Francisco vs House of Representatives GR No 160261 10 November 2003

Facts: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate Justices was
filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the
Constitution, “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within the period of one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the validity of
the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.

Decision: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 1
Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the government. The
courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
its officers , this is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

Angara vs Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec
3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he
be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec
9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to
dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec.
Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission
taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the
Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No.
142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can
be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel
“to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship
left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically,

it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to
“a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental
rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
 In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting
damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses
of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and
deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’
acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does
not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal
waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to
compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the
UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine
environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the
criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

USA VS GUINTO

G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City,
ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR,
respondents.

Facts:

The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in
the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it
has not consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those
who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and
Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that
he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the
invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange
(PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the
ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial
court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:
Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by
them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority
of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed
to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity
from suit with its implied consent.

Rulings:

The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners
cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the
United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself
is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the
record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it
can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly,
this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings