a

did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is

Angelitos alleged psychological condition. not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the

conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the

expert opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the

psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description

declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the

psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The

conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her

cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she

upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they

the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the be found in her testimony.

application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined

above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder

parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder

psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable. prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental

stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion

the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional

jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on

requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have

may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is

relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge

complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately of Angelitos family background and upbringing.

related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be

helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the

flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the questions of why and to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder

credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos

doubtful sources of information. awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and

responsibilities of marriage.

90
 The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the different treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on

more important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such

which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause. violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological

incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a

b. Jocelyns Testimony link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological

incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion

psychological report and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that

to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were

the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its

psychological incapacity. related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment,

insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly

gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual

received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor

she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We

behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its

the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.

him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not

before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for

when these beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at the time lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in

of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear CA-G.R. CV No. 62443.Costs against the petitioner.

evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related

jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the

-SO ORDERED.
time of the celebration of the marriage.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while

JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, G.R. No. 167459
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show Petitioner,
Present:
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or

mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
condition or illness.
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.

January 26, 2011

91
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x did not change her ways when they lived together at
Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her
bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living
DECISION quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with
Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: sexual infidelity circulated in the military community.
When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got
a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 During their confrontation, Bona admitted
as well as the Resolution[2]dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona
CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated
away from their living quarters. Bona left with
January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Ramona and went to Basilan.
Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live
court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose) petition for the
with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the
declaration of nullity of marriage between him and private respondent needs of Ramona.
Bona J. Alano (Bona).
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No.
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
Appeals, are as follows: seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground
of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage.
It appears that Jose met Bona in August
1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP
Summons with a copy of the petition and
while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year
its annexes were duly served upon Bona who failed
college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that
to file any responsive pleading during the
culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual
reglementary period.
marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the
acquire any property. Neither did they incur any
Public Prosecutor conducted an investigation to
debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
determine whether there was collusion between the
however, they found an abandoned and neglected
parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report that she
one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as
issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose
their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano
appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably
Ochosa.
determined whether or not there was collusion
between them.
During their marriage, Jose was often
assigned to various parts of the Philippine
Trial on the merits of the case
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in
Lita, testified about respondents marital infidelity
his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion
during the marriage.
when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth

Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as
E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after
the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given
that respondent was suffering from histrionic
living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where
personality disorder which she described as follows:
they resided with their military aides.

Her personality is that

In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion
she has an excessive emotion
for his alleged participation in the failed coup detat.
and attention seeking behavior.
He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
So therefore they dont develop
sympathy in feelings and they
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful
have difficulty in maintaining
spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when
emotional intimacy. In the case
Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she
of Mr. Ochosa he has been a
had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently
92
 military man. It is his duty to be party who,
transferred in different areas in at the time
the Philippines. And while he is of the
being transferred from one celebration,
place to another because of his was
assignments as a military man, psychologic
Mrs. Bona Alano refused to ally
follow him in all his assignments. incapacitat
There were only few occasions ed to
in which she followed him. And comply
during those times that they with the
were not living together, essential
because of the assignments of marital
Mr. Ochosa she developed extra obligations
marital affair with other man of of marriage,
which she denied in the shall
beginning but in the latter part likewise be
of their relationship she void even if
admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that such
she had relationship with incapacity
respondents driver. I believe becomes
with this extra marital affair that manifest
is her way of seeking attention only after
and seeking emotions from its
other person and not from the solemnizati
husband. And of course, this is on.
not fulfilling the basic
responsibility in a marriage. Such a ground to be
invalidative (sic) of marriage, the
According to Rondain, respondents degree of incapacity must
psychological disorder was traceable to her family exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE
history, having for a father a gambler and a and INCURABILITY.
womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife.
There was no possibility of a cure since respondent From the evidence
does not have an insight of what is happening to her presented, the Court finds that
and refused to acknowledge the reality. the psychological incapacity of
the respondent exhibited
With the conclusion of the witnesses GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence INCURABILITY.
and rested his case.
It is grave because the
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respondent did not carry out the
submitted its opposition to the petition on the normal and ordinary duties of
ground that the factual settings in the case at bench, marriage and family shouldered
in no measure at all, can come close to the standards by any average couple existing
required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, under everyday circumstances of
240 SCRA 20 [1995]). life and work. The gravity was
manifested in respondents
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the infidelity as testified to by the
trial court granted the petition and nullified the petitioner and his witnesses.
parties marriage on the following findings, viz:
The psychological
xxxx incapacity of the respondent
could be traced back to
Article 36 of the respondents history as testified
Family Code, as amended, to by the expert witness when
provides as follows: she said that respondents bad
experience during her childhood
A resulted in her difficulty in
marriage achieving emotional intimacy,
contracted hence, her continuous illicit
by any
93
 relations with several men
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by
before and during the marriage.
the Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated
Considering that March 10, 2005.
persons suffering from this kind
of personality disorder have no
insight of their condition, they Hence, this Petition.
will not submit to treatment at
all. As in the case at bar,
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should
respondents psychological
incapacity clinically identified as be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
Histrionic Personality Disorder marital obligations.
will remain
incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
The petition is without merit.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the
January 11, 1999 read: trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, A marriage contracted by any party who, at

judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING the
marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J.
ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB
INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as
amended with all the effects and consequences
provided for by all applicable provisions of existing
pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let
copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of
Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said
marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil
Registrar of Makati City for its information and
guidance.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said
ruling to the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that
the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to
discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the
appealed Decision dated 11 January 1999 in Civil Case
No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[6]
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we
observed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina[8] the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation.
It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.

94
 The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are
incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.

(3) The incapacity must be proven Since the purpose of

to be existing at the time of the celebration of the including such provision in our
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness Family Code is to harmonize our
was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. civil laws with the religious faith
The manifestation of the illness need not be of our people, it stands to
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must reason that to achieve such
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to
(4) Such incapacity must also be decisions of such appellate
shown to be medically or clinically permanent tribunal. Ideally subject to our
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or law on evidence what is decreed
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not as canonically invalid should also
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same be decreed civilly void.
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not This is one instance
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the where, in view of the evident
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. source and purpose of the
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing Family Code provision,
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure contemporaneous religious
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to interpretation is to be given
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an persuasive effect. Here, the
essential obligation of marriage. State and the Church while
remaining independent,
(5) Such illness must separate and apart from each
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the other shall walk together in
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. synodal cadence towards the
Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood same goal of protecting and
changes, occasional emotional outburst cannot be cherishing marriage and the
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown family as the inviolable base of
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, the nation.
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the (8) The trial court must order the
person, an adverse integral element in the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
personality structure that effectively incapacitates General to appear as counsel for the state. No
the person from really accepting and thereby decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
95
 agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[9] (Citations
omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish
partys psychological condition.For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these
requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does
not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was
any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing
was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to
assume or had assumed.[11]
A little over a decade since the promulgation
the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo
Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been
inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court
was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world. The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all
sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity
of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of
the said individuals.[13]
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an
abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared
and, thus, clarified in the same Tecase that there is a need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in
the same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts.And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.[14]
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains
testimony[15] and her psychiatric evaluation report[16] as well as the
individual testimonies of Jose[17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes
Himpayan Padernal[18] and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the
evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions
with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we
are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we
cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas
acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of
of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects
were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In
other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage
to Jose, we have only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open
court to support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the
transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken
with your wife after several years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can
no longer bear the torture because of the
gossips that she had an affair with other
men, and finally, when I have a chance to
confront her she admitted that she had an
affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with
other men of course before the marriage
you have already known
96
 A: Yes, your honor. Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who
Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you testified in this court?
thought that this affair would go to end
after your marriage? A: Yes, maam.

A: Yes, I was thinking about that. xxxx

Q: So, that after several years she will not change so Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in
thats why you cant bear it anymore? order to evaluate members of the parties?

A: Yes, maam.[20] A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of

stenographic notes of the testimonies of
other witnesses, maam.
Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not
xxxx
provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Joses
one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrists Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on
the respondent?
conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed
prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition purportedly A: Yes, your honor.
made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in
cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by
which you based your evaluation report?
which such an inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms
of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological A: It was based on the psychological test conducted
and clinical interview with the other
incapacity.
witnesses, your Honor.[22]

The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not

emanate from a personal interview with the subject herself as admitted Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition
by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows: indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in
came for psychological test, how about the
respondent, did she come for interview the absence of sufficient corroboration.
and test?
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at
A: No, maam.
issue since the trial court judge had found them to be credible enough
Q: Did you try to take her for such? after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we
cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
A: Yes, maam.
Bonas pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an this case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas
interview?
dysfunctional family portrait which brought about her Histrionic

A: There was no response, maam.[21] Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the
assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain
if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her witness testified to Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the
interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to
record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit: know Bona only during their employment in petitioners
household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the
interview? married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live
with petitioners family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness
Padernal, maam.

97
 We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent
Q: And, of course she would come to your place
level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a every now and then because it is not very
personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically far
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
A: No, maam, once in a while only.
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is
desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were
determination though of a partys complete personality profile, allowed to at least three (3) days every
information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical other month.
antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so
Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not that is 16 years you were supposed to have
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert been living together?
opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.[23]
A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I
was in x x x.[25]
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouses psychological condition
GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:
based on the information fed by only one side, similar to what we have
pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not different from
Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
husband and wife?
such evidence.[24]
A: 1979.

Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their

Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner
marriage, Bona did not wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of and the respondent in this case because in
her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial fact, you lived with them together in the
same quarters. Does the quarters have
records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
different rooms?

JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY: A: Yes, maam.

Q: But very near each other?

Q: How long did you stay with your wife?
A: Yes, maam.
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in
1988 but in all those years there were only Q: You know them because of the proximity of the
few occasions that we were staying quarters?
together because most of the time Im in
the field. A: Yes, maam.

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3)
field, did you not your wife come with you years that you lived together that you have
in any of your assignments? a chance to be with the spouses?

A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and xxxx

stayed for one (1) day and then
A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves house.
you?
xxxx
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time? reside together with your husband?

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to
Basilan. Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
98
 Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner
and the respondent lived together?
A: Yes. Maam.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the
petitioner and the respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time,
from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this
time?
A: Yes, maam, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the
petitioner, he was assigned in different
Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case
did not go with the husband in different
places of his assignment did you ask her
why what was the reason why she did not
like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with
him because by transferring from one
place to another, she just dont want to go,
she just wanted to stay in Basilan where
her hometown is, maam.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the
respondent dont want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she
simply did not want to go with him
because she did not want him to be
appointed to far away places.
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Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go
with the husband in some far away
different assignments she also assumed
that the assignments were in this war
regions they were always fighting
considering the place in Basilan they were
in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and
she also refused to stay in Manila, maam.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to
Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not
follow immediately. She stayed with him
only for four (4) months, maam.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the
respondent were living together as
husband and wife for this period of time
during the relationship?
A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their
relationship was good for a few months
until he was transferred to Julu. I believe
during that time when they were together
the husband was giving an attention to her.
The husband was always there and when
the husband transferred to Basilan, the
attention was not there anymore,
maam.[27]
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to
Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning
of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from
their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was
Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties
and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to
accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao
may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the
seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be
erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to
Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.[28]

While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly

appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial
precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological
incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision

of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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