G.R. No.
192573, October 22, 2014 of a complaint on the ground of unreasonable failure to submit a position paper by
RICARDO N. AZUELO, Petitioner, v. ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Respondent.
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Azuelo was employed by the respondent as a maintenance worker.
Sometime in March 2006, Azuelo filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of
the NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of benefits against ZAMECO. The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter
(LA) Mariano L. Bactin (LA Bactin). After several mediations, the parties were
ordered to submit their respective position papers. Instead of submitting his
position paper, Azuelo moved that the submission of his position paper be extended
to August 4, 2006, which was granted by LA Bactin. Having failed to submit on
time, LA Bactin then directed Azuelo to submit his position papers on August 22,
2006. On the said date, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position paper, moved for
the issuance of an order directing ZAMECO to furnish him with a complete copy of
the investigation report as regards his dismissal. ZAMECO opposed the said motion,
asserting that it has already furnished Azuelo with a copy of its investigation report.
LA Bactin issued an Order dimissing the case for lack of merit.
On November 21, 2006, Azuelo again filed a complaint with the RAB of the NLRC in
San Fernando City, Pampanga for illegal dismissal with money claims against
ZAMECO, containing the same allegations in his first complaint. The case was
referred to LA Abdon who dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata. LA
Abdon pointed out that the dismissal of Azuelo's first complaint for illegal dismissal
was with prejudice; that the appropriate remedy available to Azuelo against LA
Bactin's dismissal of the first complaint was to appeal from the same and not to file
a second complaint for illegal dismissal. On February 26, 2010, the CA rendered the
herein a Decision which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Azuelo.
ISSUE:
whether the dismissal of his first complaint for illegal dismissal, on the ground of
lack of interest on his part to prosecute the same, bars the filing of another
complaint for illegal dismissal against ZAMECO based on the same allegations
HELD:
"The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' is well-defined in our jurisprudence. It exists
where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility."
After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that the
CA did not commit any reversible error in upholding the dismissal of Azuelo's second
complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground of res judicata. The NLRC did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that the Order issued on November 6, 2006 by LA Bactin,
which dismissed the first complaint filed by Azuelo, was an adjudication on the
merits.
The 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 Revised Rules), the rules
applicable at the time of the controversy, is silent as to the nature of the dismissal
the complainant. Nevertheless, the 2005 Revised Rules, particularly Section 3, Rule
I thereof, provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court to arbitration
proceedings before the LAs and the NLRC in the absence of any applicable
provisions therein. The unjustified failure of a complainant in arbitration proceedings
before the LA to submit his position paper is akin to the case of a complainant's
failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time in ordinary civil
proceedings.
Thus, in arbitration proceedings before the LA, the dismissal of a complaint on
account of the unreasonable failure of the complainant to submit his position paper
is likewise regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing
of another complaint, except when the LA's order of dismissal expressly states
otherwise.
The non-applicability of technical rules of procedure in labor cases should not be
made a license to disregard the rights of employers against unreasonable and/or
unjustified claims. Azuelo was given sufficient chances to establish his claim against
ZAMECO, which he failed to do when he did not submit his position paper despite
several extensions granted him. He cannot now be allowed to raise anew his
supposed illegal dismissal as it would be plainly unjust to ZAMECO. It bears
stressing that the expeditious disposition of labor cases is mandated not only for the
benefit of the employees, but of the employers as well.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated February 26, 2010 and Resolution dated June 10, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107762 are hereby AFFIRMED.
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage transformers. Among PWU members
were selected for promotion, therefore ordering them to undergo training,
eventually shall receive allowance until the training is completed. PWU is a
legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of
PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. PHILEC and its rank-and-file employees were
governed by collective bargaining agreement providing for the steps in increasing
the employee’s basic salary in case of promotion. PWU members claimed that
schedule of training allowance did not conform to Article X of their CBA. PWU and
PHILEC decided to settle their grievance to voluntary arbitration. PHILEC contends
that they applied Modified “SGV” pay grades to avoid salary distortion. However,
Voluntary Arbitrator held that PHILEC violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering
the PHILEC to pay the PWU members allowance based on their CBA. PHILEC filed a
petition for certiorari on Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator
gravely abused its discretion in rendering his decision, but the CA affirmed the
decision of Voluntary Arbitrator. PHILEC filed its petition before the SC for review on
certiorari insisting that they did not violate their CBA with PWU.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abuse its discretion in directing
PHILEC to pay the training allowance based on CBA with PWU.
RULING:
1
 No, the Voluntary Arbitrator did not gravely abuse its discretion. The
Voluntary Arbitrator correctly awarded training allowances based on the amounts
and formula of the CBA. A Collective Bargaining Agreement is “a contract executed
upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after the negotiations with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment,
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement.” A collective bargaining agreement being a contract, its provisions
“constitute the law between the parties” and must be complied with in good faith.
Therefore, the allowance of the members of the PWU must be computed based on
Article X of their CBA. Moreover, PHILEC allegedly applied the “Modified SGV” pay
grade scale to prevent any salary distortion within PHILEC’s enterprise. This,
however, does not justify PHILEC’s non-compliance with the collective bargaining
agreement. This pay grade scale is not provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code, to incorporate the
“Modified SGV” pay grade scale in its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. But
it did not. Therefore PHILEC cannot insist on the “Modified SGV” pay grade scale’s
application.
Benson Industries Employees Union-ALU-TUCP et. al.
vs. Benson, Industries, Inc.
NO. While serious business losses generally exempt the employer from
paying separation benefits, it must be pointed that the exemption only pertains to
the obligation of the employer under Article 297 of the Labor Code. This is because
of the law‟s express parameter that mandates payment of separation benefits “in
case of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses.”
However, when the obligation to pay separation pay is not sourced from
law, but from contract, such as an existing CBA between the employer and its
employees, an examination of the latter‟s provisions becomes necessary in order to
determine the governing the parameters for the said obligation. When the parties
agree as to the grant of such separation benefits irrespective of the employer‟s
financial position, then the obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms
should be carried out to its full effect. When it is clear and unambiguous and is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, it becomes the
law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express
policy of the law.
In the case at hand, it was not shown that the CBA was forged between the
parties contrary to law, etc. Hence, the parties to the CBA must be presumed to
have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. Moreover, it is only in
absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands assistance for
the debtor company.

G.R. No. 200746, August 06, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Benson Industries sent its employees, including petitioners, a
notice informing them of their intended termination from employment, to be
effected on the ground of closure and/or cessation of business operations. In
consequence, the majority of Benson‟s employees resigned and accepted Benson‟s
payment of separation pay computed at 15 days for every year of service, as per
the parties‟ Memorandum of Agreement.
Nevertheless, petitioners proffered a claim a claim for the payment of
additional separation pay at the rate of four days for every year of service on the
basis of the existing CBA executed by and between the Union and Benson which
states that “[Benson] shall pay to any employee/laborer who is terminated from the
service without any fault attributable to him, a „Separation Pay‟ equivalent to not
less than nineteen (19) days‟ pay for every year of service based upon the latest
rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in
favor of the petitioners but held that respondent was indeed in a state of insolvency
which justified its closure and/or cessation of business operations. On appeal, the
VA‟s ruling was reversed
and deleted the award of additional separation benefits equivalent to 4 days of work
for every year of service. It held that despite the express provision in the CBA
stating that Benson should pay its employees who were terminated without their
fault separation benefits equivalent to at least 19 days‟ pay for every year of
service, Benson cannot be compelled to do so considering its current financial
status.

Issue:
Whether or not the deletion the award to petitioners of additional separation
benefits equivalent to 4 days of work for every year of service.

Held:
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