Doctrine: Expanded definition of judicial power

The IBP has no locus standi in the case at bar

IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
 In view of the alarming incidents that occurred in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnapping and
carnappings, the President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrol for
the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
 In this case, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of
PNP, and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to implement and execute
said order.
 Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in
a Memorandum, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
 Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence.
 However, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annul and declare the
deployment of marines null and void and unconstitutional.
 They argued in their complaint that: 1) It is in derogation of Article II, Sec. 3, considering that no
emergency situation in Manila would justify the deployment of soldiers in that area; 2) Said
deployment constitutes insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government
which is in derogation of Article Article XVI, Sec. 5(4). 3.) Said deployment creates a dangerous
tendency that would rely on the military to perform the civilian functions of the government.
 On the other hand, the Solicitor General defends the constitutionality of the deployment of Marines,
contending that, among others, the IBP has NO LEGAL STANDING; that the question of
deployment of Marines is not subject for judicial scrutiny since it involves political question; that
the team-up of PNP and Marines, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Issue: 1) Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing in this case;
2) Whether or not the factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
subject to judicial review;
3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP.

Ruling: The petition has NO MERIT. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner failed to sufficiently
establish that it has the standing to raise the issue in the petition. Second, the President did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor he did not commit a violation of
the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
As a matter of fact, it is enshrined in the Constitution that the power of judicial review is set forth in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Verily, in this case, the Court can only exercise its power for judicial review based on the following
requisites, namely: (1) the existence of an ACTUAL AND APPROPRIATE CASE; (2) A PERSONAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF THE PARTY raising the constitutional question; (3) the EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the LIS
MOTA of the case.
In the case at bar, the SC ruled that the IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in
this case. It primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
In another issue, the SC ruled that the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out
the Marines. The factual determination of the necessity of calling out the armed forces is subject to judicial
review considering that the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable
- the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
In this case, the petitioner also fails to discharge a heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for the calling out of armed forces. Moreover, there is, likewise,
no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military
Under the Constitution, it bestows the President, being the Commander in Chief, a full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces of the Philippines, whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Also, in the same provision, Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the
Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
Lastly, The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the
civilian character of the police force.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP,
and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Doctrine: The Composition of JBC (The Congress may only have ONE representative, not two)
Francisco Chavez vs. JBC
Facts:
 The case stems when the unexpected departure of CJ Corona in 2012 and the nomination of the
former Solicitor General Franciso I. Chavez, as his successor, triggered the filing of the case.
Primarily, under Article VIII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, it conceived a body of representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).
 Congress, from the moment of the creation of JBC, designated ONE REPRESENTATIVE to sit in
the JBC as one of the ex officio members. The House of Representatives and the Senate would
alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had ONLY ONE representative.
 In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representatives one full vote each.
 Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
 The Sol Gen however contended that according to Article VI, Sec.1, the Senate and the House of
Representatives are permanent and mandatory components of Congress. In layman’s term, the
House of Representative without the Senate and vice versa is not Congress. The framers of the
Constitution intended the bicameralism system which requires that both houses are required to
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus,
when Section 8 (1) , Article VII of the Constitution speaks of “representative of Congress” it should
mean ONE REPRESENTATIVE EACH from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
 The petitioner, Francisco Chavez, at that instance, filed the petition in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED. The Supreme Court ruled that under Article VIII, Sec. 8 “A Judicial
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.”
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Doctrine: Article VIII, Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
Macalintal vs. PET
Facts:
 Petitioner Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4, Article VII and Sec. 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Considering the
fact that he primarily questions the existence of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal in matters
concerning the Executive Department. This case is concomitantly raised by the petitioner arguing
that, among others, the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
 However, the Solicitor General raised the following questions directed at the petitioner, namely; 1)
Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition; 2) Whether the creation of the
PET is in violation of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution; 3) Whether the designation of the
members of the court as chairman and members contravenes Sec. 12, Article VIII.

Issue: Whether or not the PET violates Sec. 12, Article VIII of the Constitution
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that
the traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.” Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the settlement
of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable
and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional
trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels — city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial — exclusive
and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate
Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for
the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
decisions are still subject to judicial review — via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party — if
there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
 The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise
of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
Doctrine: Sec. 3, Article VIII: The Judiciary shall enjoy FISCAL AUTONOMY. Appropriations for the
Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Bengzon vs. Drilon
Facts:

 The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They
filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
 Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the
Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of
the Executive Department involved in the implementation of the release of funds appropriated in
the Annual Appropriations Law.
 On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years
service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained
the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the
office.
 On the other hand, RA 910 amended RA which RA 1792, Sec 3-4 which provides that “in case salary
is increased or decreased, such increase or decrease will be deemed the retirement pension”.
 Identical retirement benefits were also given to the Constitutional Commission under RA 1568
amended by RA 3595. Likewise, the same benefits was extended to members of the AFP by virtue
of PD 578.
 Wherefore, PD 578, RA 1797, and 3595 now have automatic readjustment features. However, in
1975, Marcos issued PD 644 repealing RA 1797 and RA 3595 which authorized the adjustment of
the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members
of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to
the prevailing rates of salaries.
 Subsequently, Marcos issued PD 1909 providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of
the members of the Armed Forces. Realizing the unfairness of this, Congress approved a bill for the
reenactment of RA 1797 and RA 3595 under the impression that PD 644 became a law. They passed
a law HB 16297 and Senate 790.
 However, President Cory Aquino vetoed HB 16297 saying that it “would erode the foundation of
government to adhere to the policy of standardization of compensation”. Also, it should not grant
distinct privileges to other servants.
 There was a prior case: Retired justices asked for the readjustment according to RA 1797. It was
ruled that PD 644 repealing RA 1797 did not become a law as there was no valid publication (Tanada
vs. Tuvera). Consequently, it was GRANTED and the Congress included in the General
Appropriations Bill of 1992 the adjusted pension rates. However, President Aquino vetoed the
provisions of Sec 1 and 4 of Gen. Funds Adjustments of GAA bec. it allegedly nullified the veto of
HB 16297.

Issue: Whether or not the veto of the President impairs the fiscal autonomy of the courts.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters
but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even
informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation,
the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections
to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation,
in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to
the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including
the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld.
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to
it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be
given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30
Doctrine: Fiscal autonomy (Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the
privileges they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.)

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the
Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court

Facts: The issue has its roots in 2010 when the office of the General Counsel of COA found an
underpayment when five retired Supreme Court Justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
properties assigned to them during their incumbency.

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the by the Property Division of the Supreme Court
of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to COA, the
Property Division erroneously appraised the motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) when it should have applied the formula found in the COA Memorandum in 1998.

Recommendation of the Office of the Administrative Services, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the
Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that it was
the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution and its
guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997.

More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget
and resources. Full autonomy, among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation
and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court
thus has the recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by
law in the course of the discharge of its functions. To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the
disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court is barred from using the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) formula in the appraisal of the property?

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but
also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence
and Court rulings on these matters. (See Political Law by Cruz and Cruz, 2014)
Doctrine: Proper parties ( The Court allowed the petition of Kilosbayan, considering that it involved an
“issue of utmost and far-reaching constitutional importance, namely, the qualification regarding
citizenship –of a person to be appointed as member of the Supreme Court.)

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita and Gregory Ong

Facts:

 Petitioners are people’s and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes
aimed at protecting the people’s rights to self-governance and justice.
 Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of
releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.
 Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in
this Court.
 In 2007, respondent Executive Secretary announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory
Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy in the said position. However,
it was reported that the appointment was “recalled” or “held in abeyance” by Malacanang in view
of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Ong.
 Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent
Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. In the same token, petitioners
invoked Sec. 7, Art. VIII. Further, petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years
after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization,
that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
 Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court. Subsequently, petitioners filed an urgent motion
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) o prevent and restrain respondent
Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain
respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this
Court.
 On the other hand, the respondent Executive Secretary asserted that the appointment of respondent
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court was made by the President pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 9.
Also, it contended that petitioner has NO LEGAL STANDING IN THIS CASE

Issue; Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing in this case

Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner have standing to file the suit simply as people’s
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance,
namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship – of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has
been accorded and recognized in similar instances

Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit
impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his
Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the
Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Doctrine: Quo Warranto

Topacio vs. Ong

Facts:

 Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks,
in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties
and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
 It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court, by Decision of July 3,
2007, enjoined Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until
he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the
records of his birth and citizenship.
 Ong immediately filed with the RTC a Petition for the amendment/ correction/
supplementation or annotation of an entry in his certificate of Birth.
 Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified letter-complaint implored respondent Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the
latter’s capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking
paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution in conjunction with the Courts
Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita petitioner points out that natural-born
citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that
Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such
in October 1998.
 However, the OSG informed the petitioner that it cannot favorably act on the request for the
filing of quo warranto UNTIL the RTC shall have been terminated with finality. Petitioner
assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from
Ong’s continuous discharge of judicial functions.
 Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare
null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from
accepting his appointment, and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is
not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the
appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial statesmanship. Subsequently, the RTC
granted his petition and recognized him as a natural born citizen.

Issue: Whether or not the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of the petition
for quo warranto.

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the case at bar, the Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the
OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated
with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected
party disagrees with it.

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of
the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt
not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the
national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. It appears that after studying the
case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ong‘s citizenship in the quo
warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping.
In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the
outcome of the RTC case.
Doctrine: ACTUAL CASE (The Court found the assertion that the President has not withheld her consent
or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual
case or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned)

Senate vs. Ermita

Facts:
 In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee
as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO
464 which took effect immediately.
 EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of
chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
 The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only
2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
 However, Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive
officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the
NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
 Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President
Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials. These
officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent
of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy

Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld
her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence
of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a
deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar
officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the
hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before
considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this
Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation 45 is not disputed. E.O. 464,
however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to
law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest
over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47
Doctrine: ACTUAL CASE (When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of the Court)

Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:
 Before the SC is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services;
and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion
of their internal revenue allotments.
 In 1997, the President of the Philippines, Ramos, issued AO 372 reducing the expenditures by
25%
 Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section
4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be
withheld from the LGUs.
 Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power
of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further
argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section
286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for
the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
 The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued
to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted
merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate
local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will
reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary
in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of
the emerging fiscal situation
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing (locus standi) to bring the suit

Ruling: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out
any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been
issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that
certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents
of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes
the Constitution and the law.
Doctrine: When an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, settling the dispute becomes the duty and
responsibility of the courts.
-Any act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators.

The Province of North Cotabato vs. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Facts:

Issue:
Ruling:
DOCTRINE: The Garcillano proceeding has to be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

Facts:
Doctrine: UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS VOID.

THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not
only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.

Planters Products Inc vs. Fertiphil Corporation

Facts:

 Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine
laws. In 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.
 Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank
and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.
 After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return
of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand.
 Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI
solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of
the fertilizer industry.
 Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI
solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of
the fertilizer industry.
 In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a
valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the
country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed
by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
 RTC = Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of
taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for
public purpose
 PPI-MR=DENIED; PPI-NOTICE OF APPEAL=FAILED TO PAY THE DOCKET FEES.
 SEPARATE RELATED PROCEEDING = ALLOWED THE APPEAL OF PPI AND REMANDED
THE CASE TO THE CA.
 CA=AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE RTC
 The CA did not accept PPIs claim that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters
Foundation, Inc., a foundation created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI.
 PPI-MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION=DENIED

Issues: Whether or not Fertphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465; Whether
or not; WON the RTC has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statues, EO, PD

Ruling: The SC ruled that the Fertphil has legal standing in the case at bar. Fertiphil has locus standi to file
it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay,
the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has
passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the
constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the
levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury
to Fertiphil.

Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because it was compelled to factor
in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers
much more expensive. The harm to their business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price,
but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other
fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm
occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.

Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the liberal policy consistently adopted
by this Court on locus standi must apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It
involves not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes for public
purpose. Former President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 with the intention of rehabilitating an ailing private
company. This is clear from the text of the LOI. PPI is expressly named in the LOI as the direct beneficiary of
the levy. Worse, the levy was made dependent and conditional upon PPI becoming financially viable. The LOI
provided that the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.

The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of the statute. It is Our constitutional duty
to squarely resolve the issue as the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies. The doctrine of standing, being a
mere procedural technicality, should be waived, if at all, to adequately thresh out an important constitutional
issue.

Furthermore, the SC held that RTC may resolve constitutional issues. The constitutional issue was adequately
raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case. It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive order. This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, the SC rules that the general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact is
inapplicable.
Doctrine: The Doctrine of Operative Fact

League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC

Facts:

 During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
 During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
"the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
 After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29,which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
 During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
 On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11
 The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
 Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of
internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood laws violate Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Also, also applying the doctrine of operative fact to the present case, the Cityhood laws remain unconstitutional
because they violate Sec. 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of
Cityhood laws prior to the declaration of nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by ‘new cities’ or
their issuance of license or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective.
Doctrine: Where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: