Section 11.
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
People v. Camat
256 SCRA 52 | Apr. 2, 1996
REGALADO, J.
Failure of the police officers to inform the accused’s rights, and any admission extracted from such
failure would be inadmissible in court. In cases of conspiracy, the co-conspirator would not be convicted
since with respect to him, such testimony is considered hearsay.
FACTS
Accused-appellants Armando Rodriguez Camat, alias Amboy Camat, and Wilfredo Tanyag del Rosario, alias
Willie, were charged in Criminal Case No. 19841 of the Regional Trial Court of the then Municipality of
Makati, Branch 147, with the so-called special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide
committed in Paranaque, Metro Manila.
The investigation of the case centered upon Camat only after the latter was pointed to by a vendor who
allegedly saw what happened during the night of September 1, 1985; As fate would have it, Camat was arrested
by Paranaque policemen on October 11, 1985 for acts of lasciviousness, upon the complaint of his sister-in-law.
Since Camat fitted the description given earlier by the eyewitness to the investigating policemen, Patrolman
Cario fetched the vendor to verify the identity of Camat. At the police station, said witness recognized and
identified Camat as the one who killed Sinoy. On the witness stand, Patrolman Cario refused to give the identity
of the anonymous vendor-witness who was allegedly afraid of the accused, but the policeman promised that he
would present said witness if ordered to do so by the court.13
In support of their lone assignment of error, appellants insist that the trial court cannot rely on the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Camat as a basis for their conviction because such confession was obtained during
custodial investigation in violation of their constitutional rights.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Whether the confession of Camat during the custodial investigation may be admitted in evidence. No.
Morales et. al. v. Enrile, Jr.: At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless
it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
A reading of the challenged decision shows that the court below relied upon appellants confessions to disaffirm
their credibility and to impugn their denial of complicity in the commission of the felony. This the lower court
cannot do because, absent any showing that appellants were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the
Bill of Rights, their confessions made before Patrolman Cario are inadmissible against them and cannot be used
in support of their conviction.
As we have heretofore held, it is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior to
regularity of official acts does not apply during in-custody investigation.18 Trial courts should further keep in
mind that even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.19
As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed on the
imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the exceptions
thereto,20 especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. As against the latter, the
confession is hearsay
Note: Camat et. al. were still convicted because the testimony of the prosecution’s witness were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS that
appellants are declared guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and the civil indemnity for the
death of Nelson Sinoy is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with the present jurisprudential
policy.
Miranda v. Arizona
384 US 436 | June 13, 1966
WARREN, J.
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
FACTS
In each of these cases, the defendant, while in police custody, was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was
given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases, the
questioning elicited oral admissions, and, in three of them, signed statements as well, which were admitted at
their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Whether the accused can be convicted without proper knowledge and adequate safeguards with regard to
their constitutional rights. No.
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently
intimidating, and works to undermine the privilege against self- incrimination. Unless adequate preventive
measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the
essential mainstay of our adversary system, and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period of custodial interrogation as well as
in the courts or during the course of other official investigations.
(c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, stressed the need for protective devices to make the
process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege.
(d) In the absence of other effective measures, the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment
privilege must be observed: the person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has
the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and
that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present.
(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to counsel.
JH Compilation 1
(g) Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody interrogation, he has not waived his
privilege, and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter.
(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites
to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant.
The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights
should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the
procedures of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions.
In each of these cases, the statements were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional
standards for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Affirmed.
Tanenggee v. People
699 SCRA 639 | June 26, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.
The right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
FACTS
Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the December 12, 2006 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos
L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal
Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and the
dates and amounts thereof.
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea. The
cases were then consolidated and jointly tried
RTC rendered a consolidated Decsion finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged. CA affirmed with
modification RTC’s decision.
ISSUES AND HOLDING 
 ISSUES AND HOLDING
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based
on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was taken. No
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation
of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation
means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights
above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2)
petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning.
Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. The right to counsel "applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation."
(Remolona v. CSC). The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect
during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation. Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment.
No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration
to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility. Petitioner’s written
statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed,
under duress and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable
basis and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim
of duress and intimidation. “A confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and
the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.” (People v. Rapeza). Petitioner failed to overcome this
presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously.
The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the
crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness.
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative,
against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign
negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not
present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall
be considered as having been voluntarily executed. PETITION IS DENIED; RTC DECISION IS
AFFIRMED.
People v. Sunga
G.R. No. 126026 | March 27, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
“The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and
not a simple perfunctory representation.”
FACTS
Appeal from decision of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City. Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-
school girl at a coffee plantation, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with
Homicide against several suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac
as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice. Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition
for bail underscoring the weakness of the prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them.
In the same proceeding, a motion was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the
resolution of the bail petition. Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga
and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
death, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.
1. Whether Sunga was denied his Constitutional right to counsel? Yes
Sunga’s two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they referred 
 to
statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which he was charged, could have lent corroborative support to Locil’s testimony,
having likewise given details of how the crime took
 place. However, his admissions are inadmissible in
evidence not only against him but also against his co-accused appellants.
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit A - admission before the police on the
ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto
Princesa. The independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse
to the accused (People v. Bandula).
Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sungas rights and 
 interests,
especially that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even
made to testify so he could have related the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station.
Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving his (Sungas)
admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from
Sunga. Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was
investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present
evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands of SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman
Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions
about Jocelyns death. At that point, Sunga was already under custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. Sunga’s second extrajudicial
JH Compilation 2
admission-Exhibit I is inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it on August
3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission
before the NBI and his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement- Exhibit I is inadmissible.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding
of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation. 
 APPELLANTS ARE ACQUITTED. 
 CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be restituted
People v. Ibanez
G.R. No. 191752 | June 10, 2013
BRION, J.
An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
FACTS
The Court decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian Cruz
Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474.
The CA decision affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 196, Parañaque City, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
There was a robbery happened in Weapons Systems Corporation (WSC) and one if its employee, Rex Dorimon,
was found killed during the robbery. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from
an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its
employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. Cachuela and Ibanez were
arrested in an entrapment operation.
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy, employee of WSC, pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the
persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas, agent of Cachuela and Ibanez,
also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
The Trial Court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. W/N the extra-judicial confession is admissible as evidence? NO
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the
persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took
place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there
were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same
height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the
line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy
regarding the appearance of the appellants.
Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable
Zaldy’s out­ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally
justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.
Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of
Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency
investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the
agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty.
Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client
made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was
also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made
voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and
its impact on his constitutional rights.
"An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas
was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this
regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early
stages of the trial that she would be presented.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2009 in
by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. be increased from P1,093,947.50 to P1,481,000.00.
People v. Chavez 735 SCRA 728
Facts:
 Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood City. When
he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black,
long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque
(Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peñamante’s house. There was a light
at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante stated that he was able to see
the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.
 Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor
so he simply walked away. However, he dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped
on it. He walked away after, and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding. Peñamante
then entered his house and went to bed.
 Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO)
team arrived. The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead body
inside. At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at
9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house at 2:45 a.m.
 An autopsy
on the body and found that the time of death was approximately 12 hours prior to examination. There were 22
injuries on Barbie’s body — 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed
instrument, and one incised wound was caused by a sharp object. Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered
fatal. The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. Peñamante
described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbie’s parlor.
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the
police station. Chavez was then 22 years old. His mother told the police that she wanted to help her son who
might be involved in Barbie’s death. SPO3 Casimiro informed them of the consequences in executing a written
statement without the assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed by
Administrative Officer Alex Francisco. She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie and a
baseball cap owned by Chavez.
Issue:
 W/N the Miranda Rights Doctrine applies to those who voluntarily surrendered. [YES]
Held:
 The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights,
which require that:
 (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent;
 (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law;
 (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being
questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and
 (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so
desires.
The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any
waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel.” The invocation of these
rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.”
Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice of issuing an
‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.”
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being
questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been
compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
JH Compilation 3

[Gamboa v Cruz]
[GR L-56291] | [June 27, 1988]
[PADILLA, J.]
[Section 12: When Custodial Investigations May Not Apply:Police Line-up: General Rule]
FACTS
 [PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION]
 - Petitioner Christopher Gamboa was
arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was
brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with
several others.
-During the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to
petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to
their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police
investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. An information for robbery was filed against the
petitioner. Petitioner was arraigned, hearings were held
-Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion
to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground
that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process.
-Respondent court denied Motion to Acquit. Thus, the instant petition.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
W respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, in issuing the assailed
order, insisting that in denying his Motion To Acquit, it is null and void for being violative of his rights to
counsel and to due process. NO.
-To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof,
or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of
law. This is not the situation in the case at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well
as the prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.
-The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
-Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited provisions
of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has
consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel.
-As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part
of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel
- 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the guarantee of the right to counsel under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to counsel
"attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the
accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of
investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused
have begun.
-Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police
investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that, while
the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there
is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
[PETITON IS DISMISSED]
People v. Linsangan
195 SCRA 784 | April 16, 1991
GRINO-AQUINO, J:
Although accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills, his right against self-
incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; The
subject of prosecution was his act of selling marijuana.
FACTS
 APPEAL ON RTC DECISION
Police operatives of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District were informed that there was
rampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila. The pusher was described to them as a
boy of about 20 years, 5'5" in height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold marijuana to anybody. In light of
these reports, a "buy-bust" operation was organized to effect the arrest of the notorious drug pusher.
Before the group left the office for the area of operation, two P10 bills were given to Pat. Corpuz who had
marked them with his initials "T.C." He gave one of the marked bills to the informer.
They proceeded to the area. The confidential informant approached the appellant and told him that he would
buy P10 worth of marijuana while his "compadre" (referring to Patrolman Tomasito Corpuz), would also get
P10 worth. The accused took the P20 from Pat. Corpuz and tucked it in his front waist. The accused handed
over to Pat. Corpuz ten cigarette sticks of handrolled marijuana. Pat. Corpuz took them with his right hand and
at the same time he grabbed the accused with his other hand, saying: "Pulis ito, h'wag kang pumalag!" Pat. Ruiz
saw the signal and rushed over to them. The accused tried to resist but was overpowered. Pat. Ruiz frisked
Linsangan and retrieved the marked ten-peso bills tucked in his waist. He asked the appellant to sign his name
on the two P10 bills. Pat. Ruiz prepared a letter-request to the NBI for the laboratory examination of the ten
suspected marijuana sticks. The appellant also put his initials "C.L." on each stick.
Before Pat. Ruiz investigated the appellant, he prepared the booking sheet and arrest report, the affidavit of
arrest, crime report, and referral letter to the Fiscal's Office. Just when the appellant was being apprised of his
constitutional rights, his uncle, a neighbor, and the barangay chairman arrived. According to Pat. Ruiz,
Linsangan's uncle offered P500 to Pat. Corpuz in the presence of Pat. Lahom, to let the accused go. He was
requested by the barangay chairman, who is allegedly a compadre of Major Yangquiling, commander of the
arresting officers, not to proceed with the case.
The ten hand-rolled cigarette sticks were tested positive for marijuana. As soon as the NBI report was received,
he booked the appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law and filed the case with the fiscal's office. The
RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of violation of Republic Act 6425 The Dangerous Drugs Law,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
Whether the appellant’s constitutional rights to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself were
violated. No
The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial investigation. Although he was not assisted by
counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-
incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of
the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes.
His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court
believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling
marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party.
WHEREFORE, THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
People v. Ang Chun Kit
251 SCRA 660 | December 29, 1995
BELLOSILLO, J:
When an arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report at a police station he does not admit the
commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance.
FACTS
 APPEAL ON RTC DECISION
The accused is Ang Chun Kit, a Chinese national reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate
operating in Metro Manila.
In November 1991, a Confidential Informer (CI) reported to Chief Investigator Razon that he arranged a
JH Compilation 4
transaction with a drug dealer interested in selling 1 kilo of shabu for P 400,000. They were to meet at Cardinal petition for review of the appellate court’s decision.
Santos Medical Center. Razon immediately organized a buy-bust team. ISSUES AND HOLDING
The team went to Cardinal Santos Medical Center. The CI and SPO2 Jacobo proceeded to the lobby of the 1. Whether petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the documents, either by failing to object to their
hospital while the others moved around to avoid detection. The accused arrived in a Toyota Corolla. The CI met introduction during the trial or by using them in evidence. NO
him in the lobby and introduced SPO2 Jacobo as a potential buyer of shabu. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. In the case of documentary
After Ang Chun Kit looked at the money, the CI and SPO2 followed him to the parking lot, where he took from evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
his car a blue SM plastic bag and handed it to SPO2. The money was handed then he casually lit a cigarette to purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
signal the NARCOM officers to arrest him. documentary evidence may be made.
The team arrested Ang Chun Kit and seized money from him. They also searched his vehicle and found three In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when they were formally offered.
more packets of a crystalline substance in a Kleenex box. Laboratory tests confirmed the substance in the SM Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of the said
bag and Kleenex box as shabu. documents by their failure to object when these were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial.
The RTC found Ang Chun Kit guilty beyond reasonable doubt. That was not the proper time to make the objection. Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the
ISSUES AND HOLDING time it is formally offered, not earlier. Thus, it has been held that the identification of the document before it is
Whether the right of the accused under custodial investigation was violated. Yes.
 The accused signed a receipt marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it.
Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when
or lists of items confiscated from him. It is inadmissible as there is
it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
no showing that he was then assisted by counsel.
offered as an exhibit.
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico that “when an arrested
Objections to the admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court may rule on them then,
person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not admit the commission of an
but, if this is not done, the party should make the objections when the documentary evidence is formally offered
offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the
at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other party.
accused’s being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be
Indeed, before it was offered in evidence, the confession in this case cannot even be considered as evidence to
useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and
which the accused should object.
cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction.”
Petition granted. Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
However, his guilt has been adequately established by detailed and unshaken testimonies of the officers who
apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the questioned documents we still find the accused guilty beyond
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ANG
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
CHUN KIT ALSO KNOWN AS “ROMY ANG” GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
VIOLATING DANGEROUS DRUGS LAW.
Yap v. CA
GR 141529 | June 6, 2001
Macasiray v. People
J. GONZAGA-REYES
291 SCRA 154| June 27, 1988
Doctrine: The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
J. MENDOZA
required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required
Doctrine: Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered, and in the case of
but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
FACTS
specifying the purpose which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,5
objection to the documentary evidence may be made.
Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail
FACTS
pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on
Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales are the accused in Criminal Case
condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
No. 33(86) of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, presided over by Judge Pedro C. Ladignon. The case is
resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
for the murder of Johnny Villanueva, husband of private respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva, on February 9,
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.”
1986.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an
right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is
extrajudicial confession executed by petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on March 27, 1986, in which he admitted
equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation,
participation in the crime and implicated petitioners Melecio Macasiray and Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused.
and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis
Also presented in evidence, as Exhibit D, was the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
for determining the amount of bail. He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to
investigation of the case on April 8, 1986 before the fiscals office. This transcript contained statements
the Supreme Court. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him
allegedly given by Benedicto in answer to questions of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his
his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty,
extrajudicial confession.
claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
When the extrajudicial confession was offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the
ISSUES AND HOLDING
prosecution, petitioners objected to its admissibility on the ground that it was given without the assistance of
1. Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged.
counsel. The transcript of the preliminary investigation proceeding was similarly objected to on the same
NO
ground. In its order dated April 14, 1988, the trial court sustained the objections and declared the two
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale, as
documents to be inadmissible.
declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could
Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial courts orders and succeeded. The Court of Appeals
render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abao, this Court made the pronouncement that it will
declared the two documents admissible in evidence and ordered the trial court to admit them. Hence, this
not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused
JH Compilation 5
entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
The Supreme Court find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the
risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner
inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail
while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is
to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged
of; this the Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
Petition Partially Granted.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, vs. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. and Juan Antonion Munoz
 G.R. No. 153675 | April 19,
2007
 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Extradition Proceedings, Right to Bail
FACTS
This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowing
Juan Antonio Munoz to post bail and denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed
by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice (DOJ).
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of "accepting an advantage as agent and
seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued. On September 23,
1999, NBI agents arrested and detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999,
the Court of Appeals declared the Order of Arrest void. On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed, and this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the
validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent.
As early as November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for
the extradition. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. On October 8,
2001, the petition for bail was denied, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private
respondent to post bail. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but
it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Whether or not Munoz is entitled to bail.
 YES. Because of the growing importance of the individual person
in public international law; (2) the higher value now given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of
this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other, it can be observed that te modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of
the detention and order their release if justified.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light
of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to
life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Second, Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it
that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state
to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a
criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extradite. nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object
is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it (a) entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." Hence, an extradition proceeding, while administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings.
Private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001.
He had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. This extended period
of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. While our extradition law does not
provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail.
The applicable standard of due processbshould not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. Bearing in mind the
purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. The prospective extraditee thus bears the burden
of proof of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. "Clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
This standard is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the
trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 213847 | August 18, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.
Right to Bail FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions issued by
JH Compilation 6
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) where he has been charged with plunder.
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition praying that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion and ordered his arrest. Said court also denied his subsequent motion to post
bail, hence, this petition.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Is Enrile entitled to bail
 YES. His social and political standing and his surrender to the authorities indicate
that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition during his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. Also, when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail. Additionally, the currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused regardless of the crime charged should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Denying him
bail resulting to endangering his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in
Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL
RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB- 14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
Ricardo de la Camara vs. Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II)
 G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 | September 17, 1971
 FERNANDO,
J.
Excessive Bail
FACTS
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the
sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate
prohibiting excessive bail.
Petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested for his alleged participation in the
killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur. A case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-
accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, was filed. On January 14, 1969, an application of bail was
filed. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on
July 10, 1969. Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail
but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00. There was a motion for
reconsideration to reduce the amount but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. Is the amount for bail excessive?
 YES. The fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude the
obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.
P1,195,200.00 as bail is excessive. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the
other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement, as to costs.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
People v. Luling
G.R. No. 11164; August 12, 1916
 Article 3 Section 14: Presemption of Innocence
Facts:
Prosecutor filed a complaint in CFI Manila alleging: that on or about May 10, 1915, in Manila, said accused,
being a wharf watchman employed in such capacity in the customs service of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, did, willfully, directly, unlawfully, and criminally, solicit of and receive from one Rufino Elorz or
Rufino Elord the sum of P100, in order that he might secure through customs brokers, the importation and
delivery to the said Rufino Elorz or Elord, of certain rolls of paper in which a large quantity of opium was
hidden; an act committed with violation of law.
Upon said complaint defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty and sentenced by the Honorable
James A. Ostrand to pay a fine of P1,000, and in default of such payment of suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, no to exceed 6 months, and to pay the costs.
The appellant alleges that Sec 316 of Act No. 355, in so far as it requires the accused to prove his innocence, is
unconstitutional, and further that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause does not show that he is
guilty of the crime charged.
Appellant cites several paragraphs of Sec 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. He alleges that said Sec 316
is unconstitutional in that the state is without right or authority to enact a law by virtue of the term of which
certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt. The assailed provision of law provides that:
“Any officer or employee in the customs service of the Government of the Philippine Islands who shall,
excepting for lawful duties or fees, solicit, demand, exact, or receive from any person, directly or indirectly, any
money, or thing of value, in connection with or pertaining to the importation, exportation, appraisement, entry,
examination or inspection of goods, wares, or merchandise, including herein any baggage, or liquidation of the
entry thereof, on conviction thereof shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned at hard
labor not more than ten years, or both, in the discretion of the court. And evidence of such soliciting,
demanding, exacting, or receiving, satisfactory to the court in which such trial is had, shall be regarded as
prima facie evidence that such soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving was contrary to law, and shall put
upon the accused the burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with unlawful intention. The
reception of a gift by any officer or employee in the Philippine customs service from any importer or exporter,
either directly or indirectly, shall prima facie be deemed to be a violation of the provisions of this section.”
Issue:
Whether or not Section 316 of Act No. 355 is unconstitutional in that the state is without right or authority to
enact a law by virtue of the term of which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt
Decision:
 NO.
 The Court is of the opinion that said section 316 does not violate any of the provisions of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
It has been established in criminal law than every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact
and circumstance constituting the crime charged, to show the guilt of the accused.
While that is the rule, many of the States have established a different rule and have provided that certain facts
only shall constitute prima facie evidence, and that shifts the burden to the defendant to show or to explain that
such facts or acts are not criminal.
It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated by
a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that
such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
In the Philippines, no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what
acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a
JH Compilation 7
crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant
the burden of showing that such acts or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or
intention.
DUMLAO V. COMELEC
95 SCRA 392 | January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Doctrine: The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective "except in a clear case.
FACTS
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in
their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52,and 53 for being
unconstitutional.
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec. 4 x x x x x
 Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
 provided, that a
judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
W/N Sec.4 of BP 52 is constitutionally infirm (YES)
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts.
With respect to the second part of the provision, which reads as follows:
 "x x x the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact."
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective
"except in a clear case." We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office ON THE GROUND ALONE that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard.
IN ULTIMATE EFFECT, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted
of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,
yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will
prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided.
Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a
judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
which can stand by itself.
People v. Holgado
86 PHIL. 752
Ponente: MORAN, CJ.
 Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: FRISCO
HIDALGO
Respondent Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention.
Being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty."
On 8 May 1948, the case was set for trial. The trial court proceeded as follows:
Court: Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? Respondent: I have no lawyer and I will plead
guilty.
Q. What do you plead?
 R. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? R. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
"The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man."
Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with this case and I found
no evidence against this Ocampo.
 Court: Sentence reserved.
2 days after, the trial court charged respondent with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent was accorded due process in his conviction. (NO)
Held:
The SC pointed out several infirmities that made respondent’s conviction illegal. The infirmities are as follows:
1. The facts alleged in the information are not clear as to the offense charged.
In the judgment issued by the court, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in
the body of the judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention." In the information led by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the
crime of slight illegal detention." The facts
alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense charged is merely "slight illegal detention" as
the offense is named therein or the capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the
trial judge in his judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the
information.
2. The respondent was not assisted by a counsel.
 The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the
beginning. It is expressly provided in our
Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney."
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not
inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court
failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure
one or to assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an
attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his
right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have
been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this
is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
JH Compilation 8
SC further stated that one of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Under our rules of procedure, it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
3. The prosecution failed to fully investigate the qualification stated by the respondent in his plea.
Without the assistance of any counsel, the Respondent pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I
was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification.
The record does not show whether the supposed instruction was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea of guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on
this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently, the court became
satisfied with the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case.
Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient
to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be
assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense
found to be capital by the court. The case was remanded to the lower court for a new arraignment.
People v. Regala
G.R. No. L-23693; April 27, 1982 Article 3 Sec. 14: Right to Be Informed
Facts:
Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Masbate with the CFI of Masbate.
Prosecution was able to establish from the testimonies of witnesses they presented that in the evening of June
12, 1964 the night or a coronation dance, Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. a sergeant of the Philippine Constabulary, who
was in uniform, attended to the exit door at the Magallanes Gate. While Desilos was guarding the gate, and
trying to clear the exit gate of people, Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores, who had his arm on the shoulder of
Regala, arrived. When Regala and Flore reached the exit gate where Desilos was stationed, Desilos pushed
Flores and told him “not to get thru this entrance because this is for the exit”, because of the pushing Regala
became angry, got his knife from his waist and stabbed Desilos in the abdomen. Desilos fell down and then
Regala and Flores ran away. Juanito Evangelista, an eyewitness, further narrated that he ran after them but was
not able to catch up because they ran fast. He saw Regala throw away the knife on the road.
The trial judge gave more weight and credence to the People than that of the accused. The killing of Sgt. Juan
Desilos, according to the trial court, was qualified as murder by the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and hence, Regala was convicted of the complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority.
Issue:
Whether or not Regala can be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority
Decision:
NO.
Regala cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority because the information filed against appellant did not allege the essential elements of assault
that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person
in authority.
Further, the information cannot be cured or validated, when there are no allegations of facts from which it can
be implied that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a
person in authority.
Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution without any
objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the information so as to
validly convict the accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not properly
alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
As already stated, the crime of assault was definitely demonstrated by the evidence of the People because it
showed that the victim (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.), while maintaining peace and order at the exit gate of the Plaza
Magallanes where the crime took place, was in complete PC uniform at the time the accused attacked him by
reason of the latter's act of pushing the accused and his co- accused so as to prevent them from entering the
plaza through its exit gate.
In the aforesaid Rodil case, it was stated that "[L]ike a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be
expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as aggravating
circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace
officer, could be considered only as aggravated by being 'in contempt or with insult to the public authorities'
(par. 2, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code) or as an insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank . . ." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
People v. Begino
 582 SCRA 189
 
 Facts:
 Sometime in the early afternoon of August 2, 1994 in Sitio
WWW, Barangay XXX, YYY, ZZZ, Philippines, the accused, being then the stepfather of private complainant
AAA, with lewd design, and by using force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said AAA, an 8 year old girl, against her consent, to her damage.
 
 At
the time she testified, AAA was 14 years old. She testified that she was born on 28 February 1986. AAA stated
that in the afternoon of 2 August 1994, she and appellant were alone in their house. Appellant was sharpening
his bolo while her mother, BBB, was out getting “talapang.” She was not aware that appellant had closed the
door and windows of the house. Appellant approached AAA and removed her shirt, panties and bra. Appellant
removed his shorts and briefs and laid AAA down on the bamboo bench. With the bolo placed on his right side,
appellant placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to fight back and
resisted but appellant was too strong. Appellant kissed her and touched her breasts. AAA felt pain and blood
oozed out of her vagina. After satisfying himself, appellant warned AAA that he would kill her and her mother
BBB if she would tell anybody about the incident. Sometime in November 1998, AAA mustered enough
courage to narrate her ordeal to her mother. AAA claimed appellant raped her four times—when she was still
eight years old, then when she was in Grade III, in Grade IV and in Grade V. BBB brought her daughter to the
DSWD where AAA was interviewed and assisted in executing her sworn statement before the Philippine
National Police of YYY. AAA was later brought to Dr. Barazona for medical examination. Dr. Barasona
explained that the lacerations on AAA’s hymen were caused by penetrations of an erected and turgid sex
organ.
 AAA testified that she stopped studying since 1998. She felt ashamed of what happened to her that she
even transferred to Daet because she was scorned by people.10
 The Ruling of the Trial Court
 
 After trial,
the RTC-Branch 64 rendered judgment on 13 December 2005 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the
“crime of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the victim is below eighteen (18) years old” and that the
offender is the common law husband of BBB.
 
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction but reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346)
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty.
Issue:
 W/N Begino’s right to be informed was violated [YES]
Held:
 While the death penalty is no longer imposable in view of RA 9346, the technical flaw committed by
the lower courts is a matter that cannot be ignored.
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step- parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
However, the Information stated that appellant is the “stepfather” of AAA. A “stepfather” is the husband of
one’s mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. It
presupposes a legitimate relationship between the appellant and the victim’s mother. The evidence adduced by
the prosecution showed that appellant is not the stepfather of AAA but the common law spouse of BBB, mother
of AAA. In fact, the trial court itself, in its decision, found that appellant and BBB were not married and
therefore he is not the stepfather of AAA. During the trial, AAA, when asked why she kept calling appellant
JH Compilation 9
“Tiyo,” testified that appellant is the third husband of her mother and that the name of her real father is CCC,
who at that time was in Manila. She explained that her mother lived separately from CCC since she was eight
months old and on 2 August 1994, her mother was living with appellant. Her birth certificate and the Social
Case Study Report likewise showed that her father is CCC, not appellant. CCC was married to BBB and
appellant was never married to BBB. There was no proof of marriage between BBB and appellant.
Since appellant is not the stepfather of AAA, the prosecution’s failure to prove the qualifying
circumstance bars conviction for rape in its qualified form. What the prosecution clearly proved was that
appellant was the common law spouse of BBB, but such circumstance was not alleged in the Information. And
as we have ruled in People v. Garcia, qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If
the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the
offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.
Consequently, since the qualifying circumstance of “common law spouse” was not alleged in the Information
for rape against appellant, he could not be convicted of rape in the qualified form as he was not properly
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is a fundamental rule
that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The qualifying circumstance of relationship not having been properly pleaded, appellant should be convicted
only of statutory rape under paragraph (d) of Article 266-A, for having carnal knowledge of a woman “under
twelve (12) years of age.” Statutory rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
People v. Ching – GR 177150
Facts:
AAA is the third child in a brood of eight children born to appellant and BBB. She was 12 years of age in the
year 1996 when the alleged incidents of rape took place. Sometime in the year 1996, at around 5:00 in the
afternoon, she and her younger siblings, namely, CCC, DDD, EEE and FFF, were left at their house with
appellant, while BBB was at the market buying food. Appellant told CCC, DDD and EEE to play outside the
house. AAA was then cooking rice when appellant instructed her to go inside the bedroom and raped her. After
satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and left the bedroom. AAA proceeded to the house of BBB’s kumare,
Aling Leony, to forget and recover from the incident. She did not inform BBB of the incident because of her
fear that appellant would make good his threats to kill her. For the second time, one evening of May 1998,
AAA and her younger siblings were sleeping on the cemented floor inside the bedroom when appellant entered
and lay down beside her and raped her. For the third time, in the evening of May 1998, while AAA and her
younger siblings were sleeping inside the bedroom, appellant lay down beside her and raped her. From June
1998 to February 1999, appellant was arrested and detained for drug pushing. In the meantime, AAA was
employed as a house helper. After his release from jail, appellant would go to see AAA at her employer’s house
demanding money and creating a scene when AAA refused to give him any. Appellant testified singly and
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape without sufficient evidence
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
INFORMATIONS CHARGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE
WITH PARTICULARITY THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPES
. extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on
Decision: NO.
With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. In rape cases,
failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material
ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and
intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such,
the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information
states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. In
sustaining the view that the exact date of commission of the rape is immaterial
Conde v. Rivera- GR No. L-21741
Facts:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than
five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to
come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when
the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when
originally charged.
Issue:
Whether or not accused’s right to a speedy trial was violated
Decision:
YES. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations
and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to
the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate
information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a
trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
The Court laid down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. The
writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute
the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges
now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed.
Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz – G.R. Nos. L-34756-59
Facts:
 The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding arose from the gnawing fear that
the prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" implicit in the due process guarantee may be set at
naught. Petitioners are among those being tried by respondent Judge for the offense of robbery in band with
homicide. Thereafter, an extrajudicial statement by one Rolando Reyes, who was later on likewise indieted for
the same offense, implicating petitioners, was subscribed before respondent Judge. That was the background of
a motion for his disqualification, as the aforesaid Rolando Reyes, when called upon to testify as an additional
witness for the prosecution impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed as a result of a threat
by a government agent. It is now contended that such a repudiation would not sit well with respondent Judge,
who had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to pass on such question with that degree of
objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such a move did not fall squarely within one of the
specific grounds to inhibit judges. Respondent Judge turned down this plea for disqualification. Hence this
petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be convicted of an offense without due
process of law. This Court, after a careful consideration of the matter and in the light of past decisions to be
hereaf ter noted, looks upon such failure of respondent Judge to disqualify himself as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by prohibition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an
repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against
petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires.
Decision: Y es.
It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the
part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who
does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has
been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
JH Compilation 10
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothihg less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth of commitment and concern to the
cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull
of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."
It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity
on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be
the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand
on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothihg less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge." He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth of
commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds
in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his
fellow mortals." A judge then, to quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v. Gonzales, penned by Justice
Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering
a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due process aspect of
an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in
Government v. Abella, a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that the litigant had not had a
fair trial, a new trial could be granted." There was a reiteration of such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v.
Torres, with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words: "Although a judge may not have been disqualified
[according to the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not
given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it
deems it necessary, in the interest of justice."
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.
He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A
salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a
judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care
and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved.
He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not
to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be
sinuously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."
Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we have the power to set aside the order denying the
motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its
exercise is subject to our corrective authority. Certainly, there can be no question as to its being
considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's
impartiality. The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party having
subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in
which
an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of his
having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the
Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative.
Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what
apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was
not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was
intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is
not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the
requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he
who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the
crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them
was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and
rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a separate
proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial
statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion
having come into the picture there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that
by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact became rather obvious. For respondent
Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad
in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to
the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more
than justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.
In Re Oliver
 333 US 237
 March 8, 1948
FACTS:
William Oliver testified before a Michigan circuit judge over the inquiry into alleged offenses of corruption and
gambling. Said judge was acting as a “one-man grand jury”, and the proceedings were conducted with two other
judges (who were merely in an advisory capacity), within the circuit judge’s chambers. Another individual, Leo
Thomas Hartley was questioned by the circuit judge - without the knowledge of Oliver. After questioning
Oliver, the circuit judge contended that Oliver’s story, in conjunction with that of Hartley’s did not seem to
match. Oliver was immediately sentenced to 60 days in jail on the ground of contempt.
ISSUE:
W/N Oliver’s rights under the 14th Amendment were violated
HELD:
YES.
Oliver was clearly denied the right to a public trial.
Grand juries possess an investigative character. This in mind, they have no authority to conduct trial and
provide sentence/conviction. The purpose of confidentiality cannot defeat the right to a public trial.
Oliver was also denied due process as he was never given an opportunity to provide his defense.
Midsapak Tampar, et al. v. Esmael Usman, et al.
 G.R. No. 82077 | Right to Confrontation, to Cross-
examine, or to Meet witness face to face
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for "Annulment of Sale in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Simultaneous Sale and Delivery of Certificates of Title and Damages" before the Shari'a District Court in
Cotabato City. Petitioners denied that they entered into the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Simultaneous Sale" sought to be annulled was purportedly executed on June 11, 1947 between petitioners and
Usman, whereby ownership of the land was conveyed to the latter for the sum of Php 1,000. The land was
subsequently sold by Usman to his co-respondents.
The pre-trial conference failed to result in an amicable settlement between the parties. The Court thereafter
directed the parties to submit the statements ("shuhud") of at least two witnesses to prove their claims. The sole
witness of petitioners withdrew. Consequently, they challenged Usman to take an oath ("yamin") declaring that
there is no truth to the claim of forgery brought against him. The challenge was grounded on Section 7 of the
Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts which provides as follows:
The plaintiff (mudda'i) has the burden of proof, and the taking of an oath ("yamin") rests upon the defendant
(mudda'aalai). If the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment
shall be rendered in his favor by the Court. Should the defendant refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall affirm
his claim under oath in which case, judgment shall be rendered in his favor. Should the plaintiff refuse to affirm
his claim under oath, the case shall be dismissed.
Usman then took the oath in the following form:
I, Esmael Usman, swear in the name of Allah Most Gracious, most Merciful and upon the Holy Quran that I
bought the land in question from the plaintiffs; that I have not forged or falsified the signatures of the plaintiffs;
and that God will curse me if I am not telling the truth. Having taken the oath as demanded by petitioners,
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judgment was rendered in favor of respondents, and the complaint against them was dismissed. Petitioners now Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
assail the decision of the Shari'a court as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They contend rebellion when the public safety requires it.
that the cognizance by the court of the "yamin" of Usman is not only "unprocedural," but likewise amounts to a
deprivation of their constitutional right to be heard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Shari'a court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint of
petitioners by virtue of the "yamin" taken by the defendant, namely, respondent Usman
HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, which may apply in a suppletory manner in
this case, each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. When the plaintiffs failed to adduce any
evidence to support the complaint, then the complaint must be dismissed. On this basis, the dismissal of the
complaint by the Shari'a court in this case should be upheld, but not because of the "yamin" taken by Usman.
Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional right to due process. It denies a party his right
to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. It should have no place even in the Special
Rules of Procedure of the Shari'a courts of the country. The possible deletion of this provision from the said
rules should be considered. For this purpose, a committee should be constituted by the Court to review the said
special rules, including the above discussed provision, so that appropriate amendments thereof may be
undertaken by the Court thereafter.

Carredo v. People – G.R. No.

Facts:
On February 3, 1983, petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial Court of
Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a
plea of not guilty and thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance. In this waiver of appearance, he agrees
to be identified by witnesses when he is not present at trial. 

At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness for the purpose
of identifying the accused-petitioner who was not then present. Hence, the hearing was re-scheduled on October
9, 1985 and a subpoena was issued to petitioner who failed to appear on said date. 


The defense counsel justified petitioner's absence in that the latter's presence can no longer be required as he
already filed a written waiver of appearance. Nevertheless, the municipal judge issued an order dated May 27,
1986 ordering the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and at the same time ordering the
bondsman, who is the petitioner himself, to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against the
bondsman.
Issue: (Art. III, §14) W/N an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial can
be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification
(Yes)
Decision: Petition is DISMISSED. In Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, six justices were of the view
that petitioner 
 may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, while five justices were in
agreement that he may so waive such right, except when he is to be identified. In People v. Presiding Judge, the
Court agreed to the proposition of a "total" waiver in 
 any case where the accused agrees explicitly and
unequivocally in writing signed by him or personally manifests clearly and indubitably in open court and such
manifestation is recorded, that whenever a prosecution witness mentions a name by which the accused is
known, the witness is referring to him and to no one else. In other words, the Constitution unqualifiedly permits
trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the
purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court
after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Petitioner’s statement that
“he admits that he could be identified by witnesses who have testified at the time that said accused was not
present” is not the unqualified admission contemplated in Presiding Judge. What is stated in Presiding Judge as
an exception is when the accused "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment the he is the person
named as defendant in the case on trial," no more no less. In the present case petitioner only admits that he can
be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence. He did not admit that he is the very person named as
defendant in the case on trial. His admission is vague and far from unqualified. He cannot therefore seek the
benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge.

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