EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Held: The conviction must be set aside.
conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became
Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime
in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him,
guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743,
post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week
of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB
Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico;
between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan
in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced
upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the
checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the
checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement
that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that
petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga
spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of
the three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the
latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 as conspirator.
“a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be
held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist
of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed
to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may
be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check
was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established,
not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose
ROMUALDEZ v. MARCELO
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the
Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, respondents
G.R. Nos. 165510-33
July 28, 2006
FACTS:
Romualdez is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019
for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period
1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as
Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act;
Romualdez asserts that the Ombudsman (Marcello) cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004.
He also claims that the case should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
The Ombudsman, however, contends that:
the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from
criminal prosecution;
that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it
find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation;
that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the
information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
prescriptive period;
that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The PCGG avers that the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint
with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the alleged offenses of the petitioner;
And since both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 (the Act To Establish
Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To
Run) are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines, the RPC should be applied.
(RPC provides that prescription is interrupted when accused is outside of
the Philippines)
ISSUE:
W/N the prior quashal of an information bars subsequent prosecution
W/N the offenses charged have already prescribed
HELD:
FOR THE FIRST ISSUE
The court held that the prior quashal of an information does not bar
subsequent prosecution.
Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that an order
sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts.
In this case, the original information was dismissed due to the lack of
authority of the officer who filed it, hence, a subsequent prosecution
of the same offense is allowed by law.
The court also pointed out that informations were filed by an
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting
another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no
information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.
Also, the court said that the petitioner’s right to be informed of the
charges against him was not violated when the preliminary investigation
conducted used the same docket number, which was already previously
dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for
efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in
sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.
The use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for
reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket
numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049.
FOR THE SECOND ISSUE
The court held that the offenses charged have already prescribed.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Section 11 of RA 3019 (amended by BP 195) provides a prescriptive
period of 15 years but before it was amended by BP 195 on March
16,1982, the prescriptive period was 10 years. The amendment cannot be
given retroactive effect because it is not favourable to the accused.
Hence, offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to
March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand,
for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from
March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when the period begins to run and when it is interrupted, reference
is made to Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
The court ruled that the prescriptive period began to run from the
discovery thereof on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed
by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner
with the PCGG.
The court however disagrees to the respondents’ contention that the
prescriptive period was interrupted when petitioner was outside the
Philippines because Article 91 of the RPC should be applied suppletorily.
(Art 91 – prescription is interrupted when accused in outside the
Philippines)
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the
absence of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the
prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean
that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.
Hence, petitioner’s absence from the Philippines did not interrupt the
prescriptive period.
The only matter left is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG
in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan
to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period.
The court held that an invalid information is no information at all and
cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. Hence, no proceedings exist
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
In addition, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG.
Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.
JUSTICE CARPIO DISSENT:
Justice Carpio argues Article 91 should apply to RA 3019.
He claims that there is nothing in RA 3019 that prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91 of the RPC. He claims that the
prescriptive period should have been interrupted when petitioner was
outside the Philippines. He said “An accused cannot acquire legal
immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction.”
The court’s answer is that suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only
when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter.
The court said that RA 3019 is a special law and its prescription is
governed by Act 3326.
The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive
period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326
must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to
special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws
only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary.
Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others
People of the Philippines vs. Martin Simon
G.R. No. 93028
July 29, 1994
Ricardo, J.:
FACTS
 On November 10, 1988 Martin Simon y Sunga was charged with a
violation of Section 4, Article 2 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972)
o Alleging that on October 22, 1988 he sold 4 tea bags of
marijuana to a Narcotic Command (NARCOM) in a sum of
PHP40
 On March 2, 1989 he was arraigned with counsel following his escape
from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
o Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY
 Voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference
 A NARCOM operative informed the police of illegal drug activities of
ALYAS PUSA. Capt. Francisco Bustamante (Commanding Officer of
the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit) formed a team to bust appellant
o Lopez was handed 2 marijuana bags which cost a total of
PHP40
o Lopez signaled the team with a scratch on the head and they
busted the appellant
o Pfc. Villacruz corroborated Lopez’ testimony
o Sgt. Domingo Pejoro conducted the custodial investigation
 He apprised the rights of Simon: “You have the right
to remain silent, etc.”
 Simon orally waived his right to counsel
 Prepared “Exhibit G”, The Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated
o Dr. Pedro Clara examined the appellant
 Normal except for high blood pressure
 No physical injuries
 Appellant had gastrointestinal pains due to history of
peptic ulcer
 Appellant’s side of the story
o He was told that he was a pusher on a jeep ride with the
officers and forced to sign papers. He was punched in the
stomach when he refused to do so.
o Admitted that he escaped from the NARCOM office BUT it
was because of the maltreatment
 Went to his uncle’s house (Bienvenido Sunga)
 Confined in the hospital for 3 days
 Appellant’s brother (Norberto Simon) testified that his brother was in
the hospital that was likely due to his peptic ulcer
o Confirmed by Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas
 On December 4, 1989, the trial court convicted the appellant for a
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act
o Penalty = Life imprisonment, fine of PHP20,000, and pay the
costs
o 4 tea bags of marijuana were confiscated by the Government
 Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. Thus, it is unlikely that he was set-up and more likely
that he committed the crime.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the appellant is guilty of selling prohibited drugs and
having possession. YES.
2. Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the
case. YES.
RATIO
1. YES.
a. Dangerous Drugs Act - punishes any person who unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions
i. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.
ii. One cannot sell the drugs without first having
possession over it.
b. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be
valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any
other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking or pictures.
2. YES.
a. It is indeterminate in the sense that after serving the
MINIMUM, the convict may be released on parole, or if he is
not fitted for release, he shall continue serving
his sentence until the end of the MAXIMUM.
b. Drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed
any act, which would put him within the exceptions to said law,
and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion
perpetua to death. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal
and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the accused.
ISSUE: whether the patently favorable provisions of
Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect
to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
HELD:
The execution in said article would not apply to those
convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency
refers to convictions for the third time or more of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification.
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which
period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on the
accuse.
by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be
considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on
the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since
each component penalty of the total complex penalty will
have to be imposed separately as determined by the
quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was
held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under
special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided
their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since
the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum
periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider
the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main
function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a
special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects
under the system of penalties native to said Code. When,
as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it
would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise.
hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium
period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance
those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in
the United States but differently from the penalties
provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish
origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment
for one year or for one to five years but without division
into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is
the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed
during the American regime
a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would
direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under
the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided
therein.
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses
defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties
as technically named and understood in the Revised Penal
Code.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D.
No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the
Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the
law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
application of penalties which distill the "deep legal
thought and centuries of experience in the administration
of criminal laws.
Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under
the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for
purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence,
we have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20
of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64
of the Code to impose the same in the medium period.
Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is
now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must
apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
themaximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposedunder the rules of said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."

while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to

determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this
reason that the three component penalties in the second
paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty
should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses

final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence

Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it
does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has
appellant committed any act which would put him within
the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed
does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed
one year of imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect,
however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained
Garcia vs. CA (2006)
Subject:
Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita; Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) of
R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se; Extraordinary diligence required in
canvassing election results
Facts:
Arsenia B. Garcia, a chairman of the board of canvassers in
Alaminos, Pangasinan, was charged before the RTC for allegedly decreasing
the number of votes cast in favor of Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. during the
1995 senatorial elections, a violation of Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 or the
Electoral Reforms Law. It was alleged that the grand total of Sen. Pimentel
Jr.’s votes were reduced to 1,921 instead of 6,921 or 5,000 votes less than the
actual number of votes received.
Garcia appealed the same to the CA which affirmed the lower
court’s decision. It likewise denied his motion for reconsideration, thus an
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Garcia contends that the CA’s judgment is erroneous and is based on
mere surmises instead of substantial evidence. During the trial, she admitted
that she was the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was
subsequently entered by the secretary of the board of canvassers. She also
admitted that she was the one who prepared the Certificate of Canvass
(COC), though it was not her duty. Despite this, she claims that there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of Senator Pimentel, Jr.
The court on the other hand contends that acts prohibited under Sec.
27(b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se, thus intent is taken into
consideration. Given this, the act of preparing the COC even if it was not her
task manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous COC entry. It was
further contended that it was his concern as the chairman of the board of
canvassers to ensure the authentic entry of votes.
Held:
Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita
1. Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes,
the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Garcia’s
acts showed that there was intent on her part to decrease the number of votes.
Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se
2. Acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited
amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could
not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received
by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent
to injure another.
Extraordinary diligence required in canvassing election results
3. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by
the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the
elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of
the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers
are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly
scrutinized.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111343. August 22, 1996]
ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, and LOURDES DU, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in
Davao City using the business name “Dunlao Enterprise.”
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito
Catog, both employees of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, to
go to petitioner’s premises together with some police officers to verify
information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from
Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioner’s compound, the group saw the farrowing
crates and pipes inside the compound. They also found assorted lengths of
G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner’s shop and another pile outside the
shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were
owned by Lourdes Farms and had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered the items. These were then taken to the police station.
Subsequently a case was filed accusing petitioner of violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded NOT
GUILTY. Trial ensued and the trial court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the said crime which was then affirmed by the CA. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not intent to gain is necessary in order for the accused to
be found guilty of violation of Republic Act 1612?
HELD:
Under Presidential Decree 1612, “fencing is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.”
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in
crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called
“acts mala in se,” and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called “acts malaprohibita.”[6] This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The
rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in
acts malaprohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? [7] When an
act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.[8]
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals[9] involving violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law, we said:
“On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this
element was not clearly established by the People’s evidence and he,
therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in
presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the
fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is
demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368
[1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external
demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent
court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in
the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over
which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister
mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing
out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up
(People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section
3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required
in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is
the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense
(U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59;
1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52).”