Soc Leg digest Land reforms

1. Gelos vs CA
Facts:
1. The subject farmland in Laguna belonging to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in
equal shares.
2. they entered into a written contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the
land.
3. after Alzona had acquired full ownership of the land, he informed Gelos of the termination of his
services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land.
4. Alzona filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and
damages against Gelos but was dismissed. On appeal to the Office of the President, however, the
complaint was declared proper for trial and so de-archived and reinstated.
5. Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations under
PB 129) - dismissing the complaint. It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled
to remain thereon as such.
6. CA reversed the decision of RTC - held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question and
ordered him to surrender it to Alzona.

Issue: WON petitioner is a tenant of the farmland.

Ruling: No.
• parties.·It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the
relationship between them.
• As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, “tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties,
the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.”
• It is noted that the agreement provides,
• (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and
• (The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid
for every day of work on the said farm.)
• These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy agreement but only a
contract of employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute.
• tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
• The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the land,
paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave him vales, or
advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon.

Gelos vs. Court of Appeals

208 SCRA 608 (1992)
Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a 25,000-sq. m
farmland. They executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired laborer Gelos would receive a
daily wage of P5.00. Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his services and was
asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint
for illegal detainer. The lower court found Gelos as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon
as such. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. DHACES
Issue:
What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held:
The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The agreement is a lease of
services, not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow the agreement, but his protestations
are less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the
contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement does not
stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and
as an attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even
read it himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and
suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work specified is
not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer working under the
direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention
of the parties that determines the relationship between them. As this Court has stressed in a number of
cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important."
Classes of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and leasehold tenancy (M. A. GERMAN, SHARE
AND LEASEHOLD TENANCY, 13 [1995]).
Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with
aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be
divided between the landholder and the tenant." (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963]. Sec. 166 [25]).
With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has been declared to be contrary to public policy and
abolished (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec. 4) except in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands
principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian and other similar permanent trees at the time
of the approval of said Act (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 35). When RA 6389 (1971) was enacted,
agricultural share tenancy has been automatically converted to leasehold but the exemptions remained. It
was only under RA 6657 when the exemptions were expressly repealed.
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible
of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or
legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both (Rep.
Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).
Under RA 6657, the only agricultural tenancy relation that is recognized is leasehold tenancy. Said law
expressly repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844, making all tenanted agricultural lands throughout the country
subject to leasehold.
Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of law, that is, through the abolition of share
tenancy under Sec. 4 of RA 3844; through the exercise by the tenant of his right to elect leasehold; or by
agreement of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, which was the condition before
1972 (M.A. German,supra, at 27).
 Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with tenant(s) under RA 6657 or PD 27 who opts to
choose to remain therein instead of becoming a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features. The tenant must exercise his option within one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 6). Leasehold
relation also exists in all tenanted agricultural lands that are not yet covered under CARP (DAR Adm. O.
No. 5 [1993]).
The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the protection and improvement of the tenurial and
economic status of tenant-tillers therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988], sec. 6).
Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease
In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the Supreme Court distinguished leasehold tenancy
from civil law lease.
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of
leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law
lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (at 596).
Elements of Agricultural Tenancy
The following are the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relation:
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either orally or in
writing, expressly or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or produce. (Carag vs.
CA, 151 SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 [1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235
[1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991])
The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that "(a)ll these requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws." (Caballes v.
DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the Court found all the elements of an
agricultural leasehold relation contained in the contract of lease executed by the parties.

Teodoro vs. Macaraeg

27 SCRA 7 (1969)
Facts:
Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years when he was
advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be given to another tenant. Thereafter, a new
tenant was installed who forbade Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro
denied that Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland
under civil lease. He further claimed that after the expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in
1961, the latter did not anymore renew his contract.
Held:
The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural
production. More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for
agricultural enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for rice
production as could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare
for one agricultural year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only four and a half
(4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly
or with the help of the members of his immediate farm household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE," it can
reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which
he did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the
landholding belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of
a fixed annual rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally
cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of
outside assistance in the cultivation of the said riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession thereof to
Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold
tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans
per hectare — is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually
enter into a leasehold tenancy relation (at 16-17; underscoring supplied).
Agricultural tenancy relation is different from farm employer-farm employee relation. The Court
clarified the difference in the case ofGelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), as follows:
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to
control the employee's conduct — although the latter is the most important element.
According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm
employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one
of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of
agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives a
salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives
his income from the agricultural produce or harvest." (at 614)
Parties: landholder and tenant
Tenant defined.
A tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate household,
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system." (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 5 (a)).
An overseer of a coconut plantation is not considered a tenant.

Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.

184 SCRA 248 (1990)
Facts:
Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was tasked to have the
land titled in Su's name. He was also "assigning portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising
the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of coconuts and selling of the
copra." As compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of
the copra. Su got another 1/3 of the proceeds while the other third went to the tenants. In 1981, Su
obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano and the latter was authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts.
Meanwhile, he informed Zamoras that he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled. Zamoras
filed a case for illegal termination and breach of contract before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
Ministry of Labor. The Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras' dismissal was without just cause and ordered
Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter
by holding that there is no employee-employer relation existing between the parties but a landlord-tenant
relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court. Zamoras assailed the decision of NLRC.
Held:
The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and Zamoras is not
supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but as overseer of
his coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective portions
which they cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received
their one-third share of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras, aside from
doing administrative work for Su, regularly managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is
no evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his immediate
farm household.
The following circumstances indicate an employer-employee relationship between them: 1. Zamoras was
selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3. Su
controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the
copra produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of
the copra sales every two months as compensation for managing the plantation."
There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation does not exist.

Castillo vs. CA
205 SCRA 529 (1992)
Facts:
Alberto Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against Castillo alleging that he is the agricultural tenant
of the latter. He claims that Castillo allowed him to construct a rest house in the property and that,
thereafter, Castillo started cutting fruit-bearing trees on the land and filled with adobe stones the area
intended for vegetables. On the other hand, Castillo denied that Ignacio was his tenant but that the latter
was only a "magsisiga" of the landholding and that he did not ask permission from Ignacio when he
constructed his rest house. The trial court found no tenancy relationship between the parties but this was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The element of personal cultivation is absent in this case. The alleged tenant "is a businessman by
occupation and this is his principal source of income. He manufactures hollow blocks. He also has a
piggery and poultry farm as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to
that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of
the respondent as a businessman and his other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and
obligations of a real tenant. This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot
even personally perform the work of a smudger because on 22 October 1986, the respondent hired some
20 people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the subject
land." (at 535-536).
An owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation of the law (Baranda
vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194 (1990).
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., 280 SCRA 235 (1997), certifications of tenancy/non-tenancy issued by DAR
are not conclusive.
"The certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as ruled by this Court in Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals,
citing Puertollano vs. IAC. Secondly, it is well-settled that the "findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties is merely preliminary or
provisional and is not binding upon the courts." (at 246)
Landholder-lessor
 A landholder-lessor is defined as "any person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary
or legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said property for purposes of
agricultural production and for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount of money or produce."
(Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 42). Thus, consent need not be necessarily given personally by the
registered owner as long as the person giving the consent is the lawful landholder as defined by law.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals

225 SCRA 119 (1993)
Facts:
Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her brother, Benigno, so
that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children's education in Manila. The property
was leased by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and
Benigno. Natividad played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his
sister but when the owners sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas
was claiming that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for
recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently reversed by the
CA.
Issue:
Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner, sufficient to create tenancy
relationship?
Held:
Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter into an
agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority
and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed." (at 125-
126)
Subject is agricultural land
For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land.
RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." (see discussion on
scope of CARP, Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers to land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land.
The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should cultivate the entire
area leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the award that may be given to the
agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consent by landholder
As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the property.
In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy relation does not exist
where a usurper cultivates the land.

Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

148 SCRA 573 (1987)
Facts:
Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him and Socorro
Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 ha to certain
individuals and what remained under his cultivation was ½-ha owned by Corazon Pengzon. After
Socorro's death, no new contract was executed. Sometime in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a
4,000-sq m portion of the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same. The Hilarios claimed
that they acquired the landholding from the Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On
the other hand, Corazon Pengzon explained that she did not get any share from the produce of the land
since 1964 and she would not have accepted it knowing that she did not own the property anymore.
Held:
Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. "So the mere cultivation of the land
by usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of
security of tenure of the law(Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)."
Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent are bound to
recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land.

Endaya vs. Court of Appeals

215 SCRA 109 (1992)
Facts:
Spouses San Diego owned a 2.0200-ha rice and corn land. The property has been cultivated by Pedro
Fideli as a tenant of the couple under a 50-50 sharing agreement. In 1974, a lease contract was executed
between spouses San Diego and a certain Regino Cassanova for a period of four (4) years at P400.00 per
ha per annum rental and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops. The contract was
subsequently renewed to last until 1980. In both cases, Fideli signed as witness. While the contract was
subsisting, Fideli continuously worked on the property, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce
of the harvests. In 1980, the land was sold to spouses Endaya. Fideli continued tilling the land despite the
Endaya's demand to vacate the property. Fideli refused to leave and deposited with Luzon Development
Bank the landowner's share in the harvests. Fideli filed a complaint praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of the Endayas. The trial court ruled in favor of the Endayas but the same was
subsequently reversed by the CA holding that Fideli is an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure.
Held:
It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true and
lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is
cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or although permission to work on the
farm was given, there was no intention to constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm
land. The rule finds no application in the case at bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a
tenanted land over which an agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the
original owners to constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds
private respondents who, as successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's shoes,
acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations. (at 118;underscoring supplied).
Purpose is agricultural production
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the
primary purpose of agricultural production.