LACSON v PEREZ

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

Petitioners: PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO
Respondents: SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO
MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA

G.R. No. 147781

Petitioner: MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
Respondents: ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner: RONALDO A. LUMBAO
Respondents: SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO
VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA

G.R. No. 147810

Petitioner: THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
Respondents: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA,
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA

RESOLUTION

EN BANC

MELO, J.:

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following 4 related petitions
were filed before the Court –

(1) G. R. No. 147780 (by Lacson, Aquino and Mancao): prohibition, injunction,
mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
(2) G. R. No. 147781 (by Defensor-Santiago): mandamus and/or review of the factual
basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order
(3) G. R. No. 147799 (by Lumbao): prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
(4) G. R. No. 147810 (by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino): certiorari
and prohibition

All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue
thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a

"state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been
rendered moot and academic.

ISSUE:
WON a petition for habeas corpus may be availed of to prevent an impending unlawful
warrantless arrest NO

HELD:

G.R. No. 147780

In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson,
Aquino, and Mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations
against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with
the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly
premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been
filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are
later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with
the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly
issued warrant.

As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be
declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing
the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even
expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the
same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.

Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application

for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for
since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v.
Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very
day.
G.R. No. 147781
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for
mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right
of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled
must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is
clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present
time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger
of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically
stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.

G.R. No. 147799

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his
part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has
the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1,
2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the
general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides
that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…" Thus, we held in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):

x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No.
38 having been lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule
requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury
to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation
of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his
behalf (KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has
not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is
a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by
a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are
being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every
action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief,
petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is
affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid
for being contrary to the Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to
petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.
Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang. SO ORDERED.