TORTS AND DAMAGES

KATHRYN PINEDA – DELA SERNA

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE WORD “TORT”?

The word ―tort‖ is taken directly from the French and is a derivation of the Latin
word ‗torquere‘ meaning ‗to twist‘.

HOW IS TORT DEFINED IN COMMON LAW?

In common law, tort is an unlawful violation of private right, not created by

contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. It is an act or omission
producing injury to another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which
said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.

It is a private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. It is a violation of a
duty imposed by general law or otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to
each other which is involved in a given transaction. There must always be violation of
some duty that must give rise y operation of law and not by mere agreement of the
parties.

A tort is a wrong independent of a contract, which arises from an act or omission

of a person which causes some injury or damage directly or indirectly to another
person. It may either be (1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; (2) the
infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3)
the violation of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF TORTS IN COMMON LAW?

Tort in common law includes:

1. INTENTIONAL TORTS which include conduct where the actor desires to cause the
consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it. It includes assault, battery, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion
of privacy and interference of property.
2. NEGLIGENCE involves voluntary acts or omissions which result in injury to others,
without intending to cause the same. The actor fails to exercise due care in
performing such acts or omissions.
3. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT where the person is made liable independent of fault or
negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts.
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WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF TORT?

There are three most important elements of tort:

1. Right and duty;

2. Act or omission; and
3. Damage

WHAT IS QUASI-DELICT?
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

HOW IS TORT DISTINGUISHED FROM QUASI-DELICT?

Quasi-delict is what is known as ―TORT‖ in Anglo-American law. Tort is broader

than the Spanish-Philippine concept of quasi-delict which is Roman in origin. Tort in
Anglo-American Law includes not only negligence but also intentional criminal acts,
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. Quasi-delict, on the other
hand, covers only acts or omissions which cause damage to another because of fault or
negligence, there being no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. This is
referred to as non-contractual negligence.

The concept of tort came to our legal system after the Philippines became a
colony of the United States of America as a result of the Treaty of Paris signed on
December 10, 1898.

The Code commission deliberately used the term ―quasi-delicts‖ to designate

those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal
offenses, because this term more nearly corresponds to the Roman law classification of
obligations and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability. It rejected to use
the term Tort, which is broader, because in the general plan of the Philippine legal
system, intentional and malicious acts, which certain exceptions, are governed by the
Penal Code.

WHAT ARE THE SOURCES OF THE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES?

The law on Torts and Damages is based on several articles spread in the New
Civil Code and special laws, particularly the following:

1. Chapter on Quasi-Delicts (Articles 2176 to 2194)

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K. P. Dela Serna

2. Chapter on Quasi-Contracts (Articles 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2150, 2151 and
2159)
3. Chapter on Human Relations (Articles 19 to 36)
4. Articles 1172 to 1174 of the New Civil Code which are made applicable to quasi-
delicts (See Article 2178)
5. Article 1723, New Civil Code (See Article 2192)
6. Article 309, New Civil Code (See Article 2219 [9])
7. Article 1314 NCC (Contractual Interference)
8. Family Code of the Philippines
9. Articles 100 to 103 of the Revised Penal Code (see Article 2177, NCC)
10. Title XVIII (Damages) covering Articles 2195 to 2235, NCC.
11. Chapter on Nuisance (Articles 694 to 707, NCC)
12. Chapter III, Section 4 (Common Carriers) covering Articles 1755 to 1763, NCC
13. R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act)
14. Supreme Court decisions
15. American law and jurisprudence; and
16. Opinion of legal authors

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR PURPOSES OF TORT LAW?

The major purposes of tort law include the following:

1. To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might
otherwise take the law into their own hands;
2. Deter wrongful conduct;
3. To encourage socially responsible behavior; and
4. To restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do
this, by compensating them from their injury

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF INTERESTS PROTECTED BY TORT LAWS UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE AND WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WHICH PROTECT SUCH INTEREST?

INTEREST PROTECTED TORTS AND PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Person
1. Freedom from contract and of 1. Physical Injuries (Art. 32), Quasi
movement Delict (Art. 2176)
2. Freedom from distress 2. Moral Damages (Arts. 2217-2220)
Dignity
1. Reputation 1. Defamation (Art. 33)
2. Privacy 2. Violation of Privacy (Art. 26)
3. Freedom from wrongful actions 3. Malicious Prosecution (Arts. 20, 21)
Property
1. Real property 1. Nuisance (Arts. 694-770), Quasi
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Delict (Article 2176)

Economic/Pecuniary
1. Contracts 1. Interference with contractual rights
(Art. 1314)
2. Freedom form deception 2. Fraud (Art. 33

WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CULPA CONTRACTUAL, CULPA AQUILIANA

AND CULPA CRIMINAL?

CULPA CONTRACTUAL CULPA AQUILIANA CULPA CRIMINAL

There is a pre-existing There is no pre-existing There is nor pre-existing
obligation (a contract, obligation. contractual obligation.
either expressed or
implied)
Preponderance of evidence Preponderance of evidence The crime must be proven
is required. is needed. beyond reasonable doubt.
Defense of good father of a Defense of a good father of This defense cannot be
family in the selection and a family in the selection of interposed. If the employee
supervision of employees is the employees is a proper is insolvent or incapable to
not a proper and complete defense of the employer. pay the civil aspect or
defense but this can liability, the employer is
mitigate liability for subsidiarily liable
damages
The existence of a contract The fault or negligence of The innocence of the
must be proven. If it is the defendant must be accused is presumed until
proven and it is also proven proven. the contrary is proven.
that the contract was not
complied with, it is
presumed that the debtor is
at fault.
Negligence is only Negligence is direct, Negligence is direct,
incidental to the substantive and substantive and
performance of an existing independent. independent.
obligation based on
contract.

HOW IS QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM DELICT OR CRIME?

BASIS QUASI-DELICT DELICT OR CRIME

1. Legal basis of liability There can be a quasi-delict There can be no crime
as long as there is fault or unless there is a law
negligence resulting in punishing the act.
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K. P. Dela Serna
damage or injury to
another. It is broader in
scope than crime.
2. Criminal intent Criminal intent is no
necessary for quasi-delict to
exist. Fault or negligence
without intent will suffice.
3. Nature of right violated Right violated is a private
right. Quasi-delict is a
wrongful act against a
private individual.
4. Liability for damages Every quasi-delict gives rise
to liability for damages.
5. Proofs needed Proof of the fault or
negligence requires only
preponderance of evidence.
6. Sanction or penalty Reparation or
indemnification of the
injury or damage.
HOW IS QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM CULPA CONTRACTUAL?
BASIS Quasi-Delict
1. Nature of negligence Negligence is direct,
substantive and
independent (Rakes vs.
Atlantic, 7 Phil. 395)
2. Defense of good father of This is a complete and
a family proper defense insofar as
parents, guardians,
employers are concerned
(Art. 2180, last par.)
3. Presumption of There is no presumption of
negligence negligence. The injured
party must prove the
negligence of the defendant
(Cangco vs. MRC, 38 Phil.
Criminal intent is essential
for criminal liability to
exist.
Right violated is a public
one. Crime is a wrong
against the State.
Some crimes (like
contempt, illegal possession
of firearm) do not give rise
to liability for damages.
The guilt of the accused
must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Punishment is either
imprisonment, fine or both;
sometimes other accessory
penalties are imposed.
Culpa Contractual
Negligence is merely
incidental to the
performance of the
contractual obligation.
There is a pre-existing
contract or obligation.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, supra)
This is not a complete and
proper defense in the
selection and supervision of
employees. (Cangco vs.
MRC, infra.)
There is presumption of
negligence as long as it can
be proved that there was
breach of the contract. The
defendant must prove that
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K. P. Dela Serna

768). Otherwise, the there was no negligence in

complaint of injured party the carrying out of the
will be dismissed. terms of the contract.
(Cangco vs. MRC, supra)

APPLICATION:

FACTS:

X, INC. – PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANY

Y – BUS DRIVER, RECKLESS DRIVING
Z – PASSENGER INJURED

CAUSES OF ACTION:

1. Culpa contractual – negligence based on contract

2. Culpa aquiliana – negligence based on tort
3. Culpa criminal – negligence based on a crime

CULPA CONTRACTUAL

In the contract of carriage of passengers, it is the obligation of the carrier to

convey the passengers safely to the point of destination. In case a passenger is not
brought safely thereto, there will be a breach of contract. Any case brought based on
culpa contractual will be captioned ―Passenger Z vs. X, Inc‖ because the contract is
between them. The driver is not to be included as a party to the action, because he is not
a party to the contract. As to him, there is no privity.

CULPA AQUILIANA

Damage caused to another due to negligence. The case will be entitled ―Passenger
Z vs. X, Inc. and Driver Y” (the defendants will be solidarily liable as joint-tortfeasors)

CULPA CRIMINAL

The driver‘s act may amount to a crime (physical injuries through reckless
imprudence). The case will be entitled ―People of the Philippines vs. Driver Y”, and if the
latter is convicted but is insolvent, Passenger Z may pursue against X, Inc. to enforce the
latter‘s subsidiary liability.

NATURE OF THE CASES:

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K. P. Dela Serna

The weakest cause of action is culpa aquiliana where the employer may raise the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Culpa criminal is
a stronger cause of action because as to the company‘s subsidiary liability the latter‘s
defense are limited, however the quantum of evidence needed to convict the employee
would have to be guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Culpa contractual (breach of contractual of carriage) is a stronger cause of action

because if death or injury occurs, the presumption of negligence automatically arises
and the common carrier can be held liable if he fails to prove the extra-ordinary
diligence for the duration of the carriage.

II. QUASI-DELICT UNDER THE CIVIL CODE

A. ARTICLE 2176

Article 2176 - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The article covers all wrongful acts or omissions as along as –

1. They are not constitutive of breach of contract; and

2. They are not punishable as offenses.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT?

1. Act or omission;
2. Presence of fault or negligence
3. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
4. Causal connection between the fault or negligence and the damage
5. No pre-existing contractual relation

1. ACT OR OMISSION

WHAT IS ACT OR OMISSION?

When a person by reason of his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to

another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a
right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damaged.
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K. P. Dela Serna

2. FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE

A. NEGLIGENCE

WHAT IS NEGLIGENCE?

Article 1173 of the New Civil Code explains negligence as follows –

―Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.

XXX

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which I expected of a good father of a family shall be required.‖

The Supreme Court has defined ―negligence as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury‖ (United States vs. Arias, 23 Phil. 434; Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378)

WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF CARE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED?

Based on the definition of Article 1173, the degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that should be observed depends on the circumstance of a) persons, b) place,
and c) time. That which may be considered therefore as sufficient care and precaution in
a set of circumstances, may be insufficient in another set of circumstances that confront
the same individual.

WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF CARE OR DILIGENCE REQUIRED?

The standard or degree of care or diligence that should be observed is that which
is expected of a good father of a family unless the law or stipulation of the parties
requires another standard of care.

The Supreme Court explained in Picart vs. Smith, infra that the standard of
conduct used in the Philippines is that of pater familias in Roman law or that what is
referred to in Article 1173 of the NCC, in relation to Article 2178 as a good father of a
family. What should be determined in negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good
father of a family. A good father of a family is likewise referred to as the reasonable
man, a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent
man.
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K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT ARE EXAMPLES OF PROVISIONS OF LAW THAT REQUIRES ANOTHER STANDARD

OF CARE?

a. Article 1733 provides that common carriers ―are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence according to all circumstances of each case‖.
b. Article 1755 provides that common carrier ―is bound to carry the passenger
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, suing the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.‖
c. Highest degree of diligence is required in practice of medicine [likened to the
diligence required of a common carrier] (Ramos vs. CA, August 11, 2002) Res ipsa
loquitor doctrine is applicable to practice of medicine.

CAN THERE BE A TORT IN MALPRACTICE IN LAW?

Yes, while lawyers are no required to exercise the extraordinary diligence of a

common carrier, they must exercise diligence not lesser than the diligence of a good
father of a family in handling of cases which they accepted from clients. (Ventilla vs.
Centeno, 1 SCRA 215 1) In fact, a lawyer commits the crime of ―betrayal of trust‖ if he
would maliciously breach his professional duty, or is guilty of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance to the prejudice of his client. (Article 209, RPC)

WHAT IS THE TEST OF DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE?

In Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, the test of negligence is capsulized as follows –

―Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is

attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposed a duty on the actor to refrain from the
course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and failure to do so
constitutes negligence.

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE?

Actionable negligence may either be a) culpa contractual, b) culpa aquiliana, and c)

criminal negligence. Thus an action fro damages for the negligent acts of the defendant
may be based on contract, delict, or quasi-delict. The bases of liability are separate and
distinct from each other even if only one act or omission is involved.

WHAT IS THE COVERAGE OF NEGLIGENCE IN ARTICLE 2176?

1 A lawyer was made liable for nominal damages for failure to perfect an appeal.
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K. P. Dela Serna

Article 2176, whenever it refers to ―fault or negligence‖, covers not only acts ―not
punishable by law‖ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed (if the torfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary (Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 202).

WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE?

1. Time
2. Place
3. Emergency
4. Gravity of harm to be avoided
5. Alternative cause of action
6. Social value or utility of activity
7. Person exposed to the risk

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE:

a. Violation of rules and statutes

b. Practice and custom
c. Compliance with rules and statutes

WHAT ARE THE DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE?

a. Ordinary negligence
b. Gross negligence

This is recognized in Article 2231 of the NCC which provides that ―in quasi-delicts
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence‖

Gross negligence is defined as ―want of even slight care of diligence‖. It is also

characterized as implying conscious indifference to consequence; pursuing a course of
conduct which would naturally and probably result to injury; utter disregard of
consequences.

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

a. Burden of proof

WHO HAS THE BUDEN TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE?

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K. P. Dela Serna

The plaintiff must prove the elements of a quasi-delict, the most important of
which is the element of fault or negligence attributable to the defendant. If this is not
proven, the plaintiff cannot recover damages from the defendant. It is even presumed
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence.

b. PRESUMPTIONS

WHAT ARE THE PRESUMPTIONS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE ON NEGLIGENCE?

The Civil Code provides for the following cases when the existence of negligence
is presumed.

1. Article 2184. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he

had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
2. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
3. Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of
the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearm and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or
business.
4. Presumption of negligence may also arise because of certain contractual
relationship between the parties. Thus the Civil Code provides for a
presumption of negligence in case a passenger was injured in an accident
involving his carrier. (Article 1735)

c. RES IPSA LOQUITOR.

WHAT IS RES IPSA LOQUITOR?

This is one of the rules relied upon in negligence cases – the thing speaks for
itself. Its function is to aid the plaintiff in proving the elements of a negligence case by
circumstantial evidence.

In the case of Spouses Bernabe Africa and Soledad C. Africa vs. CALTEX (Phil.) Inc.,
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 2 the Supreme Court applied the presumption of

2
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of
appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who
knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
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K. P. Dela Serna

negligence under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur — Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

B. FAULT

WHAT IS FAULT?

It is that condition where a person acts in a way or manner contrary to what

normally should have done. Fault is negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or
omission which gives rise to a liability in torts or would, apart from this act, give rise to
the defense of contributory negligence

WHAT ARE THE TWO KINDS OF FAULT?

1. FAULT SUBSTANTIVE AND INDEPENDENT, which on account of its origin, gives rise
to an obligation between two persons not similarly bound by any obligation, or

2. AS IN INCIDENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF AN OBLIGATION WHICH ALREADY EXISTED,

which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the
liability arising from the already existing obligation.

WHAT KIND OF FAULT IS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2176?

The fault referred to in Article 2176 is ―fault substantive and independent‖ and
which in itself a source of obligation.

3. DAMAGE

WHAT IS DAMAGE?

Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from injury. It differs from
damages which term refers to the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered (So Ping Bun vs. CA, 314 SCRA 751)

4. CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE AND THE DAMAGE

WHAT IS CAUSAL CONNECTION?

explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because
of want of care.
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The fault or negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the
injury of the plaintiff. If the cause of the injury is due to the plaintiff‘s sole negligence,
he cannot recover. There must be clear evidence that the cause of the damage is the fault
or negligence of the defendant.

WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

The proximate cause of injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.

More comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with the predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstance, that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Vda De
Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181; Teague vs., Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181).

5. NO PRE-EXISTING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES

STATE THE GENERAL RULE AS TO CONTRACTUAL RELATION OF THE PARTIES.

If there is pre-existing contractual relation between the parties and the same is
violated, the proper cause of action is not anchored on quasi-delict but breach of contract
or culpa-contractual.

WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE ABOVE RULE?

However, there may be cases of contractual relations like a contract of carriage

by airplane where quasi-delict may arise when the contract was grossly violated (Air
France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 3). The tort liability here is not based on the contract
of carriage but on some other bases like deliberate and malicious violation of the
contract.

3 In Air France vs. Carrascoso, a passenger was ousted from his first class accommodation and
was compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment. He was allowed to recover damages from the
carrier notwithstanding the fact that the relation between the carrier and the passenger is contractual both
in origin and nature. The Supreme Court held that the act itself of breaking the contract creates a tort
liability.
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K. P. Dela Serna

In other words, the existence of contract does not bar the commission of a tort by
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort, the contractual relation of the parties does not bar
the recovery of damages. (Singson vs. Bank of P.I., 132 Phil. 597 4)

B. ARTICLE 2177

―Responsibility for fault or negligence under the proceeding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.‖

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 2177?

The Article distinguishes two kinds of negligence –

1. Criminal negligence – is a violation of criminal law

2. Civil negligence – it is a distinct and independent negligence which is culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict of ancient origin, having always its own foundation,
separate from criminal negligence.

The article makes a distinction between a civil liability arising from a quasi-delict,
and civil liability arising from a crime, that is, if the act or omission is punishable by the
Revised Penal Code, or may create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code (Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195).

WHAT ARE THE MODES OF ENFORCING CIVIL LIABILITY DUE TO FAULT OR

NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE ARTICLE?

The injured party has the option –

1. To pursue a criminal action which includes the claim for civil liability arising
from the crime based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or
2. To pursue an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 to
2194 of the New Civil Code (Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98).

4 In Julian C. Singson and Ramona Del Castillo vs. BPI and Santiago Frezas, the bank clerk
committed a mistake that caused the freezing of the current account of Julian Singson. As a result, his
checks were dishonored. The bank apologized to Singson and restored the checking account.
Nevertheless, Singson sued the bank for damages. The bank interposed the defense that there could be no
liability for negligence or quasi-delict on account of the contractual relations between the bank and
Singson, and that the error was immediately corrected. The Supreme Court held that Singson can recover
damages from the bank despite the existence of contractual relations between the parties because the act
itself that breaks the contract may also be a tort or quasi-delict.
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K. P. Dela Serna

If the action is filed against the employer of the negligent employee, the offended
party may choose the remedy of primary liability allowed in Article 2180 or the
subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code. There is however, a limitation – he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.

Application:

B, A FIVE YEAR-OLD-BOY, WAS RUN OVER BY A PASSENGER JEEPNEY RESULTING IN HIS

DEATH. O IS THE OWNER OF THE JEEPNEY. D IS THE DRIVER OF THE JEEPNEY.

THE PARENTS OF B WANT TO SUE. WHAT ARE THEIR OPTIONS?

1. They can sue D alone for homicide through reckless imprudence; or

2. They can sue Y for quasi-delict.

CAN D BE CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND AT THE

SAME TIME, BE ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY THE PARENTS OF B?

Yes, because every person criminally liability is civilly liable.

WHAT PROOF IS NEEDED TO SECURE CONVICTION OF D?

The guilt of D should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SUPPOSE THE GUILT OF D IS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND HE IS

ACQUITTED, CAN THE PARENTS OF B STILL SUE D FOR QUASI-DELICT?

Yes. The acquittal of D is not a bar to a subsequent civil action. This is so because
the evidence in the criminal case may not be sufficient for a conviction, but sufficient for
a civil liability, where mere preponderance of evidence is enough.

CAN THE PARENTS OF B SUE O AND Y FOR QUASI-DELICT?

Yes, but O can interpose the defense that he exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of D. If O proves this, he will be excused from civil liability.

SUPPOSE O WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF D, CAN O STILL BE HELD LIABLE?

Yes, if it was proven for instance, that O was also in the jeepney at the time of
accident, and he could have, by use of diligence, prevented the misfortune, but he did
not. (Vide first par, Art. 2184)
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K. P. Dela Serna

IF D IS CONVICTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE AND A WRIT OF EXECUTION WAS ISSUED

AGAINST HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY, BUT IT TURNED OUT THAT D IS
INSOLVENT, CAN THE WRIT OF EXECUTION BE ENFORCED AGAINST O?

Yes. The guilt of D is automatically the civil guilt of O, if D is insolvent. O is

subsidiarily liable as employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and he
cannot interpose the defense that he exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his driver.

IF THEY OPT TO SUE FOR QUASI-DELICT, WHAT PROOF IS NEEDED TO PROVE THEIR
CASE AGAINST D AND O?

The proof needed is a mere preponderance of evidence.

As against D, the parents of B should prove the fault or negligence of D. In other

words, the elements of quasi-delict should be proven. As against O, the parents of B
should prove that O has not exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
D.

HOW CAN O BE EXCUSED FROM LIABILITY?

O can be excused form liability provided he proves that he exercised due

diligence in the selection and supervision of D

CAN O STILL BE HELD LIABLE EVEN IF HE PROVES DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF D?

Yes, if it is proven that he was inside the jeepney at the time of accident, and he
could have, by use of diligence, prevented the misfortune, but which he did not
exercise.

Procedural Aspect [Concurrence of Causes of Action and Remedies]

Enforcement of the civil liability arising from crime is governed by Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court effective December 1, 2000. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 5 provide as
follows:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
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K. P. Dela Serna

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other that actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the

accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil action, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees cased on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amount are so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

When the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal action.

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may,
upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the
civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
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K. P. Dela Serna

offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding
has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is
a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.

Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. – A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against
the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.

SIMPLIFICATION OF THE RULES

STATE THE RULE ON CONCURRENCE OF ACTION.

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

STATE THE EXCEPTIONS.

The civil liability arising from the offense charged shall not be deemed instituted
together with the criminal action if:

1. The offended party waives the civil action; or

2. If the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; or
3. If the offended party institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

WHAT IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION?

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.

PROVISO:
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K. P. Dela Serna

In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Application:

AFTER A CRIMINAL ACTION HAS BEEN COMMENCED, IS IT STILL POSSIBLE THAT A

CIVIL ACTION CAN BE FILED BY THE INJURED PARTY?

Yes, if the case to be filed falls under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the New Civil
Code.

IF THE CASE FALLS EITHER UNDER ANY OF THE SITUATIONS REFERRED TO IN SAID
ARTICLES AND THE CRIMINAL ACTION HAS ALREADY COMMENCED, WHEN SHALL THE CIVIL
ACTION BE FILED?

It may be filed during the pendency of the criminal case.

IF SAID CIVIL ACTION IS FILED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CRIMINAL CASE, CAN
BOTH ACTIONS BE TRIED AND HEARD INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER?

Yes, by express provision of law which says that such civil action ―xxx shall
proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.‖ (Section 3, Rule 111)

WHAT HAPPENS IF A CIVIL ACTION IS NOT EXPRESSLY INSTITUTED?

The civil action shall be impliedly joined with the criminal action. This means
that the two actions are joined in one action as twins, and the civil action may be tried
and prosecuted with all the ancillary process provided by law.

WHAT HAPPENS IF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTS THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BUT FAILS TO DECIDE ON HIS CIVIL LIABILITY?

The civil liability may be imposed in a subsequent proceeding without

transgressing the prohibition against double jeopardy.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON HIS CIVIL LIABILITY?

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K. P. Dela Serna

The acquittal of the accused in the criminal case will not necessarily exonerate
him from civil liability (Article 29 5).

The civil liability which may arise from culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict was never
intended by law to be merged in the criminal action. The criminal prosecution is not a
condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil rights.

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Article 33 6 and 2177 to the result
of the criminal action would render meaningless the independent civil action and the
injunction in Article 31 7 that such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceeding.

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITAL DOES
NOT NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED?

1. When it declares that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist;
2. when it declares that the accused is not the author of the crime;
3. when the judgment expressly declares that the liability is only civil in nature;
4. Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted;
5. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; and
6. where the civil action has prescribed.

IF THERE IS NO SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION, WHAT SHOULD THE COURT TRYING THE
CRIMINAL CASE FIND OUT TO ENABLE IT TO DETERMINE FULLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
OFFENDER?

The court should find out if there is evidence to prove the civil liability of the
offender, and it should also determine who the heirs of the deceased are entitled to

5 ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his

guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
6 ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,

entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
7 ARTICLE 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or

omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. acd
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K. P. Dela Serna

receive payment of the indemnity in case of conviction. This is necessary to avoid

payment to wrong persons.

WHAT SHOULD THE OFFENDED PARTY DO IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION (WHERE CIVIL
ACTION IS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED) TO ENABLE HIM TO RECOVER?

The offended party must present evidence in support of his claim for damages.
Otherwise, the court cannot award damages in the judgment of conviction.

SHOULD THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION?

Even without any allegation as to damages, the offender shall be liable for them
if the offended party was able to prove that he is entitled to damages. This is predicated
on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

IF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS RENDERED AND THE ACCUSED DECIDES TO APPEAL

THE SAME TO SEEK A REVIEW OF HIS CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY, WHAT ARE THE
COURSES OF ACTION?

He may appeal both with respect to the judgment in the civil and criminal
liability, or he may appeal only with respect to the civil action or criminal action.

WHAT DOES THE PHRASE “IN NO CASE, HOWEVER, MAY THE OFFENDED PARTY
RECOVER DAMAGES TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION CHARGED IN THE CRIMINAL
ACTION” MEAN?

This means that if the plaintiff succeeded to recover damages from the defendant
the Civil Code, he can no longer recover damages for the same negligent act under the
Revised Penal Code. Conversely, if the offended party takes the option of merely filing
a criminal case and submits his damage claim for decision in the criminal action, and
thereafter, he succeeded to recover damages from the accused in the civil action, he can
no longer recover damages from the accused in a criminal action based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict.

IS RESERVATION REQUIRED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR THE FILING OF CIVIL ACTION
ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT?

Under the 1964, 1985 and 1988 amendments of the Revised Rules of Criminal
procedure, it was required that the injured party must make a reservation in the
criminal case for the filing of a civil action based on quasi-delict. The failure to do so will
result in the inclusion of the claim for civil liability in the criminal case and bars any
separate civil action based on the same act or omission. (Vide: Hambon vs. CA, G.R. No.
122150, March 17, 2003)
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K. P. Dela Serna

However, under the 2000 amendments of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the reservation required before was deleted. (Vide: Section 3, Rule 111) The
new amendment now conforms to the express mandate of the New Civil Code that a
quasi-delict may be prosecuted separately and independently of the criminal case arising
from the same act or omission, just like the other independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 of the New Civil Code (Vide: Article 2177).

MORE DISCUSSION:

Article 2177 of the Civil Code makes a distinction between a civil liability arising
from a quasi-delict, and civil liability arising from a crime, that is, an act or omission may
be punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or may create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. 8 Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a
civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, and whenever Article 2176 refers to "fault or negligence", it covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged
also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. 9 The Supreme Court in the case of Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 explained
that:

―According to the Report of the Code Commission, Article 2177 of

the Civil Code though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito"
has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain . . .‖

xxx xxx xxx

―In Azucena vs. Potenciano, (5 SCRA 468, 470-471), the Court

declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of
the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil

8 See: Andamo vs. IAC, 191 SCRA 195; Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp. vs. People, 329 SCRA 600
9 Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 472
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K. P. Dela Serna

action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal

prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

xxx xxx xxx

―In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals (176 SCRA 591), this
Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case,
unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared
that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case
the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.

The Supreme Court has already laid a fundamental premise clearly enunciated
as early as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607 (1942), thus:

"A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce."

The options of the plaintiffs (offended parties) therefore are: (1) To pursue a
criminal action which includes the claim for civil liability arising from the crime based
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or (2) To pursue an independent civil action
based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the New Civil Code. 10

As it is quite apparent that the plaintiffs had predicated their present claim for
damages on quasi-delict, they are not barred from proceeding with this independent civil

10 Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; ce Haulers Copr. Vs. CA, 338 SCRA 572; Virata vs. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
472
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K. P. Dela Serna

suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil
action based on quasi-delict. 11 And the separate civil action for quasi-delict may proceed
independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case, 12 except that the
plaintiffs cannot recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the
defendant. 13 The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, which should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action, is that
arising from delict, and not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. 14

The civil liability which may arise from culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict was never
intended by law to be merged in the criminal action. The criminal prosecution is not a
condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil rights. 15 To subordinate the civil
action contemplated in Article 33 and 2177 to the result of the criminal action would
render meaningless the independent civil action and the injunction in Article 31 that
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding. 16

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. 17

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict — without violating the rule
on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. 18

11 Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 13 SCRA 658 (1965).

12 Chan vs. Yatco, 103 Phil. 1126 (1958).
13 Article 2177, Civil Code.
14 Felix Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping and Salvador Mendoza, G.R. No. L-53064, September 25, 1980.
15 BLTB vs. CA, 64 SCRA 427
16 Azucena vs. Potenciano, 115 Phil 465. See also: Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc. vs. Gamboa, 101 Phil. 1219; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; Standard Vacuum Oil Vo. Vs. tan, 107
Phil. 109; Pacholo vs. Yumangday, 108 Phil. 238; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112.
17 Avelino Casupanan and Roberto Capitulo vs. Mario Llavore Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26,
2002.
18 Ibid.
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K. P. Dela Serna

In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147703,
April 14, 2004, the Supreme Court explained the concept of independent civil action in
this wise:
―At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides: "When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." xxx
xxx xxx" Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. xxx xxx
xxx It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and
independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are
some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1. The right to
bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved
in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2.
The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission. What is deemed instituted in
every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from
quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is
filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution
remains, and the offended party may — subject to the control of the
prosecutor — still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein. This discussion is completely in accord
with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

C. ARTICLE 2178

―ART. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-
delict.‖
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K. P. Dela Serna

―ART. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every

kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances.‖

―ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, par. 2, shall apply.‖

―ART. 1174. Except in case expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which though foreseen, were inevitable.‖

―ART. 2201. Par. 2. x x x In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.‖

Article 1172 provides that one incurs a responsibility for being negligent in the
performance of every obligation.

WHAT ARE THE TWO KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE MENTIONED BY ARTICLE 1172?

1. When an obligor does not observe diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, time
and place, there is fault or negligence; and
2. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
performance of the obligation. (Article 1173 in relation to Article 2201, last
paragraph)

Application:

A.) A took an ABC bus bound for Butuan City. In Gingoog City, said bus collided
with an XYZ Liner. A was hurt.

1. WHAT CASE CAN A FILE AGAINST ABC?

This is a case of contractual negligence or culpa contractual. A may

file a civil case against ABC because there is a contract of carriage between
him and ABC.

2. WHAT IS THE EFFECT IF ABC PROVES THAT IT EXERCISED DILIGENCE IN THE

SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVER?
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K. P. Dela Serna

Even if ABC proves that it exercised diligence in the selection and

supervision of its driver, ABC is still liable. That defense is not a proper
and complete defense in culpa contractual. However, the diligence of ABC
makes it a debtor in good faith, and the damages would be mitigated
(Cangco vs. MRL co., 38 Phil. 769).

3. IS ABC LIABLE IF IT TURNED OUT THAT A HAS NOT YET PAID HIS FARE AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT?

Yes. This is a case of culpa contractual and for as long as A was able
to prove that he was a passenger of the bus at the time of the accident and
that he failed to reach his destination safely, there is already a breach of
the contract of carriage.

4. IS ABC LIABLE IF IT TURNED OUT THAT A HAS JUST BOARDED THE BUS
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE SAID ACCIDENT?

Yes, for the same reason.

B.) A took an ABC bus bound for Davao City. To avoid a head on collision with
an XYZ Liner, ABC’s driver swerved to the right causing it to hit a sari-sari
store. A was hurt. X and Y who were taking snacks in the sari-sari store were
also hit and they died.

1. IS ABC LIABLE TO A FOR DAMAGES?

For as long as A can prove that he was a passenger of ABC at the

time of the accident and that he failed to reach his destination safely, ABC
is liable. If ABC wants to escape liability, it should prove that its driver
was really careful and extraordinary diligent.

2. IN THIS CASE, IS ABC PRESUMED NEGLIGENT?

As a rule, a common carrier is presumed negligent in case of death

or physical injuries to passengers unless it proves the exercise of
extraordinary diligence.

3. CAN X AND Y FILE A CASE OF CULPA CONTRACTUAL AGAINST ABC?

No. This is now a case of culpa aquiliana which can be filed both
against the driver and ABC. X and Y have the burden of proving that the
driver was negligent and that ABC did not exercise diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
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K. P. Dela Serna

If ABC is able to prove that it exercised diligence and supervision

in the selection and supervision of its driver, it will be exempt from
liability. This is a proper defense in culpa aquiliana.

If X and Y fail to prove the negligence of the driver, then there is no

culpa aquiliana. The reason for this is because fault or negligence is an
essential element of a quasi-delict, and if this is not proved, then there is no
quasi-delict.

C.) CAN THE PARTIES STIPULATE REGARDING FUTURE NEGLIGENCE?

Simple negligence may in certain cases be excused or mitigated but gross

negligence can never be excused in advance because this is contrary to public
policy.

1. A SHIPPED ITS GOODS TO A VESSEL OWNED BY XYZ, INC. THERE APPEARS A

PROVISION IN THE BILL OF LADING WHICH STATES THAT NO MATTER HOW
NEGLIGENT IS SAID VESSEL, XYZ, INC., SHALL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DAMAGES CAUSED TO THE GOODS. A SIGNED THE BILL OF LADING. IS SAID
STIPULATION VALID?

It is void, for being contrary to public policy.

2. SAME PARTIES BUT THE PROVISION IN THE BILL OF LADING IS DIFFERENT.

THIS TIME, THE PROVISION STATES THAT NO MATTER HOW NEGLIGENT IS
SAID VESSEL, XYZ, INC., SHALL BE LIABLE ONLY FOR P300.OO, REGARDLESS
OF THE VALUE OF THE GOODS. IS THE STIPULATION VALID?

It is also void. This kind of stipulation is, in effect, allowing XYZ,

Inc., to be negligent knowing that its liability will be limited to P300.00,
regardless of the amount of the goods.

3. SAME PARTIES BUT THE PROVISION OF THE BILL OF LADING STATES THAT THE
XYZ, INC.’S LIABILITY IS LIMITED TO P300. 00, NO MATTER HOW NEGLIGENT
IT IS, UNLESS A DECLARES A HIGHER VALUE AND PAYS A HIGHER COST OF
FREIGHT. IS THE STIPULATION VALID?

This time the stipulation is valid because the parties made an

honest definition of their respective obligations and liabilities.

D. ARTICLE 2179
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K. P. Dela Serna

―When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant‘s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.‖

WHAT ARE THE SITUATIONS COVERED BY THE ARTICLE 2179?

1. Plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury – he cannot recover damages. (Taylor vs. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8)
2. Plaintiff‘s own negligence is only contributory; and the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury is defendant‘s lack of due care – plaintiff can
recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded
(Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359).

WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

A proximate cause is that adequate and efficient cause which in the natural order
of events, and under the particular circumstances surrounding the case would naturally
produce the event.

In Vda de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil.181 and Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA
181, the proximate cause was defined as the proximate legal cause, acting first and
19

producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with the predecessor, the final event to the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable circumstance, that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.

PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER TERMS

1. HOW IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM IMMEDIATE CAUSE OR NEAREST

CAUSE?

The proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause; it is not

necessarily the nearest time, distance or space. As distinguished from immeditate
or nearest cause, proximate cause is not necessarily the last link in the chain of
events but that which is the procuring efficient and predominant cause. The
requirement is that the act was the proximate cause, not implying, however, the
nearest in point of time or relation, but rather the efficient cause, which may be
the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in

19 See also: PCIB vs. CA, 350 SCRA 464.

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K. P. Dela Serna

motion and is to be distinguished from a mere pre-existing condition upon

which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the
resultant damage with out the intervention of an independent cause (The Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-
4195, February 18, 1908).

2. HOW IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM PRIOR AND REMOTE CAUSE?

A remote cause is that cause which some independent force merely took
advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof.

A prior and remote cause can not be made the basis of an action, if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition of occasion. If no damage existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which results in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such act or condition is the proximate cause.

3. HOW IS PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONCURRENT CAUSES?

The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the accident. The
defendant is still liable in case there are concurrent causes brought about by acts
or omissions of third persons. Thus, the primary cause remains the proximate
cause even if there is an intervening cause which merely cooperated with the
primary cause and which did not break the chain of causation.

WHAT ARE THE TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE?

A. CAUSE-IN-FACT TEST

In determining the proximate cause of the injury, it is first necessary to determine

if the defendant‘s negligence was the cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If the
defendant‘s negligence was not a cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it is a cause-in-
fact, the inquiry shifts to the question of limit of liability of the defendant. The latter
determination of the extent of liability involves a question of policy. In other words, the
question of proximate cause does not only involve cause and effect analysis. It also
involves policy considerations that limit the liability of the defendants in negligence
cases. The mere fact that the negligence of the defendant is a factor in bringing about
the injury does not necessarily means that he shall be liable.
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K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF CAUSE-IN-FACT TESTS?

1. SINE QUA NON TEST (BUT FOR TEST) – this is a question of causal connection. Where
the defendant‘s own conduct will not be considered as proximate cause of the
event if the event just the same would have occurred without it. Simply stated,
defendant‘s conduct is the cause in fact of the injury under the ―but for‖ test if
the damage would not have resulted had there been no negligence on the part of
the defendant. Conversely, defendant‘s negligent conduct is not the cause in fact
of the plaintiff‘s damage if the accident could not have been avoided in the
absence thereof.
2. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST – makes the negligent conduct the cause in fact of the
damage if it was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. This test is
especially important where there are concurrent causes. Here, the issues are not
factual but conceptual.
3. NESS TEST – A condition may still be considered a cause where it is shown to be a
necessary element in just one of several co-present sets each independently
sufficient for the effect.
4. POLICY TESTS

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF POLICY TESTS?

1. FORESIGHT PERSPECTIVE

It is a test that determines whether the chain of events that in fact occurred was
sufficiently ―foreseeable‖, ―natural‖ or ―probable‖ at the outset for the defendant to be
held liable.

WHAT ARE THE TESTS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENCE UNDER THIS TEST?

1) FORSEEABILITY TEST – where the particular harm was reasonably

foreseeable at the time of the defendant‘s misconduct, his act or
omission is the legal cause thereof. The defendant is not liable for
unforeseeable consequences of his act. The liability is limited within
the risk created by the defendant‘s negligence act.

2) NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE TEST– where the defendant‘s

liability is recognized only if the harm or injury suffered is the natural
and probable consequence of his act or omission complained of.

2. DIRECTNESS PERSPECTIVE
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K. P. Dela Serna

It does not require that the injury is within the foreseeable risk created by the
defendant. This second approach starts with the injury and works towards the
wrongful action of the defendant, seeking to determine whether any act of a third party
or the plaintiff, or any event, severed the causal connection between the harm and the
defendant‘s wrongful conduct. Here, the question is only whether, when all the
evidence is in, it is permissible to say that the defendant ―did it‖, that is, brought about
the plaintiff‘s harm.

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF TESTS UNDER THE DIRECTNESS PERSPECTIVE?

1) NATURAL AND ORDINARY OR DIRECT CONSEQUENCE TEST – makes the

defendant liable for damages which are beyond the risk. Direct
consequences are those that follow in the sequence from the effect of
the defendant‘s act upon condition existing and forces already in
operation at the time, without the intervention of any external forces,
which come into active operation later.
2) Hindsight test
3) Orbit of risk test
4) Substantial factor test

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CAUSE AND CONDITION.

A distinction is made between the active cause of the harm or injury and the
existing ―conditions‖ upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only
a passive (not active) static condition, which made the damage possible, he is not liable.

Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm
and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has
created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant
is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it
is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces
which have gone before. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
"condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the
spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant
will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in
the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause"
and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
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K. P. Dela Serna

case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position
of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause" (Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, G.R. No.
L-65295, March 10, 1987).

WHAT IS EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE?

It is one that destroys the causal connection between the negligent act and injury
and thereby negatives liability. An intervening cause will not be regarded as the
proximate cause and the first cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so
broken that they become independent and the result cannot be said to be the
consequence of the primary cause. However, a cause is not an intervening cause if it is
already in operation at the time the negligent act is committed.

WHAT ARE FORESEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSES?

If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably

to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and
customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the
combustible or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire
from some independent source. . . . In all of these cases there is an intervening cause
combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result, and in each case the
defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk
(Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, supra).

IS A FORESEEABLE INTERVENING CAUSE CONSIDERED A SUFFICIENT INTERVENING

CAUSE?

A foreseeable intervening cause however, cannot be considered sufficient

intervening cause. If the intervening cause is foreseeable, the defendant may still be
considered negligent because of the failure to guard against it.

Also, the intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to

relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and
proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury (Spouses
Bernabe Africa vs. Caltex, supra).

APPLICATION
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X AND Y, JAM LINER, INC., HAD A HEATED ALTERCATION INSIDE

PASSENGERS OF
THE BUS RESULTING IN A FIST FIGHT. IN THE PROCESS, X THREW A SOLID PUNCH AGAINST Y
AND AS A RESULT, Y FELL ON THE DRIVER’S SCAT. THE DRIVER LOST CONTROL OF THE
WHEEL AND THE BUS HIT AN ELECTRIC POST. WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT?

Here, the proximate cause is the fist fight between X and Y.

A WAS ON HIS WAY HOME, AFTER A SHOT OR TWO OF LIQUOR IN A BIRTHDAY PARTY.
ON HIS WAY HOME AFTER CROSSING AN INTERSECTION, HIS CAR HEADLIGHTS SUDDENLY
FAILED. HE SWITCHED HIS HEADLIGHTS TO “BRIGHT”, AND THEN AND THERE, HE SAW A
DUMP TRUCK WHICH IS ABOUT 2 ½ METERS AWAY FROM HIS CAR. A TRIED TO AVOID A
COLLISION BY SWERVING HIS CAR TO THE LEFT BUT TO NO AVAIL. HIS CAR SMASHED INTO
THE DUMP TRUCK. WHO IS NEGLIGENT AND WHO IS THE IMMEDIATE AND PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE INJURY? (PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 65295, MARCH
10, 1987)

Both were negligent but the immediate and proximate cause of the accident and
of A‘s injuries was the wrongful and negligent manner in which the truck was parked
or the truck driver‘s ―lack of due care.‖

The collision of A‘s car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver‘s negligence. The negligence of the truck driver, far
from being a ―passive and static condition‖ was an indispensable and efficient cause.
The accident would not have occurred were it not for the fact that it was parked askew
and without warning lights and reflector devices.

The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury
for anyone driving, and for having created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible.

A‘s negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver‘s negligence,
is merely contributory and the damages therefore that he will recover is subject to
mitigation by the courts, in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

On the issue of damages – In a suit for damages arising from a quasi-delict, where
the plaintiff‘s negligence was contributory, the demands of substantial justice may be
satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.

Based on this, the following were awarded:

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K. P. Dela Serna

1. 20% of the damages awarded by the appellate court shall be borne by the
plaintiff;
2. 80% shall be paid by the driver and his employer who shall be solidarily liable to
A; and
3. The award of exemplary damages shall be borne exclusively by the defendant
Phoenix.

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?

Contributory negligence has been defined as the act or omission amounting to

want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendant‘s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.

To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he

performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body (Mao-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. CA, 189 SCRA
93; MMTC vs. CA, August 1, 2002).

ARE CHILDREN BELOW 9 YEARS CAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?

No, a child under 9 years of age is conclusively presumed incapable of

contributory negligence as a matte of law.

In our jurisdiction, a person under 9 years of age is conclusively presumed to

have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability.
The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over 9 and under 15 years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of
age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child
over 9 but under 15 years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule therefore, is
that a child under 9 years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. (Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377)

WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF PLAINTIFF’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?

If the proximate cause of the injury is the contributory negligence of the plaintiff,
there can be no recovery for damages (Taylor vs. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8)

A plaintiff is barred from recovering the damages for loss or injury caused by the
negligence of defendant only when plaintiff‘s negligence is the sole legal cause of the
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K. P. Dela Serna

damage, or the negligence of the plaintiff and some person or persons other that the
defendant or defendants was the sole cause of the damage.

If the plaintiff and the defendant are both at fault, the former may recover, but
the amount of his recovery may only be such proportion of the entire damage plaintiff
sustained as the defendant‘s negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the
plaintiff and the defendant. For example, when it is found that the plaintiff‘s negligence
is at least equal to that of the defendant, the amount awarded to the plaintiff should be
reduced by one-half from what it otherwise would have been entitled.

If the proximate cause of the injuries is still the negligence of the defendant,
despite the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the latter can still recover damages
from the former. However, damages will be reduced due to the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff (Rakes vs. Atlantic, supra.)

This is apportionment of liability also known as the DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE

NEGLIGENCE. Under said doctrine, the negligence of both the plaintiff and of the
defendant are compared for the purpose of reaching an equitable apportionment of
their respective liabilities for the damage caused and suffered by the plaintiff.

Contributory negligence in common carriers does not bar recovery of damages if

the proximate cause of the death of the passenger is the negligence of the common
carrier –

―Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does

not bar recovery of damages fro the death or injuries, if the proximate
cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.‖

CAN THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE APPLY IN CRIMINAL CASES?

The principle of contributory negligence cannot be sued as defense in criminal

cases through reckless imprudence because one cannot allege the negligence of another
to evade the effects of his own negligence. It may, however, mitigate the civil liability of
the defendant but cannot affect his criminal liability.

IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS INVOLVING

BREACH OF CONTRACT?

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only for actions of quasi-delict, not
in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to
a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by the law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
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K. P. Dela Serna

relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.

E. ARTICLE 2180

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but
not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

P.D. 603, ARTICLE 58. Torts– Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF VICARIOUS LIABLITY OR IMPUTED LIABLITY?

The article provides that one is not only liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but
also for those persons for whom he is responsible under the law.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY?

The basis of vicarious liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior, which
under American jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant is conclusively
the negligence of the master. Rather, the basis of Article 2180 is the principle of pater
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K. P. Dela Serna

familias. The reason for the master‘s liability is negligence in the supervision of his
subordinates. The ―master‖, however, in pater familias under Article 2180 will be freed
from liability if he can prove that he had observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.

IS THE ACTUAL TORTFEASOR (MINOR, WARD, EMPLOYEE, SPECIAL AGENT, PUPIL,

STUDENT OR APPRENTICE) EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY?

No, they are not exempt from personal responsibility. They may be sued and
made liable alone as when the person responsible for them or the vicarious obligor
proves that he exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family or when the
minor or insane person has no parents or guardians. In the latter instance, they are
answerable with their own property (Article 2182).

WHAT IS THE DEFENSE AGAINST VICARIOUS LIABILITY?

The responsibility imposed by Article 2180 is not based on respondeat superior. It

arises by virtue of a legal presumption of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible for the tortious conduct if another. Such presumption is only juris tantum,
not juris et de jure, and may be rebutted by showing that they ―observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage‖ (last par.), which in the case of
employers, means due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF “DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OR A FAMILY”?

The phrase may be equated with ORDINARY CARE or that diligence which an
average or a reasonably prudent person exercises over his own affairs. This standard of
care is also referred to as that ―a man of ordinary prudence,‖ or ―a man using ordinary
care and skill.‖

WHAT PROVISION OF LAW GOVERNS THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER

FOR THE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OF HIS EMPLOYEE?

The vicarious liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of his
employee is governed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction of the
employee for criminal negligence conclusively binds the employer who is automatically
made subsidiarily liable, to answer for the damages awarded. The defense that the
employer exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee is
not available under said article.

Since the employer‘s civil liability is subsidiary, and not direct, his responsibility
will arise only if the employee cannot or is unable to pay the indemnity awarded.
Furthermore, his liability cannot be more than that of the employee. The employer
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K. P. Dela Serna

stands in the position of a guarantor. The injured party, however, can sue both at the
same time, although he has a choice of remedy either under the Revised Penal Code or
under Article 2180.

LIABILITY OF FATHER/MOTHER

WHAT IS THE REASON OF THE LAW IN MAKING THEM LIABLE?

It is a necessary consequence of the parent‘s authority they exercise over their

children.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES TO HOLD THE PARENTS LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 2180?
1. The child is below 21 years;
2. The child committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice of another
person; and
3. The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether single or
married.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FATHER AND MOTHER?

Their responsibility is not simultaneous, but alternative, the father being

primarily responsible, and the mother answering only in case of death or incapacity.

PD 603, ARTICLE 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. — The civil

liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender.

However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification (Libi vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 16 [1992]). In other words, both parents
are primarily liable for the damages caused by their child.

The liability is primary and not subsidiary.

WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE PARENTS’ LIABILITY?

Parents‘ liability extends to intentional crimes committed by their minor

children.

Revised Penal Code, ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6
of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
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K. P. Dela Serna

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or
by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount
for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately,

or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants
of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of
the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed
by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF MINORITY IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF THE

ARTICLE?

Minors in the said article refer to those who are below twenty-one and not
to those below 18 years. The law reducing the majority from 21 to 18 years did
not amend these paragraphs. Article 236 of the Family Code as amended by R.A.
No. 6809 provides –

ARTICLE 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty one.

Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or

responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty one years
of age mentioned in the second and third paragraph of 2180 of the Civil Code (R.A. No.
6809).

ARE PARENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR MINOR ADOPTED CHILDREN/ ILLEGITIMATE

CHILDREN?
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K. P. Dela Serna

Judicially adopted children are considered legitimate children of their

adopting parents (Section 17, R.A. No. 8552, Domestic Adoption Act of 1988),
thus the adopters are civilly liable for their tortious and criminal acts if the
children live with them and are below 21 years.

If the child is illegitimate and acknowledged by the father and lives with
the latter, the father shall be responsible. However, an illegitimate child who is
not recognized by the putative father but is under the custody and supervision of
the mother, it is the latter who is vicariously liable.

HOW CAN THE PARENTS AVOID CIVIL LIABLITY?

By pleading and proving the defense that there was no fault or negligence
on their part.

SHOULD THE MOTHER BE IMPLEADED AS CO-DEFENDANT OF HER HUSBAND FOR THE

NEGLIGENT ACTS OR OMISSION OF THEIR CHILD?

No. The mother is liable only if the father is dead or incapacitated.

IS THE FATHER LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE CRIME OF HIS MINOR SON WHO IS
ALREADY MARRIED BUT LIVING WITH AND RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM HIM?

Yes. The marriage of a minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to
any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent (Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRAS 100).

2) LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS

The vicarious liability of the guardians with respect to their wards is governed
by the same rule as in the liability of parents with respect to their children below
twenty-one and who live with them.

In guardianship, however, the ward may be an adult or of age, like an

incompetent or incapacitated adult. The age limit of being below 21 years does not
apply. What is important is that the guardianship is subsisting.

If the ward has two (2) guardians, one over his person and the other over his
property, only the former shall be liable because he is under obligation to supervise the
personal acts of the ward.
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K. P. Dela Serna

WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF RESPONISBILITY OF GUARDIANS?

The responsibility of guardians extends to incapacitated persons even if they are

already of age. Section 2 of Rule 92 uses the word ―incompetent‖. It includes:

1. Persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction

2. Hospitalized lepers
3. Prodigals
4. Deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write
5. Those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals
6. Persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar cases, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property.

The guardians stand in loco parentis

ARE GUARDIANS DE FACTO RESPONSIBLE?

If a person is not legally appointed as guardian, the de facto guardian would

generally not be responsible, because of the absence of one of the bases for the
responsibility, namely, the duty to take care of the ward. But if the injury caused is the
result of bad education or training by the guardian de facto, the latter should be held
liable. It is but just that the law should be applied by analogy. This is to compel them to
exercise control and supervision over the orphans whom they voluntary assumed the
duties of parenthood.

3) LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT OR ENTERPRISE AND

EMPLOYERS

ARE MANAGERS OF A CORPORATION INCLUDED WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE

TERMS “OWNERS AND MANAGERS”?

The terms ―owners and managers‖ (par. 4) and ―employer‖ (par. 5) do not
include the manager of a corporation. The term manager (―director‖ in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of ―employer‖. Thus, a mere manager, who does not own
the business is not to be considered an employer because he is just an employee.
However, a manager who is not an owner but who assumes the responsibility if
supervision over the employees of the owner may be held liable for the acts of the
employees.
The existence of employer-employee relationship must be established by the
plaintiff ―in a satisfactory manner‖. It cannot be presumed.
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K. P. Dela Serna

One who hires an independent contractor but controls the latter‘s work us
responsible also for his negligence. Also, negligence of a professor is negligence of the
school.

WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PARS. 4 AND 5?

A. Article 2180 has a separate provisions for ―owners and managers of an

establishment or enterprise‖ (par. 4) and ―employers‖ (par. 5). Both are
employers, however, it is not necessary that the ―employer‖ under the 5 th
paragraph be engaged in any business or industry.
B. Both are made liable for damages if they are caused by their employees acting in
their service or on the occasion of their functions, or acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks at the time of the commission of the tortious act or
negligence.
C. The 4th paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the
service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the 5th
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task whether or not the employer is engaged in an business or
industry . The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and
acts included.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER?

The liability of the employer is primary and solidary with the employee although
the former can recover from the latter whatever it pays to the plaintiff (Article 2180)

The responsibility of the owner and manager is only with respect to damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their
functions, and not with respect to acts of strangers who committed unauthorized acts
and in doing so, caused damages to others. The same thing is true with respect to the
employer in relation to the unauthorized acts of strangers.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT AN EMPLOYER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER
PAR. 4?

1. The employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;

2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with the orders which the employer
has the authority to give at all times;
3. The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him; and at the time the employee was performing his functions.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT AN EMPLOYER MAY BE LIABLE UNDER
PAR. 5?
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K. P. Dela Serna

1. The act was committed by employees and household helpers (including family
cooks, gardeners, yayas, servants, etc.);
2. The said act was committed while they were acting within their assigned tasks;
3. Damage was caused as a result of said act.

WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION CREATED BY LAW IF AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS CAUSED

BY AN EMPLOYEE? HOW CAN THE EMPLOYER REBUT THIS PRESUMPTION?

If an injury or damage is caused by an employee, it is presumed that the

employer (pars. 4 and 5) was negligent either in the selection of the employee or in his
supervision over him, or both. The employer can overcome the presumption by a clear
showing that in the selection and supervision he observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage (last par.) Allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of employer-employee relations in the complaint are enough to
make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180.

Note that to be exempt from liability, the employer must establish that he
exercised due care not only in the selection but also in the supervision of the employee.

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PRIMARY LIABILITY AND SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF

EMPLOYERS. WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS ON REMEDIES OF THE INJURED PARTY?

The injured party has two (2) options in pursuing the civil liability of the
employer for the acts of his employee:

A. If he chooses to file a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict under article
2180 and succeeds in proving the negligence of the employee, the liability of the
employer is primary, direct and solidary. It is not conditioned on the insolvency
of the employee.

The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the

performance of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover
from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.

B. If he chooses to file a criminal case against the offender and the offender was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the civil liability of the employer is
subsidiary. The employer cannot use as a defense the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family.

The judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly
liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability
but also as to the amount.
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K. P. Dela Serna

Once there is conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable, if it be shown that
the commission thereof was in the discharge of the duties of the employee. And a
previous dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana could not be a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability required by said Article 102 of the Penal
Code.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES SO THAT THE SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
MAY BE ENFORCED?

To enforce the employer‘s subsidiary liability, there must be adequate evidence

establishing that:

1. He is indeed the employer of the convict;

2. He is engage in some kind of industry;
3. The crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and
4. Execution against the employee is unsatisfied.

The employer who is made liable may seek reimbursement from his employee
for the amount he paid to the offended party for the satisfaction of the claim.

4) STATE’S IMPUTED LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF ITS SPECIAL AGENTS

WHAT ARE THE TWO ACTS OF THE STATE THAT MAY GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY?

The state may act as:

1. A government entity (public aspect) exercising governmental functions, where it

is liable for the acts of its special agents. Here, the state is engaged in public or
government functions, through its special agent; or
2. In a corporate capacity (private or business aspect), as when it engages in some
private enterprises, where it may be held liable just as any other employer for the
acts of its employees.

WHAT IS A SPECIAL AGENT?

By special agent is meant one specifically commissioned to carry out the acts
complained of outside of such agent‘s regular duties. He is one who receives definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official.
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K. P. Dela Serna

HOW IS A SPECIAL AGENT DISTINGUISHED FROM AN OFFICIAL WITH SPECIFIC DUTY

OR DUTIES TO PERFORM?

Under the meaning of paragraph 6 of Article 2180, the word official comprises all
officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public
offices. All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class
of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies.

In qualifying the special agent with the adjective ―special‖, the Civil Code aimed
at distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of government, which refers to
all officers and employees in public service.

WHEN IS THE STATE LIABLE AS AN ORDINARY EMPLOYER?

1. When the state is engaged in private business or enterprise;

2. If the special agent is not a public official and is commissioned to perform non-
governmental functions;
3. If the special agent appointed by the state is assigned to perform acts for private
and business interests of the state.

WHEN IS THE STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS SPECIAL AGENT?

Under Article 2180 (par. 6), the state has voluntarily assumed liability for acts
done through special agent if:

1. The state‘s agent is a public official, who must not only be especially
commissioned to do a particular task but such task must be foreign to said
official‘s usual governmental functions.
2. The state commissioned a private individual to perform a special governmental
task (Fontanilla vs. Maliamen).

WHEN IS THE PUBLIC OFFICER OR OFFICIAL PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR HIS ACTS?

Since the state authorizes only legal acts by its officers, the state shall not be
liable and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
state within the rule of immunity of the state from suit for:

1. Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers;

2. Acts of a public officer that goes beyond the scope of his duty particularly when
acting tortiously;
3. Tortious acts committed by the public officers unrelated to his special
assignment;
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K. P. Dela Serna

4. Acts performed by an official ―upon whom previously devolved the duty of

doing the act performed‖;
5. Acts performed in the discharge of the official duties of a public officer.

5) LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTS AND TRADES

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS?

The teachers and heads mentioned in paragraph 7 of Article 2180 stand, to a

certain extent, in loco parentis to their pupils and students.

Where the parent places a child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
latter together with the school head (and the school itself for the fault of the teacher and
head), not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under
their custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instructions.

WHAT DOES THE PHRASE “AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR CUSTODY” MEAN?

The phrase was held to contemplate a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher such that the control and influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the
torts of the pupil (Mercado vs. CA, 108 Phil. 414).

This interpretation was abandoned in Palisoc vs. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 557[1971],

where the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase means ―the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its head and teacher exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are in the school including recess time. There is nothing in the law
which requires that for such liability to attach, the pupl or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school.‖

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the
control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended (Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315). Under Article 218
of the Family Code, custody extends to activities even outside the premises as long as
they are ―authorized activities‖.

It is not necessary that at the time of the injury the teacher be physically present
and at the position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but it refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the
discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.

IS THE SCHOOL LIABLE IF THE STUDENT IS OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE?

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K. P. Dela Serna

A student over 21 years of age, by enrolling and attending a school, places

himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school
authorities, which is the basis of the latter‘s correlative responsibility for his torts,
committed while under such authority.

Thus, unlike the parent, who will be liable only if the child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of
the age of the student. Article 2180 treats the parents more favorably than the teacher.

However, the teacher‘s control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor;
but the circumstances can only affect the degree of the responsibility but cannot negate
the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not
the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as
prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180 (Palisoc vs. Brillantes, supra).

UNDER THE FAMILY CODE, WHAT IS THE RULE WITH RESPECT TO MINORS?

ARTICLE 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether

inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

ARTICLE 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances. cda

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed
by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

These two provisions control with respect to pupils and students or

apprentices who are minors. The basis of liability is the SPECIAL parental authority and
responsibility assumed over the minor for whose acts or omissions those given such
authority and responsibility are principally and solidarily liable for damages, with the
parents, judicial guardians, or the persons exercising substitute parental authority being
subsidiarily liable. 20

20 ARTICLE 216 (Family Code). In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: cd i
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
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K. P. Dela Serna

DOES THE LIABILITY EXTEND TO NON-ACADEMIC SCHOOLS?

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-
academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same
vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching (Amadora vs CA).

However, where the law is academic rather than vocational or technical in

nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the pupil or student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such pupil or student, following the first part of paragraph 7 of
Article 2180. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments for arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature; in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF WORKING SCHOLARS?

Section 14, Rule X (PD 442) provides: There is no employer-employee

relationship between students on one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the
other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of
charge provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as
may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen courses under said arrangement.

F. OTHER PROVISIONS ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY

WHAT IS THE RIGHT OF THE PERSONS ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 2180 WHO PAID FOR
THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THEIR DEPENDENTS OR EMPLOYEES?

ARTICLE 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
the claim. (1904)

The phrase ―dependents or employees‖ in Article 2181 should be construed to

include all persons for whom another is liable under Article 2180.

WHAT IS THE RULE IF THE TORTFEASOR IS A MINOR OR INSANE PERSON WITHOUT A

PARENT OR GUARDIAN?

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the
same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

G. STRICT LIABILITY

WHAT IS STRICT LIABILITY?

Strict liability is defined as liability without fault. A case is one of strict

liability ―when neither care nor negligence, neither good faith nor bad faith,
neither knowledge or ignorance will save the defendant.‖

WHEN IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?

There is strict liability if one is made liable independent of fault,

negligence or intent after establishing certain facts specified by law. Strict
liability tort can be committed even if reasonable care was exercised and
regardless of the state of mind of the actor at that time.

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE WHERE THERE IS STRICT
LIABILITY?

1. Liability of possessors of animals (Article 2183);

2. Liability for falling objects (Article 2193);
3. Liability of employers (Article 1171);
4. Liability of manufacturers and processors (Article 2187)
5. Liability for nuisance (To be discussed separately)

A. LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF ANIMALS

ARTICLE 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)

WHY IS ARTICLE 2183 AN INSTANCE OF STRICT LIABILITY?

The language of Article 2183 reveals an evident intent to make the

possessor or whoever makes use of the animal, liable independent of fault.

Additionally, the owner or possessor of the animal is liable even if the

damage was caused by the animal through the fault of third persons. There is
also liability even in a case in which it could not be avoided because the animal is
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K. P. Dela Serna

not in his possession for having escaped or gone astray, and for this reason, it
does not admit in this class of damages, unlike in damages caused by a person
other than the one responsible, evidence of diligence of a good father of a family.

WHO IS MADE LIABLE UNDER ARTICLE 2183?

Liability is imposed only on the possessor or user of the animal, since he is

the one who has custody and control, he is, therefore in a position to prevent the
animal from causing damage. The law used the word possessor instead of owner.
Thus, if the animal, like a horse or carabao was borrowed by someone for his
own use, the latter alone, should be held liable for the damage caused while the
animal was under his control.

WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND ARTICLE 2183?

The obligation imposed by Article 2183 is based on natural equity and on

the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which may be caused by such
animals, even if such damage was not due to their fault or negligence.

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE 2183?

1. When the damage was caused by force majeure;

2. When the damage is caused by the person who suffered the damage;
3. If the acts of a third person cannot be foreseen or prevented, then the
situation is similar to a force majeure and the possessor is not liable.

WHAT ARE THE ANIMALS COVERED UNDER ARTICLE 2183?

Article 2183 makes no distinction as to what kind of animal is used or

possessed. Hence, it may be construed as applicable generally to all animals,
whether domestic, domesticated, or wild. It would seem that birds are covered
since they can also cause damage.

B. LIABILITY FOR FALLING OBJECTS

ARTICLE 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is
responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910a)

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 2193?

It is evident in Article 2193 that the liability is absolute. It does not indicate
a presumption or admit proof of care.
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K. P. Dela Serna

Unlike Article 2183, the provision does not exempt cases involving force
majeure.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 2193?

The nature of the liability of the head of the family is both absolute and
exclusive. It is absolute in the sense that as long as he is head of the family that
lives in the building or part thereof like a rented room, he is liable even if he is
not present at the time of the incident. It is exclusive in the sense that it is only
the head of the family who is made liable.

WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE ARTICLE?

The obvious purposes of the law in making it absolute are:

a) To compel the head of the family to see to it that no dangerous things are
placed on the window sills and other parts of their dwelling place which may
be thrown or fall by accident;
b) To compel him to supervise the members of the family or guests from doing
acts or activities which may result in the throwing or falling of things from
their house or place of dwelling;
c) To relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the persons who
caused the throwing or falling of the injurious thing.

WHAT DOES THE TERM “HEAD OF THE FAMILY” INCLUDE?

The head of the family is usually the father; in his absence, the mother. A
single person may also be the head of the family if he is the one supporting his
family which may include as members, adopted children, unemployed parents,
brothers and sisters.

The term ―head of the family‖ is not limited to the owner of the building
and it may even include the lessee thereof (Dingcong vs. Kanaan, 72 Phil. 14).

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY WHO MAY HAVE BEEN
OBLIGED TO PAY INDEMNITY TO THE INJURED PARTY?

The head of the family who may have been obliged to pay indemnity to
the injured party may recover from the person responsible for the damage. Their
liability is solidary (Article 2194).

D. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS (ARTICLE 1711)

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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay
compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a
fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.
The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease
caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was
due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer
shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his
death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 1711?

The language of the provision indicates that the same is strict liability
because liability exists even if the cause if purely accidental.

It should be noted, however, that if the death or injury is due to the

negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily
liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker‘s intentional or malicious act is the
only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or
supervision of the plaintiff‘s fellow-worker (Article 1712).

E. LIABILITY OF MANUFATURERS AND PROCESSORS (ARTICLE 2187)

ARTICLE 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles

and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful
substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers. (n)

WHY IS THERE STRICT LIABILITY IN ARTICLE 2187?

There is strict liability in Article 2187 because it imposes liability for death
or injury without fault or negligence on the part of the manufacturers and
processors and without privity of contract between them and the consumers.

The principle of strict liability in tort means that proof of negligence

is not necessary. It applies even if the defendant manufacturer or processor
has exercised all the possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.

The purpose of such liability is to insure that the burdens of such

accidental deaths or injuries resulting from defective products intended for
public consumption be placed upon those who market them, and can be
treated as cost of production rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves.
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K. P. Dela Serna

WOULD THE PRESENCE OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE MANUFACTURER OR

PROCESSOR AND THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDE THE LATTER FROM FILING OF A DAMAGE
SUIT?

If there is a contractual relation between the parties, the plaintiff us not

precluded from filing a suit based on the breach of warranty whether express or
implied. The principle of strict liability still applies. The consumer‘s cause of
action does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from
whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other
agreement, whether it be between the seller and the immediate buyer, or
attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer‘s hands.

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THIS ARTICLE?

To establish the liability of manufacturers or processors under the Article,

the following requisites must be established:

a) The defendant is the manufacturer or processor of foodstuff,

drinks, toilet articles and similar goods involved;
b) The defendant used noxious or harmful substances in the
manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles
and similar goods;
c) Plaintiff used or consumed such product unaware of the injurious
condition of the product;
d) Plaintiff‘s injury or death was caused by the product used or
consumed;
e) The forms or kinds of damages suffered and the amount thereof.

The plaintiff has the burden of proof that at the time the product left the
hands of the defendant, the product was in a defective or injurious condition.
Otherwise, his case will fall.

WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS ON REMEDIES OF THE PLAINTIFF?

The plaintiff has four (4) options if he desires to pursue a complaint

against the manufacturer or processor under Article 2187. He may base his
complaint on the:

a) Theory of strict liability in torts;

b) Fault or negligence;
c) Breach of warranty; or
d) Crime anchored on violation of the Foods and Drugs Act
wherein the enforcement of which is the doctrine of
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K. P. Dela Serna

absolute criminal liability may be applied (People vs. Siy

Cong Bien, 30 Phil. 577).

F. OTHER PROVISIONS

1. LIABILITY OF OWNER IN MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS (ARTICLE

2184); PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 2185); AND
BOND REQUIRED BY MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERS (ARTICLE
2186)

ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months. cd i

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

ARTICLE 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)

ARTICLE 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government
office a bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages
to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public
official. (n)

WHO ARE THE OWNERS GOVERNED BY THE ARTICLE?

Article 2184 refers to owners of vehicles who are not included in the terms
of Article 2180 as ―owners of an establishment or enterprise‖ (De Leon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 517). It is intended to cover only owners of
motor vehicles for private use. It is generally not applicable to motor vehicles for
public use and convenience because the operator thereof, usually a corporation,
cannot, in the very nature of things, be in the motor vehicle at the time of mishap.
However, if the manager of the bus company was in the bus at the time of the
mishap, Article 2184 may be applied by analogy (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062).

WHEN IS ARTICLE 2184 APPLICABLE?

Article 2184 applies if the owner was in the vehicle at the time of the
mishap; otherwise, the provisions of Article 2180 would be applicable (par. 2)
where the owner even if he was not in the vehicle would be liable unless he
exercised due diligence to prevent the damage.
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If the causative factor was the driver‘s negligence, the owner of that car,
who was present, is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap
by the exercise of due diligence. Negligence under Article 2184 is, to a certain
degree, necessarily subjective (Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai, 26 Phil. 410). The owner
should not be held liable for the negligence of a competent driver, if by the
sudden act of negligence, the owner could not have a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance (Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil. 374; Johnson
vs. David, 5 Phil. 663).

WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND ARTICLES 2184 TO 2186?

The rationale for the inclusion of Articles 2184 to 2186 is ―to cope with the
alarming increase of vehicular mishaps.

IS THERE A PRESUMPTION THAT A DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT?

There is no presumption that a driver was negligent unless he has been

found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice
within two months next preceding the mishap (Article 2184, par. 2), or was
violating any traffic violation at the time of the motor vehicle mishap (Article
2185).

WHAT IS THE TEST OF NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAR OWNER UNDER THE ARTICLE?

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of
traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within
the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his
own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as
perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another.

Where the law require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment

of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies have real
need of drivers‘ services, would be effectively prescribed (Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai,
supra.).
2. DEATH RESULTING FROM POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS
WEAPONS OR SUBSTANCES (ARTICLE 2188)

ARTICLE 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances,
such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business. (n)
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K. P. Dela Serna

When death or injury results from the defendant‘s possession of

dangerous weapon or substances, there is a rebuttable presumption that he is
negligent. The burden of evidence is on him to establish that he was not
negligent at all. The presumption prevails if he fails to overcome it by clear
strong and convincing evidence.

When the possession or use of the weapon or substances is indispensable

in the defendant‘s occupation or business, no presumption arises. The plaintiff
has the burden of proving defendant‘s negligence.

3. DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS OF THE ROADS, STREETS, BRIDGES,

PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND OTHER PUBLIC WORKS (ARTICLE
2189)

ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

WHO ARE MADE LIABLE FOR DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF ROADS, ETC?

Article 2189 does not require the defective roads, streets, etc. to belong to
the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. It only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the road, street, etc. (Guilatco vs.
City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382).

4. LIABILITY OF PROPRIETOR OF A BUILDING OR STRUCTURE DUE

TO ITS COLLAPSE (ARTICLE 2190); OTHER LIABILITIES
(ARTICLES 2191 & 2192)

ARTICLE 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
(1907) aisa dc

ARTICLE 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and
adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force
majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

ARTICLE 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of
any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may
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proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within
the period therein fixed. (1909)

Article 2190 supplements Article 482 which provides:

ARTICLE 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other construction is in danger of

falling, the owner shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary work in order to
prevent it from falling.

If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the administrative authorities may
order the demolition of the structure at the expense of the owner, or take measures to insure
public safety. (389a) acd

WHAT ARE THE LIABILITIES OF PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES

DUE TO ITS COLLAPSE?

1. Where the damage is caused by the total or partial collapse of a

building or other structure, the proprietor or owner is prima facie
deemed negligent and is made liable, if it should be due to lack of
necessary repairs, because it is his duty to maintain his property in
goods condition at all times to avoid causing injury or damage to
another person or property. To relieve himself from liability, he
must prove that the property was in a goods state of repair or that
the collapse was due to a defect in its construction in which case the
engineer or architect and/or contractor may be held responsible for
the damage (See Article 1723).
2. The fact that the property is leased or in usufruct will not exempt
the owner from liability for his duty to make necessary repairs
remains although the property is legally in the possession and
control of another. Under the law, the lessee or the usufructuary is
obliged to notify or advise the owner of the need for urgent or
extraordinary repairs (Article 593, 1663). The failure of the lessee or
usufructuary to give notice will entitle the owner to
reimbursement, for the damages he may have been required to pay
third parties injured by the collapse of the property.

WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER ARTICLE 2191?

If any of the four (4) enumerated events occurred, the proprietor of the
machinery, not necessarily of the owner of the tenement where it is located, is
presumed negligent. He has to overcome the presumption with sufficient
evidence to avoid responsibility.

WHO IS LIABLE IF THE DAMAGE SHOULD BE THE RESULT OF ANY DEFECT IN

THE CONSTRUCTION?
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If the building or structure referred to in Articles 2190 and 2191 were

constructed with substantial defects which defects are the cause of the damage or
injury, the injured party may proceed only against the engineer or architect or
contractor in accordance with Article 1723 which provides that:

ARTICLE 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the
same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects
in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within
the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or
architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. cda

Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes
of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

5. SOLIDARY LIABILITY FOR QUASI DELICT (ARTICLE 2194)

ARTICLE 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict
is solidary. (n) aisa dc

NUISANCE

ARTICLE 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ARTICLE 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition. cda

ARTICLE 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a
nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as
the one who created it.

ARTICLE 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.

ARTICLE 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
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ARTICLE 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or

(2) A civil action; or acd
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
ARTICLE 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a
public nuisance are availed of.
ARTICLE 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance,
such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.

ARTICLE 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without
judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.

ARTICLE 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is
specially injurious to himself.

ARTICLE 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to
him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of
the local police; and cda
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

ARTICLE 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:

(1) A civil action; or

(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

ARTICLE 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.

ARTICLE 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be
liable for damages:

(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or

(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

HUMAN RELATIONS (INTENTIONAL TORTS)

DEFINE HUMAN RELATIONS.

It is the interaction or interrelation of one person to another person or persons

and vice versa, in accordance with mores, habits, customs, and public policy not
contrary to laws. It refers to the rules needed to govern the interrelationships of human
beings in a society for the purpose of maintaining social order
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It is based on the old adage or golden rule: ―Do not do unto others, what others
don‘t do unto you,‖ and the Latin maxim: Sic uture tu ut alterium non laedas” (So use
your property as not to injure others.

1. CATCH ALL PROVISIONS

WHAT ARE THE ARTICLES COVERED IN THE “CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS” ON HUMAN
RELATIONS?

1. Article 19: ―Every must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.‖

2. Article 20: ―Every person, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latte for the same.‖

3. Article 21: ―Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.‖

WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES/DISTINCTIONS OF THE THREE ARTICLES?

1. Article 19 declares a principle of law and Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions,
while Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for their own sanction;
2. There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, that is, the act must be
intentional, however, Article 20 does not distinguish, in that the act may be done
either willfully or negligently;
3. Under any of the three articles, an act which causes injury to another may be
made the basis for an award of damages;
4. Under Article 21, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; in
Article 21, the act is contrary to law. Under Article 21, the act is done willfully, in
Article 20, the act is done either willfully or negligently.

ARTICLE 19

Article 19 is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. The law

recognizes the norms of human on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.

The article sets standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one‘s rights but also in the performance of one‘s duties. These standards are: a) to act
with justice, b) to give everyone his due; and c) to observe honesty and good faith.
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Article 19 rejects the classical and traditional theory that ―he who uses a right
injures no one.‖

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,

may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible.

Article 19 is intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate

remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.

Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the regulation of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order. It does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Articles 20 and 21 would be proper
[(Globe Mackay vs/ CA, 176 SCRA 778 (1989).]

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF AN ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19?

1. Exercise of a right which is objective and apparently legal;

2. Damage or injury to an interest not specifically protected by a legal precept; and
3. Immorality or anti-social character of the damage or injury manifested either
subjectively, i.e., when the right is exercised with the intent to injure or simply
without legal or legitimate purpose.

WHAT ARE THE EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS?

1. Those in favor of third persons who acted in good faith; and

2. Those arising from the concurrence or conflict with the tight of others.

Exercise of right. The exercise of rights must be done within certain limits.

The limitations in the exercise of a right are classified into:

a. Intrinsic limitations – that which emanate from the right itself, that is, from its
nature and purpose.
b. Extrinsic limitations which are the following:

3. Those derived from the nature of the right itself

4. Limitations arising from good faith; and
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5. Limitations imposed by the economic and social ends for the right which require
the holder of the right to exercise it in accordance with the end for which it was
granted or created.

IN WHAT ARTICLES IS “ACTING WITH JUSTICE AND GIVING ANOTHER HIS DUE”
ELABORATED?

1. Article 20 – indemnification of another due to illegal acts

2. Article 21 – indemnification due to immoral acts
3. Article 24 – unfair competition
4. Article 22 – unjust enrichment

IN WHAT ARTICLE IS “OBSERVANCE OF HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH” ELABORATED?

1. Article 26 – respect for the personality and dignity of others

2. Article 25 – restraint of due extravagance
3. Article 31 et seq. – independent civil actions

ARTICLE 20

WHAT IS BEING PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 20?

This article punishes illegal acts whether done willfully or negligently. The
article is broad enough to cover all legal (not moral) wrongs in violation of law, whether
willfully or negligently. Thus, in the law of torts or quasi-delict – ―Whoever by act or
omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done.― (Article 2176) It embraces the Spanish-Philippine concept of
quasi-delict which is based on negligence and the tort in Anglo-Amercian jurisprudence
which is based on malice.

This article serves as a sanction to all violations of right which cause damage to
another irrespective of whether the particular law that is violated provides for damages
or not. The rule in Article 20 compliments the principle of abuse of rights enumerated in
Article 19.

The conduct may be both a crime and a quasi-delict. Any person who willfully or
negligently causes damage to another in his person, his property, or in any right shall
be obliged to indemnify the latter. A felony may be committed by means of deceit or by
means of fault or negligence (Article 3, Revised Penal Code). If the fault or negligence does
not constitute a penal offense, the actor is liable only for quasi-delict under Article 2176.
In either case, it is essential that the act is voluntary for the obligation to indemnify to
arise.
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ARTICLE 21

Article 21 seeks to remedy the ―countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so may
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury.

Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF ACTS CONTRA BONUS?

1. There is an act which is legal;

2. But which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy;
and
3. It is done with intent to injure

Under this article, damages are recoverable even though no positive law was
violated.

Article 21 presupposes losses or injuries material or otherwise, which one may

suffer as a result of the violation. Thus, the complaint must asks for damages.

EXAMPLES OF ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES:

1. Breach of promise to marry

As a general rule, breach of promise to marry by itself is not actionable.

However, it becomes actionable if there are additional circumstances which make it fall
within the purview of Articles 19, 20, 21 or 2176 of the Civil Code. In such cases, there is
another act independent of the breach of promise to marry which gives rise to liability.

These include cases where:

1. If the breach of promise to marry is accompanied by a tortuous act

2. If the breach of promise to marry is accompanied by a quasi-contract
as when on the strength of the promise to marry, money or property is
given. An action will lie to recover such money or property
3. If the breach of promise to marry constitutes an abuse of right.
4. There was financial damage;
5. Social humiliation was caused to one of the parties; and
6. Where there was moral seduction

2. Seduction and sexual assault

Seduction, by itself, without breach of promise to marry is an act which is
contrary to morals, good custom and public policy. The defendant is liable if he
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employed deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence in successfully

having sexual intercourse with another.

The defendant would be liable for all forms of sexual assault. These include the
crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code as rape, acts of lasciviousness and
seduction.

3. Desertion by a spouse

A spouse has a legal obligation to live with his or her spouse. If a spouse does
not perform his or her duty to the other, he may be held liable for damages for such
omission because the same is contrary to law, morals and good customs.

4. Trespass and deprivation of property

Trespass to real property is a tort that is committed when a person unlawfully

invades the real property of another. The Revised Penal Code punishes different forms
of trespass. On the other hand, the Civil Code provides that damages may be awarded
to the real owner if he suffered such damages because he was deprived of possession of
his property by a possessor in bad faith or by a person who does not have any right
whatsoever over the property. (Article 451) Anybody who builds, plants or sows on the
land of another knowing full well that there is a defect in his title is liable for damages.

Liability for damages under the provisions of the revised Penal Code and the
Civil Code requires intent or bad faith.

With respect to personal property, the commission of the crimes of theft or

robbery is obviously trespass. In the field of tort, however, trespass extends to all cases
where a person is deprived of his personal property even in the absence of criminal
liability.

5. Disconnection of electricity or gas service

A usual form of deprivation of access to property is the unjustified disconnection

of electricity service. The right to disconnect and deprive the customer of electricity
should be exercised in accordance with law and rules.

6. Abortion and wrongful death

7. Illegal dismissal
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The exercise of the right to terminate must be consistent with the general
principles provided for under Articles 19 and 21. If there is non-compliance with the
said articles, the employer may be held liable for damages.

8. Malicious prosecution

A tort action for malicious prosecution has been defined as ―An action for
damages brought by one against another whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or
other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein.

The statutory bases of the action are not only Articles 19, 20 and 21 but also
Articles 26, 32, 33 35, 2217 and 2219(8) of the Civil Code.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION?

a. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor,
b. That the action was finally terminated with an acquittal;
c. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
d. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.

IN ORDER FOR THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SUIT TO PROSPER, WHAT MUST THE
PLAINTIFF PROVE?

a. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
b. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
c. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by
improper or sinister motive. (Lao v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58 [1991];
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Koh, 4 SCRA 535 [1962]; Buchanan v.
Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 [1915])

The foregoing requisites are necessary safeguards to preserve a person's right to

litigate which may otherwise be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious
prosecution cases. Thus, as further held in the aforecited case of Buchanan v. Viuda. de
Esteban, supra: "Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious
prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. But malice alone
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, where probable cause is shown,
even where it appears that the suit was brought for the mere purpose of vexing,
harassing and injuring his adversary. In other words malice and want of probable cause
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must both exist in order to justify the action." (see also Rehabilitation Finance Corp. v.
Koh, supra)

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime (or in this case, the
wrongdoing) for which he was prosecuted. (See Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, supra).

The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other
words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. (Id.)

9. Public humiliation

Example: slapping in public

4. Action In rem Verso and Liability Without Fault

Action in rem verso

Article 22: ―Every person who through an act or performance by another,

or by any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the same to
him‖

This article is designated as action in rem verso.

What are the requisites of action in rem verso?

a. One party must be enriched and the other made poorer;

b. There must be a causal relation between the two;
c. The enrichment must not be justifiable;
d. There must be no other way to recover; and
e. The indemnity can not extend the loss of enrichment whichever is less

LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

Article 23: ―Even when an ac or event causing damage to another‘s property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for
indemnity if through the act or event was benefited.‖

Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust enrichment will occur.

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The concept of liability without fault is introduced in this article. It is based on

equity.

5. Human Dignity

TORTS THAT INVOLVE THE RIGHT OF A PERSON TO DIGNITY, PRIVACY AND PEACE OF
MIND

Article 26 – ―Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace if mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and other similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another‘s residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER THIS ARTICLE?

a. right to personal dignity;

b. right to personal security;
c. right to family relations;
d. right to social intercourse;
e. right to privacy and
f. right to peace of mind

WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN THIS ARTICLE?

a. An action for damages

b. An action for prevention
c. Any other relief

 A civil action may be instituted even if no crime is involved, and moral

damages may be obtained

 Scope:

a. Prying into the privacy of another‘s residence – includes by implication respect

for another‘s name, picture, or personality except insofar as is needed for
publication of information and pictures of legitimate news value.
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b. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another –

includes alienation of the affection of the husband or the wife.
c. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends – includes gossiping,
and reliance on hearsay.
d. Vexing or humiliating – includes criticism of one‘s health or features without
justifiable legal cause.

6. Public Officers

TORTS COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER HUMAN RELATIONS

Article 27 – ―Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.‖

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ACTION UNDER THIS ARTICLE?

a. That the defendant be a public official charged with the performance of

official duties;
b. That there be a violation of an official duty in favor of an individual;
c. That there be willfulness or negligence in the violation of such official duty;
d. That there be an injury to the individual

7. Unfair Competition

Article 28 – ―Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial

enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination, or
any other unjust, oppressive or high handed method shall give rise to a right of action
by the person who thereby suffer damage.‖

WHEN IS THERE UNFAIR COMPETITION?

Unfair competition consists in employing deception or any other means contrary

to good faith by which any person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in
which he deals, or his business, or services to those of the one having established
goodwill, or committing any acts calculated to produce such result.

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION?

i. Agricultural enterprises
ii. Commercial enterprises
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iii. Industrial enterprises

iv. Labor

b. Examples

i. Strike prematurely declared

ii. Strike for trivial, unjust or unreasonable cause
iii. Strike carried out thru force, intimidation or other unlawful means
iv. Strike in order to circumvent valid obligations entered into a
collective bargaining contracts
v. Cut-throat competition
vi. The making of false statement in the course of trade to discredit the
goods, business or services of another
vii. The making of goods so as to deceive purchasers
viii. Selling of goods above the maximum prices set by the state

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION?

1. That the offender gives his goods the general appearance

of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
2. That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods
themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in
the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature
of their appearance;
3. That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or
gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the
same with a like purpose;
4. That there is actual intent to deceive the public or
defraud a competition.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A COMPLAINT FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION?

It is basically a suit for injunction and damages.

e. Civil Action After Acquittal In a Criminal Case

Article 29 – ―When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
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If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,

the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.‖

WHAT ARE THE REASONS OF THE PROVISION IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF A CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES EVEN THOUGH THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN ACQUITTED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT?

a. The reason is found in Article 2177 which states that responsibility for
fault or negligence is entirely separate and distinct form the civil
liability arising form negligence under the penal code but the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

b. Also, under the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also
civilly liable (Article 100). The two liabilities are separate and distinct
form each other; the criminal aspect affects social order; the civil,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender,
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party.

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES WHERE NO CIVIL ACTION MAY BE INSTITUTED?

(a) When the accused is acquitted on the ground that he did not
commit the act, or
(b) That no crime was committed, or
(c) Because he is justified or exempt from criminal liability,

Reason: Because the acquittal on these grounds constitutes res

adjudication.

 When such civil action is instituted, only a preponderance of evidence is

required. However, to protect persons form harassment, the provision
authorizes the defendant t file a motion in court requiring the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found
to be malicious.

 Note that Article 29 does no speak of an independent civil action.

f. Institution of Civil Action for Damages

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Arising out of a Criminal Offense before a Criminal

Action is Instituted for the Criminal Offense

Article 30 – ―When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability

arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to
prove the act complained of.‖

 If however, a criminal action is instituted while the civil action is pending, the
civil action will be suspended until final judgment in the criminal case has
been rendered.

 As in Article 29, this article does not speak of an independent civil action.

g. Torts with Independent Civil Actions.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?

Article 31 – ―When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the later.‖

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 31?

This article refers to a civil action based not on the act or omission charged as a
felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources,
such as law or contract (Example: Breach of contract of carriage. Reason: The civil action
based on contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from the criminal action
instituted against the carrier or its employee based on the latter‘s negligence).

 Meaning of independent civil actions – An independent civil action is one

that is brought distinctly and separately from a criminal case allowed for
considerations of public policy, because the proof needed for civil cases is
less than that required for criminal cases; but with the injunction in
general that success in financially recovering in one case should prevent a
recovery of damages in the other.

 Note that the bringing of the independent civil action is permissive, not
compulsory

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?

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K. P. Dela Serna

(a) Article 21 – Acts contra bonus mores

(b) Article 32 – breach of constitutional and other rights
(c) Article 33 – Defamation, fraud, physical injuries
(d) Article 34 – Refusal or failure of city or municipal police to
give protection
(e) Article 2177 – Quasi-delict

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN THE CIVIL CASE?

The dismissal of the civil action cannot constitute a bar to the criminal suit for the
two actins are entirely distinct from each other, and may therefore be litigated
independently.

PROSECUTION OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION [RULE 111, RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE]

What are the general rules in institution of criminal and civil actions?

 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless :

(1) the offended party waives the civil action,

(2) reserves the right to institute it separately or
(3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

[The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil

action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. Section 1,
Rule 111]

 When the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2
of this Rule governing consolidation if the criminal and civil action.

 After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.
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K. P. Dela Serna

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in
the court trying the criminal action. [Section 2, Ibid.]

WHAT ARE THE RULES ON INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS?

 In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. [Section 3,
Ibid.]

 The independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111

include quasi-delicts provided for in Article 2176, in addition to
Articles 32, 33 and 34. It is necessary, however, that the civil
liability under the said articles arise ‗from the same act or omission
of the accused.‖ Further, a reservation of the right to institute these
separate actions are impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the former are waived or filed ahead of the criminal action.

 Where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the

criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction is entirely
irrelevant to the civil action. Thus under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
action regardless of the result of the latter.

 Prior to the case of Roa vs. De la Cruz (101 Phil. 8), it was held that
where the law authorizes a separate and independent civil action,
there was no need for making a reservation, however, in
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has decided that reservation
is needed because of the specific provision of Section 3, Rule 111
requiring such reservation to be made even where the law provides
for independent civil actions.

What are the kinds of independent civil actions?

a. Article 21 [Supra]
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K. P. Dela Serna

b. Article 32 – ―Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who

directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxxx―

 In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

defendant‘s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution, and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

 The indemnity shall include moral and exemplary damages.

 Where a public officer is charged with violation of any of the basic rights
of an individual provided for in this article, it is deemed that the action is
against him in his private capacity and not a suit against the state which
requires its consent.

c. Article 33 – ―In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

 This article speaks of independent civil action in cases of:

defamation, libel or slander or intriguing against honor

fraud, including estafa and swindling, and
physical injuries, including attempted and frustrated homicide
so long as there was injury.

d. Article 34 – ―When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to

render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality
shall be subsidiarily responsible therefore. The civil action recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.

 The liability of the city or municipality being subsidiary can only be

enforced when the guilty officer is insolvent. However, it can not be
avoided by proving that the city or municipality has exercised due
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K. P. Dela Serna

diligence in the selection and supervision of its policemen. This defense,

allowed under Article 2180, in favor of employers for the fault or
negligence of their employees, is available only to private employers; it
would be available to the city or municipality if the function involved is a
corporate function, but not when, as contemplated by the present article, it
is a governmental function.

e. Article 2177 – ―Responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 is

entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising form negligence
under the penal code. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.‘

DAMAGES

WHAT ARE THE DAMAGES THAT MAY BE AWARDED?

Under Article 2197, damages may be:

1. Actual or compensatory;
2. Moral;
3. Nominal;
4. Temperate or moderate;
5. Liquidated; or
6. Exemplary or corrective.

WHAT DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF DEATH OF A PASSENGER?

When death occurs, the following items of damages may be recovered:

1. An indemnity for the death of the victim;

2. An indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
3. Moral damages;
4. Attorney‘s fee and expenses of litigation;
5. Interest in proper cases (Brinas vs. People, 125 SCRA 687).

IN FIXING A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF A PASSENGER THAN

THAT PROVIDED BY LAW WHAT MAY THE COURTS CONSIDER?

Article 2206 applies in case of death caused by breach of contract by the common
carrier (Article 1764). It fixes the minimum indemnity for death at P____ which the
courts may increase according to circumstances. It is in fixing a greater amount of
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K. P. Dela Serna

indemnity that courts may consider the financial capacity of the common carrier, along
with such other factors as:

1. Life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter;

2. Pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or beneficiary;
3. Loss of support;
4. Loss of service;
5. Loss of society;
6. Mental suffering of beneficiaries; and
7. Medical and funeral expenses (Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Legaspi, 12
SCRA 592).

In awarding compensatory damages, the age of the plaintiff, his expected life
span, and his earning capacity within that life span must be taken into consideration.
Thus, the fact that the plaintiff was only in his twenties, when through the negligence of
the defendant, he lost the use of his limbs, being condemned for the remainder of his
life to be a paralytic, in effect leading a maimed, well-nigh useless existence, were taken
into account in fixing compensatory damages (Marchan vs. Mendoza, 24 SCRA 889).

HOW MAY LIFE EXPECTANCY OF A PERSON BE DETERMINED FOR PUPROSES OF FIXING

THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES THAT MAY BE RECOVERED?

In determining the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed and the rate which the losses sustained by said heirs should be fixed, the
following formula was adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
actual Combined Experience Table of Mortality:

2/3 x (80 – age of the decedent) = life expectancy.

Thus, the life expectancy of the passenger who died when he was over 29 years
of age (or around 30 for purposes of computation) was placed at 33 1/3 years, following
the foregoing formula (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 514). And
where the passenger was 37 years old when he died, he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3
more years (Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, March 18, 1999).

In the computation of the damages to be awarded, it should be life expectancy of

the passenger who died and not the life expectancy of the beneficiary which should be
considered (Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 110).

ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Actual damages are adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered and
proved. It includes attorney‘s fees.
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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

ARTICLE 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)

ARTICLE 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)

ARTICLE 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. cdasia

ARTICLE 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

ARTICLE 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or

lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

ARTICLE 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. cdtai

ARTICLE 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from
the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of,
the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the
person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover
the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing
the loss or injury.
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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest; casia
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

ARTICLE 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per
cent per annum. (1108) casia

ARTICLE 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded
for breach of contract.

ARTICLE 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper
case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.

ARTICLE 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded,
although the obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a)

ARTICLE 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when
the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.

ARTICLE 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the
damages that he may recover.

ARTICLE 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate
the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the
following instances: cdtai

(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice
of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or
injury.
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K. P. Dela Serna

OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case. cda

MORAL DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.

ARTICLE 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or
personal, may be considered.

ARTICLE 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. casia

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article,
may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in
No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

ARTICLE 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies
to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

AS A GENERAL RULE, MAY MORAL DAMAGES BE RECOVERED IN BREACH OF

CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION?

Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of

contract of transportation in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220. The said
provisions limited the award of moral damages to those enumerated therein and
―analogous cases‖. A breach of contract cannot be considered included in the
descriptive term ―analogous cases‖ used in Article 2219, not only because Article 2220
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K. P. Dela Serna

specifically provided for damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because
the definition of quasi delict in Article 2176 expressly excludes the cases where there is a
―pre-existing contractual relation between the parties‖ (Verzosa vs. Baytan, 107 Phil.
1010; Martinez vs. Gonzales, 6 SCRA 331).

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOREGOING RULE WHEN MORAL DAMAGES MAY
BE RECOVERED IN BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION?

Moral damages may be recovered in an action for breach of contract of

transportation in the following cases:

1. When the mishap results in the death of a passenger (M. Ruiz Highway Transit,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 11 SCRA 98);
2. Where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death
does not result (Rex Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Bautista, L-15392, September 30, 1960;
Singson vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 149).

Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive or ill-will. Self
enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will, may have been the motive,
but it is malice nevertheless which may be the ground for awarding moral damages for
breach of contract of carriage (Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). The
bad faith referred to may be bad faith in the securing and in the execution of the
contract and in the enforcement of its terms or any other kind of deceit which may have
been used by the carrier (Tamayo vs. Aquino, L-12634 and 12720, may 29, 1959).

MAY MORAL DAMAGES BE GRANTED IN CASE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT OF

TRANSPORTATION WHICH MERELY CAUSES PHYSICAL INJURIES TO PASSENGERS?

In case of breach of contract of carriage resulting only to physical injuries of

passengers, moral damages are not recoverable (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Cornista, 11
SCRA 182), unless the carrier acted fraudulently or with malice or in bad faith (Roque vs.
Buan, 21 SCRA 651; Bulante vs. Chu Liante, 23 SCRA 604).

NOMINAL DAMAGES

Nominal damages are awarded not to compensate but to vindicate a right of the
plaintiff that has been violated by the defendant. Temperate damages, on the other
hand, refers to pecuniary loss suffered but cannot be proven with certainty.

ARTICLE 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. cd
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K. P. Dela Serna

ARTICLE 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

ARTICLE 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the
right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
assigns. cdtai

TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

ARTICLE 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be
paid in case of breach thereof. aisa dc

ARTICLE 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be

equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

ARTICLE 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the
measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES

ARTICLE 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ARTICLE 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

ARTICLE 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.

ARTICLE 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

ARTICLE 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. cdt

ARTICLE 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting
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K. P. Dela Serna

exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. cdtai

ARTICLE 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be
null and void.

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