Whitaker - Aristotle Interpretation

ARISTOTLE'S DE INTERPRETATIONS
OXFORD ARISTOTLE STUDIES

General Editors
Julia Annas and Lindsay Juclson
Aristotle's
De Interpretatione
CONTRADICTION AND DIALECTIC
C. W. A. W H I T A K E R
CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD

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Acknowledgements
I should like to express my deep gratitude to David Sedley and

Myles Burnyeat, the supervisors for my doctoral dissertation, out
of which this book arose. I am also most grateful to Lindsay Judson,
Ian Mueller, Sarah Broadie, Michael Frede, and Nick Denver for
their comments and criticism.
C.W.A.W.
Peterhouse, Cambridge
October 1995
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Contents
Abbreviations ix
Introduction i
1, The Title 5
2, Chapter i: Significant Utterances 8
1. Words, Thoughts, and Things 9
2. Truth and Falsehood 25
3, Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 35
1. The Structure of Chapters 2 and 3 35
2. Simple and Compound Words 37
3. Human Speech and Inarticulate Utterances 45
4, The Role of Names and Verbs in the Assertion 52
5, Indefinite Names and Verbs 61
6, Inflexions of Names and Verbs 67
4, Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions 71
5, Chapter 5: Simple and Compound Assertions 74

6, Chapter 6: Contradictory Pairs 78
7, Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP;

Singular and Universal Assertions 83
8, Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP;
Hidden Complex Assertions 95
1. Two Assertions Hidden in One 95
2. Unanswerable Questions;
The Dialectical Background 98
9, Chapter 9: The Third Exception to RCP;
Future Singular Assertions 109
1. The Argument for Fatalism 112
2. Aristotle's Solution and its Bearing on Dialectic "9
3. The Scholarly Debate 129
viii Contents
10. Chapter i o: Three Types of Assertions 132

1. The Composition of Assertions 132
2. TTie First Type of Assertions: "Man is" i35
3. Hie Second Type of Assertions: "Man is Just" i37
4. TTie Third Type of Assertions: "Man Walks" i43
5. Inferences, Negations, and Word Order 146
n. Chapter n: Sophistic Puzzles concerning Simple and
Complex Assertions 150
12. Chapter 12: Modal Assertions 156
13. Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions 161
14. Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs 171
15. Conclusion 178
Appendix I. The Principle of Contradiction in

Metaphysics F i%
1. First Principles 183
2. The Refutation Proof 186
3. The Definiteness of Signification 189
4. The Refutation Completed 196
Appendix II. The Substitution of Phrases for Words 204
Appendix III. Signification and Definition 209
1. The Problem of Definition 209
2. Aristotle's Solution 214
Bibliography 221
Index 229
Abbreviations
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
APo. Posterior Analytics
APr. Prior Analytics
Cat. Categories
DeAn. De Anima
De Int. De Interpretatione
De Sensu De Sensu et Sensibilibus
EN Nicomachean Ethics
GA Generation of Animals
GC De Generatione et Corruptione
HA History of Animals
Mela. Metaphysics
PA Parts of Animals
Ph. Physics
Poet Poetics
Pol. Politics
Pmb, Problems
Prog. An. Progression of Animals
Rhet. Rhetoric
Rhet. ad Alex, Rhetoric to Alexander
SE Sophistici Elenchi
Top. Topics
WORKS OF PLATO
Ap. Apology
Crat, Cratylus
Gorg. Gorgias
Hipp, Maj, Hippias Major
Hipp, Min, Hippias Minor
Prat. Protagoras
Rep, Republic
Soph. Sophist
Symp. Symposium
x Abbreviations
Tht. Theaetetus
Tim, Timaeus
OTHER ABBREVIATIONS
LSI Liddell, H. G,, and Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon,
rev. by Sir H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford, 1968).
OED The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1971).
RE Pauly, A., and Wissowa, G. (eds.), Real-Encyclopadie
der dassischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1894).
Introduction
The De Interpretation has traditionally been as the second

work of the Organon, lying between the Categories and Prior
Analytics, and taking the proposition as its subject. On this view,
the treatise presupposes the Categories, which is about terms, the
constituents of propositions, and in turn prepares the way for the
Prior Analytics, dealing with syllogisms, of which propositions are
the components. The De Interpretations is thus seen as part of a
sequence of treatises in which Aristotle's logic is presented.1 This
traditional view has not been challenged. In recent years, however,
the treatise has been approached in other ways. A large amount of
scholarly attention has concentrated on a small number of pas-
sages, which have been treated as isolated oases of philosophical
interest in an otherwise barren work.
The first such oasis is contained in chapter i. Here, it is alleged,
Aristotle's semantic theory or philosophy of language is to be
found. The first four chapters or so form a second oasis: they are
often called the 'linguistic chapters* of the treatise, and are
detached from the rest as being of special interest in the history of
grammar and linguistics.2 The final oasis comes in chapter 9, where
the famous Sea-Battle Argument is to be found. This argument has
claimed the attention of many philosophers, and has provoked an
independent debate OB fatalism, running to dozens of publications.1
1
See, e.g., Ammonitis, In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius, A. Busse
(ed.), Commentaria in Amtotelem Graeca, iv (Berlin, 1897), i. 22-2. % J. Tricot,
Aristou: Organon, 2, De I'lnterpre'tation (Paris, 1989), viii, and J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle
the Philosopher (Oxford, 1981), 79,
2
For the former, see N. Krelzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds Significant by
Convention', in J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation
(Dordrecht, 1974), 3-21. Examples of the latter approach are seen in Montanari,
who prefaces his study of chapters 1-4 with an argument that they form an
autonomous body of theory, irrelevant to the rest of the treatise and the Organon
in general (E. Montanari, La sezione linguistics del Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele,
2 vote,, Studi e testi, 5 and 8 (Florence, 1988); see i. 12 £), and Arens, who also con-
centrates on chapters 1-4, where Aristotle 'formulates his genera! views on lan-
guage* (H. Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition, Studies in the
History of Linguistics, 29 (Amsterdam, 1984): see i).
3
See the Bibliography, passim.
2 Introduction
These studies rest on the assumption that the philosophical oasis

in question bears no relation to its arid surroundings, and so may
be studied in isolation.
My approach will be to examine the De Interpretations as a
whole, rather than detaching passages of supposed greater interest,
By reading it carefully chapter by chapter, we shall see that the
work forms a coherent unity, and that even the passages which are
so often considered in separation are integral to the work, and
cannot be fully understood in isolation from it. The importance of
the treatise will then become apparent: it does not take as its
subject propositions, seen as the components of the syllogism, but
rather contradictory pairs, which are central to the working of
dialectic. It is meant to provide theoretical underpinning for dialec-
tic, and so should be read closely with the Topics and Sophistici
Elenchi, rather than with the Categories and Prior Analytics. I
shall thus challenge the traditional view of the place of the De
Interpretatione in the Organon,
It will therefore be useful to set out briefly here the importance
of contradiction in the practice of dialectic. Two people take part
in a dialectical debate, one of whom adopts a thesis, which he
defends as answerer. The other seeks to refute the thesis by asking
questions. He chooses questions such that the answers supplied by
the answerer will form an argument leading to the refutation of the
thesis: the answerer is thus, in a sense, forced to refute the thesis
himself, since he is obliged to answer honestly the questions which
are put to him. The business of dialectic, then, is refutation. It is the
job of the dialectician to be familiar with the real and apparent
refutations which are common to all disciplines, Aristotle tells us
(SE i7Qa20-bii). Thus, in the Topics he deals with genuine refuta-
tion, and in the Sophistici Elenchi with apparent refutation. All the
sophistries discussed in the Sophistici Elenchi may be brought
under the heading of ignorance of the definition of refutation (SE
i68ai7-i69a2i). Refutation is defined as an argument whose con-
clusion is the contradictory of the thesis.4 A refutation may there-
fore be vitiated either by relying on a faulty argument, or else by
mistaking what a contradictory is (SE 171*1-11).5 Of these two
4
SE 165*21,168*361, 170"! L, i?i"4f., 175*36!
5
An example of a type of argument which goes wrong as a result of mistakenly
assigning assertions to the wrong contradictory pairs is furnished by sophistries
which involve the dropping of a qualification, such as "it is white in one way and
Introduction 3
branches of knowledge which the dialectician must master, per-

missible modes of argument are treated in the Topics and later in
the Prior Analytics, while the question of which assertions contra-
dict which others is covered by the De Interpretatione,
Contradiction is also important to dialectic in another way. The
questioner seeks to refute the answerer's thesis by means of posing
dialectical questions, A dialectical question is a demand for the
answerer to assent to the truth of one member of a contradictory
pair or the other: it is a way of presenting a contradictory pair of
assertions without choosing the true one, and instead leaving this
choice to the answerer; it is also called a dialectical premiss (De Int.
20b23; Top, 1O4S8), It is therefore vital for the practice of dialectic
for one to know which assertions are paired together and which
are not: an answerer who did not know what the contradictory of
a dialectical premiss was would not know which assertions he was
being offered to choose from. The De Interpretatione shows us how
to sort assertions into contradictory pairs, and this is precisely the
skill needed in order to understand which two assertions are
offered in a dialectical question.
We shall see that an important task of the De Interpretatione is
to warn us of certain contradictory pairs which must be avoided in
dialectic. These pairs are ones for which it is not the case that one
member is true and the other false. In such cases, the dialectical
question based on the contradictory pair cannot be answered, since
to answer such a question is to pick out which member of the cor-
responding contradictory pair is true and which false. Moreover, in
these exceptional cases refutation will be impossible. In normal
cases, the truth of one member of a contradictory pair implies the
falsehood of the other, Therefore, to establish the truth of the con-
tradictory of the thesis also means establishing the falsehood of the
thesis itself, and that is how refutation works. In cases where the
truth of one contradictory is compatible with the truth of the other,
there would be no need to reject the original position just because
its contradictory had been established.
The De Interpretatione, in supplying an examination of contra-
dictory pairs, thus provides essential knowledge for the dialectician.
In the course of reading the treatise, its unity of purpose will
not white in another, so it is white and not white': this is a mistake about contra-
diction, and therefore is to do with ignorance of the definition of refutation (S£
i68"n-i6).
4 Introduction
become evident. We shall see that the De Interpretations should be

viewed as closely connected to the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi,
rather than as the middle treatise between the Categories and Prior
Analytics, m it has traditionally been seen,
The ideas contained in the De Interpretations are also applied in
other works. In the appendices, I shall pursue some of these appli-
cations. Hie first appendix concerns the discussion of the Principle
of Contradiction in Metaphysics F, and the use made there of the
notion of signification. TWs discussion exhibits the principle that
phrases and names may be substituted for each other if the phrase
explains the signification of the name. In Appendix III shall trace
this idea and its use in the Topics and elsewhere. The question then
emerges as to whether the phrase which explains the signification
of a name is a definition, and, if so, whether definitions can be found
by looking for the significations of words. In Appendix III I
examine the treatment of this question in the Posterior Analytics.
I
The Title
- The title of the De Interpretations presents a puzzle. The English

'On Interpretation' and the Latin 'De Interpretatione' are rough
translations of the Greek (ntgl %M?ra'ag),We should ask what this
title means, and whether it was the one originally intended by
Aristotle, The title first appears in the list of Aristotle's works given
by Diogenes Laertius.1 The discussion by Andronicus of Rhodes of
the order and authenticity of the works of Aristotle unfortunately
does not survive; however, references to Andronicus by the scho-
liasts suggest that he, too, knew the treatise as On Interpretation
(mgl sQfttjvelas).2 No reference to the work by this title is found in
Aristotle, and modern commentators agree that the title is not
original.3 However, the absence of the title from Aristotle's works
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for its inauthentieity, since
no reference to the treatise is to be found by any other title either.
More can be learnt concerning its authenticity by looking at what
the title could mean.
It was generally assumed in antiquity and the Middle Ages that
the above title was indeed the correct one, and it was therefore con-
sidered important to explain its meaning. The treatise was tradi-
tionally seen as being a study of the assertion, following on from
the Categories, which deals with single terms, and preparatory
to the Prior Analytics, which is concerned with syllogisms.4
1
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of the Philosophers S. 26.
2
See L, Minlo-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae el liber De Interpretatione
(Oxford, 1949), vi, and anon., 'Scholion on the De Interpretatione', in C. A, Brandis
(ed). Scholia in Aristotelem, in L Bekker and O. Gigon (eds.), Aristotelis Opera, iv
(Berlin, 1961), 94.
' Minlo-Paluello says that the title seems to have been added by an editor earlier
than Andronfcys (Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae et liber De Interpretatione,
vi). See also J, L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford,
1963), 70.
4
See, e,g.,» Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Pbsteriorum
Analytieorum Expositio, R. M. Spiazzi (ed,) (Rome, 1955),
6 Aristotle's De Interpretation
Accordingly, a number of scholiasts and commentators explain

that 'on interpretation' means 'concerning the assertion*.5
'Interpretation' (egi4ijvela) is, according to this tradition, equivalent
to 'assertion' (dnoQantxds Mjog), since, according to the explana-
tion offered by Ammonias, the assertion interprets (eg/t^vevov) the
knowledge in the soul,6 This tradition is followed by Pacius, who
comments that an interpretation (interpretatio) is a conventional
utterance which signifies the experiences of the mind.7
'Interpretation' ('interpretatio*) thus enters his as a techni-
cal term, so that he entitles the section on complex utterances
beginning with chapter 4 'On Composite Interpretations'. More
recently, Steinthal too follows Ammonias, commenting that, at least
in the title, 'interpretation' must mean 'assertion',8
This view of the meaning of the title is the result of deciding that
the treatise concerns the assertion, and that therefore the title must
mean 'On the Assertion'. The word 'interpretation' thus becomes
loaded with technical meaning so as to fit it exactly to the supposed
purpose of the treatise. However, there is no evidence from
Aristotle's own writings to connect the term with the notion of an
assertion. Instead, the word is used broadly for any sort of linguis-
tic expression, and even for animal communication. 'Expression' or
even language' would therefore serve as a better translation. All
birds have expression (egfajveid), he says (PA 660*35). Speech is dis-
tinguished from other forms of expression on the grounds that it
uses words (Poet. 1450*14). The title of the De Interpretations, then,
would mean something like 'On Language', provided we took lan-
guage in a generous sense, so as to include what might be called
animal language.
Waitz concludes that the title would not be inappropriate taken
in this sense, since the title would then pertain to spoken commu-
nication, the elements of which are dealt with in the treatise.9 The
De Interpretations is not a treatise about language in general,
however, and is not even a treatise about human language in
5
See, e.g., Amiaonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretations Commentarius 4,27-5.23,
Brandis (ed,}, Scholia in Amtotetem, 94, 19-21, and T, Waitz, Arislotelis Organon
Graece, 2¥ols. (Leipzig, 1844), L 38,
6
Animonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius 5, 18.
7
J, Pacius, 'Agunxnt&ovg 'Ogyavov {Frankfurt, 1597).
* H, Steinthal, Gesehichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und R&mern
(Berlin, 1863): see 230-3.
* Waitz, Aristotelis Organon, i. 324,
The Title 7
general. Instead, we shall see that its central subject is an analysis

of contradictory pairs of assertions, considered as relevant to
dialectic. This project begins properly with Chapter 7, after a pre-
liminary investigation of signification, names, verbs, and how the
assertion is composed. These supposedly linguistic chapters take up
only a sixth of the treatise. They are meant as a preparation for the
study of contradiction, and do not form an independent investiga-
tion into language.
The title which the treatise traditionally bears is therefore not an
apt one, whether taken to mean 'On the Assertion*, or, as on Waitz's
view, 'On Communication' or 'On Language'. The title is not sup-
ported in other works of Aristotle, and should be rejected as spu-
rious, 'On the Contradictory Pair' (negl avcupamtoz) would be the
most obvious title to express the true subject of the treatise.
2
Chapter 1: Significant Utterances
With chapter i, the preliminary section of the treatise begins, which

culminates in the introduction of the contradictory pair in chapter
6, Before such a complex item as the contradictory pair can be
understood, we must first be shown how assertions work, and that
means understanding the name and verb, and, before that, how lan-
guage is related to thought and to the real world, and how it is that
utterances can make claims about things which are true or false.
The first sentence sets out the programme for these introductory
chapters: first the name and verb must be defined, then the nega-
tion, affirmation, assertion, and phrase (i6 a if,), The last four are
listed in the opposite order to that in which they are introduced;
this is easily explained if we think of Aristotle as seeing the con-
tradictory pair as the final goal of these chapters, and working his
way back through the parts of language which must be defined first.
A contradictory pair contains a negation (17*9) but also an affir-
mation (17*8), which is more basic; both are kinds of assertion
(17*2), which is in turn a kind of compound utterance, or phrase
(Uyog, i6b26tt).
We are told that the first task is to introduce the name and verb
(i6ai). Before turning to this task, however, Aristotle offers a pre-
liminary treatment of significant utterances in general, which occu-
pies the remainder of chapter i. The chapter falls into two sections.
In the first, the general relation between words, thoughts, and things
is set out (16*3-9). This shows what it means for utterances to be
significant, and so prepares the way for the definitions which are to
follow: names, and, it is implied, verbs, are significant utterances
(16*19),as are phrases (i6ba6). In the second section of chapter i,
a distinction is drawn between simple thoughts and utterances,
which cannot possess truth value, and complex ones, which can
(16*9-18). This distinction paves the way for the succeeding chap-
ters, in which we are presented first with names and verbs, the
Chapter i; Significant Utterances 9
simple elements of significant speech (16*20ft, i6b6f.), and then

with complex phrases formed from them, one kind of which, the
assertion, is either true or false (i782ff.). Rather than constituting
an isolated investigation of semantics, chapter i thus forms an
introduction to chapters 2 to 6, which conclude with the definition
of the contradictory pair, and so in turn constitute an introduction
to the main work of the treatise which is to come.
i. WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THINGS (i6 a 3-9)
i.i. Words as Conventional Tokens

In the first part of the chapter, Aristotle sets out the relation
between writing, spoken utterances, the thoughts, or 'affections in
the soul', which they express, and the external objects for which
they stand.1 He begins by developing an analogy between, on the
one hand, the relation between speech and thought and, on the
other, that between writing and speech. We are first told that
spoken utterances are 'symbols' of affections in the soul, and that
writing likewise consists of symbols of spoken utterances (i6*3£).
He then goes on to say that, just as written letters are not the same
for everyone, neither is speech; the affections in the soul, however,
for which speech stands, are the same for everyone, as are the things
of which the affections in the soul are likenesses (16*5-8). The same
spoken sound, then, can be represented in different written marks:
the nature of the sound does not determine how this must be done.
In the same way, the same affections in the soul may be represented
by different utterances; there is a variety of languages spoken, just
as there is a variety of systems of writing in use. The way in which
the soul registers thoughts, on the other hand, does not vary
between people of different countries, who may speak different
languages and use different systems of writing (i6"8f.). Let us con-
sider first of all writing and utterances, both of which are 'not the
same for everyone', and both of which consist of 'symbols'. This
terra must be examined. The Greek word used by Aristotle
1
The terms used in this section are general, utterances being referred to as, lit-
erally, 'what is in the voice' and thoughts as 'affections in the souP (i6*3f.; see also
Plato, Rep. 51 id). We shall see that the affections in the soul referred to here must
be thoughts, rather than, for example, perceptions or emotions.
io Aristotle's De Interpretatione
is that from which the English 'symbol' is directly

derived. The English word, however, has acquired senses which the
Greek word lacked: 'symbol' is therefore not the roost informative
word to choose to translate it. The normal use of the Greek word
was for a tally or token. A contract or other agreement might be
marked by breaking a knucklebone or other object in two,
one portion being taken by each of the parties to the agreement,
Each person kept his piece, and could identify the person who pre-
sented the other piece by matching it with his own. The word hence
comes to denote any token, for instance for admission to the
theatre.2
We shall see from Aristotle's account of how words function that
this term is aptly chosen for his purpose. In his view, the meaning
of & word is fixed by convention (i6ai9, 17*1 £), just as the impor-
tance attached to a tally, token, or ticket depends on agreement
between the parties concerned. Any suitable item could be used as
a tally, provided people agreed to regard it as such. What is impor-
tant is that the choice of a token, unlike a tool, is not determined
by the task for which it is chosen. Any sound may be chosen to
denote any object. There is, indeed, the requirement that the word
should be audible, but, as we shall see, a sound is meaningful by
virtue of being adopted as a token, not because it can be heard. In
the same way, a theatre ticket should not be too big to be carried,
and a tally must be the result of breaking something in two, so that
the two parts may match.
Accordingly, something becomes a token when adopted as one
by convention. Thus, in chapter 2, Aristotle states as part of his defi-
nition of a name that it is a sound significant by convention (16*19),
and then goes on to explain that nothing is a name by nature,
and something only becomes a name when it becomes a token
(avfiftolov). He is able to say this, since a sound may become a
name, or cease to be a name, by the adoption or abandoning of a
convention. We see the point made in the Nicomachean Ethics with
regard to money. Money, like words, came into being by conven-
tion (EN 1 133*29); it is not by nature, but by convention, and 'it is
within our power to change it or render it useless' (1133*31). The
idea is that if the use of something can be changed merely by
human decision, then its use cannot have been determined by the
2
See LSI
Chapter i: Significant Utterances n
nature of things. Similarly, we are able to invent new words, by

assigning a new meaning to a sound, Aristotle frequently employs
thought experiments in which a word is given a new meaning?
There are many things which do not have names (EN no7bi£);
there are cases, therefore, in which a new word ought to be coined
to apply to something currently nameless.4 This process can be seen
in chapter 2 of the De Interpretatione, only a few lines after we are
told that something only becomes a word when adopted as a token.
There is no name for such expressions as 'not man,*, and so the term
'indefinite name' is coined for them (16*30-2); we see here the dis-
covery of something which is nameless, and the invention of an
expression to designate it.
Aristotle also speaks of words as tokens at the beginning of the
Sophistici Elenchi, There, words are seen as tokens not for thoughts,
but for things. He states that, since we cannot carry about with us
the objects which we wish to talk about, we use words instead of
things, as tokens (mtfifhia) for them (SE 165% ft.).5 In argument,
we manipulate these tokens, and then count the results as applying
to the things for which the tokens stand. He draws a comparison
with the use of pebbles in calculation. Pebbles, like words, are
adopted as tokens because they are easier to manipulate than the
things for which they stand. Once a sum has been worked out using
pebbles, its result may be applied to the things for which the tokens
were taken to stand. This statement is consistent with the view
expressed in the De Interpretatione that words are significant by
convention and not by nature. The two passages differ, however, in
taking utterances to be tokens for different classes of items. In, the
De Interpretatione words are tokens for thoughts, which are, in turn,
likenesses of things; m the Sophistici Elenchi, on the other hand,
words are tokens for things, adopted and manipulated by a thinker
like pebbles used in calculation. When we come to consider the
3
See, e.g., De Int. 18*19, where 'cloak* is made to stand for man and horse, and
also Mela. 24, imffzji and PA 649*16, '"22.
4
Cat. 7*51,bi 11 Cf. Top. 157*21-33, EN 1108*16-19. and Rhet. I4i4bi5~i8, where
we are warned not to coin a word if it does not mark off a distinct thing.
5
The rather startling idea that words arc equivalent to things, but less bulky,
prompts Swift to turn the tables on Aristotle: the Laputians argue that 'every word
we speak is in some degree a diminution of our lungs by corrosion,' and so, 'since
words are only names for things, it would he more convenient for all men to carry
about them such things as were necessary to express the particular business they
are to discourse on* (1 Swift, Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World, by
Lemuel Gulliver (London, 1766), ii. 175).
o Aristotle's De Interpretatione
relation between thought and its objects, it will be seen that these
two views are consistent with each other,
According to the view put forward in chapter i of the De
Interpretatione, then, words are conventional and not natural; they
are not the same for everyone, and stand as tokens for thoughts. In
advancing this view, Aristotle was reacting to a debate which had
been carried on by earlier thinkers. The debate was already going
on in the time of Democritus, who argued against the naturalist
theory by drawing attention to four types of phenomena, which, he
claimed, could not take place if language were natural. He pointed
out first that the same word may have several meanings; secondly
that different words may have the same meaning; thirdly that one
name can be substituted for another, and fourthly that there are
many things which do not have names.6 The third of these argu-
ments corresponds to that used by Aristotle ia citing the change-
ability of words and of money.
The debate was taken up in Plato's Cratylus, in which
Hermogenes advocates the view put forward by Democritus. The
names of things can be changed, since their attachment to any item
depends only on 'convention and agreement' (Crat. 384di-6,
43362 ff.). Aristotle takes up the term 'convention* (ovv&rfxrf) from
Plato (De Int. i"j*i i), Hermogenes is also given the argument that
the names in use vary between different nationalities (Crat
385d7-e3); Aristotle makes this the principal difference between,
on the one hand, writing and utterances, which are not the same
for all, and, on the other hand, thoughts and things, which are the
same.
As well as adopting some of the vocabulary and arguments used
by Democritus and by the character Hermogenes on the side of
conventionalism, Aristotle distances himself from the naturalist
position portrayed by Plato. In the Cratylus it was argued that
naming is an action, and actions are not relative to us, but have a
nature of their own: we must carry out an action with the appro-
priate implement, and not in whatever way we choose (Cmt,
38731-8),. It is thus concluded that a name is a tool (Crat. 38838,
brjf.). Aristotle explicitly rejects this view, stating that language
signifies by convention, and not as a tool (i6h33-i7a2). The token
6
H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1951), frag, B
26. See also RE, vii. cols. 17821
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 13
replaces the tool as the model for how words do their job. We shall
see other ways in which he responds to the Cratylus, in examining
the treatment of simplicity and complexity in words and thoughts
in the final part of chapter i.
1.2. Thoughts as Likenesses of Things

Having examined those items which Aristotle designates as tokens,
and which, being fixed only by convention, vary from one person
to another, we must move on to look at those other items which
have a fixed nature, and are 'the same for all' (i686f.). These items
are thoughts, and the things of which thoughts are likenesses. In
order to understand the relationship between thought and things
which is envisaged here, we need to consider what is meant by the
term 'likeness' (oftoiwfia). To do this, we shall need to turn to the
De Anima. Aristotle himself refers us to that work, concluding
the first section of the chapter with the comment that 'these things
have been discussed in the writings on the soul, and belong to
another discipline* (i6*8f.),
Two questions now present themselves. First, when he says that
'these things' have been spoken of in the De Anima, which part of
the preceding passage is he referring to? Secondly, which part of
the De Anima is supposed to provide a fuller treatment of the
matters discussed here? The two questions are, of course, con-
nected, since the explanation should correspond to what is being
explained. Does the phrase 'these things' refer back to the entire
previous passage (i6a3-8)? If so, we would expect to find a fuller
discussion of convention and the relation between writing, speech,
thought, and things somewhere in the De Anima, It would be dif-
ficult to argue that the De Anima does provide a fuller discussion
of all of these issues. Furthermore, we find along with the reference
to the De Anima the parenthetic remark 'for this belongs to a dif-
ferent enquiry' (16*9). This suggests that the material of which the
De Anima will provide a further elucidation is incidental, and not
central, to the present passage. It would be odd if the paragraph
with which Aristotle chooses to begin the treatise were promptly
dismissed as irrelevant. Instead, 1 suggest that the reference per-
tains to the topic which has been most recently introduced, that is,
the point that thoughts are likenesses of things (16*7). The relation
between thought and things is not discussed further in the De
14 Aristotle's De Interpretations
Interpretations, and very clearly belongs to the sphere of the De

Anima.
We must now look to see which passages in the De Anitna might
help to elucidate our passage. Opinion has varied as to which
portion of that treatise is here being referred to. There was also
an ancient debate as to whether the reference can be traced at
all. Andronicus of Rhodes, alone in antiquity, believed the De
Interpretatione to be inauthentic. An anonymous scholiast tells us
that his principal reason stemmed from this reference,7 Andronicus
reasoned that thoughts (vorificaa) are not referred to as affections
in the soul anywhere in the De Anima, and so either that work or
the De Interpretatione must be inauthentic. He Judged the Dg
Anima to be more important to the corpus, and so was willing to
sacrifice the De Interpretatione, The scholiast points out that,
although thoughts are not actually called affections in the soul,
Aristotle does refer to the part of the soul which houses thoughts
and memories of things as 'capable of being affected'
De An. 430*24). Since thinking is being affected by external things,
it is certainly consistent to call thoughts affections in the soul.
Trendelenburg, and after him Tricot, take the reference to be
to De Anima III. 6. where truth and falsehood and simple and
complex thoughts are discussed.8 These subjects are only intro-
duced in the latter part of chapter i, however, and so a reference
to De Anima III. 6 would be out of place at this point. Also, the
subjects of truth value, simplicity, and complexity are much more
fully covered in the De Interpretatione than in the De Anima, so
that any cross-reference ought to work in the other direction. We
should instead took to passages in the De Anima which deal with
the relation between thoughts and things, and look for an expla-
nation of how the former are likenesses of the latter.
The theory of how thoughts match things is developed in book
III of the De Anima, along similar lines to the theory of percep-
tion, advanced in book II. In book II we are told that an organ of
perception is potentially what the thing perceived already is actu-
ally, and becomes like it when it perceives it (wftouuTcu xai eanv olov
1
C. A, Brandts (ed.), Scholia in Aristatelem, in I. Bekker and O. Gigon (eds.)
AdstoteUs Opera, 2nd edn,, iv (Berlin, 1961), 94,
* R A. Trendelenburg, Aristotelis De Anima libri tre$ (Jena, 1833), i t6f., and J.
Tricot, Aristote: Organon, 2, De I'lnterpr&ation (Paris, 1989), 78, n. 2.
exelvo, DeAn. 418*3 ft). We are told in book III that thought works
in an analogous fashion (429*13-18). Before conceiving of any
object of thought, the mind is blank: it is not actually anything, until
it begins to think (429s23fl). It is capable of taking on the form of
an object of thought, and so, Aristotle goes on to say, that which
thinks and that which is thought about are the same, and know-
ledge is the same as the thing known (430a3-5,431*1 £). The theory
concerns the process of conceiving a thought of some intelligible
thing. In this process, the intelligible form of the object of thought
is taken on by the thinker, so that this same form is common both
to the object and to the thinker, in this way, a likeness of the object
of thought is present in the mind.
It is important to clarify that Aristotle does not mean that the
affections in the soul are mental images or pictures: they are
thoughts, and a thought is like its object, since both share the same
form. This does not make a thought into a picture. In the De Anima
thoughts and images are carefully distinguished. The crucial differ-
ence is that images (âvnza/tara) cannot be woven into complex
thoughts which have a truth value, whereas simple thoughts
can. Imagination takes perception as its starting point,
and cannot take place without it (De An, 428bn-i6). We are told
that creatures are guided by imagination either because they lack
rationality, as do brute beasts, or because their intellect is tem-
porarily veiled, through sleep or disease (429*5-$). So, while images
may accompany thoughts, they are clearly not the same as thoughts
themselves (432aio-i4). To say that a thought is a likeness, then, is
not to say that it is an image or picture.
Once we have seen that the two are separate, it should be clear
that Aristotle is concerned in the De Interpretation with thoughts
and not images. If by 'affections in the soul' he meant mental
images and not thoughts, then he would be claiming that spoken
utterances are tokens for images, and not thoughts; yet, later in the
chapter we are told that simple thoughts correspond to names and
verbs (16*13 fc), and in chapter 3 we see that both speaker and
hearer register in thought the utterance of a word (i6b2o£).
Aristotle is clearly interested in the relation between words and
thoughts, and not. that between words and mental images,
Despite the clear distinction which he draws between thoughts
and images, Aristotle has been accused of adopting the view that a
16 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
thought is just a picture.9 Commentators on the chapter are very

ready to enumerate the problems to be encountered by anyone
seeking to hold such a ¥iew, and put them forward as objections to
Aristotle's view that affections in the soul are likenesses of things.
Chief among these problems is the question of how the thought of
something non-existent can be an image. For, if the object of
thought does not exist, there is nothing there for the thought to
resemble. Kretzmann concludes that Aristotle's account cannot
possibly apply to thought in general, but only to 'mental images of
actual things'.10
A similar objection might, indeed, be raised against the inter-
pretation according to which thoughts are likenesses, correspond-
ing to the forms of the things of which they are thoughts: how is it
possible for the mind to take on the form of something which does
not exist? The analysis of thought in the De Anima is concerned
with thinking about things which have a formal and material
aspect; to think of such a thing is for the thinker to take on its form.
The discussion of thinking in the De Anima is not, perhaps, suffi-
ciently broad to include thinking about the non-existent, or indeed
any other items which do not have forms. According to this objec-
tion, something such as the goat-stag, which does not exist, has no
form and therefore cannot be thought of.
This objection need not be worrying. The notion of form is often
broadened to include items which belong to categories other than
that of substance, and even items which do not exist. The treatment
of discursive thinking in De Anima HI. 6, for example, must have a
scope broad enough to cover thoughts of subjects and predicates
in general, so as to allow for true or false complex thoughts con-
cerning them. We find an account of this broadening of the scope
of essence and definition in Metaphysics 24, so that even the non-
existent may, in a sense, be said to be (Meta. Z, iojo*ij-2j),11 The
goat-stag, at least in a distant sense, is something, and so has an
intelligible form which can be conceived in the mind. For every
name there is a phrase which sets out what the name signifies
' See, e.g., H. Arena, Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition
(Amsterdam, 1984), 31, and J. L, Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De
Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 113.
10
Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds Significant by Convention*, in A
Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation (Dordrecht, 1974), 9.
" Cf. Top. I03l>20-3i.
(Mete. 1030*7-9; APo, 92b26~-34);!2this phrase, in a broad sense, can

also be called a definition (oewpog, Meta. 1030*171); in the case of
'goat-stag', it might state what a goat-stag would be, were it to
exist.13 The theory that thoughts are formal copies, or 'likenesses',
of items in the world is thus broad enough to accommodate any-
thing which can be thought of or talked about, even things which
do not exist. It is not threatened by examples of objects which do
not obviously have forms, and so fares better than the image theory
attributed to Aristotle by some, which could not extend beyond
those objects of thought which can be pictured.
We have now seen how the reference to the DeAnima elucidates
what Aristotle means by calling thoughts likenesses of things.
'Affections in the soul*, we may now see, are thoughts of anything
which is intelligible. Armed with an understanding of this theory of
thought, it is easy to see why it is that thoughts, like things, are, as
he puts it, 'the same for all'. Just as a dog is always a dog, since
every dog shares the same form, so there is no difference between
the thought of a dog conceived by a Greek and that conceived by
a Persian. Thinking of a dog means conceiving a formal likeness of
dog in one's mind: this likeness is determined by what a dog is, and
must therefore be the same no matter who the thinker is. A differ-
ence is thus marked between thoughts and words. While the spoken
sound 'horse' could be adopted just as well in place of the sound
'dog', it would be impossible for the thought of a horse to be used
in place of the thought of a dog. We cannot choose which thoughts
to use for which things: unlike words, they are not tokens adopted
by convention to apply to whichever thing people please,
i.j. Words as Signs

In order to complete our understanding of the relation between
words, thoughts and things, we must consider a third term which
Aristotle uses in addition to 'token* and likeness*, and that is 'sign'
i6B6), The sentence in which this term is introduced in
chapter i has been heavily debated, and several interpretations
have been proposed. In this sentence (i6a5~8), Aristotle is making
12
13
See Appendices II and III.
The definition of goat-stag cannot mention the fact that it does not exist: being
is not a genus, and does not form a part of the substance or definition of anything
(APo,
i8 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the point that writing and utterances are not the same for all,
whereas thoughts and things are. In the course of this point, he
describes affections of the soul as being the 'primary things of
which spoken utterances are signs'
i6a6). The debate arises over the interpretation of this clause, and
also involves a textual dispute.
Three main interpretations have been advanced. Proponents of
all three agree that the sentiment contained in this clause is 'words
are primarily of affections in the soul'. The disagreement
comes as to whether 'primarily' qualifies 'words', 'signs', or 'affec-
tions in the soul*. According to Ammonius, 'primarily* qualifies
"affections in the soul'. Words are signs, primarily of thoughts, and
secondarily of something else, that is, of things.14 He develops this
interpretation by making thoughts intermediaries between words
and things, so that words are of thoughts directly, and of things
indirectly. I shall argue that Ammonius' interpretation of how to
read 'primarily* is correct. Before considering his view in more
detail, we must consider the other two interpretations of the clause,
and also discuss the bearing of the textual dispute.
According to the second interpretation, adopted by Kretzmann,
'primarily* is to be taken with 'signs*. Words are primarily signs
of thoughts, and secondarily something else, that is, symbols of
them.15 The two terms 'sign' and 'symbol' (as he translates it)
are expanded as follows. Spoken utterances are, according to him,
primarily natural signs, or symptoms, of mental impressions; this
is expressed by the word 'sign'. They are also, secondarily,
conventional signs or tokens; for this, the word 'symbol* is used. So,
according to this view, when Aristotle says that a word is a
word when it becomes a symbol (i6a27f.), he means that a
sound is already a natural symptom of some mental event, and
when it is adopted as a conventional symbol it becomes a word in
addition.
Aristotle's comments on animal noises are cited in defence of
this view. He clearly says that, while animal noises are not words,
yet they do indicate something (i6a28~3o). This means of expres-
sion does not depend on the formation of a convention. Pepin
exploits in defence of Kretizmann's view an inference drawn by
14
Ammonius, In Artstotetls De Interpretatione Commentariuf, A. Busse (ed.),
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, rv (Berlin, 1897), 17 tt
15
Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds'.
Boethius that some human utterances, such as cries and groans,

must, like animal sounds,signify by nature."However, Kretzmann's
view requires there to be not just utterances which signify by
nature, but utterances which signify both by nature and by con-
vention, the former primarily and the latter secondarily. This
requirement might be satisfied by a word like 'ouch', which could
be said to be a non-conventional symptom of pain expressed in
a conventional form. For their argument, however, P6pin and
Kretzmann would need to establish that not only conventionally
expressed groans, but words in general, are natural signs, as well as
being conventional ones.
For this, Pepin cites a passage in which Aristotle describes the
production of voice (HA 536*19 £}. Voice is the same for all, in the
sense that the production of sound by the mouth and throat works
in the same way for everyone. It would be a mistake, however, to
suppose that Aristotle speech as consisting of natural signs.
Spoken utterances only have any meaning by convention, and not
by nature, even though they are expressed by means of the voice,
which it is part of human nature to be able to produce. We are told
that words are not words by nature (16*27), and are not tools (17*1).
They are, instead, conventional tokens, Aristotle certainly does not
argue that they are both natural and conventional. We may confirm
that this is his view by turning to a passage in the De Sensu, There,
he says that speech is a source of instruction not per se, by virtue
of being audible, but per accidens, by virtue of the that speech
consists of words, and all words are tokens (De Sensu 437ai2-is).17
Here he makes the point clearly that the semantic function of a
spoken sound depends on. its adoption as a token, and not on its
being spoken. Just because the production of voice is natural in the
sense that it is part of human nature to speak, it does not follow
that words are natural signs, Aristotle's theory of what makes a
16
1. P^pin,"£it[t(Sof.a, Sp«a,'O/totopara: A propos de De Interpretatione i, 1683-8
et Potttique VIII 5,134036-39', in 3, Wiesner (ed.), Aristotele$: Wtrk und Wirktmg, I
(Berlin, 1985), 22-44: see 41, n. 60.
" Lo Piparo comments on these lines, 'if this were so, intelligence and learning
would normally exist without the contribution of hearing' (R Lo Piparo, 'Aristotle:
The Material Conditions of Linguistic Expressiveness", Versus; Quaderni di studi
semiotici, no. 50-1 (May-Dec. 1988), 83-102; see ioo).This is to misunderstand what
Aristotle means. He does not mean that speech could be informative even if it were
not audible, but that it is informative not because it is audible, but because it con-
sists of words.
2O Aristotle's De Interpretatione
word a word does not permit a word to be both a natural and a
conventional sign, and so the interpretation of Kretzmann and
P6pin cannot be supported.
The third way of interpreting Aristotle's words at i686-8 is
adopted by Belardi. In 'words are primarily signs of affections in
the soul', Belardi takes 'primarily' to qualify 'words': it is pri-
marily words which are signs of thoughts; secondarily, some other
items are signs of them, and these other items are written marks.18
In an earlier publication, Belardi suggested that words were pri-
marily signs of affections in the soul, secondly signs of images, and
thirdly of concepts.1* Both positions taken by Belardi involve
excluding the things from the scheme, and seeing Aristotle's com-
ments on signs as confined only to writing, utterances, and various
mental states. Accordingly, he claims that Aristotle nowhere says
that words are symbols of things.20 As we have seen, though, in a
passage in the Sophistici Elenchi words are indeed said to be tokens
for things (SE i65a6ff.).21 We see the importance of the relation
between words and things in many other passages. Important
examples to be found in the De Interpretatione include the follow-
ing: verbs are defined as being signs of a certain sort of thing (i6b7,
10); the verb 'to be', unlike other words, is not a sign of a thing
(i6b22f.); in chapter 7, assertions are classified according to the
kinds of things which they take as subject (i7a38ff.); the truth of
utterances matches things (19*33). Given the great importance of
the relation between words and things in the De Interpretatione,
and the mention of both words and things in the sentence under
discussion, it is vastly preferable to suppose that this relation finds
a place in the discussion. Belardi, however, goes to some trouble to
exclude it.
We now come to the textual question lurking in this sentence
(16%). This concerns whether to adopt as the correct reading the
genitive plural 'of the first things' (ngtuttov), or either of two syn-
18
W. Belardi, 'Riconsiderando la seconda frase del De Interpretatione', Studi e
saggi linguistki, 21 (1981), 79-83. Bar a criticism of this view, see p. 181 of H.
Weidemann, 'Grundzflge der aristotelischen Sprachtheoric', in Schcnitter (cd.),
Sprachtheorien der abendlandischen Antike (Tubingen, 1991), 170-92.
" W. Belardi, It tinguaggio netta jtiosafia, diAristottle (Rome, 1975): see especially
106-9.
m
Ibid, 109.
zt
With reference to this passage, Belardi argues that we must instead take
Aristotle to mean that words are used as symbols of states of mind.
onymous adverbs, 'first' (nganajg or xQfinav). The first of these is an

emendation proposed by Minio-Paluello,22 It would have the con-
sequence of making the sentence read 'the first things of which
these [that is, the utterances] are signs, namely the affections in the
soul, are the same for everyone, as are the things of which these
are likenesses,' This reading would, in other words, exclude the
interpretations of Kretzmann and Belardi, and leave only that of
Ammonius as possible. This is because the genitive plural forces
the idea of priority to be linked with the affections in the soul, so
that the sentence can only mean that words are primarily signs
of thoughts and secondarily of something else. Kretzmann
and Belardi could not sustain their interpretations, which require
priority to be linked to 'signs' and 'words' respectively.
Thus, both argue in favour of reading the adverb 'first', and
against Minio-Paluello's emendation.23 Kretzmann and Belardi
allege that Greek manuscripts have one or other of the adverbs,
and take this as conclusive evidence against the genitive plural
reading. The genitive plural is indeed mainly based on the Syriac,
Armenian, and Latin translations, but these are earlier than any
surviving Greek manuscript. There is also, however, as Montanari
points out, one surviving Greek manuscript in which the reading is
found. Montanari argues convincingly that the genitive plural was
the original reading, and that the two adverbs were adopted in
order to make the text fit more comfortably the traditional inter-
pretation of Ammonius (so nQanaw yielded to agaroic and
ztQ&tov)?* Montanari argues that the introduction of the adverbial
form was unnecessary, since Ammonius* interpretation is perfectly
possible given the original form. Indeed, the introduction of the
adverb only rendered the text liable to other interpretations
besides the traditional one, as we see from the fact that the inter-
pretations of Kretzmann and of Belardi rely on adopting one of
the adverbial readings. Even if we were to grant what they ask, and
agree to read one of the adverbs instead of the genitive plural, the
interpretation of Ammonius would still be possible, and preferable
n
L. Minio-Paluello, Ariaotelis Categorise et liber De Inlerpretatione (Oxford,
1949)-
s
See Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds', 18, n. 4, and Belardi, II linguag-
gio netta fitosetfia di Aristotele, lofiL
** E. Montanari, La seiione Knguistica del Peri Benueneias di Aristotele, i vote.,
Studi c testf, 5 and. 8 (Florence, 1988), I 126-32 and IL 47-9.
on philosophical grounds, I have argued that Kretzmann's inter-
pretation involves a confusion over Aristotle's views on nature
and convention, and that BeJardi neglects the importance of the
relation between words and things. We are left agreeing with
Ammonius, then, that Aristotle means to say that spoken words are
primarily signs of thoughts, and secondarily signs of things.
Our understanding of these lines cannot consist merely in
a choice between the three interpretations of Ammonius,
Kretemann, and Belardi, however. We still need to explain what it
means for words to be signs primarily of thoughts and secondarily
of things. In order to elucidate this, let us remember the relation
between thoughts, and things investigated above. Thoughts are like-
nesses, that is, formal copies, of things. The thinker takes on the
form of the thing, so that the form is present both in the thing and
in his mind, just as the same impression might be shared by two
wax tablets. If words are of thoughts, and thoughts are exact
copies of things, it would seem to follow inevitably that words
would also be signs of things. Of course, they are only signs of things
by virtue of the fact that the words are already in the first place
signs of thoughts, which are in turn copies of the things. Thus,
Aristotle's view that thoughts are likenesses of things easily
explains why it is that words are signs first of thoughts and then
of things, Ammonius' account of the relation between words,
thoughts, and things is rather different. He takes words to signify
thoughts immediately and directly, and to signify things only indi-
rectly, through thoughts as intermediaries,25 Thoughts are not inter-
mediaries, though, standing between the words and the things:
rather, they are identical in form with the things. Words express
people's thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. It is for
this reason, and not because thoughts stand as intermediaries, that
words are signs first of thoughts and secondarily of things,
We may now answer the question of whether the De
Interpretatione and Sophistici Elenchi are consistent in their use of
'token' or not. In the former work words are said to be tokens for
thoughts, while in the latter they are tokens for things. The two
positions are clearly consistent with each other. Words stand for
thoughts and also for things; since words are arbitrary tokens
25
Ammonius, In Amtotdis De Interpretatione Commentarius 24. 7-9. Cf. a
scholiast on Cat 1*1 (in T, Waitz, Arutotelis Organon Craece (Leipzig, 1844),
i. 30.
whose meaning is assigned by rational beings, they will be tokens

both for the thoughts of those rational beings and for the things
of which their thoughts are likenesses. So, just as words are
both of thoughts and of things, so they may be said to be tokens
for both.
We should now turn to consider in more detail what Aristotle
means by saying that words are signs. A sign is defined in the Prior
Analytics as something from which the existence of something else
may be inferred: if there is a sign, then there is some object of which
it is a sign (APr. 70*7-9), We may see that this view of what a sign
is fits well Aristotle's conception of how words function, as seen in
the De Interpretatione. In chapter 3 we Ind a passage which is ¥ery
useful for understanding the relation between significant speech,
thoughts, and things. When a word which signifies something is
uttered, both speaker and hearer register a thought in their minds
to accompany the utterance of the word (i6b2o£). This thought is,
as we learn in chapter i, a likeness of a thing. The utterance of a
word, then, makes a rational being who is familiar with the lan-
guage in question aware in his mind of the thing which the word
signifies. The definition of sign found in the Prior Analytics thus
suits Aristotle's view of words well. If an utterance is significant,
then there must be a thought which it arouses, and. since that
thought must be a thought of some thing, there must be a thing for
which the word stands,26
The relation between signs and tokens may now be clarified. The
term 'token* is used to point to the fact that a word is adopted by
convention to stand for a thought of a thing, and so for the thing
itself. The term, 'sign', on the other hand, does not convey anything
about whether words are conventional or not, To say that a word
is a sign of a thought and a sign of a thing simply means that there
is some thought and some thing corresponding to the word.
The statement in chapter i that utterances are signs of thoughts
and of things is fundamental to the work. The definitions of the
name and verb rely on this statement: names are defined as signifi-
cant utterances, and verbs as signs of something which is said of
something else (16*19,b?)- These two types of word are the basic
components of assertions, and assertions are therefore, in turn,
24
Cf. Meta. F 1006*29f.: a word signifies being something. For a discussion of this
point, see Appendix I.
significant (i6b33f.. 17*23, I7bi7, 18*14, I9b5). It is the relation

between words and things, rather than words and thoughts, which
is most often exploited in the De Interpretatione. Thus, in chapter
7 assertions are classified according to the kind of thing which the
assertion takes as its subject (17*38), An assertion claims that some-
thing holds of something (17*21,18*12,I9b5ff,, 20b3i fi), and so lan-
guage is true according to the way things are (nQdyfiata, 19*33). A
significant word, then, designates a thing (r6b22£) or a 'this*
(id'ifi),27 and an assertion indicates that one thing holds or does
not hold of another. It follows that the things signified by words
must be considered carefully if the workings of assertions are to be
understood. The relation between words and thoughts is exploited
less in the treatise. In chapter 14, however, Aristotle tries a new
approach which makes use of this relation. Since words stand for
thoughts as well as for things, contradictory assertions may be
investigated by examining the beliefs which they express, as well as
the things which they talk about (23a32f,). Chapter 14, therefore,
attempts to establish which assertions are most opposed to each
other by considering which are the most opposed beliefs that may
be entertained on a subject,
Having said that for a word to be significant means that it stands
for a thing, or points to the existence of a thing, it will be useful to
consider what Aristotle means by 'thing*. The scope of the term is
clearly very broad. We are told that we use words instead of things,
and that there is a boundless number of things, all of which may be
signified by words (SE i65%-~i3). These things will include items of
every sort. Even 'goat-stag' signifies something, he points out
(i6ai6£). Since 'goat-stag' is a significant word, and not a mere
jumble of meaningless syllables, there must be a thing to corre-
spond to it. The thing in this case is a fabulous one and not a real
one, but it is a thing for all that.
Whatever its nature, however, one restriction must inevitably
hold of any 'thing' which can be signified by language. This is that
the thing must be a single unit. We see this requirement in
Metaphysics r. Signification must be definite, not vague (Mete, F,
ioo6*34f£), and must come in distinct units: a word must signify one
thing or a limited number of things. 'Not to signify a single thing is
not to signify anything at ail' (Mete, r, ioo6b7).M In the Z>e
27
For a discussion of this line, see Chap. 2. Sect, ^ below.
"* See Appendix 1.
Interpretation we see that an assertion must assert, or, as Aristotle

says, signify, a single thing about a single thing (i8*i2f,, I9b6f£), So,
whether the thing in question is a substance, a quality, quantity, or
anything else, it must be a single thing, to which a single word can
be assigned. Even the goat-stag would have to be a single thing in
order to be an object of signification. Non-existence does not dis-
qualify it from being signified, whereas vagueness and indefinite-
ness would,
While considering Aristotle's views on signification, it is worth
observing that signification is not the only semantic function which
words may fulfil. In the Poetics, only four of the eight parts of
speech defined are significant (Poet. I456b2off.). The other four
include letters and syllables, but also conjunctions and prepositions,
which do not stand for things, as significant words do, but perform
other functions, such as joining two assertions into one. Further, in
the De Interpretatione we see that verbs not only signify, but have
an 'additional signification*, which does not involve pointing to a
thing, but indicating that the thing pointed to holds of a subject,
and when it holds. The interesting nature of this conception of the
verb will become clear later. This first passage of the treatise estab-
lishes important principles concerning the relation of significant
utterances, thoughts, and things, which underlie the rest of the
work, and serve as a starting-point for the discussion of names and
verbs.
2. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD (16*9-18)
The section of chapter i discussed above contains a short discus-

sion of the relation between writing, significant utterances, the
thoughts which they express, and the things which they signify,
set out in general terms. Starting from these broad comments,
Aristotle's analysis of significant utterances descends into progres-
sively greater detail. In the second part of the chapter, he moves
on to discuss complex utterances and thoughts as contrasted with
simple ones, and to introduce the issue of truth and falsehood. At
16*9 the distinction between the simple and complex is introduced.
This applies to thoughts as well as to spoken utterances,2* Simple
thoughts and utterances are 'without truth and falsehood', while
3
Cf. Mela. 8, !05ib3-8-
complex thoughts and utterances of a certain kind must be either

true or false. He goes on to explain that truth and falsehood are to
do with combination and division (16*12), which, he implies, are
found only in the case of complex thoughts and utterances, and not
simple onea
Names and verbs (ovd/tara and frtftara) are examples of simple
utterances, and resemble 'thoughts without combination or divi-
sion' (i6*i3f.). Examples are 'man' and 'pale', which are neither
true nor false,'if nothing is added'. A further example is given; even
'goat-stag* signifies something, but is not true or false, unless 'to be'
or 'not to be' is added. If there were such a thing as a false name,
'goat-stag' might seem a good candidate, since it signifies something
which does not exist.30 However, truth is not the same as significa-
tion. Names are simple, and do no more than signify things. In order
to form an utterance which is true or false, it would be necessary
to make a claim about the goat-stag, such as 'the goat-stag exists,'
rather than just mention it. What is not complex cannot be true or
false.31 We may compare what is said in chapter 10 about the for-
mation of the most basic affirmation and negation. There can be no
assertion without a verb, and the most basic consists of a name with
'is' or 'is not' added (i9bi2-i9).
Aristotle explains his comment that simple thoughts and utter-
ances do not possess truth value by saying that 'truth and falsehood
are to do with combination and division* (i6ai2fc). No explanation
is provided here as to what he means by combination and division,
though clearly the issue of combination and division must be
closely connected with that of truth and falsehood, and will account
for why it is that thoughts and utterances require complexity in
order to attain truth value. Fortunately, we find in other works a
full account of the theory of combination and division, which
entirely illuminates the passage at hand. In Metaphysics £4, we find
the statement that truth and falsehood are to do with combination
and division repeated, using nearly the same words (Mete, E,
i027bi8-25). He goes on to say that in the case of something com-
bined, the affirmation is true and the negation false, while in the
case of something divided the negation is true and the affirmation
false. A true affirmation corresponds to a combination of things in
* See Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, 114.

31
Ct Cat. 2'4-io.
the world: things are combined in a certain way, and the true affir-
mation asserts truly that they are so combined. A false affirmation
asserts the combination of things which are in fact divided.
Similarly, if things are divided, a true statement about them will be
a negation, asserting that they are separated, and a false statement
the affirmation which falsely asserts their combination. Truth con-
sists in correctly matching combination and division in thought or
utterance with the combination and division in things. In an affir-
mation, a subject and predicate are represented as combined, and
in a negation they are shown as divided front each other.
Combination and division, then, are features of the world, which
thoughts and statements represent either truly or falsely. The defi-
nitions of truth and falsehood in Metaphysics r are consistent with
this view, though more superficial and less helpful. There, truth is
defined as saying that what is is or that what is not is not, and false-
hood as saying that what is not is or that what is is not (Meta. F,
ioiib25~7).These definitions introduce the idea of a true assertion
matching the way things are and a false one failing to match,
without making clear what feature or aspect of the world it is that
an assertion either succeeds in matching or fails to match. The
definitions in terms of combination and division make up this
deficiency.
The theory appears again in chapter 10 of Metaphysics &
(i05ia34~bi7), A true thought is a thought that what is combined
is combined or that what is divided is divided, while a false thought
represents the things as being the opposite to the way they are.32
la both Metaphysics £4 and 0io, Aristotle discusses being true as
one of the senses in which something may be said to be. The same
point is also made in Metaphysics A? (roi7a3i~s). In this sense of
being, being is being true, or compounded, and not-being is being
false, or divided. This notion incorporates the traditional associa-
tion between being and unity in Greek thought. 'To be is to cohere,
and be one; not to be is to fail to cohere, and instead to be many*
(Meta. 0,105ibn ft).33There are thus real nonentities in the world.
32
It is consistent with this view that. Aristotle should speak of an affirmation as
asserting 'something of something' (nvitg xma ro/of), and a negation as asserting
'something away from something* (twos Aao m>o$, De Int. 17*25!.: ct APr. 47ll3),
33
For olher references to being as being compounded, see SE I50b22; 151*20-32;
Ph. i88bi8; Meta. Ill, iO43*i8tt Ct Ph. 2*5*20, where we are again told that one of
the senses of not being is that to do with combination or division,
These things are separations of existent simples: if Socrates is not

sitting, then the simples Socrates and sitting are existent, but are
separated from each other, so as not to cohere as a compound
entity. Their separation constitutes a nonentity (/«) <5v).
Combinations are also referred to as true things, and separations
as false things. In this sense, truth and falsehood are real features
of the world. This is the first sense of falsehood to be introduced in
the discussion of falsehood in Metaphysics &,2f),m Aristotle then
divides this sense of falsehood as separateness into two subsidiary
senses. First, there is that which cannot be combined, and which is
always false, such as the eommensurability of the diagonal.
Secondly, there is that which is not combined, but is only false
sometimes, such as the fact that you are sitting, supposing that at
the moment you are not sitting (Mete. Azg, 1024^7-21).35 This divi-
sion matches the distinction between the necessary and contingent.
Both kinds of false things are nonentities (OVK ona). False things
are thus divided things, or things which 'are not', so that one sense
of truth and falsehood amounts to the being and not-being of things
(c£ Mete. E2t load^-^).3* Only compound things can be true or
false: the being of simple entities cannot be to do with being com-
pounded, Aristotle argues (Meta, 0, 105ib 17ft); nor could some-
thing simple be separated or false. Simple things cannot, therefore,
be true or false (io5ib2i).37
The truth or falsehood of thoughts and assertions depends on the
M
A statement in Mete, £4 would seem to conflict with the view that there are
true and false things (io27b25). The context, however, makes this statement clear,
In this chapter, Aristotle is approaching the study of being qua being (i<B8s3f,). He
therefore wishes to dismiss from Ms investigation the senses of being to do with
being an accident, and to do with combination and separation (1027*1711, 33!.).
Neither introduces a new kind of basic entity in addition to the categories (1028*1 £},
Accordingly, at the opening of Meta, Z, following directly on this chapter, Aristotle
only lists as senses of being the senses of the categories. Ct Meta. A?, where, although
the senses of being dismissed in Mete. £4 are included, only the senses of the cate-
gories are cases of being 'in itself (1017*22 £). See F. Brentano, On the Several Senses
of Being in Aristotle, R. George (tr.) (Berkeley, 1975),
35
For the same distinction, see Meta. 64, 1047*13 if.
34
Aristotle goes on to define a second sense in which things may be said to be
false, which must not be confused with this one. A shadow-picture or a dream is
false, but this does not mean that the dream 'is not*, just that it appears to he other
than it is (Mete. loz^zi-^).
*7 Furthermore, simple things are actually, and never potentially (io5ib28): for a
simple to come to be, it would have to come from nothing. We see that passing from
potentiality to actuality involves passing from dividedness to combination, or from
not-being to being. Cf. Ph. i88"i«.
truth and falsehood, or combination and separation, of the things

in the world, A sentence is true because things are as it represents
them to be: 'it is not that you are pale because I truly think that
you are pale' (iO5ib6ft). For this reason, the sense of truth and
falsehood as applied to thoughts and sentences is secondary, and
is not mentioned until some way through Metaphysics ^29, the
chapter on falsehood (i024b26f£). Just as simple things cannot be
combined or separated, or, in other words, true or false, so think-
ing of a simple cannot be true or false either. Thinking of a simple
thing is like touching it: if we fail to touch a simple with our thought,
then we are not in error concerning it, as we would be if we had a
false belief about it. Want of success in thinking about simples is
not falsehood or error, but unawaretiess. Similarly, a thought of a
simple is not true, as a true belief would be (io5ib22),3SIn language,
names and verbs correspond to simple thoughts (De Int. i6ai3). Just
as the simple thoughts are without combination or division (16*14),
and are thoughts of indivisibles (De An. 430a26), names and verbs
signify definite single things, and are not composed of parts which
signify separately (De Int. i632off.).
We also find an account of what it means for simple thoughts to
enter into a compound one. In a compound thought, the thinker
thinks of some simples either together, in. an affirmative belief, or
apart' in a negative one (Meta. £4, iO27b23~5; De An. 43Oai6-b2),
This does not mean that someone who believes that Socrates is not
walking thinks of Socrates, and then separately thinks of walking,
Rather, he thinks a single thought, but thinks of Socrates and
walking as divided. The thinker separates two thoughts, but in a
single act of thinking. Thus, while affirmative thoughts are seen as
combinations and negative ones as divisions, both can also be said
to be combinations, since they are compounded of simple thoughts:
falsehood is only possible in a compound (DeAn. 43obi £). A nega-
tive thought is a belief about a subject and a predicate, and so must
incorporate both, even though the content of the belief is that the
two are separated,
We thus see that Aristotle has a coherent and developed theory
of truth and falsehood as having to do with the combination
and separation. This theory is of great importance to the De
38
Making contact with a simple using thought or language may be spoken of as
true (Mew. losi^); this is, however, a different sense of troth
fnterpretatione, which will be closely concerned with the truth value

of various sorts of assertions. To sum up, the theory states that true
assertions represent a combination as combined or a separation as
separated, while false assertions represent a combination as sepa-
rated or a separation as combined. We need to note in addition
Aristotle's use of truth and falsehood to apply to the states of
affairs which assertions describe truly or falsely. We see this usage
in all four chapters discussed above. A true thing is one which is
combined, and a false one is one which is separated. It follows that
truth and falsehood in this sense may apply only to complex things
and not to simple ones. Examples would be the following. The fact
that grass is green is a true thing: it is the case that greenness and
grass are combined. To this, there corresponds a true assertion:
'grass is green.' That grass is pink, on the other hand, is a false thing.
There is no combination of these two simples, only a separation,
and hence a false thing. Corresponding to the true affirmation
asserting the combination of grass with greenness we now have the
false affirmation 'grass is pink.'
It is also possible to make true assertions concerning false things
and false assertions concerning true things. So, when Aristotle says
that a false assertion is of what is not (Meta. A, I024b26f.), he means
that it asserts to be the case that which is not the case. The false
negation 'grass is not green* asserts the reality of a separation of
two elements which are in fact combined, or, we could say, asserts
the falsehood of something which is true. Since the claim which it
makes does not match reality, it is false. Similarly, pinkness and
grass may be correctly identified as separated, or, in other words,
that grass is pink may be truly asserted to be a false thing, in the
negation 'grass is not pink.'
We now need to go on to examine the case of goat-stag.3'We are
told that 'goat-stag* is not true or false unless 'is' or 'is not' is added
(De Int, 16*16). Since no goat-stags exist, we would expect Aristotle
to mean that 'goat-stag is* is false, while 'goat-stag is not* is true.
Since truth and falsehood are to do with combination and separa-
tion, one explanation would be to say that the error in 'goat-stag
is' lies in claiming that goats and stags cohere as a single entity. This
would be to take goat-stag to be itself complex: it would be like the
y!
For a general study of the goat-stag, see G. SiUitti, Tragelaphos, Elenchos, 2
(Naples, 1980),
fact that grass is pink, a non-existent compound of elements which

never come together. This view might seem tempting. We are told
in Metaphysics © that there are no non-existent simples. Simples
are always actual, are not composed of parts, and so are never sep-
arated, potential, or non-existent (Meta. &io, io5ib28). Non-exis-
tent things are complex, since they consist of separations of simples.
So, since the goat-stag does not exist, it cannot be
simple. Its non-existence would then consist in the fact that goat
and stag nowhere unite as a single thing, although there are goats
and stags.40
However, this solution will not work. The sense of being under
discussion in Metaphysics & is to do with states of affairs, that is,
combinations of predicates with subjects. Goat-stag is not a state
of affairs, and 'goat-stag is' does not assert that a goat is a stag.
Goat-stag is not a false thing in the sense which we have seen
above; it is merely a non-existent thing, Furthermore, goat-stag is
introduced as an example of a simple: it furnishes an example of a
name which by itself has no truth value. What then of the statement
that there are no non-existent simples? There are certainly no
simples which fail to exist by virtue of being separated, since what
is simple has no parts, and so cannot be split up. This point is made
in Metaphysics Bio,
Alternatively, does 'goat-stag is' assert a combination of goat-
stag with being? This interpretation is offered by Boethius.41 There
are two difficulties with this view. First, Aristotle does not regard
being as a single thing: it is not the substance of anything, and is
not a genus.42 Secondly, we need to account for why it is that asser-
tions formed by the addition of the verb 'to be' to a name are
treated in chapter 10 as primitive (1^14-1^), while assertions con-
taining a name and a verb such as 'walks' are dealt with as a sepa-
rate class, after those containing the copula (2Oa3 ff.). Being, in other
words, is not treated as a normal predicate like walking: to assert
that something is is the most basic claim which can be made about
* The goat-stag or sphinx are nowhere (Ph. 208*30).

41
According to Boethius, when I say 'Socrates is not' I have separated being from
Socrates, just as when I say 'Socrates is not a philosopher' i have separated being a
philosopher from Socrates (Boethius, Commenlarii in librum Aristotelis FJe@i
eg/ntvetaf* C. Meiser (ed.) (Leipzig, 1877-80), 49. 18-23),
42
See APo. 92" 13 f., and G. E. L, Owen, 'Aristotle and the Snares of Ontology', in
J. R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, (London, 1965), 69-75,
repr. in G. E, L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic (London, 1986), 259-78.
it (i6b2ff., 17*11ft, I9bi3ff,). In order to find a sense of being in

which it is true to say that man is, and false to say that goat-stag is
not, we must look to the sense of being which is distributed
throughout the categories, beginning with substance, and applying
to each category in a different sense (Meta, 24, 1030" 18-27). We
only need to look as far as the category of substance to find a sense
to suit both man and goat-stag. The claim that man is is the claim
that man is a substance (cf. Meta. H2,1043a2~4): 'goat-stag is a sub-
stance' is a sensible claim to make concerning goat-stag, and it is
also false. The sense of 'is' in 'goat-stag is' is therefore, I propose,
the 'is' which applies to the categories.43 This is because, if the goat-
stag did exist, it would be a substance, Thus, every name will yield
an assertion if 'is' is added to it (i6b3f,), and the sense of being
which is asserted depends on the category of the thing in question.
This use of the verb 'to be' is distinct from the copulative use which
emerges in chapters 2 and 3, and which asserts a combination or
separation of subject and predicate. The copula can only form an
assertion if both a predicate and subject are indicated by other
words in the assertion; by itself it has no content, and so could not
form an assertion if it were added to a name, without the addition
of a word to indicate the predicate (iS^f,),44
Having investigated the theory which Aristotle invokes in the
second part of chapter i, we may now turn to the structure of the
closing passage (i&ai3~i8). These lines give two illustrations in
support of the view that names and verbs are simple and without
truth value. According to the traditional view, the illustrations work
as follows. 'Man' and 'pale* are first given as examples of simple
words: they are neither true nor false if nothing is added to them.
Aristotle then says, 'and it [or there] is a sign of this' (aqftetov 6'sail
rovde, i6ai6), which is rendered as 'there is evidence of this,' and
goes on to give the second illustration: even 'goat-stag' signifies
something, but is not true or false unless 'is' or 'is not' is added in
some tense. The sequence of thought here is odd. First two exam-
ples of simple words are given, which are by themselves neither
true nor false. Then we are told to expect evidence of this, but in
fact a further example is presented of exactly the same thing. If we
have two illustrations of the same point, it is odd for Aristotle to
*J For a further discussion of this point, see Chap. 10 below.
44
The copulative sense of the verb 'to be' is, however, related to the being of the
categories. See APr. 49*6-10 and Meta. A?, 101:7*22-30,
call the second one evidence for the first. Furthermore, the Greek
does not bear this interpretation happily. 'This* (rode) normally
refers forward.45 Expressions such as 'and there is evidence'
(mjftetov 6e), followed by an explanation (introduced by yog), are
indeed common, but the forward-referring 'this' (rode) is not
found.4*
Another interpretation is possible, by punctuating with a comma
instead of a full stop after 'it is not yet false or true' (i6ai6).47
Aristotle would then be adding to his first illustration the comment
that the words 'man* and 'pale' are signs of a particular thing, or of
this: 'for it is not yet false or true, but it is a sign of Ms.' This would
correspond to the comment that the goat-stag signifies something,
and the two illustrations would follow each other smoothly, the
second supporting the same point as the first, but with an
even stronger example. We often see the word 'this' (rode) in the
deictic sense of 'this particular thing'.48 In Metaphysics T we find a
closely related word (rodt) used in speaking of the signification of
words. A word signifies being or not being this (Mete ioo6a3o),This
covers names, such as 'man', and indefinite names, such as 'not-
man'. In either case, the signification must be tied to a this. In the
Posterior Analytics 'triangle' signifies this (rode aijftaivei,APo. 71*15;
cf. De Int. 20^30). As we have learnt, to signify is to be a sign of a
thing. The things which 'man' and 'pale* are of are here
referred to using the deictic pronoun, as if pointing out the thing
signified.
On this interpretation, the passage at 16*13-18 would assume a
highly symmetrical structure, which might be set out as follows:
1. Names and verbs are like thoughts without combination and
division,
2, [First illustration] like 'man' and 'pale', which,
(a) if nothing is added,
(b) are not yet either true or false,
(c) and are signs of a this:
45
See, e.g., De Int. 20*10; Rhet. i^trj^fi. At Top. I32a23f. it is used twice, appar-
ently once referring back and once forward, but the text here may be corrupt,
* We find in some passages a different word for 'this*, which can refer back
(oryitiov H Tovtav, and not rovie). See, e.g., APo. 87bi, Meteorology 350*28; and
Waltz,
47
Aristolelis Organon, i. 327.
I am indebted to David Sedley for suggesting this interpretation.
48
See, e.g., j4ft>.77*i;GC3i7 l> 9, 21,28; Atoa.Z, 10^24, Meta, A, io69bn.
3. [Second illustration] for even 'goat-stag'
(a) signifies something,
(6) but is not yet true or
(c) unless 'is' or 'is not' is added, either simply or with time.
The three clauses under the second iEustration correspond to
those under the first, occurring in reverse order. Both illustrations
support the point that simple words are neither true nor false, and
that truth value would only follow with the addition of something,
that is, some verb. While these simple words are neither true nor
false, they do signify something. This point is made in both illus-
trations, though in slightly different words, 'Man' and 'pale' stand
for a this, that is, some real thing which may be designated. Goat-
stag is introduced as an extreme example to choose; 'even goat-stag
signifies something' (aypawei n). This is perhaps a more cautious
claim: since the goat-stag does not exist, Aristotle does not commit
himself to saying that it is a sign of a Ms; nevertheless, the word is
meaningful. Just as it is not meaningless, it is not false: it is not a
one-word assertion, and so can have no truth value.
We may now look back briefly on chapter i, before going on.The
first part of the chapter sets out in general terms the relation
between writing, speech, thought, and things, while the second part
introduces a distinction between simple and complex utterances
and thoughts, and so allows the notions of truth and falsehood to
be brought in. This first chapter deals briefly with important issues
which underlie the rest of the treatise. Later chapters will contain
detailed studies of contradictory pairs of assertions. Before
Aristotle can go on to this, he must explain how assertions work,
and to do this he must define the name and verb, and show how
they combine together to form compound utterances which are
either true or false. The outline of this project is seen in chapter i,
where the name and verb are distinguished from complex utter-
ances. He is now ready to go on to define the name and verb, which
is the task of the next two chapters.
3
Chapter 2-3: The Name and Verb
i. THE STRUCTURE OF CHAPTERS 2 AND 3

We have already seen Aristotle discuss the nature of significant
speech, and mark its relation to the thoughts which it expresses and
the things which it signifies. We have seen, also, that significant
utterances may be either complex or simple, complex utterances
being built up from simple elements, namely names and verbs. In
the main body of the treatise, discussion will concentrate on a par-
ticular type of complex utterance, that is, the assertion. According
to Aristotle, in order to understand how assertions work, it is
necessary first to understand how they are composed, and how
their elements function: they cannot be treated as atoms, whose
internal structure does not matter. As we have seen, to affirm is to
claim that simple things are combined, and to deny is to claim that
they are separated. Thus, the next stage in the exposition is to intro-
duce the two types of simple significant utterance which are used
to stand for these simple things. These simple utterances are the
name and verb (Svo/ia and §»P«)-1 Chapter 2 is devoted to the
name, and chapter 3 to the verb; each chapter begins with a defin-
ition, which is then elucidated, point by point. The two chapters
have a closely parallel structure, which may be set out as follows;
Chapter 2; The Name

A t . The definition of the name (significant utterance, conventional,
without time, no part signifies separately) (16*19-21)
1
I translate the first of these terms (ovona) as 'name' rather than 'noun* in order
to avoid the Implication thai it corresponds to the modem grammatical category of
the noun. We shall see that the term covers adjectives as well as nouos. Further, a
verb uttered by itself signifies something and is a'name' (16*19 £). 'Name*, or even,
in this context, 'word' are better translations than 'noun'. The second term (<frftKa),
on the other hand, does correspond closely enough to the modern 'verb* to make
that the best translation. It does not mean 'predicate* or 'description', as we shall
see.
Bj. Elucidation of the definition

(i) no part signifies separately (16*21-6)
(ii) conventional (i6a26-9)
Q. The indefinite name (16*29-32)
Dj. The inflexion of a name (i6a32~b5)
Chapter 3: The Verb

A2, The definition of the verb (signifies time in addition, no part
signifies separately, sign of things said of something else)
(i6"6f.)
B2, Elucidation of the definition
(i) signifies time in addition (i6b8f,)
(ii) said of something else (i6h9f.)
C2. The indefinite verb (i6bi 1-15)
D2, The inflexion of a verb (i6bi6-i8)
E2. By themselves, verbs are names (i6bi9~2s)
The elucidations are systematically arranged. The definition of

the name contains four points. It is first defined as being a signifi-
cant sound; by implication, this applies also to the verb, which, when
uttered by itself, is a name (16^19). The relation in which significant
speech stands to thoughts and things has been covered in chapter
i, and the term 'significant utterance' (16*19) receives no further
explicit treatment,
The name is, secondly, conventional {xaia awOtpajv, i6°i9). This
too applies to verbs as well as to names: we have already seen that
utterances are distinguished from thoughts in that the former are
not the same for everyone, and are conventional tokens for
thoughts and things. Convention is now introduced more explicitly,
and is explained later in the chapter, where significant utterances
are contrasted with the inarticulate noises of beasts, which com-
municate by nature rather than by convention (i6326-9).
The third point in the definition is that names are 'without time'.
This serves to differentiate the name from the verb, and the point
is left unexplained until chapter 3, where it is explained how a verb
carries an additional signification of time, while a name does not
(i6b8£). The fourth point, like the first two, applies also to the
verb. This final point states that no part of a name signifies sepa-
rately. Names and verbs are the smallest significant units of speech:
Chapters 2-3: The Name 7
they are the elements of significant utterances, into which larger

utterances are to be analysed. While, considered as sounds, they are
divisible into letters and syllables, considered as units of meaning
they are indivisible. This part of the definition is explained later in
the chapter (16*21-6).
The definition of the verb contains three points: the verb signi-
fies time in addition, no part of it signifies separately, and it is a sign
of things said of something else,2 The first and third points are
explained in chapter 3 (i6b8-io); the second point is shared with
the definition of the name, and is explained in chapter 2, Thus, the
two chapters fit neatly together, and, with the exception of signifi-
cation, which is dealt with in chapter r, what is left unexplained by
one chapter is covered by the other. For this reason, it will aid
understanding to tackle the chapters together.
In each chapter, after the definition and its point-by-point eluci-
dation, two categories of expression are introduced which are not
to be included as names or verbs. These are the indefinite name and
verb, and the inflexion of a name and verb. It will be necessary to
discuss how Aristotle views these expressions, and why they are
bracketed off into separate groups. Chapter 3 concludes with a
section making the point that, by themselves, verbs are names. This
final section draws the two chapters together. The definitions show
that the name and verb have in common that they are conventional
significant utterances, which cannot be divided into smaller signifi-
cant parts. The verb is distinguished by having an additional signi-
fication of time, and by signifying something which holds of
something else. The final section of the chapter argues that, when
a verb is uttered by itself, these functions do not operate, and it is
a mere name (i6 b i9fc). Having considered the structure of the two
chapters, we may now go through them in more detail,
2. SIMPLE AND COMPOUND WORDS (i6"20-6)
In both the definitions of the name and of the verb it is stated that
no part of the word signifies separately (i6a2ot, i6b6f.).The point
2
The symmetry of the chapters, with definitions followed by explanations, sug-
gests that the additional clause 'and it is a sign of something said of something else1
(16'"?) should be a part of the definition of the verb. It receives its explanation at
16*91 For this reason, Bekkers comma at i&f seems preferable to Minio-Paluelo's
colon.
is explained in chapter 2, so that the one discussion does duty both

for names and verbs, which we might simply term words. For
Aristotle, words are the simple elements out of which complex
utterances, including assertions, are constructed. Something coin-
pound must contain elements, and these must be simple. It is an
important part of his theory of how utterances work to show that
names and verbs have no separately significant parts, and are in-
capable of possessing truth value. We have already been told that
even 'goat-stag' is not true or false: this might the most likely
candidate of all for a false name, since it appears to contain some
complexity, and is the name of something non-existent. Mere words
cannot be true or false, however, since this would require the predi-
cation of one thing of something else, and the possession of sep-
arately significant parts is a prerequisite for this. We now see
Aristotle arguing that no words, not even compound ones, have the
semantic complexity which would allow the possession of truth
value,3
In order to resist the view that there are words with significant
parts, he tackles the case of compound words, whieh seem the most
likely to have significant parts, if any words do. He may then leave
it to follow a fortiori that simple words are not divisible into mean-
ingful parts either. A name is defined as having no part which 'sig-
nifies separately' (i6a2of.). He therefore sets out to show that not
even a compound name has parts which signify in their own right.
A compound name is thus to be distinguished from a phrase, which
contains separately significant words as parts. As examples of these
two types of expression we are presented with a proper name,
meaning literally 'Fair-horse' (KdJJiuaios), and the two-word phrase
'fair horse' (xcdog &wr<?ff). The former is compounded of the two
words which make up the latter; the former, however, does not have
separately significant parts, while the latter does.
We must address the question of why it is that what appear to
be the same elements, that is, 'fair' and 'horse', are separately sig-
nificant in one context and not the other. An approach taken by
some commentators has been to point out that the constituents of
the compound word and those of the phrase are not, in fact, exactly
3
Again, Aristotle is at odds with Plato's Cratybu. In that work, Plato mounts a
huge project of showing how words have been Conned by being compounded from
others. Apparently simple words are thus treated on the analogy of obviously com-
pound ones (Oat 3998-0),
Chapters 2-y The Name and Verb 39
the same. Both the Greek words for 'fair' and 'horse' are modified
when they enter the compound name, the former by the
doubling of a letter and the dropping of its inflexional ending, and
the latter by the dropping of the rough breathing or aspiration.
Both words also undergo a change in their accentuation, marking
their tonal pronunciation. We shall need to determine whether
these factors are intended by Aristotle to be relevant to the loss
of signification which the words suffer when they join the
compound.
The interpretation of the next sentence bears on this question.
He now goes on to say that in the compound 'Fair-horse', 'horse'
(amoq) signifies nothing by itself; in the phrase 'fair horse',
however, 'horse' (ataog) is an independent word, and does have its
own separate signification (16*21 £). There arises the question of
whether the Greek word for 'horse' is meant to appear in the same
form in these two contexts. In Aristotle's time, Greek was written
without accents or breathings, so that the two occurrences of'horse'
would have been indistinguishable. With the introduction of
accents and breathings, however, it seems most obvious to read
'horse* without them at its first occurrence (i6a2i), and with them
at its second (i6a22). This difference in accentuation, which is
highlighted in a modern, or indeed medieval, text, has inclined
some commentators to argue that the two are seen as completely
different words, and by this means to account for why Aristotle con-
sidered that one is significant, and the other is not.
This approach is taken by Leo Magentinus and by Aekrill, Leo
Magentinus takes the possession of the proper breathings and
accents as a necessary condition for meaningfulness: 'expressions
with their proper breathings and accents are significant, but without
these they signify nothing.'4 Ackritl follows the same approach, and
thinks of English examples where the parts of a compound word
do not form proper words when separated. So, he argues that the
two elements of 'pirate-boat' do not signify if removed from the
compound, 'assuming that we count "-" as a letter: "pirate-",
"-boat" '.5 Thus, the failure of the first element of 'pirate-boat' to
signify separately while in the compound is attributed to the fact
* Cited by Busse in Ammonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretations Commenfarua,
A. Busse (ed), Commentaria in Aristatelem Graeca, Iv (Berlin, 1,897), xxxvj,
5
J. L, Ackrili, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretalione (Oxford, 1963).
116.
4O Aristotle's De Interpretatione
that 'pirate-', unlike 'pirate', is not a real word. Aekril! also
offers another criterion. If one element of the compound cannot
stand as an independent word, then neither can the other; 'pirate'
ia 'pirateer' is not an independent word because 'er' is not. Both of
these explanations depend on there being parts of compounds
which are not independent words when written by themselves.
As Ackrill says, this approach cannot stretch to all cases, since
there are many compounds both of whose elements can stand
independently.6
On the above view, then, it is the alteration of a word in some
way when it enters a compound which prevents it from being fully
significant. This does not seem adequate to account for the differ-
ence in meaning, though. The loss of an accent or the appearance
of a hyphen might be a consequence of the combination of words
into a compound, but there seems no reason why it should bring
about a change in meaning. If we bear in mind that Aristotle wrote
without using accents or breathings, and that the two occurrences
of horse' would have looked exactly the same in the text as he first
wrote it, a different interpretation suggests itself He might then be
saying that 'in "Fair-horse" "horse" signifies nothing in itself, as it
does in the phrase "fair horse" ' (i6a2i f.). According to this view,
'horse* is seen as the same utterance in both cases, the difference
in accent and breathing being merely incidental, and not apparent
in the written text. Aristotle would not then mean that the word
without its breathing and accent could have no meaning anywhere,
but that 'horse' has no independent signification as a part of the
compound word 'Fair-horse', but does as a part of the phrase 'fair
horse".
According to this interpretation, the illustration would directly
support Aristotle's view that every word, even a compound one,
has its own signification, so that, once a word becomes an element
in a compound, it loses the independent signification which it pos-
sessed while it stood by itself. We shall see in the next few lines that,
while an element in a compound has no independent signification,
it does not cease to signify altogether, but, contributes to the signi-
fication of the whole.
We must now ask what it means to say that an element of the
* His example is 'bookcase'. In Greek, ixifytvetv is composed of two elements

which can each stand as separate words without any change in accent or breathing.
Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 41
compound has no signification 'in itself (naff avrd, i6a2i).

According to the interpretation of Leo Magentinus, when Aristotle
says that a part signifies nothing separately or in itself, he would be
saying that it means nothing even if removed from the compound.
We have seen, however, that these terms refer not to the removal
of parts from the compound, but the presence of parts in it. This
is observed by Aekrill, although he follows Leo Magentinus in
explaining the lack of signification of the parts of a compound in
terms of the alteration in their form. Aristotle's point, then,
in saying that 'horse* in 'Fair-horse* does not signify by itself, or in
its own right, is not that if removed from the compound it would
be found not to be a real word, but that while part of the compound
it is not a word, as it would be if it appeared by itself. A compound
word, unlike a phrase, does not have independent words as its
parts.
To be an independent word is to have a separate, identifiable sig-
nification; the two words in the phrase 'fair horse' have this, unlike
any part of 'Fair-horse'.7 'Horse' in 'Fair-horse* is not an indepen-
dent word, and does not signify 'in itself. Does this mean that it
does not signify at all, or does Aristotle merely deny to it the full
signification of an independent word? Ammonius takes the defi-
nition of the name to mean that no part of any word is significant
at all. He points out that, in the compound, 'horse' does not signify
the animal: names signify things, and 'horse' does not do that when
it is part of the compound. 'It becomes,' he says, 'as it were, dead
with regard to signifying, and indistinguishable from entirely mean-
ingless syllables.' The parts of compound words may have an appar-
ent signification, but in fact no part of any word signifies at all.8
According to this view, the difference between simple and com-
pound words is only a matter of appearances, and in reality no word
has any significant parts at all.
7
Arens and Aekrill both lament Aristotle's choice of a proper name as an
example, on the grounds that its signification has nothing to do with the compo-
nents of the word (H. Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition
(Amsterdam, 1984), 41; Aekrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, H?).
This criticism seems strange. A name can be appropriate or inappropriate: it must
therefore have a meaning which can be tested against the actual character of the
name's bearer. Etymology, or the search for the true nature of something by con-
sideration of its name, could be carried out on proper names as well as ordinary
nouns (see, e.g., Plato, Crat. 3840).
6
Ammonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretations Commentarius 33. 26-34. i-
In fact, Aristotle does draw a real distinction between simple and

compound words regarding the signification of their parts. In the
next few lines it becomes clear that the fact that the parts of com-
pound words do not signify separately, or in their own right, does
not mean that they do not signify in any way. The parts of simple
words do not signify at all (16*24!), and are 'merely voice'
(i6b3i i); in the case of compound words, however, there are parts
which 'tend to signify' (ftovlemi), but do not signify anything sep-
arately (i6a2sf.). We shall consider the sense of 'to tend to' here
shortly. In returning to the issue of simple and compound words in
chapter 4, he is even prepared to say that the parts of compound
words signify, but not in their own right (i6b32 £). The definition of
the name only stated that no part was separately significant, not
that no part was significant at all. The term 'separately' therefore
qualifies the statement that words do not have significant parts:
they can indeed have significant parts, but not separately significant
onea
The account of simple and compound words found in the Poetics
corroborates this interpretation. The name is defined, and, as in the
De Interpretatwne passage, the first part of the definition to be
explained is that stating that 'no part signifies by itself.* This
involves a treatment of compound names. Here, Aristotle states
that we do not recognize (or, literally, 'use') the parts of compound
words as having their own separate signification (Poet. 20,
1457*12-14). The discussion of compound names continues in the
next chapter, where different kinds of name are classified (Poet. 21,
I457a3itt). Names can first of all be divided into simple and
double, although there can also be threefold, fourfold, or manifold
names. Simple names are those which are not composed of signifi-
cant parts. Double names are of two sorts. They may either be made
of a significant and non-significant part, or of two significant parts.
TJhis distinction provides for the difference between words such as
'unwell* and those such as 'Fair-horse'. No compound, we are
clearly told, has parts which signify when they are part of the com-
pound: the significant part of a compound word is 'not significant
in'the word" (1457*33 £). The difference between the two kinds is
not that 'Fair-horse' contains two significant parts, and 'unwell* only
one: it is that 'fair' is a significant word when used by itself, whereas
'un' is not. This passage further supports the view that Aristotle
sees the difference between the two occurrences of'horse' as being
merely a question of whether they appear as an independent

word or as part of a compound. The signification of the utterance
is thus determined by its context. These passages go against
Ammonias' view that the parts of compound names falsely appear
to signify, but are in fact as far from signifying as the parts of simple
names,
We may now consider what Aristotle means by saying that the
parts of a compound word 'tend to' signify (16*25). Arens follows
Ammonius in his view that no part of any word signifies in any way,
and takes 'tends to' to mean 'pretends to*: according to Arens, the
parts of compound words pretend to have, or have the appearance
of having, their usual meaning, but in fact do not.9 Aristotle does
not say, though, that the parts fail to signify altogether, but that they
do not signify separately, or in their own right: they signify only in
some inferior sense. The verb 'to tend to* (flwAsoQai) is used to
express this idea, and would not be well adapted to convey Arens's
sense of 'pretending to signify'. It will be helpful to consider
Aristotle's use of the term in other contexts, Bonitz sums up one
of its uses as denoting the direction in which something tends by
its nature, even if it does not fully reach it.10 We see the verb used
to express the fixed nature of a thing,11 or a tendency which may
not be realized,12
A word, being the basic element of signification, cannot have
parts which are themselves words, and which have their own in-
dependent meaning within the word of which they are parts.
Compound words differ from simple ones, however, since they have
parts which could stand as independent words. When parts of com-
pounds, they no longer have the full signification of an independent
word, but they do not lose their signification altogether: instead of
signifying 'separately*, or 'in their own right', they seem, to eon-
tribute their signification to that of the whole.13 The example pre-
* Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language, 42.

10
H. Bonitz, Index Aristoteticus (Berlin, 1870).
11
APr. 70*7, 21; Ph. 194*32,212*18, 214*20; De An, 423"i4.
12
CA 778*4; Pol, i254l>27,1:255*3-, el De Sensu 441*3,"
13
Boethius also concluded that the parts of the compound contribute to its
meaning, though, tike Leo Mageniinus, he is mistaken about what Aristotle means
by separation. According to him, the element tends to signify when in the com-
pound, but if removed from it signifies nothing (Boethius, Commentarii inAristotelis
riegi %»»ji's'af, C. Metser (ed.) (Leipzig, 1877-80), 58), He speaks of the elements of
the compound 'jointly signifying* ('consignificare') the singie meaning expressed by
seated in chapter 4 supports this view (i6b3i f.), 'Mice' (MY2) is a

simple word; 'ice' (YZ), however, which is a part of it, happens to
be able to stand as an independent word." Since 'mice' is not a
compound, though, 'ice' does not contribute its meaning to it, and
so counts as being in no way significant,
This view of the formation of a compound word from simple
ones may be compared to the theory of combination found in the
De Generations et Corruptions and the Meteorology, The con-
stituents out of which a compound is formed may not actually be
present in the compound, though they are not destroyed, and can
be formed again if the compound is dissolved (GC 327b23 ff.). The
constituents only exist independently when in separation from the
compound; once combined, they coalesce. Examples of these
homogeneous bodies are flesh and bone. They consist of the four
elements, but what they are is determined by their essence and
function. Flesh is flesh because of its role in the body: it is not Just
several of the elements mixed together (Meteorology 3%b23 ff.),
Despite the fact that the elements are not actually present in
the compound, they may still contribute their properties to the
character of the homogeneous body. Thus, blood is made up of
earth and water, and this accounts for its heat (Meteorologv
389b7 off.
We see here a theory closely parallel to the theory of compound
words. In both cases, the constituents of the compound have their
own independent existence when found in separation. Earth and
water are independent bodies with their own characteristics, as
'horse' is a separate word with its own signification. In combina-
tion, the constituents lose their identity, and, in a way, disappear:
earth and water are only potentially present in blood, and 'Pair-
horse' (Kallmnog) contains no such independent word as 'horse*
{mnoc,), even though the same letters are present. Blood has its own
essence and properties, and 'Fair-horse* its own signification. In
both cases, however, the constituents continue to contribute their
the compound as a whole; for Ammonips, on the other hand, the syllables of any
word combine in producing the signification of the whole, and so 'jointly signify*
(avamitta&>eo>), so that there is no difference between simple words and compound
ones regarding the signification of their parts (Ammonius, In Aristoidis De
Interprclationc Commentarius, 32, 30-3).
14
I write the Greek in capitals in order to avoid adding misleading accents and
breathings. Ackrill's English equivalents {'mice* and 'ice') capture the example
well.
original attributes to the compound, even though they are not

present as full, independent units.
In this passage we have seen Aristotle explaining what it is for
an utterance to count as a word. He still maintains that there are
no words which have parts with a separate signification: there are,
however, words whose parts tend to signify, or contribute to the sig-
nification of the whole, without having the independent significa-
tion only possible in a free-standing word. This view is embodied
in the definition of the name, according to which no part of a word
is separately significant.
3. HUMAN SPEECH AND INARTICULATE

UTTERANCES (i6 a 26~9)
The next section of chapter 2, following the discussion of simple

and compound words, contains an explanation of what it means for
words to be conventional, and distinguishes them from the inarti-
culate utterances of animals. Like the previous section, this discus-
sion should be taken as applying to verbs as well as names. In
explaining what he means by saying that words are by convention,
Aristotle says that no word is by nature: it is only a word when it
becomes a token {ovfiftoXov, 16*28). As we have seen, a word is a
conventional token which signifies by virtue of agreement: people
choose to use it to stand in for a certain thing. In this, words are to
be distinguished from inarticulate sounds, such as those which
animals make in order to communicate with each other. These, too,
'at least show something* (16*28), but they are natural and not
conventional means of expression,15 They are also inarticulate, or,
IS
According to another tradition, we should translate this phrase (wcred avvOrpaiv)
as meaning 'composite', or 'by composition*, rather than 'by convention*. For this
interpretation, see J, Engels, 'Origine, sens et survie du terme boeseien "secundum
placitum*". Vivarium, i (1963), 87-114 and E Lo Piparo, 'Aristotle: The Material
Conditions of Linguistic Expressiveness', Versus: Quaderni di studi semiotici, no.
50-1 (May-Dec. 1988), 83-102. The inspiration for this is perhaps to be found at
Poet i456!>22~5: a letter is an indivisible utterance out of which composite (owfetif)
utterances may be formed. The words used in the two passages (avvfteros and
ovv&pa}) are indeed related. However, the contrast in the Poetics is between the
simple and indivisible elements and the compounds formed out of them; in the De
Interpretations, on the other hand, human language, consisting of tokens, is con-
trasted with utterances which are expressive by nature. It is most natural to take
Aristotle as intending to draw a contrast between nature and convention. The word
for 'convention* (avv9rpaj) had already beeo used in this sense by Plato (Crat.
384di).
4& Aristotle's De Interpretatione
more literally, 'without letters' (16*28 f,), and, Aristotle adds, none
of these sounds is a word (i6a29),To understand this more clearly,
we need to look at other works, and understand the views found
there on articulate and inarticulate utterances.
The difference between voice (fiatvy), sound (ipoôt;) and speech
(dtdlemo^) is discussed in two passages in the History of Animals
(HA 1.1,488*31 ff, and IV, 9,535*27 ff,}. Ax draws from these pas-
sages a hierarchic division in four levels,16 The first level is a divi-
sion of things into those which make a noise and those which do
not (^>00i?Ttxd and ov tfto^nxaj.The specilc difference at this level
is the production of sound, whether vocal or not. Animals which
make no sound at all are included in the latter category. At the
second level things which make a sound are divided into the living
and the non-living, where the non-living include musical instru-
ments, which can be said homonymously to have a voice (De An.
420b6f.). Thirdly, the living can be divided into animals without
voice and those with voice (5<jw aQtova and £<pa tptuvqevra). The,
former are voiceless, though not necessarily noiseless.
Voice is a particular kind of sound, and is distinguished from
other sounds in two ways. First, voice is made by a living thing (De
An. 42Obs). Secondly, it must be made by certain organs (De An,
420bi3f.), The grasshopper, gurnard, scallop, and certain other
animals emit noises using various other parts of their bodies, but
these are not voice." The organs required for voice are lungs and
a windpipe. Air is drawn in through the windpipe, hitting it as it
comes in, so as to produce sound.18 This is the material aspect of
the production of voice. There is also another aspect: the soul is
responsible for voice." Voice accompanies some imagination
(Qavraaia), and is a significant sound (ipo4>o$ arfftavnxog, 420^2 f.).
We would thus expect those animals capable of producing voice
also to have imagination, and this is suggested by another passage
(DeAn. 428*10 £)
16
W. Ax, 'WoQof, 4>oivt) und {feUexrof als Ginndbegriffe aristotelischer
Sprachreflexion', Glossa, 56 (1978), 245-71. See also R. A. Zirin, 'Inarticulate
Noises*, in J, Corcoran (ed.). Ancient Logic and its Modem Interpretation
(Dordrecht, 1974), 23-5.
" HA 535b4W.; De An. 420*1 a ff.
!S
De An. 42ok2ift; ct PA 673*23 ft
" De An. 420*2"! ft Animals which are capable of voice may also produce noise,
and may even produce it with the organs normally involved in the production of
voice: coughing is a noise produced by the tongue (De An, 4zot*3ot).
This seems to conflict with the definitions of the parts of speech

found in the De Interpretatione and Poetics, In the latter work, non-
signifying vocal utterances (<j><oval aaqpoi) are distinguished from
the significant: four of the parts of speech do not signify, while only
the name, verb, inflexion, and phrase (idyog) may be said to signify
(Poet. i456b2of£).The De Interpretatione also implicitly recognizes
the existence of non-signifiying vocal utterances (ifKuvat), by defin-
ing the name as a significant utterance (tfxavif oijftavrua}, i6aig).mln
the De Anima, we see a broad conception of signifying; all voice
may be said to be meaningful. In the stricter sense of signification
employed in the Poetics and De Interpretatione, where Aristotle
analyses the kinds of utterance used in language more closely, a
narrower conception of signification emerges, according to which
only certain classes of words signify.
We shall understand this better by going on to look at the fourth
division which Ax finds, by which animals which have voice are split
into inarticulate animals (£<Sa ajganiima) and those which have
speech (£<{« didlexwv %owa). I choose the word 'speech' as the
best one-word translation here, though we should bear in mind that
so far it has only been denned by opposition to inarticulate utter-
ance: we shall shortly see more clearly what Aristotle means by the
term, whether there are animals besides man which are capable of
this type of utterance, and whether it implies rational content or
not. Speech (6idiexmg) is defined as the articulation of the voice
using the tongue (HA 535*30 £). The differentia here is the articu-
lation (did@0Qtttai$) of the voice, using the lips, tongue, and teeth,21
These organs must have particular characteristics in order for
speech to be produced. The tongue should be broad, soft, and free,22
and the lips should be flexible (PA 660*4 ff.).
7a
Waltz sees the statement that all voice signifies as consistent with De Int. 16*6,
where 'things in the voice' («t «• rf <f>tuvfj) are said to be signs of affections of the
soul. According to Waitz, "the things in the voice' refers to voice in general, not just
words; he cites the definition of voice at HA 535*28 ft The vocal utterances discussed
in De Int. i must, on the contrary, refer to articulate speech consisting of words as
conventional symbols, and cannot include animal noisea See T, Waitz, Aristotelis
Organon Greece (Leipzig, 1844), i, 324,
21
The 'animals capable of speech' are distinguished by their capacity for ar-
ticulate utterance; however, animal noises are only introduced as one example of
inarticulate sounds (De Int. i6**29); certain sounds made by man fall into the same
class of unarticulated voice. The sounds made by children are also like those of
animals (Prob. 902" 19-21; HA 536*4-8).
12
PA 660*17.
This articulation of the voice amounts to the pronunciation of

letters,23 Although these letters are referred to using a word
cognate with the verb 'to write' (yganfiaTa), they are clearly not
written marks, but spoken sounds. Letters are of three kinds,
defined in chapter 20 of the Poetics. Vowels (Qtavrjevm) are vocal
utterances (tpatvai) which can be heard without any contact of the
tongue or lips; semivowels (fmufxava) are also audible utterances,
but involve contact or application (xgoaftoA^); consonants (a^wva)
involve contact, but have no voice in themselves. They become
audible along with letters which have their own voice. Consonants
are made by the meeting of the lips (avfiftolai) and the striking of
the tongue (jiQoaftolai, PA 660*6), and the front teeth also
contribute (66ibi4£).
Articulate and inarticulate sound are distinguished by being
structured or not. Letters (usually referred to as yQaftfuam) are also
the elements (atoi%eta) of articulate speech; they are the elements
out of which it is structured. In the Poetics, a letter is defined as
being an indivisible utterance (<pcuvij); Aristotle hastens to add,
though, that not every indivisible utterance is a letter, but only one
out of which a compound utterance can be formed. The utterances
which animals produce are also indivisible, but they are not el-
ements out of which compound utterances can be formed (Poet,
I456b2off,).
There are thus two kinds of indivisible utterance. Those of the
first sort are the basic elements of compound utterances: they are
indivisible because, though parts of structured, divisible utterances,
they are the smallest units, and division can go no further. Those of
the second sort cannot be elements, however short they may be,
since they are not components of a structured whole, and cannot
be divided into elements, however long they may be. Two senses of
divisibility may be observed here, corresponding to two senses of
part given in Metaphysics A25. In one sense, a part is that into which
any quantity is divided (Meta. 102^12). In another, it is that of
which the whole is composed (i023bi9). In the former sense, animal
sounds are divisible, since a longer bellow can always be divided
into shorter ones. In the latter sense, they are indivisible, since they
are not structured. It is the latter sense which is of importance here
3
PA 660*5, 22- W the tongue is not sufficiently free, a tisp results; that is,
the speaker is not able to produce letters properly (PA 660*26ft); see also Prob,
895*7 ft
in distinguishing the articulate from the inarticulate. Aristotle is

making the same point in speaking of 'indivisible utterances'
(aduuQEiot, (ftotvai) in the Poetics (1456^4), and 'unlettered* or in-
articulate sounds (dyffdfiîami iftdtpot) in the De Interpretatione
(i6*28).24'Indivisible' and 'unlettered' both have the sense 'indivis-
ible into letters'. Complex utterances are oaly possible if they are
structured; mere undifferentiated bellowing cannot be used to
express the complexities of human thought.
We must now ask whether articulate speech is restricted to man
or not. Man has the tongue best suited for speech (PA 660*17 ff-)>25
and in man alone the lips are principally present for the sake of
speech (PA 659*31 ft). Despite this, some other animals do have
some limited power of articulation. Birds are better able to utter
letters than other animals, since they have broader tongues,26 and
are next after man in their ability to utter letters (HA 504*1 ft,).21
Mammals also have some lesser ability of producing articulate
utterance (PA 660*30 ff.).28The ability to make articulate utterances
does not necessarily amount to the ability to produce speech
(didAex-coc;): the articulate utterances of birds are only like speech
(HA 536bi i £), and, while several animals have voice, only man has
speech (HA $36*32 ff.)*9
Birds are certainly able to use their limited ability to articulate
in order to communicate; Aristotle does not just mean that birds
can imitate the sounds which are used in human speech.30 Birds use
24
At De Int. i6aa8. the generic term 'noises' or 'sounds* (yofoi) is used instead
of the more specific 'utterances' (<j>a>vcu). Thus, he contrasts articulate speech with
all inarticulate noise, not just vocal utterances made by animals: coughing, tot
example, would be comprehended under inarticulate noise, but not under voice,
whether articulate or not,
25
These attributes are also necessary for the sense of taste. We may note that
each of the organs used in the production and articulation of voice is used for some
other function, which is described as necessary, while its role in speech is only ever
referred to as good (De An. 42obigff,}. The lips have a similar dual function (PA
&59b27 ft)- Aristotle considered voice and speech to be beneficial to animals, but not
necessary to them.
" PA 660*29; HA 536*20 ft
27
See also Prob. 905*32,
n
CLProb.Sgs'Zl
29
Cf. Prob. 905*20.
* Sextus cites the view that human language cannot be distinguished merely on
the grounds of sound, since certain of the irrational animals, such as parrots and
crows, can make articulate utterances (Sextus Empiricus, Adversity Mathematical 8
275-6). Human language can only be distinguished by its meaning and its com-
plexity. Aristotle grants birds the power to communicate in a sort of language of
articulate utterance to communicate with each other in the wild,

and in some cases actually seem able to teach one another using
their voice (PA 660*35 ff-)-31 Human speech is characterized by
varying from place to place. The author of the Problems states that
this is unique to man: other animals have voice which is standard
for the whole species (Prob. 895as),32 Again, it is birds that come
closest to man in this respect: the calls of some birds do vary, and
can be trained.33
The division between the articulate and the inarticulate is thus
not entirely clear-cut. Several animals approach man in a number
of respects: some birds and mammals manage a fair degree of
articulation. There is a scale of ability, rather than a sharp division,
between man, capable of articulation, and other living things, which
are not. Birds with flat tongues come closest to having speech, but
Aristotle does not say that arty creature besides man is capable of
speech in the full sense: he only says that such birds are able to
speak to a greater degree than other animals, not that they are able
to speak in the proper sense (HA 536a2o). Here I depart from Ax,
who takes this passage to show that the category of the 'animals
having speech* (§<j« dtd&emov %OFTO) includes both man and
certain animals.34 The dichotomy between articulate and inarticu-
late living things proposed by Ax does not match Aristotle's usage,
which defines man as unique in being fully capable of language,
while allowing other animals to share in some degree the attributes
which in their full form belong only to man. This position is an
application of Aristotle's view that other animals often have traces
of human characteristics (HA 588*16 ft).
Man is also unique in being the only creature to possess ration-
ality.35 We read in the Politics that other creatures have mere
voice, which is a sign of what is pleasant or painful; animals can per-
ceive pleasure and pain, and so have a means of signifying this to
each other (Pol. 1253*7 ff.). Man is also able to register good, bad,
their own, not just to imitate human sounds. Cf. Dante, De Vulgari Eloquentia i. 2,
in E. Moore (ed.), Tutte le opere di Dante Alighieri (Oxford, 1904),
31
32
Ct HA 608*17 ff,
See also HA 536*20.
33
In particular, the sounds made by partridges vary (HA 536*11 ff,). Partridges
also resemble man in the effect had on their voice by leeks (Prob, ejoj^ft).
54
Ax, 'Vofos, tjHiiv^ und AidAtxras', 253,
35
DeAn. 428*23!.; HA 536*33 ft; GA 786" 17ft
just, and unjust, and the means of communicating these perceptions

is rational speech (Myog), which is thus linked to the possession of
a rational soul36
Aristotle's position, then, is that articulation and rationality go
together. Properly speaking, man is the only living thing capable of
utterances which are structured out of letters, and which express
thought. Animals, in general, make only inarticulate utterances,
which express pleasure or pain, but not good, bad, just, or unjust.
However, Aristotle has at his disposal the notion of "traces', which
allows him to explain much animal behaviour in terms of a trace
of some capacity only found in its full form in man. Thus, although
some animals have articulation to a limited extent, to be able to
articulate and to be able to express thought in language properly
speaking go together. The word 'speech' (du&sx-cog) is used to refer
to human speech: it implies articulation, and cannot properly be
applied to the sounds of any other creature.
We have seen that the basic units of signification are words:
speech must consist of them if predications are to be made and
thoughts expressed. We now learn that significant voice must be
articulate. In order for there to be a sufficient variety of sounds to
provide an adequate number of words, speech must consist of basic
elements which can occur in different orders: these elements are
letters.'7 Thus, in chapter 2 of the De Interpretations, human speech
is distinguished from animal sounds on the grounds that the former
consists of words, conventional tokens made up of letters, while the
latter is inarticulate, containing neither letters nor words. Animal
sounds can show something, but cannot signify: the verb 'to show'
(dtjiovv) is used here to denote the way in which animal sounds
may express something by natural means, while 'to signify*
is reserved for human utterances, conventional, articu-
late, and rational in content.
36
37
CiProk Sgs'isB.
KreEzraana is therefore right to render 'unlettered' (dygafi/tatof) as 'inarticu-
late*, and Zirin is not inconsistent with him in claiming that it instead denotes
utterances which cannot be resolved into phonemes. See Kretzroann, 'Aristotle
on Spoken Sounds Signiieant by Convention', in Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic,
3-21, and Zirin, 'Inarticulate Noises"; also R. A. Zirin. 'Aristotle's Biology of
Language*, Transactions of the American Philological Association, no (1980),
325-4?.
4, THE ROLE OF NAMES AND VERBS

IN THE ASSERTION (i6 a 20, i6 b 6-io,
i6 b i9"2 5 )
In the last two sections, which have covered the first portion of
chapter 2, we have first considered the contrast between words
and the complex utterances formed out of them, and then
that between articulate human speech and the inarticulate sounds
made by animals. Both sections, then, have been devoted to the
study of the word, embracing both name and verb. We must
now go on to examine how Aristotle differentiates the name
from the verb, and how he defines their different roles in the
assertion.
Names and verbs are both utterances which are significant
according to convention, and of which no part signifies separately.
They are distinguished by the criterion of 'signifying time in addi-
tion': a name is 'without time* (16*20), while a verb is 'that which
signifies time in addition* (i6b6). Aristotle also distinguishes a verb
as being a sign of something said of a subject (i6b7, 10): that is, a
verb signifies a predicate. We might expect a corresponding state-
ment that a name stands for the subject in a sentence; however, the
definition of the name includes no such statement, and we shall see
that names may also stand for predicates.
The simplest assertion is composed of names and verbs (17*20,
vfn). Here, Aristotle follows in the footsteps of Plato, who iden-
tified the two basic constituents of an assertion in the Sophist using
the same words, which I translate as 'names and verbs' (Soph,
26231-07). However, although the words used are the same,
Aristotle does not define them as Plato does. For Plato, they are
defined in terms of the types of object which they signify: a 'verb'
signifies an action. Aristotle, on the other hand, defines the verb in
terms of its function in the sentence; it is not distinguished from
names by the type of object which it signifies. This will become
clearer as we go on.
The name and verb are the basic constituents of an assertion.
Thus, Ammonias comments that Aristotle was not concerned with
the distinction between names and verbs in the Categories, and that
he introduces the distinction in the De Interpretatione because it is
important to the study of the assertion. By means of the difference
between names and verbs, we distinguish subject terms from predi-
Chapters 2—3: The Name and Verb 53
cates in assertions.381 shall agree with this traditional view to an

extent: the name and verb are indeed the most important parts of
speech for the formation of assertions, and it is the verb which
expresses the combination of subject and predicate. However, I
shall argue that Aristotle also allows names to stand for the predi-
cate, ie which case subject and predicate are linked by the copula
"to be*. The roles of name and verb are ingenious, and do not
simply consist in the former standing for subject and the latter for
predicate,
Names and verbs are distinguished by the issue of 'signifying
time in addition'. Because of this, words which would now be
classed as adjectives are included as names under Aristotle's defi-
nition: they are significant words which do not convey any indica-
tion of time. We may confirm this by looking to the definitions of
the parts of speech in the Poetics. Of the eight parts of speech
defined there, four signify and four do not (1456*20 ff.). If an adjec-
tive is to be a kind of predicate, we would assume that it would
count as signifying: a word which stands for a predicate is 'a sign
of something said of something else' (De Int. i6b7). The four sig-
nificant parts of speech are the name, verb, inflexion (mami^), and
phrase (loyogJ.Thus, if an adjective is a single, significant word, and
not a phrase, it must be either a name, verb, or inflexion, An in-
flexion is something derived from either a name or a verb (Poet.
1457*18). Clearly, inflexions need not in general be either adjectives
or predicates. Furthermore, even if an adjective could be said to be
a 'sign of something said of something else', it cannot be a verb,
since adjectives, unlike verbs, do not 'signify time in addition*. The
verb 'thrives' (t>y«M'v«), for example, signifies that something else,
some subject, is thriving. It also signifies that that subject is thriv-
ing now. The verb carries an indication of time in addition to its
basic meaning, and this is expressed by the term 'to signify in addi-
tion' (itQoacnjfMiveiv, De Int. i6b6): this is not the same as simply sig-
nifying time, which would presumably only be done by the word
'time'.39 In the account of parts of speech in the Poetics adjectives
are clearly included as names (Poet. 1457*16). There Aristotle says
that 'man' and 'pale* do not signify when, whereas 'walks' or
* Ammonias, In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius 10, 25-31, H, iff,

Cf. 8. 31-9.4 and Piutarch, Platonicae Quaestiones 10, loocjb ff.
" Cf. Boethius, Commentarii in AristoteUs flew %«?ro«g, 66.
'walked' signify in addition present and past time respectively,

It seems, then, that the name includes both the modern category
of the noun and the adjective.40 The view that names and verbs
represent subjects and predicates respectively is undermined
further by the realization that not only adjectives, but also nouns,
can stand for predicates: 'man* can be predicated of particular
men, and 'animal' of 'man' (Cat ibi2; APr. 43*31). Furthermore,
adjectives can, in certain expressions, stand for subjects instead of
predicates, as in 'that white thing is Socrates,' or 'what is approach-
ing is Callias* (APr. 4^2-6), We also see here proper nouns
appearing as predicates, though we are told that this is not a normal
use.
We may sum these statements up as follows. Nouns can stand as
subjects or predicates; even proper nouns can exceptionally stand
as predicates, though normally they are only subjects. It would
therefore seem impossible for Aristotle to define the as sig-
nifying only the subject, since in many cases names work as predi-
cates. It would likewise be impossible for the adjective to be split
off from the name and classified as a verb: not only does it differ
from the verb in not signifying time, but it is also capable of being
a subject as well as a predicate, which a verb is not. Verbs are
defined as being a sign of a predicate, and Aristotle nowhere says
that they can represent the subject in an assertion.41 Participles
might seem to be problematic for the scheme. One might argue
that "walking', like "walks', carries a signification of time. Should it,
then, be classed as a verb?42 We shall see that Aristotle does
give a treatment of participles, and uses them to analyse part
of the sense of a verb. Thus, 'is walking* is equivalent to 'walks';
it is 'is*, though, and not "walking*, which is responsible for
making the utterance into an assertion, and that is the job of the
verb.43
* This was typical of ancient grammar after Aristotle, Dionysius Thrax also rec-
ognized eight parts of speech, with no distinction between the adjective and noun.
See Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica, G. Uhtig (ed.) (Leipzig, 1883), 23ft
41
'By itself a verb is a name and signifies something* (16^19). He does not mean,
however, that a verb can, like a name, stand for a subject; rather, he means that when
a verb is removed from a sentence, it still signifies some content, although it is not
engaged in predicating its sense of a subject.
4i
Paerus, for instance, adopted this view (Pacius, 'Agumntiavf "Gfvavov
(Frankfurt, 1597)).
43
Participles were later recognized as a separate part of speech; see, e.g.,
Dionysius Thrax, who calls it a 'participant' 0*™%>?), since it participates in the prop-
Chapters 2-3: The Name a 55
We have seen so far that names are words which do not convey
any notion of time in addition to their basic signification; they
include the modern categories of noun and adjective. Verbs are
more complicated. Not only do they convey an indication of time,
but they are also 'signs of something said of something else'. We
must now go on to form a deeper understanding of what this
means: we shall see that this part of the definition of the verb is
connected with its role in the assertion. The verb is essential to
the formation of an assertion; we are twice told that there can be
no affirmation or negation without a verb (i7aio, I9bi2). Thus,
Aristotle often considers the difference between a name by itself
and the assertion which would be formed if some form of the verb
'to be' were added. 'Goat-stag* is not true or false unless being or
not-being is added to it (16*16-18): that is, 'goat-stag is' is an asser-
tion, while the bare word alone is not. Similarly, for the definition
of man to be converted from a mere phrase (Adyog-) to an assertion
(Idyog <mo$avjix0<;), 'is', 'was*, or 'will be' needs to be added
(i7ao £). The addition of Is' to a name is the minimal condition
for the formation of an assertion, and gives what Aristotle consid-
ers to be the primitive type of assertion (i9bi5). We have already
considered the meaning of these assertions;44 we must now turn to
consider the working of assertions in which subject and predicate
are signified.
At the end of chapter 3 we learn of the function of the verb in
forming such assertions. This is made clear through a consideration
of what a verb means when uttered in isolation, as compared with
the role which it plays in an assertion. An isolated verb certainly
signifies something, we are told, since the speaker arrests his
thought and the bearer pays attention (i6 b i9ff,). By virtue of this
signification, it counts as a name, and not a mere empty sound. The
additional qualification needed for it to count as a verb is, however,
missing: it does not signify that something is or is not (i6b2i 1).
Isolated from the context of an assertion, it does not assert that
anything is the case.
There now follows, in explanation, an account of the verb 'to be'.
erties both of the name and the verb (Dionysius Tbrax, An Gmmmatica 60. 2-4).
Varro classified participles as having time and case, as against names, which have
case but not time, and verbs, which have time but not case (Varro, De Lingua Latina,
G. Goetz and F. Schoell (eds.) (Leipzig, 1910), 10. ij).
44
See the discussioo of 'goat-stag is* in Chap, 2, Sect. 2 above.
'For "to be" or "not to be" is not a sign of a thing,' Aristotle says,
'not even if you were to utter "being" by itself (i6b22t). He goes
on to say that by itself 'being' is nothing: it 'additionally signifies* a
combination, which cannot be conceived of without the things
which are combined (i6b23~5). This statement may readily be
understood if we bear in mind the theory of the assertion as a com-
bination of subject and predicate, A complex thought which has
truth value is one which brings together in the mind a subject and
predicate, and represents them either as combined or divided. The
word 'is' represents this combination in a spoken assertion. This is
why Aristotle says that it is not a sign of a thing: the two things sig-
nified in an assertion are the subject and the predicate, for example,
Socrates and walking. The 'is' which turns these two words into an
assertion, and not just a list, does not stand for a thing. It does not
in fact signify anything: 'by itself it is nothing,' and is entirely
without content unless united with two words which stand for
things, in which case 'is' expresses their combination.Thus, the com-
bination which it expresses 'cannot be conceived of without the
things which are combined*. Even if you uttered the word 'being',
that would not signify (i6b23t).
The verb 'to be' signifies a combination in a similar way to that
in which all verbs signify time: both are said to 'signify in addition*
(ziQoaatjficiivetv, i6b6, 24). 'Thrives' signifies thriving, but also that
the subject is thriving now; that is, the signification of time is addi-
tional to its bask meaning. This basic meaning is what Aristotle has
in rnind when he says that a word 'signifies something' (16*17, b2o)-
In the copula we have a word which has an additional signification,
while lacking a basic signification of its own. It performs a unique
role in the structure of an assertion, which it could not perform
without the presence of other words to stand for the subject and
predicate. It is neither subject nor predicate, but 'predicated in
addition* (jtQoaxarfifOQOvftevov, I9bi9).45
How, though, is this account of the copula supposed to explain
why it is that a verb by itself is just a name? The use of 'for' (i6b2)
45
In this passage Aristotle seems to doubt whether the copula should be called
a verb, and calls it 'name or verb* (vfti). 'Nanae* must here be meant in a similarly
general sense to i6bi9, and is perhaps best translated 'word*. His thought may be
that a genuine verb should signify something, and not just indicate the combination
of the subject and predicate. Ct hts refusal to recognize indefinite names and verbs
as names and verbs proper (i6'2<), bn).
clearly implies that the two points are intended to be related in this
way. The answer becomes clear if we consider that verbs may be
analysed into a participle together with the verb 'to be*. An as-
sertion such as 'man thrives' (avOQwmoi; vyiaivei) is equivalent,
Aristotle says, to 'man is thriving* (&V&QOMO<; vytaivurv lanv, 2ibg;
see also APr. 5ibi3-i6).46 Since 'thrives' can be replaced by 'is
thriving' with no change in meaning, it seems reasonable to ask
whether there is some element in 'thrives' which 'signifies a com-
bination in addition', and so performs the function of 'is' in 'is
thriving'. 'Combination' means the attaching of a predicate to a
subject, and we have seen that this is involved in any assertion, not
just those containing the verb 'to be'.47 There must therefore be a
combination expressed in an assertion which contains only name
and verb, just as there is in an assertion containing two names and
a copula. This combination must be indicated by the verb: accord-
ingly, we find a verb defined as being a sign of something said of
something else, and a sign that something holds of a subject (16*7,
10). Thus, part of the force of a verb is that it predicates its basic
meaning of a subject: like the copula, it 'additionally signifies* that
a predicate holds of a subject.
We may now see how the discussions of the solitary verb
(i6bi9-22) and the copula (i6b22-~s) are linked.The explanation of
what it means for a solitary verb to be a name is provided by con-
sidering the copula. Neither verb nor copula can fulfil its function
of claiming that a predicate holds of a subject if it is removed from
the context of an assertion and uttered by itself. 'Is' when uttered
by itself signifies nothing whatever, since it has no basic significa-
tion. "Thrives*, if uttered by itself, is not without signification,
because it conveys the basic signification of thriving, even outside
an assertion. However, it cannot, exercise its 'additional significa-
tion' that a predicate holds of a subject, nor can it 'additionally
signify' when it is that the predicate holds. Stripped of its two addi-
tional significations, it has only its basic signification left. By itself,
* The equivalence of 'walks' with 'is walking' is also observed at Mete. A7,
1017*22-30. The point there is that any predication can be expressed in a form which
uses 'to be'; predication is therefore linked with being, and each kind of item which
can be predicated is something which 'is' in a different sense. In other words, in the
copulative 'is' we find the sense of being which is to do with the categories. The poi0t
is also found at APr. 49*6-10, where Aristotle says that to say that one thing holds
of another has as many senses as there are categories.
47
Cl DeAn. 430*26 ff.
then, 'thrives' signifies no more than the thing, thriving, and so is

reduced to the status of a name. This is the point at i6hif-22, and
it is backed up by reference to the fate of the copula when it is
uttered by itself (i6b22~5), Siace an isolated copula no longer
expresses 'it is,' an isolated verb will not express 'it is' either, and
so will in effect be a mere name.48
We may conclude that Aristotle sees the semantic role of the
verb as consisting of three parts. First, it signifies something, in the
same way as does a name; it is, in other words, a sign, or token,
standing for a thing. Thus, the name 'thriving' and the verb 'thrives*
both signify something, and presumably the same thing (i6b8),
Secondly, a verb additionally signifies time. It signifies not only
what is true of the subject, but when it is true. Thirdly, the
verb applies its own signification to that of the subject-word. It
signifies that the predication holds, as well as when it holds: like
the copula, it signifies a combination of subject and predicate. It is
this last element which makes the difference between a phrase
without truth value and an assertion, which must be true or false,
and it is for this reason that the verb is the vital ingredient in an
assertion.
* 4Q
These three semantic roles need not be concentrated in a single

word. So, a verb may be replaced by a participle and the copula,
and these two words together perform the three roles which a verb
may perform by itself. The copula performs both the second and
third roles: in a number of places where the copula is mentioned,
Aristotle refers to the various tenses in which it can appear (i6ai8,
b
3, i"jai2,19bi3). Thus, in 'Socrates is a man,' 'man' signifies man,
48
This passage has caused commentators considerable difficulty. Areas calk it 'a
curious medley, not easily digestible* (see H. Arens, Aristotle's Theory of language
and its Tradition, Studies in the History of Linguistics, 29 (Amsterdam, 1984), 50).
For a debate on these lines, see H. Wagner, 'Aristoteles, De Interpretations 3
16*19-25', in R. B. Palmer (ed.). Philomathes: Studies and Essays in the Humanities
in Memory of Philip Merlon (The Hague, 1971), 95-115; W, Ax, 'Zum isolierten
in Aristoteles de Interpretatione i6bi$-2$*, Archiv fur Geschkhte der Philosophie,
61 (1979), 271-9; and H, Weidemann, 'Aristoteles fiber das isolierte Aussagcwort, de
Int. 3 i6ki9-25', Archiv fur Geschkhte der Philosophie, 64 (1982), 239-56, These
studies fail to appreciate the relation between verb and copula, and so cannot ade-
quately explain the passage.
** Every assertion must contain a name and a verb (i<fii)\ however, Aristotle
twice states that there can be no assertion without a verb, without mentioning the
necessary presence of a name (17*12,vfiz). In these passages he emphasizes that
it is the verb which marks the difference between a mere phrase and an assertion,
by indicating the combination between predicate and subject.
while 'is* provides the 'additional signification' that the predicate is

combined with the subject, and that it is combined now (i6bg)- If
'signifying time in addition' means signifying when it is that the
predicate holds of the subject, then we can understand why the sig-
nification of time contained in a participle is not recognized as
important. If a participle were added to a bare name, no assertion
would be formed: that is, it contains no additional signification that
a predicate holds of a subject. Therefore, it is not capable of signi-
fying when it is that the predication holds. The two tasks of addi-
tional signification thus go together.
It is now clear why it is that an adjective, like a participle, must
count as a name and not a verb. Even though both adjectives and
participles are used to stand for predicates, they do not fulfil the
additional functions which distinguish the verb from the name; they
do not claim that something holds of a subject, and, therefore, they
do not say when it holds. Like other names, they can. only stand for
the predicate in an assertion if the verb 'to be' is present to indi-
cate that the predicate holds of the subject. That a noun, an adjec-
tive, and a participle all function in the same way may be seen in
the assertions 'Socrates is a man,' 'Socrates is pale,' and 'Socrates
is walking.'50
It has been objected against Aristotle's statement that every
assertion must contain a verb that there are examples of sentences
in the De Interpretation from which the verb is missing (e.g. I9bi2,
20*26). Here, Aristotle is writing in abbreviated, idiomatic Greek,
from which the copula may be omitted. The discrepancy only shows
that the theory is meant to apply to fully expanded assertions,
rather than their abbreviations. Aristotle's interest in language in
the treatise is, as we shall see, determined by Ms interest in dialec-
tical argument. His analysis of the structure of assertions is there-
fore meant to apply to the ideal assertions prescribed in dialectic,
and not to everyday, idiomatic utterances. For idiomatic language
to be employed in an account of ideal assertions should not seem
paradoxical,51
The modern reader is likely to be worried by Aristotle's theory
m
Arens puts forward the view that Aristotle's words for 'name' and 'verb' instead
mean 'subject' and 'predicate* (Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language, 24), See the
discussion of 20*1 ft in Chapter 10 below.
31
See G. Graffl, 'Una nota sui concetti di cjf#<« e &>yo£ in Aristof ele", Athenaeum,
44 (1986), 91-101.
of the structure of assertions in another way. This worry concerns

the question of one-word sentences. Such assertions are clearly
ruled out: every assertion must contain both a verb and a name to
designate the subject of the sentence. Already in chapter i we were
presented with the idea that truth and falsehood require com-
plexity, both in thought and speech. In speech this complexity is
represented by the presence in. the assertion of distinct words,
There can be no one-word sentences. According to the modern
view of grammar, however, Greek does contain one-word asser-
tions: the same verb may either have a noun added to furnish its
subject, or be used by itself, in which case it contains its own subject.
The same word may thus mean either 'runs' or 'he, she, or it runs*
(rQexei). In the latter case, it counts as a sentence in its own right.
According to Aristotle's account, however, if uttered in isolation it
would not be an assertion, and would not even count as a verb: it
would merely be a name (16*19). This is not an oversight on his
part, and in the Categories he states explicitly that neither names
nor verbs contain the complexity requisite for the possession of
truth value (TQE^SI and nxa are given as examples of verbs: Cat..
2a8-io), He clearly does not agree with modern grammar in regard-
ing the implicit 'he, she, or it' as a subject, and hence does not see
a solitary verb as an assertion. This seems entirely reasonable if we
remember that an assertion must make a claim about a thing
(i7bi~3), which must therefore somehow be signified in the asser-
tion. The vague and indefinite "he, she, or it' which modern grammar
recognizes as contained in the verb can hardly count as signifying
a thing in the Aristotelian sense. No item in the world is selected
as the one to which the sense of the predicate is meant to apply. It
is therefore not surprising that one-word sentences should not be
allowed in his scheme,
Aristotle's theory of the structure of the assertion is now clear.
It depends on his definitions of the name and verb. Both signify
things, while the verb has the two additional semantic functions
necessary to turn a list into an assertion: it states that a combina-
tion holds, and when it holds. An affirmation containing a name and
a verb therefore makes the claim that something is combined with
something else, either now, before now, or later than now, while the
addition of a negated, or indefinite, verb to a name gives us the cor-
responding claim that subject and predicate are separated: we shall
come to examine Aristotle's theory in more detail later. The two
additional functions of the verb will drop away if no name is

present to signify a subject; the verb cannot claim that the thing
which it signifies holds of a subject or when it holds if no subject
has been picked out. In this case, only the verb's basic signification
remains, and it is no more than a name. The copula is a unique
word, which does not signify a thing; it has no basic signification,
and has only the two additional roles of the verb. For this reason
it can form an assertion together with two names, one to stand for
subject and the other for predicate, and conveys nothing whatever
when uttered by itself. The working of the assertion is thus made
clear by understanding the functioning of its basic elements, and
it is for this reason that Aristotle devotes two chapters to the
name and verb before going on to the assertion and contradictory
pair.
5. INDEFINITE NAMES AND VERBS

(i6 3 29~32, i6 b n-i5)
In addition to discussions of names and verbs, chapters 2 and 3 also

contain accounts of certain kinds of words which appear to be
names and verbs, but are instead separated into different cate-
gories. The two chapters are symmetrical in their treatment of these
words: so, just as indefinite names are treated in chapter 2, so a class
of indefinite verbs is discovered in chapter 3. These expressions
consist of names or verbs with 'not' prefixed.
We first learn, that 'not man' (mm avBgoino^) "is not a name
(i6829). Neither, he goes on to say, is it a phrase (loyog). We shall
see in chapter 4 that a phrase is defined as an expression which con-
tains some significant part (i6b26ft), as distinct from single words,
which do not. Thus, we are here told that 'not man' should not be
considered as a phrase consisting of separate words. By denying
that it is a name, he implies that it was a candidate for being one:
it is not excluded on the grounds of being a phrase consisting of
more than one word. Yet, we have been told, a name must have no
independently significant parts (16*20). The same applies to the
indefinite verb: since it is stated that 'doesn't thrive' (ov% vyiaivetf1
52
In Greek indefinite names and verbs are both formed by prefixing the word
for 'not'. This symmetry is hard to preserve in translation; while 'not man* presents
no problem, the form 'not thrives* is a poetic archaism (see OED under 'not*, sense
is not a verb (i6bu), it seems that it too is seen as a single

word, and is at least eligible to be a verb on that count. Before
considering why these expressions are classed as indefinite, we
should examine Aristotle's reasons for considering them as single
words.
Ammonius offers a solution to this problem. He says that we
would expect 'not man' to be a name, since it occupies the place of
the subject in a sentence such as 'not man walks' (ovx avOgtuaio^
aegutttTet)', he adds that it conforms to the definition of the name,
since 'not* and 'man' are not by themselves significant when they
are parts of'not man*.53The assumption that the subject in an asser-
tion cannot be represented by a phrase does not seem well
founded, however. Aristotle himself gives an example of a phrase
standing as subject in chapter 5: 'two-footed land animal* would
yield an assertion if a verb were added (i6bn ft).
Let us examine what it means for 'not man' not to be a phrase.
If the expression is to fail to meet the definition of a phrase, then,
assuming it to be a significant sound, it must fail to be divisible into
significant parts (i6b2&~8).The same consideration which prevents
indefinite names from being phrases admits them as names: no part
of & name signifies by itself. In adding that indefinite names are not
negations (i6a3i), Aristotle is reminding us that adding 'not' to a
name does not amount to making a denial with a truth value; for
this, the negated verb 'to be' would be needed. If indefinite names
are not seen as phrases, they could well be seen as single words
compounded out of independent words; 'not man' might be seen
as a unit, with its parts only contributing to the signification of the
whole. They would come under the heading of compounds made
from one significant and one non-significant member (Poet
1457*33), since 'not' is not a significant part of speech: an indefinite
name such as 'not just' would then be treated in the same way as
a compound such as 'unjust'.S4To express the fact that expressions
I.ia). In order not to sound too archaic, while still translating by means of a single
negative word followed by the verb, I shall use 'doesn't-thrive',
53
54
Ammonius, InAratotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius 41.21-7.
The practice of scribes may also be seen as evidence that 'not-roan* was seen
as a single word. 'Not* could be split between lines, whereas other monosyllables
could not (a line division such as oi)|x &v9ga>sog would have been permitted, while
vvjv avOfwTios would not). This suggests that 'not' was seen as a prefix attached to
the word. See W, Crdnert, Memoria Graeca Herculanensis (Leipzig, 1903; repr.
Hildesheim, 1963), 12.
such as 'not man' are considered as a single unit, I shall adopt the
convention of writing 'not-man' and 'doesn't-thrive*. By this means
it will also be clear to which word the negation belongs: the impor-
tance of this will be seen in Chapter 6.
Having considered why indefinite names and verbs might be
treated as single compound words, and not phrases, we also need
to ask why Aristotle was sufficiently interested in these expressions
to devote a special treatment to them, and why they are put in a
class of their own rather than being counted as proper names and
verbs. We find that negated names and verbs are of great interest
later on in the De Interpretatione. The main concern of the treatise
is the examination of contradictory assertions. As part of this
project, Aristotle lists all the ways in which negation may be
introduced into each type of assertion, then decides which of the
resulting assertions are negations and which affirmations, and sorts
them into their contradictory pairs, working out inferences between
related assertions (i9bi5-i8, 27 ft). Given the project for which
Aristotle is preparing in the early chapters, it is to be expected
that negated names and verbs will play a part in his account of
language.
The question remains why they should be separated into their
own categories apart from names and verbs. In the case of indefi-
nite names, no explanation is given for why they are not genuine
names; the term 'indefinite* provides a clear clue, however. We see
in several passages that to signify is to signify some single thing.
Even if some expression signifies more than one thing, still a dif-
ferent word could be assigned to each signification, so that each
one would then only signify one thing (Mete. ioo6a34-bi3); not to
signify one thing is to signify nothing (Me/a. ioo6b7). A name, then,
must signify some definite, single thing, A non-man is anything at
all that is not a man: the expression cites something definite, that
is, man, and then points away from it in every direction indiscrimi-
nately, whereas the genuine name 'man' points towards something
definite.35 If 'man' is looked on as conveying definite information
on what is signified, 'not-man' removes one point of doubt, but
55
We may compare Plato's analysis of negation as denoting something other than
what is negated, rather than opposite to it (Soph, 25?b), While something might be
supposed to have only one opposite, there will be an indefinite number of things
which differ from it, and thus an indefinite number of things denoted by the
negation.
conveys nothing certain or definite in its place. 'Not-man' appears

not to signify a single thing, and if this means it cannot be said to
signify, it follows that it cannot really fall under the definition of
the name, which was defined as a significant sound.5*
It is interesting to compare an objection made by Aristotle
against Plato's Forms in On Ideas. According to this argument, on
the 'one over many* principle, there would have to be Forms of neg-
ative terms, since a single negative term will hold of many things.
These things will have nothing whatever in common, which violates
the expectation that particulars sharing in the same Form will all
share some attribute. The same consideration which makes a
Platonic Form of not-man unacceptable ensures that *not-rnan'
does not have a sufficiently definite signification to count as a
name.57 Accordingly, we are told at the beginning of chapter 10 that
the simple assertion claims that one thing holds of one thing
(i9b6£: cf. i8ai2f.). Aristotle adds that an indefinite name as well
as a name may fulil the function of signifying a single thing; the
indefinite name 'signifies in a way an indefinite unity* (i9b9). We
see, then, that definiteness of signification is an important criterion
for any word which is to stand for something which is cited in an
assertion. It was because of their indefiniteness that these expres-
sions were excluded in chapter 2 from the class of genuine names;
they are still of sufficient importance to be introduced in this
chapter, however, even though they are placed in, a separate group.
In chapter 10, it is explained that, despite their lack of definiteness,
indefinite names still signify a single thing in a manner sufficient to
render them usable in assertions.
We should now turn to indefinite verbs, which are introduced in
chapter 3. Aristotle first says that 'doesn't-thrive' («%• vytaivei) is
not a verb (i6bn). Indefinite verbs do signify time, and are always
said of some subject, but are differentiated from verbs on one other
point, which did not appear in the definition of the verb (i6h6 f.; nor
58
Cf. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, 117 f., and T, H. Irwin,
'Aristotle's Concept of Signification', in .M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds.)>
Language and Logos (Cambridge, 1982), 241-66: see 244, Irwin opposes Aristotle's
view, and states that ihe meaning of 'not-man' seems no less definite than the
meaning of'man'.
57
Sec Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysics Commentaria, in M.
Hayduck (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, i (Berlin, 1891), 80, iSft; also
in W. D. Ross, Aristotelis Fragment® Selecta (Oxford, 1955), 123. See also Meta. M,
1079*91
is it seen at Poet. 1457*14): they hold equally of what is and of what

is not (16*15). The idea here is that a genuine predicate would be
false of something non-existent: 'doeso't-thrive', however, is true of
the non-existent as well as the existent. We have seen that asser-
tions can be made about non-existents. In the Categories we read
that the rale according to which one member of a contradictory
pair is true and the other false applies to assertions about non-
existent subjects just as to those about existent ones, but 'in a
different way' (Cat. I3b20~35); if Socrates exists, then of the con-
tradictories 'Socrates is ill' and 'Socrates is-not ill,' one will be true
and the other false. If Socrates does not exist, 'Socrates is ill' will
be false, and 'Socrates is-not if will be true. Thus, in the case of an
existent subject, it is undetermined which statement of a contra-
dictory pair will be true and which false, whereas it is fixed in the
case of a non-existent one. Every affirmation is false of a non-exis-
tent subject, while every negation is true of it. If Socrates does not
exist, then 'doesn't-thrive' and all other such expressions can be
truly said of him,
This position follows clearly from Aristotle's theory of combina-
tion and division. Something non-existent cannot enter into any
combinations: no predicate can be combined with what is not there.
All affirmations which take it as subject claim that something is
combined with it, and all such affirmations must be false. Negations,
on the other hand, assert a separation of subject and predicate. Just
as a non-entity is never combined with anything, so it is always
separated from everything, and so every negation which takes it
as subject will be true. So, if the subject is non-existent, then the
truth value of an assertion made about it is determined by whether
it is affirmative or negative. A non-existent Socrates is neither ill
aor healthy. Of course, even though something non-existent does
not enter into combinations, it can still be signified: since 'goat-
stag' signifies something, much can be said about it, and whole
fairy-tales constructed, which are all meaningful, though none of
them true.
In a related discussion in the Prior Analytics, indefinite names
are also brought in. The difference between 'is not-equal' (elvat/o?
law) and 'is-not equal* (fi.ii eivcu laov) is given as being that for the
former to be true there must be an underlying subject, which is
unequal; in the latter, nothing need underlie at all. The former can
only be true of something existent and capable of equality or
inequality, such as a quantity; the latter is true of many existent

things and all non-existent ones (APr. 5^25-^5), The former is an
affirmation, in which an indefinite name appears as predicate; the
latter is a negation, formed by the use of an indefinite verb instead
of a verb. Whether an assertion is affirmative or negative depends
entirely on the verb: an assertion containing a negated name (that
is, an indefinite one) is still an affirmation, so long as the verb is not
negated, and so will be of the non-existent; an example would
be 'the man in the moon is a non-smoker.'
We may now see what Aristotle means when he says that an
indefinite verb holds equally of what is and what is not. A normal
verb makes an affirmative statement, which can only be true of an
existent subject. An indefinite verb, on the other hand, makes a
negative one, which may be true whether the subject exists or not,
since it is always true to say that a nonentity is separated from any
predicate. Still, why are negative verbs called indefinite, and why
does it matter that they may hold of the non-existent? In the case
of the indefinite name, I argued that its indefiniteness arose from
the fact that it does not signify a single, specific thing, but rather
may apply to practically anything: everything is a not-man but man,
A similar point could be made concerning the indefinite verb.
While 'thrives' will only be true of a limited class of existent things,
clearly defined by their sharing in the predicate signified by the
verb, 'doesn't-thrive' is true of a huge and ill-assorted class of
objects. Almost nothing is conveyed by saying of something that it
does not thrive; even the most basic of all facts concerning it, the
question of whether it exists or not, is left open. This is the point
which Aristotle seizes on as showing up the indefiniteness of a neg-
ative verb.
Both the indefinite name and the indefinite verb, then, are seg-
regated from the genuine name and the genuine verb for the same
reason: they hold of things which have nothing in common. The
indefinite name, instead of picking out a definite thing which could
be said to hold of a clearly defined class of subjects all sharing some
attribute, works by pointing away from a definite thing in every
direction indiscriminately. The indefinite verb, rather than making
a definite claim that a predicate holds, merely denies that it holds;
this claim would be true of a miscellaneous assortment of subjects,
including non-existent ones. The fact that indefinite names and
verbs are here excluded from the categories of names and verbs
shows us something more about Aristotle's concept of signification:

in order to count as significant utterances in the full sense, words
must signify some definite, single thing. Still, indefinite names and
verbs are of great importance throughout the De Interpretations,
and are listed along with names and verbs as being the essential
ingredients of the assertion (i9bioff.). So, although they are less
definite than unnegated names and verbs, they are not so indefinite
as to preclude their use in meaningful assertions.
6. INFLEXIONS OF NAMES AND VERBS

(i6 a 32- b s, i6 b i6-i8)
In addition to indefinite names and verbs, Aristotle distinguishes

two other groups of words which might seem to be names and
verbs, but which, he says, are not. In chapter 2, we find that 'of
Philo', 'for Philo' (Qiitovoc;, $&o>vi), and such are not names, but
'inflexions* (jtrdxretf) of them (16*32). Like indefinite names, the
inflexions of names are disqualified from being names on grounds
which are not immediately apparent from the definition at the start
of the chapter (i6ai9, bi-5). We are told that in other respects
indefinite names conform to the definition of the name, but they
fail to form an assertion possessing truth value if the verb 'to be' is
added to the word (i6bi fl). A genuine name, on the other hand,
always forms an assertion if 'is*, 'was', or 'will be' is added (i6b3 £):
we have already seen examples of this at the end of chapter i. A
name, in other words, must be able to stand for the subject of an
assertion: it must signify a thing which can be said to be combined
with or separated from other things. This criterion was not set out
explicitly in the definition of the name. Names were only defined
as significant, conventional, without time, and without separately
significant parts. However, we have seen that Aristotle understands
signification to involve picking out a definite single thing, and that
these things enter into combinations with each other which may be
represented in assertions. A word which does not point to a thing
in this sense, we may infer, cannot be fully significant, and so would
not fall under the definition of the name. The inflexion 'of Philo'
certainly does not appear to be a sign of or token for a thing;
nothing is signified of which anything can be predicated truly or
falsely,
We should now consider the inflexions of verbs. This type of word

is introduced with the same form of words as was used for the
inflexion of names (i6bi6: ef. i6a32). Words of this type are said to
differ from verbs on the grounds that verbs 'additionally signify*
present time, while inflexions 'additionally signify' time outside the
present (i6biji). Yet the verb was defined as 'signifying time in
addition* (i6b6), and it was said that 'thrives* additionally signifies
that the predicate holds now (i6b9).58We would therefore expect
that past and future verbs should be genuine verbs, since they
signify time just as much as those that signify the present. While it
is plausible to think that genitive and dative nouns are unable to
perform the basic function of a name, since they cannot designate
subjects, it is harder to see what might disqualify past and future
verbs from being genuine verbs.
In many passages Aristotle states that assertions may be made
using verbs of any tense.S9In these passages he seems concerned to
make dear that a point which he has established for a present-tense
verb also applies to verbs of other tenses. Despite this, in a number
of passages his expression suggests that the present tense is basic,
Past and future are defined with relation to the present as 'outside'
(imog, 17*29, i9bi8) or 'beyond* (negt^, i6bi8), and in one passage
a verb is described as applying either 'simply or with time* (i6ai8),
presumably contrasting the present with past and future. It is cer-
tainly the case that present-tensed verbs are far more prominent in
the De Interpmtatlone than past or future onea General statements
must be made in the present tense: 'all men are rational' does not
have a useful counterpart in the past or the future. The question
arises whether an assertion such as this is really timeless, rather
than present.* Aristotle's scheme clearly only allows room for past,
present, or future assertions; the verb must contain an indication
of time. He could argue with plausibility that 'all men are rational'
does apply to the present: the present is, as it were, the world in
which we live, and about which we most readily think and talk.
Assertions about the present would then naturally be the most
basic.
58
60
See also Poet. 1457*17 f. * 16*18, "3,17*10,12, 24,291, iîgf.
In a passage in the Prior Analytics, we are told that general assertions must be
made 'simply' rather than *with time'; that is, they are not to specify 'now or this
particular time* (APr. •^fj-iS). In the De Interpniatione, the task of signifyiag
'simply' is allotted to verbs which indicate the present.
We also see the present picked out as basic in other works. In

the account of thought in the De Anima we are told that, in the
case of compound thoughts of the past or future, the mind adds
time, and thinks it in addition (De An. 43ob5 ff.). The verb 'to think
in addition' (jrgoaewoefv) here recalls signifying in addition
(nQoaot)paivEiv)\ both terms denote the addition of time to the basic
content of a thought or word. When the mind thinks of the subject
and predicate combined in the future or the past, the time at which
the subject and predicate are thought of as being combined is
included by the mind in the thought. This extra component appar-
ently is only included in thoughts pertaining to the past or future:
there is no additional element of time contained in thoughts about
the present. Could he intend here a contrast between omni-
temporal uses of the verb and temporal uses? His words do not
allow this interpretation: the additional component of time is only
included in thoughts of 'things that were or will be'. He contrasts
time outside the present with present time, rather than statements
of general or omnitemporal application with those applying to
some particular time,
In the Physics too we see that the present holds a privileged posi-
tion. The present appears to be the most real part of time: the past
has gone by and is no longer with us, while the future has not yet
come into being (Ph. 2i7b33f.).61 The present tense of verbs is
therefore primary. Assertions represent there as being either a
combination or a separation of a subject and a predicate. This may
either be represented as being the case now, or as having been the
case or going to be the case. If the present is the time which most
fully exists, then present-tensed assertions are the ones which most
clearly make claims about a state of affairs which holds or does not
hold. Thus, the example of a genuine verb is 'thrives*, which 'addi-
tionally signifies that it holds now' (i6b9), while verbs which addi-
tionally signify the past or future are put into a class of their own,
and are not allowed the full title of 'verb' (i6bi6f,).
As with the indefinite name and verb, however, the inflexion of
the verb is not dismissed as useless in forming assertions. As we
have seen, in many passages in the De Interpretations Aristotle
specifically includes past and future assertions along with present
H
For a discussion, see A. Diaz Tejera, *Tiempe> ft'sico y liempo linguistic© en
Arist(Steles', Revista Espanola de Littgiibtiea, 15 (1985), 37-58,
ones. In chapter 10, where indefinite names and verbs are also
brought into the account, he says that without a verb in some tense
or other there can be no assertion (i9biaff.; cf. i6ai8, ""3), and
adds that verbs of all tenses are verbs according to his definition,
since they signify time in addition (19*13 ft). Thus, although
the inflexion of a verb is excluded from being a genuine verb in
chapter 3, it is counted as one for all practical purposes: it fulfils
the same function as does the genuine verb in the formation of
assertions,62
We are now ready to leave chapters 2 and 3. Armed with an
understanding of Aristotle's account of the name and verb, we may
move on to his account of larger linguistic units.
62
Inflexions make possible what is, according to Aristotle, one of the most impor-
tant and useful types of argument dealt with fa the Topics (Top. 119*36ft, 154*121).
The 'argument from inflexions' employs the idea that a relationship which holds
between two words in one inflexion will also hold between them in all other inflex-
ions. If justice is praiseworthy, then something done justly will be done in a praise-
worthy way. The inflexion of 'praiseworthy' will follow that of 'just' (Top. ii4 b i ft
Cf. I24"iof£, I36bi5(t, iî*yo1L',Rhet, 1397*20ft). In the Poetics, we find theirtiex-
ion introduced as one of the eight parts of speech (Poet I456b2i £. I457>i8ff.). The
term is given a loose definition; it has a very broad application, and may apply to
any words related in form.
4
Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions
In chapter 4, Aristotle moves on from basic utterances, which are

not divisible into smaller significant parts, to complex utterances,
which are compounded out of the basic ones, and which, therefore,
have parts which signify. I shall translate the term for these complex
utterances as 'phrase' (Aoyo?). It is defined as follows: 'a phrase is
a significant utterance, some one of the parts of which is separately
significant'; also, the phrase is 'an expression and not an assertion'
(i6^2(>-8),1 Some part of a phrase must have a signification in its
own right, and so, as we have seen, compound words do not count
as phrases, since they have parts which merely contribute to the
meaning of the compound, having no separate signification of their
own. This means, in effect, that a phrase is composed of at least two
independent words.2
In the second part of the definition, Aristotle emphasizes that not
every phrase affirms something: it need only be an expression
(0CMM?), not an affirmation (xardQaats, i6b2jt). The term 'ex-
pression' (ipaax;) is used elsewhere in the same sense as here to
indicate an utterance which does not claim that something is the
case: thus, names and verbs are only expressions, not assertions
' The use of the term here which I translate 'phrase* (Adyof) has caused some con-
fusion, Ackrili translates 'sentence* (J, L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De
Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 45). This translation implies that the term covers
only complete assertions, questions, prayers, and the like; in fact, it covers every
expression with at least one significant part, and so phrases and clauses are included
too. Lo Piparo suggests that we have here a definition of 'human language' (F. Lo
Piparo, 'Aristotle: The Material Conditions of Linguistic Eipressiveness', Versus:
Quademi di studi semiotid, no, 50-1 (May-Dec. 1988), 84); cf. also G. Graffi, 'Una
nola sui concetti di gypa e lavas in Aristotele', Athenaeum, 44 (1986), 91-101.
2
If a phrase is an utterance containing at least one significant part (i6b26f.; Foe*.
1457*27), then presumably 'the man* would count as a phrase, since it has. on the
definitions found in chap. 20 of the Poetics, one signifying and one non-signifying
part. Certainty, there is no other category offered into which such utterances could
fit.The issue does not seem to be uppermost in Aristotle's mind, since he also speaks
of a phrase as having parts which signify something (Poet,
(17*17 ft).3 The point made here is that not all phrases are asser-
tions: some are mere utterances without truth value, and in this
resemble words. What differentiates the phrase from the name and
verb is that phrases have significant parts.
Much of the chapter is spent in setting out the distinction
between words, compound words, phrases, and assertions. Thus,
Aristotle goes on, 'man' signifies something, but does not affirm or
deny: it does not signify 'that it is or is not' (i6b2&~3o). For an asser-
tion to be formed, something would need to be added, that is, a
verb,4 No mere word can be an assertion: an assertion involves com-
plexity, and demands the presence of a verb. We are next reminded
that no part of a word signifies: 'ice' in 'mice' (vg in uvg) is mere
voice, having no signification. Since 'mice' (wi»g) is a simple word,
it does not have parts which signify at all. In a compound word,
however, the parts signify, but not in their own right (i6b32f.). As
1 have argued, the point is that the parts of compound words tend
to express the signification which they would have if they appeared
in isolation, but when parts of the compound they do not signify
independently. Even compound words, therefore, fail to come
under the definition of the phrase,
There follows a brief sentence in explanation of the part of the
definition stating that phrases signify. Every phrase signifies, he
says, not as a tool, but by convention (i:6b33-i732); we are referred
back to the earlier discussion of convention in chapters i and
2 (i6"3f., 26-9). Finally, the assertion is introduced (layog
axoâmao^ I7a2 ft). The assertion is a kind of phrase. While com-
plexity is necessary for an expression to be an assertion, it is not
sufficient: all phrases are complex in that they have parts which
signify in their own right; however, not all phrases are assertions,
but only those capable of truth or falsehood. There may be said to
be two types of non-assertoric phrase: first, there are expressions
which do not contain a verb, like 'fair horse1 (xoldj aaiog , i6a22),
or the definition of man (i7an).sThese phrases cannot be complete
3
The same term is also sometimes used to refer to affirmations, as opposed to
negations (e.g. APr. 32a28; De An. 432*10), or to assertions in general (e.g. De Int.
22*11), It is always clear from the context which sense the word has; since the basic
meaning of the word is 'saying*, it will refer to affirmations if contrasted with
'denying,* and, if contrasted with 'asserting*, it will denote mere utterances without
truth value,
4
i6*t7f., l> 2£, 17*1 it, I9 b i2f,
5
See also Poet. 1457*24-7.
Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions 73
assertions, since a verb is needed to indicate that a predicate holds

of a subject. Like names, these phrases may be used to stand for
the subjects of assertions, and an assertion will be formed if a verb
is added to such a phrase (i6 b 29fc, 17*1 if.). Secondly, there are
phrases which contain verbs, but which are not assertions, and
cannot be true or false. Examples are prayers (17*2 ft). The princi-
pal concern of the treatise will be the assertion, and more particu-
larly assertions considered as members of contradictory pairs.
Accordingly, Aristotle states that, among phrases, he is at present
interested only in assertions; prayers and such are the business of
rhetoric or poetics, and are dismissed from the present enquiry
(i785).6The assertion has now been introduced and defined as a
bearer of truth or falsehood. This is a very important step: others
are to follow in the next two chapters. In chapter 5 the negation is
introduced and then, in chapter 6, the contradictory pair.
6
He does not, of course, dismiss those phrases which may be the components of
assertjons. He should here be taken as dismissing complete utterances such as 'May
good men prosper", which is not an assertion and is neither true nor false, while
keeping 'Good men prosper,' and not excluding from consideration the phrase 'good
men,' which is a component of the assertion, just as are the words 'good* and 'men'.
5
Chapter 5: Simple and Compound

Assertions
In the previous chapter, we were presented with phrases, that is,

compound utterances made up of significant parts, or words.
Among phrases, assertions were singled out as of special interest,
and in chapter 5 these are considered in more detail. We are first
introduced to the primitive assertions, which are either affirmations
or negations. Other, non-primitive, assertions are single by con-
junction, being formed by joining other assertions together (17*8 £).
Assertions, then, like words, may either be simple or compound.
In the first part of the chapter, Aristotle makes the important
point that an assertion must be formed from either a verb or an
inflexion of one (17*9 f.): even the definition of man is not an asser-
tion without the addition of 'is', 'will be', or 'was*. Hie verb to be'
here serves as the most basic verb possible: it is the least addition
needed in order to form the most primitive kind of assertion.'This
statement is reminiscent of that made concerning goat-stag in
chapter i;'goat-stag' and the definition of man might both perhaps
appear to have truth value, the former and the latter true, and
both have some complexity, the former as a compound name and
the latter as a phrase. Neither, however, is an assertion, since
neither contains a verb.
In a parenthesis, Aristotle raises the question of why it is that
'two-footed land animal' is one and not many, explains that the fact
that the words are uttered together would not be sufficient, and dis-
misses the question as belonging to another enquiry (17*13-15),
Why does this parenthesis occur here? If the definition of man sig-
nifies a single thing, then it would seem to threaten the distinction
between word and phrase; would such a phrase fail to have signifi-
1
See the discussion of 19*14-19 in Chapter 10 below.
Chapter 5: Simple and Compound Assertions 75
caot parts, if the whole only signifies one thing? On the other hand,
how is the unity of the definition to be established, if it is composed
of several words, each signifying a different thing in its own right?
The parenthesis dismisses this objection. The unity of the essence
defined in the definition does not prevent the definition from
having independent words as its parts. Indeed, a definition must
contain parts with their own separate meanings, even though a
single thing is being defined: a one-word definition would be a mere
renaming.2 The unity of essence does not fall within the province
of the De Interpretatione, and we are, for a second time, referred to
another treatise for a fuller discussion (17*14!.). The problem is
raised again in Posterior Analytics II, 6, and is dealt with in
Metaphysics Ziz.
Aristotle now returns to the basic assertion, and two different
criteria are given for what makes an assertion single (17*15-24).
This is an important question, and is picked up again in chapters 8
and ii. The first criterion is to do with whether the assertion
expresses a single claim about a single subject; according to this cri-
terion, an assertion which expresses a multiple sense is really more
than one assertion, regardless of its apparent form. This might be
called the semantic criterion,
The second criterion is syntactic rather than semantic: according
to this, two assertions which have been combined may be con-
sidered one by conjunction, while separate assertions which are not
conjoined would count as more than one,3 Applying the two cri-
teria clearly gives a different result. Two assertions linked by 'and*
would still count as more than one by the semantic criterion, since
two distinct claims would, be made, but on the syntactic criterion
would count as conjoined into a single assertion. We are thus, in
effect, given two senses in which an assertion may be said to be
single: we are told that a single assertion either reveals one thing
or is one by conjunction, and more than one assertion either makes
more than one claim or else is not conjoined (17*15-17).
2
Top, 102*2-6, !48b33-i4<j34. A similar issue arises at Co*. ib25-2*i, where 'in the
Lyceum' is included among things which are not complex; (rd xmn /tqfa/uav
ovialoxijv Myvfteva): this only means that, according to some extralinguistie cri-
terion, the signification of *in the Lyceum' is simple and not complex, not that the
phrase has no significant parts.
-' Ct Poet. 1457*4-6, where the corrupt text seeins to define a conjunction
(awfej#<«s) as that which can make many significant utterances into one; examples
are words such as "but* and 'and* (piv. ij-coi, As).
We shall see later, in chapter 8, that it is the semantic criterion

which is of the greater importance. There, if an assertion is appar-
ently simple, but in fact makes two claims, it is to be counted as
more than one assertion. This semantic complexity may be revealed
by expanding the assertion into two, linked by conjunction
(i8ai9f£). Although the resulting assertion is one in the syntactic
sense, that is, by conjunction, on the semantic criterion it is multi-
ple (18*24), and it is this criterion which is here given preference.
The distinction presented in chapter 5, then, forms part of the back-
ground knowledge concerning the assertion which we need in
order to follow Aristotle into his discussion of contradictory pairs,
beginning in chapter 7.
Inserted in this section we find another short argument to the
effect that names and verbs are mere expressions (<^«<j«f), which
do not assert anything (i7ai7~2o). It is argued that a name or verb
could not be used to express an assertion, whether in answer to a
question, or in making an utterance which is not a response to any-
thing. This is a thought experiment rather similar to the one found
in chapter 3, where Aristotle imagined one person uttering a single
word by itself, in the presence of another person (i6bi9-22). He
claimed that both speaker and hearer would register a thought
when the word was uttered, thus demonstrating that the word sig-
nified something. Nothing would be asserted, however: an assertion
demands more complexity than could be conveyed by a single
word. In chapter 5, also, we are to imagine two people, this time
one asking a question and the other attempting to reply by a single
word, or else using a single word in the attempt to make an asser-
tion. Both are impossible, we are told. This might seem strange;
surely a single word might sometimes be given as an answer to a
question. We shall see, however, that Aristotle is concerned in the
De Interpretatione with the dialectical question, which is a demand
for either an affirmation or the negation contradicting it as an
answer. Only an assertion, therefore, can answer such a question,
and a dialectical argument is constructed out of such answers. A
single word signifies, and a thought in both speaker and hearer
accompanies its utterance, but it is not an assertion, and is not the
answer to a question. We shall need to consider questions and
answers in more detail in connection, with chapter 8, and we shall
see that only full assertions count as genuine answers, and 'yes* or
'no* are mere abbreviations of them.
Chapter j: Simple and Compound Assertions 77
Following this parenthetical discussion, we find Aristotle going

on from single and multiple assertions to define simple and com-
pound ones. He now introduces two kinds of single assertions,
simple ones, which affirm or deny something of something, and
assertions which consist of these, and are therefore 'a sort of com-
pound phrase' (loyog- ng trovterog, 17*20-2): a compound assertion
is, in other words, an assertion or 'assertoric phrase' compounded
out of other ones. Simple assertions are thus those which are single
on the semantic criterion, and compound ones are those which are
single on the syntactic criterion. The final lines sum up the simple
assertion as signifying whether something holds or not, at some
time (i7324f.): this is consistent with the theory of the assertion
which emerged from chapters 2 and 3, and emphasizes that an
assertion must contain a verb, which expresses when the predicate
holds of the subject. This definition is the starting-point for the next
chapter.
6
Chapter 6: Contradictory Pairs
This chapter sees the culmination of the introductory section of the

treatise. In it, the contradictory pair is presented, and the way is
clear to move on to the detailed examination of contradictory
assertions which occupies the remainder of the work. The chapter
follows on from the division into simple and complex assertions
made in chapter 5. Complex assertions are now left on one side,
and simple affirmations and negations, which were introduced at
the start of the last chapter as the two kinds of basic assertion
(i7a8f.), are formally defined, the former as an assertion *of some-
thing concerning something' (nvog xmd nvog), while the latter
asserts something 'away from', or 'apart from' something (uvoc; and
nvog, I7a25 £), These expressions conform to the view that an affir-
mation claims that a predicate is combined with a subject, while a
negation asserts that they are divided from each other, and do not
form a single coherent entity: the theory of truth and falsehood as
matching or failing to match combinations and separations of
things implies that there are affirmative and negative assertions
representing subjects and predicates as combined or separated;
this, however, was not made explicit until now.
The main argument of the chapter now follows, in which it is
shown that all assertions belong to pairs, one member of each pair
being an affirmation, and the other a negation. The two members
of each pair contradict each other. This comes about because what-
ever may be affirmed may be denied: the same simple things
may be represented either as combined or as separated. This dis-
cussion follows directly on from the previous chapter. A simple
assertion claims either that something holds or that it does not hold
(17*23 L); these assertions are affirmations and negations (i7a25 £).
Since anything which holds can be said to hold or not to hold, and
the same may also be said of anything which does not hold, it is
quickly concluded that everything that can be affirmed can be
Chapter 6: Contradictory Pairs 79
denied, and vice versa (if'26-31). Thus, all affirmations and nega-
tions are paired off with one another; to every affirmation there is
a negation, and to every negation an affirmation (17*31-3). In any
such pair, the affirmation represents something as holding, white
the negation represents it as not holding. Having arrived at this
result, Aristotle defines a new term, that is, the contradictory pair
(dvnâoif), consisting of the affirmation and the negation which
are opposed to each other (i7a33 i).1 He also stipulates that the two
contradictory assertions must oppose each other in the same sense:
contradiction which depends on homonyrny and other sophistries
does not count as genuine (17*34-7).
Chapter 6 marks the conclusion of the project of the opening
chapters, in which new concepts and linguistic phenomena are
introduced, progressively moving on to higher levels of structure,
and making use of earlier definitions in establishing later one&
Thus, after a discussion of significant utterances, the name and verb
were defined as significant utterances of a certain sort; it was then
shown how these combine into assertions with truth value; asser-
tions themselves may be said to be members of a larger unit, that
is, the contradictory pair (cf. APo. 72*13 £,). This final unit differs
from the others in that it is, as it were, an abstraction from ordinary
language: the utterance 'man is pale-—man is not pale' is not a
quotation from ordinary speech, but an analysis of a structure
found in it.
The main task of the remaining part of the De Interpretations is
the examination of contradiction. The preliminary work of the first
six chapters enables Aristotle to begin this task in earnest. In the
first part of this study, taking up chapters 7-9, contradictory pairs
of assertions are classified according to different criteria and then
examined. For each group of assertions he tests the rule that, in
every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false.
In each of the three chapters, a group of exceptions to this rule is
found, the best-known being the future singular assertions of
chapter 9.1 shall call this rule 'RCP' (for 'Rule of Contradictory
Pairs'). It may be stated as follows:
RCP: Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other
false,
1
A more literal translation would be 'contradiction*. We also see the term used
to denote one of the members of the contradictory pair (21*22).
8o Aristotle's De Interpretatione
At this point someone accustomed to modern logical assump-

tions is likely to be surprised. Such a person would expect a nega-
tion to be true whenever the affirmation which it contradicts
is false, and vice versa: RCP could never be violated. Aristotle's
views concerning negation and contradiction are not modern
ones, however, and they leave it entirely open for there to be ex-
ceptions to RCP. Before going on to examine the exceptions
discovered in chapters 7-9 in detail, we must be clear what
Aristotle's concept of negation is, and why it allows RCP to be
violated. We must review what we have learnt about negation from
the opening chapters.
Anscombe says that 'Aristotle has not the idea of the negation
of a proposition, with the negation sign outside the whole propo-
sition.'2 She is right. For Aristotle, negation is internal to a sentence.
An affirmation claims that two elements, denoted by two words,
are combined. In 'Socrates sits.' for example, it is asserted that
Socrates and sitting cohere as a single compound entity. A nega-
tion makes the opposite claim about the same simple elements:
that is, it represents them as separated rather than as combined. In
an affirmation, it is the verb which signifies the combination of
subject and predicate, and so makes an assertion into a claim that
something holds of something else, rather than a mere list. Since
it is the verb which expresses the combination of subject and
predicate, it is the verb which must be negated if they are to be
represented instead as divided (2ia38 £.). As '&' expresses a combi-
nation, so 'is not' expresses a separation. Hie process of negation,
then, involves going to the heart of the assertion, rather than treat-
ing the assertion as an atom, and affixing the negation sign to the
outside,
We find that other words in the sentence may also be negated,
as in 'not-man' or 'not-just', but an assertion will only be a nega-
tion if the verb or copula itself is negated. So, the negation 'man
is-not just' (OVK eon dixatog av&Qamo^) must be distinguished from
the affirmation 'man is not-just' (eortv ov dixcuag avffgwjiog,
i9b24-9). One asserts a combination between man and not-just,
while the other asserts a separation between man and just: thus,
one is an affirmation and the other is a negation, and, since the two
!
G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle', Mind, 65 (1956), 1-15, repr,
in G, E. M. Anscotnbe, Collected Philosophical Papers. Vol. T: From Parmenides to
Wittgenstein (Minneapolis, 1981), 44-55,
Chapter 6: Contradictory Pairs 81
assertions do not both cite the same predicate, they must belong to
different contradictory pairs, I shall contioue with the convention
of writing 'is-not' in translating Aristotle's examples, which will
make plain that 'not* attaches to the verb, and so produces a nega-
tion and not an affirmation.
For Aristotle, then, negation is not an external operation. For one
who held a theory of external negation, it would be impossible for
RCP ever to be violated. For such a person, a negation would be a
comment on an affirmation taken as a whole: it would deny that
the affirmation is true, A suitable notation to express this view
would be 'p' for the affirmation and '~p' for the negation: the affir-
mation is taken as an atom and denied by the negation. It would
follow from this view that if the affirmation were true, the negation
which contradicts it would have to be false, and vice versa. This rela-
tion between the contradictories is represented in the truth table
for negation: if the truth value of one contradictory is given, the
truth value of the other can be inferred to be the opposite. In other
words, RCP would have to be upheld.
Aristotle, however, does not hold such a view of negation. He
sees a negation as an assertion which alleges the separation of el-
ements which an affirmation represents as combined. A better
notation to represent this view would be to write the affirmation
as 'a + b' and the negation as 'a ~ &': this would reflect Aristotle's
belief that negation is internal to the assertion, and involves alter-
ing the relation between subject and predicate from combination
to separation. It does not follow inevitably from this view of con-
tradiction that one contradictory will always be true and the other
false. Thus, truth and falsehood are not mentioned in chapter 6, and
form no part of Aristotle's definition of contradiction. Instead,
whether one contradictory is true and the other false will depend
on the nature of the items which form the subject matter of the
assertions: if there are subjects and predicates in the world which
may truly be said both to be combined and separated, or neither
to be combined nor separated, then RCP will not hold. We cannot
infer from the mere nature of contradiction that no such subjects
and predicates exist: rather, we roust make an investigation of the
types of items with which the world is stocked before deciding
whether RCP is universally true or not.
The theory which one adopts concerning negation is therefore
crucial to the status of RCP. To an exponent of external negation,
the rule will be a logical law, whose truth follows a priori from the
nature of contradiction, without requiring any examination of the
subject matter with which language is concerned: any two asser-
tions which are both true or both false cannot, by definition, be
contradictories,3 For Aristotle, on the other hand, RCP cannot be
established as true from the nature of contradiction. Rather, its
truth depends on the nature of the subject and predicate cited in
any particular assertion: it is for this reason that Aristotle under-
takes an examination of 'things' (jrpay/<ara), beginning in chapter
7, and so exposes three classes of exceptions to RCP, In other cases,
RCP is upheld; for most assertions, then, Aristotle is in agreement
with the exponent of external negation in saying that if one con-
tradictory is true, the other is false. Aristotle's account is more sat-
isfying, since it offers an explanation of how the claims made about
the world by two contradictories differ, rather than merely defin-
ing a contradictory as an assertion bearing a different truth value
from the assertion which it contradicts.
3
For an exposition of external negation and an attack on the Aristotelian ¥iew
see G. Frege, 'Negation', in P. Geach and M, Black (eds.). Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford, 1960),
7
Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP;

Singular and Universal Assertions
With this chapter, Aristotle begins his investigation of contradic-

tory pairs of assertions. In order to classify assertions into kinds, he
first divides things (MQdyfiam)1 into two groups, universals (rd
xaOofav) and singulars (rd xaffexama)? Universals are denned as
those things which can be predicated of more than one thing,
whereas singulars cannot, Man is a universal, since it is true of many
items that they are men, but Callias is a singular, because only
Callias is Callias.3 We may note that Aristotle does not define these
terms by saying that singulars can only be subjects, while univer-
sals can also be predicates. Rather, his form of expression suggests
the view that universals may be said of more than one thing, while
it is still open for a singular to be truly predicated of something,
though only of itself.
Having divided things into two classes, it is natural to divide
assertions accordingly, since assertions are made about things.
Assertions show that something holds or does not hold, either of
universals or singulars (i7bi~3). So assertions, like things, can be
divided into the universal and the singular, depending on. the type
of thing about which a claim is made, A further division is then
made within the class of assertions which take universals as their
subjects: assertions about universals are either made universally or
non-universally. Aristotle uses the noun 'universal' (TO xadalav) to
1
We here see 'thing' used in the same all-embracing sense as in chapter t,
covering all items which can be spoken of. See also SE 165*6.
2
I shall translate the latter 'singulars* and not 'particulars', for reasons which will
become apparent.
' The same distinction is made at APr. 43*15 ft In APo. I. 4 a further distinction
is drawn between what is 'throughout the whole' (x«rd aanos) and what is 'univer-
sally' (tfaOoAov): the former holds throughout some class, while the latter must also
be essential to the members of the class (73*28-34,73*"'26-74*3),
denote a thing, such as man, which is a universal, and the adverb
'universally' (xaOolov) to refer to a certain manner of making an
assertion about a universal,4 A universal assertion about a univer-
sal is marked by a word such as 'all' (nag) or 'no* (oudetg). 'All',
unlike 'man*, does not signify a universal thing. Instead, it signifies
that the assertion about the thing signified by 'man' is made uni-
versally (i7 b nt). In those assertions which are made universally,
a claim is made about every item of which the universal term can
be truly predicated: something is said to hold of every man or no
man. In a non-universal assertion about a universal, a claim is made
about a universal such as man, without adding that it holds of man
universally. The three classes of assertions may be set out as follows:
1. Assertions about singulars. Examples: Socrates is pale, Socrates
is-not pale (18*2),
2. Assertions made universally about universab. Examples: every
man is pale, no man is pale (i7b5 f.).
3. Assertions made non-universally about universals. Examples:
man is pale, man is-not pale (i7b8-ii).
In the first class, the subject is a singular, in the next two a uni-
versal. In classes 2 and 3 different kinds of claims are made about
the same type of subject. The third class is the hardest to under-
stand. Should the sample assertion be translated *a man is pale", or
'man is pale'? What would the latter mean? This will become clear
as we go on.
In the course of the chapter, Aristotle investigates the properties
of the above classes of assertions. His first observation is that
among the second group some pairs of assertions are contraries
(i7b3~5). Contraries are subsequently distinguished from contra-
dictories. The contraries 'every man is pale' and 'no man is pale'
cannot both be true together, but their contradictories can both be
true: this would be the case supposing some men to be pale and
others not (i7b22-6). Among the third group, on the other hand,
there are no contrary assertions, Aristotle adds an obscure qualifi-
cation to this, though: 'what is expressed may be contrary' (i768).
4
For a similar distinction between the ingredients of an assertion and the manner
in which the assertion is made, c£ 23b6t, where contrary thoughts are said nol to be
thoughts of contraries (evavrlum), but thoughts conceived in a contrary way
(
Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP 85
This statement may be explained as follows. Assertions of group 3

are intended merely as unqualified statements about universals
such as man, and, taken in this sense, there are no contrary asser-
tions within the group. However, we learn later in the chapter that
they can also be taken in another sense, that is, as equivalent to
assertions of group 2. So, Aristotle says that 'man is-not pale' and
'no man is pale' might seem to mean the same thing (i7b34-7). If
a group 3 assertion is used to express the same thing as an asser-
tion of group 2, then a pair of group 3 assertions may be contraries.
The point in saying 'what is expressed may be contrary* (i7b8),
then, is that the contrary assertions 'every man is pale' and 'no man
is pale' may be expressed by 'man is pale' and 'man is-not pale1,
which, if used in their proper sense, would not be contrary.5 If asser-
tions of the three classes are used in the senses in which Aristotle
intends, and not according to the misuse described later in the
chapter (i7b34-7), there can only be contraries among the quanti-
fied assertions of group 2. This is because it may be that something
holds of some men, neither of all nor of none, so that both con-
traries may be false. There can be no contraries among unquanti-
fied assertions.
Aristotle next dismisses from the discussion a form of words
which might seem to form a fourth group of assertions (17*'12-16).
No assertion can be formed in which the predicate is given uni-
versally, he says: an example would be 'every man is every animal.'
He describes this as 'not true': no true assertion can be formed in
this way, and indeed no assertion at all.6
We must now turn to consider the contradictories of assertions
in these three classes. Contradictory assertions, as we learnt in
chapter 6, affirm and deny the same thing about the same thing. It
is perfectly clear how this works in the case of singulars; the two
classes of universal assertions require more attention. Aristotle
deals with the contradictories of assertions of the second group as
follows. The negation of 'every man is pale' is 'not every man is
pale,' while the affirmation which contradicts the negation 'no man
3
We may compare Top. 134*5-17, where a distinction is drawn between what
one's words mean and wfaa? one intends to express by them (the distinction being
marked by (tovteccu / t e v , . , amtaivu <M rrj U£et, 134*9 £).
* See H. Weidemann, 'Textkritische Bemerkungen zum siebten Kapitel der aris-
totelischen Hermeneutik: Int. j, I7bi2-i6/i6-20*, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Amtoteles:
Werk und Wirkung, i (Berlin, 1985), 45-56. For a similar point, cf. APr, 43*25-7; no
true assertion can be made by taking a singular subject universally,
is pale' is 'some man is pale* (i7bi8-2o). These assertions, which

contradict universal assertions about universals, are elsewhere
called by Aristotle 'partial* (ev ueget: see APr. 24*17, 25*8 ft,
53*3 tt)-7 An assertion made 'partially' claims that something holds
at least of some part of a class, while one made universally makes
a claim about the whole of the class. Thus, the terms 'partially* (ev
(teoei) and 'universally* (xaftUou) reflect the fact that the predicate
is applied to the universal which stands as the subject either in
part or as a whole: in 'every man is pale," a claim is made about the
whole class, and in 'not every man is pale,' it is claimed that, for
some part of the class, paleness fails to hold. If one member of a
contradictory pair is a universal statement, then the other will be
partial, and vice versa, since the claim that something holds of a
class as a whole is contradicted by the claim that there is some part
for which it does not hold, and the claim that something holds of
no part of a class is opposed by the claim that it does hold of at
least one part.
Aristotle does not list partial assertions as a separate group in
chapter 7, although they are mentioned later in the treatise
(23ai6f,). We should ask, therefore, whether they belong in one of
the three groups treated in this chapter, or whether they are left
out of the scheme. In AckrilTs view, partial statements are equiva-
lent to the non-universal statements about universals of group 3.8
According to that view, 'man is pale' would be the claim that some
man is pale, and would contradict the universal statement 'no man
is pale.* If this view were correct, statements of group 2 would find
their contradictories in group 3. Ackrill supports his claim by ref-
erence to a passage in the Prior Analytics, where Aristotle says that
oon-universal statements about universals, in. that work referred to
as 'indefinite* (ddtoQurra), can be substituted for partial assertions
in the premisses of syllogisms, and the same conclusions will follow
(APr. 29*27 ft). This need only mean, however, that 'man is pale'
implies 'some man is pale'; it might be that the same inferences
could be drawn from the former as from the latter, without the two
being semantically equivalent.
We may easily see that 'man is pale' and 'some man is pale' are
not equivalent, since they do not have the same contradictory.
7
See also the discussion of 20*5-15, considered below in Chapter 10.
8
J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 129 f.
Chapter j: The First Exception to RCP 87
Aristotle gives 'man is pale' and 'man is-not pale' as contradicto-

ries (i7b31 £); but the contradictory of 'some man is pale' is 'no man
is pale' (i7 b i9f). Therefore, if 'man is pale' is to be equivalent to
'some man is pale,' then "man is-not pale* must be equivalent to 'no
man is pale,* since every assertion has only one contradictory
(i8*8i). According to Ackrill, though, 'man is-not pale' is equiva-
lent to 'not every man is pale,' since he holds that group 3 asser-
tions are equivalent to partial ones. It would follow that 'no man is
pale' is equivalent to 'not every man is pale,' which is absurd, since,
if some men were pale and others not, the latter would be true, and
the former false. Therefore assertions of group 3 cannot be equiv-
alent to partial assertions. We have learnt so far that 'man is pale'
is not the claim that at least some man is pale, and, although it may
be used in place of 'every man is pale,' this is not its proper
meaning. More will become clear about these assertions in the
course of the chapter, and we shall see that they form the first of
the exceptions to RCP.
We have seen that partial assertions are not equivalent to the
non-universal assertions about universals found in group 3, They
are not mentioned as a separate group: do they belong in either
group i or 2, or does Aristotle fail to accommodate them in his divi-
sion of assertions into three groups? To answer this question, we
should look at the account of contradictory pairs of universal state-
ments about universals, that is, group 2 assertions (i7b2&f,). For
such contradictory pairs, Aristotle says, it must always be the case
that one member is true and the other false. This statement cer-
tainly presupposes that the contradictories of group 2 assertions
are to be found within the same group. But we have that the
contradictories of the universal assertions 'every man is pale' and
*no man is pale' are the partial assertions 'not every man is pale*
and 'some man is pale.' Therefore, if the contradictories of group 2
assertions are also to be found in group 2, then partial assertions
must belong in that group as well as universal statements about uni-
versals. If partial assertions were placed in group 3 instead, as
Ackrill proposes, Aristotle would be guilty of gross confusion in
talking of contradictions among group 2 assertions, that is, univer-
sal statements made universally (i7b26£), and then giving a quite
separate treatment of contradictions in group 3, that is, among uni-
versal statements made non-universally (i7t>29~34): for, on Ackrill*s
proposal, the contradictories of group 2 assertions would be found
in group 3, so that both groups would need to be discussed together.

Therefore, the reason why partial assertions are not placed on their
own in a separate group alongside the other three is that Aristotle
wants to compare the behaviour of contradictory pairs in each
group, and for this to be possible, no contradictory pair may strad-
dle two groups: since partial assertions contradict universal ones,
both must be placed within the same group.9
In the light of this, we may now turn to consider the corrupt sen-
tence in which the contradictories of universals are described
(i7bi6-2o). As it stands, the text cannot be translated literally. On
Ackriil's translation, the contradictories are found 'when what one
signifies universally the other signifies not universally* (i7 b i7f,). w
This sentence might be taken to support Ackriil's view that partial
assertions are non-universal statements about universals, and so
belong in group 3. We have seen, however, that this cannot be
Aristotle's intention. What, then, is this sentence intended to
convey? The examples which follow are of contradictory pairs in
which a universal assertion contradicts a partial one, and it seems
clear that this is the point which Aristotle wishes to make in the
corrupt sentence. Thus, a partial negation is a statement about a
universal, to the effect that something does not hold universally
of it. 'Not every man is pale* is a statement about the universal man,
and denies that paleness holds of it universally. It asserts that there
is some part of the universal for which the universal claim does not
hold. If we bear in mind that contradictories affirm
and deny the same thing of the same subject (17*33 £), 't should
hardly be surprising to see Aristotle counting the denial of a uni-
versal assertion as being itself universal: both are concerned with
whether a predicate holds universally of a universal, the affirma-
tion affirming it and the negation denying it." The contradictory of
' This explanation of why partial assertions are omitted as a separate group in
chapter 7 is to be preferred to that proposed by Trendelenburg (F. A.Trendetenburg,
Elemenla Logkes Amtotelkae (Berlin, 1836), 43). According to him, man is a uni-
versal when compared to Callias, but is a particular when compared to animal: the
inconstancy of the concept of the partial therefore causes Aristotle to omit its
mention. Since the term 'partial' refers to a kind of assertion which can be made
about a universal.Trendelenburg is misleading in speaking of one uoiversal as stand-
ing as a particular with reference to another.
10
Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, 48-
" For a proposed emendation of the garbled text, see Weidemann, 'Textkritische
Bernerkungen", 51-6. His reconstruction is consistent with my interpretation.
a universal statement is not, as AckrilTs translation suggests, non-

universal
It is worth drawing attention to another way in which the three
groups of assertions could be confused. This confusion is that
between the singular assertions of group i arid partial assertions,
which, I have argued, belong in group 2. An assertion of the former
class makes a claim about some single, named member of a class,
such as Socrates. A partial statement, on the other hand, asserts that
something holds of at least some part of a class, without specifying
how large a part it might be, and without naming the individuals
which make it up. The former takes an individual (xaff exaarov) as
its subject, while the latter takes a universal as its subject, and
makes a certain kind of claim about it. It is true that if Socrates is
pale, then some man is pale; but the paleness of Socrates is merely
a sufficient, and not a necessary, condition for the paleness of some
man, and the assertions are certainly not equivalent.
The possible confusion of these two classes of assertions results
from the mixing up of the terms used to denote them. Aristotle's
own terms, 'singular' (naff ixaarov) and 'partial' (ev/ueget), are used
clearly and consistently. The two terms used to translate them in
Latin, however, and hence in English, have become somewhat con-
fused. Aristotle's two terms were, at first, kept distinct, the former
being translated by a word meaning single or individual ('singu-
laris'), from which the English 'singular' is derived, while the latter
was rendered as 'partial* ('particularis' or 'particulariter'), using an
adjective from the Latin for 'part*.12The misuse of the term seems
to have begun with Aquinas, who sometimes spoke of the singular
as partial.13 Thus, the Latin word originally used to mean 'partial'
came to take on the sense of "singular', with the result that 'partic-
ular* in English came to mean 'individual, single, separate', rather
than 'partial, not universal'.14
12
'Particularis* was perhaps first used by Apuleius (Peri Hermenelos 266. 11 ff.).
Tile distinction between 'universaliter* and 'particulariter' was familiar to Augustine
(Retroctationes 5); c£ also Apollonios Dyscolus' distinction between those adverbs
which apply universally (aa&olov) and those which "have a more partial application'
(fitgtxaiwgav %?» rf/v OTJVTO&V, De Adverbiis 123. i). Boethius followed this usage
(Commentarii in
" See, e.g., De Potentia 9. i. The original sense of the word is seen in Littleton's
dictionary entry for 'particularis': >ep««%, particular, pertaining to a part' (A.
Littleton, Linguae Latinae Liber Dictionarius Quadripartitus (London, 1677)}.
14
See the OED under "particular': compare sense 6 and the obsolete sense i.
Although logical works in the scholastic tradition have continued

to preserve the original usages,15 some commentators have failed to
keep them distinct. Thus, Waitz speaks of assertions about singu-
lars as particular ('enuntiatio particularis'}.16 Ackrill, in his com-
mentary, calls partial assertions 'particular', and so follows the
original use of the term. In his translation, though, he also uses 'par-
ticular* to render 'singular* (xaffexaawv)."! have chosen to use the
terms 'singular' and 'partial*, so avoiding the confusion which has
developed over the use of 'particular',
I have argued, then, that partial statements should not be con-
fused either with the non-universal statements of group 3, or with
the singular statements of group i. Partial assertions are assigned
to the same group as universal statements made universally (group
2). In the Prior Analytics, they are distinguished as a separate
group. The advantage for Aristotle in assigning partial assertions to
group 2 in the De Interpretatione, rather than to a separate group
of their own, is that he thereby ensures that each of his three groups
contains both members of every contradictory pair: there is no con-
tradictory pair such that its two members belong to different
groups. This allows a separate treatment of contradiction to be
given in each of the three groups. Since this is Aristotle's prevail-
ing concern in the De Interpretatione, the method of classification
in chapter 7 is suited to his needs.
Now that we have seen that the three groups of assertions in
chapter 7 are distinct from one another, we need to turn to the non-
universal assertions about universals and address the question of
what these assertions actually mean. As we have seen, in the Prior
Analytics Aristotle does not give them an independent role: for the
purposes of the syllogism, they are equivalent to partial assertions
(AJPr. 29*27 f t ) . Ackrill wishes to assimilate them to partial asser-
tions in the De Interpretatione as well, while Anscombe also dis-
misses them, observing that this type of assertion is one in which
'we (nowadays) are not interested'.18 Aristotle agrees that they are
not interesting from the point of view of deductive logic; from the
15
e.g. J.-A, Draowski, Institutiones Philosophlcae, 3 vols, in i (Leuven, 1840-1),
L is; 1 i. Urrfburu, Compendium Philosophiae Sc.hoiasti.cae, 2 vols, (Madrid, 1902),
i jjt
16
T. Waitz, Aristotelis Organon Graece, 2 vols., i. 334.
'•' Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, 47,129,
m
G. E, M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle', Mind, 65 (1956), 1-15.
point of view of dialectic, however, with which, I shall argue,

the De Interpretations is directly concerned, they are of the very
greatest importance.
Non-universal statements about universals are needed in order
to make certain important claims about universals, which cannot
be made by assertions of the other classes. The accident, genus,
property, and definition all require non-universal assertions about
universals in order to be assigned to their subjects. These four are
of great importance in the Topics, They are introduced together in
chapter 5 of book I, and books IV, V, and VI are devoted to tech-
niques for establishing and demolishing them. They each involve
attaching a predicate to a universal as subject. We may see from
the De Interpretatione how this is possible. We were told at the
beginning of chapter 7 that universals are things, just as are singu-
lars." They differ from singulars in that they may be predicated of
many things: however, they may also be subjects, and have other
things predicated of them. Thus, just as we can say 'Socrates is pale,*
so we can say 'man is pale,'20 This does not mean that some man is
pale, although it implies that, and equally, its usual meaning is not
'every man is pale.' It merely means that a predicate holds of the
thing, man.
Examples of the use of such assertions are as follows. If
something holds of some, but not all, of the items falling under
the universal, then it is an accident of the universal, and so may be
said to hold of it (Top. 102^5, io3bi8f., I54b33~6; cf. Mete. A,
ioi5b28ff.). If some man is capable of writing, then it will be true
to say that man and also animal are capable of writing (Cat, 3a4).
Thus, if some men are pale and others are not, it will still be the
case that paleness is an accident of man, and so holds of man
(vjidffxei &£ T<y xgdyfictn, Top. I02b5; cf, also Top, !55a28-36).
Therefore, it will be true to say 'man is pale,' since an assertion
states 'that something holds or not' (tog vxdgxet n f ftij, De Int. ijb2).
Similarly, the genus, such as 'man is an animal,' the property, such
as 'man is rational,' and the definition, such as 'man is a
rational animal,5 all require non-universal assertions with univer-
sals as their subjects (Top. I. 5,6,8). For the purposes of dialectic,
then, it must be possible to make statements of this form, and not
" This allows Aristotle to say that, 'man' signifies a single thing (Meta, T, 1006*3' )•
28
Cf.APr. 43*29-32.
just to assert that every man is rational, or that some man is

rational,21
We may now go on to consider further Aristotle's treatment of
these assertions in the chapter at hand. An examination of the
behaviour of contradictory pairs belonging to each of the three
groups of assertions takes up the later part of the chapter
(i7b26ff.). It is discovered that the three groups behave differently.
In the case of the first group, statements about singulars, and the
second, universal statements about universals, it must be the case
that one member of the contradictory pair is true and the other
false (i7b26-9). For the third group, though, this is not always the
case: RCP may be violated (1/7*29 i). An explanation of this follows
(i7b29-34). It is simultaneously true, he says, that man is pale and
is-not pale. Man is fair and is-not fair, since man is ugly, and what
is ugly is-not fair.
A number of questions arise concerning this argument. First, we
need to understand why it is that universals furnish exceptions to
RCP whereas singulars do not. What is it about universals that
makes them different? Secondly, we were told at the end of chapter
6 that contradictories affirm and deny exactly the same thing, and
not homonymously or in any other merely sophistic way (i?335-7).
Are these genuine contradictories, or merely homonymous ones?
If the truth of the above assertions depends on man's being pale in
one respect and not pale in another, then a genuine exception to
RCP has not been discovered.
An example of a merely sophistical contradiction is as follows.
An Ethiopian is black and not black, since he is black of skin but
white of tooth (SE 167*10-14). He sophism results from illicitly
dropping the qualifiers. The contrary attributes hold of the subject
in different respects, and so, while it might seem that the Ethiopian
could truly be said to be black and not to be black, the affirmation
that the Ethiopian is black in one respect does not find its genuine
contradictory in the negation which denies that he is black in some
other respect: therefore these claims would not form a contradic-
21
The troth of the non-universal assertion does not imply the truth of the uni-
versal one. Even if the non-universal assertion cites a property of the subject, there
is a case in which it may not hold universally: a property which holds by nature but
not always, as seen in 'man is two-footed,* will not hold of the subject universally;
while man is naturally two-footed, it is not the case that every man has two feet
(Top. i34"5-i7)-
Chapter j: The First Exception to RCP 93
tory pair, and so could not furnish an exception to RCP (SE

i68bi i ff.). The case of the universal man is different from that of
the singular Ethiopian, however. One single man cannot both be
pale and not be pale in the same respect: thus, a statement about a
singular cannot violate RCP.22 Considering men in general, though,
we find that some are pale and others are not. We have in the
case of 'capable of writing' that whatever holds of individual men,
that is, of singulars of which the universal man is truly predicated,
also holds of man. Thus, very many diverse and contrary properties
hold of the universal, man, in virtue of the properties which hold
of the individuals. While an individual man will not be both fair and
ugly at the same time in the same respect, it will be true to say of
man that he is both fair and ugly: the fairness of the universal man
is justified by certain members of the class, while its ugliness is jus-
tified by other members. 'Man is fair' and 'man is ugly' are both
true for the same reason, that is, because they hold of certain men.
Therefore, given Aristotle's beliefs about universals, it seems
reasonable to treat these assertions as conveying opposite pre-
dicates oon-homonyinously of the same subject.
Only the final step is needed, that what is ugly is-not fair.29
Presumably, those men who are ugly are-not fair; they are sep-
arated from fairness, as the fair men are combined with it. Since
accidents which hold of individual men also hold of man, man will
be ugly, and since what is ugly is-not fair, man will not be fair. The
universal man will thus be both combined with fairness and sepa-
rated from it, in virtue of the individual men who are, on the one
hand, fair, and those who are, on the other, ugly and therefore not
fair. Thus, man both is and is-not fair. Therefore, he concludes that
these non-universal statements about universals can violate RCP,
while singular statements cannot.
The remainder of the chapter is largely an explanation and
summary of what went before. Aristotle explains the difference
between the second and third groups of assertions (i7b34-7); he
then reaffirms that an affirmation has only one negation and vice
versa, and sets out examples of contradictory pairs in each of the
three groups (i7b37ff.).This incorporates his conclusions concern-
ing how to assign assertions to contradictory pairs: when he set out
K
The same applies to Platonic Forms. They have the simplicity of individuate, so
that the same Form could not have contradictory properties (Top. 14^11-32).
v
We see this principle used also at 23*15 tt
examples of group 2 and 3 assertions earlier in the chapter

(i7b5-i i), the examples given were not contradictories.
In chapter 7 we begin to see clear signs of Aristotle's interest in
providing theory relevant to dialectic. Non-universal assertions
about universals are of use for dialectic, rather than syllogistic. We
have seen that they may be substituted for partial assertions in a
syllogism (APr. 29*27 ft). From the point of view of the Prior
Analytics, then, these assertions would not need to be treated sep-
arately, and are not of interest. In the Topics, however, the assign-
ing of accidents, genera, properties, and definitions are important
skills, to which Aristotle devotes a great deal of attention. All four
of these projects will involve making non-universal claims about
universals. The consideration of these assertions in chapter 7, then,
is relevant to dialectic. It will be important for the dialectician to
realize that such assertions do not always obey RCP: this will mean
that the truth of 'man is not pale' does not imply the falsehood of
'man is pale/ and so, for example, proving the former will not
amount to refuting the latter. In chapter 8 we shall learn more
about the dialectical motivation for examining contradictory pairs
and identifying exceptions to RCP.
8
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to
RCP; Hidden Complex Assertions
i. TWO ASSERTIONS HIDDEN IN ONE
In chapter 8, Aristotle goes on to look at assertions in a new light,

and discovers a second class of exceptions to RCP, The chapter
begins with a definition of a single assertion as 'signifying one thing
of one. thing* (18*13 ft); examples of such assertions are then
repeated from the previous chapter, making both universal and
non-universal claims about the universal subject man. It is then
added that these examples will only count as single assertions if the
predicate 'pale' signifies a single thing (18*17),
We have already seen simple and compound assertions discussed
in chapter 5, where two different criteria were given for what is a
single assertion. One was syntactic: according to this, two separate
claims may be made in a single assertion, if two assertions are
joined by conjunction. According to the other, semantic, criterion,
an assertion which makes more than one claim is in fact more than
one assertion, regardless of whether it is single syntactically. At the
end of chapter 5, the simple assertion is defined using the seman-
tic criterion: it is a significant utterance concerning whether some-
thing holds or does not hold, at some time (17*23 £). Chapters 6 and
7 follow on from this, and concern assertions which are semanti-
cally single. Thus, the definition of the single assertion at the begin-
ning of chapter 8 matches that of the simple assertion at the end
of chapter 5, both relying on the semantic criterion of asserting 'one
thing of one thing',
In chapter 8, Aristotle exposes the possibility that some asser-
tions might seem simple, but in fact be complex: in these cases, he
argues, two separate assertions lie concealed in what appears to be
only one. This complexity may be revealed by expanding the appar-
ently simple assertion into a compound one, consisting of two

simple assertions conjoined. This, in turn, counts according to the
semantic criterion as being more than one assertion. Thus, the
semantic criterion is taken as the guide to whether an assertion is
really simple or not. This is consistent with the procedure which we
see throughout the treatise. In the investigation of language in the
early chapters, signification was used as the principal means of clas-
sifying types of utterance.1 So, here, it is the signification of the
assertion which is of importance, and not its outward linguistic
form. It will then be found that these semantically complex asser-
tions furnish a second exception to RCP.
These hidden complex assertions come about, we are told, when
one name applies to two things. Since a simple assertion is one
which asserts one thing of one thing, if one of the words does not
stand for a single thing, an assertion using that name will not count
as a single assertion (i8ai8£). For his example of a complex asser-
tion, Aristotle supposes that the word 'cloak' applies to man and
horse.2 It is at first unclear what this means: is 'cloak' supposed to
be ambiguous between the two senses, so that in certain contexts
it would mean 'man*, and in others 'horse*? Or is 'man and horse*
supposed to denote a compound entity, like a horse and rider,
which might be talked about as a unit, without counting as one
in the proper sense? Or, again, might 'cloak' be intended as the
genus of man and horse? This will become clear as we go on.
Aristotle exposes the multiple meaning of his made-up assertion
by expanding it into equivalent assertions that display the com-
plexity openly.
It is asserted that
1. Cloak is pale-
would not differ from
2. Horse and man is pale,
which in turn would not differ from

3. Horse is pale and man is pale (i8a20-3),
1
See, e.g., i6aj9-26, "6-10,19-15, j6&26-i7*a.
2
Aristotle may again be seen to have the Cratylus in mind: 'tnan! and 'horse*
were there employed as examples (Crat. 38586-10),
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP 97
Aristotle goes on to say that the two expanded assertions, 2

and 3, 'have a multiple signification and are multiple' (18*24),
Therefore, i also signifies more than one thing, if it signifies any-
thing at all (i8a24f.), since it is equivalent to the other two. His
strategy is to expose the hidden complexity in i by showing that it
is equivalent to 3, which is an obviously compound assertion made
by the conjunction of two simple ones. The complex form of 3
reveals the semantic complexity which is present in i, but obscured
by its simplicity of form.
The last stage of this argument deserves some attention. It is con-
cluded that i has either a multiple signification or no signification
at all, since no man is a horse (18*25 £). This would seem to imply
two ways of interpreting 'man and horse*: according to one, it would
stand for more than one thing, while according to the other, it
would stand for that which is both a man and a horse; since there
is no such thing, it would therefore signify nothing. The point of
the argument is to show that i is not really one assertion, as it
appears, but two: 'if one name applies to two things which do not
constitute a unity, there will not be a single affirmation* (i8ai8t).
So, Aristotle does not wish to conclude that i is meaningless, but
that it contains two assertions. We are therefore not meant to
accept the alternative that i is meaningless: 'man and horse', in
other words, should not be taken in the sense of 'that which is both
a man and a horse*. This last stage of the argument thus empha-
sizes that there is no interpretation of'man and horse' which makes
i into a single assertion. Either it is multiple, or, if we understand
'man and horse' differently, it is meaningless: in any case, it is not
a single assertion.
We may now see what it means to suppose that 'cloak* stands for
'man and horse*. Aristotle cannot mean 'cloak* to be an ambiguous
word, which might signify either man or horse. Had he meant this,
i would not be equivalent to 3: instead, 'cloak is pale* would either
mean 'horse is pale* or 'man is pale,' depending on which sense of
'cloak* was intended, just as 'bank' does not mean 'a financial insti-
tution and a hill', but one or the other depending on context. We
see instead that a statement about cloak involves making a state-
ment both about man and about horse, not an ambiguous claim
about one or the other. This implies that 'cloak' is meant as a word
which is adopted to stand for two separate things misleadingly
taken together as if they were a single unit, such as a horse and
98 Aristotle's De Intetpretatione
rider. This has an important bearing on how assertions of this type

violate RCP, as we shall see,
Ackrill objects that Aristotle's argument is ruined by his choice
of "man* and 'horse* as examples.3 He argues that there are other
assertions involving objects which are not genuine unities, which
could not be interpreted so as to be meaningless: 'man and horse*
can be interpreted as 'all that is a man and a horse', which is
vacuous, but 'white walking man*, which is also a compound, has
no such vacuous interpretation: Aristotle would then be unable to
make the move of saying that the assertion signifies nothing, since
it is not true to say that nothing is a white walking man. Ackrill
concludes that the example of 'man and horse' would not stand for
all compound assertions and that, therefore, there are compound
assertions which are not exceptions to the rule. This complaint does
not harm Aristotle's case, The status of an assertion as an excep-
tion to RCP does not depend on the possibility of its being inter-
preted as meaningless, nor does he say that all compound assertions
can be interpreted in this way. The exception to RCP is supplied
not by the interpretation of 'cloak is pale' which renders it mean-
ingless, but by that according to which it stands for two things taken
together. 'Socrates is a white walking man' could also supply an
exception to RCP, if part of the predicate held and part did not, as
we shall see below (see Top, I57b28 £); I shall return to this example
in Chapter n.
2. UNANSWERABLE QUESTIONS:
THE DIALECTICAL BACKGROUND
Following this argument that 'cloak is pale' is in fact two assertions

and not one, Aristotle concludes the chapter abruptly, with the
words 'so that neither in the case of these assertions is it
necessary for one contradictory to be true and the other false*
(18*261). In other words, he has come upon another class of asser-
tions for which RCP is not upheld. Chapter 8 itself does not provide
any explanation as to why these hidden compound assertions
3
J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations (Oxford, 1963), 131.
Ackriil's interpretation of these lines 1$ developed by Irwin (T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle's
Concept of Signification', in M. Schofield and M, Nussbaum (eds,), Language and
Logos (Cambridge, 1982), 241-66; sec 245).
violate the rule, and we need to turn to chapter n for further infor-
mation. There he repeats the point that an assertion which asserts
one thing of many or many of one does not count as single; we may
not conclude, just because a single word is used, that a single thing
is designated by it (20hi2 ft), As in chapter 8, assertions which are
apparently simple may in fact be complex, if the words that stand
for subject and predicate do not signify a single thing. In these
cases, 'there is a single utterance, but more than one assertion'
(20b20l).
Aristotle goes on to explain the importance of assertions which
are compound, though apparently simple (20*22-30), A dialectical
question expects as its answer one member or the other of a certain
contradictory pair. In posing a question, both members of a con-
tradictory pair are offered, and the answerer is invited to choose
which member is true. Certain dialectical questions are unanswer-
able, though: if the question is compound in the way we have been
discussing, then a single response is not appropriate. The two ques-
tions that have been asked under the guise of a single one may
deserve to be answered differently; furthermore, even if a single
true answer could be given to both, Aristotle insists that it is not
right to give a single answer to what was not a single question
(20b24-6).
At this point (2Obz6) we are referred to the Topics, and it is to
that work and to the Sophistici Elenchi that we must look in order
to understand more. The proper posing and answering of questions
is of the greatest importance in dialectic, book VIII of the Topics
being devoted to the subject. If a question is properly put, then the
answerer has only to answer *yes' or 'no.' If it has been improperly
phrased, though, the answerer may need to correct the faultiness
of the question in order to obtain something to which an answer
can be given (Top. i5?b6-33; SE I75b7~i4), Double questions are
dealt with in chapter 5 of the Sophistici Elenchi*This sophistry
involves making two questions into one, so that the answerer does
not realize that he is being presented with more than one question,
and answers as if only one thing had been asked (SE i67b38ff.). In
some cases it is easier to tell that there are in fact two questions
hidden in one, and in other cases it is more difficult.
4
The sophistry is also mentioned by Plato (Corg. 4660, 5033); see G. Ryle,
'Dialectic in the Academy*, in J. R. Bambrough (ed.). New Esmys on Plato and
Aristotle (London, 1965),
loo Aristotle's De Interpretatione
The consequence of answering a double question as if it were

single is that the answerer may lay himself open to refutation. This
comes about if one of the two hidden questions ought to be
answered in the affirmative and the other in the negative. One way
in which two questions may be rolled into one is if the subject is
itself a compound consisting of two items. Thus, something which
naturally has sight is either seeing or blind; but this only applies to
subjects taken singly. It does not follow that two things, falsely
taken together as a unity, are either both sighted or both blind (SE
168*13-16). So, of a single subject, it would be true to say that it is
blind or not: thus, RCP would be upheld, since of 'it is blind' and
*it is not blind' one is true and the other false. If we consider a com-
pound subject, on the other hand, consisting of two people, this
need not be the case: to insist on RCP here would be to say that
either both the people are blind or neither is,
A modern logician would object that the negation of 'Callias and
Coriscus are both blind' is 'it is not the case that Callias and
Coriscus are both blind,' so that the latter would be false if either
or both of the two men were sighted, and there would be no occa-
sion for RGP to be violated. This would follow from the truth table
for negation. However, Aristotle does not form negations by pre-
fixing 'it is not the case that' to the affirmation. We have seen that
for Aristotle, negation is internal to the assertion. A negation rep-
resents subject and predicate as separate rather than as cohering
as a unity; it denies that the predicate holds of the subject. In this
case, if the subject is denoted by 'Callias and Coriscus* the nega-
tion must claim that blindness is separated from Callias and
Coriscus, In other words, blindness must hold neither of Callias nor
of Coriscus, On the other hand, the affirmation that 'Callias and
Coriscus are blind' would only be true if both men were Wind, since
both men together constitute the subject, and an affirmation claims
that the predicate and subject are combined. The result is that both
affirmation and negation could be false, supposing, for example,
CalMas to be blind and Coriscus sighted, and so RCP would not be
upheld. The possibility of the rule's being violated arises because
the subject is not a genuine unity, and this is Aristotle's point in
chapter 8 of the De Interpretatione.
Reference to dialectic has enabled us to understand why it is that
chapter 8 furnishes a second exception to RCP. It can also show us
why exceptions to RCP are important. The consequence of this vio-
lation of RCP for dialectic is that double questions do not have

yes-no answers. When a dialectical question is asked, the answerer
is required to assent to one member of a contradictory pair or the
other. The answer 'yes* is the claim that the affirmation is true, and
the answer 'no* is the claim that the negation is true: yet in the
contradictory pairs which we have been considering, neither
member is true, and so neither the answer 'yes' nor 'no' is correct.
We have seen, then, why it is that certain contradictory pairs in
which concealed double claims are made violate RCP, and why
the associated concealed double questions cannot be correctly
answered. Aristotle also expresses a stronger position, namely
that it is never right to give a single answer to a double question,
even if both questions taken separately would be correctly
answered in the affirmative, or both in the negative (De Int.
2ob24-6; SE 176*3-18), So, if someone asked, 'are Coriscus and
Callias at home or not?* it would not be right to answer 'yes1 or
'no,' even if both were at home or both out: the fact that both el-
ements of a double assertion are true does not make it into a single
ooe (SE I7&$t).
So, even these double questions are unanswerable. We may
account for this as follows. If we suppose that Coriscus and Callias
are both at home, then the two concealed questions, asking sep-
arately whether each was at home, would both be correctly
answered in the affirmative. It might seem from this that the same
answer, that is, 'yes,' would do for both questions. This, however, is
misleading, A dialectical question is a demand that the answerer
assent to one member of a contradictory pair or the other: the
words 'yes' and 'no' merely stand for the choice of one member or
other of the pair. The real answer is not 'yes,' but the assertion to
which the answerer assents. For example, the correct answer to %
Callias at home?' is either 'Callias is at home* or 'Callias is not at
home,* 'Yes' and 'no' merely abbreviate these replies. A semanti-
cally single assertion cannot possibly be the answer to more than
one dialectical question, just as one assertion cannot belong to
more than one contradictory pair.5 This follows from the definition
5
We might ask whether 'Callias is at home* might also be the answer to another
question, that is, 'isn't Callias at home?* This would be to view questions in a way
alien to Aristotle, however. A dialectical question offers both members of a con-
tradictory pair equally, without claiming that one in particular is true and the other
is false (e.g. APo. 72*7-11): it is then up to the answerer to choose which portion of
of the dialectical question as the demand for one member or other

of a contradictory pair (e.g. De Int. 20b23ff.), Similarly, a single
question can only have a single right answer (SE i8ia37f>); of
course, it also has one wrong answer, the contradictory of the right
one. An interesting example of a double question supports
Aristotle's point that questions can only be answered singly. The
question is, 'Is this and this a man?" (SE 168*5). Pointing either to
this or to this will not seem to answer the question, since the subject
of the question was 'this and this'. The question could only be
answered by pointing to both at once; but pointing, like other forms
of answering, can only pick out one thing at a time.
It is a mistake, then, to suppose that 'yes' is the same answer
when given in response to different questions, since it will repre-
sent different assertions in each case. So, a double question, both
of whose concealed questions deserve an affirmative answer,
cannot be answered with a single reply; only two assertions can
answer two questions. In such a case, Aristotle says, 'yes' and 'no'
are not answers at all: 'nor has the speaker given an answer, but
has only said something* (SE ij6ai6).6 We may compare the state-
ment in chapter 5 of the De Interpretatione that names and verbs
are mere utterances (tpdaeif), and cannot be the answers to ques-
tions: they cannot genuinely answer questions because they cannot
assert anything, and the answer to a question is an assertion
(17" 17-20). Answers to questions, then, are assertions; if names and
verbs are not assertions, then they are not answers to questions. The
dialectical motivation of Aristotle's study of assertions in the De
Interpretatione is here apparent.
The double questions which we have considered in the Sophlstici
Elenchi so far have differed from the example of De Interpretatione
8 in one respect: in 'are Callias and Coriscus at home?' the com-
plexity of the question is at once evident, whereas in 'cloak is pale'
the contradiction is the true one. There can therefore be no difference between
'is Callias at horn*?' and 'isn't Callias at home?": they are the same question, with
only one right answer. It is interesting to compare De Int. 22|I8-I0, where 'neces-
sary* and 'impossible' are said to signify the same thing, but "conversely*
{®Tr£e&TQaft[t£v&jg},
* At Top. 160*23-34, however, a different position is seen. There, Aristotle admits
that there are cases in which a question with multiple meaning may be given a single
answer, If the source of ambiguity is well known, and if the predicate attaches or
does not attach to the subject in all its senses (that is, if RCP is not violated), then
a single answer may be given.
semantic complexity is obscured by an apparent simplicity of form.

In order to reveal the two claims which 'cloak is pale* makes, it was
necessary to expand 'cloak' to 'man and horse'. Examples of double
questions containing a word which stands for two things are also
found in the Sophistici Elenchi, Instead of asking the double ques-
tion 'are Callias and Themistoeies musical?' we might substitute a
single word which stands for both Callias and Themistoeies (SE
I75b39 ff,). The result, we are told, would still be a double question:
if the word substituted for the two names stands for more than one
thing, then more than one question has been asked (176*2 f.), and,
we may infer, the only difference would be that the semantic com-
plexity of the assertion would be more deeply hidden. Here we see
a very similar example to the use of 'cloak' for 'man and horse',
The real complexity of the question is hidden by means of the use
of one word to stand for two things.
In the Sophistici Elenchi Aristotle connects double questions
with sophistries which are to do with homonymy and amphiboly
(SE i65b3o-i66a2i). Homonymy covers sophistries playing on a
word which has more than one sense, while amphiboly covers
longer expressions which are ambiguous, even though the words of
which they are composed are not. Although he at first lists
homonymy and amphiboly as sophistries which rely on language
(Ae|«:, 165*23 ff), and double questions as ones which do not
(i66s27), he later draws a connection between the two, saying that
the former depend on the latter, and may also be seen as instances
of making several questions into one (i?5b39 ff.). Indeed, he is pre-
pared to speak of both as cases of homonymy, that is, cases in which
one word signifies more than one thing (166*16, 176*2). Thus, the
single word that stands for Callias and Themistoeies can be
regarded as homonymous (i75b39ft), as can 'Coriscus*, which
stands for two men of the same name (i75bi5ffc). The two cases
differ, since in the former, one word refers to the two men taken
together, while in the latter case 'Coriscus' is not a name for a pair
of men, but a name which might apply to either one of the two
namesakes, although it is left unclear which.
For the purposes of the Sophistici Elenchi, however, there is no
need to distinguish the two types of case. In both, two questions are
hidden in one, and the strategy for dealing with them in argument
is the same: the hidden complexity must be exposed, and the two
questions separated before they can be answered. A passage in the
104 Aristotle's De Interpretation*
Topics shows clearly how ambiguous assertions function in the
same way as double ones (129^0 f£). In giving a property, Aristotle
says, no word should be ambiguous (nleova^&c Mye-rai), He gives
two reasons for this instruction. First, the expression will be
obscure, since one will not know which one of the two senses of
the ambiguous word is intended (130*2-4), just as above it was
unclear which Coriseus was meant. Secondly, the property will be
prone to refutation, since an opponent could attack one of the
meanings which was not intended. In order to be secure from refu-
tation, then, the claim must hold true for all senses of the ambigu-
ous word. Thus, a statement containing an ambiguous word also
expresses a double assertion. This justifies Aristotle in treating
ambiguous assertions as cases of assertions which contain two sep-
arate claims, since an opponent may interpret what is said in either
of two ways.7
We have seen that the scope of the Topics and Sophistid Elenchi
is broader than that of the De Interpretatione, The Sophistid
Elenchi is concerned with all questions which put the answerer in
the position of being unable to give a correct answer. Accordingly,
it covers questions which are obviously double and those which are
apparently single but really double, as well as questions which can
be taken in two senses either by reason of homonymy or amphi-
boly. In all of these cases the answerer finds himself giving a single
answer when a single question has not been asked. Either both of
two questions are posed under the guise of a single one, or else, in
the case of homonymy and amphiboly, either of two, without the
questioner having made it clear which one he meant.
In the De Interpretatione, on the other hand, we find that the
range of assertions under discussion is more restricted. At the end
of chapter 5, the scope is narrowed to simple assertions, so as to
rule out the class of single assertions which was defined as com-
pound: these are assertions formed by conjoining simple ones, such
as 'man is pale and horse is pale' (ijs2î). Aristotle is interested
only in statements which assert that something holds or does not
1
Amphiboly also involves two questions disguised as one. An example is a ques-
tion which may either be taken to ask whether one may be silent while speaking,
or whether one may speak of things which are silent (%' «m mytona Uynw; SE
166*12), We see that, whether the answerer says 'yes' or 'no,* the questioner may
interpret the question so as to make the answer false: 'yes* may be taken as a
false answer to the first question, while *no' can be taken as a false answer to the
secood.
hold of something, not those which make two assertions, one after
the other (17*25 £}. Following the argument in chapter 6 that simple
assertions are either affirmations or negations, and that they may
all be ordered into contradictory pairs, a further restriction is
added. Assertions are only to be considered to be genuinely con-
tradictory which assert and deny 'the same thing of the same thing,
and not homonymously' (17*35): the same predicate and subject
must appear in both affirmation and negation. This requirement
would rule out assertions such as 'Coriscus is blind,' where there
are two men with the same name, so that either of two claims might
equally well be represented by the same words.
So, both obviously compound assertions and those in which
homonymous terms appear have been excluded from the discus-
sion in chapters 5 and 6. Had they been included, both, as we have
seen in the Sophistici Elenchi, would have furnished examples of
contradictory pairs which violate RCP, and consequently of unan-
swerable dialectical questions. However, even with the discussion
limited to assertions containing non-homonymous words, in which
'something is asserted of something,' problematic types of asser-
tion remain. The hidden compound assertions discussed in chapter
8 were not ruled out by either of the restrictions seen in chapters
5 and 6. 'Cloak is pale' is not a compound assertion, and so should
count as simple (17*20-2), Further, it is not ruled out along with
assertions which contain homonymous words, because 'cloak' is
not homonymous, but stands for two things taken together as a
unit.
Chapter 8 thus pursues the project of studying simple assertions
in non-homonymous contradictory pairs, but finds that within the
class of apparently simple assertions there are some which are
nevertheless not single; they are simple as opposed to complex in
their outward form, but, on the semantic criterion of whether they
make a single claim of a single subject or not, they turn out to be
multiple. These result when an assertion contains a word which
stands for two things taken together as if they were one. At the start
of the chapter the semantic criterion for the unity of an assertion
is invoked: a single assertion must assert a single thing of a single
thing (i8 a i2f,), not just 'something of something' (17*25 fc). These
contradictory pairs of apparently simple assertions do not neces-
sarily abide by RCP, since for an affirmation to be true, both of the
concealed predications must hold, and for the negation to be true,
neither must hold. If one concealed predication holds and the
other does not, then both members of the contradictory pair will
be false.
We have also seen that Aristotle's interest in RCP in chapter 8
is closely connected to his interest in the issue of which dialectical
questions can be answered and which cannot. Questions and con-
tradictory pairs are linked, A question is a demand for agreement,
'either with the premiss or the other portion of the contradiction'
(2ob23): in asking a question a premiss is put forward, with which
the answerer may agree or disagree. A dialectical question, in fact,
amounts to the same thing as a dialectical premiss (Top. 104^8; A Pa,
72a9f.); Aristotle even allows himself to speak of a question as
being true or false (Top, 160*23 ft)-8
To give the correct answer to a dialectical question, then, is to
select the true member of a contradictory pair and reject the false
member. This is obviously impossible in cases in which there is not
one true member and one false member, that is, if RCP is not
upheld. In chapter 8 we have seen contradictory pairs in which both
members are false; there is thus no true assertion to select from the
pair, and the question which offers both members of the pair for
acceptance or rejection cannot be answered. Similarly, in chapter 7
we saw contradictory pairs in which both members were true. To
accept either assertion would be to reject the other; yet neither can
be rejected, and so the dialectical question cannot be answered. To
answer a question involves an act of acceptance and an act of rejec-
tion. If either of these acts is impossible, then the question cannot
be answered. A contradictory pair which violates RCP thus corre-
sponds to a question which is unanswerable.
The existence of such contradictory pairs is of great significance
for the practice of dialectic. In a dialectical debate, one person
adopts a position, and is then the answerer, while another person,
the questioner, proposes questions with the aim of eliciting a train
of assertions from the answerer which will form an argument
ending in the refutation of his position. The assertions which form
s
We should not make the mistake of insisting that the De Int. is a treatise about
assertions only, and that questions are alien to the enquiry in the same way as
prayers and other expressions which lack truth value, which were dismissed from
consideration, in chapter 4 (i7a2-7). The diaiectical question and the contradictory
pair of assertions are intimately connected.
the stages in this argument must be the replies to genuine dialec-

tical questions: the answerer must be offered a choice between a
true assertion and a false one which contradict each other, and
should do his best to identify which one is true and which false. If
both possible answers to the question are false, the answerer will
be forced to commit himself to a position which may then be
refuted; if both are true, by accepting one he may be taken to have
denied the other, and may then be shown to have denied some-
thing true. So, if the questioner poses a question which has either
both false answers or both true answers, rather than one true and
one false, and the answerer is unwary enough to give an answer,
then the answerer will be unable to avoid committing himself to a
falsehood,
The answers given, are used by the questioner as the premisses
of his argument, leading to the refutation of the thesis. Clearly, if
some of these premisses are false, any conclusion which rests on
them will not constitute a genuine refutation. Since dialectic is con-
cerned with genuine refutations, the existence of questions which
cannot be answered without committing oneself to a falsehood is
a threat to the normal functioning of an argument. A wide range
of false refutations is dealt with in the Sophistid ElenchL Even once
homonymy, ambiguity, and other sophistic tricks are excluded as
impermissible, however, there still remain certain unanswerable
questions based on apparently normal contradictory pairs of asser-
tions. These questions offer the answerer a choice between two
assertions which contradict each other, and which do not contain
any ambiguous terms; yet, it is not the case that one of the answers
is true and the other false. These questions are those based on con-
tradictory pairs which violate RCP, examples of which we have seen
in chapters 7 and 8.
We may see from this that Aristotle's investigation of RCP is of
great importance to the practice of dialectic, which requires for its
operation assertions which can be ordered into contradictory pairs,
where one member is true and the other false. In order to avoid
the pitfalls represented by exceptions to this rule, the dialectician
must master the theory contained in the De Interpretations, just as
he must be familiar with the false refutations described in the
Sophistid ElenchL Then, if the dialectician is confronted with
the question 'is man pale?' or Is cloak pale?' he will know from
the De Interpretatione that such a question cannot be answered,
and will be able to explain why not. Chapters 7 and 8 thus pro¥ide
knowledge essential for the dialectician, as does chapter 9, in which
we shall see the third and final exception to RCP exposed.
9
Chapter 9: The Third Exception to RCP;
Future Singular Assertions
We have seen in chapters 7 and 8 how Aristotle exposes two classes

of contradictory pairs which contain exceptions to RCP, In chapter
7, we saw that in the case of non-universal assertions made con-
cerning universals, such as 'man is pale,* both affirmation and nega-
tion could be true; then, in chapter 8, we learnt that a contradictory
pair of assertions which were apparently simple, but in fact con-
cealed two different claims, could furnish an affirmation and nega-
tion which are both false. In chapter 9 the search for exceptions to
RCP continues, and a third class of exceptions is exposed, consist-
ing of assertions concerning future singulars. This is an important
point to recognize. It is usual among commentators to treat chapter
9 as an isolated treatment of fatalism, not the continuation of a dis-
cussion of RCP which began with chapter 7, Thus, the chapter is
normally discussed without reference to the rest of the work, and
some almost seem to regard it as a separate treatise.1 By treating
the chapter in this way, commentators have missed the fact that
the chapter concerns RCP at all; they therefore cannot appreciate
how Aristotle sets up the problem of fatalism, or the subtle manner
in which he solves it at the end of the chapter. I shall argue for a
new understanding of chapter 9, which becomes possible by
approaching it fresh from chapters 7 and 8, and so setting it in its
context.
The strategy of the chapter is as follows. Aristotle first argues
that, on the assumption that RCP holds for future singulars, unde-
sirable consequences follow. If RCP holds, then, he argues, there
1
Dickason writes, "Since nearly the time Aristotle wrote, interest has waxed and
waned in his early work, De Interpretatione he' (A, Dickason, 'Aristotle, the Sea
Fight and the Cloud", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 14 (1976), 11-22: see
11).
no Aristotle's De Interpretation
must be true statements about the future, since (by RCP) one
member or the other of a contradictory pair about the future must
be true: if there are true statements about the future, then the
future must be the way it is truly predicted to be. This follows from
the conception of a true statement as one which says how things
are. It follows that all future events are necessary, and nothing in
the future will happen by chance (i8a34-bi6). Thus, the undesirable
consequence of fatalism follows from the assumption of RCP for
future singulars.
This section concludes with an unsuccessful attempt at solving
the problem (i8bi7-25). If the truth of predictions implies the
necessity of the future, the most obvious way of escaping from fatal-
ism would be by denying the truth of future singular assertions. This
move does not have the desired consequence, however, since all
predictions would then be false, and so the event predicted would
neither take place nor not take place. We would be no closer to
reinstating chance events, and would merely have shown that there
is no future at all. The failure of this solution shows that something
more than merely denying the truth of predictions is needed if
fatalism is to be avoided.
In the next section, further unfortunate consequences are shown
to follow from the assumption of RCP: as well as chance, deliber-
ation is also abolished (i8b26-i9**6). These conclusions are mani-
festly absurd, Aristotle then argues {19*7-22). Fatalism, then,
cannot be accepted, and we are now ready for the solution.
In the final section Aristotle presents his own view of how future
singular contradictory pairs work (i9a23-b4). According to this
view, certain future events are open to go either way. Certainly,
either there will be a sea-battle or not, but the outcome is not
settled in advance: it is contingent. The contingency of an event is
reflected in the distribution of truth and falsehood between the two
members of the contradictory pair. So, while it must be the case
that one prediction is true and the other false, it is not determined
which is which. Truth and falsehood are not decided between the
two members of the pair, and so RCP cannot be said to hold.
Aristotle's solution is a subtle one. It involves a denial of RCP:
this is necessary, since he has argued strenuously that if RCP were
to hold, fatalism would inevitably follow. However, the two ways in
which RCP is denied in chapters j and 8 will not help us in chapter
9. In chapter 7, both members of certain contradictory pairs were
Chapter g: The Third Exception to RCP 111
found to be true. By contrast, in chapter 9 Aristotle says that in the

case of future singulars it cannot be the case that both members of
a pair are true (18*38!). In chapter 8, we were shown contradic-
tory pairs both of whose members could be false. Yet this move too
is blocked as a solution of fatalism, since it would abolish future
events entirely (i8fci7-25). Instead, RCP is violated by the lack of
determinacy as to which member of the pair is true and which false.
This lack of determinacy in the assertions reflects the fact that the
things themselves are not yet settled. Aristotle's solution incorpo-
rates the view that the future is genuinely open, not Just that we
are unable to predict what is already determined to be one way or
the other.
This much will suffice as a brief summary of the chapter. Before
approaching it in more detail, an important distinction must be
made. There has been a general assumption among commentators
that Aristotle's interest in chapter 9 is not in RCP, but in the
Principle of Bivalence, which may be stated as follows:
PB: Every assertion is either true or false.2
Aristotle is seen as introducing this principle at the beginning of
the chapter (i8a34),3 drawing fatalist conclusions from its applica-
tion to future contingent assertions, and finally rejecting it by
denying that future predictions are, in fact, true or false. I shall
argue that this is not the rule with which the chapter is concerned.
It is RCP, and not PB, which leads to fatalism, and which is shown
at the end of the chapter not to hold for future singular assertions,
PB is tacitly employed in the argument of the chapter, and is taken
to hold for all assertions; it does not imply fatalism, and is not
shown to be violated by future singular assertions,
It will be noticed that PB is a rule which applies to assertions
taken singly, whereas RCP is a rule applying to contradictory pairs,
PB claims that every assertion has exactly one truth value, and
makes no reference to contradictory pairs, RCP, on the other hand,
presupposes a theory of contradiction and negation. It assumes a
1
See, e.g., D, Frede, Ariitateles und die Seeschlacht: Das Problem der Contingentia
Futura in De Int. 9, Hyporoncnala, 27 (Gdttingeu, 1970), 24, and also D, Frede, 'The
Sea-Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation*, in Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1985), 31-87.
3
See, e.g., J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford,
1963). 134-
H2 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
division of assertions into those which affirm and those which deny,
as well as a pairing of every affirmation with the negation that con-
tradicts it. The rale concerns the apportionment of truth and false-
hood between the two members of a contradictory pair: one
member is true, and the other false. It follows that an exception to
RCP will not necessarily be an exception to PB. PB will only be
violated by a single assertion which is both true and false, or neither
true nor false. RCP, however, will be violated if two members of a
contradictory pair are both true or both false; in this case, each
member considered separately would have one truth value and
only one, and so PB would be upheld. It was this situation which
we found in chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, it was seen that 'man is
pale* and 'man is-not pale' might both be true; in chapter 8, "cloak
is pale' and 'cloak is-not pale' could both be false, if'cloak' stands
for two things. While both cases constitute exceptions to RCP, in
neither case is PB violated, since each single assertion is either true
or false. Aristotle's interest in RCP reflects his concern with con-
tradictory pairs rather than assertions considered as separate items.
Had he devoted chapters 7 and 8 to an investigation of whether PB
holds of isolated assertions, no exceptions would have been found,
and we would have learnt nothing about which assertions to
beware of in dialectic. I shall argue that chapter 9 shows us a third
group of assertions for which RCP is violated while PB is upheld.
i. THE ARGUMENT FOR FATALISM
We may now go through, chapter 9 in detail. At the beginning of

the chapter we see contradictory pairs of assertions divided in such
a way as to place the final group of exceptions in a class of its own.
Assertions may pertain to the past, present, or future; we are told
that RCP is upheld in the case of assertions concerning the present
or past (i8*28f.), anticipating the statement a few lines later that
future singular assertions do not behave in the same way (18*33),
These opening lines of the chapter include a resum6 of the findings
of chapter 7 concerning RCP. We are reminded that, for assertions
made universally about universals, the rule is upheld, while for non-
universal assertions about universals it need not be (iS'zgf.; see
I7ha6 f.). It is relevant to be reminded of chapter 7 here, since it was
established in that chapter that singular assertions abide by RCP.
Chapter 9, however, will modify this conclusion: thus, we are here

told that the rule only holds of past and present assertions (i8az8 f.),
while singular assertions concerning the future do not work in the
same way (18*33 f.).
It is important to be clear before proceeding that these lines do
concern RCP and not PB. Aristotle often refers to RCP elliptically,
and we must follow his line of thought carefully to avoid confusion.
The first sentence of chapter 9 states, 'In the case of things that are
and things that have been it is necessary for the affirmation or the
negation to be true or false,' Taken literally, this scarcely makes
sense, I take it to be an abbreviation of RCP; might it instead be
an abbreviated statement of PB? The sentence follows immediately
on a statement of RCP at the conclusion of chapter 8 ('so that
neither in these cases is it necessary for one contradictory to be
true and the other false,' i8"26f.), and precedes a repetition of the
results concerning RCP discovered in chapter 7 ('it is always the
case that one is true and the other false,' i8a3o). Set between these
two references to RCP, it is clear that the abbreviated statement
with which chapter 9 opens must also refer to the same rule: it is
natural to abbreviate RCP, which is already under discussion, but
would be strange to introduce PB, which is not the topic at hand,
in so abbreviated a form. Thus, the statement 'it is necessary for
the affirmation or the negation to be true or false* is short for 'it
is necessary either for the affirmation to be true and the negation
false, or for the affirmation to be false and the negation true,'4 In
the course of the treatise we see RCP stated in a number of
shortened forms. For example, in the summing-up of chapter 7
we find 'not every contradictory is true or false* (i8 a i0f,), meaning
that in not every contradictory pair is one member true and the
other false (cf. I7b27), Sometimes Aristotle merely says 'one is
true and the other false,' without making explicit that he is
speaking of the members of a contradictory pair (i7b3o). Later in
chapter 9 we see RCP stated at greater or shorter length. 'Of
every affirmation and negation of contradictories it is necessary for
one to be true and the other false' (i8b27~9 and i9bi f.) is perspic-
uous, while 'it is necessary for one portion or other of a contradic-
tion to be true or false* (19*361) requires some expansion. The
4
For the rival view, see Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione,
mf.
H4 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
shortest expression of all, found in contexts where RCP is clearly

under discussion, is simply "true or false' (i8 a nf, (twice) and
I9a39)-
The opening of the chapter, then, introduces us to a new stage in
the investigation of RCP. Assertions are divided according to the
time to which they pertain, and whether they are singular or uni-
versal, A third class of exceptions to the rule is to be found among
assertions concerning future singulars. The argument to this effect
now begins (18*34), with the assumption that RCP does hold of
future singulars, and the deduction of unacceptable consequences
from this supposition.
In the first step of this argument, Aristotle deduces from RCP
that there must be true assertions about future singulars. If one
person says that something will happen, and another says that it
will not, then one or other of them must be telling the truth, if RCP
is upheld (i8"35-8), A true assertion about the future has been
made, then. Aristotle will then apply the principle that an assertion
represents something as being the case, and so is true if and only
if things are as the assertion represents, and false otherwise
(i8a39ff.). Thus, if there are true future singular assertions, there
are future singular events which definitely will take place. The
argument can only gain a grip if he establishes that there are true
statements about the future, and this can only be done using
RCP.
It is often held that this argument takes PB as its starting-point,
and not RCP.5 The deduction could not be made by assuming PB,
however; from PB aloae it could only be deduced that whatever
assertion is true is not false, not that anything is true about the
future. Suppose, for instance, that all assertions were false, as
Aristotle took the consequence of Anaxagoras' doctrine to be
{Meta. r, ioi2a26~8). This would still be possible, even given the
assumption that PB holds: no assertion would be both true and
false, or neither true nor false. However, nothing would be true
about the future, and so fatalism would not ensue. From RCP, and
• Thus, Anseombc reads 18*30 as a statement of PB, but immediately afterwards

paraphrases 18*31!, as pertaining to RCP: she appears not to distinguish the two
(Anseotnbe, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle*, Mind, 65 (1956), 1-15: see 1-2). Ackrill,
on the other hand, sees 18*28 as a statement of RCP, but takes Aristotle to switch
to a discussion of PB at 18*34 (Aekritt./trwfttffe '$ Categories and De Jnterpretatione,
I33t).
not from PB, it follows that there must be truths about the future,
since of any contradictory pair, either the affirmation or the nega-
tion must be true. We see, then, that 'if every affirmation is true or
false' (18*37!) cannot be a statement of PB. Aristotle is arguing
that if one person affirms what the other denies, then one or the
other must be telling the truth, if of every affirmation and negation
one is true and the other false. The claim that every assertion is
either true or false would not imply that either assertion needed to
be true. PB cannot be the rule that is invoked,
The text as quoted above is problematic. It does not look like a
statement of RCP, and does not make sense as a statement of PB
either, since the word used (xazdipaotg) means 'affirmation', and not
'assertion', so that this could not be the claim that every assertion
is either true or false. It is better to read 'if every affirmation or
negation is true or false', following Ammonius and a Syriae trans-
lation: we would then have one of the standard abbreviations of
RCP, seen already at the start of the chapter (18*28 £), as is required
by the structure of the argument.
So, the argument that there are true predictions about the future
rests on the assumption that RCP holds. Aristotle has only assumed
that RCP holds in general, with no reference to time (18*34), He
now supplies an argument to fill this deficiency, and argues that if
RCP holds for contradictory pairs about the present, then it must
hold for those about the future as well (iS*39-b3), He argues as
follows. If it is true to say that something is pale or that it is not
pale, then it is necessary for it to be pale or not to be pale. If it is
pale, or is not pale, then it was true to predict that it would be pale
or not pale. The same argument is sketched for the false member
of a contradictory pair (18*2 f.).This argument, then, starts from the
assumption that RCP holds of present assertions, and infers that it
must hold of future predictions, by deducing that things must be as
a true present assertion says, and if they are that way, then a pre-
diction made in the past must have predicted them truly. In
this passage Aristotle does not argue circularly from RCP back to
itself: rather, he argues for the application of RCP to assertions
about the future, on the hypothesis that it holds for those about the
present,
The argument contains a step which has frequently been viewed
as a glaring modal fallacy. On this view, Aristotle is supposed to be
smuggling in necessity, by assuming that what is true about the
future is therefore necessary: he is supposed to be saying 'if it is

true to say p or not-p, then it is necessary for p or not-p to be!
(18*39 £.). This would seem to be a completely unjustified move
from the truth of a proposition to its necessary truth. AckriH picks
it out as a flaw in the argument,6 while Fine goes further, and
credits Aristotle with later recognizing the flaw, and rejecting the
inference from the truth of future singular assertions to their nec-
essary truth.7 Aristotle's argument here is far more innocent,
however. There is no illicit assumption that what is true is neces-
sary. Rather, the inference is from the truth of an assertion about
the future to the reality of the future, following the principle that
if an assertion is true, then the state of affairs referred to by it is
real. Thus, the emphasis should be, 'if it is true to say p or not-p,
then it is necessary for p or not-p to be.'s
He may now proceed to his conclusion. It is necessary for either
the affirmation or the negation in a pair of future singular asser-
tions to be true (i8b4), and so nothing happens or will happen by
chance or as it happens to turn out, and instead everything comes
about by necessity: if something did happen by chance, then it
would be equally likely to go one way or the other; but since every-
thing is fixed, this is ruled out (18*5-9), We see that the argument
threatens not just the openness of the future, but of the present too
(i8b5); for, if a future event is fixed in advance, then it will be fixed
when it happens, and cannot be open to chance either before it
happens, or as it is happening.
In the next argument, which also supports fatalism, Aristotle
plays on the intuition that if the future could always have been pre-
dicted, then it must be fixed and inevitable (i8b9~i6). He has
already established that future events will happen (i8bi). Of some-
thing that was going to happen, it was always true to say of it that
it would happen (i8bioi). If it was always true, then it could not
be otherwise; it is impossible for it not to be the case, and so it is
necessary (i8bi2-i4). Therefore, everything future is necessary
(i8bi4f.).The first step is the crucial one: if at every moment pre-
vious to the event it could truly be said that it would happen, then
4
Ackril!, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, 137.
' G, Fine, 'Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione (f, History of Philosophy
Quarterly, I (1984), 23-47.
8
For a similar inference, also prone to the same misinterpretation, sec Meta. f,
1006*28 ff., for a discussion of which see Appendix I.
Chapter 9: The Third Exception to RCP 117
it could not fail to happen. From this the necessity of the event may
be deduced. Again, important use is made of the principle that true
assertions correctly describe how things are or will be.*
Aristotle has already argued that, on the assumption that RCP
is upheld, it cannot be the case that both members of the con-
tradictory pair are true (18*38 £), He now adds that fatalism
cannot be avoided by claiming that neither assertion is true, that is,
that something would neither take place nor not take place
(i8bi7~-25).10Thi$ would seem to be a natural way of trying to solve
the problem: the necessity of the future was proved from the truth
of assertions about it, and so, it would seem, if there were no true
assertions about the future, then the future would not be necessary.
He here argues that this would not solve the problem, and has two
arguments against the attempted solution.
First, he points out that if neither assertion were true, then this
would involve a violation of RCP: it would come about that one
member of the contradictory pair was false, but that the other one
was not true (i8bi8-2o). Aristotle puts it this way in order to make
it explicit that RCP is violated, RCP states that one member is false
and the other true; but, if neither were true, then one would indeed
be false, but the other would fail to be true, and this would violate
RCP. This point makes use of the assumption that an assertion
which is not true is false: that is, PB is tacitly employed. Aristotle's
objection here is as follows. The argument that RCP applies to
future assertions rests, as we have seen, on the assumption that it
applies in general (i8a39f£); therefore a simple denial of RCP for
future assertions will also overthrow it for present ones, which is
highly undesirable.
Secondly, he adds, even if this were so, there would neither be a
sea-battle nor not be one, if a sea-battle were predicted (i8b2o~5).
In effect, there would be no future at all. The reasoning is as follows.
If an assertion is true, then what it asserts must hold: 'if it is true to
say that something is white and black, then both must hold; if it is
* This argument does not depend on a confusion between always being true and
being necessarily true, as Hintikka argues. This confusion does not seem to be at
work in the chapter, 'Necessarily troe* is only deduced from 'always true* by means
of several intermediate stages For the rival view, see J. Hintikka, 'Necessity,
Universality and Time in Aristotle", Ajatia, 20 {1957), 65-90, repr. in J. Barnes, M.
Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.). Articles on Aristotle, iii (London, 1979), 108-24.
10
Aristotle here uses a word normally meaning 'such as' (olov) in the sense 'that
is*. For the same use see 17*20.
n8 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
true to say that something will hold tomorrow, then it will hold'
(i8b2i i). He will also need the principle that if an assertion is oot
true, then what it predicts will not happen; we have already seen
Mm use the principle that something is not the ease if, and only if,
the assertion claiming that it is the case is false (i8b3). He con-
nection can only be made by assuming that if an assertion is not
true, then it is false, and this is the Principle of Bivalence, Thus,
Aristotle can only infer that the sea-battle will neither happen nor
fail to happen if he means both members of the contradictory pair
to be false, and neither true. It is worth understanding this clearly,
because it shows us that here, while he assumes for the moment
that RCP is violated, he continues to rely on PB in his argument
(i8b20~5): while RCP is openly suspended, PB is tacitly taken for
granted. Again we see that the two must be kept distinct if we are
to follow his thought. Aristotle shows us, then, that the move of
denying that there are true future singular assertions, far from
destroying the fixedness of the future and releasing future events
to go either way, would actually destroy the reality of the future
altogether.
We should now ask why Aristotle inserts this argument here. He
has so far been drawing out the dangerous consequences of taking
RCP to hold of future singulars. He now blocks off one way in
which one might be tempted to solve the problem. If the truth of
predictions is what is responsible for threatening us with fatalism,
then it might seem that fatalism could be avoided by claiming that
all predictions are false. The defect of this move, he points out. is
that it would prevent future events from taking place at all. This
places a constraint on the solution. While RCP cannot be accepted
if fatalism is to be avoided, it must be denied in such a way as
to escape the problem of abolishing future contingent events
altogether. Aristotle returns to the example of the sea-battle in
working out his solution; there must either be a sea-battle or not,
even though neither its occurrence nor its non-occurrence is
necessary (i9a29f£). We shall see how this works in more detail
later.
Aristotle now sums up the argument so far (i8626ff.), and pro-
ceeds to draw out other undesirable consequences of the hypoth-
esis that RCP holds of future singulars. We are presented with a
kind of lazy argument (i8b3i-3): there would be no need to delib-
erate or take trouble over anything, since if we are to act, then we
Chapter g: The Third Exception to RCP I ig
shall act. Deliberation is about what is in our power, and depends

on the openness of alternative courses of action:" thus, if the future
is not open, there can be no deliberation.
The arguments for fatalism deduced from RCP conclude with
the following step. So far the argument has depended on spoken
predictions of the future to show that what was predicted could not
be otherwise. One speaker was taken to utter an affirmation, while
another utters the negation; it was then inferred from RCP that one
statement or the other must be true, and so one must truly predict
a fixed future event (18*35 ff> b7 £» 19*4)- Now Aristotle goes on to
exclude speakers and show that fatalism does not depend on the
actual utterance of the predictions. Ten thousand years in advance
two people could have uttered the two members of the contradic-
tory pair, and so, since one of them would have to be true, the future
would have been truly predicted, and would have to turn out the
way it was truly predicted to (i8b33 ft). Furthermore, it makes no
difference even if no prediction is made, since the uttering of asser-
tions is not what makes the future fixed: rather, it is by considering
assertions about the future that we learn that it is fixed (18*36 ft).
Here we see the principle that it is the reality of the state of
that brings about the truth of a thought or assertion, and not the
other way around.12 This completes the argument drawn from RCP
that nothing happens by chance, and everything happens of neces-
sity. In the rest of the chapter, Aristotle exposes the absurdity of
these conclusions, presents what he sees as the correct view to hold
concerning non-necessary future events, and so shows the way in
which RCP is violated in the case of future singular contradictory
pairs.
2. ARISTOTLE'S SOLUTION AND ITS

BEARING ON DIALECTIC
In the next section it is argued that the consequences that have just
been set out are impossible (19*7-22). We have seen that the argu-
ment based on RCP attacks the existence of chance and the effi-
cacy of deliberation, Aristotle now goes on to say that the existence
of both is, however, self-evident: we see that deliberation and action
" See EN 111. 3, VI. 2, " See Mete, 0, losi1"^.

are genuine causes of future events (i9a7-9), and, in. general, there
are many evident cases wbere something has a potentiality for
being or not being (19*9-11), In these cases, both being and not
being are possible (wfiof,). This recalls us to the assumption on
which the fatalist position was based, namely that of every contra-
dictory pair about the future, one assertion is true and the other
fake. Both, however, must be possible, Aristotle now insists, if
the future is to be open in the way needed for chance and deliber-
ation. If the argument in the earlier part of the chapter is to be
believed, only one outcome is ever possible: yet in order for
there to be chance, deliberation, or action, there must be a poten-
tiality for either of two outcomes.13 Aristotle appeals to our in-
tuition that there are potentials which may not be actualized: this
cloak can be cut, but will not be; it is open for it to be cut, but, as
it happens, it wil be worn out first (i9ai2-i4). Equally, it had the
potential not to be cut, since in fact it is worn out before being cut
(I9ai4-i6).
He concludes that it is obvious that not everything is necessary.
Two classes among non-necessary things are distinguished
(19*18-22). First, there are chance events, which happen as it
chances to turn out, and for which the affirmation is no more true
than the negation (19*19 f.; cf. i8b8f.). Secondly, there are events
which may be called usual: these tend to turn out one way rather
than the other, but still may go either way; one member of the pair
is generally the true one, but the other might always turn out to be
true instead (19*20 ft). The three groups of events are distin-
guished, then, according to the behaviour of the contradictory pairs
of assertions pertaining to them. As we shall see, this has a bearing
on which contradictory pairs abide by RCP and which do not.
Contradictory pairs relating to necessary events will abide by RCP;
those which relate to the occurrence or non-occurrence of events
which are open to chance, or which usually happen one way but
are still not fixed, will not abide by it.
In the final section (i9*23-b4), Aristotle sets out the view of
future singular contradictory pairs which we must accept in order
to avoid fatalism. This solution will mean that RCP, the premiss on
which the fatalist conclusions were founded, will need to be
rejected. The solution cannot, however, be that simple. We have
" See Mete. B, 1046*36 ft

Chapter g; The Third Exception to RCP 121
seen that another paradox results from claiming that both members
of the contradictory pair are false: the result of this is that there
will neither be a sea-battle nor not be one (18*20-5). Thfi solution
must therefore avoid the vicious consequences both of accepting
RCP and of denying it in that particular way.
Aristotle first concedes that there is a weak sense in which every-
thing is necessary (itfzî.). When something is the case, it is
necessary for it to be the case. This is only necessity on a hypothe-
sis: something must be, given that it is; its being follows necessarily
from the hypothesis of its being. This does not mean, though, that
everything is necessary pure and simple (ebrf<3g, 19*26). Similarly,
what is not, necessarily is not, given that it is not; but this does not
make it impossible. The same argument applies to contradictory
pairs, he goes on (19*27-32): everything necessarily is or is not; also,
everything necessarily will be or will not be. This disjunction cannot
be split up, though, and necessity applied to either disjunct sep-
arately. To illustrate this point, Aristotle reverts to the example of
the sea-battle. We saw the sea-battle used earlier to argue that fatal-
ism could not be escaped by claiming that both members of the
contradictory pair were false. For, if it is false that there will be a
sea-battle tomorrow, and false that there will not be one, then the
battle will neither take place nor not take place (i8K2s), He is
seeking to preserve the common-sense view that either there will
be a sea-battle or not, while it is not determined which of these out-
comes will be actualized. The example of the sea-battle, then, is
used in both cases to express a constraint on the solution. While
RCP, if accepted, leads to fatalism, it must not be denied in such a
way as to force there to be no future at all: even an event which is
open must either take place or not. So, Aristotle here says that it
is necessary that either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or
not. However, neither the sea-battle, if it happens, nor its oon-
occurrence if it does not, will be necessary (19*29-32).
We now move to the crux of the chapter (i9a32 ft). We are first
reminded of the important principle that the truth of utterances
matches the way things are (i9a32~s); we have seen this principle
used before, to argue that there is a state of affairs to correspond
to a true assertion, and that there was a true prediction to corre-
spond to the state of affairs (i8a39~b3) and to argue that if both
members of a contradictory pair about the future were false, then
there would be no future (i8b2O~5)> The principle is now applied
to assertions about chaoce and usual events. It is open for such

things to be the case or not; this openness is reflected in the truth
of assertions about them. We have already been prepared for this
move, Aristotle has said that in the case- of chance events one
member of the contradictory pair is no truer than the other
(19*19 £), and in the case of usual events, one member of the pair
is truer than the other, but both are still open (i9a20-2). So, he says,
something which is up to chance has a potential for both opposites
(19*34), and so this must be reflected in the contradictory pair
(T9a35)» since the truth of assertions matches the way things are
(*9a33).
He now sets out how this works. In the case of chance events,
one member of the contradictory pair must be true and the other
false, 'but not this one or that one, but however it chances'
(i9"36-8):'4he hopes to capture in Ms solution the point that the
sea-battle must either take place or not, although it still remains
open to chance. The other class of non-necessary events consists of
those which usually happen one way, but yet are not fixed, and may
still go the other way. In these cases, one member of the contra-
dictory pair tends more towards truth than the other, but it is not
thereby the case that one is true and the other false (19*38 £). In
these cases it is still open for either event to come about, though
one outcome is more likely than the other. One member of the con-
tradictory pair therefore tends more towards truth, but this does
not mean that one is true and the other false.
The phrase 'but not yet [or thereby] true or false' (ovftevroi fdif
i9"39) has prompted much comment, and has been
taken as a sign that Aristotle's solution to the problem of fatalism
is to deny that future singular assertions have any truth value.15 He
is taken to say here that future singular assertions are not yet true
or false; that is, they have no truth value in advance of the fact, but
acquire a truth value later. Debate has ensued over the issue of
14
'Of these, it is necessary for one portion of the contradiction or the other to
be true or false' (19*361.) is a statement of RCP, which is then qualified by the clause
beginning 'but not* (ov/tenot). The statement of RCP would read in tall 'one or the
other is true, the other false.' It is not a statement of PB; if one tried to read it as
such, it would have to mean 'one ot the other abides by PB,* which would make
poor sense.
15
For the translation "not thereby' in place of'not yet' see Anscombe, 'Aristotle
and the Sea Battle*, 8. It is also taken up by Rne {'Truth and Necessity in De
Interpretatione g\ 35),
becoming true: does a prediction become true when the event pre-
dicted becomes inevitable? What about the tense of the prediction?
Is it actually the present-tensed version of the prediction that
becomes true? If a future-tensed assertion became true with the
occurrence of the event predicted, then the tense in the assertion
would be wrong, and the prediction would become obsolete as it
became true.
The view that Aristotle denied truth value to future singular
assertions rests principally on the interpretation of this phrase as
'not yet true or false*. A more careful look at the text shows that
this interpretation is extremely unlikely. If Aristotle did indeed
intend to avoid fatalism by claiming that predictions were not yet
true or false, then this would have to apply to all future singular
assertions. Instead, the statement where he is supposed to claim this
applies only to one of the two classes of non-necessary future asser-
tions, that is, to the usual ones. The statement 'but not thereby true
or false' (i'9839) is a rider to the statement that one member of a
contradictory pair relating to a usual event is truer than the other,
just as 'but not this one or that one, but whichever it happens to
be' (ov fttvroi T0de ij rode aAX6n6i£Q'ih:v%ev, I9a37 f.) is a rider to the
statement that, in the case of chance events, it must be the case that
one member of the contradictory pair is true, and the other false.
In both cases, 'but not* (pv pevioi) introduces a qualification. Thus,
if in the second of the two statements (19*39) he did indeed mean
'not yet true or false', Aristotle would only be claiming this for
usual events, and not for non-necessary events in general.
It remains to defend the choice of 'thereby' as a translation in
place of 'yet', and to explain the sense here more fully. The state-
ment made seems to be the following: 'one member of the pair
tends more towards truth, but is not thereby, or on that account,
true or false' (19*38 f.) Taken literally, this makes doubtful sense. It
would be reasonable for Aristotle to warn us against jumping to
the conclusion that something is true just because it is more likely,
or tends towards truth. It would be very strange if he warned us at
the same time not to jump to the conclusion that it is false just
because it is more likely to be true.
In order to understand this phrase, we must realize that 'true or
false' is an elliptical statement of RCP. We see RCP abbreviated
twice in exactly the same way as at the end of chapter 7 (18*10-12).
There, Aristotle concludes the chapter by stating that RCP is not
always upheld ('not every contradiction is true or false'), and then

says that it has been explained why it is violated, and in what cases
it holds {'and why, and when it is true or false', i8ai i £). We may
also compare the statement in chapter 9 concerning predictions of
chance events (ig^fit): by 'it is necessary for one portion of the
contradiction to be true or false' he means that it must be the case
that one member of the contradictory pair is true, and the other
false, and by the qualification which follows he means that it is not
fixed which is which. So here, where usual events are being dis-
cussed, the point is that one member of the contradictory pair tends
towards truth, but it is not therefore the case that one member (the
one that tends towards truth) is true, and the other (the one that
tends towards falsehood) is false: the event predicted may be prob-
able, but it is not certain.
This solution respects the constraint established earlier in the
chapter (i8bi7~2s): it cannot be the case that neither member of
the pair of assertions is true, since then neither outcome would take
place. Furthermore, there would follow the undesirable conse-
quence that RCP would cease to hold for present assertions too,
since its application to the future was shown to rest on its applica-
tion to the present (18*39fif-)-The solution preserves the reality
of the future, while still allowing its openness, which matches
common-sense ideas about the future, and is exactly what Aristotle
wanted. The point is that one member of the contradictory pair is
true, while the other is false, but it is not settled which is which. This
might sound like a paradoxical form of utterance. An example may
make it seem less surprising. If there are just two candidates in an
election for prime minister, then, we might say, one or the other is
the prime minister-to-be. It is not settled which, however, and so
we cannot pick one out and say, 'this is the one,' since it is open for
it to be the other one. Even if one candidate is more likely to win,
we can only say that candidate is tending toward being the next
prime minister, not that he is. All the same, it would be wrong to
say that neither candidate is the next prime minister: one is and the
other is not.
We should note that Aristotle does not mean that it is merely a
limit on our knowledge that means that we cannot pick out the true
member of a future contingent contradictory pair. It is not just that
we have no means of knowing which is which. Rather, it is gen-
uinely still open. Otherwise, fatalism would not have been refuted,
and we would merely have the illusion of being able to deliberate

and make decisions. This genuine openness of the future is then
reflected in the apportionment of truth between the two members
of the contradictory pair: 'expressions are true just as are the things'
(19*33). R is this principle of the connection between the way things
are and the truth of assertions which leads to Aristotle's solution,
and makes it natural and comprehensible. Either there will be a
sea-battle or not. This state of affairs regarding the things is
relected in the truth of the corresponding assertions: either the
affirmation predicting the sea-battle is true and the negation false,
or vice versa. The other important fact about the sea-battle, in addi-
tion to the fact that it will happen or will not happen, is that its
occurrence or non-occurrence is open. This too is reflected in the
way in which the assertions are true. Since it is not settled whether
the battle will occur or will not, it is not settled whether the affir-
mation is true and the negation false, or vice versa. These two
statements about the contradictory pair, that one member is true
and the other false, and that it is not settled which is which, must
both be accepted as compatible, and then we have understood the
solution which Aristotle intends.
Something must be said of the status of PB at the end of the
chapter. I have argued that PB is not the rule which is at issue in
the chapter, just as it was not in chapters 7 and 8, It is used im-
plicitly in the course of argument (i8bi5-20), but, unlike RCP. its
validity is never challenged. Does the solution to fatalism at the
end of the chapter involve giving up PB for future singular asser-
tions, as many commentators have argued? I have said that
Aristotle claims that it is not the case that this member of the con-
tradictory pair is true and that one is false. Might this imply that
neither one is either true or false, and that the assertions somehow
lack truth value, with truth and falsehood floating between them
until definitely assigned? It would be wrong to draw this inference,
Aristotle insists that one member of the pair is true and the other
false; there can be no question of any assertion's being neither true
nor false. Each assertion certainly is either true or false, just as there
either will be or will not be a sea-battle.
The scheme of the De Interpretatione does not leave room for an
assertion with no truth value. The assertion was defined in chapter
4 as an expression to which truth or falsehood pertains (17*2 f.).The
prayer was given as an example of an expression which lacks truth
value, and is not an assertion. We also see the statement that every
assertion is true or false in the Categories (Cat, 2*7-10); the asser-
tion is to be distinguished by this criterion from utterances which
are not compound, and which cannot have any truth value. The
point that truth value is only possible with complexity recurs in
chapter i of the De Interpretatione (i6aio£f.). In chapter 10 we see
the argument that 'not-man' is not a negation, since every negation
must be true or false, and 'not-man* is neither (20*34 f t ) . Again, in
Metaphysics F, Aristotle insists that anyone who says that anything
is or is not the case will necessarily either be saying something true
or something false (Meta. r, ioiih28). To add to these passages,
there is a text in which Aristotle explicitly states that truth and
falsehood apply to past and future assertions as well as to present
ones, using a contingent assertion concerning a singular as his
example: 'not only is it false or true that Cleon is pale, but also that
he was or will be* (De An, 430*41).
It is apparent from these passages that PB is a fundamental prin-
ciple governing all assertions. To assert is to represent things as
being a certain way. Either they are that way or not; hence the
utterance of something true or something false is inevitable if an
assertion has been made. The assertions considered in chapter 9 are
no exceptions to this. They predict the future, either truly or falsely:
they are predictions, not prayers or one-word ejaculations. As the
future is open, it is not fixed which are the true predictions and
which the false ones, but this does not prevent them from being
true or false, just as the openness of the future does not prevent
one outcome or the other from actually taking place.
The chapter concludes with the statement that RCP is violated
in the case of 'things which are not, but are capable of being or not
being', that is, in the of things in the future which may turn out
either way (I9a39-b4). We still need to ask how it is that this solu-
tion constitutes an exception to RCP. The exception presented in
chapter 9 appears to be of a different sort from those seen in chap-
ters 7 and 8. In those chapters, contradictory pairs were found in
which either both members were true or both false: thus, RCP was
not upheld. In chapter 9, though, one member of each pair is indeed
true and the other false (19*36 ft). This would appear to be a state-
ment that they abide by RCP. Yet, a few lines later the chapter is
concluded with the statement that it is not necessary for one
member of a contradictory pair to be true and the other false. Why
Chapter g; The Third Exception to RCP 127
does Aristotle conclude that RCP is violated? Could he not simply

say that RCP is indeed upheld for future singular assertions, since
one member is true and the other false?
He apparently rules that RCP is not upheld because of the qual-
ification that the future is not settled. It is not that this one is true,
and that one false, 'but whichever one it happens to be' (i9a37f.),
Why does this qualification make a crucial difference to whether a
contradictory pair may be said to abide by RCP or not? Light may
be shed on this by considering the importance of violations of the
rule. In the previous two chapters we saw that an exception to RCP
marked a dialectical question which could not be answered. If
we consider what it means to answer such a question, we shall see
that a question concerning a future singular would likewise be
unanswerable.
A dialectical premiss is a premiss put in the form of a question.
It is a demand for one member of a contradictory pair or the other
to be given as an answer. In this, it is distinguished from the demon-
strative premiss, in which one member of a contradictory pair is put
forward as true (APr, 24*23-5; APo. 72*8-11). The difference lies in
how the premiss is offered. In dialectic, the questioner offers the
answerer a choice between two members of a contradictory pair,
He himself does not favour one with truth and the other with false-
hood: both members of the pair are offered equally, and it is up to
the answerer to decide between them. We have seen that it is vital
to dialectic that every question posed have a right answer; to
answer is to choose which of the contradictory assertions offered
is the true one, and which the false one.
We can see that there is a similarity between the dialectical ques-
tion and a contradictory pair of future singular assertions. In such
a pair, it is not the case that this is true and that false (De Int.
ig"3yl). As in the question, truth is not allocated to one assertion
or the other in particular. In the case of the dialectical question,
this uncertainty is resolved by the answerer, who chooses which
assertion from the pair is true. In the case of the predictions, no
apportionment of truth to one or the other is possible: the contin-
gency of the situation is reflected in the impossibility of assigning
truth to one assertion and falsehood to the other (19*32-5). To
answer the dialectical question based on a contradictory pair of
future singular assertions would be to choose which prediction is
the true one: chapter 9 tells us that the choice cannot be made, and
therefore the question is unanswerable. Instead, a dialectical ques-

tion offering a choice between a prediction and its negation already
contains as much certainty as there is in the situation. The question
offers both assertions equally, without picking one out as true, and
this matches exactly the way things are,
Just as in chapters 7 and 8, we are shown a class of contradictory
pairs which lie outside the bounds of dialectic, since questions
based on them cannot be answered. For a contradictory pair to
obey RCP means that, if posed as a dialectical question, one
member of the pair could be selected as the true one and the other
pointed to as false. If both members are true or both false, clearly
RCP is violated. In chapter 9, RCP is violated just as surely, even
though one member is true and the other false, since it is impossi-
ble to pick out which is which, and so, as in the other cases, the
related dialectical question has no answer. This impossibility is
imposed by the way the world is, not by any shortcoming in the
answerer's knowledge. Had the questioner posed a question which
does have a right and a wrong answer, but the answerer was unable
to say which was which out of ignorance, the questioner would have
committed no breach of the rules of dialectic. It is a different matter
if the questioner 'will there be a sea-battle tomorrow or not?*
The answerer is then entitled to reply that is not a question such
that one answer can be picked out as true in preference to the
other; we can only say that there will be or will not be, and we must
wait and see which (cf. I9a28 ft).
Dialectic is a universal discipline, and its questioning can cover
any subject where a question can be posed which has a right and a
wrong answer. Chapters j to 9 of the De Interpretatione demon-
strate that there are limits to the universality of dialectic, marked
by three classes of contradictory pairs from which it is impossible
to select one true and one false assertion. In chapters 7 and 8 eases
were found in which it is not the case that there is one true and one
false member; in chapter 9 there is one true member and one false
one, but it is not determined which is which. This determination of
which is true and which false is necessary before a contradictory
pair can provide an answerable question. So, Aristotle's interest in
dialectic throughout these chapters accounts for why future singu-
lar assertions must be counted as furnishing a third class of excep-
tions to the rule.
Chapter 9: The Third Exception to RCP 129
3. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE

Before leaving chapter 9, it is worth considering some of the other
interpretations of it which have been put forward. Interpretations
have tended to fall into two groups, which may be called realist and
anti-realist.16 According to both schools of thought, Aristotle's
argument for fatalism starts from PB as its premiss: he is supposed
to assume that statements about the future are either true or false,
and proceed to infer that the future is necessary. Both interpreta-
tions are in broad agreement on how the problem is set up. They
diverge in how they take Aristotle to solve it, however. If the
problem of fatalism is set up in this way, there are two strategies
for overcoming it.
First, the premiss might be accepted, but the validity of the infer-
ence denied, and the conclusion thus rejected. This would be to say
that statements about the future do have truth value, but this does
not make the future fixed. The future is thus real, in the sense that
we can make true statements about it in advance. The truth of our
statements is justified by the way things will be in the future, though
the truth of a prediction does not fix the event predicted: truth does
not imply necessity. This may be called the realist position. It is
widely regarded as the proper view to hold about future assertions,
though few commentators credit Aristotle with having adopted it
as his solution; Sorabji expounds the view well, and laments that
Aristotle did not subscribe to it." Fine, however, argues that the
realist position can be seen in Aristotle's solution.18
Secondly, the argument can be resisted by accepting the infer-
ence that, if there are true assertions about the future, then the
future must be Ixed, but denying the premiss that there are any
such true assertions. On this view, the future is not yet real, just as
assertions about it are not yet true: the future only comes into being
as it becomes the present. This may be called the anti-realist view,
since it denies reality to what has not yet taken place. Aristotle is
16
See, e.g,, H. B. Andersen and J. Faye, *Om Fremtidige S0siag', Museum
Tufculanurn, 40-3 (1980), 149-81, and, for a review of the many interpretations, V,
Celtuprica, // capitolo <j del DC Interpretatione di Amtotek; Rassegna di studi
1930-1973 (Bologna, 1977),
17
R, Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame (London, 1978), chap. 5.
" Fine, 'Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9*.
most commonly taken to have adopted this solution: he accepted

the inference that if there are true predictions, then what is pre-
dicted is necessary, and so he denied PB, which, according to both
these lines of interpretation, was the premiss on which the argu-
ment for fatalism was founded.
There are several versions of the anti-realist interpretation. PB
may be formulated in a number of ways, and so denied in a number
of ways. One way in which PB might be violated is if an assertion
lacked truth value altogether; PB might even be stated as 'every
assertion is either true or false or both,' so that only an assertion
with no truth value would count as an exception to it.19 This lack
of truth value has been considered as a third truth value in itself,
in addition to truth and falsehood. Other commentators have
argued that Aristotle sought to retain the Principle of the Excluded
Middle, while rejecting PB.29 This would allow Aristotle to say
that future predictions do not lack truth value, and are in some
sense both true and false, while their truth value is not fixed in
advance,
As we have seen, these interpretations do not approach the
chapter in the right way, Aristotle's project in chapters 7-9 is
not to test whether PB holds of individual assertions, but to
test whether RCP holds of pairs of assertions. His question is not
whether a prediction about the future has a truth value, but
whether truth and falsehood are so apportioned between the two
members of a contradictory pair about a future singular as to make
that pair obey RCP or violate it, and this is to do with the issue of
whether the dialectical question based on the contradictory pair is
answerable or not.
So also, since the distinction between realism and anti-realism
only arose by seeing the central problem of the chapter as being
either the acceptance or rejection of PB for future singular asser-
tions, Aristotle's solution cannot really be placed in either category.
He does not deny truth value to predictions, and so is no anti-
realist. An assertion which accurately predicts the future is cer-
tainly true; however, it is not fixed which assertion from the
contradictory pair is the true one, just as it is not fixed whether the
19
For this formulation see Fine, Truth and Necessity in De interpretations t)\
36.28
See W, Rneate and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), 47,
event will take place or not. This position does not correspond to
the conception, of realism arrived at by taking the issue of the
chapter to be PB, according to which predictions are true, but not
therefore necessary. If Aristotle's thought is to be followed and his
solution to fatalism understood, we must realise that RCP is the
rule at the centre of chapter 9, as it was in chapters 7 and 8.
We have seen that chapter 9 is not a detached study of fatalism.
Instead, it continues the work of chapters 7 and 8 into a new class
of assertions, that is, those which concern future singulars, and so
identifies the final group of assertions which violate RCP. Questions
posed about future singulars are unanswerable, just as there can be
no knowledge of chance future events, since they are open to go
either way.21 Chapter 9 therefore shows us another class of asser-
tions to be avoided in debate,22 and the dialectical motivation of the
De Interpretation is once again apparent.
21
See Mete, £2,1027*20-6.
a
Ct Top. 129*28 £, where we are warned that investigations of properties which
do not always hold should be confined to the present.
10
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions
In chapter 10 the investigation of contradictory pairs continues.

Assertions are divided into classes in a new way, and in each class
the contradictories are set out and inferences between them dis-
cussed. No new exceptions to RCP are found. We have already seen
assertions divided up in several different ways. In chapter 7 they
were divided into those about singulars, universal assertions about
universals, and non-universal ones about universals; in chapter 8,
we saw single and multiple assertions distinguished, and then past,
present, and future, singular or universal in chapter 9. In chapter
10, we see assertions classified in yet another way, according to
whether they contain the verb 'to be*, and, if so, in what role. We
are presented first with assertions in which 'is' is added to a name
(i9bi4~i9)» then assertions formed by the addition of Is' as a third
element to words standing for subject and predicate (igbi9-2Q83),
and then assertions in which 'is' has no place: in these, copula and
predicate-word are replaced by a verb, which both signifies the
predicate and is a sign that the predicate holds of the subject
(2oa3-i5; see i6b9 £.). In each of these classes, assertions are ordered
into their contradictory pairs.
i. THE COMPOSITION OF ASSERTIONS
The chapter begins with a discussion of the composition of affir-

mations and negations which applies to all three groups (i9b5-i4).
Aristotle at first confines his comments to the affirmation: this is in
accordance with his view that the most primitive kind of assertion
is the affirmation, while the negation is secondary (i7a8 £). An affir-
mation 'signifies', or in other words, asserts, something of something
(19*5). Either a name or an indefinite name, called here 'that which
is nameless' (w dwawjiov: ef, i6a30f.), will pick out the subject of
Chapter jo: Three Types of Assertions 133
the predication. In either case, a single thing must be asserted of a

single thing (19*6 £). We have already seen that Aristotle is
interested only in assertions which make a single claim about a
single subject (17*20f.» i8*i2t). Only words which 'signify a single
thing* (i8ai7) can be used in an assertion of this sort: otherwise,
two separate claims will instead be made, and the assertion will
really be more than one, as we saw demonstrated in chapter 8
(i8ai8ff,).
We see here that assertions which make a single claim about a
single subject include those containing an indefinite name such as
'not-man'. Apparently, these too count as signifying a single thing
(i9b6), despite the fact that they were previously separated off from
names by reason of their indefiniteness, Aristotle refers the reader
back to his earlier treatment of the indefinite name (i6a29~32): a
parenthesis summarizes the terminology he adopted (i9t)7-io),
'Not-man' is not counted as a name, but as an indefinite name, he
reminds us, and inserts a brief explanation (i9b9), before conclud-
ing the parenthesis by adding that 'doesn't-tfarive' is not a verb.
There is a question of how to read the text here. The explanation
of why 'not-man' is an indefinite name could either read 'for even
the indefinite [name] signifies a single thing in a way' (ev ydy jra>g
wpatra xai m doQurrov) or 'for it signifies in a way a single indefi-
nite thing' (Iv yd@ mog otjftaivet dogujrov).1 The former would do as
an explanation of why indefinite names are, after all, usable in
assertions; however, the context demands an explanation of why
indefinite names were defined in chapter 2 as indefinite, and this
can only be supplied by the second reading. Aristotle is thus incor-
porating the idea that the indefinite name signifies something
indefinite, which was why it was put in a class of its own in chapter
2 apart from, genuine names, but also the idea that it signifies a
single thing, which gives it enough in common with genuine names
to allow it to fill the same role as them in assertions,2
Aristotle here abides by his earlier choice of terminology: 'not-
man' is not a name, but an indefinite name, and similarly, 'doesn't-
thrive' (ov% vyiaivei) does not count as a verb (i9b9f,; see i6"30,
b
i i ft). Having reintroduced these terms, he now proceeds to draw
1
See H, Bonitz, Arueoielische Studien (Vienna, 1862-7; rcPr- Hildesheiin, 1969),
1221
2
We may compare Mela. r"4, where 'not-man' as well as 'man' are examples of
words that signify a single thing (1006*291 and lootfag).
a conclusion concerning the composition of affirmations. He has

already cited the fact that an affirmation asserts something of
something (i9b5), that, moreover, it makes a single claim about a
single thing (i9b6f.), and has listed those types of words which can
be considered to signify a single thing (i9b6-io). He may now infer
that an affirmation must contain the types of words which he has
mentioned: 'every affirmation must consist of a name and verb, or
an indefinite name and a verb* (i9bio-i2),3 An affirmation cannot,
of course, contain an indefinite verb such as 'doesn't-recover',
which would be the chief ingredient not of an affirmation, but of a
negation. We see once again at work Aristotle's view that & nega-
tion is formed by negating the verb.
While both a name or indefinite name and a verb must be present
in an affirmation, it is the verb which is essential to its working: so,
Aristotle goes on to say that without a verb, there can be no affir-
mation or negation (19^12),4 The verb is, as we saw in chapters 2
, and 3, the word which conveys a combination of subject and pred
icate, or, if negated, a separation of them. A name can only point
to a thing; a verb can assert that one thing holds of another. The
verb, we are next told, may be in any tense, whether 'is', 'was*, or
'will be'. This recalls the statement in chapter 5 that every asser-
tion must have a verb or an inflexion of a verb in it (17*9 £). While
verbs which signify some time outside the present were classified
in chapter 3 as inflexions of verbs and not verbs (i6bi6-i8), we see
that they function in the same way as far as the formation of asser-
tions is concerned. Assertions contain an indication of the time
when the predication is asserted to hold (17*24), and this indica-
tion is provided by the verb, which 'signifies time in addition' (i6h6),
So, Aristotle now reinstates inflexions of verbs, saying that they
count as verbs according to the definition, since they additionally
signify time (19*13 £).
This statement of the importance of the verb applies to all three
classes of assertions with which chapter 10 is concerned. The three
are exemplified by 'man is,' 'man is pale,' and 'man walks,' and each
must contain a verb in order for a claim to be made about the
3
Cf, Plato, Soph. 26zb9~cio, where the addition of a verb to a name results in
the shortest and most basic assertion,
4
We may note that this very sentence has no verb in it, Aristotle's account is not
meaot to cover the abbreviated, idiomatic use of language, but assertions in, their
correct, fully expanded form.
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions 135
subject. Also, while only simple assertions are of interest here, the
point roust apply to compound ones too, since, as we have seen,
they are formed by combining simple ones together (17*21 fc),
Examples of assertions follow, and so Aristotle moves on to the first
of the three groups discussed in the chapter.
2. THE FIRST TYPE OF ASSERTIONS:

'MAN IS'
This group consists of assertions containing the verb 'to be' and a
name or indefinite name standing for the subject. Contradictory
pairs of assertions are set out, beginning with non-universal asser-
tions containing a name, then going on to those containing an inde-
finite name and finally to universal assertions, first with a name and
then with an indefinite name standing for the subject. We thus have
the following:
man is—man is-not
not-man is—not-man is-not
every man is—not every man is
every not-man is—not every not-man is,
Similar pairs of assertions could be made using past and future
verbs, Aristotle adds (i9 b i8£). Assertions containing a name and
the verb 'to be* are labelled as 'first' or 'primitive' (i9bi5), and the
move to the other, less primitive, examples is marked by 'then'
(i9bi6) to introduce those containing the indefinite name, and
'again' (i9bi7) to introduce the universal assertions,5 We may note
that we are here once again presented with universal and non-
universal assertions about universals, which we first saw in chapter
7. Here, however, the same assertions are divided according to new
criteria, so that both universal and non-universal assertions will be
found in each of the three groups of chapter 10.
Several questions arise concerning this passage. Why are asser-
tions containing the verb 'to be' dealt with separately from those
in which other verbs are added to a name? We are also confronted
once again with the question of what 'man is' means. Is this a com-
plete utterance, and, if so, in what sense are we to take 'is"? We see
5
Cf. the use of 'first' and 'then' at i7*8t
in several other passages that the verb 'to be* marks the minimum
that needs to be added to a name in order to form an assertion with
truth value. Thus, single names signify something, but are neither
true nor false unless 'is' or "is not* is added, and do not signify 'that
it is or is not' (16*14-18, b28~3o); even the definition of man is not
an assertion, unless 'is*, 'will be", or 'was' is added (17*11£; cf.
20-351).
The examples of assertions containing a name and the verb 'to
be' are clearly meant as complete assertions; they do not await
completion by the addition of another word, TThe use of 'is' must
therefore be different from that seen in 'man is Just,' How, though,
do assertions like 'man is' differ from those such as 'man walks'?
If 'is* appears here in a complete sense, there would seem to be no
difference: both, we might suppose, are examples of verbs. Yet
Aristotle clearly separates the two types of assertion. Assertions
such as 'man walks' are only introduced after a discussion of asser-
tions containing the copula, such as 'man is just,* and are said to
follow their pattern (2oa3-i5),
In reading chapter i, we have already had occasion to consider
the sense of being which is involved in claiming that goat-stag, or
man, is. I argued that the sense of 'to be' here cannot be that which
is found in 'man is pale.* This copulative use of the verb demands
the presence of a second name to designate the predicate of the
assertion, and by itself accomplishes nothing (i6b23~5). 'Goat-stag
is' is not an incomplete utterance waiting for the addition of a
predicate: it is an assertion in its own right, aad is true or
(i6'i6-i8). Moreover, it is not the claim that a goat is a stag: the
combination between goat and stag in a goat-stag is not the com-
bination seen in a state of affairs in which a predicate holds of a
subject.
Being, therefore, is in some sense a predicate, which is asserted
to hold of goat-stag or of man. It is not a predicate in the same way
as walking is, though. First of all, 'is' means something different
depending on what category the subject belongs to (Mete, &j,
1017*22-7). Furthermore, being in the ease of each thing is a con-
sequence of what that thing happens to be: to say that ice is is to
say that ice is solid (Meta. Ha, io42b27f.), and, in general, the sub-
stance of each thing is the origin of its being (Meta. ioi7bis,
i043a2).Thus, being, in the case of man, consists in being what man
is, that is, a rational two-footed animal. So, 'is' in 'man is' and 'is* in
'goat-stag is' make different claims, since being man and being
goat-stag are two different things, as determined by their respec-
tive definitions. The former assertion is true, since there is such a
thing as man, while the latter is false, since there is no such thing
as goat-stag. Both assertions contain the same sense of 'is', that
relating to substance, but the substance which is said to be is not
the same, and so 'is' makes a different claim in each case.*The verb
'to be' exhibits similar behaviour when used as a copula. Thus, we
are told that the copula has a different sense for each category
(APr. 49a6-ro; Meta. A?, 1017*22-30). In 'man is pale' and 'man is
just,' then, the same sense of the verb, that pertaining to the cate-
gory of quality, is used to predicate two different qualities of a
subject, just as in 'man is' and 'horse is' the same sense of the verb
asserts the existence of two different substances.
To claim that something is, then, is a very different operation
from attaching a normal predicate to it 'Is' is very far from being
a sign of a single thing, with which any existent subject may be said
to be combined in the same sense (cf. APo. 92bi4). 'Man is' could
not be analysed as 'man is being,' where 'being' signified some thing
in its own right. It therefore does not fall into the same class as
'man walks': the latter is discussed only after assertions such as
'man is walking,* which makes the same claim, and in which the
structure of the assertion is more evident.
3. THE SECOND TYPE OF ASSERTIONS:

'MAN IS JUST'
We may now move on to the second group of assertions dealt with

in chapter 10. In assertions such as 'man is just,' there is a third
element in addition to subject and predicate. This element is the
copula, *a third thing predicated in addition* (i9bi9l); it does not
signify anything, but indicates that what 'just' signifies is supposed
to hold of man. It is what makes the assertion into an assertion,
while the other two words show what is asserted of what. The term
'to be predicated in addition* (aQoaxaxri'YQQelaQv.i) is reminiscent of
'to signify in addition* (jteovotmaiveiv, i6b6, 18, 24), which, as we
* C£ Owen,'Aristotle and the Snares of Ontology', in J, R. Bambrough (ed.). New

Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London, 1965), esp. sect. iii.
have seen, is used to refer to semantic roles other than signifying
properly speaking. To signify is to be a token for a thing. Thus, for
a verb to express when a predication is to be taken as holding,
whether in the past, present, or future, is not for it to signify, nor is
it a case of signification when the copula represents the things
picked out by two names as being combined. Both of these roles
are denoted by the term Ho signify in addition'. Similarly, the copula
is here said to be a 'predicate in addition'; just as it is not a sign of
a thing, so it is not a sign of a predicate. Just as it has a semantic
role which is not signifying, it has what might be termed a predi-
cating role which is not predication. It asserts that a predicate holds
of the subject, while it is left to another word to signify which pred-
icate it is that holds.1
We must also note that the copula is here referred to as 'a name
or verb' (Svofta f gtf(ta, I9 b 2it), as if he were unsure how to
classify it. It is certainly unlike other verbs in not signifying a thing,
but merely serving to combine other elements. It is more like a
conjunction (avvdsafios) in this respect, which has the power of
combining several expressions into one, while itself being an
insignificant utterance (ffHovij acnpog, Poet. I457S4 £). In fact, it falls
into a class of its own, and has a unique position in the account of
how assertions work.
In this class of assertions, exemplified by 'man is just,' two 'oppo-
sitions* (dra$«7«g, igb2o) are possible, Aristotle says. That is, either
the copula or the predicate may be negated. He means that to con-
tradict 'man is just', one may say either 'man is-not just' (owe fern
dixoiog avOg&itog), so denying that justice holds of man, or else
'man is not-just' (eanv oil dixau>$ av%»jroc), so affirming that not-
justiee holds of man. It becomes clear that only one of these 'oppo-
sitions' is the genuine contradictory, denying what the affirmation
affirms, while the other is actually an affirmation. While one is a
negation and the other an affirmation, the sense of both is to
oppose the statement that man is just.8 There are therefore four
assertions (i9b22), consisting of the two affirmations and their
negations. As Aristotle puts it, 'is' may either be added to 'just' or
7
Cf. 21*27, where the copula is said to predicate being of the subject. The copula
asserts that the subject Is' the predicate: being is thus, In a sense, a second predi-
cate attached to the subject,
8
Aristotle returns to the question of whether two affirmations can oppose each
other in chapter 14.
to 'not-just', and likewise the negated copula, here called 'the nega-
tion' because it is what makes an assertion negative, may be added
either to 'just' or 'not-just' (i9b24 ft). These four assertions may be
set out as follows:
man is just—man is-not just (I9b27 f.)
man is not-just—man is-not not-just (i9b28£).
It will be seen that an assertion is only a negation if the copula
is negated. Thus, of the above assertions, those on the left are all
affirmations, since they claim that something holds of something
else; those on the right, since they each deny that something holds,
are negations. The nature of the subject and predicate does not
affect whether the assertion is a negation or not,
In these later chapters, we find that Aristotle not only presents
sets of contradictory pairs, as he did in. chapters 7-9, but is also
interested in the inferences which can be drawn between the
various assertions. His statement of the relation between the above
assertions is brief and obscure: he says that two of the assertions
are in a series with the affirmation and negation in the same way
as the privations, and two are not (i9b23f,). For a more detailed
explanation, we are referred to the Analytics,9 In Prior Analytics 1,
46, Aristotle explores the difference between the two forms of con-
tradiction represented by 'not-being pale' and 'being not-pale'
(APr. 5ib7t). These are abbreviations of full assertions, and corre-
spond to the two sorts of opposition mentioned above (De Int,
I9b2o). These, he says, do not signify the same thing. The former,
and not the latter, is the negation of 'being pale' (APr. 5ib8-io).
Various arguments are presented which are intended to show that
they are distinct. The manifest difference between 'is-not capable
of walking* and 'is capable of not-walking' is cited (5ibi4-20).
Furthermore, to say that something is not-equal presupposes that
there is something unequal which is underlying, and of which
inequality may be affirmed. In order to say that something is-not
equal, however, and so deny equality of it, nothing needs to be
underlying (5ib2S-7),w Negations, as we have seen, are true even
of the non-existent (De Int. i6bis).
' Ct Waltz's explanation (Arutatelis Organon Graece, 2 vois, (Leipzig, 1844), i.

344)-
'* We may note that 'not-equal* and 'unequal' seem to have the same force when
used in assertions, although Aristotle does not explicitly say that they signiCy the
Having argued for their difference, Aristotle sets out their
arrangement (td^tg, 5ib36-52ai7). It is this analysis of the relations
between the assertions to which we are referred in the De
Interpretations (i9b3i). Four examples are set out, which corre-
spond to the four assertions given above:
A: is good B: is-not good
D: is-not aot-good C: is not-good.
If A holds of something, then D does, and if C holds, then B does.

Since Aristotle an assertion as being the claim that a predicate
holds of a subject, he has here abbreviated Ms assertions to in-
clude only the copula and the name standing for the predicate.
They could be expanded to full assertions by the addition of a
subject-word.11
We are next shown two further assertions which stand in the
same relation to A and B as do D and C, These are obtained by
replacing 'not-good* by some privative; for this purpose the
example is changed to 'equal' to allow the use of the privative
'unequal'. The following are now set out (52*15 ft):
A: is equal B: is-not equal
D': is-not unequal C': is unequal,
These assertions are even further abbreviated, the copulas being

omitted in the Greek. I have translated them with 'is' added in
order to make them clearer, I shall designate the first two as A and
B, since they represent assertions of the same type as A and B
above. It is important to note that B here, as above, denotes a nega-
tion: the example here is not the affirmation that something is not-
equal, but the negation claiming that something is-not equal, I shall
designate the two assertions that contain privative terms as C' and
D', The relations between A, B, C', and D' are parallel to those
between A, B, C, and D. If A holds of something, then D' does, and
if C' holds, then B does."Thus, the assertions containing privatives
same thing. I have argued above in Chapter 3, Section 5 that an indefinite name
such as 'not-equal* is considered as a single word, on the analogy of "unequal*
(16*29 tt).
" "To be' appears as an Infinitive in the Greek forms of ihe&e sample assertions
only because they arc quoted in indirect speech.
** For the inference from C' to B, cf. the inference which we saw in chapter 7,
that if man is ugly, he is-not fair (17*33).
such as 'unequal* stand in the same relation to the two basic asser-
tions A and B as do the assertions containing the indefinite names
such as 'not-good'. We may now see what Aristotle means in
chapter 10 of the De Interpretatione, when he says that two of his
four assertions stand in the same relation as do the privations, while
the other two do not (igb2^ fc). C' and D' stand to A and B as do
C and D. So, C and D are matched in their relation to A and B by
the privations C' and D'. A and B, however, are not balanced by
another pair of assertions.
In the treatment of assertions containing the copula in chapter
10, we have so far been considering non-universal assertions about
universals (u/20-g); we now move on to universal assertions
about universals (i9b32 f t ) . We thus have the following:
every man is just—not every man is just
every man is not-just—not every man is not-just.
These assertions, Aristotle says, are related in the same way,
except that the diagonal assertions are not simultaneously true in
the same way as those above (i9b3Sf.). In order to consider this
statement, it will help to set out both the non-universal and the uni-
versal assertions, following the order prescribed in the Prior
Analytics (APr. 5ib36-9). 1 shall assign the letters E, F, G, and H
to the universal assertions.
A: man is just B: man is-not just
D: man is-not not-just C: man is not-just
E; every man is just F; not every man is just
G: not every man is not-just H: every man is not-just
In the Prior Analytics passage, we are told that A and C cannot
both be true together, whereas B and D can (52*12-14). Similarly,
if ever)' roan is just, then it cannot be the case that every man is
not-just, so that E and H cannot both be true. F and G might cer-
tainly both be true, if some men were just and others not. If we
follow the comments in the Prior Analytics, the relations between
diagonals in the two sets of assertions seem to follow exactly the
same pattern.
Why, then, does Aristotle say that the two sets of assertions do
not work in the same way (I9b35)? If we look within the De
Interpretatione instead of relying on the comments to be found in
the Prior Analytics, this will become clear. The difference between
the two sets of assertions is that the former consists of non-
universal assertions, the latter of universal ones. We have seen in
chapter 7 that the former can violate RCP, while the latter cannot,
So, certain assertions of the types represented by A and B can be
true together: they constitute one of the exceptions to the rule that
one member of a contradictory pair is always true and the other
false (i7b3offi). If B is true, then C may be true.13 Thus, A and C
may both be true, whereas in the second set of assertions the cor-
responding diagonals, E and H, may not. Non-universal assertions
concerning a universal may behave differently from the universal
assertions concerning a universal which appear in the second set.
Not all assertions in the first set violate RCP, however ('man is
an animal,' for example, would not supply an exception), and in
these cases the diagonals will work in the same way for both sets:
this is marked by the statement, following the claim that the two
sets do not work in the same way, 'but sometimes it is possible'
(19b36).
Having considered these two sets of assertions which take 'man'
as the subject, Aristotle now takes *not-man' as subject. The result-
ing assertions are:
not-man is just— not-man is-not just (i9l>38f.)
not-man is not-just— aot-man is-not not-just ( 19*39 £).
He has already discussed the effect of negating the predicate and
the copula, and so here introduces negation to the subject. Each of
the three elements of assertions formed by means of the copula has
now been negated: there are no further oppositions (dvwftawg),
Aristotle says (20*1). We have seen that inferences can be drawn
between those assertions in which the copula is negated, and those
in which the predicate is negated: while only the attaching of 'not'
to the copula can have the effect of producing a negative assertion,
it is still possible to infer, for example, from 'man is not-just* to
'man is-not just.' The third way of introducing negation into an
assertion containing the copula involves negating the subject, so
that 'net-man* appears as the name, in place of 'man' (2oa2). Since
the subject is different, these assertions are, he says, entirely sep-
arate (20ai-3): any claim about not-man is made about that which
" According to the Prior Analytics passage, B does not imply C, though C may
be true If B is. B might be true and C false if there were no subject underlying the
predication (APr, 52*4 1).
is not a man, and therefore has nothing to do with any assertion

concerning man, so that no inferences can be drawn from one to
the other.
Aristotle does not consider universal assertions which contain
the copula and take not-man as subject; an example would be
'every not-man is just,' This is not because such assertions are inad-
missible, though: we see universally made assertions with
not-man as subject presented in the next section (20*5 ff.). Since
there is more than one thing which may be truly said to be a not-
man, it will count as a universal by the criterion of chapter 7
(17a39f_.
4, THE THIRD TYPE OF ASSERTIONS:

'MAN WALKS'
The examination of assertions consisting of name, predicate, and

copula is now complete, and he moves on to those 'in which "is"
does not fit* (20*3), that is, those consisting only of a name and a
verb. These assertions, we are told, work in the same way as those
containing the copula (20*4!.). He begins by setting out the four
universal assertions:
every man thrives—every man doesn't-thrive
every not-man thrives—every not-man doesn't-thrive.
These pairs are evidently meant to consist of contradictories:
*every man doesn't-thrive' means 'not every roan thrives,' not *no
man thrives.'14 We shall see why it is that the negations are written
in this way, On these assertions, Aristotle comments that we should
not say 'not every man': 'not' should be added not to 'every', but
to 'man' (20*7-9). The next few lines explain the comment. 'Every',
he goes on, does not signify a universal, but rather shows that the
assertion is made universally (20*9 f.). This comment is repeated
from chapter 7 (ffn £.). This, we are told, is made clear by con-
sidering the non-universal assertions, which are now set out
(20aiofc):
man thrives—man doesn't thrive
not-man thrives—not-man doesn't-thrive.
14
Cf, 'all that glisters is not gold.'
These, differ from the first set in being made noo-universally

instead of universally (20*12). It will be seen that this difference is
marked by the presence of 'every' in the same position in eaeh of
the first set of assertions, and its absence from the assertions of the
second set. From this, Aristotle concludes that 'every' and 'no'
'additionally signify* that the assertion is made universally of the
subject, and that therefore 'the others should be added in the
same way' (20*12-15): that is, the other words in the assertion are
unchanged, the only difference between the universal and non-
universal being the presence or absence of 'every' or 'no'. We may
now understand the instruction that 'not' should be added to 'man'
and not to 'every'. If we start with the universal assertions taking
man as subject, such as 'every man thrives,* and wish to form similar
assertions taking a negated universal as their subject, negation
should be added to the name which signifies the universal, that is,
to 'man*, and not to 'every'. 'Every' does not signify a thing which
is a universal: that is a task to be done by a name. Instead, it indi-
cates that the predicate applies to the whole of the subject, rather
than merely holding of it, with no indication of whether it holds of
all or part.
That 'every' has this function is then demonstrated by setting out
the same assertions with the word 'every' missed out: the result is
a set of non-universal assertions, still with the same universal as
subject. 'Every' and 'no' do not affect the working of an assertion
except to make it universal rather than non-universal: they show
that the affirmation or negation holds throughout the thing signi-
fied by the name (20*13 fc). 'Every man thrives' still asserts that
thriving holds of man, just as does 'man thrives.' In addition,
however, it asserts that thriving holds throughout the class of
man. We see that the interesting word 'signifies in addition*
(nQoamjjuaivei) is used in connection with 'every* (20*13). This is
usually used of semantic roles which cannot be described as signi-
fying in the usual sense: such words are additional elements in the
working of language which cannot be characterized by the simple
relation whereby words are said to signify things. So, verbs 'addi-
tionally signify' time (i6b6): that is, they express when the predica-
tion is supposed to hold. The copula 'additionally signifies' a
combination between the things signified by two names (16*24).
The term is an appropriate one to use here. 'Every*, unlike 'man',
is not a sign of a universal thing, or of any thing: the things signi-
fied in corresponding universal and non-universal assertions are

exactly the same. So, the semantic function of 'every' is not a stan-
dard case of signifying,"
In this passage Aristotle does not allow any role to the negation
of the word 'every'. To negate the universal, man, negation should
be added to 'man'; to make the assertion negative, the verb would
need to be negated, for, as we saw in chapter 7, the contradictory
of a universal assertion is itself universal (i7bi6 ft). In either case,
'every* is untouched. Furthermore, to form a non-universal asser-
tion does not mean negating 'every*, but omitting it. The way of
setting out the assertions in this passage is thus carefully chosen to
be both consistent and perspicuous. The prefixing of'not' to a word
represents adding negation to it; since there is no sense in negat-
ing 'every*, Aristotle avoids prefixing 'not' to it in setting out the
assertions. So, he does not write the negation of 'every man thrives*
as 'not-every man thrives/ since it is not 'every', but 'thrives' to
which negation properly belongs in a universal negation. This per-
spicuous use of language will enable one to use complicated con-
figurations of negations in argument.16
We may note that assertions containing the copula have been
treated before those containing ordinary verbs, and the latter are
said to follow the pattern of the former. In assertions containing
the copula the possibilities of negation are more numerous, since
subject, predicate, and copula can each be negated. In assertions
which contain a verb instead of the copula, the verb signifies the
predicate and also performs the function of the copula in joining
subject to predicate. Since these two functions are carried out by a
single word, there is no way of negating the copula or the predi-
cate separately from each other. There are thus fewer assertions to
list under this heading than there were among assertions in which
the copula is present. When a verb is negated, it must be its copu-
15
We may now see how it is that universal assertions may be dealt with to each
of the three groups of assertions in chapter 10. The addition of 'every* does not
move an assertion to a radically different level of complexity, and so is considered
in this chapter as subordinate to the classification of assertions into those in which
*is* is added to a name, those containing the copula and those not containing the
copula.
B
The presentation of sample assertions is not always so clear; at I7bi8 and i"fz$,
the copula is missed out, so as to bring "not" and 'every* into juxtaposition; at 19*33 f.,
we find 'not* preceding 'every', even with the copula present; at 20*38!., however,
"not* is added to %' and not to 'every'.
lative aspect that is negated, and not the aspect of its meaning
which signifies the predicate: otherwise there could be no nega-
tions, since only if the copula is negated is an assertion a negation.
An assertion containing a verb can always be expressed as one
containing a copula, by substituting the copula and a participle for
the verb (e.g. 2ib9ff.). This reveals its structure more clearly, and
it is for this reason that 'man is just' is presented before sman
walks.'
5. INFERENCES, NEGATIONS,
AND WORD ORDER
Having discussed these three types of assertions, Aristotle goes

back to consider more inferences which can be drawn between
them. In the next section (20*16-30), he reverts to assertions con-
taining the copula, and works out such inferences as that from
'every man is not-just' to 'no man is just.' In order for the differ-
ence between these sentences to be clear, cases must be used in
which the predicate can be negated independently of the copula:
assertions containing verb instead of copula will not illustrate the
point. Among singulars, if it is true to deny that Socrates is wise,
that is, if the negation 'Socrates is-not wise' is true, then the affir-
mation 'Socrates is not-wise' is also true (20*23 ft). The point is pre-
sented by means of a dialectical question, with its answer and an
inference drawn from that answer (2Oa25 £): 'Is Socrates wise? No.
Therefore Socrates is not-wise.' This inference does not work for
universal assertions, though: if it is false that every man is wise, it
does not follow that every man is not-wise. Instead, only the truth
of the negation, 'not every man is wise,' follows from the falsehood
of the affirmation: 'every man is wise' and 'every man is not-wise'
are merely contraries (20*30).
In chapter 10 so far, we have seen Aristotle set out a range of
contradictory pairs within each of the three classes of assertions.
Negation has been introduced into these assertions in a variety of
ways, negating each element in the assertion separately. It is impor-
tant to bear in mind throughout this discussion exactly what a nega-
tion is. A negation is a kind of assertion (17*23-6), and must contain
a verb (i9bi2). However, in chapter 10 we have seen that the word
'not' may be applied to any member of a sentence, with the excep-
tion of 'every', in order to negate it. Although it is possible to

negate individual words in this way, the negating of a word in an
assertion does not make the assertion into a negation, unless the
copula or verb itself, which is what makes the assertion into an
assertion and not a mere list, is negated. Further, the negating of a
single word does not make that word into an assertion. An asser-
tion must be complex, consisting of subject, predicate, and some-
thing linking the two, either expressed by the copula or contained
in the verb, Thus, Aristotle says in chapter 2 that 4not-man' is
neither a phrase nor a negation (i6a3i). We see once again that to
negate an affirmation is to negate its verb, and so claim that the
predicate does not hold of a subject. In ordering assertions into
contradictory pairs and deciding what inferences can be drawn
between them, we must always bear in mind the structure of the
assertion, and not treat it as an atom which can be negated from
outside,
In the next section of the chapter (20a3i-6), Aristotle is con-
cerned to clarify the status of negated words such as 'not-man*.
They seem, he says, to be like assertions without names and verbs.
However, he argues, they are not, since a negation must be true or
false, and 'not-man' cannot have a truth value. It has no greater
claim to truth than 'man'; indeed, he adds, it has even less claim. It
is important for him to clarify this point, since he frequently allows
himself the use of the term 'negation' (dbto0aat£) in referring to
indefinite names such as 'not-man'.17 He does not have separate
words to denote negative expressions like 'not-man', and assertions
which deny rather than affirm. Similarly, earlier the chapter, the
word 'not* is termed a negation (rtjv dmtyaaiv, 2o"8). Here, there-
fore, he reiterates that an indefinite name is not a negation; the
same point was made briefly in chapter 2 (16*31). As we have seen,
however, no single word can possibly have truth value (i6ai5ff.).
It cannot even, properly speaking, be an answer to a question
(17*18-20), In order to emphasize his point that 'not-man' has no
truth value, he adds that it 'has even less claim to be considered
true or false' than 'man' (20*36), The claim seems odd, since neither
expression can have truth value at aII,1RThe answer may lie in the
indeflniteness of "not-man". We saw in chapter 2 that indefinite
17
See, e,g., Top, i3685-l*2, where the indefinite name is termed a negation
(axetfiaatf. the name is called a fdaif).
18
C£ 23biS-2i.
names were disqualified from counting as genuine names. A name

must signify, and signification must be definite, A name is a sign of
a thing, which means that it is a sign of a single thiag. It is not clear
that 'not-man* matches up to this requirement. In chapter 10, the
indefinite name is allowed back into the discussion, with the argu-
ment that it signifies a single thing in a sense (i9b9). 'Not-man' has
a less definite signification than 'man*, and less claim than it to be
called true.
A short passage follows in which universal assertions taking 'not-
man* as subject are discussed (2Oa37~4o). Such assertions are not
equivalent to any of those formed with 'man' as subject. There is
an equivalence, however, between 'every not-man is-not just' and
'no not-man is just.* This comment is interesting, in that it gives us
two equivalent ways of expressing a universal negative, one using
'every* and 'not', and the other using 'no*.19
This short section is followed by the final stretch of the chapter,
which concerns word order (20bi-i 2), Aristotle states that an asser-
tion signifies the same thing if the order of the names and verbs in
it is changed. In his example, 'man is pale,' it is claimed that there
is no change in signification if the positions of 'man' and 'pale' are
exchanged; the comment is true of his example in Greek. The argu-
ment in favour of this claim rests on showing that otherwise there
would be two contradictions of the same thiag, which was shown
in chapter 6 to be impossible.
It might appear that Aristotle here speaks of 'pale' as a verb;
there is no need to assume this, however. His point is that, in asser-
tions in general, the order of names and verbs can be changed
without altering the meaning. The example in support of this point
happens to be a case in which the order of two names is reversed,
but the point extends to assertions containing two names just as
well as those containing a name and a verb, and the same argument
will cover both (2ob3~io). In two other passages names alone are
brought in as examples of a point which has been said to hold both
of names and of verbs, yet we should not feel compelled to re-
classify the names in the examples as verbs (16*13-15, 2Qa3i~3).
Nothing forces us to concede that Aristotle uses the term 'verb'
" In English, the former of these two assertions resembles the one seen at 20*51,
which meant not 'no man thrives,* but 'not every man thrives.' In Greek, the post-
two of'every' differs: in the earlier passage it preceded the subject-word 'man', while
in the later passage it precedes the negated verb,
to mean 'predicate*, which would be inconsistent with the defini-

tion and maia treatment of the verb in chapter 3.
In chapter 10, then, assertions are examined in a new light. They
are classified according to their structure, starting from the most
basic, in which 'is' is attached to a name, and going on to those
in which there is a copula, as well as words denoting subject and
predicate, and then assertions in which the copula and predicate-
word are replaced by a verb. The inferences which may be drawn
between the various groups are investigated. I have argued that, in
the section dealing with assertions containing the copula, the
exception to RCP which was discovered in chapter 7 is applied in
order to differentiate the relations which hold between non-
universal and universal assertions about universals. We also receive
elucidations of various points, including the role of the word
'every', the question of whether indefinite names are assertions,
and the effect of word order. The chapter covers subjects with
which it is important for the dialectician to be familiar: we are pro-
vided with detailed training in determining which assertions are
affirmations and which negations, in sorting assertions into their
contradictory pairs, and in drawing inferences between related
assertions belonging to different contradictory pairs.
II
Chapter 11: Sophistic Puzzles concerning

Simple and Complex Assertions
Chapter n takes up the issue of complex predications, which were

also considered in chapters 5 and 8. If one thing is affirmed or
denied of more than one subject, or more than one thing is affirmed
or denied of a single subject, then the assertion does not count as
single (20bi2ff.), This claim is in accordance with the semantic
criterion for the unity of an assertion, put forward in chapter 5
(i7ai5fi), and expanded in chapter 8. If either the subject or
predicate in an assertion is not a genuine unity, then the assertion
is not properly speaking one assertion, but many (18*18, 20), In
order to determine which assertions are single and which multiple,
then, it is necessary to know something about the items which are
signified by the words in the assertion. As so often in the work, we
find that a knowledge of things is necessary if we are to investigate
the statements made about them.
'Man is pale,' we learnt in chapter 8, is a single assertion, assum-
ing that 'pale' signifies a single thing (i8ai4~i7). Accordingly,
Aristotle now explains what he means by 'single' (aobi5 ft). The
existence of a single name certainly does not mean that there is
a single thing for which it stands. He is well aware that one word
can stand for more than one thing (e.g. Meta. T$, ioo6a32ff,; SE
165*10 ft); this may either mean that a word is ambiguous and can
stand either for one referent or for another, or that the item for
which it stands is not really a single item. Just as one name can
stand for many things, so one thing may have many names attach-
ing to it. Man, animal, two-footed, and tame form a unity, despite
the multiplicity of names; pale, man, and walking, though, do not
make up a unity (20*16-19), If "pale walking man' were to appear
as either the subject or the predicate in an assertion, there might
Chapter n: Sophistic Puzzles 151
be a single utterance, but there would not be a single assertion

(2QbI9-22).
In chapter 8, Aristotle chose as his example of a multiple asser-
tion one that could be split in two, and so shown to be equivalent
to the conjunction of two simple assertions. Here in chapter n,
however, the emphasis is on accidents, either taken with each other
or taken with the subject of which they hold. It is less clear that all
assertions involving merely accidental unities could be analysed
into more than one simple assertion.1 Aristotle's unease over asser-
tions in which a single thing is not asserted of a single thing stems
from dialectic, and the reader is accordingly referred to the Topics
(2ob26), I have argued in connection with chapter 8 that he believes
strongly that a single question must have a single assertion as its
answer, A dialectical question demands as its answer one portion
of a contradictory pair or the other (2ob22 ft). Thus, we are here
told, a question of the form 'what is it?' is not dialectical (2ob26f£;
see also Top, I58ai4ff,). If a dialectical question contains hidden
complexity, and is in fact two questions in one, then it will not be
appropriate to give a single answer, since, first, the answerer may
lay himself open to refutation, and secondly, to give an answer is
to choose one assertion from the contradictory pair offered: one
assertion can no more answer two questions than belong to two
contradictory pairs.
We can see how a consideration of assertions involving clusters
of accidents is connected to the issue of double questions. If
someone asks, 'is Socrates a pale walking man?*, the answerer
encounters the same difficulty as in the case of *is Callias or
Themistocles musical?' (SE i75b39~-i76aiS). If we suppose that
Socrates is pale but is not walking, then it becomes clear in what
way the question can be seen as multiple, and in fact deserving to
be split into several separate questions, in order to supply a
separate answer to each one. In asking % Socrates a tame two-
footed animal?*, on the other hand, only a single question has
been asked, and either the affirmation or the negation will be a sat-
isfactory answer (20bi6ff.), This is because 'tame two-footed
animal' denotes a unity.2 Thus, it will be important for the purposes
of dialectic to distinguish between assertions about clusters of
1
Cf. Mew. A6, where these acddcntal associations do count as unities, though
unities per accidents rather than per se (Mete, ioi5 k i6ffi).
2
What of the question *is a horse a tame two-footed anitnal?* This might simply
accidents and those which involve a property or a definition,
since this will determine which questions are double, and so
unanswerable.
Ackrill argues that not all assertions containing groups of acci-
dents can be split into several simple assertions.3 His examples
consist of assertions containing quantifiers, 'No musical cobblers
are wise,' for example, is not equivalent to the conjunction of two
simple assertions, nor is it simple itself. To this we may reply that,
if there are assertions containing groups of accidents which cannot
be analysed into a number of simple ones, then, by the same token,
they would pose no threat to dialectic: for, if one of them were
posed as a dialectical question, there would be a single right answer.
Where the expansion of a complex statement into component
simple statements is impossible, it is unnecessary. Aristotle's dis-
cussion here is only aimed at identifying assertions which need to
be avoided in dialectic, and AckrilTs example falls outside the
scope of this scheme. Aristotle's own example, on the other hand,
does provide an assertion which could be problematic in dialectic
(20*18 £). Since pale, walking, and man do not form a unity, some
of them might hold and others not. Therefore, both affirmative and
negative answers to the question *is Socrates a pale walking man?'
might be open to refutation, in the same way as we saw in the case
of 'are Callias and Coriscus at home'?'
In the next section (2ob3i-2ia33), he considers the difference
between assertions in which two predicates are attributed to a
subject and two assertions each separately attributing a predicate
to the subject. Again, he is interested in the inferences which can
be drawn between different assertions. We might describe this
problem as the question whether the two inferences
1. (F & G)x -» F* & Or and
2. ¥x & Gx -»(F & G)x
(where 'F and 'G* stand for predicates, and V stands for any
subject) are valid or not. If complex assertions are to be split into
simple ones, as described above, then we would certainly expect i
to be valid; 2 is now examined.
In. some cases, Aristotle says, we can infer from the two simple
be the question % a horse a man?* and so would count as simple, A name and a
definition can be.substituted for each other: see Appendix II.
3
1 L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 145.
Chapter n: Sophistic Puzzles 153
assertions to the one complex one: if Socrates is pale and a man,

then he is a pale man. In other cases, though, difficulties arise. Two
such difficulties are considered, arising from the assumption that
predicates which hold of a subject separately also hold of it
together. First, he alludes to a sophism presented in the Sophistici
Elenchi: if someone is good and a cobbler, then he is a good cobbler
(2Ob35 £; see SE I77bi3-i5). It is assumed that in 'Socrates is a good
cobbler,' both good and cobbler are predicated of Socrates, This is
'a single predication' (if xaTtj-yogij/ta, 20b3i £.), though not, pre-
sumably, *a single affirmation' 20bis): the latter term
is reserved for assertions where a single thing is predicated of a
single thing. Secondly, an infinite number of longer and longer
assertions will follow from two simple predications involving the
same subject (2Ob37 ft). For, if 'Fx* and 'Gx' are true predications,
and inference 2 is valid, then we have '(F & G)*,' and, by means of
the inference 'Ex & (F & G)JK -» (F & F & G)JC,' we obtain '(F &
F & G)je'; and so on. If a man is pale, then he is a pale pale man,
Like the cobbler sophism, the regress of ever longer sentences is
treated in the Sophistici Elenchi, Forcing one's opponent to repeat
himself, or babble, is a recommended means towards victory in
argument (SE i6sbi5-i7,173a3i~4o).4
Aristotle now goes on to lay down rules which are intended to
limit these inferences so as to prevent any absurdities (21*5 ft,).
First of all, subjects and predicates which are only clusters of acci-
dents should not be considered as forming unities: the fact that they
can be said to hold separately therefore does not imply that they
can. may be said to hold together (21*7-16). So, even though it may
be true to say that what is pale is musical, this does not make them
into one thing (2i a i2 ft). Thus, the cobbler is not good absolutely
(eut/UOg), but only as a cobbler. We would still need some know-
ledge of the things of which the world is composed in order to be
able to say when a string of words represents a cluster of accidents
and when it cites a definition or a group of properties which must
accompany each other. Arguments on these subjects form an
important part of the Topics,
Next, another rule is presented, in order to exclude inferences
* Cf. the problem of the snub nose (Mete 25, 1030*28 ft). Aristotle would not
agree with a logician who claimed that -—;—p was equivalent to ~p: the former is
a case of babbling, and not an acceptable fonn ot" eipression. See L, Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. R Pears and B. R McGuianess (trs,) (London,
1961; ist pub, 1922), see 5,512.
which result in infinite regresses (2iai6fi). If one predicate is

present in another, he says, then both cannot be predicated
together, Socrates is a man and & two-footed animal, but not a two-
footed man animal. Likewise, he is not pale pale: in both cases there
is repetition, but in 'pale pale' it is patent, and in 'two-footed man
animal' concealed. Repetition, we are told in the Topics, is confus-
ing, obscure, and sounds like babbling (Top. 130*32-4).The case of
repetition is perhaps similar to that of the clusters of accidents: in
both cases there is a sequence of words which does not stand for a
unity. The words 'two-footed animal' together signify a unity, that
is, man; 'two-footed man aniinar, we might say, signifies that unity
twice, and so cannot properly be said to signify a unity.
Both the good-cobbler sophism and cases of babbling have now
been dealt with, both involving false inferences from simple to
compound assertions. A third sophism is now introduced, involving
an inference from the compound to the simple (2iai8f£). This
inference works, he says, except when the original compound asser-
tion contains something which implies a contradiction. Thus, we can
infer from 'Socrates is a pale man' to 'Socrates is pale,' but not from
'Socrates is a dead man' to 'Socrates is a man,' since 'man' implies
'living man'. IB order to test whether a predication contains a con-
tradiction, the method of substituting phrases for names is to be
used (21*291), Th's method is widely used in. the Topics.5 The
method of substitution is usually used in order to expose undesir-
able contradictions or repetitions. Here, the rule is reversed in
rather a surprising way. We find an example of an assertion in
which contradictory predicates are assigned to the same subject in
a perfectly acceptable way: 'Socrates is a dead man' may well be
true. It is in the expanded simple assertions found by substituting
a phrase for a name where the contradiction comes out into the
open, and is therefore unacceptable; for, while Socrates might be a
dead man, he cannot both be dead and be a man.
Aristotle finds that this rale is not adequate as it stands, and
needs further modification: when there is a contradiction contained
in the compound assertion, then it cannot be split, but if there is
not a contradiction then sometimes it can be split, and sometimes
it cannot (2ia24 ff,),TMs modification is introduced in order to cope
with a related sophism. If Homer is a poet, then Homer is; but this
5
See, e.g., Top, 102*19,13°*39> I47|I9-I5-- Mete. F4,1006*34 ft; an<i Appendix II.
Chapter n; Sophistic Puzzles 155
is false, since Homer is dead. This cannot be dealt with by the pre-
vious rule, since 'Homer is a poet' does not contain any implicit
contradiction. Instead, this sophism is treated in the same way as
the good cobbler. Just as goodness only pertains to the cobbler
accidentally, so 'is' is only attached accidentally to Homer; he only
is in that he is a poet, so that he cannot be said to be absolutely.
We may note that the copula 'is' is here said to be predicated of
Homer (21*27): it is not predicated absolutely, though, as it would
be in 'Homer is*; the function of 'is' in 'Homer is a poet* is what is
called in chapter 10 'additional predication' (vfigf.),
In the final comment of the chapter, Aristotle draws a connec-
tion with another sophism, related to the argument that if Homer
is a poet then Homer is: the sophism concerns the argument that
what is not is, on the grounds that it may be believed (2ia32f.).*
In chapter n, thinking concerning simple and compound asser-
tions is applied to exposing double questions and fallacious
inferences. The treatment of sophisms in this chapter, like the dis-
cussion of RCP in chapters 7-9, is aimed at drawing the line
between, the ground of genuine dialectic and the daogers of
inferences which seem to follow but do not, or questions which
seem to have answers but do not. We also find an explicit discus-
sion of dialectical questions (20*22-30), which sheds light on
Aristotle's preoccupations in earlier chapters.
* Se« SE i6fi i; cf. Top. i2i'2O-6,

12
Chapter 12: Modal Assertions
In the following two chapters, Aristotle turns his attention to asser-

tions involving possibility and necessity. Once again, assertions are
arranged into contradictory pairs, and it is then determined what
implications exist between them. We are told at the outset that
'certain puzzles' are involved in the question of modal assertions
(21*37); it is tne task of these chapters to solve them.
A problem arises as soon as he considers how to allocate modal
assertions to their contradictory pairs. We are reminded here that,
so far in the treatise, negations have been formed by adding 'not*
to the copula: contradictory assertions are marked by 'is' and *is-
not* (21*38 £): the negation of "is a man' is 'is-not a man', not 'is a
not-man' (2ia39~b5). Th's *s briefly argued for, using abbreviated
assertions. He argues from the assumption that either the affirma-
tion or negation is true of any subject: exceptions to RCP have now
been left behind. If this is so, he says, and if the negation of 'is a
pale man' is not 'is-not a pale man' but % a not-pale man', then a
stick, since 'pale man' does not hold true of it, would have to be a
not-pale man. This, in turn, would entail 'a stick is a man* (2ib3~5).
The supposition that the negation of'is a pale man' is 'is a not-pale
man' has thus been shown to lead to an absurdity. Therefore, the
negation must instead be 'is-not a pale man'.1 It is the copula, then,
to which 'not' must be added if a negation is to be formed.
Assertions containing a verb instead of 'is' work the same way, he
now goes on to say, since 'walks' is equivalent to 'is walking': the
verb is 'what is said instead of "to be"' (21*5-10). Thus, it is the
verb, and no other word in the assertion, which must be negated in
order for the assertion to become a negation. Here, then, we see
clearly set out the account of negation which we have seen in oper-
ation throughout the work. Just as in chapter 10, the argument is
1
See APr. 51*5-35.
Chapter 12: Modal Assertions 157
first applied to assertions containing the copula, and then extended

to those containing verbs, or those in which 'is' does not fit or is not
added (cf. 2oa3-5),
The problem involved in determining modal contradictories now
emerges (2ibio-i8), If the negation of a modal statement is to be
found by the procedure as for non-modal ones, that is, by
negating the copula or verb, difficulties will result. 'Able to walk'
cannot be contradicted by 'able not to walk', since the same things
are generally thought capable both of being and of not being
(2ibi2). Something capable of walking need not actually be walking
all the time, and so must be capable of not walking too. Both claims
can therefore be simultaneously true of the same subject, and they
therefore cannot be contradictories (2ibi7f.).
We may note that Aristotle here, as in the stick argument above
(21*4), assumes that RCP is true. He does not solve the present
problem by declaring an exception to RCP, but rather by arguing
that in this case the negation is formed by negating not the copula,
but the modal operator, This, he says, is preferable to admitting that
it is possible to affirm and deny something of the same thing at the
same time, which is an impossibility (2ibi9~23). It might sound as
if this statement precludes there ever being two true assertions in
the same contradictory pair, and so conflicts with the exception to
RCP uncovered in chapter 7, In that chapter, however, it was the
fact that man is a universal which made it capable of being both
combined with and separated from, the same predicate. Part of the
universal might be pale and part not pale, so that both 'man is pale'
and 'man is-not pale* might be true. It was the nature of the thing
standing as the subject of the two assertions which allowed them
both to be true. Now, however, Aristotle is in a different situation.
Any type of item can be the subject of a statement involving pos-
sibility; to admit an exception to RCP here would mean allowing
all items, including singulars, to have contradictories true of them,
and this would clash with the Principle of Contradiction, which
states that the same single thing cannot possess and fail to possess
the same predicate at the same time and in the respect (Meta,
r*3, i0o5bi9-22).2None of the exceptions to RCP which have been
discovered violates this law. No one man in chapter 7 is both pale
and not pale, nor is either man or horse in chapter 8. Chapter 9 did
2
For a discussion of the Principle of Contradiction, see Appendix I.
not show us contradictories which were both trae or both false: the
exception was constituted only by the fact that it was not settled
which was which. It would therefore be a radical departure for
Aristotle to admit in chapter 12 that contradictories could be trae
of subjects in general, including singular ones, and he refuses to do
it. Instead, he says, assertions of possibility must constitute an
exception to the usual practice whereby negations are formed by
adding 'not' to the verb or copula (2ibi9-23),
He declares, then, that the negation of 'possible to be' is 'not
possible to be' (2ib23f.). In this case, unlike the others, the nega-
tion is reached by negating not 'to be", but 'possible'. According to
Ackrill, the problem of how to negate modal assertions results from
Aristotle's 'dangerously elliptical forms of expression'.3 The state-
ments under consideration could be spelled out in the form 'it is
possible that Socrates is wise*: in that case, if the negation is to be
arrived at by negating 'is', we might simply say that it is the first 'is'
which should be negated and not the second, for, according to
modern ideas of sentence structure, the first 'is' is the main verb of
the sentence, the second one being merely subordinate.
According to this criticism, then, Aristotle has blundered badly
through presenting his sample assertions in too abbreviated a form.
Had he written them out in full, he would have seen that it is the
first 'is* which should be negated. The criticism is mistaken,
however. Aristotle's method for finding the correct negation of an
assertion is not to look for the main verb and negate it, but to look
for the verb which combines subject with predicate, and negate that
(e.g. 2i838f.). An affirmation claims that a predicate holds of a
subject, and the core of it is the copula which links the two. A nega-
tion claims that subject and predicate are separated, and this sep-
aration is to be indicated by negating the copula. The 'is' of 'it is
possible that' is not a copula, and does not link subject with predi-
cate. So, even if he had written out 'it is possible that Socrates is
wise* in full, his normal practice for forming negations would
dictate that the second 'is', and not the first, should be negated. It
would be alien to Aristotle to consider this sentence as having 'it'
for its subject and the first 'is* for its main verb. Instead, he would
see the assertion as claiming that wisdom holds of Socrates poss-
ibly, rather than truly or necessarily (cf. 22*11-13).
1
S. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 149.
Chapter 12: Modal Assertions 159
We have seen that the negation of 'possible to be' must be 'not

possible to be', Aristotle must now explain why it is that the nega-
tion is not formed by negating the copula, as it is in other kinds of
assertions. He does not do this by explaining that an 'it is' should
be understood before 'possible', as we would expect if he accepted
AckrilTs analysis of modal sentences. Instead, modal operators are
seen as taking the place of the copula, and so are the proper part
of the assertion to be negated, if a negation is to be formed. In non-
modal sentences, subject and predicate words such as 'man' and
'pale' denote the 'underlying things* (vxoxeifieva xgdyitam), and 'to
be' and 'not to be' are 'additions* (nQooOeaeis, 2ib26 ft);4that is, man
and pale are things, designated by the two words which stand for
them, and the copula, whether negated or not, is added to them,
not standing for a third thing, but indicating their combination or
separation (cf, i6b22-~5).
In modal sentences, being becomes a kind of 'underlying thing'
or 'subject' (fatoxefyievov) itself, along with the subject and predi-
cate, and the modal word is now the addition (ngoaOEaig). Since it
is the addition which bears the negation in non-modal assertions,
so here the addition is the word which must be negated, and this
will be a word such as 'possible*. This serves as an explanation of
why the negations of modal sentences are what they are, but is not
in itself an argument; that has been supplied earlier in the chapter
(2it>io-25). Aristotle concludes that in non-modal sentences the
addition expresses the truth of some state of affairs, while in modal
sentences the addition expresses the possibility or necessity of
something (2ih3O-3). If we remember that truth and falsehood are
primarily properties of things and only belong to language secon-
darily, we see that a non-modal assertion claims that something is
true or false, that is, that it is combined or separated, while a modal
assertion claims that something may be combined or may be sep-
arated, must be combined or must be separated. This analysis rein-
forces the point that what he has called the 'addition* in each case
fulfils a similar role.
Aristotle now looks to the consequences of his findings con-
cerning modal contradictory pairs. 'Possible to be* and 'possible not
to be* do not, after all, contradict each other. Indeed, they seem to
imply each other: this was proposed earlier (2t b i2), but could not
4
Cf. i6ais, "30; the verb 'to be' is the 'addition' necessary to bestow truth value.
be confirmed until it was decided that they are not contradictions,

The possible and the not-possible, on the other hand, never coin-
cide: this accords with the view that they are contradictories
(2ib37f.). The mutual implication of 'possible to be' and 'possible
not to be' follows from the nature of possibility. What is possible
can go either way: either of two courses is open. We have already
seen this conception of possibility at work in chapter 9 (i9B9ff.).
Whatever is capable of being is also capable of not being, while
whatever is fixed to a single course cannot be described as poss-
ible, and will instead be necessary. In the next chapter we shall see
this view of possibility challenged.
The word 'possible' has so far been used as the example of a
modal word. In the closing part of the chapter, the conclusions
which have been worked out for 'possible* are extended to other
modal words, and the contradictory pairs summarized (22*3-13): it
is repeated that 'to be' and 'not to be* are merely 'underlying', while
it is the modal words that make an assertion into an affirmation or
a negation (22*9 f,). Thus, modal contradictories are formed by pairs
such as 'possible—not possible' and 'necessary—not necessary'.To
this list he adds 'true—not true* (22ai3); these are the claims made
by assertions which do not contain a modal word, and in which the
verb 'to be' therefore appears not as 'underlying' but as 'addition'.
So, Just as the modal 'additions* express the claim that the predi-
cate holds or does not hold possibly or not possibly, necessarily or
not necessarily, so the copula when functioning as addition claims
that the predicate holds of the subject truly or not truly. An inter-
esting parity between modal and non-modal assertions is thus
established.
13
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions
The discussion of modal assertions is continued in chapter 13,

Aristotle now investigates the inferences which may be drawn
between them, and encounters another problem. The setting out of
contradictories in chapter 12 took into account the idea that the
same thing can be capable both of being and of not being some-
thing: the two are not contradictory, and indeed appear to imply
each other (2ib35 f t ) . According to this view of possibility, what is
possible is contingent, and can go either way. What is possible
therefore cannot be necessary, since what is necessary can only go
one way. According to another view, what is possible is what may
happen, and since what must happen may happen, what is neces-
sary must be possible. The question thus arises in this chapter
whether possibility should be seen as excluding or including
necessity.
Equivalences and implications are first set out, and summarized
in the Modal Square of Opposition (22ai4~-t*io). The square con-
of four columns of assertions, the members of each column
following from the assertion at its head. On the left side we have
the implications of "possible to be' and 'possible not to be', and on
the right the implications of their negations;
possible to be not possible to be
admissible to be not admissible to be
not impossible to be impossible to be
not necessary to be necessary not to be
possible not to be not possible not to be
admissible not to be not admissible not to be
not impossible not to be impossible not to be
not necessary not to be necessary to be.
Following the setting out of the square, we find two stretches of
argument in which the positions on the square of impossibility and
necessity are discussed (22a32~7,22a38-bio). It is then objected that

the contradictory pairs of necessary assertions cannot be as he has
said, and it is discovered that the square as it has been set out incor-
porates conflicting views of possibility. On the left side, possibility
appears in the sense seen in chapter 12: what may be, also may not
be, and so is not necessary. The necessary must therefore fall into
the class of the not-possible, or in other words, the non-contingent.
On the right side, on the other hand, what is not possible is taken
to be impossible, so excluding what is necessary. The issue thus
arises as to whether possibility includes only what is contingent,
and excludes what is necessary, or whether it is broad enough to
include what must be as well as what may or may not be. The
Square of Opposition is finally amended so as to remove the
inconsistency.
We first find a discussion of impossibility (22*32-7), Impossi-
bility follows from possibility 'contradictorily but conversely'
(avzeoTQafifievwf)} That is, 'impossible to be* is the negation of
'possible to be'; in turn, 'not impossible to be', which is the nega-
tion of 'impossible to be', and so in effect the double negation of
'possible to be', follows from 'possible to be'. Impossibility, the con-
tradictory of possibility, therefore follows from it 'conversely': the
negation of impossibility follows from possibility, and impossibility
follows from the negation of possibility.
We see, then, that what is not possible is impossible. We might
ask why this is. It is not the case, for example, that what is not equal
is unequal: instead, as we are told in the Prior Analytics, there must
be the appropriate kind of underlying subject, a stick, for example,
before we can say of it that it must be either equal or unequal (APr,
5ib25f£.}. In chapter 13, Aristotle evidently assumes that we are
speaking of a class of entities of which either possibility or impos-
sibility must hold. This would seem to be a reasonable assumption:
if we are speaking of predications, then every predication either
may hold or may not hold. This assumption underlies the relation
between possibility and impossibility which we see set out in the
Square of Opposition, and which is applied in the reductio argu-
ment later in the chapter (22bi3).
Having dealt with impossibility, Aristotle now moves on to
' On the origin of the term avmnyeûv, see R A, Ttendelenburg, Eletnenta

Logices Aristotelicae (Berlin, 1836), 6g,
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions 163
discuss necessity, which, we are told, works differently (22a38), In

every line of the square apart from the fourth and eighth, in which
necessity appears, two contradictory assertions are to be found, one
member in each column. In the case of necessity, however, the two
assertions which appear on the same line are not contradictories,
for both can be true together, as we see on the fourth line: what is
necessary not to be is not necessary to be (22*39-b3). Instead,
Aristotle calls these assertions 'contraries', even though this term
was reserved in chapter 7 for assertions which cannot both be true
(i7b22 ff.). Contradictory assertions of necessity, then, are riot to be
found on the same line, as in the case of the other assertions, but
at diagonally opposite corners of the square, or, as Aristotle puts
it, 'apart' (22a39).2
The reason why assertions of necessity are arranged in this
exceptional way is now explained (22b3~io), Necessity and impos-
sibility, he says, 'have the same force', or 'signify the same*, but in
a 'contrary' or 'converse' way (22b41,8-10). That is, if something is
impossible, then it is necessary not that it is, but that it is not, and
if it is impossible not to be, then it is necessary that it is (22b5™y),
This explains why 'necessary not to be' appears in the top right
quarter of the square and 'necessary to be' in the bottom right, and
not the other way around. Impossibility, then, works in the same
way as possibility, but with 'not* added in front, while necessity
works in the same way as impossibility, but with 'not' added after
it (22b7~io),
The above discussion explains the position of necessary asser-
tions on the right side of the square, and so, given the arrangement
of the left side, why it is that contradictory statements of necessity
are to be found in diagonal positions in the square. It does not,
however, account for their position on the left.3 In order to under-
stand this, we need to recall the view of possibility presented in
chapter 12. According to this view, what is able to be is also able
not to be. So, on the left side of the square we see that 'possible to
be' implies 'not necessary to be', and 'possible not to be' implies
'not necessary not to be'. What may be also may not be, and if it
may not be, then it is not necessary for it to be. Therefore, what is
1
See T. Wait/, AristoteUs Organon Greece, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1844), i, 361.
J
Ackriil suggests that this passage is out of place (J. L, Ackrill, Aristotle's
Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 152).
possible is not necessary. This view might be characterized as
interpreting 'possible* as 'contingent*, and so excluding the
necessary,
The right side of the square, however, involves the other con-
ception of possibility, according to which what is necessary is also
possible. Thus, in the top right portion, 'necessary not to be' follows
from "not possible to be'. Here, what is not possible is not as
non-contingent; had it been seen as contingent, what is not poss-
ible would have included the necessary along with the impossible,
just as in the top left portion of the square what is possible is
neither necessary nor impossible; instead, 'not possible* is taken as
'impossible', and so implies 'necessary that not*. The Square of
Opposition thus incorporates two inconsistent conceptions of
possibility. This inconsistency is now exposed (22bio ff,), and in the
remaining part of the chapter Aristotle argues against the view of
possibility as being merely contingency, and in favour of the view
that it includes what is necessary as well. The left side of the Square
of Opposition is changed in accordance with this position.4
We may now go on to consider the argument that the square as
set out contains an inconsistency. We first see an argument to the
effect that what is necessary is also possible (22bu-i4): this result
will then be seen to violate the way in which the left side was set
out. The argument proceeds by reductia ad absurdum. Supposing
that the necessary were not possible, the negation will follow
instead, for 'it is necessary either to affirm or deny' (22bi2 £): as we
have seen, Aristotle takes it that RCP must apply to modal state-
ments. Then, if the necessary is not possible, it must be impossible,
which is absurd (22bi3 £). The hypothesis on which the reductio is
based is therefore false, and so what is necessary is, after all, possi-
ble. This statement is now combined with the incompatible view of
possibility found on the left of the square: from 'possible to be*
there follow 'not impossible to be' and 'not necessary to be', as we
see from the top left portion (22bi4~i6). We now have, from the
reductio, 'what is necessary is possible,' and from the top left of the
square, 'what is possible is not necessary'; combining the two, what
4
See the debate between Hintikka and Bluck (K. I J. Hintikka, 'On the
Interpretation of De Interpretatione XII-XIIF, Acta Plnlomphka Fennica, 14
(1962), 5-22, and R. S, Bluck, 'On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De Interpretatione
12-13', Classical Quarterly, m, 13 (1963), 214-22).
Chapter ij: More on Modal Assertions 165
is necessary is not necessary, which is, as Aristotle says, absurd

(22bI7}.
Before proceeding, we need to examine the reductio argument
more closely, Ackrill argues that this argument is not valid. He com-
ments: 'When he claims that "necessary" must imply "possible"
since otherwise it would have to imply "not possible" he is, of
course, misusing the principle of excluded middle; it would have
been sufficient for him to say that otherwise "necessary" would
have to be consistent with "not possible".'5 It is certainly not the
case that if necessity does not imply possibility then it must imply
its negation; however, this is not what Aristotle says. He says, not
that 'necessary' implies 'possible', but that 'necessary* is 'possible*.
Not implication, but predication is at issue.
Aristotle is accused, then, of making the jump from saying that
if being necessary does not imply being possible, then being
necessary implies not being possible. It will help to set the argu-
ment out using symbols. In the following, let 'L' denote '"it is nec-
essary that', 'M' 'it is possible that*, and T sit is impossible that',
and let 'p* be a prepositional variable. According to Ackrill, then,
Aristotle's defective argument runs:
To prove
(p)(Lp -> Mp).
Suppose the contradictory to be true:
1. ~(p)(Lp -» Mp)
2. (p)(Lp -» -Up).
Then, supposing ~Mp «-» Ip (see 22*36),
3. (pXLp —> Ip), which is absurd.
The inference from i to 2 is invalid. 2 states that if something is
necessary then it is not possible, while i leaves it open for some
necessary things to be possible and others not. Ackrill imputes the
mistake to Aristotle, and points out that it would have sufficed for
him to have concluded that necessity and impossibility would, on
the hypothesis, be compatible. The argument would then run as
follows:
To prove
(p)(Lp -* Mp),
5
Ackriti. Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatkme, 152 (his italics).
Suppose the contradictory to be true:

4. ~~(p)(Lp -»Up)
5. (Bp)(Lp & ~Mp).
Then, supposing ~Mp «-» Ips
6. (3p)(Lp & Ip), which is absurd,
This would be valid, and the conclusion would show that if neces-
sity did not imply possibility, then there would have to be at least
one case of something necessary and impossible. Ackrill is right
that this is not how Aristotle argued, since Aristotle did not think
of his assertions in terms of implication, but he is wrong to credit
him with the mistake which I have formalized above, Aristotle's
argument, as it appears in the text, is not set out in the form of
propositions containing quantification and implication: we do not
see statements of the form 'for every proposition, if that proposi-
tion is necessary, then it is possible,' nor indeed 'necessity implies
possibility.' Rather, the steps in the argument are put in terms of
predicates holding of subjects. Thus we see that the result to be
proved is 'the necessary is possible' (22bn).The negation of this is
taken to be 'the necessary is not possible' (221*! i ft). This follows
the standard practice of the De Interpretatione in seeing a negation
as asserting the separation of a predicate from a subject, which an
affirmation represents as combined.
So, here, the subject is 'what is necessary' and the predicate is
'possible'. The negation of 'the necessary is possible' is therefore
'the necessary is not possible.' Aristotle's argument could be for-
malized, using 'n' for 'the necessary', *M* for 'is possible', and T for
'is impossible', as follows:
To prove
7. MH.
Suppose this not to be the case; then, by RCP, the negation is true:
8. ~Mn.
Then, supposing ~Mn <-» In,
9. In, which is absurd.
The move from the assumed falsehood of 7 to the truth, of 8
involves no mistaken application of the Law of the Excluded
Middle. The fallacy only arose by reading implication into state-
ments which are merely combinations of subjects and predicates:
while it is false to say that a proposition must either imply p or
imply not-p, it is true to say that a subject is either F or is-not F.
Chapter ij; More on Modal Assertions 167
We shall understand the argument more clearly by considering the

nature of the assertions found in it. They seem to be examples of
noa-universal assertions about universals, which we have seen dis-
cussed in chapter j. These assertions may either express something
which holds in all cases, such as 'man is rational,* or else something
which holds of only some of the items falling under the universal,
such as 'man is pale.' The latter, we saw, can violate RCP. Here,
Aristotle wishes to show that all that is necessary is possible; this
is expressed by the non-universal assertion, 'the necessary is possi-
ble,' The denial of this, with which the reductio begins, is 'the nec-
essary is not possible,' Just as we have seen in the case of 'man is
not pale' in chapter 7, this need only mean that there is something
which is necessary which is not possible. It is consistent with this
statement that possibility might be, as it were, an accident of neces-
sity, holding of some necessary things but not all. However, if 'the
necessary is not possible* is true, then some portion of the neces-
sary is not possible, and so impossibility will hold of the necessary.
This consequence would mean that there was something which was
both necessary and impossible, and this absurdity is sufficient for
Aristotle to reject the premiss that the necessary is not possible.
The argument is therefore perfectly valid, but can only be under-
stood if we enter into Aristotle's use of non-universal assertions of
universals, and see that his arguments are composed of simple
predications and not statements of implication.
We have thus seen an argument to the effect that the necessary
is possible (22bn-i4), and we have seen that this result is incom-
patible with the left side of the square, according to which 'not
necessary1 follows from 'possible' (22bi4~i7). In order to banish the
absurdity, he must either abandon the view enshrined in the left
side of the square that what is possible is open to go either one way
or the other, and cannot be fixed or necessary, or else abandon the
new proposal that what is necessary is also possible. He opts to
retain the new proposal; this means reworking the earlier state-
ments about the drawing of inferences.
According to the most recent arguments, 'not necessary to be'
cannot follow from 'possible to be', since what is necessary is now
held to be possible. Some statement involving necessity must now
be found which follows from 'possible to be' and which can there-
fore fill the vacant spot in the top left portion of the square. Two
more candidates are now ruled out: neither can 'necessary not to
be' follow from 'possible to be* (22bij t); for, we are told, if some-
thing is possible, then either outcome may result, and then
whichever is true, the other is not true (22bi8-2o). It follows that,
since both outcomes are possible, neither is necessary, and so
neither necessity nor impossibility (that is, necessity that not) can
follow from possibility. Only the fourth and last statement involv-
ing necessity is now left as a candidate for the place of consequent
of 'possible to be': that is, 'not necessary not to be' (22b22f,). This
can follow from, 'possible to be' since it is also true of what is
necessary, and, we are now assuming, what is necessary is possible
(22*23 £)• The inferences now run: what is necessary is also poss-
ible, and what is possible is also not necessary not to be. There is
no longer any contradiction,The places of 'not necessary to be' and
'not necessary not to be' on the left side of the original Square of
Opposition are therefore swapped. This means that, reading along
each line, there is an assertion followed by its contradictory, as there
was in the first place oa all the other lines (22^24-8),
Although Aristotle has proposed that possibility does follow
from necessity, and has adjusted the Square of Opposition in accor-
dance with this view, the matter has still not been finally settled.
There are arguments to be weighed on both sides of the question
(22b29ff,), On the one hand, we have the reductio argument that
what is necessary must be possible, since otherwise it would be
impossible (22bn-i4): if one tried to evade the absurd conse-
quences of this argument by insisting that 'not possible to be' is not
the negation of 'possible to be', then 'possible not to be' would have
to be the negation, instead (22b3i t), and in that case what is nec-
essary will be capable of not being, which is equally absurd. The
reductio argument thus cannot be wriggled out of by someone who
wished to maintain that there is a class of possible things which are
not necessary. The view of possibility as contingency still has its
pull, however. So, Aristotle says, the capacity for something to be
and the capacity for it not to be are generally thought to go
together (22b33-6); what may be cut may not be cut too (cf.
19*12 ft). What is possible can therefore go either way, and if the
necessary is possible, then it would be capable of not being, which
is false.
The two views are thus in deadlock, one supported by a strong
argument to the effect that what is necessary is possible, and the
other by a common-sense notion of possibility as contingency. The
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions 169
problem is solved by distinguishing different sorts of possibility

(22b36 ft). Not all potentialities are potentials for both contradic-
tories: notably, certain irrational potentials are o01y potentially one
way and not the other way. Fire is potentially hot, and has no poten-
tial not to be hot. Some irrational potentials, however, may be
potentials for two alternative outcomes (23*3 £.); it is those things
which are always actualized which have a potential for one thing
only,6 In the passage which follows, the distinction between the two
sorts of potentiality is elaborated (23a6f£), The first sort covers
what is actual as well as potential: something can walk because it
is walking; it can be because it already is. The second sort covers
what is not actualized: it can walk because it might walk, not
because it is walking now. The second sort is found only among the
changeable, while the first may also be found among the unchange-
able (23au-i3).
The distinction is now applied to solving the earlier problem,
Things which are possible in the second are not necessary,
while things possible in the first are (238i5 £). What is neces-
sary is also possible, in the first sense, since what is necessary is
always actual. There is another sort of possibility beyond this first
type, which includes those things which have the potentiality for
either contradictory. These things will not be necessary, and may
not be actual; this class of contingents therefore forms a separate
class of possible things, lying outside the class of possible things
which are necessary. The problem over whether the necessary is
possible or not arose from not distinguishing the two forms of
possibility.
Aristotle now goes on to draw an interesting comparison
(23*16 ft). Just as the partial (i.v pegei) follows from the universal
(xaffofav), so the possible follows from the necessary,'but not all'.7
That is, if all men are wise then it follows that some men are; if man
must be wise, then he may be. The final phrase 'but not all' points
to the fact that there is a further class of possible things, that is, the
contingent, which are not also necessary.
The last few lines sum up the findings of the chapter concerning
necessity and possibility, actuality and potentiality (2382i-6). What
6
See Mete, Oi-z.
7
The text must be emended to follow manuscript B, reading 'the partial follows
the universal' (TO ivuiget n^xadolov) and not 'the universal follows the partial' (i<|i
) at 23*i6f.; otherwise the comparison does not snake sense.
is necessary is actual; actuality is of two sorts, either pure actuality,

such as first substance, or else actuality combined with potentiality,
A third group comprises those things which are potential and never
actual. This third group corresponds to possible things which are
open to go either way, while the two divisions of the actual make
up the necessary. It has been concluded that what is necessary is
possible. This, presumably, applies to both classes of actual things,
since nothing actual is impossible, while one class lacks potential-
ity and the other possesses it, Ackrill argues that the introduction
of metaphysical concepts is out of place here, so that the passage
must be a later addition,8 However, since assertions make claims
about things, a consideration of things has a bearing on the study
of assertions. We have already seen that issues such as why the defi-
nition of man stands for a single thing are important for the under-
standing of assertions, though a full treatment of such issues is
outside the scope of the De Interpretatione (if'13-15,20bi2 f£). We
have seen that Aristotle needed to study the nature of possibility
in order to come to a conclusion about how modal assertions
should be arranged, and has needed to take into account things
which are 'unmoved' (23*12 f.) aad 'always actualized* (23*3).
Metaphysical actions have therefore already played a part in the
chapter, and are here summed up at its end.
Chapter 13 brings to a close the investigation of assertions of
possibility and necessity. The importance of these assertions is
brought out in the following statement: 'the necessary and not-
necessary are the origin of everything's being or not being'
(23ai8-2o), Something is or is not, in other words, either because it
must be or not be, or because its being or not being is the fulfil-
ment of a possibility. Thus, necessity and possibility together
account for the being or not being of everything. The chapter pro-
vides an interesting discussion of modal assertions, bringing in
arguments concerning the nature of possibility, contingency, and
necessity, in order to determine which assertions are equivalent,
which contradict each other, and which may be inferred from which
others. The investigation of contradictory pairs has thus been
extended into a further important class of assertions,
8
Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, 153.
14
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs
In chapter 14, Aristotle adopts a new approach in his study of con-

tradictory pairs. So far in the De Interpretatione we have seen him
examining the things signified in assertions in order to determine
which ones contradict each other, and whether the contradictories
abide by RCP or not. Now he turns to the relation between utter-
ances and thoughts, which was established in chapter i, but which
has not yet played an important part in the discussion. Since words
express thoughts, it ought to be possible to determine which asser-
tions are most opposed to each other by considering which are the
most opposed beliefs.The chapter begins with the question whether
two affirmations can be contrary to one another. Is 'no man. is just*
or 'every man is unjust' the contrary of 'every man is just'? It was
laid down in chapter 7 that the former is the contrary (i7b6). Now,
however, Aristotle considers the thoughts behind the words. If the
belief that every man is unjust is contrary to the belief that every
man is just, then, since utterances match thoughts, the two affir-
mative utterances corresponding to the beliefs ought to be contrary
(23*32 ft).
While the same standard vocabulary continues to be used for
contradictions and contradictory pairs, the use of 'contrary'
(evavTws) is more variable. In chapter 7 we saw that contrary asser-
tions were those which could not both be true, but whose contra-
dictories could be (i7 b 22f); in chapter 13, the term was used for
'not necessary to be' and 'necessary not to be', which are, in fact,
compatible (22a39). In chapter 14, the term is applied to beliefs in
another sense. Contrary beliefs are those which are the most
strongly opposed possible: 'he who holds the contrary belief is in
the deepest error [or has embraced the greatest falsehood] con-
cerning each thing' (23b2i. £.). When the word 'contrary* is applied
to beliefs, it is this sense which Aristotle has in mind. Thus, he con-
eludes that m most cases contrary beliefs are those which corre-
spond to contradictory assertions.
The consideration of beliefs and assertions must be closely con-
nected, since assertions are the spoken expressions of beliefs. Just
as names and verbs are like simple thoughts which have not yet
been combined into something that can be true or false (16*9-15),
so there are beliefs, which involve either a true or a false combi-
nation of these simple thoughts. We have seen in earlier chapters
how two assertions which both count as affirmations, because the
verb or copula is not negated, may yet seem to contradict each
other. The sense of the subject or predicate may imply some sort
of negation, even if the assertion is not a negation (i9b24fl).
Aristotle suggests that it is relevant to consider the beliefs which
the assertions express: discovering which beliefs are most strongly
opposed to each other will contribute to our understanding of
spoken assertions.
He now approaches the principal question of the chapter, that
is, whether the true belief which is contrary to a false belief is the
belief in the contradictory or the contrary (23*381). The question
is whether contradictory or contrary beliefs are the more violently
opposed. Thus, he goes on, of something good, there is a true belief
that it is good, but two false beliefs about it, namely the belief that
it is not good, and the belief that it is bad.1 Which of the two false
beliefs is contrary to the true one, in the sense of being most
opposed to it? Both are admissible candidates, he argues in a paren-
thesis: they are not merely beliefs whose subjects are contraries,
such as the beliefs that something good is good, and something bad
is bad, both of which might be true. Instead, they involve contrary
suppositions concerning the same subject (23*3-7).
There follows an argument that the most opposed beliefs are
contradictory ones (23b7 ft). Of something good, there is the belief
that it is-not good, and then the belief that it is something else
which it is not. Aristotle explains that it is the former of these which
constitutes error on the subject: there is a limitless number of false
beliefs representing things as holding which do not, or as not
holding which do, but these are not to be posited as constituting
error, or being deceived (caidtij, 23b9-i3). To be deceived about
1
He does not mean his example of a true belief to be the tautological 'the good
is good,'
Chapter 14; Contrary Beliefs 173
something is to believe the contradictory: if the belief that some-

thing is good is true, then error on this matter will not be any of
the other boundlessly many false beliefs which it is possible to
entertain concerning the subject, but only the belief that it is-
not good. This argument is supported by mention of change:
changes also are from contradictories, and so error will be too
(23br}-i5). The idea is presumably that someone who alters his
opinion on a certain matter from false to true or vice versa under-
goes a change: if changes in general are from one contradictory to
another, then error should also represent the contradictory of the
true belief,
In the preceding argument, the belief that something good is bad
has been included as just one of the boundlessly many false beliefs
that do not represent error. Now we are offered another argument
that the deepest error is not that what is good is bad, but that it is-
not good. What is good is both good and not-bad, the former in
itself, and the latter only incidentally (23**! 5 f.). There are, in other
words, true affirmations that it is good and that it is not-bad; the
former, however, which affirms something in itself, has a greater
claim to be called true than the assertion of something accidentally.
Similarly, an error about something in itself has more of a claim
to falsehood than one about its accidents (23br7-2i). Therefore,
believing that what is good is-not good is a deeper error than
believing that it is bad, and if that represents the deeper error, then
that belief must be more contrary,2
Aristotle concludes, then, that belief in the contradiction, 'it is-
not good,' is more contrary to 'it is good' than is 'it is bad,* Belief
in 'it is bad' presupposes the belief that 'it is-not good,' and so is
'tied up with it', or compounded with it (pvfuienteyfievy, 23b25~7);
that is, one cannot believe that something good is bad, without first
mistakenly supposing it not to be good. It is useful to compare a
statement in the Topics that whenever someone makes a statement,
he has in a sense made many statements, since every assertion has
many consequences (Top. ii2 a i6-2i). Belief in the contradictory
2
For this use of 'accidentally' (xutd <>(j«/fe/}»y»%) to denote something which, while
it must always accompany something, is nevertheless only incidental and not essen-
tial, see Ph, 240*8-12 (a passenger in a boat is moved accidentally, as a consequence
of the boat's motion), and De Sensu 437*12-15, discussed in Chap, 2, Sect. 1.3 above
(voice conveys meaning accidentally, not because it is audible, but because it con-
sists of words).
174 Aristotle's De Interpretatiooe
is therefore directly, and not, indirectly, opposed to the true belief,
There are varying degrees of error, and the error involved in believ-
ing the contradictory of what is true is the most serious error that
can be committed on that subject. The conclusion is now general-
ized; for instance, the thought contrary to It is a man' is 'it is-not a
man* (23b27-32),
Next, having considered something good as the subject of
thought, we move on to consider something not-good. This proce-
dure matches that of chapter 10, in which the consideration of man
as an example is followed by the consideration of not-man. The
case of something not-good is analogous to the case of something
good (23b33-24*3): in both cases, it is the contradictory thoughts
which are found to be contrary. If the subject is good, then the con-
trary of the true affirmative thought 'it is good* is the negative
thought 'it is-not good.' Similarly, if the subject is not good, then
the contrary of the true negative thought 'it is-not good' is the false
affirmative thought It is good.'
In the final section we come to universal beliefs. These are
treated in the same way (24a3~b9).3 'Everything good is good*
means the same as 'whatever is good is good,* and the contrary
thought to that, from above, should be 'whatever is good is-not
good*; this in turn is equivalent to 'nothing good is good' (24*4-6).
In this case, unlike the earlier ones, the procedure of looking for
the most contrary beliefs does not give us beliefs whose expres-
sions are contradictories. The deepest error, if 'everything good is
good' is true, is not to believe that just one good thing is not good,
which would, according to chapter 7, be the contradictory, but to
be mistaken about every good thing, and believe none of them to
be good. We may compare chapter 8, where the negation of 'man
and horse are pale' claims not that at least one of them is not pale,
but that neither of them is. So here, the most opposed belief to
'every man is good' is not the belief that there is just one counter-
example to the goodness of humanity, but the belief which sep-
arates man from goodness entirely,
Aristotle now goes on to say that these results must apply to
spoken assertions as well as to beliefs, if spoken affirmations and
J
Minio-Paluello divides this passage into two paragraphs. Since the subject of
universal assertions occupies the whole passage, however, it may usefully be
regarded as a unit (L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categorise et liber De
Interpretation (Oxford, 1949)}.
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs 175
negations are tokens for those in the soul (24**! £). He now sets out
the contrary and contradictory universal assertions, and reiterates
that contraries cannot both be true (24b2-9), Contrary universal
assertions are the affirmation and negation 'of the same thing', that
is, 'everything good is good' and 'nothing good is good' (24*3-5).
One contrary asserts that subject and predicate are completely
combined, the other that they are entirely separate. We are next
reminded how universal contradictories work: the contradictory of
the former would be 'not everything good is good' (24b5 £.), These
statements are consistent with what was said in chapter 7
(i7bi6-22; cf. APr, 59b8-~o),
The final sentence makes the point that universal contraries
cannot both be true. A truth cannot be contrary to a truth, either
in belief or in spoken contradiction (24^6 £). The word 'contradic-
tion' (a-nitpaatf) is here used in an unusual sense to refer to the
opposition found in spoken utterances, as contrasted with that
found in beliefs. Contraries, he explains, are to do with contradic-
tories. This terse comment is made clearer by what follows: the con-
tradictories of contraries may be simultaneously true, but the
contraries themselves cannot (24b8£). The statement recalls the
characterization of contraries in chapter 7: the contraries 'every
man is just* and *no man is just' cannot both be true, but both of
their contradictories, 'not every man is just' and 'some man is just,'
may (i7b20-6). To say that 'contraries are to do with contradicto-
ries' is thus an abbreviated way of referring to this account of their
behaviour.4
It has been established, then, that in general it is contradictory
beliefs, and therefore contradictory assertions, which are contrary,
or most strongly opposed (23b24-32).$ In the case of universal
assertions, however, it is the contraries, as defined in chapter 7,
rather than the contradictories, which are the most opposed. The
question raised at the beginning of the chapter, whether two affir-
mations can be contrary (23*27 £), is now settled. A contradictory
pair cannot possibly contain two affirmations (17*33 £), so that in
cases where the strongest opposition is between contradictories,
two affirmations clearly cannot be opposed. Universal assertions
provide the only case in which contraries and contradictories are
4
For a similar use of 'to do with* (JKJK with the accusative), cf. "truth and false-
hood are to do with combination and separation' (16*121).
5
C£ Meta. r
distinct. According to the findings of chapter 14, the contrary

universal assertions are more violently opposed than the contra-
dictory ones, A pair of contraries, however, still consists of an affir-
mation and a negation (24a4, b3), and they cannot both be true
6£).
In chapter 14 we see Aristotle approaching questions of how
spoken assertions are related to each other using different methods
from those found in earlier chapters. In chapter i, utterances were
shown to be related both to thoughts and to things (i6a3-8). He
here exploits the relation between utterances and beliefs, rather
than between utterances and things. The task of the chapter is to
establish which beliefs, and so which assertions, are the most
strongly opposed on any subject, The interest shown in this chapter
in belief and error can be traced to dialectic. The aim of the ques-
tioner in a dialectical debate is to show that the belief which is held
by the answerer, and expressed by his thesis, is mistaken. Chapter
14 investigates how to pair true and mistaken beliefs on the same
issue. Aristotle argues that, with the exception of universal beliefs,
the two beliefs furthest opposed will be contradictories.* This
means that, supposing the belief held by the answerer in his thesis
to be false, it is the belief contradictory to this which will represent
the correct opinion to hold on the matter in question, and it is
therefore this which the questioner must establish,1 By showing its
truth, the falsehood of the answerer's belief is also shown, and so
the answerer is forced to change his mind. This process is that of
refutation, which is, as we have seen, the pattern followed by dialec-
tical arguments. This dialectical motivation accounts for why
Aristotle considers the opposition between true and erroneous
beliefs in chapter 14, rather than speaking merely in terms of
thoughts (w»para), which, while true or false, might be entertained
without any commitment to their truth or falsehood. It also
6
Even universal beliefs are not really different, he says (24*3 ft): the contraries
'all that is good is good* and 'nothing good is good* are the most strongly opposed
for the same reason that contradictories are in other cases: the negation represents
the subject and predicate of the affirmation as being entirely separated from each
other,
7
To establish the contrary of" a universal thesis will also be sufficient to prove its
falsehood. The supposition on which a proof by reductio is based, however, should
be the contradictory of what we wish to prove and not its contrary, since if one con-
tradictory is false, the other must be true, whereas from the falsehood of one con-
trary the truth of the other does not follow (APr. 62*11-19).
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs 177
explains the importance of contradiction in chapter 14, His chapter

provides theoretical support for the dialectical method. It shows
that the reason why establishing the contradictory of a thesis con-
stitutes a refutation is that contradictory beliefs are as violently
opposed as it is possible for two beliefs to be. To convince someone
of the truth of one belief is to disabuse him of his error ia believ-
ing its contradictory. Chapter 14 may be considered the summation
of the whole work, since it justifies the importance of studying con-
tradiction as the underpinning of dialectic.
15
Conclusion
We are now in a position to look back over the De Interpretatione

and draw general conclusions. The first point to notice is the coher-
ence of the work. It is not a series of detached episodes, from which
the opening chapters and the Sea-Battle Argument should be
rescued and the rest discarded. The work is, on the contrary, coher-
ent and clearly structured. The bulk of the treatise constitutes a
study of contradictory pairs of assertions, dividing them first by one
criterion and then by another, and asking similar questions about
each group found. It is clear from a reading of chapters 7-14 that
certain preliminaries are necessary before the project can begin, A
contradictory pair consists of an affirmation and a negation; in
general, one is true and the other false. Therefore, these notions
must be discussed before the main task of the treatise can begin.
To understand the assertion, how two assertions can contradict
each other, and what truth and falsehood mean, we must under-
stand the parts of which an assertion is composed: the functioning
of the compound cannot be understood without a knowledge of its
elements.1 Thus, the name and verb must be discussed, and, since
these are defined as significant utterances, we must also know about
signification. We can thus reason back from the demands of the
later chapters, and see how the preliminary work of chapters 1-6
is necessary.
The De Interpretatione starts, therefore, with a discussion of the
relation between words, thoughts, and things. Utterances are sig-
nificant by virtue of expressing thoughts and standing for things;
they are thus signs of both. Simple and complex utterances may
now be distinguished, allowing for the distinction between words,
which merely signify, and assertions, which are true or false. The
1
The contradictory pair is sometimes seen itself as a whole with parts: see,
e.g,, APo. 72*1 it, where the assertion is explained as being one portion of a
contradiction.
Conclusion 179
following chapters are built around definitions of the name, verb,

phrase (Uyog), and assertion (a phrase with truth value): these defi-
nitions go to make up an interesting theory of how the assertion
works. Names and verbs both signify, while the verb performs
two extra roles, referred to as 'signifying in addition'. The verb
expresses that the thing it signifies holds of the thing signified
by the name, and also when it holds. These functions may also be
performed by the verb 'to be', in which case the predicate is signi-
fied by a name, performing no other role besides signifying the
predicate.
After the distinction between the simple and complex assertion,
we are then introduced to the affirmation and negation, which
signify a combination or separation of subject and predicate. This
theory of negation must be understood before we can understand
the violations to RCP found in chapters 7 and 8. Hie introduction
of negation leads to the definition of the contradictory pair, which
consists of two assertions, one claiming the combination, the other
the separation of a subject and a predicate. Hie first six chapters
thus reach their culmination, and the examination of contradiction
can begin. It is therefore wrong to split chapters 1-4 off from the
rest as a detached study of language: instead chapters 1-6 together
constitute the preliminary work needed for chapters 7-14.
We may also note that the early chapters do not provide a study
of language in general. Only those aspects of language relevant to
dialectic are considered. Sentences incapable of truth value, such
as prayers, are dismissed; only assertions are of interest, and we see
them given an exhaustive treatment in the remainder of the work,
considered in their contradictory pairs. Aristotle is interested in
every kind of assertion which could be used in debate; universal
and singular, primitive and non-primitive, non-modal and modal,
affirmative and negative. His interest in language is thus restricted.
He is not here interested in the use of assertions in everyday
speech, nor in poetry or rhetoric. Idioms, abbreviations, ornament,
and metaphor are absent from the treatment. Every assertion must
have a verb: this statement applies to the ideal, dialectically correct
use of language, rather than to its idiomatic everyday use. In the
Poetics and Rhetoric language is studied from other points of view;
here it is considered in so far as it is used in argument.2
2
Ct M. T, Larkin. Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle (The Hague, 1971),
35 K
i8o Aristotle's De Interpretation
Hie central theme of contradiction is thus introduced in chapter

6, and after that the main part of the treatise may begin. In the
remaining chapters we see Aristotle carrying out an examination
of contradictory pairs of assertions. In chapters 7-9 these are
divided into universal or singular, genuinely simple or apparently
simple, past, present, or future; in chapter 10 they are again divided
according to whether 'to be* is present or not, and if it is, what part
it plays in the assertion. Some problems to do with simple and
complex assertions are reflected on in chapter n, and there then
follows a discussion of assertions to do with necessity and possi-
bility; as before, contradictories are set out, and inferences drawn.
The final chapter offers us a study of contrariety from the point of
view of belief, thus applying to the study of contradiction the theory
that utterances express thoughts.
As well as recognizing the coherence of the treatise, we have also
seen its relevance to dialectic. RCP, the role that one member of a
contradictory pair is true and the other false, underpins the opera-
tion of a dialectical debate. Only a question based on a contradic-
tory pair which obeys RCP can be answered. This is because to
answer a dialectical question is to select one of two contradictory
assertions as true and to reject the other as false. If it is not the case
that one is true and the other false, no answer can be given. In
chapter 7, we see cases in which both members of the pair are true,
while in chapter 8 we see pairs both of whose members are false.
Chapter 9 shows us contradictory pairs concerning future singulars,
in which it is the case that one member is true and the other false,
but it is not determined which of the two is the true one and which
the false one. In order to answer a question, it is not enough for
there to be a right answer and a wrong answer; it is necessary in
addition for the world to be such that it is fixed which is which.
Since this condition is not fulfilled, questions concerning future sin-
gulars are unanswerable, and RCP is once again violated. Every
contradictory pair which violates RCP marks & dialectical question
which cannot be answered.
Furthermore, the possibility of refutation also depends on the
validity of RCP. Refutation works by establishing the truth of the
contradictory of the thesis, and inferring the falsehood of the thesis
itself. This is only possible if the thesis falls within the class of asser-
tions which abide by RCP. So, if we consider a contradictory pair
which violates the rule, to prove that man is-not fair will not estab-
Conclusion 181
lish the falsehood of 'man is fair': for, as we learn in chapter 7, 'man

is fair' and 'man is-not fair,' though contradictory, might both be
true. It is part of the job of the De Interpretatione, then, to show us
types of assertions which should be avoided in debate. The excep-
tions to RCP pose a threat to the normal working of dialectic, and
it is very important to identify them, and understand why they
violate the rule.
The treatise also investigates how contradiction works in regular
cases. In chapters 10, 12, and 13 Aristotle concentrates on asser-
tions which obey RCP,3 and considers which inferences can be
drawn between related assertions. The dialectician must be capable
of sorting assertions into their contradictory pairs: in order to know
which assertion to seek to establish in order to demolish the thesis,
he must know what the contradictory of the thesis is; in order to
answer a question, he must know which two assertions are being
offered to him to choose from, and these will always be the two
members of a contradictory pair. Assigning assertions to their con-
tradictory pairs can be a hard task: assertions in which several
forms of negation appear, universal assertions, and assertions of
necessity and possibility all furnish difficult cases which must be
discussed at length. In general, it is the verb which must be negated
in order to find the contradictory of an affirmation. In the case of
modal assertions, however, Aristotle discovers that it is the possi-
bility or necessity of the predication, rather than, its being, which
must be negated. We are thus given a detailed treatment of how to
determine which assertions contradict which others.
Chapter 11 provides a discussion of simple and compound asser-
tions which is applied to dealing with a number of sophistries. It
also contains an explanation of dialectical questions and the fallacy
of making two questions into one, which helps in the understand-
ing of chapter 8, and again illustrates the importance of the work
for dialectic.
Chapter 14, finally, shows us why contradiction is of such great
importance for dialectic. In this chapter Aristotle considers the
opposition between different kinds of beliefs, as a means of deter-
mining which assertions are most violently opposed to each other:
3
RCP has not been forgotten in the later chapters. In chapter xo, we find a ref-
erence to the eiception discovered in chapter 7 (iff'ss f.; for a discussion,, see Chap.
10, Sect. 3), In chapters 12 and 13 RCP is taken to hold of modal assertions (2ik4,
17f,22aI,12f,32f,).
he thus applies the relationship between words and thoughts out-

lined in chapter i. He concludes that error OB a subject is consti
tuted by the belief contradictory to the true one. This result shows
why it is that refutation works by establishing the contradictory of
a thesis: if the answerer admits the truth of the contradictory of his
position, he has accepted as true the belief most opposed to belief
in the thesis, which he may therefore no longer maintain.
This reading of the De Interpretatione has an obvious conse-
quence for the position of the treatise with relation to Aristotle's
other works. The De Interpretatione has been traditionally seen as
lying between the Categories and the Prior Analytics, On this view,
the subject of the Prior Analytics m the syllogism, which is com-
posed of assertions, and so the De Interpretatione, being a study of
assertions, is a prerequisite for the study of syllogisms, just as the
Categories is preparatory to the De Interpretatione, since it deals
with terms, the ingredients of assertions.
This view is correct in neither respect. The De Interpretatione
does not presuppose the Categories, Rather, as we have seen, it
begins front basics and provides in chapters 1-6 all the preliminary
discussion necessary for the real work contained in chapters 7-14.
Neither is it preparatory for the Prior Analytics, The central subject
of the De Interpretatione is not the assertion, seen as the basic
element of the syllogism, but the contradictory pair. The treatise is
thus oriented towards the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi, which
deal with the proper asking and answering of dialectical questions,
with the aim of refuting a thesis,4 By underpinning the nature of
refutation, marking out which contradictory pairs violate RCP, and
showing how assertions of many different kinds may be arranged
into contradictory pairs, Aristotle provides us in the De
Interpretatione with the essential theoretical background for
dialectic.
* The question of the relation of the De Interpretatione to Aristotle's other works

is separate from the issue of its dating. It is of a similar sophistication to the Prior
Analytics, and prhaps belongs to the same period, though its concern with contra-
diction relates it to the Topics, In subject matter, it looks back to the Topics, a much
simpler work probably belonging to an earlier period, and provides a theoretical
investigation of issues underlying dialectic.
Appendix I
The Principle of Contradiction in

Metaphysics T
Following an examination of the De Interpretatione, Aristotle's

treatise on the behaviour of contradictory pairs of assertions, it will
be interesting to turn to the other important text in which contra-
diction is discussed, namely Metaphysics T. We once again see the
importance of investigating words and things together, as Aristotle
brings in names and their significations in order to examine
whether the same thing can hold of a subject and not hold of it at
the same time. To see the argument in its context, we must begin
with the question of first principles.
i. FIRST PRINCIPLES (Meta.Tj)

Every science, we are told in Metaphysics r$, has its own first prin-
ciples. Some principles, however, are common to all sciences, and
these must be studied by the philosopher. Foremost among them
is the Principle of Contradiction: it is impossible for the same thing
to hold and not to hold of the same thing in the same respect at
the same time (ioo5bi9£). According to Aristotle, this is the most
secure of all principles, the ultimate belief on which demonstrations
and all other axioms naturally rest (ioo5bn f., 32 ft). It is also the
most epistemologically basic (yycopêurdff ) and error about it
is impossible (1005*12!). Furthermore, it is 'unhypothesized'
(dvvno&eTov);1 it never needs to be cited as an additional supposi-
tion in an argument. It is universally accepted, and is used without
either support or even recognition that it is being used. The prin-
ciple must be grasped before anything else can be understood
1
A supposition (vnoOeotg ) is an additional assumption which is supplied in an
argument in order to reach the conclusion, where the conclusion will not follow
from the premisses alone. An assumption receives this designation if both parties
to the argument believe in its truth: otherwise it is a case of begging the question,
or petitio (ofrqua, APo, 76*23-34).
184 Appendix I
(ioosbi5). In the argument which follows (ioo5bi9-34), Aristotle

attempts to establish that the Principle of Contradiction is indeed
the most fundamental principle. He will assume the truth of the
principle, and thereby show that contradictory thoughts cannot be
entertained, deduce that error about the principle is impossible,
and conclude that it is fundamental, since the most fundamental
principle is one about which it is impossible to be in error
(ioo5bii £). In chapter 4 he goes on to argue for the truth of the
principle, against those who deny it.
The argument that the Principle of Contradiction is fundamen-
tal begins in earnest with the assertion that it is impossible to
believe that the same thing is and is not (ioo5b23 £). Heraclitus is
supposed to have denied this; he maintained, that is, that contra-
dictory thoughts can be entertained at the same time. But, Aristotle
says, the fact that one can say 'it is and is not' does not imply that
one can think it. There follows immediately an argument that it is
impossible to think that something is and is not (1005^6-32),
The reference to Heraclitus has often been understood in a dif-
ferent way. According to Lear, Heraclitus is supposed to think that
he believes the principle false, while in fact believing it true; he is,
then, in error about his own beliefs.2 According to this reading,
'error concerning the law' means thinking that the law is false, and
when Aristotle says that error about the law is impossible, he means
that everyone must believe in the truth of the law, although some
people think that they do not believe in it, and so do not know what
their own beliefs are. It then becomes necessary to bring in theory
from the Nicomachean Ethics about inner conflict and weakness of
will to show how Heraclitus can think that he disbelieves the law
while in fact believing it. However, this seems unlikely: what is
shown to be impossible is to believe that something is and is not,
not to believe that it is possible to believe that something is and is
not (io05b23~5). The opponents certainly claim that the principle
is fake, and nothing suggests that they do not also think that it is
false (ioo5b35-ioo6a2). If, instead, we take the aim of the argument
of chapter 3 to be to show that no one can believe the principle
false, then Aristotle must be credited with a fallacy in drawing his
conclusion; he must move from saying that it is impossible to
believe in a contradiction to saying that it is impossible to believe
2
J. Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge, 1988), 251.
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta F 185
that there can be contradictions,3 This move is not explicitly made,

and the argument does not force us to insert it.
Aristotle argues for the inconceivability of contradictions by
taking thoughts to be properties possessed by the mind as subject;
thus, thoughts are governed by the principle, which makes a claim
about the possession of properties by things in general. Thinking,
as an instance of property possession, works according to the
Principle of Contradiction. In order to press this argument, he uses
a slightly different form of the principle; it is impossible for oppo-
sites to hold of the same thing (ioo5b26f,). This would seem to
follow from the more usual form, which states that a property
cannot both hold and not hold of a subject. For, if there are con-
trary properties, that is, properties such that possessing one implies
not possessing the other, and if the principle is true, then it will also
be impossible to possess contrary properties at the same time. For
example, if being white implies not being black, and if nothing can
be white and not be white, then nothing can be white and black,
since being black would entail not being white.
It might seem unusual for thoughts to be seen as properties;
however, this does not seem inconsistent with what is said about
thinking in the De Anima. The passive mind is like a wax tablet,
and the thoughts are like impressions on it (De An, 424*17 ft,
429*15 ft). The rnind is receptive of forms, and takes them on. A
tablet cannot have both an impression and its opposite in the same
place. If the Principle of Contradiction applies to objects like wax
tablets, it should apply to the mind. In order to reach his conclu-
sion, Aristotle must take it that contradictory beliefs are opposites:
we have seen an argument that this is so in De Interpretatione
chapter 14 (De Int. 23^-32), If this is granted, then the mind cannot
hold both beliefs at once, and so it is impossible to believe that the
same thing is and is not (ioo5b28-3o).
By the Principle of Contradiction, then, contradictory beliefs
cannot be held simultaneously, and thus it is impossible to believe
that a property does and does not hold of a subject. To believe that
the law had been violated would itself be to violate it. Aristotle now
glosses this as 'someone in error about this would be entertaining
opposite beliefs at the same time' (ioo5b3oft). Since this has been
J
So, according to Kirwan, Aristotle, 'fallaciously ignoring the intcnsionality of
belief, concludes that it is impossible for anyone to believe that the law is false (C.
Kirwan, Aristotle's Metaphysics; Books r, 4 and E (Oxford, 1971), 89).
186 Appendix I
shown to be impossible, error about the principle is impossible, The

original premisses BOW allow the conclusion to be drawn. Whatever
is the most fundamental principle is most familiar
therefore, no one can make a mistake about it, since people
only make mistakes about things with which they are not
familiar (ioo5bi3 i). The Principle of Contradiction is therefore
most familiar, and so fundamental, as he speedily concludes
(ioo5b32ff,).
Aristotle reaches the conclusion that the principle is fundamen-
tal by showing that no one can violate it in thought. He has not
shown that no one can believe that the principle is false, nor has he
set himself this task. There are people who disbelieve in it, and in
chapter 4 he addresses an argument to such people to show them
that such disbelief is misguided, and that their position is unten-
able. He has, however, certainly shown that no one can have any
grounds for disbelief in the principle, since no one can ever have
the experience of entertaining a contradiction in his mind.
For his argument in chapter 3, Aristotle has taken the truth of
the principle for granted, as he says (1006*3 &)• Th's need not seem
surprising, since he thinks that belief in this principle is natural and
justified. It stands in no need of support; experience can only
confirm a belief in its truth, and can never undermine it, since no
one can believe that any subject ever possesses and lacks the same
attribute. Nevertheless, Aristotle has provided no support for the
principle, and there are people who say that contradiction is poss-
ible both in the world and in the mind (looses ft). In chapter 4 he
produces arguments to convince such opponents of their error, and
to establish the truth of the principle.4 These arguments will also
serve to support chapter 3, which took the principle as true.
2. THE REFUTATION PROOF (Meta.T^)

Aristotle cannot use ordinary methods in his attempt to convict his
opponents of their error, since the principle cannot be demon-
strated. This must be the case if the Principle of Contradiction is
the most fundamental of all. We understand something when we
know the reasons why it is the case, and why it cannot be other-
* Ct Mete, KS, 1062*2 £: there cannot be a proof simpticiter, but only ad hominem.
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta, r 187
wise (APo. 7ib9ff.).These reasons must be epistemologically prior

(APo. 7ib29ff.; see also Ph. I94bi8 ft). There is no reason why the
principle is true; thus it cannot be known or understood in the
usual sense. Instead, it is the ultimate opinion, immediately avail-
able, without any preceding steps from anything more basic
(looses).5
A demonstration shows the principles which something rests on:
it reduces (dvdyetv or avalveiv) something to its basic principles, or
elements, and so gives an explanation of it. This job of analysing is
the business of analytics (dvalvTwa).6 Since the Principle of
Contradiction does not rest on more fundamental principles, the
ordinary method of demonstration is unsuitable for supporting it.
Some people, however, make the mistake of trying to demonstrate
it, since they are not sufficiently skilled in analytics (ioo5b3ff.,
ioo6as ft). They do not know that there must be principles which
cannot be analysed into more primitive elements, or they do not
know which are principles and which are not. Before beginning Ms
argument against the opponents who deny the truth of the law,
Aristotle devotes a short argument to showing that there must be
indemonstrable principles, and that this principle is likely to be
such a one (1006*8-11).
The Principle of Contradiction is, then, indemonstrable. Given
this, how can Aristotle prove that he is right and the opponents
wrong? A different method can be used: he will demonstrate his
own view by refuting the opponents' position in a negative demon-
stration, or refutation (fleyjog). He has said that the principle
cannot be demonstrated. Does he not violate this position by saying
that the principle can be demonstrated negatively (iiepraKe^
&ro<S«f«t» ioo6ais)? Is not a negative demonstration nevertheless
a demonstration? How can it matter who provides the starting-
point for the argument? These criticisms are made by Lukasiewicz.'
Aristotle is well able to withstand these attacks, though. The two
5
See APr, 64*^4-6, and A. Code, 'Aristotle's Investigation of a Basic Logical
Principle: Which Science Investigates the Principle of Non-Contradiction?*,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, id (1986), 341-57.
* See F. A. Trendelenburg, Element® Logices Aristotelicae (Berlin, 1836), 361
7
J, Lukasiewicz, 'Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction', in I Barnes, M.
Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds,). Articles on Aristotle, iii (London, 1979), 50-62: see
p. 55, sect. ii.
188 Appendix: I
methods are importantly different. In a positive demonstration, the

one who makes the demoostration takes some prior and more reli-
able principle as his starting-point (<%tf, or afwg), and proceeds
to establish a conclusion which is posterior to the starting-point,
and which follows from it (APr. 64*321). In a refutation, the
demonstrator takes something else as his starting-point; in this case,
some utterance made by his opponent (1006*15 &•)• The refutation
does not give reasons for the truth of the principle, or an under-
standing of it, either of which would be impossible; rather, it gives
reasons why the opponents cannot hold their position, and an
understanding of why they must be wrong. If the opponents are
wrong, then the principle is true. In this sense, the argument is a
demonstration, but it is one which establishes the truth of the
Principle of Contradiction indirectly by destroying the rival posi-
tion, rather than directly by showing prior principles which guar-
antee its truth. Thus, the refutation shows the necessary truth of the
principle, without making it dependent on any prior principles. We
may now see why it is of the greatest importance that the starting-
point of the argument should come from the opponent, and not
from Aristotle, and why he is consistent in saying that the princi-
ple can be supported by the refutation, although not by a positive
demonstration.
The opponents* position is, according to Aristotle, incoherent. In
order to refute them, he has to draw out this incoherence and so
demonstrate why they are in error. The opponents' position is not
just that there are contradictions in the world, but that contradic-
tions can be believed (looses ft), and hence rational activity is still
possible even in a contradictory world. They are thus committed to
the possibility of rational thought and discourse. The opponents
hold a view which, if true, would destroy reason, and at the same
time think that they can take, part in reasoned argument
(ioo6a25f.); thus they have sown the seeds of their own defeat.
The opponents' submission to reasoned argument is the begin-
ning of the refutation. Aristotle confronts his opponents with a
dilemma. If they keep silent, they have abstained from rational
debate, and so have in effect retreated from their position, and left
victory to him. He may then claim that the opponent is no better
than a vegetable; it would be ridiculous to try to offer an argument
against one who has abstained from rational activity (1006*13 ft).
If the opponent does make some significant utterance, then,
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta F 189
Aristotle says, the refutation may begin, since there is a definite

starting-point,8
For the argument to begin, the opponent is only credited with
making a minimal significant utterance; would mean that he
had abandoned rationality, while more would mean that Aristotle
was unfairly supplying something to which the opponent need not
assent. This ensures that the argument is a genuine refutation of
the opponent's position,9 Accordingly, he will not assume that the
opponent will utter an assertion: this would seem like a petitio
(ioo6a2o£). We may now consider how the argument against the
opponent is conducted once the starting-point has been obtained.
Several arguments follow, based on this same starting-point. The
opponent has uttered a single significant word, which, as we know
from the De Interpretations, is the smallest unit of significant
speech (De Int. i6ai9f£).
The opponent must signify 'both to himself and to another'. That
is, he must utter something which he himself can comprehend, and
which is comprehensible to others; he is aware, therefore, that his
utterance is significant, If words did not signify anything, then, we
are told later in the chapter, there would be an end not only of dis-
course with others, but even of discourse with oneself, or, in other
words, of thought (ioo6b&~n). We ha¥e akeady seen in the De
Interpretatione that the utterance of a significant word is accompa-
nied by a thought both in speaker and hearer (De Int. i6b2of.).
Aristotle may proceed, since 'there is now something definite'
(1006*241). Here he brings in the important doctrine that all
signification is definite,10 This is argued for a few lines later
(ioo6*34-hii), and made to follow from the premiss that thought
and discourse are possible; thus, the doctrine is implied by the
opponents* position, and Aristotle feels himself entitled to assume
their assent.
3. THE DEFINITENESS OF SIGNIFICATION

After these preliminaries, we come to the first argument
(1006*28-31). 'First, it is clear that this itself is true, that the name
8
The opponent might, of course, utter meaningless nonsense, but this would be
no better than keeping silent: Aristotle only requires the opponent either to abstain
from debate or utter something meaningful.
* Thus, the opponents are seen as actively resisting his attack (1006*26).
19
Ct
190 Appendix I
(ovofta) signifies being or not being this particular thing, so that

not everything could be so and not so.*" This is a difficult sentence;
crucial to its understanding is the interpretation of 'name'. Should
this be taken narrowly to mean 'name', or, more broadly, 'word'?
Aristotle is extremely careful not to introduce hidden assumptions
during his refutation: it would be remarkable if he moved from
the bare requirement for the opponent to 'signify something' to
the assumption that the opponent must have uttered a word
belonging to a particular part of speech. It would be still more
remarkable if, as some have suggested, he assumes that the oppo-
nent must have uttered a name which signifies a substance. There
is no need to suppose that Aristotle narrows his argument in either
way.
We have seen from the De Interpretatione that verbs as well as
names are simple significant utterances (De Int. i6ai9 f., b6 £.), as are
their inflexions (i6bi£, 19^14). Verbs, like names, signify things.
They also signify in addition that a subject holds of a predicate, and
when it holds. As we have seen, when a verb is uttered by itself,
these additional significations fall away: they only operate within
an assertion. By itself, a verb is just a name, and signifies something
(i6bi9l). Here, the opponent has only been assumed to make a
minimal significant utterance, that is, to utter a single word.
Whether this is a name or a verb, it will have the same effect on
the attention of the hearer and the thought of the speaker.12 The
term 'name* therefore covers whatever word the opponent may
utter: a word in this sense is the smallest linguistic unit which can
signify something. If the opponent is not to withdraw from ratio-
nal discourse, this is the least he must be prepared to utter. The
opponent might, of course, choose to do more, and utter a phrase
or assertion. This would have to be composed of words, though, and
so Aristotle's supposition covers this possibility. If the opponent
chose instead to utter an article or conjunction, this would not
11
Other interpretations of the sentence have been proposed. 'Being or not
being' could be taken in apposition to 'name*, in which case this clause would read,
'the name "being" or "not being™ signifies this particular thing.' ITiis reading, as
Kirwan points out, seems to conflict with De Int. i6l'22-5, where Aristotle states that
the verb 'to be* is not itself a sign of a thing, but only expresses a combination of
the concepts signified by the other words of the sentence (Kirwan, Aristotle's
Metaphysics, 93).
n
De Int. i6b2of. For the simplicity of names and verbs, see De int. (-3 and Cat
1a16.
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta. F 191
signify anything: unlike names and verbs, such words are not ele-
ments out of which rational speech may be constructed.13
I shall now consider what Aristotle means by saying that a word
signifies 'being or not being this particular thing'. The deictic
pronoun 'this particular thing' (rodt) denotes the thing which a
word stands for. We may compare the comment in chapter i of the
De Interpretatione, which I interpret as meaning that a word is a
sign of a this (i6"i6).M The 'this' which the word signifies may
belong to any category, not just that of substance.15 For Aristotle,
to signify is to stand for a thing, which may be a particular (rode w,
Cat, 3*10-13), or a quality (noiav it, Cat. 3bi3-23, io"i8), or a quan-
tity (Cat, 5^26 £). If a word signifies something's being, this by no
means restricts the discussion to substantial essences. Members of
all the categories are, in their different ways, things which are
thus, the referents of verbs count as being, as well as those
of names (Mete. Aj, ioi7a23-3o). The point, then, is that a word
merely signifies being or not being some definite thing. Signification
is thus distinguished from assertion: 'man' signifies something, but
does not assert that it is or is not (De Int. i6b28£). For an assertion
to be formed, the name would have to be combined with the copula
(i6ai6f.). Aristotle marks this distinction by talking here of a
name's signifying being something (TO eivcu, Meta. Aj ioo6a3o),
rather than that something is (on eanv, De Int. 16^291).
I have considered how a word can be said to signify being some-
thing; the text, however, says that it signifies being or not being
something. What does it mean for a word to signify not being some-
thing? Does he mean that 'man' signifies not being all the many
things which man is not, as well as signifying being man? If this
were so, a word's signification would be infinite, and Aristotle
insists that signification is definite. The next sentence makes it clear
that 'man' signifies a definite single thing, and does not also signify
not being an indefinite number of other things (1006*31). It seems
more likely that Aristotle's statement includes, in addition to those
words which signify something's being, those words which signify
13
See Poetics 20,
14
See also A Po. 71*15, where the same pronoun as here (rod/) is used in the same
way.
K
The term 'this particular thing' (rodt), unlike "some this* (rodt «), is not used by
Aristotle in a technical sense to indicate a member of the category of substance. See
EN i ist'35; Meta. A, 98is8.
192 Appendix I
something's not being. These are expressions such as 'not-man*
(OVH avQgmaog) and 'doesn't-thrive' (ov% vymivei, De Int. 16*29-32,
b
o-i5). These indefinite names and verbs can appear in a simple
assertion in which a single thing is asserted of a single thing
(19*5-12): this requires the explanation that even 'not-man* signi-
fies a single thing in a way (i9b9).16 Thus, they are not genuine
exceptions to the rule that all signification involves signifying a defi-
nite single thing. Expressions like 'not-man' and 'doesn't-thrive*
start from some definite thing, signified by 'man' or 'thrives', and
then point away-, from it instead of towards it. Rather than signify-
ing being a certain thing (rodt), they signify not being it.
Compared with 'man', 'not-man' can indeed be said to be indef-
inite. 'Not-rnan! may be truly predicated of all subjects which are
not men; its realm of application is only definite in the sense that
there is one class of items to which it does not apply. Within the
infinite class of objects of which *not-man' may be truly predicated,
it may be predicated indiscriminately of a large range of items
which have nothing in common but not being men. In another
sense, however, 'not-man' may be seen as having a definite signifi-
cation. The expression can only signify in the way that it does by
first picking out a definite referent, namely man. If 'man* had no
definite signification, then 'not-man* could not signify anything.
Thus, Aristotle does not consider indefinite names and verbs as true
exceptions to his doctrine of definite signification. All significant
words point to some definite referent, whether they then denote
the being or non-being of that referent. Both types of signifying,
therefore, can be thought of as definite.
The statement that a name signifies being or not being this par-
ticular thing (1006*29!), then, covers any significant word, 'Man*
and 'not-man' are both brought into the argument as examples of
words which the opponent might utter (ioo6a3if£, b23ff.), and
together stand for all significant words." Whatever word the oppo-
nent may utter must signify being or not being something. The
result of this, as Aristotle goes on to say, is that 'not everything can
be both so and not so.' At least whatever the opponent has signi-
fied must definitely be itself, and not other than itself; otherwise the
opponent could not have signified it. Since this is so for any utter-
!
* POT a discussion of this statement, see Chap, 10, Sect, i above,
" I have argued above that Aristotle sees 'not-nuui* (e«Sx &v0gemo%) as a single
word. See Chap. 3, Sect. 5,
ance which the opponent might make, it is true for every such utter-
ance. These lines, therefore, give us a very compressed argument to
the effect that nothing which can be referred to in words is both so
and not so.
The next argument against the opponent now follows (ioo6a3i).
Aristotle takes the word 'man' as an example: 'further, if "man" sig-
nifies a single thing, let this be two-footed animal.' Some commen-
tators have suggested that he here brings in doctrine about
substances, and narrows his conception of signification to apply
only to picking out substantial essences. There is no need to think
that any such narrowing takes place. 'Man' is taken as an example
of a word which signifies being something, where 4not-man* later
represents words signifying not being something (ioo6b22fl). By
this, Aristotle means that the word picks out the being of man; if
there is such a thing as man, then the word signifies being that thing
(ioo6a32~4). The word, then, signifies the essence of man (TO
avQQumq) eivai).
Here again, some commentators see Aristotle as narrowing his
argument: if the word 'man' signifies what it is to be a man, then,
it is alleged, the idea of signification is closely bound up with the
doctrine of substance. 'Signifying one thing', complains Furth, 'is
heavily theory-laden.'18 Anscoinbe states that a word signifies one
thing if, and only if, it is a sign of a per se existent.19 If this is true,
she argues, then the argument can apply only to individuals and
their essential predicates. However, Anscombe seems to assume
that 'man' signifies a subject who is a man, that is, the unity which
consists of a subject and an essential predicate. Instead, it seenis
much more likely that 'man* merely signifies the universal, man,
that is, something which can be predicated of many individuals (De
Int. 17*39!; Cat. 3bi5-i8), rather than an individual of which the
predicate holds. The word 'man* does not signify Socrates, or an
unnamed individual who might be Socrates or might be someone
else. It only signifies a thing which is said of Socrates and all indi-
viduals like Mm (De Int, 17*38-40).
Commentators who seek to connect signification with the doc-
lft
M, Furth, 'A Note on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction', Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1986), 371-81.
" G. E. M, Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford, 1961), 41. C£
S, M. Cohen, "Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 16 (1986), 359-70: see 370.
194 Appendix I
trine of substance might point to Aristotle's statement that 'two-

footed tame animal' signifies a single thing, whereas 'pale man*
does not (De Int. 20bis f£); it is also Aristotle's view, however, that
'pale' signifies something (Mete. ioo7a3),2<> and, moreover, that
it signifies a single thing (£>e Int. 18*17), and we have seen from
the De Interpretatione that even 'goat-stag' signifies something
(16*17). Simple assertions signify a single thing about a single thing
(18*12!., I9b6f.); that is, the words standing for subject and predi-
cate each signify a single thing. The point is not restricted to just
one class of significant expressions; as he here tells us, not to signify
a single thing is to signify nothing, and if words did not signify any-
thing, thought and speech would be impossible (Meta. ioo6b7-9).
The ontological status of something is not relevant to whether or
how its name is significant. The example of 'man', then, can easily
stand for all words.
If Aristotle m taken to restrict his argument to cover only words
signifying substances, a number of serious difficulties follow. First,
his argument would lose the breadth of scope necessary for defeat-
ing his opponent. If the word which the opponent uttered were
"pale* and not 'man', then the argument against him would collapse.
Later we do indeed find an explicit argument that the opponent's
position would destroy substance (1007*20 ft). In this earlier
passage, however, the force of the argument is that whatever the
opponent says, it must signify something; supposing the opponent
to say 'man*, then he has signified (let us say)21 two-footed animal.
Secondly, an argument about the most fundamental of all princi-
ples ought not to make use of theories which belong to the more
advanced stages of the subject: if it were really true that Aristotle
was basing the Principle of Contradiction on the theory of sub-
stance, he would, in his own phrase, be manifestly guilty of lack of
training (dbratdeuata, 1006*5-8). Thirdly, if he assumes that only sub-
stances can be signified, then he has smuggled in a massive assump-
tion, with which the opponent is most unlikely to agree; this is
exactly what Aristotle has promised that he will avoid. Every other
step in the argument is most carefully argued for, in ways designed
to carry the opponent's assent at each stage, or else force him to
20
Ct T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle's Concept of Signification', in M. Schofleld and M.
Nussbaum (eds,), Language and Logos (Cambridge, 1982), 252,
" This is the force of 'let it be* (Sana, 1006*31). Ct 1037*12!
ThePrincipleofContradictioninMeta,r 195
retire from rational discourse.22 Fourthly, if he here held the view

that signifying is signifying substances, he would be neglecting
his views on signifying which are seen in the Poetics and De
Interpretatione, namely that all names, verbs, inflexions, and phrases
signify, and that signification means signifying a single thing. If we
take Aristotle to be talking of signification in general, we do not
encounter these difficulties. His view of signification is a simple one,
and applies to entities of any category: words pick out things. Man
is a good example of a definite, unified entity, and Aristotle uses it
to show how signification works. The essence of man is just what
the word 'man' signifies.23
Before Aristotle goes on with his argument based on the
example of 'man', he argues in a parenthesis that even words that
signify more than one thing still count as having definite significa-
tion, as long as they have a definite number of-significations
(1006*34 ft). The opponent cannot escape by uttering a word which
has many senses (7toM.a%&; Mjetai), Whatever he utters, 'there is
now something definite* (1006*241). He now goes on to say that a
word which signified a boundless number of things would signify
nothing, and if words were supposed not to signify, then both
thought and speech would be impossible. Just as it is impossible to
signify without signifying a single thing, so it is impossible to enter-
tain the thought for which a word stands as a token, if the thought
is indefinite (ioo6b5-i i). The idea that thought and speech are par-
allel is familiar from chapter i of the De Interpretatione: single
words are like simple thoughts (wjpaza, De Int. i6ai3 ft; cf. vofjaai,
i6b25). Any name or verb will be matched by a thought in the
speaker and the hearer (16*19 &). Any sound which is not matched
by a thought has not been adopted as a token for a thing (i6B2ji):
consequently, it does not signify, and is not a word.24
22
The principle that all signification is definite, assumed at 1006^24, is supported
at 1006*31 ft. and the connection between signifying and rationality, alluded to at
ioo6a2i, is argued for at ioo6b7 ff.
23
Cf, Cohen, 'Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction', 369 £, and
Lukasiewicz, 'Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction', 56. See also Appendix II for
a discussion of the substitutability of a phrase, of which the definition of man is an
example, for the name of the thing in question.
24
The opponents might choose to express themselves without signifying, as do
animals (16*28 £); but animals do not think, and would not be capable of believing
that there coald be simultaneously true contradictions, so that the opponents could
not continue to hold their position. If by keeping silent they will be dismissed as
plants (1006*15), then by bellowing they will be no better than animals.
196 Appendix I
11 words did not signify, then discourse would be abolished, and

so, indeed, would thought (ioo6b8 f.). If the opponent still wishes to
maintain that contradiction in thought is possible (ioo6ar), then he
must certainly maintain that thought is possible. He must therefore
accept that words pick out objects in a definite way, since otherwise
both thought and discourse would be impossible. Once again,
Aristotle has offered the opponent a dilemma: either he must deny
the possibility of thought, step down from his position, and be
content to be called a plant, or eke he must agree with Aristotle,
and be carried on still further with the refutation.
A name, then, signifies something, and signifies a single thing:
since 'man' signifies a single thing, that is, man, it cannot signify not
being man (iooSbii~i4). This statement will be important as a
premiss for the decisive argument (ioo6l>28-34). Before going on
to that, however, Aristotle clarifies further what he means by sig-
nifying a single thing (i0o6bi4~22): he does not mean signifying
'about a single thing' (xaffevoc;), but just signifying *a single thing'
(?v, ioo6bis~i8). Signifying a single thing means picking out a single
item. It does not mean being truly predicable of a single subject: in
that case, 'musical', 'pale', and 'man' would all signify the same
thing, since they can be applied to the same subject. Indeed, every-
thing would be one single thing on this view.25 Instead, these three
words each signify some separate thing. He allows that the same
thing could both be and not be by homonymy (ioo6bi8ff.): that is,
if the meanings of the words were changed, it might be true to say
that something is and is not, but that proves nothing: the issue is
whether things can really be and not be.26
4. THE REFUTATION COMPLETED

He now approaches his conclusion. If 'man' and 'not-man' did
signify the same thing, then being a man and being a not-man
s
In explanation, Aristotle says,'for they are synonymous' (ioo6bi8).We see from
Cat, 1*6 ft that two objects are synonymous if the same name in the same sense can
be applied to both (man and ox are both animals, and so 'synonymous'): the
Aristotelian term applies to things and riot words, and should not be confused with
the modern use of the word. The point here may be that there is some word %vhich
can be truly predicated of everything; perhaps such a word is 'being*. Alternatively.
one could argue that groups of synonymous things must overlap with each other,
and if each such group is 'one', then two groups having a member in common would
be 'one' as well, and so, extending the argument, everything would be one. Of. the
'late learners* of Plato's Sophist, who confuse possessing many predicates with being
many things (Soph, asia-d). * Cf. De Int. 17*34-7,
would be the same (ioo6b22fl). Here Aristotle uses his view that
words signify being things (1006*29 fi). If the words 'man' and
'net-man' signified the same thing, this would mean that they
picked out the same object; the entity picked out by the one word
would be the same as that picked out by the other. Being for a man
would be being for a not-man (ioo6b24t). Some commentators
have been tempted to translate 'being for not-man' (w/tij avBgatm^
elvai) as 'the essence of not-man*,27 There is no need to credit
Aristotle with such a doubtful essence. We have seen that 'not-rnan'
signifies a single thing in a way (De Int. I9b9). Not-inan might have
an essence in the weak sense in which essence and definition extend
to all categories of being, but the point here is that 'not being
man' expresses the signification of not-man, not that it defines its
essence.28
Aristotle has suggested that all words either signify one thing or
many (ioo6a32~4); in this division, 'not-man' falls among those
words signifying one thing. It is not homonymous: that would mean
that the sense in which an ox is a not-man would be different from
the sense in which a sheep is a not-man, just as an animal and a
picture may be designated by the same Greek word in different
senses (both, are £$a, Cat i a r f£). Surely, however, sheep and oxen
are not-men for exactly the same reason, that is, because they are
not two-footed animals,29 Further, if we were to say that 'not-man'
signifies something different for each thing that is not a man, then
'not-man' would have infinitely many significations, since there are
infinitely many things that are not men (SE 165*11 £); and since to
signify an infinite number of things is to signify nothing (ioo6b6t),
'not-man' would lose its signification altogether. Instead,'not-man'
seems to have a single signification. Non-men all have in common
that they are not men: 'being for not-man' consists just in not being
a man.
Here, then, Aristotle argues that if 'man' and 'not-rnan' did not
signify anything different, the two words would only pick out a
single thing (ioo6b22 ft). If this were so, he goes on to say, then 'is
a man and a not-man' would say precisely the same as 'is a man
v
See, e.g., Forth, 'A Note on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction*,
3
See Top. 103*27-9; Mete. Z, 1030*21 ft
29
Similarly, it would not seem right to say that non-men are said 'with regard to
a single thing* (.t^df IV). Non-men are not like entities, or things pertaining to med-
icine, which are related to a central concept in various ways. Non-men are all related
to man in the same way, that is, by not being one, Cf, Meta, 24,1030*32 £f.
198 Appendix I
and a man'. There would thus be no contradiction at all. Hie oppo-

nent is committed to the view that the same thing can hold and not
hold of the same thing at the same time; to use Aristotle's example,
he is committed to the view that a subject can be a man and not be
a man. If 'man* and 'not-maa' signified the same thing, though, a
subject who was a man and not a man would not be a subject of
which something both held and did not hold. Since 'man' stands for
any word which the opponent might utter, the opponent must agree
that 'man' and 'not-man* do not signify the same thing in order to
retain his position that contradiction is possible.
The final argument follows (ioo6b28-34). Aristotle has so far con-
centrated on an arbitrary word which the opponent has been taken
to utter, and has examined its signification. It picks out a definite
thing, and the corresponding word with 'not-' added on signifies
something different. Now he will make the move from these prim-
itive units of significant discourse to the assertions composed of
them. This is the decisive step against the opponent, who claims, in
effect, that the same predicate can be affirmed and denied of the
same subject.
'It is necessary, if there is such a thing as man, that it is two-
footed animal, for this was what "man" signified' (roo6b28-3o).30If
'man' signifies, man must be the thing signified by the name, and
this was taken to be two-footed animal. The opponent must agree
to this if he has agreed with the previous arguments about the defi-
niteness of signification. Aristotle now substitutes "impossible not
to be* for 'necessary to be*. Would the opponent be forced to
agree with this step? If he has assented to the previous step, then
he has admitted that 'necessary' means something, and, Aristotle
argues with plausibility, this is just what 'necessary' means. 'It is no
possible for this same thing not to be two-footed animal,' he
deduces. If it is necessary for man to be man, and impossible for
man not to be man, then Aristotle can move from speaking of
applying names to things to the making of assertions, and conclude
that 'it is therefore not possible for it to be true at the same time
to say that the same thing is a man and is not a man' (ioo6b33f.).
38
It might appear that a bold move has been made in introducing necessity into
the argument. In fact, Aristotle is merely applying the view that a thing must be
what its aame signifies, just as in De Int, 9 we saw him arguing that things must be
the way a true assertion says that they are (De Int. 18*39 £): fa neither case is neces-
sity illicitly smuggled in.
He has now proved that, using the example of'man', he is right and
his opponents are wrong. The same argument will work for 'net-
man', he adds. These two examples together cover all basic utter-
ances which the opponents might make, since a word signifies being
or not being something (1006*28 ft). 'Man' stands for all those
words signifying being something, while 'not-man' serves as an
example of all words signifying not being something.
We need to consider whether this is a good argument, before
moving on to a brief look at the arguments found later in the
chapter. First, it might be argued that the opponents could grant to
Aristotle that it is impossible for the same thing to hold and not to
hold of a subject (ioo6b331); still, if they do not believe in the
Principle of Contradiction, what is to stop them from continuing to
assert at the same tune that it is possible for the same thing to hold
and not to hold of a subject? In other words, while admitting that
the principle is true, could not the opponents affirm that the prin-
ciple is also false, since, in their view, the Principle of Contradiction,
like any.other statement, can be both true and false at the same
time? The opponents could thus assent to Aristotle's conclusion,
while asserting its contradictory.
If the opponents could say this legitimately, then the argument
would indeed fail. However, they are not entitled to this move. In
general, the opponents think that they can assent to any assertion
while also denying it. There must be one exception to this, however,
since if they genuinely accept the truth of the Principle of
Contradiction, then they no longer believe that contradictions are
possible, and if they do not genuinely accept its truth, they have not
assented to it, and cannot claim that they both assent to the prin-
ciple and deny it. Consequently, in accepting the principle as true,
they abandon their position altogether, and are no longer entitled
to claim that anything is true at the same time as its contradictory.
Of course, the opponents could say that they believed that the prin-
ciple was both true and false, but this would be merely to utter
empty words. Proof is directed not against the 'external argument'
(I|o> Idyof), or spoken word regardless of its meaning, but against
the interior reason in the soul (APo. j6b241), There are genuinely
irresistible arguments, and this is one such.31
31
There is nothing to stop anyone from inventing a system of logic in which a
Principle of Contradiction is both true and false: such systems are not threatened
by Aristotle's proof, nor do they threaten it. The Principle of Contradiction in
200 Appendix I
Aristotle's argument is, I believe, a good one. He and his oppo-
nent must both be committed to the possibility of assertion; the
opponent accepts that there are contradictory beliefs and asser-
tions, but claims that they may be true simultaneously. For there to
be assertions, there must be words which signify things in some way
that is sufficiently definite for predicates to be asserted of subjects.
There are certain undesirable results which the opponent, just as
much as Aristotle, wishes to avoid; Aristotle threatens the oppo-
nent with the results that thought and discourse might be imposs-
ible (1006*22, b8), and that all things would be one (ioo6bi7,
1007*6). The assent of the opponent is thus secured, and that is suf-
ficient, since this is an ad hominem argument, and not one which
seeks to build up conclusions from prior premisses. The argument
establishes exactly the conclusion which Aristotle wants, namely
that it is impossible for the same thing to hold and not hold of a
subject (see ioo6a3 f£).
A further passage provides more argument to the effect that
words do not signify the same thing just because they may be truly
affirmed of the same subject (1007*4-20). 'Pale' does not signify
man just because man is pale; 'man* signifies a single thing, even
though man may be pale, large, and an infinite number of other
things. The refutation proper may now be said to be at an end. Up
until this point Aristotle has argued from the starting-point of his
opponents* signification and has ended up by proving the truth of
the Principle of Contradiction. The rest of the chapter is taken up
with other arguments against the opponents, which are not as con-
clusive. They draw out various unacceptable consequences of
denying the Principle of Contradiction, or attack particular posi-
tions. Protagoreans, for example, are attacked on the grounds that
their view that all appearances are true would mean that anything
might be both so and not so (ioo7bi 8-1008*7). If the world were
really like this, then everything would be one, and there could be
no distinctions between objects. Aristotle, on the other hand, as we
Aristotle's sense must be true because of its semantics: according to it, a property
cannot hold and not hold of a subject. As far as properties and subjects are com-
prehensible by the mind, there can be no contradictions in them, nor in the beliefs
and utterances which apply to those properties and subjects However, a Principle
of Contradiction in a system of logic upon which this semantic interpretation is not
imposed might well be false, or true and false, though, in Aristotle's view, it would
then be meaningless.
have seen, argues the other way around: since there are distinctions
between objects, and a word signifies a definite thing, then not
everything can be so and not so (1006*30 £).
One argument should be looked at in more detail, since its func-
tion has often been confused with that of the argument which I
have discussed at length above. According to the next major argu-
ment after the refutation (ioo7320-bi8), if the opponents were
right, then there could be no substance, and everything would be
merely accidental, since man would also be not-man. However,
there can be no accidents without substance, since accidents are
accidental to subjects, and not to each other (ioo7b2 ft).Therefore,
there must be substance (if there is to be anything at all). Some
commentators worry that, since substance is brought in explicitly
here, it must have been lurking all along:32 Aristotle appears to be
employing here a distinction between substance and accident to
which the opponent need not agree, and perhaps has been employ-
ing it in earlier parts of the chapter by speaking of the signification
of 'man'.
This need not be a worry: the two arguments are entirely distinct.
In the earlier argument, which is an ad hominem refutation
addressed to the opponent, nothing is taken for granted except that
'man', or some other arbitrary word which the opponent utters, sig-
nifies something. It is legitimate to take this as a starting-point,
since it is something to which the opponent must commit himself
if he is to maintain his position that rational speech is possible. The
later argument is not an ad hominem refutation, and Aristotle
therefore is not required only to use arguments which the oppo-
nent must grant. He is no longer addressing the opponent, but is
drawing out absurd consequences of the opponent's view from his
own standpoint. The introduction of substance in the later argu-
ment does not mean that it is presupposed in the earlier one, nor
will the refutation only work if the opponent utters a word signi-
fying a substance.
The refutation argument is the most interesting and successful
argument which Aristotle brings to bear against those who deny
the Principle of Contradiction. Since the opponents are committed
to the possibility of rational discourse, they must be committed to
33
See, e.g., Cohen, 'Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction*.
202 Appendix I
the possibility of signification. We thus see arguments on significa-

tion presented, which may be compared with profit with those in
the De Interpretations,
The question might be raised whether the exceptions to RCP
found in the De fnterpretatione are exceptions to the Principle of
Contradiction: the latter, according to Aristotle, has no exceptions,
while the former does. The two rules seem to be importantly dif-
ferent, though. RCP is a rule governing pairs of assertions: it is vio-
lated if truth cannot be assigned to a specific member of the pair
and falsehood to the other. Thus, in chapter 9, RCP failed because
it was not settled which member was the true one and which the
false one: the Principle of Contradiction would not be violated
here. Neither would it be violated by the exception in chapter 8:
man is either pale or not pale, and so is horse; it is only 'man
and horse' which can be neither pale nor not pale. This meant
that both members of the contradictory pair could be false, but it
would be a strange interpretation of the Principle of Contradiction
to say that it was violated here. Similarly, the violation of RCP in
chapter 7 arose because a universal can be combined with a predi-
cate in virtue of some of its members, and separated with respect
to some others. No particular man can be both pale and not pale;
again, the Principle of Contradiction is intact. The exceptions
to RCP do not, then, imply exceptions to the Principle of
Contradiction.
Metaphysics T is concerned with whether the same thing can both
be and not be (ioo6a3 £); the De Interpretatione, on the other hand,
is concerned with the truth value of contradictory assertions. If the
words in an assertion do not stand for units, but multifarious
classes, then assertions containing those words may not abide by
RCP (see, e.g., De Int. 18*17 £)• No unit, however, will be both com-
bined with and separated from the same predicate, aod this is the
point behind the argument of Metaphysics Y^. Man, when seen as
the subject of accidental predications in De Interpretatione 7, is a
genus containing diverse members, of which contrary predicates
may hold. In Metaphysics T, man is seen not as a diversified subject,
but as a unified predicate, which must either hold or not hold of
any subject. Thus, Aristotle's argument concludes that the same
thing, cannot both be a man and not be a man (ioo6t>33 £).
We have seen in the argument against those who deny the
Principle of Contradiction that the signification of a word can be
expressed using a phrase (ioo6a3i £). The substitution of a phrase

for a word is, in Aristotle's view, an important technique for under-
standing the meanings of words. An examination of this technique
will be the subject of the next appendix.
Appendix II
The Substitution of Phrases for Words
We saw in Metaphysics T that Aristotle does not consider the prin-

ciple that all words have definite signification to be threatened by
the existence of words with multiple meanings. This would make
no difference, he says, so long as there is a limited number of such
significations: a separate phrase (A6yo$) could be assigned to each
one, and then a separate word to each phrase (Meta. T, ioo6*34~b4),
Similarly, we have seen in chapter 8 of the De Interpretations how
the hidden complexity in a word standing for two things may be
exposed by substituting a word for each one (i8ai9ft).
Multiple signification is, in Aristotle's eyes, a common and
important feature of language. We see from the Sophistici Elenchi
that at least some names must apply to more than one thing, since
the number of things is unlimited, and the number of names limited
(SE r6saiG~i3),nhis does not make language indefinite in any way;
it means, however, that many expressions contain hidden com-
plexity which must be exposed if problems are to be avoided:
people who engage in argument must be aware of the "powers of
words' (SE 165*15 £). In order to reveal these hidden significations,
Aristotle expands each signification a word has into a phrase. This
method can also be applied to words with a single signification.
While a word is a token for a thing (SE 165*7 f-)» itcan still have its
semantic content spelled out at greater length. It may be tempting
to see this process as one of replacing the word with a definition;
however, the phrase which expands on the word need not be a defi-
nition, as we shall see.5 The method of substituting a phrase for a
name is used frequently, and is referred to in the Topics as
'exchange' (ftercdijiptg, e.g. Top. H2 8 2ifc, 149*6).
lite method is used in the De Interpretations to determine
whether two predicates contain contraries: if phrases are substi-
tuted for the words, then any contrariety contained in the signifi-
1
See, e.g., Bonitz, Index Aristoteticus (Berlin, 1870), on Svofm,
The Substitution of Phrases for Words 205
cations of the names will become evident (21*21 ft). Thus, if the
definition of man is substituted for 'man' in 'dead man', the
phrase 'dead man* will be seen to contain an opposition, since
'man' really signifies something which is living. Similarly, a defini-
tion will be unsuccessful if it mentions implicitly what it attempts
to define. This only becomes explicit when the names in the sup-
posed definition are replaced by phrases (Top. I42a34-b6).2 In all of
these cases, the signification of a name is set out clearly by substi-
tuting a phrase for it, and fallacies caused by neglecting the signi-
fication of the name may be solved. In a proof, however, the name
is preferable for the sake of brevity (APr. 49b5).The name is shorter
than the phrase, and so more convenient,1 while the phrase is
longer, but more informative. Of course, the phrase is not perspic-
uous unless one is familiar with the names used in it; Aristotle says
that the names in a definition should be replaced by other defini-
tions as far as is possible (Top. 149*1-3), and words should not be
replaced by others still more obscure (i4985-7),
There are also other phrases besides the definition which may be
substituted for a word.4 While 'man' only signifies one thing, there
are many different phrases that are equivalent to and substitutable
for the name 'man*: these include not only the definition, but also
whatever is proper to man, Properties (iS«t) are things which hold
uniquely of something: if something is a man, then it is capable of
learning grammar, and if capable of learning grammar, then it is a
man: these can be 'predicated interchangeably of the thing' (Top.
I02ai9ff.). Only those predicates which are proper to the thing sig-
nified by the name are interchangeable with it: 'asleep' would not
be substitutable for 'man', even if by chance all men and only men
should happen to be asleep at a certain time (Top. io2*i9-24).Thus,
there is a very large number of phrases which can be substituted
2
For the same procedure, see Top, 130*38 ft and 147*9 ft C£ also Mela. 25,
icxjoâSff.: the problem of the snub nose starts from the assumption that equivalent
expressions can always be substituted for each other,
3
In a sense, the name stands for the phrase: a name is also spoken of as a sign
of its phrase (Meta. Tj, 1012*24, H6, 1045*261). The name is likewise more con-
venient than the thing (SE 165*6ft),
4
It should not be surprising that the word I have translated 'phrase' (le-fog) does
not mean 'definition'. At De Int. i6b26f£, this term is simply defined as a significant
utterance which has separately significant parts, A definition (<%oj) is defined as
being a phrase (Ao'yos) which signiies an essence (Top. ioifc38); thus, deinitions form
a subset of phrases, and we should not assume that a statement about phrases applies
only to definitions.
206 Appendix II
for 'man', even though 'man* signifies a single thing. We should now
ask whether all of the phrases substitutable for 'man' expand its
signification equally well, or whether the signification is only prop-
erly expressed by the definition. If words with multiple significa-
tion are to be distinguished from those with simple signification, it
seems important for only one phrase to match each signification:
the distinction between the two kinds of words would otherwise be
threatened.5
Aristotle distinguishes between the definition (%og), which sig-
nifies the essence, and the property (tdtov), which does not (Top,
io3b9£). Both definitions and properties are phrases which
uniquely specify the same object and so may be substituted for the
name which stands for the object. The definition stands out from
the properties in that it gives an informative account of the object,
rather than merely designating it uniquely. Since definition,
name, and properties all specify the same item, they are all mutu-
ally substitutable. Thus, a definition may be substituted for a
property, and so we find Aristotle telling us that one phrase may
expand the signification of another (Top. 102*1 f,). A word such
as 'man', therefore, does not have a multiple signification Just
because a great many phrases can be substituted for it. Among
these many phrases, it is the definition which makes the word's
signification manifest,6
We find, however, that not all phrases which represent significa-
tions are definitions. Even 'goat-stag' signifies something (De Int.
16*16 £). No one can know what something non-existent is, we are
told, but it is perfectly possible to ask what the name signifies, or
what its phrase signifies (APo. 92bs-8)JSimilarly, the phrase which
expands the signification of the word 'void' is not a definition of it
in any usual sense. The word signifies *a place in which there is
nothing*: yet no such thing can exist (Ph. 2i3b30f£). The fact that
5
There are also phrases which signify more than one thing (SE 165*13): thus, a
word with many significations could presumably be replaced by a phrase with many
significations, as well as by several phrases, each with only a stogie signification.
6
Etymology may be used in supplying an equivalent phrase for a name. At Top.
112*32-8, this method is recommended for foiling one's opponent by twisting the
sense of » word from its ordinary use. Elsewhere, support for definitions is some-
times found in etymology. The 'automatic' (to awa/teaov) is thus found to be what
happens for no reason (than afaoftdnpr y&vrat, Ph. lyfzyt). Cl Rfiet. 1400^-2$.
1
Thus, the refutation argument of Mete. F4 would work even if the opponent said
'goat-stag'. It signifies being something, even though the goat-stag 'is* only in a most
remote sense of the word.
The Substitution of Phrases for Words 207
there are words signifying things which do not exist means that to
ask what a word signifies is not a reliable method for discovering
definitions. The question 'what does the name signify?* does not
necessarily yield an answer to the question 'what is it?* (APo.
92ba6-34). I shall consider this problem in more detail in Appendix
III.
Despite this caution, something useful can be learned by asking
'what does the name signify?' or 'in how many ways is the name
said?' Of being, Aristotle says 'in as many ways as it is said, in so
many ways does being signify* (Meta, A?, 1017*231). So, when he
asks 'in how many ways is it said?* (jroaa^cBg Myeiat;) he is asking
for a list of the significations of a word. This method of enquiry is
used frequently. As we have seen, a different phrase can be assigned
to match each signification of a word. Thus, when a name has more
than one signification, it has 'many phrases' (aoliol loyai), or 'it is
said in many ways' (110^0%®$ MyeTcu), The two expressions are
closely related in Greek; in order to capture this in English, the
former might be rendered as 'many sayings'. The question 'in how
many ways is it said?' is quite different from the question 'what is
it?' and is used in altogether different circumstances. The defini-
tions of Metaphysics A answer the former question, but not the
latter. The book is a glossary of the meanings of important philo-
sophical terms: its title is given as 'concerning "in how many ways"'
(jteQirov}iooax&;,Meta.Zi, iO28an). Terms such as 'to hold' (Meta.
A23) or 'to be from something* (Meta, 424) have several significa-
tions and thus several explanatory phrases. The task of this book is
to explain the meanings of terms, rather than to answer the ques-
tion 'what is it?' and offer definitions in any strong sense.
Determining the various meanings of words is important in
carrying out an investigation. Confusion as to the number of senses
of a word results in indeterminacy of thought (De Caelo 28ob2 ft),
and thought must be definite if it is to succeed as thought at all
(Meta. T, ioo6b5~n). Different methods are appropriate to differ-
ent enquiries. When Aristotle is interested in defining substances,
searching after the significations of words will not necessarily help:
if the word signiles a substance, then it may help, but if it does not,
then finding the signification of the word will yield a phrase which
looks like a definition but is not. When he is dealing with technical
philosophical terms, on the other hand, asking for definitions which
express the essence signified by the term would be useless. Instead,
2o8 Appendix II
the correct method is to ask in how many ways the word signifies,
and to elucidate each signification,
A consistent view of signification may be seen in all these con-
texts. All words (names, verbs, and their inflexions) signify. Some
words only signify one thing, while others signify more than one
thing. What is signified may exist or it may not; it may belong to
any category, and need not be a substance or a physical object.
Signification comes in definite units; a phrase may be substituted
for each unit of signification, and then a name for each phrase. All
phrases which uniquely specify the same thing are interchangeable,
though only the definition is explanatory of the word's significa-
tion. There are thus phrases which stand for the same object, but
which pick out different aspects of it, rather like 'the morning star"
and 'the evening star*. This picture is complicated by the existence
of things which do not have definitions, and yet may be signified:
in these cases there will still be a phrase expressing the significa-
tion of the name, but this phrase will not be a definition. This poses
a problem for the task of finding definitions, which brings us to the
next appendix.
Appendix III
Signification and Definition
In Appendix I I I investigated Aristotle's method of expanding the

signification of a word by substituting a phrasfe for it. Not all
phrases which can be substituted for a word can be definitions,
however: properties (Bta) can also be substituted for words,
and furthermore, there are words signifying things which do not
exist. I shall now look more closely at the problems which this state
of affairs poses for the search for definitions in the Posterior
Analytics.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION (APo. II. 7)

In Posterior Analytics II. 7, Aristotle addresses the problem of how
it is possible to arrive at definitions. They cannot be reached as the
result of a demonstration, since a demonstration is a syllogism in
which a conclusion is shown to follow necessarily from prior pre-
misses (APo. 92*35-7; see also 7ibi7~23), and there can be no such
premisses from which a definition could be established, since it is
itself basic. Definitions are the principles from which demonstra-
tions start, and are themselves indemonstrable (APo. 9Ob24-7).
Furthermore, they cannot be arrived at by induction. Using induc-
tion, a general conclusion is drawn from the observation of many
particular instances (e.g. 71 "81). Induction might allow one to
conclude that all men were rational, but it could not lead to the
realization that man is essentially a rational animal. Induction
establishes that something is or is not the case, rather than showing
what something is (92*381). Likewise, perception or pointing with
the finger will not help in leading to a definition (92b2 f.).
Thus, Aristotle introduces the problem of how definitions can be
discovered or known. This problem leads to another: someone who
knows what man is must also know that man is, since there can be
no definition of what does not exist. If one does not even know
whether man exists or not, then it will be impossible to be sure
210 Appendix III
whether what one thinks is a definition of man is a genuine defin-

ition or not. This problem is made vicious by the fact that it is the
job of demonstration or of induction to show that something is or
is not, and it has already been established that neither of these
methods will work for establishing a definition. What a man is and
the fact that man exists are different (g2bioL); yet it would
seem that the existence of the object to be defined would need
to be established before a definition could be sought. Definition
therefore seems to rest on demonstration, which is flatly contrary
to Aristotle's insistence that demonstrations must start from
definitions. It would be absurd, he says, for someone to know
what a triangle is without knowing that there are such things as
triangles (92*15-18), yet the geometer takes a definition of
triangle as Ms starting-point and goes on to prove that there is such
a thing.
In giving a mathematical definition, the existence of the object
defined has not been established (92bi9f.). Furthermore, if one
goes on to establish the existence of the object in question, say
a circle, how does one know that the thing which has been shown
to exist is a circle (igb2o-2)7 There is thus a problem in matching
the discoveries reached by demonstration with our preliminary
knowledge, based on definitions of things which may exist or may
not.
At the heart of this problem is the unfortunate fact that there
are names which stand for non-existent objects. Such names are,
nevertheless, significant, and their signification can be spelled out
in a phrase. These names masquerade as the names of real things,
and their phrases masquerade as definitions. The answer to the
question "what does the word signify?" is a phrase which signifies
the same thing as the word (92b271), and not all such phrases are
definitions. There are 'phrases signifying the same as the word* in
the case of things which are not substances or do not exist. Besides,
a definition cannot just be a phrase that stands for a word, since a
word can be assigned to every phrase,1 so that every phrase could
be made to correspond to some word, and thus, if every phrase that
corresponded to a name were a definition, then every phrase would
be a definition (92b3o-2). Thus, the search for definitions through
examining the significations of words is foiled by the presence of
1
See Mete, r, ioo6"i I
Signification and Definition 211
explanatory phrases which do express the meaning of a word, but

are not definitions.
These explanatory phrases have traditionally been called
'nominal definitions', and the genuine ones 'real definitions'.
According to this traditional scholastic reading of Aristotle, defin-
itions are of two sorts. Nominal definitions give 'what the name
signifies* (92b6, 26!); that is, they expand the meaning of the
word according to its ordinary use. A real definition, on the
other hand, expresses what something really is. The distinction
between real and nominal is important, as Trendelenburg puts it,
"lest one embrace the lies of language in place of the truth of the
thing'.2
Irwin follows in this tradition of exegesis, and supplies Aristotle
with a distinction between 'signifying to us* (aijfiaivew jptv) and
'signifying absolutely' (arnuuvtiv anlffx;)? What a word signifies to
us, Irwin suggests, represents the definition which we believe cor-
responds to the word, before we have investigated the matter prop-
erly. When we have gone on to investigate the object signified by
the word, and have understood it in terms of what is genuinely, and
not just apparently, prior, then we see what the word really signi-
fies. In scholastic terms, the method of enquiry proposed by Irwin
would involve proceeding from a nominal to a real definition. It is
proposed as a sort of linguistic equivalent for the method of pro-
ceeding from what is more familiar to us (yvtoQtpartsQyv tjfuv) to
what is more familiar absolutely (yvasQifuhzEQov dxfaa;),4
This distinction between real and nominal definitions is not faith-
ful to Aristotle's terminology. First, the term, 'definition1 is applied
in this passage strictly to things which exist; thus, to speak of there
being a nominal definition of what might not exist is to distort
Aristotle's usage (92b5f., 28 £). Secondly, 'nominal definition* is
supposed to translate Aristotle's "what the word signifies'. What a
2
F. A. Trendelenburg, Elemetua Logices Arutotelicae (Berlia, 1836), 99. See also
J. J, Urraburu, Compendium PhMosophiae Scholasticae, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1902), i.
63-5,
3
and OED.
T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle's Concept of Signification', in M. Schofield and ML
Nussbauoi (eds.), Language and Logos (Cambridge, 1982), 241-66. He also claims
that this distinctioB is at work at Ueta, F, 1006*21; if the opponent utters something,
he must signify both to himself and to someone else. There is no distinctioo here,
however, between two kinds of signifying. A speaker roust both understand his own
utterance, that is, it must express a thought in his soul, and it must be comprehen-
sible to a bearer, see De Int. 16*20 f.
4
See/tPo. 7ib33ff.
212 Appendix III
word signifies may well be aa essence, however, so that in such cases

the nominal and real definitions would be one and the same. The
answer to 'what does the name signify?' and 'what is it?' will be the
same: the definition of man expresses the signification of the
word 'man' (Meta. T, 1006*31 £). In the case of something non-
existent, the former question can still be answered, but the latter
cannot. Therefore, if what the name signifies is a nominal defini-
tion, then real definitions are instances of nominal ones. The terms
'real' and 'nominal' are thus confusing, since they suggest an oppo-
sition between two different types of definition, whereas, in fact,
Aristotle talks of signifying essences as a particular case of signi-
fying. We shall see further on that the very term 'nominal defini-
tion' is based on a mistranslation, and represents a concept
unknown to Aristotle (93b3of,).
We also see that he does not draw a distinction between what a
word signifies 'to us' and what it signifies really or by nature. Words
have significations, which may be essences or may not. In the case
of words whose signification is given by a definition, signification
'to us' and 'by nature' must collapse into one, in the same way as
the supposed real and nominal definitions. In the case of words
which signify something non-existent, on the other hand, there
would be a nominal definition but no real one; the word would
signify 'to us' but not 'by nature'. Thus, Aristotle leaves no room
for a method of enquiry which proceeds from a nominal to a real
definition, or from what we think a word signifies to what it really
signifies. Either the two supposed kinds of definition will be one
and the same, or else there will be no real definition, as in the case
of void, where we start from 'what the word signifies* (Ph.
2i3l>30 ft), but we do not proceed to a definition; rather, we proceed
to the realization that there can be no such thing as void, and that
the word signifies something which does not exist. In either case,
there is no possibility of progress from knowledge of one to know-
ledge of the other.
In how many cases will the phrase which expands the significa-
tion of a word also be a definition? Aristotle's answer to this ques-
tion varies. Here in the Posterior Analytics, it is taken as a most
undesirable consequence that there should be definitions of non-
substances (AJPo. 92b28 ft), and in Metaphysics Z we see that only
a substance can be cited in answer to 'what is it?' (Meta, Z,
1028*10-18). Elsewhere, however, Aristotle considers that defini-
tions, and not just phrases which give the signification of the words,
might apply to all the categories of being (Top. 103*2-] ft; Mem, Z,
1030*17-32), Just as members of the categories other than that of
substance can be said to be, in derived or secondary senses of being,
so there may be definitions of them, although not in the full sense
in which there are definitions of substances. The non-existent could
even be said to have a definition. A definition is a phrase which
answers the question 'what is it?' Something non-existent, then,
should only have a definition to the extent that it can be said to be.
Being is 'said in many ways', and things are said to be by being
qualities of being, routes toward being, destructions or deprivations
of being, or by various other relations to the central concept, which
is substance (Mete, F, ioo3b5-io). So, Aristotle goes on, even that
which is not can be said to be. However, the sense in which a goat-
stag 'is' is one very far removed from the category of substance,
where definitions properly and primarily apply. In passages
where Aristotle discusses definition, rather than the many senses
of being, he is quite clear that the non-existent cannot have a defi-
nition. He is equally clear that words like 'void' or 'goat-stag'
signify something (De Int. i6ai6£; Ph, 2i3b30f.),The phrase which
reveals the signification of such a word must have some sort of
content.
The point in Posterior Analytics II. 7 is that asking the question
'what does the name signify?' is, not an appropriate method to use
when looking for a definition, since the answer may be a definition
or may not be. The reason why the method does not work is not
because it yields a nominal definition, different from the real one;
in cases where there is a definition to find, the answer to *what does
the name signify?* will indeed be the definition. However, there will
be no way of telling whether the phrase which states the
signification of the name is a definition or not. The chapters
which follow address the problem of how definitions are to be
discovered.
As we have seen, several possible methods for establishing defi-
nitions have been considered and rejected. Among these is demon-
stration, A definition, expresses what something is; demonstration,
however, does not show what something is, but only that it is or is
not (92*38 f.). Before the definiendum can be defined, it must be
identified as actually existing. This, however, is merely a prelimin-
ary step, and does not contribute to the definition of the thing: for
214 Appendix HI
merely establishing that something exists does not place it in a

genus, since being is not a genus (92bi4). A definition must state
the genus of the definiendum, and indeed Aristotle says elsewhere
that this part of the definition in particular picks out the substance
to be defined (Top. 139*29 ft). Thus, an existence claim is the wrong
sort of statement to qualify for inclusion in a definition. Since
demonstration establishes existence claims, rather than placing
definienda in genera, the method of demonstration cannot be used
for establishing definitions,
The other horn of the dilemma is provided by the fact that
demonstrations must begin from prior principles: it is necessary to
know what the things are that are being talked about before per-
forming demonstrations on them (APo. 71*13 ft). Aristotle thus has
the dilemma that demonstrations that something is the case can
only begin if there is previous knowledge of definitions, and defin-
itions cannot be sought for without knowledge that the definienda
exist, which can only be established by demonstration. Definition
and demonstration threaten to form a closed circle, where each can
only be undertaken after the other. The solution to this problem is
ingenious. Demonstrations are possible because of some prelimi-
nary grasp of the definition, which is confirmed by the demon-
stration; although the definition only demonstrates that the
definiendum exists, we nevertheless learn simultaneously what it is.
This theory of simultaneous discovery avoids the problem of
circularity.
2. ARISTOTLE'S SOLUTION (APo.H.&-io)

In chapter 8, Aristotle explains the sense in which there may be
said to be a demonstration of the definition (93*14 ft). Often, we
grasp the fact that something is the case at the same time as grasp-
ing why it is the case: however, the 'why' can never be ascertained
before the 'whether' (93*16 ff.).The possibility of making these two
discoveries simultaneously is explained as follows. Knowing what
something is and knowing the cause of its being or not being (the
cause of whether it is) is the same thing (93*3 ft). The definition
thus cites the causes which account for the existence of something:
to know the definition is to be in possession of the explanation of
why something exists. It follows that one who knows the definition
of something also knows that that thing must exist, since the defi-
nition gives the cause, and this guarantees that the thing exists, as
well as showing what it is,
If we consider the investigation into eclipses, or thunder, we may
have some hazy notion that thunder is some noise in the clouds,
and an eclipse is some sort of privation of light, but this does not
count as knowledge of the existence of eclipses (93*20-6), Thus,
when we investigate eclipses properly, we are not only searching
for a definition, but also seeking to establish whether such a phe-
nomenon exists at all. Aristotle's talk of 'the cause of whether it is*
(93a4) points to the possibility that the demonstration may show
that the supposed phenomenon does not in fact exist. An example
of this would be void: as we discover what void would be if it
existed, we also discover that it cannot exist. If the demonstration
shows that something does exist, we will also learn what it is. We
can see how this works for physical phenomena. An examination
of the physical principles which account for eclipses, thunder, and
the like shows us at the same time whether there genuinely are such
supposed phenomena, and also why they come about and so what
they are.
This allows Aristotle to draw the subtle conclusion that, although
we do not demonstrate what something is, nevertheless it becomes
known by means of a demonstration (93^5-20), As we learn that
there is such a thing as thunder, since its existence is guaranteed by
the physical causes and principles which have been cited in the
demonstration, we also realize what thunder is, and are able to
extract a definition from the demonstration, although the definition
has not been demonstrated. This theory of the simultaneous
answering of the 'why* and the 'whether' questions neatly solves
Aristotle's problems about priority. Let us consider the following
demonstration of the existence of thunder:
Noise accompanies the quenching of fire.
Fire is quenched in the clouds.
Therefore, there is a noise (of fire being quenched) in the clouds.
The conclusion is a statement of the existence of the phenome-
non in question: the demonstration establishes its reality. We have
a rough, preliminary grasp of thunder, expressed in the vague claim
that 'thunder is some noise in the clouds' (93*22 ff.). This does not
amount to a knowledge that such a thing as thunder exists, but it
is a necessary preliminary to the success of the demonstration, since
216 Appendix III
without this preliminary grasp of what thunder is, the noise in the
clouds which is demonstrated to exist could not be identified as
thunder. The preliminary grasp must therefore be postulated in
order to account for the matching of the phenomenon which is to
be understood with the understanding of it provided by the demon-
stration: we must be able to say, 'now I understand what thunder
is,' and not just, 'now I know of a phenomenon which was previ-
ously totally unfamiliar.' Since we can identify thunder as a noise
in the clouds, we can move directly from the conclusion that a noise
in the clouds exists to see that thunder exists. Furthermore, we learn
at the same time what thunder is, since the reasons which guaran-
tee its existence make up the definition of what it is. The definition
of thunder, then, is supplied by the middle term of the demonstra-
tion which establishes its existence (93*11): thunder is the quench-
ing of fire in the clouds. This type of definition is arrived at by a
demonstration, although it is not demonstrated.
We have thus seen a number of different ways of thinking about
definitions. In chapter 10, these are summed up, and we may now
address the question of how they are related, and once again con-
sider whether Aristotle meant there to be a distinction between the
real and the nominal definition. The chapter begins with a discus-
sion of different types of definition. A definition, he says, is a phrase
saying "what it is* (93b29). One kind, he goes on, is a phrase which
says what the name, or other name-like phrase (Myo<; ovo/iara>6tis),
signifies (93^301). This statement is consistent with the Topics,
where Aristotle says that a definition is a phrase which signifies
essence, and which is rendered in place of a name, or in place of a
phrase (Top, ioib38-i02a2). 'Name-like phrase' here denotes the
sort of phrase which, like a name, can be defined: it is possible to
define what is meant by 'an animal capable of learning grammar',
though it is not possible to define an assertion, question, or the
Iliad, all of which are also 'phrases* (Aoyoi) in Aristotle's terminol-
ogy. The name-like phrase is thus put alongside the name as some-
thing whose signification can be spelled out by the method of
substitution.
The expression which I have translated as 'name-like phrase* has
traditionally been translated as 'nominal definition',5 As Ross
noted, the Greek words do not bear this sense well.6 Furthermore,
5
See, e.g., LSI
6
W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1949).
it is hard to see what the sentence would mean if one did follow
this translation. Aristotle would be saying that one kind of defini-
tion is 'an account of what the name signifies, or some other
nominal definition*. Yet on the view that Aristotle recognized the
concept of the nominal definition, 'an account of what the name
signifies* would itself be a nominal definition. What, then, would
'some other nominal definition' be? The term 'nominal definition'
takes its origin from this passage: the expression does not appear
elsewhere in Aristotle. I have argued that 'nominal definition' is not
the correct translation. It might still be the case, of course, that
nominal definitions are at issue here, even though Aristotle does
not call them by that name: this position is argued for by Barnes.7
We have seen, though, that these definitions which cite what a name
signifies also answer 'what is it?' (93b29): in other words, they are
definitions of the thing signified by the name. They therefore cannot
be merely nominal definitions.8
Aristotle's example of the sort of definition which states what a
name signifies is that of triangle. In this case, we have a definition
which states what triangle is before we know whether it exists or
not. This seems paradoxical; we do, however, know 'accidentally'
that triangle exists (93b35). That is, we are in possession of the def-
inition of triangle, though it has not yet been established by demon-
stration that it is a genuine definition, and not just a phrase
expanding the signification of a word standing for something non-
existent. This 'accidental' knowledge of the definition serves the
same function as the preliminary grasp of what thunder is (93*21 £).
So, in the case- of things like triangles, Aristotle says, the prelimi-
nary knowledge that is necessary is merely what 'triangle* signifies,
rather than that such a thing exists (71*14i). It follows that the def-
inition with which a geometer begins expresses what 'triangle' sig-
nifies. The account of what "triangle* signifies is a definition of what
triangle is (cf. 93^29): it is not merely a nominal definition, expound-
ing the name and not the thing.
The second sort of definition expresses why something is, and can
only be reached after learning that it is (93b32 ft). The first sort,
then, signifies but does not show or reveal (Seatwai), while the
7
J, Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1975; 2nd edn,, Oxford, 1994):
see 222 £
s
Barnes argues to the contrary. However, his conception of the nominal defini-
tion is ynorthodox, and looks as if it would readily include real definitions (ibid.
223).
218 Appendix HI
second sort is like a demonstration of what the definiendum is

(93b39f£). As we have seen, a demonstration cannot really demon-
strate what something is, but only that it is; Aristotle is here making
the point that a definition of this kind is, only in a manner of speak-
ing, a demonstration of what the thing is, since it is extracted from
the demonstration that it is, and therefore embodies the reasons
for its existence. If we consider the demonstration of the existence
of thunder given above, we find that the middle term was the
source of the definition of thunder, since it cited the reason why
thunder exists. Thus, the question 'why does it thunder?' is
answered by the middle term: 'because fire is quenched in the
clouds' (94*3 f.).The definition differs from the demonstration only
in its manner of expression (Qeaet, 94a2; aAiov -[Qonov Aeyevat, 1)4*6;
jrowa, 94" 12). Thunder, then, is the noise of fire being quenched in
the clouds.
Finally, there is a third sort of definition, that is, that thunder is
a noise in the clouds: this is the conclusion of the demonstration
(94*7 ft). This definition is connected to the imprecise, per accidens
conception of thunder which preceded any sort of enquiry at all
(93*22 f£). It was this imprecise notion which allowed us to infer
the existence of thunder from the existence of a noise in the clouds,
by connecting the two: we started with the notion that there is
'some noise in the clouds', and so recognized the link with the con-
clusion of the demonstration, 'there is a noise in the clouds,'9 It also
allowed the definition of thunder to be extracted from the middle
term, which cites the cause of the phenomenon, and so provides us
with understanding of what it is,10
What part, then, does signification play? We have seen that defi-
nitions cannot be discovered by answering the question, 'what does
the name signify?* since in some cases the thing signified by the
name does not exist, and there is no way of knowing which cases
are which. Furthermore, we do not always know ahead of time what
the name does signify. In the case of thunder, we have only a rough
grasp of what it is (93*21 i). As we saw in Appendix II, a definition
expresses the signification of a word: it was this fact which made
* The two definitions are really versions of the same thing: each object can only
have one definition, which may be better or less well expressed (Top, 139^7ft).
16
C£ De An, 413*11-20; there, most people are said to give definitions that are
like conclusions: they merely state that something is the case, without explaining
why. A definition ought also to show the cause of something.
Aristotle raise the possibility of using a search for signification as

a search for definition (92b26fi). This plan was only rendered
impossible because not every phrase in which the signification of a
word is revealed is a definition, though some are. It follows that if
we do not really know what thunder is, then we do not really know
what 'thunder' means, since the word signifies what the thing is. The
demonstration, then, in furnishing us with the definition, shows us
what the word signifies.
The case of triangle is rather different. Here, we already know
what the word signifies, and we are therefore already in possession
of the definition (93*29-32), However, before performing the
demonstration, which establishes the existence of triangle, we are
in no position to know whether triangles exist or not; and if they
do not exist, the phrase which expands the signification of the word
'triangle' does no more than that, since things which do not exist
have no definitions. In this case, then, the demonstration, by
showing us that triangle exists, shows us that the account of what
'triangle' signifies, with which we were already equipped in the first
place, is a genuine definition.
Aristotle's account of the two cases makes very good sense. We
do have rough notions of physical phenomena. Without knowing
the cause of thunder, though, we do not really know what it is, and
it is reasonable to say that we do not really know what the word
means. Aristotle is thus very far from holding the view that our
rough, preliminary notion incorporates the signification, or nominal
definition, of the word. The signification of the words which we use
for physical phenomena can only be discovered through an in-
vestigation of the phenomena in question." In the case of mathe-
matical terms, however, there is no question of not knowing the
signification of the word: the geometer defines his terms, and knows
exactly what they signify. It only remains to demonstrate that he-
has not defined something which cannot exist. Again, no move from
a nominal to a real definition is involved: the definition is the same
throughout. The outcome of his demonstration does not bring with
it new understanding of the meaning of words, but the knowledge
that a word whose meaning he already knows stands for something
real.
" Cf. the De int., where we must examine the behaviour of things in order to
understand how assertions made about them work.
220 Appendix III
In neither case does the demonstrator start from total ignorance

of the thing which he is investigating. Aristotle is thus able to avoid
the danger which worried Meno, that if we do not know something,
then we can have no clue as to how to find it out.12 The circular
dependence of definition and demonstration on one another with
which Aristotle was threatened in chapter 7 is broken: in the act of
demonstrating that something is, we also learn what it is, and so dis-
cover both simultaneously.
12
See Plato, Meno, Bod f t
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Index
accidents 28 n,, 93, 173, 201,217 APr. 1-4, 5, 23, 27 n., 32 n,, 54, 57,
and assertions 91, 202 65-6, 68 n., 83 n. , 85 n., 86, 90, 94,
clusters of 151, 153 12-7, 137, 139-41, 1420., 156, 162,
Ackrill i n., 71 n., 163 n,, 170 175, 182, 187 n., 188, 205
on chapter 9: 1 1 1 n., 1 13 n,, i 14 Cat. 1-2, 4, 5, 1 1 n,, 52, 54, 60, 65,
1 16 75 n., 91, 126, 182, 19011., 191, 193,
on compound words 39-41 1960,, 197
criticizes Aristotle i6n., 98, 116, 152, De An. 13-17, 29, 46-7, 49 n,, 57 n.,
158-9, 165-6 69, 126, 185, 2i8n.
on partial assertions 86-9, 90 De Caela 207
actions 12,52,119-20 De Sensu 19, 173 n.
actuality 31, 169-70 EJV 10-11, 1190,, 184, 191 n.
'additions' 159 GA son.
adjectives 35 n., 53-4, 59 GC 4 4
adverbs 84, 89 n. HA 19, 46-50
affections in the soul 9, 14-17, 18, Meta.: A 191 n.; r 23 n., 24, 27, 33,
20-1,4711. 63, 91 n., 114, 126, 150, 1540., 157,
see also thoughts 175, 1760., 183-203, 210, 211 n.,
affirmations 72 n., 132, 172 212, 2 13; A 27-30, 32 n., 48, 57 n.,
affirmations and negations: 91, 136-7, 151 n., 191, 207; E 26-9,
and combination and division 26-7, i3in.;Z iin., 16-17, 28 n., 32, 75,
30,60 1530., 19411., 1970., 205 n., 207,
and contradictory pairs 78-81 2I2-(3;H 27 n., 32, 136, 2050.;
with non-existent subjects 65-6 9 2511., 27-9, 31, 11911., 1200.,
and verbs 55, 66 16904 K l86n.;M 640.
Alexander of Aphrodisias 640. Meteorology 44
ambiguity 97, 103-4, 150 On Ideas 64
see also amphiboly and homonymy PA 6,11 n,, 47-50
Ammonius i n., 6, 21-2, 41, 43, 52-3, Pk. 27 n., 31 n., 69, 173 n., 187, 206,
62 212, 213
amphiboly 103, 104 n. Poet. 6,25,42,450., 47, 48, 49, 62,
analytics 187 70 n., 71 n., 75 n., 138, 179, 191 n.
Anaxagoras 114 Pol. 50
Andronicus of Rhodes 5, 14 Prob. 47 n., 49 n,, 50, 5 1 n.
animal noises 18, 47-51 Rhet. 1 1 n., 7011., 179, 2060.
animals 15, 46-51, 195 n. SE 2, 4, n, 20, 22, 24, 27 n., 830. ,92,
Anscotnbe 90, 114 n., 12211,, 193 99-105, 107, 150, 151, 153, 1550.,
answers 76, 99-102, 104, 106-7, 12? 182. 197, 204-5, 2o6n.
Apollonius Dyscolus 89 n. Top. 2-4, 1 1 n., 16 n., 70 n., 75 n.,
Apuleius 890. 85 n., 91-2, 94, 98, 99, 102 n., 104,
Aquinas 5 n,, 89 1 06, 131 n., 147 n., 151, 153-5, '73.
Arens i n,, 16, 41 n,, 43, 58 n,, 590. 182. 1970., 204-6, 213, 214, 216.
Aristotle; 2180.
APo. 17, 31 n., 33, 75, 79, 83 n., articulation 47-51
101 n., 127, 137, 18311., 187, 191 n,, assertions 7, 23-4, 28-30, 76, 79, 172,
199, 206. 207, 209—20 198
230 Index
assertions (cent): calculation n
as answers 76, 100-2 categories 280,, 32, 570,, 136-7, 191,
composition of 52,55-61, 132-5, 197.213
158, 178-9 causes 214-15, 218-19
compound 76-7, 96-7 chance 110,116,119-20,122-4
copula in 137-43 change 173
copula missing from 143-6 Cohen 193 n., 195 n., 201 n.
criteria for unity of 75-7, 95-6, 105, combination 56-9,
150 and division 26-32, 65, 69, 78, 80-1,
definition of 72-3, 125-6 134, 158
expressing beliefs 171, 174 complexity 49,60,72
future singular 109-25, 129-30 hidden 95-7, 103, 151, 204
hidden complexity in 95-104 in things 27-9, 30-1
indefinite 86 in thoughts 16, 25, 29
modal 156-70 in utterances 25-7
multiple 75-6, 95-8, 150-5 see also combination and division
non-universal 84-7,90-4, 112, 135, compounds 29,44-5
142, 143-4 conjunction 74, 75, 95, 97
one-word 60 conjunctions 25, 75 n., 138
partial 86-90, 169 consonants 48
past and future 68-70 contingency 28, no, 161-2, 163-4,
primitive 26, 55, 74, 135 168-70
simple 76-7, 95-6, 152 contradiction 2-3, 79-82, 138, 175,
single 75-7, 95-6, 99, 133, 153 184-5,198
singular 83-4, 89-90, 92-3, 135 Principle of 157, 183-203
and things 83 contradictories 84—8. 92, 138, 171—7,
universal 83-90, 92, 112, 141-3, 169 184-5
Augustine 890. contradictory pairs 92-3,111-12,
Ax 46-7, 50, 58 n. 178 n.
axioms 183 chance, necessary, and usual 120-5
and contraries 175
babbling 153-4 definition of 78-82
Barnes 217 and dialectical questions 3, 99, 101,
being 214 106, 151, 180-1
and categories 32, 137, 213 future singular 110,118,126-7
as predicate 136-7, 138 n. modal 156-60, 1 68
and signification 191-2 and non-existence 65
as subject 159 and potentiality 169
and troth 27-8, 31-2 and refutation 180-1
and unity 27 Rule of, see RCP
see aha copula, existence, and 'is' universal 87-8
Bekker 37 n. contraries 84-5, 146, 163, 171-7, 204
Belardi 20. 21-2 convention its, 12, 13, 17, 18-19,36,45,
beliefs 24, 29, 171-7 72
contradictory 172-5 see also tokens
ultimate 183 'conversely' loan., 162
universal 174-6 copula 31-2, 53, 56-9, 61, 136, 137-43,
birds 49-50 155
Bivalenee, Principle of 111-13, negated 139, 142, 145-6, 156-9
117, 118, 122n., 125-6, 129- see also 'is*
3i
Boethius 19, 3 1,430,, 53 n,, 890. Dante 49 n.
Bonitz 133 n. definition 16,17,91, 137,305-6,209-20
Index 231
dist. phrase 205 Fine 116, 122 n., 129, 130 n.
mathematical 210, 217, 219 form 15-17, 22
real and nominal 211-12, 216-17 Forms, Platonic 64,930,
and signification 206, 210-13, 217- Frege 82 n.
ig function 44
unity of 74-5 Furth 193, 197 n.
unsuccessful 205 future 68-9, 109-11, 114-19, 129-
deliberation no, 118-20, 125 3i
Democritus 12 disappearance of HI, 117-18, 121,
demonstration 183, 187-8, 209-10, 124
213-16, 218-20 necessity of, see necessity
dialectic 2-3, 99-101, 106-8, 117-8, openness of 120, 122, 124-6
151-2, 176-7, 180-2 reality of 124, 129
assertions used in 91, 94
see also questions, dialectical genus 31, 91, 202, 2.14
Dickason 1090, goat-stag;
Diogenes Laertius 5 'goat-stag is* 30-2, 136-7
Dionysius Ibrax 540. its lack of truth value 26, 30, 32-4,
disjunction 121 38,55,?4
division, see combination and division its signification 16-17, 24-5, 32-4,
double questions, see questions, doable 65,206
dreams 28 n. see also non-existence
grammar 1, 60
eclipses 215 groans 19
elements: see also utterances, inarticulate
of assertions 35, 38, 61, 178
physical 44 Heraditus 184
of speech 48,51 Hermogenes 12
of syllogisms 182 Hintikka 117 n., 1640.
emotions 90. Homer 154-5
equivalences 161 homogeneous bodies 44
error 29, 171-4, 183-6 homonymy 46, 79, 92, 103, 105, 196,
essence 16, 44, 75, 193, 197 197
and definition 205 n,, 216 hypothesis 121, 183
and signiication 195, 212
etymology 41 n, images 15-17, 20
'every* 143-4, 148 imagination 15,46
'exchange*, see substitution implication 165-7
Excluded Middle, Principle of 130, impossibility lai, 161-6
165-6 indeflniteness 147, 195, 204
existence 210, 213-16 indeterminacy of thought 207
see also being and V individuals 89
explanation 214 see aho singulars
expressions ($d«c) 71-2, j6, 102 indivisibility 29, 37, 48-9
induction 209-10
fallacy 184-5,205 inferences 139-43, 146, 152, 161, 167-
modal 115-16 o8
see aba sophistries infinite regress 153-4
falsehood: inflexions 53
and error 171 argument from 70 n.
see also truth and falsehood of names §7
familiarity 186,211 of verbs 68-70, 74, 134
fatalism 109-21, 124, 129-31 Irwin 64 n,, 98 n., 1940., 211
232 Index
'is': see also verbs and words

added to name 30-4, 55, 67, 74, 135-7 nature 10-11, 12, 18-19, 43> 92
as copula 53, 55-9, 80, 137, 138, necessity 28, 119-21, 156, 160, 161-70,
155 198*0.
in modal assertions 158-60 of future no, 116-17, 09-30
negated 80, 158-9 hypothetical 121
see also being and copula negation 63
Aristotle's theory of 80-2, 134,
Kirwan 1850,, ijjon. 146-7, 156, 179
Kneale 130 negations, how formed 62, 80-1, 100,
knowledge: 138-9, 143-7, 156
and definition 209,212,214 see also affirmations and negations
limits on 124, 128, 131 nonentities 27-8,65-6
preliminary 217 non-existence 16-17, 25> 3'. 65-6. 139.
of things 150, 153 206, 212-13
what and that 209-10, 213-15, 220 nouns 35 n.» 54, 59, 60
Kretzmann i n., 16, 18-20, 21-2,51 n. see also names
language 6, 29, 490,, 50, 103, 179 obscurity 104,205

languages 9 opposites 63 n.
Laputians nn. opposition 138, 142, 171-7, 205
late learners 196 n. Organon 1-2
lazy argument 118-19 organs:
Lear 184 of perception 14
Leo Magentinus 39, 41 of speech 46-7, 49
letters 25,46,48-9,51 Owen 1370.
likenesses 9, n, 13-17, 22, 23
linguistics I Pacius 6, 540.
Littleton 89 n. parrots 4911.
Lo Piparo 71 n. partkiples 54, 57, 58
logic, modern 80, 100, 1530, particulars 89-90
Lukasiewicz 187, 1950. see also singulars
partridges 500.
man 49-51 parts 31
definition of 72,74, 136 of contradictory pairs 1780,
'man is' 31-2, 135-7 of definitions 75
meaning, see signification kinds of 48-9
meaninglessness 24, 97-8, 195, 197, of phrases 71
1990. of speech 25, 47, 53, 62, 70 n.
metaphysics 170 of universal^ 86, 89
Minio-Paluello 511,, 21,3711., 1740. of words 29,40-3,61,72
money 10 past 68-9, H2
Montanari i n., 21 PB, see Bivalence, Principle of
P^pin 18-20
namelessness 11,132 perse 193
names: dist per accidens 19, 28 n., 151 n.,
in assertions 52-5, 57-61, 132, 134 173
definition of 23, 35-7, 52-5, 59, 60-1, perception go,, 14, 15, 209
190 petitio 18311., 189
indefinite 1 1, 560., 61-4, 132-4, 135, phrases (Ufoi) 53
139-43, 192 and assertions 71-3,74,77
inflexions of, see inflexions and definitions 55, 205— 6, 210-12
and verbs 15, 26, 29, 32-4, 37-8, 76 dist. compound words 38, 40-1
Index 233
indefinite names as 61-3 and dialectic 100-1,106-8,127-8,
name-like 216 180-1
substitution for words 204-8 elliptical expression of 113-14,
pictures, mental, see images 122 n., 123-4
Plato 64 exceptions to 92-4, 96, 98, 100-1,
Crat. 12, 38 n., 41 n., 45 n., 960. 105, 109-12, 126-8, 142
Gorg. 99 n. and future singulars 117-28
Meno 220 and modal assertions 156-7, 164
Rep. 90, dist. Principle of Bivalence 111-12,
Soph. 52,630., 134 n., 1960. 113-15, 117-18, 125-6
see also Forms, Platonic and Principle of Contradiction 202
pleasure and pain 50 realism 129-31
Plutarch 530. reductio ad absurdum 164-7, 168
poetics 73 refutation:
pointing 102, 209 and dialectic 2, 106-7. 176-7, 180-1,
possibility 156-70 182
potentiality 31, 120, 169-70 and double questions 100, 104,
prayers 73, io6n., 125, 179 151-2
predicates 27,29,31,32,52-5,60-1,65 and Principle of Contradiction 186-9
and being 136 and RCP 107, 180
negated 146 renaming 75
see also subjects and predicates repetition 153-4
predication 83, 165-7 rhetoric 73, 179
additional 56, 137, 155 Ross 216
and being 57 n. Ru!e of Contradictory Pairs, see RCP
complex 150, 153 Ryle 990.
interchangeable 205
predictions 109-31 scholasticism 90,211
premisses 86, 106 science 183
dialectical 3, 106, 127 sea-battle 00,117-18,121-2,125
see also questions, dialectical semantic roles 58, 60- 1, 138, 144
prepositions 25 semantics i, 9
present 68-9, 112, 123, 129 semivowels 48
principles: sentences 28-9, 60, 71 n.
first 183-6 see also assertions and phrases
indemonstrable 187,209 separation 28-31, 65-6, 134
privation 139-41 see also combination and division
probability 124 series 139
properties 91, 104, 131 n,, 205-6 Sextus Empiricus 490.
Protagoras 200 signification 23-4, 33-4, 46-7, si, 72,
178-9
quality 25, 137, 191 additional (sigaaatffuxlvetv) 25, 37, 52,
quantity 25, 48, 66, 191 53. 56~9> 68-70, 134, 137-8, 144.
questions 76 179
dialectical 2-3, 76, 99-104, 106-8, basic 55-7,61
127-8, 146, 151. 180 and being 197
double 99-103, 152 delniteness of 63-4, 67, 148, 189-96
true and false 106 and definition 206,210-13,217-19
unanswerable 98-102, 106-8, 127-8, expanded by phrase 205-8
552, 180 joint 43 n.
multiple 12, 63, 96-7, 99, 193, 204,
rationality 47, 50-1, 188, 190, 195, 201 206-7
RCP 79-82 separate 38-42,71-2
234 Index
signification (cont): suppositions 183
and things 23-5, 33, 56, 58, 178-9 Swift i in.
and thought 23, 55, 76, 178, 189, syllables 25
194-6 syllogisms 2, 86, 90, 94, 182, 209
and troth 26, 33-4, 72 symbols 9-10, 18
unity of 74, 95, 133, 196 see also tokens
signs 17-25. 32-3. !78 symptoms 18-19
natural 18-20 synonymy 1960,
simplicity:
apparent 99 "tends to* 42-3, 122, 124
in things 28,31 tense 68-9, 134
in thought 14, 15, 25, 28-9 see also time
in utterances 26, 32 textual disputes 20-1, 88, 115, 133, 169
singulars 83-4, 89, 92-3, 146 things 82
future 109-31 and assertions 96, 150, 170
sleep 15 classification of 83-4, 91
snub nose 153 n., 205 n. combined' and divided 27-31,56,78
sophistries 79, 103 knowledge of 150, 153
dead man 154 and signification 24-5, 33-4, 58,
Ethiopian 92 60-1,67, 195-6
good cobbler 153 and thoughts 13-17, 27
Homer 154-5; true and 28, 30, 159
see also babbling, questions unlimited in number 204
(double), and homonymy and words n, 18, 20-5, 195-6
Sorabji 129 'this* 32-4, 191
soul 9,46,51 thoughts 9
sound 46,49 contradictory 184
see oho animal noises and utterances indeterminacy in 207
speech 6,23,46-51 as likenesses of things 13-17
Square of Opposition, Modal 161-4, past and future 69
167-8 as properties 185
states of affairs 30-1, 69, 116, 121, 136 simple and compound 29, 69
see oho things truth in 27-9, 56
Steinthal 6 and words 11-12, 18, 20-4, 51, 171,
stick 156, 162 189, 195
see also "underlying* see also beliefs
subjects and predicates: thunder 215-16,217
and combination and division 27, 29, time:
31,32,65,69,81,134 and assertions 114
in complex assertions 100, 152-3 and thought 69
and names and verbs 52, 54-7, and verbs 52-3, 54, 56-9, 68-70, 134
59-61,67,134,135 see also future, past, and present
and non-existence 65 'to be", see 'is*
phrases as 62, 73 tokens 10-12, 18, 19, 22-3, 45, 175, 195
singular and universal 83, 91 took 10, 12-13, 19> 72
substance; traces 50-1
and being 17 n., 31-2, 136 Trendelenburg 14,880., 162 n., 187 n,,
and definition 212-13,214 211
first 170 triangle 33, 210, 217-19
and Principle of Contradiction 190, Tricot i n., 14
I93~4, 201 truth and falsehood 25-34, 78
and signification 25, 191 and assertions 55, 58, 72-3, 125-6
substitution 154, 204-8, 210, 216 and future singulars 110-31.
Index 235
and the non-existent 65-6 by themselves are names 540., 55,
and questions 106-7 56-8, 190
in things 28, 30, 159 definition of 23, 36-7, 148-9
in thought 14 dist. names 52-5
see also falsehood indefinite s6n.,6o, 61-7, 133, 192
truth tables 81, too and negation. 80, 156-9
truth value 14,1060. their role in assertions 25, 54-61, 77,
and assertions 62, 125-6 132, 134
and contradictories 81 see also 'is* and names and verbs
and future singulars 122,129-30 voice 19, 42, 46 n., 48, 50
and indefinite names 67 how produced 46
lacked by simple utterances 26, 34, see also utterances
38, 62, 136, 147 void 206,212,213,215
vowels 48
'underlying' 65, 139, 142 n., 159, 160,
162 Waitz 6, 47 n., 90, 163 n.
understanding 186-7, 188. 216, 218 wax tablet 22, 185
unity 150-4 Weidemann 20 n., 58 n., 85 n,, 88 n.
accidental 151 Wittgenstein 1530.
apparent 98-9 word order 148
of assertion 75-7 words 46,74,
and being 24, 27 and signification 190-6, 204-8
of definition 74-5 as signs 17-25
of essence 75 simple and compound 37-45, 61-2,
and signification 154 72
universals 83-5, 91-3, 157, 193 and things n, 18, 20-5, 195-6
dist, universally 83-4, 143-4 and thoughts 11-12, 18, 20-4, 51,
usual events 120, 122-4 171, 189, 195
utterances 9, u, 11,79,99, 176 as tokens 10-12,23
inarticulate 45-51 see also names and verbs
indivisible 48 writing 9, 12, 20
non-signifying 47
simple and complex 35, 71
'yes* and 'no' 76, 99, 101-2, 104 n.
Varro 54 n. see abo answers
vegetables 188
verbs; Zirin 460,, 51 n.

Whitaker - Aristotle Interpretation

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ARISTOTLE'S DE INTERPRETATIONS

OXFORD ARISTOTLE STUDIES

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press

I should like to express my deep gratitude to David Sedley and

5, Chapter 5: Simple and Compound Assertions 74

7, Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP;

10. Chapter i o: Three Types of Assertions 132

Appendix I. The Principle of Contradiction in

The De Interpretation has traditionally been as the second

These studies rest on the assumption that the philosophical oasis

branches of knowledge which the dialectician must master, per-

become evident. We shall see that the De Interpretations should be

- The title of the De Interpretations presents a puzzle. The English

Accordingly, a number of scholiasts and commentators explain

general. Instead, we shall see that its central subject is an analysis

Chapter 1: Significant Utterances

With chapter i, the preliminary section of the treatise begins, which

simple elements of significant speech (16*20ft, i6b6f.), and then

i. WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THINGS (i6 a 3-9)

i.i. Words as Conventional Tokens

is that from which the English 'symbol' is directly

nature of things. Similarly, we are able to invent new words, by

1.2. Thoughts as Likenesses of Things

Interpretations, and very clearly belongs to the sphere of the De

thought is just a picture.9 Commentators on the chapter are very

(Mete. 1030*7-9; APo, 92b26~-34);!2this phrase, in a broad sense, can

i.j. Words as Signs

Boethius that some human utterances, such as cries and groans,

onymous adverbs, 'first' (nganajg or xQfinav). The first of these is an

whose meaning is assigned by rational beings, they will be tokens

significant (i6b33f.. 17*23, I7bi7, 18*14, I9b5). It is the relation

Interpretation we see that an assertion must assert, or, as Aristotle

2. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD (16*9-18)

The section of chapter i discussed above contains a short discus-

complex thoughts and utterances of a certain kind must be either

* See Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, 114.

These things are separations of existent simples: if Socrates is not

truth and falsehood, or combination and separation, of the things

fnterpretatione, which will be closely concerned with the truth value

fact that grass is pink, a non-existent compound of elements which

* The goat-stag or sphinx are nowhere (Ph. 208*30).

it (i6b2ff., 17*11ft, I9bi3ff,). In order to find a sense of being in

Chapter 2-3: The Name and Verb

i. THE STRUCTURE OF CHAPTERS 2 AND 3

Chapter 2; The Name

Bj. Elucidation of the definition

Chapter 3: The Verb

The elucidations are systematically arranged. The definition of

they are the elements of significant utterances, into which larger

2. SIMPLE AND COMPOUND WORDS (i6"20-6)

is explained in chapter 2, so that the one discussion does duty both

* His example is 'bookcase'. In Greek, ixifytvetv is composed of two elements

compound has no signification 'in itself (naff avrd, i6a2i).

In fact, Aristotle does draw a real distinction between simple and

merely a question of whether they appear as an independent

* Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language, 42.

seated in chapter 4 supports this view (i6b3i f.), 'Mice' (MY2) is a

original attributes to the compound, even though they are not

3. HUMAN SPEECH AND INARTICULATE

The next section of chapter 2, following the discussion of simple

This seems to conflict with the definitions of the parts of speech

This articulation of the voice amounts to the pronunciation of

in distinguishing the articulate from the inarticulate. Aristotle is

significant (i6b33f.. 1723, I7bi7, 1814, I9b5). It is the relation