MMDA Vs.

Bel-Air Village

Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter
of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati
City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised
that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court
decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the
authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.

Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged
in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them.

It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in
the said act that grants MMDA police power. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

MMDA V. GARIN

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero
Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending
that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of
the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines
and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:
1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is
a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16
Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to
as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up
in the charter itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority."
The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-
moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center,
and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose."

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue:
Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to
have originated in the House of Representatives as required?
Held:
Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of
the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817
was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
271 Phil. 932
BADUA vs CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land
dispute is the legal issue presented by this petition.

The petitioners, spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua, allegedly own a farm land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra. In
July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Cordillera Bodong Administration in
Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua."

The factual background of the case, as recited in the undated "decision" (Annex A, translation is Annex A-1) is as
follows:

In 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax
Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was able to
redeem the land twenty-two (22) years later, on August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died. He
allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg.

On the other hand, Rosa Badua alleged that the land was sold to her by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still
alive. However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor
Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it
failed to settle the dispute, A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial level
courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19,
1989 and rendered the following decision:

"9. The Maeng Tribal Court, therefore, decides to give the land to DAVID QUEMA and ROSA BADUA and her husband
must pay the persons to whom they mortgaged the said land. The Maeng Tribal Court also decides that ROSA BADUA
and her husband must reimburse the expenses of DAVID QUEMA in following-up the land case amounting to
P2,000.00. The Maeng Tribal Court further decides to penalize ROSA BADUA and her husband in the amount of
P5,000.00 for telling the lie that they bought this land from the late DRA. EROTIDA VALERA; for misleading the Maeng
Tribal Court which handled the continuation of this case here in Bangued, CBA Provincial Office where they failed to
make an appearance: and their illegal acquisition of the said parcel of land. This decision is based on the 'PAGTA.' "
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
When Leonor and Rosa Badua did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30, 1989 a "warning order"
from Ka Blantie, Zone Commander, Abra Zone-1 of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, thus:

"WARNING ORDER"

"Mr. & MRS. LEONOR BADUA

"A last warning from the armed CPLA of the CBA reiterates the order that you not to interfere any longer with the
parcels of land decided in favor of DAVID QUEMA as per 'Court Order' of the Maeng Tribal Court. You are also to pay
back the expenses he incurred for the case amounting to P2,000.00 and your fine of P5,000.00.

"Non-compliance of the said decision of the Court and any attempt to bring this case to another Court will force the
CPLA to settle the matter, in which case, you will have no one to blame since the case has been settled." (p. 20, Rollo.)
Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, his wife, Rosa, was arrested by the Cordillera
People's Liberation Army and detained for two days.

On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed this petition "for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs" (which may be treated as a
petition for certiorari and prohibition) praying that:

1. a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the respondents from enforcing the decision of the Cordillera
Bodong Administration, during the pendency of this case;

2. the respondents be prohibited from usurping judicial power and hearing cases; and

3. the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and Cordillera People's Liberation Army be clarified.
Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because:

1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing; and

2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the private
respondent as neither of them are members of the Maeng Tribe.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court on April 5, 1990 required the respondents to comment, but, unable to serve said
resolution on the respondents, the court requested the Philippine Constabulary Commander of the Cordillera Region
to do it.

Respondents through counsel, Atty. Demetrio V. Pre, filed their comment on October 26, 1990. They alleged that: the
Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra. The
tribe is a part of the Cordillera Bodong Association or Administration whose military arm is the Cordillera People's
Liberation Army. The tribal court, or council of elders, is composed of prominent and respected residents in the
locality. It decides and settles all kinds of disputes more speedily than the regular courts, without the intervention of
lawyers.

Respondents further allege that the proceedings and decisions of the tribal courts are respected and obeyed by the
parties, the municipal and barangay officials, and the people in the locality, ostracism being the penalty for,
disobedience of, or non-compliance with, the decisions of the council of elders in the areas where tribal courts operate.

Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the tribal courts because they are not a part of
the judicial system.

Respondents concede that if the petitioners "want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of elders," the
petitioners should file the necessary suit, not in the Supreme Court, but in the trial courts, where evidence can be
presented. Respondents pray that the decision of the tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari and
prohibition be dismissed.

After deliberating on the petition and the comment thereon of the respondents, which the Court decided to treat as the
latter's answer, the Court finds the petition to be meritorious, hence, resolved to grant the same.

In "Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al., vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., " G.R.
No. 93054, December 4, 1990, the Court en banc, found that in the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990
pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and
city[*] of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.

"Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the
February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive
Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order
No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended."
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created Under Section 13
of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera
region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as a regional police force or a
regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally
exist.

Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted
into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court
existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.

Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower
courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial
power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal objective to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make
peace settle, and compromise.

An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated, has
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only through the local
city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award
upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court
based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may been enforced or set aside, in and through the
regular courts only.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision rendered on
February 18, 1989 by the Maeng Tribal Court in Case No. 0, entitled "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua," is hereby
annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera People's Liberation
Army, Manuel Tao-il, Amogao-en Kissip, Dalalo Illiques, Juanito Gayyed, Pedro Cabanto, Vicente Dayem and David
Quema, are hereby ordered to cease and desist from implementing said decision without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate action by the parties in the proper competent courts of the land as provided by law. Costs against the
respondents.

Umali vs. COMELEC, 723 SCRA 170 (2014)

By: G-one T. Paisones

Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the
President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a
highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series
of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for the
conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion
cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where
only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.

Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the
proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main
argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing
city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in
Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the
conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change
not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-
2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.

Issue:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City
can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a Highly
Urbanized City (HUC).

Held:
Entire province of Nueva Ecija

Ratio:
The upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep
price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in
territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free
from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once
formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother
province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies
the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”

Bai Sandra Sema vs. COMELEC and Didagen Dilangalen, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 6734, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand,
voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.
There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists
of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM
but of Region XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of
Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first legislative
district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City,” prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in
Congress.
Issue: There are a number of issues resolved, but the main issue is this — Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional.
Ruling: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM
Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create
a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201,
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of
Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.
Discussion: The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
There are three conditions that must be complied with in creating any of the four local government units – province,
city, municipality or barangay – to wit:
1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate
to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts
with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs.
The creation of provinces and cities is another matter.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution (“ “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member x x x.”) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out
of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must
be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior
legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of
the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional
territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid
out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative
body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s
territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assembly’s legislative powers “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.”
CAMID vs Office of the President

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ

Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised
Admin. Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of
Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the
disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez
argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then
Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. Issue:
Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal
corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no
quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. The fact that the
municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered
part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors
are present:

1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258
creating it had never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec.
16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within 5 years from the time the act complaned of was done or committed. 4. The State and even Jimenez
recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering into an agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33,
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of MTCs in the country. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis
Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to
the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The
requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied
to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component
city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted
and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to
a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for
the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of
Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people
of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the
petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it
involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado
was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City
of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the
COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as
unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-
mentality of the Government.

GANZON VS CA
FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against
petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse
of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department
of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued 3 successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action
for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary
injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this
petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend
and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and
remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary
of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The
Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President
cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases
in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power,
yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with
a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes,
his suspension permanent.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and
informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its
resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the
extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we
assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can
we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial
to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section
31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find
equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, GR No. 152774, 2004-05-27

Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled
"ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The program was
established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local government... units (LGUs) in the discharge
of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local
Government Code."[1] The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48)... constituted
under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate
and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation.[2] Further, to address the
funding... shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program,
the "Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created.[3] For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an
amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial fund was
to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. [5] For 1999 and the succeeding...
years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The
Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable
allocation and distribution of... said fund to the LGUs.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003,
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029... and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The
petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the
amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions
for the... release thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be automatically
released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the
LGUs shall be "automatically and... directly" released to them "without need of further action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five- billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as
the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms and
guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall be
automatically released to them." The petitioner maintains that the use of the word "shall" must be given a compulsory
meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to
determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the
principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is the improper amendment to Section
285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs
Issues:
whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
(1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves
factual questions that... are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had been rendered moot
and academic.
Ruling:
The petitioner has locus standi... to maintain the present suit
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but... also that he
has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or... privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of
.
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local
government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
The petition involves a significant... legal issue
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental importance" of the case, as it necessarily involves the application
of the constitutional principle on... local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore,
warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved... notwithstanding the supervening events
S... upervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is
a grave violation of the
Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
For the GAAs in the coming... years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet,
the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical
ruling on the substantive issue now.
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly... adopted as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
C... onsistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President's power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision.
Drilon v. Lim:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor... or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed... rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000... and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the... constitutional
precept on local autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a "just share" in the
national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released
to the LGUs.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue.
As a rule, the term
"SHALL" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee's prior approval. Further,
with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for
2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the
Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had
to comply with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for funding... based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs
to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the
DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval.
It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the
projects.
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the... implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not... automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them." The
LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a
letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result
of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring
Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order
annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco
Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is
part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this
case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system
of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a
delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing
statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:

In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and agencies, including
SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the
year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered
the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43,
reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction
program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid
exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and
planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with
the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines
is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged
public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation
of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation
of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues
of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore,
Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares
of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government
Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every
quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)