r The Academy of Management Perspectives

2015, Vol. 3015, No. 1, 30–46.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2011.0091.test

A R T I C L E S
TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER FOLLOWING MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: SOLID RESEARCH TO DATE BUT STILL
MUCH TO BE LEARNED
JEFFREY A. KRUG
Loyola University New Orleans

PETER WRIGHT
The University of Memphis

MARK J. KROLL
University of Texas at Brownsville

It is commonly believed that retaining target company executives is an important de-

terminant of post-acquisition success. We review existing research, paying particular
attention to the different micro-, group-, meso-, and macro-level factors that motivate
acquisitions. We conclude that the link between turnover and post-acquisition perfor-
mance is more complex than implied by existing studies. Retaining executives may lead
to higher performance in some acquisitions, as existing studies suggest. However, there
are good theoretical arguments for the opposite view; namely, replacing executives may
be an equally important source of value creation in other acquisitions. We develop
a framework that provides guidelines for understanding when and under what con-
ditions retaining or replacing target executives may contribute to acquisition success. A
research agenda that considers acquisition context and the short-, intermediate-, and
long-term performance consequences of leadership instability in acquired firms is
suggested as a means of moving this research domain forward. The decision to retain or
replace target executives is largely a matter of context. Existing studies have not yet
captured this complexity.

I can only describe the entire merging process as
being full of secrets, lies, tricks, and games with little
or no consideration for the very excellent manage-
ment team that made this a valuable business. They
did not explore synergies or mutual growth but went
straight for dominance and control. They pretty
much left it up to empire-building subsidiary man-
agers less qualified than our own managers to man-
age the business. (Krug, 2009, p. 17)1
The authors express their gratitude to Timothy
M. Devinney, Donald S. Siegel, and Paul M. Vaaler for
their comments and insights, which greatly improved the
quality of this paper.
1
Quotes by executives in interviews with authors fol-
lowing their company’s acquisition.
30
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This quote captures the feelings of many involved
in an acquisition. Indeed, many acquisitions fail
because acquirers do not effectively integrate the
acquired firm, often by alienating target firm man-
agers. Research suggests that retaining target execu-
tives is an important part of a successful integration
strategy. The reason given is that executives may
have embedded knowledge of their firm, industry
experience, and established relationships with
stakeholders that acquiring firms find difficult to
quickly replicate. This view has been widely ac-
cepted by both researchers and practitioners alike.
Indeed, leading consulting firms involved in M&A
engagements commonly view minimizing executive
turnover as an important objective during the in-
tegration process (Adolph & Pettit, 2009; de Souza,
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
Adolph, Gemes, & Marchi, 2007; Fubini, Price, &
Zollo, 2006; Shill & Mackenzie, 2005).
Despite this focus on retaining target executives,
we believe this view is limiting. Indeed, in many
acquisitions, replacing executives may be an im-
portant source of value creation (e.g., to achieve
cost savings or eliminate resistance to the acquisi-
tion), and there are good theoretical and empirical
arguments for both views. The decision to retain or
replace target executives, therefore, is largely con-
textual and depends on individual, group, firm,
industry, and country factors that motivate each
acquisition.
To examine these issues in greater detail, we first
consider the findings of studies on executive turn-
over and its link to post-acquisition performance.
Existing research is then placed in a broader con-
text. Multiple theoretical perspectives provide dif-
ferent, often contradictory, guidelines about when
executive turnover is a desirable or undesirable ac-
quisition outcome. For example, micro-level factors
related to the psychological attributes of executives
as well as group-level factors related to the com-
position of top management teams vary managerial
perceptions of the potential value of a given acqui-
sition. Meanwhile, meso-level factors related to the
acquirer’s industry, markets served, level of corpo-
rate diversification, and ownership structure also
influence motivations. Even larger macro-level fac-
tors shape motivations. For example, a firm’s country
of domicile and degree of internationalization in-
fluence its selection of markets, entry strategy, and
method of integrating acquired foreign assets, plants,
and human resources.
We then develop a framework that relates these
different theoretical perspectives to prescriptions
for integrating target executive teams. These points
are illustrated using four case studies from the au-
tomobile industry: Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler
Corporation’s merger in 1998, Renault’s partial ac-
quisition of Nissan in 1999, DaimlerChrysler’s par-
tial acquisition of Mitsubishi in 2000, and Fiat’s
acquisition of Chrysler beginning in 2009. Each vi-
gnette illustrates how multiple motivations drive
many acquisitions and how different motivations
require different approaches for effectively integrat-
ing target assets and executive teams.
We conclude by suggesting avenues for future
research and practice. While existing research pro-
vides a good starting point for understanding the
effect of M&As on acquired executive teams, there
are significant opportunities for universities and
research institutes, consulting firms, and corporate
31
boardrooms to produce additional insights. For ex-
ample, research has focused primarily on acquis-
itions of public companies. Most target companies,
however, are privately held, family controlled, new
ventures, or subsidiaries or divisions of other
firms. This fact leads to an important question: Do
turnover—performance linkages differ for acquis-
itions of these other organizational forms? Recent
research also suggests that the timing of a firm’s
acquisition—whether at the beginning, height, or end
of a merger wave—leads to different performance
outcomes. Again, this new research leads to more
questions: Does the timing of an acquisition during
a merger wave imply different strategies for inte-
grating executive teams? Given recent globalization
trends, how do performance effects vary in other
regions of the world? These are only a few of the
many avenues for new insights that might link this
research domain with the larger issues of globali-
zation, technological change, and new venture for-
mation that will affect management scholarship and
practice in the 21st century.
SOLID THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH BASES: A BRIEF
LITERATURE REVIEW
The new owners wanted to bring in their own
management and as president, I was expected to
leave. (Krug & Nigh, 2001, p. 94–95)
Executive Turnover Following an Acquisition
Walsh (1988) offered the first empirical evidence
that target executives depart at significantly higher
rates than normal following an acquisition. On av-
erage, target companies lose an average of about
one-quarter of their executives in the first year after
acquisition—a turnover rate close to three times
higher than normal. Within five years, they lose an
average of 60% or more of the executives present
at the time of the acquisition. Subsequent studies
have found similar results (Furtado & Karan, 1990;
Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, &
Judge, 1997; Krug & Hegarty, 1997; Martin &
McConnell, 1991; Walsh, 1989; Walsh & Ellwood,
1991).
These studies generated interest in understanding
the underlying causes of post-acquisition turnover.
Theory on acquisitions through the early 1990s was
largely driven by agency theory and the market for
corporate control (Manne, 1965). When boards fail
to correct poor firm performance, outside firms will
32 The Academy of Management Perspectives
bid for control of the firm and improve performance
by replacing incompetent executives. This perspec-
tive remained a dominant but untested view of
acquisitions for more than 25 years. As a result,
many viewed executive turnover as an acceptable—
indeed, desirable—acquisition outcome. Subsequent
research, however, has largely debunked this view.
For example, Davis and Stout (1992) found that
target companies generally outperform their com-
petitors before acquisition, an indication that firms
acquire other firms because they have something
they value. Walsh and Kosnik (1993) found similar
results in an analysis of corporate raiders and con-
cluded that there is “only evidence of market dis-
cipline among target firms and competitors with
sustained histories of poor performance” (p. 671).
While poor performance is associated with higher
post-acquisition executive turnover, turnover is
generally high in targets with both good and bad
performance records. Poor pre-acquisition perfor-
mance, however, falls short of explaining why
executives depart at such high rates after acquisition.
Turnover may best be understood by looking
at executives’ psychological attributes and percep-
tions of the acquisition. Acquiring firms may, for
example, replace executives to minimize resistance
during the integration process, especially follow-
ing a hostile takeover (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993;
Walsh, 1989). Replacing executives may also mini-
mize uncertainty and increase the perception of
control. Psychological attributes and perceptions
of the acquisition also appear to weigh heavily in
cross-national transactions, with executive turnover
significantly higher in firms acquired by a foreign
multinational (Krug & Hegarty, 1997). This may be
a consequence of cultural differences, which have
been linked with both higher executive turnover
and lower post-acquisition performance (Chatterjee,
Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992). Replacing
executives may minimize communication problems
and cultural conflicts in cross-national transactions
(Krug & Nigh, 1998, 2001). Another factor explain-
ing this turnover is the target executive’s reaction
to the acquisition. Executives are more likely to
leave when they have negative perceptions of the
long-term professional and personal effects of an
acquisition (Krug & Hegarty, 2001). Executives also
depart more quickly when they lose job status
immediately after the acquisition (Hambrick &
Cannella, 1993). Perceptions of lost autonomy have
more enduring effects that cause executives to
leave several years later (Lubatkin, Schweiger, &
Weber, 1999).
January
Yet another factor in post-acquisition turnover
is executive seniority. From the acquirer’s point of
view, replacing senior executives may have posi-
tive symbolic effects by sending signals to target
employees that they are in charge. From the target’s
point of view, senior executives are generally more
accustomed to discretion and autonomy than less-
senior executives. As such, they may respond more
negatively to the loss of status and autonomy and
depart more quickly. In a survey of executives in-
volved in an acquisition, Krug and Nigh (2001)
found that a full one-third departed for subjec-
tive reasons that include fear of termination, alien-
ation, exclusion from the decision-making process,
lower status, and lost autonomy.2 In sum, psycho-
logical perceptions have a great deal to do with
the acquirer’s decision to retain or replace target
executives—and the executive’s decision to stay
or leave.
The Link Between Executive Turnover and
Post-Acquisition Performance
Despite the widely accepted premise that execu-
tive turnover leads to lower post-acquisition per-
formance, support for this premise comes primarily
from two empirical studies. The first, by Cannella
and Hambrick (1993), surveyed acquiring firm
executives and analysts about their perceptions of
post-acquisition performance in 96 large, publicly
traded U.S. companies acquired between 1980 and
1984. They found that high executive turnover
rates were related to perceptions of lower post-
acquisition performance, and they concluded that
“executives from acquired firms are an intrinsic
component of the acquired firm’s resource base, and
their retention is an important determinant of post-
acquisition performance” (p. 169). A second study,
by Krishnan and colleagues (1997), examined a
sample of 147 of the largest publicly traded U.S.
firms acquired between 1986 and 1988. They found
that higher executive turnover was associated with
lower post-acquisition performance in their sample.
They explained this by noting that “turnover in the
acquired firm will also affect the performance of
the parent firm because the parent management
will have to devote more of its time and resources
to achieve integration” (p. 365). These studies sup-
port a resource-based view that has now become
2
In the same study, Krug and Nigh found that one-third
were terminated, and the other third left for non-
subjective reasons.
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
common: Target executives are valuable resources,
and their retention leads to higher post-acquisition
performance (Butler, Perryman, & Ranft, 2012).
THE BROADER CONTEXT: CONNECTING
TURNOVER TO MICRO-, GROUP-, MESO-,
AND MACRO-LEVEL FACTORS
MOTIVATING ACQUISITIONS
The acquiring company’s post-merger strategy
involved a strong effort to absorb, sublimate, and
force-fit our company into their corporate mold.
They significantly overpaid for our company and
that led them to push excessive goals and expect-
ations on our company to improve performance.
(Krug, 2009, p. 29)
Multiple theoretical perspectives using differ-
ent levels of analysis inform us about acquisition
motivations: (1) market (agency theory and market
for corporate control), (2) top management (empire-
building, hubris, and upper echelon theories),
(3) industry (theory of merger waves and industrial
organization), (4) firm (efficiency, diversification,
and resource-based theories), and (5) country
(Uppsala model, internalization theory, eclectic
paradigm, and evolutionary view of the multina-
tional firm). Each perspective provides insights
about acquisition motivations (see Table 1) and
suggests guidelines for effectively integrating target
executive teams (see Table 2).
Market Perspective
The market perspective views acquisitions as a
mechanism for improving performance in under-
performing firms. Based on agency theory and
market for corporate control, executives may engage
in activities that maximize their wealth at the ex-
pense of shareholders (e.g., by investing in high-risk
projects that increase bankruptcy risk). Boards often
refuse to correct this behavior because their inter-
ests are better aligned with those of executives than
those of shareholders. This occurs when executives
sit on the board or the CEO also holds the title
of board chair (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2008).
If boards refuse to take action, outside firms theo-
retically intervene by acquiring the firm, firing its
executives, appointing outside directors, and sepa-
rating the CEO and chair roles (Nyberg, Fulmer,
Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010). Empirical evidence,
however, indicates that market discipline is not a
driving force behind most acquisitions. Quite the
contrary, most acquirers buy firms with good
33
performance records because they have something
they value. Even corporate raiders, who publicly
proclaim that their mission is to buy underper-
forming firms and rid them of incompetent execu-
tives, are more likely to buy firms that outperform
the market. As Walsh and Kosnik (1993) concluded,
“the discipline engendered by the raiders studied
here appears to be very similar to the discipline
revealed in firms not subject to external control
challenges” (p. 693). In short, despite the logic of
agency theory and the market for corporate control,
poor performance doesn’t appear to be a major de-
terminant of most target firms’ ultimate acquisition.
Market theories are limited by the fact that only
a small portion of companies acquired each year are
publicly traded. Most acquired firms are privately
held, family controlled, new ventures, or sub-
sidiaries or divisions of the seller. These firms can
be acquired only with the owner’s consent. Many
private firms have more effective monitoring devices
than public firms because owners assume manage-
ment roles that align owner and manager interests
(Li & Aguilera, 2008). In new ventures, many entre-
preneurs invest their own wealth and rely on fund-
ing from friends and family members (Graebner &
Eisenhardt, 2004). Self-monitoring by managers and
interactions with investors reduce agency costs and
link management and owner efforts to the firm’s
success (Gompers & Lerner, 2003). In cross-border
M&As, agency costs are affected by differences in
governance systems. Whereas Anglo-American gov-
ernance systems are shareholder driven, European
and Japanese governance systems are driven by
large institutional investors and union participation.
These other stakeholder groups often play stronger
monitoring roles that reduce agency costs. In emerg-
ing countries such as China, governance systems
have more far-reaching government restrictions that
limit the acquirer’s ability to make changes in an
acquired firm’s executive team or employee base.
Top Management Perspective
Two theoretical perspectives, each grounded in
agency theory, suggest that executives engage in
M&As for personal reasons that destroy shareholder
value. Empire-building theorists argue that execu-
tives acquire other firms to maximize firm size to
enhance their status and future compensation
(Hope & Thomas, 2008). Hubris theorists argue that
executives’ past acquisition successes cause them
to overestimate their ability to successfully integrate
future acquisitions (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin,
 TABLE 1
Theoretical Perspectives on Acquisition Objectives and Source of Value Creation
Perspective Theory Acquisition objective Metric Relevant articles

Market 1 Agency theory Realign shareholder and management Target firm risk Miller & Sardais (2011); Nyberg and
goals colleagues (2010)
2 Market for corporate control Replace incompetent target Target firm performance Martin & Combs (2009)
executives
Top management 3 Empire-building theory Increase executive status and future Firm growth and size Hope & Thomas (2008); Masulis,
compensation Wang, & Xie (2007)
4 Hubris theory Increase size and scope of the firm Firm growth and size Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll (2011);
Martin & Davis (2010)
Industry 5 Theory of merger waves Decrease industry turbulence Acquirer financial stability and Bruner (2004); McNamara and
performance colleagues (2008)
6 Industrial organization (IO) Increase firm size, market power, and Firm size, market share, and pricing Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft (2011)
entry barriers power
Firm 7 Efficiency theory Scale and scope efficiencies Firm size, economies of scale and Krishnan and colleagues (2009);
(synergies) scope Siegel & Simons (2010)
8 Diversification theory Firm growth Growth in revenues, profits, and Makri and colleagues (2010);
margins Zhou (2011)
9 Resource-based theory of the Acquire or leverage firm resources Competitive advantage and Barney, Ketchen, & Wright (2011)
firm and capabilities performance of combined firms
Country 10 Uppsala model Minimize firm risk Entry mode strategy, firm risk, Johanson & Vahlne (2009)
international experience
11 Internalization theory Protect internal investments in Entry mode strategy, firm profitability Buckley & Casson (2009)
knowledge assets
12 Eclectic paradigm and OLI Exploit differences in costs across Mobility of firm-specific assets across Dunning (2009)
model national markets national borders
13 Evolutionary view of the Create and transfer capabilities across Firm capabilities Kogut & Zander (2003)
MNE national borders, organizational
learning
 TABLE 2
Integration of Theoretical Perspectives and Prescriptions for Integrating Target Company Top Management Teams
Perspective Theory Executive retention desired Executive replacement desired Theoretical links

Market 1 Agency theory Inside directors Separation of ownership and

Chair (separate CEO and chair control in public firms
positions)
2 Market for corporate control Poor performers, especially more-senior Agency theory
executives
Top management 3 Empire-building theory Empire-building CEO and chair Agency theory
4 Hubris theory Incompetent executives Agency theory
5 Upper echelons theory Executives with compatible traits Executives with non-compatible traits Organizational fit
6 Top management team Executives with complementary Executives with redundant skill sets Strategic fit
complementarity skill sets
Industry 7 Theory of merger waves Increase global efficiencies, restructure Empire-building theory,
assets, and consolidate capacity hubris theory, bandwagon
effects
8 Industrial organization High-growth industry, local industry Mature industry, global industry Hubris theory, industrial
structure structure organization, efficiency
theory
Firm 9 Efficiency theory Industry maturity, industry Theory of merger waves, industrial
consolidation organization
10 Diversification Acquirer executives lack knowledge Acquirer has adequate supply of Efficiency theory, resource-based
to integrate the target firm executives to operate the target firm theory, upper echelons theory
using its own executives
11 Resource-based theory of the firm Target executives have idiosyncratic Objective is to leverage acquirer Theory of the growth of the firm
knowledge and capabilities capabilities to improve target
performance
Country 12 Uppsala model Acquirer lacks international Acquirer has significant international Transaction cost theory
experience experience
13 Internalization theory Protect investments in knowledge assets Transaction cost theory
by transferring knowledge using
acquirer’s executives
14 Eclectic paradigm and OLI model Country-specific assets or Acquired assets support global Locational economics
government regulations require efficiencies through consolidation
local knowledge and rationalized production
15 Evolutionary view of the MNE Target executives support Resource-based theory
organizational learning and
transfer of knowledge
36 The Academy of Management Perspectives
2006). Executives often overpay for acquisition tar-
gets and engage in excessive acquisitions that grow
the firm beyond its optimal size. Hubris among
founders in private firms and new ventures is es-
pecially destructive because smaller firms may lack
financial resources to recover from bad investments.
Both theories imply that self-serving executives
should be removed. However, it is often difficult to
attribute merger failure to self-interested executive
behavior, especially when executives tout multiple
acquisition objectives.
Upper echelons theory may offer better insights
into how acquiring firms integrate target execu-
tive teams. Executives make decisions based on
personalized interpretations of strategic events.
Their interpretations are a function of their unique
experiences, values, and functional backgrounds
(Hambrick, 2007). An acquirer’s interpretation of
target executives should, therefore, influence its
decisions about who stays and leaves. Heteroge-
neous executive teams, for example, frequently ex-
perience sociocognitive conflict that undermines
cooperation. To minimize conflict, acquirers may be
more likely to retain executives who have similar
management styles and a shared understanding of
acquisition objectives. In cross-border acquisitions,
large cultural differences can exacerbate conflicts.
Acquirers may attempt to minimize this conflict by
integrating the foreign firm using their own execu-
tives (Sekiguchi, Bebenroth, & Li, 2011). In contrast,
heterogeneous executive teams are better at manag-
ing complexity (Carpenter, 2002). When an acquirer
faces stagnant sales or declining market share, in-
tegration success may hinge on the retention of
executives who have diverse backgrounds and per-
spectives that contribute to strategic change.
Krishnan and colleagues (1997) supported this
view. They analyzed the performance effects of top
management team complementarity, which they
defined as differences in the functional backgrounds
of executives from the acquiring and target firms.
Complementary top management teams were di-
rectly linked to both lower turnover and higher
post-acquisition performance. In essence, one firm’s
strengths offset the other firm’s weaknesses, and
vice versa. Differences in functional backgrounds
are more easily integrated and contribute to the or-
ganizational learning process. When merging exec-
utive teams have similar functional backgrounds,
synergies are created by eliminating redundant ex-
ecutive positions. A similar process occurs in partial
acquisitions, which enable an acquirer to improve
an acquired plant’s productivity by eliminating
January
underperforming assets and employees and by up-
grading plant capabilities (Siegel & Simons, 2010).
Effectively merging firms is a process of combining
complementary assets, resources, and executive
capabilities in ways that improve performance. The
decision to retain certain executives and replace
others is highly contextual. It depends on top man-
agement team characteristics and their expected
contributions to acquisition objectives.
Industry Perspective
Mergers frequently occur in waves that are driven
by economic, regulatory, or technological shocks that
motivate the restructuring of an industry’s assets
(Bruner, 2004). McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes
(2008) found that performance is higher for acquir-
ers making acquisitions at the beginning—but lower
for acquirers making acquisitions at the height—of
a merger wave. Early movers may have asymmetri-
cal information that enables them to identify high-
value targets at lower cost, lock in valuable assets,
and preempt competition. In contrast, bandwagon
effects cause other firms to enter the market later in
a merger wave when only lower-value targets are
available at higher cost (Fiol & O’Connor, 2003).
Many late movers also engage in less-comprehensive
analysis and are more likely to commit to an ac-
quisition despite lower expected returns (Vaaler &
McNamara, 2004). This may cause performance
pressures that motivate firms to restructure target
assets or downsize the employee base in an effort
to improve profitability. Target executives may fall
victim to such efforts.
Early research in industrial organization viewed
firm size as a primary acquisition objective. When
firms compete on the basis of homogeneous prod-
ucts and similar strategies, acquisitions are a means
to increase pricing power and lower costs through
scale and scope efficiencies. Later work by evolu-
tionary economists viewed firm growth and market
power as a natural outcome of a firm’s cumulative
investments in innovation, which stimulate demand
and increase pricing power (Knott, 2003). In both
cases, acquisitions are a rational strategy for growing
the firm and leveraging firm size to achieve greater
economies of scale and scope (Mata & Portugal,
2002). Thus, an industry’s stage of growth may de-
termine whether target executives are retained or
replaced. In mature industries, acquisitions can be
used to consolidate industry cafici e ncies arec share
by eliminating competition. Efficiencies are created
by eliminating redundant target assets, including
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
redundant executive positions. In contrast, acquis-
itions are a means of more rapidly bringing products
to market compared to internal development. In new
or high-growth markets, firms can use acquisitions
to more rapidly grow their market share and reve-
nue base. Retaining target executives may become
an important goal that supports firm growth, espe-
cially when the acquirer lacks an adequate supply of
executives to supply newly acquired firms.
Industry structure also plays an important role in
shaping integration mechanisms in cross-border
acquisitions. Krug and Nigh (1998) found that tar-
get executives are more likely to be retained when
the firm is acquired by a multinational firm that
competes in a multi-domestic industry such as
metals, beverages, glass products, consumer prod-
ucts, or processed foods. Differentiated consumer
tastes, fragmented distribution channels, and high
transportation costs make it more difficult for firms
to benefit from product standardization and globally
rationalized production. Retaining local executives
with in-depth knowledge of the local market may be
an important source of value creation. The opposite
likely occurs in global industries such as automo-
biles, electronics, computers, and farm machinery.
Technological intensity and standardized consumer
tastes allow firms to increase worldwide sales vol-
ume and lower costs through large-scale produc-
tion. Subsidiaries no longer operate as autonomous
entities; rather, they become part of the firm’s
worldwide network that supports rationalization of
the firm’s global value-chain activities. Local market
knowledge is less likely to be critical to the firm’s
long-term success.
Firm Perspective
The firm perspective views acquisitions as a value-
enhancing strategy that increases efficiencies and
supports value creation and transfer. Efficiency the-
ory, for example, suggests that acquisitions are a
means of achieving financial, operational, and man-
agerial synergies (e.g., by combining units to achieve
scale and scope efficiencies) (Krishnan, Krishnan, &
Lefanowicz, 2009). Like empire-building theory and
industrial organization, firm size is a primary source
of value creation. The objective, however, is effi-
ciency and cost reduction rather than revenue en-
hancement. Efficiencies achieved by combining
assets imply that value is created when executives
are replaced, often when the acquirer converts a
stand-alone target to a division. Opportunities to
create efficiencies by combining units or eliminating
37
redundant assets are theoretically greater when
merging firms operate in the same industry. This
suggests that acquirers are more likely to replace
executives when they acquire firms in the same in-
dustry. Existing studies, however, indicate that re-
latedness is a weak predictor of executive turnover.
Studies have generally measured relatedness
based on product and market similarities across
businesses using coarse measures such as product
SIC codes (Robins & Wiersema, 2003). Product or
market similarities, however, may be insufficient for
synergy creation. Synergies may require more fine-
grained commonalities within specific value-chain
activities (e.g., production and marketing com-
plementarities between and within businesses).
These commonalities are critical in technology-
intensive industries, where value is created when
firms acquire scientific and technological knowledge
that is complementary to their own (Makri, Hitt, &
Lane, 2010). Even when synergy opportunities exist,
they are not always easy to capture, especially when
firms have different perceptions of the source of
relatedness or disagree on acquisition objectives.
Executives’ perceptions of relatedness are multidi-
mensional and judgmental. They include factors that
are not always easy to capture using coarse measures
of relatedness based on product-market, resource,
and value-chain similarities (Pehrsson, 2006).
Resource-based theory (RBT) focuses on the firm’s
ability to establish competitive advantages by com-
bining complementary resources in unique ways
not possible without a combination (Zhou, 2011).
Target executives may possess unique capabilities
and knowledge critical to the target’s long-term suc-
cess. Negative performance effects are heightened
when more-senior executives, who have embedded
knowledge of the firm and industry, depart (Cannella
& Hambrick, 1993). A senior executive’s positional
rank, however, may be less important than tenure
insofar as rank may not capture variations in posi-
tions across firms or instances where executives are
hired from the outside. Indeed, Bergh (2001) found
that acquired firms are more likely to be divested
five years later when their longest-tenured execu-
tives depart shortly after the acquisition. Therefore,
an executive’s organizational tenure may be a more
effective measure of imbedded capabilities than
simple seniority of titular status.
Country Perspective
The country perspective examines the foreign
direct investment (FDI) activities of multinational
38 The Academy of Management Perspectives
enterprises (MNEs). The Uppsala model provided
early insights into the firm’s internationalization
process (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). When firms
lack international experience, they minimize cul-
tural differences by entering markets through
exports or licensing. As firms gain experience, they
increasingly commit assets to foreign markets by
establishing wholly owned subsidiaries. Later, in-
ternalization theory suggested that MNEs prefer
to enter markets using wholly owned subsidiaries
because they subject the firm’s investments in
knowledge assets to lower risk of appropriation
(Buckley & Casson, 2009). The eclectic paradigm
and OLI model extended internalization theory
by explaining MNEs’ FDI decisions based on
three factors: ownership advantages (O), locational
advantages (L), and internalization of ownership
advantages in overseas production (I). Locational
advantages arise when MNEs move mobile firm-
specific assets across national markets to exploit
cost differences (Dunning, 2009). Last, the evolu-
tionary view examines the MNE as a mechanism
for developing cross-national capabilities (Kogut &
Zander, 2003). Whereas internalization theory fo-
cuses on the one-directional transfer of intangible
assets into markets using FDI, the evolutionary
view focuses on the two-directional combination of
capabilities across national borders using different
entry mode strategies.
Executive turnover is intensified in cross-
border acquisitions (Krug & Aguilera, 2005). The
acquirer’s use of parent or local executives to in-
tegrate an acquisition is influenced by a range
of factors. Investing in culturally distant markets
creates higher management costs and can create
tensions that hinder integration efforts. The ac-
quirer’s objective may also be to transfer inter-
nally developed competitive advantages into the
foreign market. Many MNEs may use their own
executives to aid the transfer of capabilities,
maintain control over knowledge assets, and mi-
nimize the negative effect of cultural differences.
Other acquisitions are motivated by a desire to
acquire technology and local capabilities (Anand
& Delios, 2002). In high-growth industries, or
when a firm lags competitors, MNEs may prefer
partial acquisitions or joint ventures over full
acquisitions to speed market entry or avoid esca-
lating rivalry with local competitors (Chen, 2008).
Local executives may play a more critical role
because they have idiosyncratic knowledge of the
local market that aids capabilities transfer and orga-
nizational learning.
January
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES FROM THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: HOW ACQUISITION
MOTIVATIONS SHAPE
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER
DaimlerChrysler Merger (1998)
The Germans tended to be more dictatorial. They
were very structured and did more detailed analy-
sis. Much slower at decision making. Morale went
downhill fast. (Krug & Nigh, 2001, p. 89)
The 1998 DaimlerChrysler (DCX) merger illus-
trates how multiple perspectives drive M&A activ-
ity and influence integration processes (Bruner
et al., 2001; Bruner, Christmann, & Spekman, 2006;
Morosini & Radler, 2003). It was touted as a “merger
of equals,” and Jiirgen Schrempp (CEO at Daimler)
and Robert Eaton (CEO at Chrysler) initially served
as co-chairmen and CEOs. While they shared some
goals, they had different views about the potential
benefits of the merger. Eaton wanted to reduce
Chrysler’s dependence on the North American
market, improve efficiencies, and increase Chrysler’s
size to minimize bankruptcy risk. Schrempp wanted
to build a global industry leader with a presence
in the U.S. market, expand Daimler’s brand down
market, and exploit product and market comple-
mentarities. Whereas .Daimler competed primarily
in North America, Daimler competed primarily in
Europe. Whereas Chrysler focused on trucks, vans,
and smaller cars, Daimler focused on premier cars
and heavy trucks. It was in this light that Schrempp
considered the merger to be “synergistic.”
The creation of a single organization created op-
portunities to drive cost savings through purchasing
economies, consolidation of facilities, exchange of
components and technology, and shared distribution.
Schrempp promised annual savings of $3 billion.
The merger agreement, however, required a clear
separation between brands and prohibited shared
platforms and combined dealerships. Another prob-
lem was that the formation of a Chairmen’s Inte-
gration Council left senior executives at Chrysler
feeling locked out of the decision-making process.
Most of Chrysler’s top executives departed within
two years after the merger, including Bob Eaton,
who departed in 2000. Chrysler’s new president,
Tom Stallkamp, complained of communication
problems created by Schrempp’s physical distance
from Chrysler. Culture clashes between German and
U.S. employees exacerbated cooperation problems.
The German governance structure also slowed
the integration process. Daimler’s supervisory
board included union representatives who resisted
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
cost-cutting measures that reduced employment.
In addition, institutional investors held close to
one-half of Daimler’s shares. Daimler’s largest
shareholder, Deutsche Bank, was known for influ-
encing strategy and appointments to the management
board. Whereas Schrempp supported a shareholder
approach that focused on short-term stock price,
institutional stakeholders focused on long-term
growth. Shareholders and analysts were both cri-
tical of Schrempp’s leadership. Many believed his
real goal was to increase Daimler’s market power
and enhance his own wealth and status. In the end,
few synergies were ever realized. Losses mounted
until DaimlerChrysler’s falling stock price forced
Schrempp to resign in 2005. Two years later,
Daimler sold Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Manage-
ment, paying Cerberus close to $650 million to
assume its liabilities. The result—a $36.7 billion
loss in five years—remains one of the worst merg-
ers in history.
Renault-Nissan (1999) and DaimlerChrysler-
Mitsubishi (2000)
The partial acquisitions of Nissan by Renault
(37%) in 1999 and Mitsubishi Motors by Daimler-
Chrysler (34%) in 2000 provide good examples of
acquisitions that had similar starting conditions but
widely divergent outcomes (Froese & Goeritz, 2007).
Both Japanese companies had long histories of poor
performance. Their survival depended on partner-
ships that helped each firm increase sales, lower
costs, and reduce debt. Schrempp approached
Nissan about an acquisition in 1999 but withdrew
after his management board expressed concern
about Daimler’s ability to manage another acquisi-
tion so soon after its merger with Chrysler. Renault
quickly stepped in to acquire interest in Nissan
instead. One year later, Schrempp approached
Mitsubishi with an offer. Shortly after, it was
revealed that Mitsubishi had covered up defects in
its automobiles. A massive product recall and de-
cline in Mitsubishi’s share price followed. Never-
theless, Schrempp proceeded with the acquisition,
which supported his vision of a global market
player (“Welt AG”) with presence in Asia, North
America, and Europe.
The acquisition of Mitsubishi was plagued with
problems. DCX sent an executive team led by Rolf
Eckrodt to lead turnaround efforts at Mitsubishi.
However, it wasn’t until two years later that Eckrodt
was officially named Mitsubishi’s CEO. As a result,
Eckrodt’s authority was never fully accepted by
39
Mitsubishi executives. The German team refused to
involve Mitsubishi managers in the planning pro-
cess and restricted communications with employees.
Few employees knewDCX’s intentions, and unclear
goals heightened uncertainty. To make matters
worse, Eckrodt did not have a direct reporting re-
lationship with Schrempp, which slowed decision
making and sent signals to Mitsubishi managers
that the German integration team was not in charge.
Consequently, DaimlerChrysler wasn’t able to es-
tablish legitimacy, break through communication
barriers, or gain the acceptance of Mitsubishi exec-
utives and employees. By 2003, falling sales, high
default rates, and rising debt led to a sharp decline
in Mitsubishi’s stock price to roughly one-quarter its
value at the time of DCX’s acquisition. DCX refused
to financially support Mitsubishi, which was forced
to seek a second external rescue package. Eckrodt
resigned as CEO one year later. Additional revela-
tions of auto defects led to continuing losses and a
third rescue package that diluted DaimlerChrysler’s
interest from 37 to 12%. DaimlerChrysler finally sold
its remaining interest in 2005 for $1.1 billion—a loss
of $1.4 billion in four years.
Like Mitsubishi, Nissan had suffered sustained
losses, high debt, and declining global share in the
decade leading up to Renault’s partial acquisition
in 1999. Nissan had a bloated bureaucracy, multiple
management layers, a weak performance culture,
and 3,000 suppliers supporting 25 different plat-
forms and 43 models, only four of which were
profitable. Carlos Ghosn, who had led turnarounds
at Michelin, Uniroyal, and Renault, was named
Nissan’s COO and charged with its turnaround.
Yoshikazu Hanawa continued as Nissan’s CEO. In
contrast to Daimler’s centralized management style,
Renault created an executive committee composed
of Renault and Nissan executives who jointly
searched for synergies and formulated strategy.
Eleven cross-functional teams were created to in-
clude Nissan employees in the integration process.
Nine cross-functional teams were formed to en-
hance participation and communication.
By including Nissan managers and employees
in the decision-making process, Renault was able to
establish a culture of mutual respect that created
strong employee commitment and a speedier in-
tegration process. By the end of the first year, Nissan
had reduced its debt by 50% and tripled operating
margins. Of 38 models, 18 became profitable. By the
end of the second year, Renault and Nissan began
to jointly develop new platforms. Integration efforts
were so successful that Renault increased its interest
40 The Academy of Management Perspectives
in Nissan to 44%. In turn, Nissan acquired a 15%
interest in Renault. In short, Renault’s success was
largely a result of its ability to successful integrate
Nissan’s human resources early in the integration
process. DaimlerChrysler was unable to achieve the
same results.
Fiat’s Acquisition of Chrysler (2009)
After Cerberus Capital assumed Chrysler’s assets
from Daimler in 2007, it terminated 12,000 Chrysler
workers and borrowed heavily to meet cash flow
needs. Poor sales and debt eventually forced it to
turn to the U.S. government for $5.5 billion in loans
to prevent Chrysler’s bankruptcy (Fritz, Spekman, &
Murphy, 2009). Chrysler, however, continued to
falter. In early 2009, it filed for bankruptcy and se-
cured an additional $4 billion bridge loan from
the U.S. government. Four months later, Chrysler
emerged from bankruptcy with an agreement with
Italian carmaker Fiat to assume Chrysler’s assets.
Fiat received an initial equity interest of 20%, with
the remaining shares held by the United Auto
Workers (UAW) and U.S. and Canadian governments
(Foley, Goldberg, & Meyer, 2010; Pisano, Andrews,
& Di Fiore, 2011). Fiat’s CEO, Sergio Marchionne,
assumed the role of Chrysler’s CEO. He immediately
restructured Chrysler around brand teams to flatten
Chrysler’s structure and give Chrysler managers
more control over brand decisions.
Flattening Chrysler’s structure made Marchionne
more accessible to Chrysler executives. In addition
to 21 direct reports at Fiat, Marchionne established
direct reporting relationships with 25 Chrysler
executives and encouraged frequent communica-
tion. DaimlerChrysler’s culture had supported cen-
tralized decision making that restricted information
flow to middle- and lower-level managers. In con-
trast, Marchionne demanded complete information
sharing with Chrysler’s executives and employees.
In addition, he hired non-U.S. and non-Italian exe-
cutives to help break down existing binational cul-
tural barriers between the two top management
teams. Operationally, Marchionne made Fiat’s fuel-
efficient engine technology available to Chrysler,
which established a new plant in Michigan to
produce Fiat’s FIRE engine. He also gave Fiat’s
award-winning Alfa Romeo Giulietta platform to
Chrysler, which it used to design a new Dodge Dart
for the compact sedan market. In addition, he es-
tablished Brand North America, which was located
at Chrysler’s headquarters in Michigan, to jointly
redesign the new Fiat 500 for the U.S. market. The
January
first Fiat 500 was sold in the United States in late
2011. The Fiat-Chrysler alliance was so successful
that Fiat increased its share in Chrysler to 58.5% in
2012 and announced that the two companies would
merge by 2014.
MUCH WORK TO DO: WHERE TO BUILD ON
SOLID RESEARCH BASES
We were “metamorphosed” from a publicly
traded U.S. Fortune 500 company to the U.S. sub-
sidiary of a Swedish multinational. The elimination
of major departments and location issues had to be
addressed at an early stage and continued to be a
problem long after the acquisition. I admired the
Swedish global management style. They gave us
greatly expanded professional responsibilities in
the M&A area but also gave us a lot of professional
independence. (Krug, 2009, p. 87)
Existing studies provide a good foundation of
knowledge on the effects of M&As on acquired top
management teams. It is clear that acquisitions
create conditions that motivate many executives to
depart at high rates after an acquisition. However,
significant gaps in the literature continue to exist.
Perhaps most noteworthy is the focus of existing
studies on executive turnover in small samples of
publicly traded firms acquired in the 1970s and
1980s. Walsh’s comment that “the present investi-
gation suffered from a restriction of range problem”
(1988, p. 181) characterizes existing work. The use
of small samples is largely a methodological prob-
lem; namely, collecting top management turnover
data are difficult and time-consuming. Neverthe-
less, random samples of M&As indicate that about
two-thirds of acquired firms are privately held
or subsidiaries or divisions of other firms (Zollo &
Singh, 2004).
It remains unclear whether turnover varies as a
function of the target firm’s ownership structure.
We know that public and private firms are often
acquired for different reasons. Information asym-
metry makes it difficult for acquirers to accurately
estimate the value of private targets (Ragozzino &
Reuer, 2009). As a result, acquirers are more likely
to buy private firms in similar businesses or that
have geographically concentrated tangible assets
that are easier to value (Capron & Shen, 2007). If
acquirers have executives with knowledge of the
target’s business, are executives in private targets
less valuable and more likely to be replaced? In
public targets, information availability makes it more
difficult for acquirers to identify undervalued firms
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
and negotiate acquisition prices that don’t capitalize
future cash flow gains from the acquisition (Shen &
Reuer, 2005). Consequently, acquirers are more likely
to buy public targets when they enter new busi-
nesses or the target has geographically dispersed
intangible assets that are more difficult to value. Are
executives in public targets more valuable in these
transactions and more likely to be retained? More
research is needed to answer these questions.
In addition to differences between public and pri-
vate firms, turnover patterns may also vary within
private firms based on ownership differences. Unlike
public firms, private firms cannot be acquired with-
out the consent of their owners; therefore, owners
are in a better position to negotiate more favorable
terms. In family firms, continued family involve-
ment is often a condition of sale that may guarantee
executive retention (Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios,
2001). In contrast, entrepreneurs often use acquis-
itions to successfully exit their firm to relieve per-
sonal pressures, eliminate stressful managerial
responsibilities, or achieve financial independence
(Graebner, Eisenhardt, & Roundy, 2010). In other
cases, entrepreneurs use acquisitions to negotiate
mutually synergistic combinations that support the
firm’s continued growth and ensure long-term sur-
vival (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). In short, pat-
terns of executive turnover are likely to vary based
on the objectives of the acquisition and the psy-
chological attributes and personal motivations of
executives who negotiate the deal.
Another important gap in the literature relates
to the turnover—performance relationship. As dis-
cussed, only two studies have directly measured
this relationship in samples of large, public, United
States firms acquired during the 1980s (Cannella &
Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997). The findings
of these studies have been widely accepted. It is still
unclear, however, whether turnover patterns found
in acquisitions from the 1980s extend to more recent
acquisitions. Merger waves are driven by different
structural phenomena. In addition, the timing of a
firm’s acquisition during a merger wave has im-
portant performance implications that may affect
when and under what conditions target executives
are retained or replaced (Haleblian, McNamara,
Kolev, & Dykes, 2012).
These research questions, however, remain largely
unaddressed. Instead, recent research has focused on
identifying reasons why executive retention contri-
butes to acquisition success. For example, Krishnan
and colleagues (1997) found that merging comple-
mentary executive teams contributes to synergy
41
creation and organizational learning. Bergh (2001)
found that retaining the longest-tenured executives
leads to more successful outcomes because exe-
cutives have idiosyncratic knowledge of the firm.
Zollo and Singh (2004) argued that retaining exec-
utives contributes knowledge to the acquirer and
minimizes “organizational disruption.” Ranft and
Lord (2000) and Graebner (2004) found that retain-
ing target executives minimizes the destruction of
the firm’s knowledge-based resources, supports
technology transfer, and reduces disruption in or-
ganizational routines. In essence, research has taken
a resource-based view to argue that executive reten-
tion contributes to acquisition success by support-
ing knowledge creation, retention, and transfer.
We’ve provided a wide range of alternative theo-
retical perspectives to show that this may not always
be the case. There are good theoretical arguments
that suggest that replacing target executives can be
a souice of value creation in many acquisitions.
In Table 2, we outlined different conditions under
which retaining or replacing target executives may
create value. Partial acquisitions, for example, can
be an effective mechanism for reallocating assets
and resources to more effective uses. The high fail-
ure rate of acquisitions is often attributed to the in-
herent difficulty of integrating firms composed of
multiple plants, subsidiaries, and divisions. It is
generally easier for acquirers to identify, accurately
price, and effectively integrate acquisitions of a sin-
gle plant or subsidiary acquired from another firm.
Partial acquisitions can enhance plant productivity
through the “matching of workers and managers
to firms and industries that best suit their skills”
(Siegel & Simons, 2010, p. 15). Another example is
industry structure. Using resource-based theory, we
might argue that retaining target executives con-
tributes value in new or rapidly evolving industries
because executives support technology transfer and
the acquirer’s growing managerial resource needs
(Ranft & Lord, 2002). Alternatively, we might use
efficiency theory to argue that replacing target exe-
cutives contributes value in mature industries when
consolidation is used to eliminate industry capacity
and redundant assets.
In cross-border acquisitions, executive turnover
is affected by a wide range of psychological, firm,
and industry factors. Cross-national cultural differ-
ences have been linked to lower post-acquisition
performance (Very, Lubatkin, Calori, & Veiga, 1997).
Cultural differences create obstacles to integration
by increasing resistance to the acquisition and re-
ducing cooperation between executive teams. When
42 The Academy of Management Perspectives January

cultural differences exist, multinational firms are in acquired firms—a view that has been widely ac-
more likely to replace local executives with their cepted in both academic and business circles for
own (Krug & Nigh, 1998). The negative effect of close to 20 years. Our analysis shows that signi-
culture is most critical shortly after the acquisition, ficant empirical and theoretical gaps continue to
when the acquirer is most likely to make structural exist in the literature. Three gaps seem particularly
changes in the target. The global structure of the relevant:
acquirer’s industry also influences its decision to
• Turnover as a dependent variable. First, research
integrate an acquired foreign firm using expatriates
has uniformly concluded that acquisitions lead
or local executives. Multinational firms that com-
to higher-than-normal executive turnover shortly
pete in globally integrated industries are more likely
after an acquisition. Studies have almost exclu-
to use expatriates to transfer standardized decision-
sively analyzed turnover among public targets.
making processes into an acquired foreign firm
Most acquired firms, however, are not publicly
(Krug & Nigh, 1998). In contrast, firms competing in
traded before acquisition; rather, they are pri-
locally responsive industries are more likely to rely
vately held, family, entrepreneurial, and new-
on local executives because they have better knowl-
venture firms. We presented numerous examples
edge of local market conditions, customer needs,
of instances where turnover might be higher or
and distribution channels. Do different integration
lower depending on the ownership structure of
mechanisms and patterns of turnover have positive
the acquired firm, such as when a family firm
effects on long-term acquisition performance in
negotiates the continued employ ment of family
cross-border acquisitions?
members as a condition of sale. What are the spe-
Existing research has generally concluded that
cific conditions under which one might expect
the effects of acquisitions are short-lived and that
higher or lower turnover following an acquisi-
executive turnover rates return to normal levels
tion? Analysis of turnover effects of M&As in
within a few years after an acquisition. Recent re-
these other organizational forms, related acquis-
search, however, shows that many acquisitions lead
itions, partial acquisitions, acquisitions involving
to instability in acquired firms that causes execu-
smaller firms, and cross- border transactions are
tives to depart at higher-than-normal rates for 10
among many topics ripe for investigation.
or more years (Krug, 2003; Krug & Shill, 2008). This
• Performance as a dependent variable. Second,
suggests that early turnover motivates higher turn-
we outlined prescriptions for integrating target
over among executives hired several years after the
company top management teams using multiple
acquisition. We still know very little about possible
theoretical perspectives. Our analysis suggests
turnover contagion effects in acquired firms. It is
that executive turnover may have positive or
possible that high executive turnover shortly after
negative performance outcomes depending on
an acquisition creates greater uncertainty among
each acquisition’s idiosyncratic objectives. Table 2
newly hired executives surrounding their manage-
illustrates the myriad of opportunities that exist
rial discretion. This uncertainty may cause newly
to test competing hypotheses about the turnover—
hired executives to leave more quickly (Krug, 2009).
performance relationship between and within dif-
A firm may also use job rotations as a means of
ferent theoretical perspectives. What are the
stimulating organizational change, promoting di-
specific conditions under which positive or neg-
versity in decision making, and training future
ative performance outcomes might be expected
executives. In the Fiat-Chrysler acquisition, Fiat
when target executives are retained or replaced?
hired executives with different national back-
Which executives should be retained or replaced?
grounds to help break embedded cultural barriers
How does the timing of an acquirer’s acquisi-
and promote a global perspective in Chrysler’s new
tion during a merger wave affect the turnover-
executive team. The composition of a newly merged
performance relationship? When and under what
top management team is likely to have significant
conditions does retaining or replacing foreign
long-term performance effects that vary based on a
nationals contribute to performance in cross-
wide range of factors.
border acquisitions?
• Theoretical context. Third, research has almost
CONCLUSION
exclusively used resource-based theory to argue
This paper challenges the one-sided view that that the retention of executives—especially more
high executive turnover leads to lower performance tenured ones—leads to higher post-acquisition
2015 Krug, Wright, and Kroll
performance. In Table 1, we examined 13 theo-
retical perspectives that inform us about acqui-
sition motivations. It is evident that acquisitions
are driven by a wide range of often conflicting
micro-, group-, meso-, and macro-level factors.
Existing research has yet to capture the multilevel
complexities of acquisition motivations or the
complex link between executive turnover and
post-acquisition performance using alternative
theoretical explanations.
New theoretical and empirical insights are some-
times readily accepted and left unchallenged de-
spite unanswered questions. Earlier, we used the
example of the market for corporate control (Manne,
1965), which remained an unchallenged view of
merger motivations for close to three decades before
research revealed little empirical support (Davis &
Stout, 1992; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993). A similar fate
seems to have befallen the phenomenon of exe-
cutive turnover in M&As. The decision to retain or
replace target company executives is largely a mat-
ter of context. Future research that considers con-
text and the short-, intermediate-, and long-term
performance consequences of executive turnover is
needed to move this research stream forward and
contribute additional insights to executive practice.
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46 The Academy of Management Perspectives
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Jeffrey A. Krug (jakrug@loyno.edu) is associate dean of
graduate programs, a professor of strategic management,
and holds the Jack and Vada Reynolds Chair in In-
ternational Business at Loyola University New Orleans.
He received his PhD in management from Indiana Uni-
versity. His research interests include top management
January
teams, corporate governance, and mergers and
acquisitions.
Peter Wright (pwright@memphis.edu) is a professor of
management and holds the Chair of Excellence in Free
Enterprise Management at The University of Memphis.
He received his PhD in business administration from
Louisiana State University. His research interests in-
clude corporate governance and the valuation of firm
investments.
Mark Kroll (mark.kroll@utb.edu) is dean of the School of
Business at the University of Texas at Brownsville. He
received his DBA from Mississippi State University. His
research interests include firm governance and strategic
leadership of entrepreneurial firms.
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