Republic of the Philippines In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted

SUPREME COURT murder allegedly committed as follows:

Manila
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
SECOND DIVISION said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014 advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and
there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon,
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners, produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their
vs. own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack,
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. to his damage and prejudice.

DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW. 11

BRION, J.: On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged
12

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
challenging the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17,
1 2
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial
that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they
were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13

Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas,
Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion
Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion for for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the petitioners'
14

reconsideration. motion for reconsideration. 15

The Antecedent Facts The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.
16

morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso
(Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the The Assailed CA Decision
petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police merit. The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02
17

Station) to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo
4 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest
Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized
to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02 Javier, together with
5 that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
6 7 Investigation.

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts
Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills
8 and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised
Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found
9 Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the grounds for
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso the denial of the motion.
fortunately survived the attack. 10
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 17, 2008; hence, the present petition.
18
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED
WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED
WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant
was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting
officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the
word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms
of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2)
hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers
could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no personal
knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court
for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to
delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and
establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and
the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the
opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the19
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in
20 21 22
their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir
Edward Coke and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta
24
Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near
Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of
25
England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties under the
26
feudal vassals' threat of civil war. The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta
27
Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. It provides:
28
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or
29
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor
will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or
by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either Justice or Right. [Emphasis supplied]
30
In United States v. Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held that this
31
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without
judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. With regard to an arrest, it is
32
considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America
and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish
laws. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
34
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 37 of Act No.
36 37
183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a
warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., the Court held that in the absence of any
38
provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar
functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and
America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos that the rules on warrantless
39
arrest were based on common sense and reason. It further held that warrantless
40
arrest found support under the then Administrative Code which directed municipal
41
policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
42 43
Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken
from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court
and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now
summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in
the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in
its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American
and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present
application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common
law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines.
In Fortaleza, the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the
45
Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense.
It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater
than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than
that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would
warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial
authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant
who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest
him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by
the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be
arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the
following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful
act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila,
which provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory
defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious
places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such
person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos, the Court cited Miles v. Weston, which ruled that a peace officer may
46 47
arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to
suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a
probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as
a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty.
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement.
Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the
arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was
actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that
the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which,
the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for
its breach. 48
In The US. v. Hachaw, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman
49
because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting
person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules
on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting
officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the
person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle left so
much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940
Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as
follows:
50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the
Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not
necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting
officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there
should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the
arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense."
Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed
the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting
officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964
Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes
and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it
added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been
"committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's
time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information
indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended
with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting
officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the
contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and
second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on
probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2)
whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria,
these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting
with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just
been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how
the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal
knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of
52
the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such
arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, the warrantless arrest of a
53
person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation of due
process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States that the
54
Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be
made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was
time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed. The
term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable
grounds." 55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for
evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less
stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from
a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based
on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on
the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities
similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable
and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in
light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in
his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere
suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest
without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest
on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the
arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime;
and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be
59
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of
the crime and should be held for triat. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined
60 61
probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the
guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant,
the respondent and his witnesses. 62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the
evidence in determining probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
63
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
64
actual facts.
65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for
the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a
warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine
"probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is
influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In
short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they
possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which
they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his
determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence
submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time
frame.
Hence, in Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining
66
probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these
instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary
policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste
on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our
jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December
68
8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the
NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the
NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days
after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the
officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to
be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
69
surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this
information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was
then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from
a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards
the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just
70
been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were
not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became
aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana, the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the
71
victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The
unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA, the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the
72
crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the
"arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused
was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police
acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one
stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the
accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr., the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was
73
held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he
personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was
one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours
74
after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held
valid.
In People v. Alvario, the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting
75
officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the
personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the
time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson, there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the
76
scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the
assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers
acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held
valid.
In People v. Acol, a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
77
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons
walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim
pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran
in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA, there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio
78
dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to
verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met
with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers'
invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the
accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed.
Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria, the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
79
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a
relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03
Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain
William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident,
and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and
when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested
Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be
involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and
proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to
run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat
as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's
seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court
held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report
which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of
the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these
discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense
has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of
the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's
Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or
80
conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual
perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the
crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he
could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances
within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have
no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after
an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are
prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the
police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold
that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should
have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is
limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of
probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes
of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of
the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a
valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when
they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts
and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners'
arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the
affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
misapprehended the facts in its decision. From a review of the records, we conclude
81
that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which
they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against
the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present
case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date
82
that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation
at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime
was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the
arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime.
Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the commission of
the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they
arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that
Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother
Joseph Macapanas, although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against
83
Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate that 84
was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling.
The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date
of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal
Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye;
Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit,
right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral
area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier,
diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic
conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to
the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged
crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside;
Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
85 86
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. 87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case
88
saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified
the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what
happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. where Tonog did not
89
flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the
present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the
courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal
assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the
90
police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed -
the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed. 1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime
was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took
place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-
the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the
perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City
Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the
petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by
his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Thus, application of
91
actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. 92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could not but
93
have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account.
SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to
the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar effect. In
other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the
petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have
acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged
perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim,
was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular offense.
Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of
the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying
the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having
been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule
95
16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. 96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record
of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for
the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In
resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely
what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution
dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice