Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of
a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the
election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the
Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as
follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as
member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the
following resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS

CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se

hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente
resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
 Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified;

(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6
of which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o

antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of
its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is
the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after
confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the
aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed
for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely
as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted
to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral
Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its
primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
 (d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of
the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question
herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the
presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it
acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by
the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in
the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:

(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March
2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by
said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission
 of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly
of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period
within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction
over protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,
endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,

corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be
article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress
of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of
this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal
propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy.
However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the
issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to
overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing
justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief
Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is
required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may
become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in
its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican
government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly,
by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not
"the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also
be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression
on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than
in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission
has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the
resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935,
by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of
American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not
be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of
constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries
which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This
is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition
courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland
of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art.
81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway,
Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123,
Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass
upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the
petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of
whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that
we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import
and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5)
laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United
States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of
its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this
provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the
particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to
the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report
on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered
to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of
the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified
executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be
composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the
legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party
and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a
member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight
modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is,
two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:

The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as

proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor
of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced
powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The
Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect
to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to
the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the
first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask
from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose
elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be
judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question
about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission
and there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm
also the election of those whose election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the
House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules
of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials
that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because
he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected?
What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their
election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case
the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a
contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from
Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in
question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by
certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the
assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by
the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman
from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the
delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the
election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are
already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and
contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
 Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance,
refuse to confirm the elections of the members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is
granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest
the election and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is,
even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided
by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to
question the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral
Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has
power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
even though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons,
Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft
as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
 xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion

apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros
que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon
en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases
contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran
solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the
amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took
place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a
la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente
a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa
forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la
Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto
los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power
to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six
(56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing
the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected
this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-
partisan character of the commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
 three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be
presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which
was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58),
gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted
by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of
proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of
membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each
session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to
hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to
report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When
an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion
thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by
the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially
the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee
was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a
quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the
house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of
membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the
year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons,
as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested.
Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government,
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr.
Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every
 principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same
licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the
public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the
unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections,
or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the
motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead
of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is
their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly
canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not
bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own
inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors,
enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial
management of the very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest
impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill
which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of
which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of
commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or
statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the
remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and
has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord
North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who
had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament,
and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of
commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-
partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two
judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules
of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in
English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and
Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act,
1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of
Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons,
are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests
which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary,
the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the
Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par.
6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of
Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak
Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927
(art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature
and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876
there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing
candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress
passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229),
creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five
members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth
justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be
binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral
lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of
Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the
Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]
— Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their
majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive
function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All
that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln,
First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer
in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties
are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the
Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very
indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B,
1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate
the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of
powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly
has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that
this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national
Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to
avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the
admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may
abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance
of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of
abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an
Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not
judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses
of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the
people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the
exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were
designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working
within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the
same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the
sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact
that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it
does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate
cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the
intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November
15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that
year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by
that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show
when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as
the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the
petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly
constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6,
1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members
of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before the
Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be
followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and
could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of
the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members
against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As
contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion
of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of
the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as
such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the
United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat.
The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return
begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26).
Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the
claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is
certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such
certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give
such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for
carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec.
13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally
regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine
Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed.
This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of
the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest
in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for
the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving
the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed
time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period,
vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No.
3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with
the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of
that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests
against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
 (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom
no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests
against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR.,
RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35538 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES,

TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR., ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA GALANG, GO ENG GUAN,
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35539 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I.
DIOKNO, *1 petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES. respondents.

G.R. No. L-35540 September 17, 1974

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO
TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35556 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND
TAN CHIN HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO,
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35567 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA JUAN L.
MERCADO, HERNANDO L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN
HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND
WILLIE BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO
ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M.
GUIAO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO
ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35573 September 17, 1974

ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.

At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the Court in the sense that
a decision represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment
itself but also on the rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result
the vote is practically unanimous; this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary
of the voting on the major issues. Why no particular Justice has been designated to write just one
opinion for the entire Court will presently be explained.

At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should
write that opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of
reasons, only two of which need be mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on
particular issues, revealed a lack of agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those
issues should be taken up although it was not necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for
the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public interest, or whether the decision should be
limited to those issues which are really material and decisive in these cases. Similarly, there was no
agreement as to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The same destination
would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of different vehicles of
approach. The writing of separate opinions by individual Justices was thus unavoidable, and
understandably so for still another reason, namely, that although little overt reference to it was made
at the time, the future verdict of history was very much a factor in the thinking of the members, no
other case of such transcendental significance to the life of the nation having before confronted this
Court. Second — and this to me was the insuperable obstacle — I was and am of the opinion, which
was shared by six other Justices1 at the time the question was voted upon, that petitioner Jose W.
Diokno's motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition (G.R. No. L-35539) should be
granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of the Court on each of the
arguments raised by him, except indirectly, insofar as they had been raised likewise in the other
cases.

It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Diokno's motion to withdraw his
petition he was still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the
separate opinions of the individual Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation
on September 12, which was the last day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court.2 Before they could
be promulgated, however, a major development supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the
President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In view thereof all the members of this Court
except Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot,
with those who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional
ground for such dismissal.

The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been
permitted to withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain
restrictions.3 In the case of Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of
firearms were lodged against him with a Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the
following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his continued
detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in this Court (G.R.
No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquino's petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed on the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new
petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider
the case on the merits.4

On Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for two reasons. In the first
place such withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest
that demanded to be resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained
pending. Secondly, since it was this petitioner's personal liberty that was at stake, I believed he had
the right to renounce the application for habeas corpus he initiated. Even if that right were not
absolute I still would respect his choice to remove the case from this Court's cognizance, regardless
of the fact that I disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape a sense of irony
in this Court's turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among others, that this
is no longer the Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken new
oaths of office under the 1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his
petition.

It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the dignity of this Court and
therefore should not be allowed to pass unanswered. Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed
by allowing the withdrawal. For my part, since most of those statements are of a subjective
character, being matters of personal belief and opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these
cases. Indeed my impression is that they were beamed less at this Court than at the world outside
and designed to make political capital of his personal situation, as the publicity given to them by
some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheets
subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in
kind, that is, from a non-judicial forum, in an address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before the
LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar Association and the Philippine Lawyers' Association. Justice
Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a simple majority of seven votes out of twelve is
legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petition effective, on the theory that the
requirement of a majority of eight votes applies only to a decision on the merits.

In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September
11 all the members of this Court except Justice Castro were agreed that his petition had become
moot and therefore should no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the
opinions of the individual members, particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken in
the time setting in which they were prepared, that is, before the order for the release of Diokno was
issued.

The Cases.

The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly or in great
detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and
held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants
or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country
and to take over the Government by force ..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
The portions of the proclamation immediately in point read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1
of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others
who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national
security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving
usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia,
crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated
in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence
of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or
 promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered
released by me or by my duly designated representative.

The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: "the President shall be
commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law."

1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the
exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or
justiciable in character?

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is political and
therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in
the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of
the Convention that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that "the Convention put
an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its continuation is
political and non-justiciable in character."

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the
Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-
embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain
from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which
the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the Court should act, Justice Barredo
opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and palpable transgression of the
Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no reception of evidence being contemplated for
purposes of such judicial action.

It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves
disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the
existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts.
He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971,
and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905), and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 91
Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang need not be overturned, indeed
does not control in these cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to
proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of
the privilege except in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification
with respect to the declaration of martial law.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no
dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the
factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided
to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.

Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma.
They hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court,
and would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of
the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability
accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from
the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertaining "merely
whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The test is not whether the
President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the
President's proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in
that finding. The factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not
disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly
demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely refrained
from discussing it.

Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of
not much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly
exercised by Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political clime, or by
theories of foreign authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is
peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.

In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in
an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance
not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and
events recited in detail in the different "Whereases" of the proclamation are of common knowledge.
The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in
several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon,
and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the
sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of
armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes
subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is
no actual fighting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in
whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and
material, fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the
rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be
counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their
opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the
transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the
ratification of this Constitution ..." To be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the
issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The question has
been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March
31, 1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in
our relations with other countries.

On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping
statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that
she concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but not of a
constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are subject to judicial review when proper under the
Constitution.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial
law — has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-
28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President,
if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue
beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of
those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the
proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the
Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the
exercise of that power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the
sovereign.

2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn
their petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions,5 the ruling of the Court is that the
petitions should be dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to
the situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of
rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider
Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released
detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of
the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of
petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the
majority; while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of
physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said
privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence.
On this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the
privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous. Justice
Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muñoz Palma
qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses
therein votes for the dismissal of the petitions.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE COURT IN THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Prefatory Note

(written on September 12, 1974)

My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C.
Makalintal on Monday, September 9, 1974, for promulgation (together with the individual opinions of
the Chief Justice and the other Justices) on September 12 (today) as agreed upon by the Court.

On September 11 the petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released from military custody. The
implications of this supervening event were lengthily discussed by the Court in its deliberations in the
afternoon. Eleven members thereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and
academic;" I cast the lone dissenting vote. Although perhaps in the strictest technical sense that
accords with conventional legal wisdom, the petition has become "moot" because Diokno has been
freed from physical confinement, I am nonetheless persuaded that the grave issues of law he has
posed and the highly insulting and derogatory imputations made by him against the Court and its
members constitute an inescapable residue of questions of transcendental dimension to the entire
nation and its destiny and to the future of the Court — questions that cannot and should not be
allowed to remain unresolved and unanswered.

I have thus not found it needful nor even advisable to recast my separate opinion or change a word
of it.

I invite the reader to assess my 38-page separate opinion which immediately follows, in the light of
the foregoing context and factual setting.

FRED RUIZ CASTRO

Associate Justice.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed.
60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches
of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered
by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their
prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all
too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-
like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole
determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed
out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the
two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President
and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is —

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to
hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes

Difference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest
(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is
composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining
six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member

Congressman

1st District

Benguet LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member

Congressman

1st District Palawan

LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

Congressman

2nd District Nueva Ecija

LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member

Congressman

1st District Davao del Sur

LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Congressman

4th District Batangas

LDP

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Congressman

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

 (formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation
and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over
Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief,"
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc
case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to
honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the
result of the appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-
Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30
P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6,
1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco
informed Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao
del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical
and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the
two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to
take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M.
Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral
Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

 Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination
and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of
which are hereto attached.

Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because —

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the
electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for
14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation
v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990).
Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached
on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.

The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23
votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-
appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4
months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H.
Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino,
David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience
vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of
the leader of his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely
difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8
integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us
that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We
believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional
function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should
be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of
the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second
largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative
component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the
sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be
lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election
contests.

We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of
affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as
they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have
been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is
scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No.
45), after the Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of
the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship
and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its
Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is
because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five
members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be
validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the
opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the
orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even
date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign
as a member of the Tribunal.
 The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz
and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed
that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge'
of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the
Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in
the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial
judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the
Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with
the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz,
and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in
character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that
the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is
co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only
for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the
issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.

Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.
Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be

designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and

discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said
Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by
this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress'
being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the
political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and
in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any
of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party;6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a
member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified;8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair"
of the LDP9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review.10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no
cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in
the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET.12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the
HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights.
What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed
had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that
decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party
to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal
would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is
valid."15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol
was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives
had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and
elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with
the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The
1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any
political party to control the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February
5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.
 The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them,
without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil.
818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as
the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.

My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral
tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?

MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the
electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments
are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like
to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate
branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable
rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the
election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on
Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.

Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule
because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman
will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although
they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both
bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies
are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee
on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner
Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering
that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case
of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
 accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations.
That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when
there are six politicians sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this
Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent.
(pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives,
or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista
Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge"
of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another
political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not
for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral
Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It
should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No
coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to
go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert
design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish
him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in
the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be
cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That
stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against
the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to
his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal.
He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge
its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or
the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59
SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his
favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice
of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in
the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon
service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.

ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner,
Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

RESOLUTION

EN BANC:

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a
statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely
and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of
society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the
succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p,
443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not
only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the
Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners
prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel
documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M.
Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin
respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr.
Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for
reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that
"the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label
'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide
the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he
prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants,
petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is
of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a
reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the
factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown
to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused
by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return
when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the
"legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts
of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President
as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new.
This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of
governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted
view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive
authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference
between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language
of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III
enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended
merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power;
 leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity
with other parts of the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition,

concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power
from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where
emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear
that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without
limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution
are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly
regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere
expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual
powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained
analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which
provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in
order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and
the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6
refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return
of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she
had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court
will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.

TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of
the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather,
it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

The Case

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator
Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the
solicitor general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice.On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their
respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998,
petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court
gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need
of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction[1] to
hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and
a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
tribunals.[2] However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine.[3] In fact,
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
legislative officers like the Senate President[4] and the Speaker of the House[5] have been recognized
as exceptions to this rule.

The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At
the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows:[6]

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim

Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)

1 member - Liberal Party (LP)

1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya

1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)

1 member - Gabay Bayan

2 members - Independent

----------

23 - total number of senators[7] (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
independent.)

On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,[8] Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those
who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus
on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate
met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,[9] stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized
Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues

From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the

position of Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing

Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

The Courts Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings[10] and a careful deliberation on the

arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of
discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as
the Senate minority leader.

First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco[11] in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction
to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of
majority and minority involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1),
Article VI thereof, stating that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that
the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively
to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved,
as the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The
legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine
the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the
Senate; neither are there peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over
the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the
petitioners theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the
various important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon
in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the
jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are
political in nature, whenever the tribunal finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.[12]
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within
the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately
assumed jurisdiction (1) in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2)
because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session[13] and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with
the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in
this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well.[14]
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter
other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective
settlement are pinned.[15]

x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide
if this Court should refuse to decide them.[16]

x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.[17]

In Taada v. Cuenco,[18] this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure.[19]
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senates full discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations.[20] Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the
issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,[21] Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that
the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by
the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was
made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker[22] and Montenegro v.
Castaeda[23] that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of
the privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts
and upon all other persons. But the Chief Justice cautioned: the function of the Court is merely to
check -- not to supplant --- the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, notto exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:[24]

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are
justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-
justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers --
characteristic of the presidential system of government -- the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1)
those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department;
2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial
decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive
department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and
enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere -- but
only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others,
and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon
the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by
the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or decision are within the
area allocated thereto by the Constitution."

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to

limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have
been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the
problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -- particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts
of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution,
and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,
we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but
are under the ineluctable obligation -- made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and
defend the Constitution -- to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky.
589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a duty, rather than a power, to
determine whether another branch of the government has kept within constitutional
limits.

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [25]

This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson,[26] Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.[27] and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[28] similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among
political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on
Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, even if the question were political in
nature, since it involved the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,[29] wherein the petitioners
sought to nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the
wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[30] (HRET), the Court
refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full
authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to
the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is
original and exclusive.[31] The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only
if such decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion.[32]
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,[33] was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill
doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that
the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative
body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the
passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House
rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the
internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated:[34]

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for

this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section
16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted.[35] In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all its members carries
with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as who may elect
a minority leader. They argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to
that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such
chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader
belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore,
the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half
of any total.[36] The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the
said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by
a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment[37] of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were
not contested in petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate
President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.[38] During the
ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority.[39] This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee.[40] History would also show that the majority in
either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers
belonged, while the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also refer
to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,[41] not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction
with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.[42] Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while
the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is theminority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the
Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups
or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress.All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary.[43] To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not
by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the
rules of its proceedings.[44] Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to
govern its internal affairs.[45] Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:

Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.

Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICERS
SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal
vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts
of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work.[46] Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.[47]
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver atthe pleasure of the body adopting them.[48] Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body[49] at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat,
this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious
in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the
Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire
whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.[50] This is
the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon
the judiciary the power and the duty not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but likewise to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:[51]
xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within
its own sphere and independent of the others.Because of that supremacy[, the] power
to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.

With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power[52] by

one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.[53] A quo warranto proceeding is
the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment.[54] The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor[55] or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another.[56] The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.[57]
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he
or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent.[58] In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes,
or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way
can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise
of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona

 The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government is restricted only by the definition and confines of
the term grave abuse of discretion.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.[59]

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that
the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came
only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the
Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse
of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979

DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU, respondents.

Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.

Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein
petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in
the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism;
(3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and
other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner
answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after
waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.

Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took
cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two
months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same
was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on
January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent
Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have
been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He
further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office.
They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution,
and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of
Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New
Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election
protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the
New Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office and position of municipal
mayor nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who
is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that election protests
involve public interest such that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed
on mere speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and
that the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.

Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political
question; and reiterated his stand, expanding his arguments on the political question, thus:

It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for
municipal mayoralty. Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the Board of
Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this present case. And before the termination
of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise of their free will and
sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF
GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. We find this provision
under Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code

which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all
its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating
among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form
of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the
New Constitution "shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not been
abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9 of Article
XVII, is meaningless.

All officials and employees in the existing Government of the

Republic shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or
decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, ...

In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working
in our government, otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they are all out of
 the government offices. In fact, in the case above-cited (Javellana) we are all
performing our duties in accordance with the New Constitution.

Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political
complexion of our new Constitution should be dismissed because only those
incumbent official and employees existing in the new government are protected by
the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of the Land. The protestant,
we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of
the Constitution. And in case he will win in this present case he has no right to hold
the position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not then
an official of the government at the time the New Constitution was approved by the
Filipino People. His right if proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935 Constitution
which is changed by the Filipino people.

On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political
question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:

There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new
Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now living under its
aegis and protection. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those
officials and employees of the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines
like the protestee herein, are given protection and are authorized to continue in office
at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the Philippines, while under Section 2
of Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention of completely
revamp the whole local government structure, providing for different qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very clear.
These present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are
outside the range of judicial review. With respect to the fate of incumbent oficials and
employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as
to the qualifications, election and removal, term of office, salaries, and powers of all
local officials under the parliamentary form of government — these have been
entrusted or delegated by the sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled by the
incumbent Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full discretionary
authority therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also
decreed in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States,
questions relating to what persons or organizations constituted the lawful
government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58), and
those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57
S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be political and for the
judiciary to determine.

To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new
Constitution has tainted this case with a political complexion above and beyond the
power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a separate
opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36, September 3, 1973, p. 8008:

The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by

understanding that in the final analysis, what is assailed is not merely
 the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is
merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or ratification, but the
legitimacy of the government. It is addressed more to the frame-work
and political character of this government which now functions under
the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already
effective. In other words, where a complete change in the
fundamental law has been effected through political action, the Court
whose existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of Mr.
Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from passing upon the fact of
change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted as the
change relates to the existence of a prior point in the Court's "chain of
title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the
horizontal distribution of powers." It involves a matter which 'the
sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments or has
reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." The
present Government functions under the new Constitution which has
become effective through political action. Judicial power presupposes
an established government and an effective constitution. If it decides
at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of
the Government under which it is exercising judicial power.

The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections
7 and 8, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and that all courts existing at the
time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with the new Constitution,
and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the
laws then in force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the
enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have
not been "entrusted to the so-called political department or has reserved to be settled
by its own extra governmental action.

Hence, this petition.

We reverse.

The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution,
through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of
office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed
to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of
Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government
structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the
respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of
petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government."

I
There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which
are decisive in the resolution of the political question theory of respondent Yu.

WE ruled:

1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending
election protest cases (Santos vs. Castañeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA
211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927, Sunga vs.
Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).

2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for
the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new
Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person
who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or
contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the
Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position
who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right
to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Castañeda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional
Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had
been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a
stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats,
intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve
inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not
only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having
been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and
emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to
them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by
herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent
(protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure
of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra).

5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of
office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its
functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal
claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers
to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay
therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the
New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the
herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding
their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to
the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive
with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the
New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now
holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their
respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now
indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear,
try and decide election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all
existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or
repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of
Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an
election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the
New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution,
and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force.' Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should
continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein
petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as
elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such
power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers
under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to
modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral
contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts;
for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with
the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree,
order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants
pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction
because to do co "is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge
duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should
ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is a
matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has always deemed General Order No. 3
including its amendment by General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of
Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973,
placing the whole Philippines under martial law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on
whether or not particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise
political questions which the Judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the
view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We may take
cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly
under the authority of the martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611,
82 SCRA 344 [1978]).

II
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein
involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into
this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term
"political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A
broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369
U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due
coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has
been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to
an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a
prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission
on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to
characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch
thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be
delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is
vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass
upon. ..." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).

2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of
political question is who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein
respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy
the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and
obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he
continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a
resolution of the issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a
given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633
[1960]). Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the
aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as
above-stated.

3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant
and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, entitled to enjoy the
extended term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As construed by this Court,
the elective officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited to those duly elected as the
right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was incumbent at the time of the
ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or
interfere with the power or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the incumbent President
or the Legislative Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents;
because whoever between protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor will be
subject always to whatever action the President or the Legislative Department will take pursuant
thereto.

4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a
political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a
local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their
qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change
in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the
New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or
judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that
contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change or
modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code.

III

The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution "... that these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the
invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political
department or reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot
be sustained in view of the result herein reached on the issue of political question as well as Our
previous pronouncements as above restated on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND

THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND
DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS DECISION
SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.

MARTIN, J,:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power
of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in
the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers.1

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16,
1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No.
991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.2

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced
thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments
to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of
a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members
of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by
law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the
different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by
their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the
sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and
the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not
exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of
the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the
Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime
Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa
is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers
vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have
been lifted.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions,
powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections
may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people
regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in
full force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on
Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the
issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution.3

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-
Plebiscite of October 16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines
the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

I

Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito
V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees
are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may
be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million
Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the
lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to
litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits,
this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem
it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed
Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. 8This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of
the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed
as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not.10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial
but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to
and ratification by the people.

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference
of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-
political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue
on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973)
for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice
Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed
new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed,
it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one.
With Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus
cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of
the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21,
1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and
refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The
return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was
decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in
support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the political
question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully
considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a
consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and
effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II

The amending process as laid out

in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election.
 SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof.

There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2)
by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in
an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.

2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional
Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order
in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention,
revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by
the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately',
made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of
January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people
voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973,
the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the
interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of
whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of
the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.

3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment
to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of
law.17 Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a
misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary
cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to
the Constitution. 19

III

Concentration of Powers

in the President during

crisis government.

1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government
today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been
regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually
independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of
constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a
total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to
arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable
barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There
are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of
purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial
power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional
system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is
evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of
government. In the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for
granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is
more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state
in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system
of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its
own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of
constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at.
That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory
Provisions, thus:23

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have
been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President
and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or

done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
 remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.

"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim
National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a
vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking
powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing
Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a
period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a
distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too
much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the
President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve
rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war.
In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and
economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25

IV

Authority of the incumbent

President t to propose

amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim
National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that
body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging
the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge
the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by
its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without
constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake
the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to
end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce
into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26

2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays,
about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities,
72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment
of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting
of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council)
created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members
of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to
the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed amendments to the
people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the
National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

The People is Sovereign

1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of
individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the
constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions
on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an
experiment, as all life is all experiment."34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation
should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people
when they adopt it. 35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their

sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves
implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.

VI

Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the

participation of the 15-year olds.

1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to
be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was
prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true
pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the
succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may
participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above
which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously
asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the
referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue,
which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional
amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily
dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of
voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen
years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under
eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in
another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the
age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes.38

2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely

consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues
submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the
totality of the executive power of the President.39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of
fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts .40 A
"plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not
imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly,
the ratification aspect.

VII

1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation
of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled
voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total
suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes
all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that
he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested
in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at
hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear
their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973
Constitution, which is already a settled matter.43 Even government employees have been held by the
Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand
on the referendum-plebiscite issues.44

VIII

Time for deliberation

is not short.

1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are
the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That
notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous
plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls:
"Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled
plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as
ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940
Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and
Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment,
an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the
plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)."45

2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States
Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of
relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not
justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which
the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but
as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely
separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to
be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson,
"(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of
today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body

IN RESUME

The three issues are

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando,
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and
Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices
Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts
as to the power of the President to propose amendments.

Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond
the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's
lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above
stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent
consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales,
supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).

Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate
opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004]

SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE

AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and SPORTS AND
GAMES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeks to nullify the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation
of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, executed by respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in
favor of respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (also
referred to as SAGE).
The facts may be summarized as follows:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under
Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President
Ferdinand Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said enabling law read:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State

to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

xxxxxxxxx

b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed
by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3)
minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement.

xxxxxxxxx
 TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE

Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and conditions established
in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25)
years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc.
whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.

On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument

denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the
satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.
On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll.
Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr.,
and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making
pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza
outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition,
praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He
maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the
internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative
franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason
that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling
since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent
and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he
argues that the internet, being an international network of computers,
necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant
to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in
PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which provides:
Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of
chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines. x x x

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any
of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation
or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could not
[1]

have been included within the commonly accepted definition of gambling

casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to
a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go
and play games of chance authorized by law.
The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D. NO.
1869 TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO
OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS RIGHT TO OPERATE
AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT
PLACES UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED AUTHORITY TO
SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.

The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal

question: Does PAGCORs legislative franchise include the right to vest another
entity, SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate Internet
gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential Decree No. 1869 authorize
PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to SAGE by authorizing the latter
to operate Internet gambling?
Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle a
number of important procedural matters raised by the respondents.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that
petitioner has no legal standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen
or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real
party-in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that
petitioner does not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to
impugn the validity of PAGCORs grant of authority to SAGE.
Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or House of
Representative to maintain a suit and assail the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities are not without precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of
Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department
of the government there must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged
official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as legislator. However
[2]

in a number of cases, we clarified that where a case involves an issue of

[3]

utmost importance, or one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in

its discretion, can brush aside procedural technicalities and take cognizance of
the petition. Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that
may have serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has
the requisite legal standing to file this petition.
Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or
person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They
maintain that in exercising its legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to
certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not
performing a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of granting
licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial
act. According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the
instant petition, the same should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to observe
the hierarchy of courts.
Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation where an almost identical
factual setting obtained. Petitioners therein filed a petition for injunction directly
before the Court which sought to enjoin respondent from operating the jai-alai
games by itself or in joint venture with another corporate entity allegedly in
violation of law and the Constitution. Respondents contended that the Court
had no jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for injunction
because it was not one of the actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule
56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents likewise took exception
to the alleged failure of petitioners to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. In brushing aside the apparent procedural lapse, we held that x x x this
Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant
the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. [4]
 In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar
seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before
this Court, the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR
with the authority to operate on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that
averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties,
determine the nature of the action. Although the petition alleges grave abuse
[5]

of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it primarily seeks to

accomplish is to prevent the enforcement of the Grant of Authority and
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming. Thus, the
action may properly be characterized as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of
Rule 65, which incidentally, is another remedy resorted to by petitioner.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is
an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. [6]

Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the substance

of the action.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will
and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration,
either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions
and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the
public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the
franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it
may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the
quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal
language. [7]

After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the

contending positions of the parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond
the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.
 In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when PAGCOR
entered into a joint venture agreement with two other entities in the operation
and management of jai alai games, the Court, in an En Banc Resolution dated
[8]

24 August 2001, partially granted the motions for clarification filed by

respondents therein insofar as it prayed that PAGCOR has a valid franchise,
but only by itself (i.e. not in association with any other person or entity), to
operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby
the former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting
stations and Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives
SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCORs
franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special
privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The
grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide
by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist
for the common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives
are subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is
therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how these privileges had been
employed, and whether they have been abused. [9]

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such
as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle
of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the
charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the Court clarified that since ADC has no franchise from Congress
[10]

to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit
from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the same
token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not ride on
PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting
and Internet Gaming executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL
and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty
was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No.
443, dated 3 January 1991.

On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process required by the Tariff and Customs
Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of
Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence
in support of their respective positions.

Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported
articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil
Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No.
478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other
existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products.

In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He
argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:

Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such
power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section
authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only when
necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the government.

Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, and asks us to restrain the
implementation of those Executive Orders. We will examine these questions in that order.

Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order No. 507 did not render the instant Petition moot
and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 April 1992 provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. — The additional duty in the nature of ad valorem imposed on all imported articles
prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No. 443, as amended, is hereby lifted; Provided, however, that the
selected articles covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as
 amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof, shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine (9%) percent ad
valorem.

Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter
of imported oil products under Executive Order No. 478.

Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides
as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is
[Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."

The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions
thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of
the Tariff and Customs Code provides in relevant part:

Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty under Section 104 of
Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees
are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.

There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty indicated in the Section under this
section except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed
one hundred per cent ad valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred One of this Code shall be
subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation
of the National Economic and Development Authority.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the limitations herein
prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter
referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates of import
duty (including any necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no
case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the
increased rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish
import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all
imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic investigations
by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection
levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this
section.

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this
section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission
shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be
afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the
views and recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall
submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public
hearings.
 c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits fixed in subsection "a" shall
include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific
equivalents of the duty with respect to imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most recent
representative period shall be used as bases.

d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all customs import entries as filed in
the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to
copy all liquidated customs import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on
Audit.

e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take effect thirty (30) days after
promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take
effect at the discretion of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
by contending that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect local industries and products for the
sake of the national economy, general welfare and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:

E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of local industries and products for the
sake of national economy, general welfare and/or national security. On the contrary, they work in reverse, especially as
to crude oil, an essential product which we do not have to protect, since we produce only minimal quantities and have
to import the rest of what we need.

These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise government finances, contrary to
Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. 3 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found
in Section 401 (a)(1): "existing protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401
(a): "protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . " We believe that the words "protective" and ''protection" are simply not
enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2) words.

In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may take judicial notice — that the
Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of
governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates
lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the government — The Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)

In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for
both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the
importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign
country." 5 The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries — where
such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs duties inevitably
have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one
policy objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become public
funds 6 — have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their moving purposes and
frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon indigenous oil production.
For the effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues
for the government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty.

In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one. Section
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of that
delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy,
general welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative
standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after all constitute the
very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national
security" as the protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers may
otherwise impose upon the community.

It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon
articles and goods which are not found at all and not produced in the Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles
and commodities: among the more interesting examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5,
5.14); Olives (Chapter 7, Notes); truffles or European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7, Notes); dates (Chapter 8,
8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88, 88.0l); special diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human
medicine and surgery (Chapter 90, Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes;
X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be imposed either for revenue purposes purely or
perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any competing local industries to protect.

Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the
desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401
of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which those
Executive Orders are entitled. 7

The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional contention that, should Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal, there should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the
"resulting excess money not be needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100481 January 22, 1997

PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONFERENCE OF

INTERISLAND SHIPOWNERS AND OPERATORS, UNITED PETROLEUM TANKER
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LIGHTERAGE ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and PILOTAGE INTEGRATED SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
and MANILA PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 103716-17 January 22, 1997

HON. PETE NICOMEDES PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and

Communications and the PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents

G.R. No. 107720 January 22, 1997

HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and

Communications and Chairman of the PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, COMMODORE
ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority,
and SIMEON T. SILVA, JR., in his capacity as the South Harbor Manager, Philippine Ports
Authority, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court — Manila, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
MANILA PILOT'S ASSOCIATION, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the
umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the
Philippines. The service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific point, usually about
two (2) miles off shore, to an assigned area at the pier and vice versa. When a vessel arrives,
a harbor pilot takes over the ship from its captain to maneuver it to a berth in the port, and
when it departs, the harbor pilot also maneuvers it up to a specific point off shore. The setup
is required by the fact that each port has peculiar topography with which a harbor pilot is
presumed to be more familiar than a ship captain.
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government agency which regulates pilotage.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857, it has the power "to supervise, control, regulate . . .
such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the Authority" 1 and to
"control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port District." 2 It
also has the power "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or
fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port
District." 3

These cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of Executive
Order No. 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage service, and the equally determined efforts
of the PPA and its officials, the herein petitioners, to block enforcement of the executive
order, even as they promulgated their own orders which in the beginning fixed lower rates of
pilotage and later left the matter to self determination by parties to a pilotage contract.

I. THE FACTS

G.R. No. 103716

On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive
Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE
SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage
fees previously fixed by the PPA.

However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been
drawn hastily and without prior consultation: that its enforcement would create disorder in
the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to
its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and
detrimental to port operations. 4

The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986.
This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who
would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86,
fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088.

Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez,
and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Soils, Jr. It sought a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop
PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in
accordance with E.O. No. 1088.

The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-38913, was raffled to Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila which issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the
UHPAP, its officers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting
pilotage fees pursuant to E.O. No. 1088.

On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc.,
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. and Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, filed a joint
answer in intervention.
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88,
entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its
order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fixing of
mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under
Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. The administrative
order provided:

Sec. 3. Terms/Conditions on Pilotage Service. — The shipping line or vessel's

agent/representative and the harbor pilot/firm chosen by the former shall agree
between themselves, among others, on what pilotage service shall be performed, the
use of tugs and their rates, taking into consideration the circumstances stated in
Section 12 of PPA AO No. 03-85, and such other conditions designed to ensure the
safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas/grounds.

The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the
case moot and academic and that consequently E.O. No. 1088 had ceased to be effective. The
UHPAP opposed the motion. Together with the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), it filed on May 25,
1988 a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC-Manila, questioning the validity of A.O. No.
02-88. This petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-44726 (United Harbor Pilots' Association and
Manila Pilots' Association v. Hon. Rainerio Reyes, as Acting Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and
Maximo Dumlao, Jr., as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), et al.) and raffled
to Branch 2 of RTC-Manila. The factual antecedents of this case are discussed in G.R. No. 100481
below.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the
PPA, rendered a decision 5 holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic
and that the PPA was under obligation to comply with E.O. No. 1088 because the order had the
force of law which the PPA could not repeal.

The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. The
petition was filed in this Court which later referred the case to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. On the other hand the intervenors appealed to the Court of
Appeals where this case was docketed as CA G.R. No. 21590. The two cases were then
consolidated.

In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division 6 of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court, by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072.
Hence, this petition by the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA. The
intervenor shipping lines did not appeal.

G.R. No. 100481

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari filed before RTC-Manila, Branch 2 (Civil Case No. 88-44726),
the UHPAP and the MPA sought the annulment of A.O. No. 02-88. which in pertinent parts provided:

Sec. 1. Statement of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the provision of pilotage in

ports/harbors/areas defined as compulsory in Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order
No. 03-85, entitled, "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports" shall be open to all licensed
harbor pilots/pilotage firms/associations appointed/accredited by this authority to
perform pilotage service.
 Sec. 2. Persons Authorized to Render Pilotage. — The following individuals, persons
or groups shall be appointed/accredited by this Authority to provide pilotage service:

a. Harbor Pilots of the present Pilotage Associations of the different pilotage districts
in the Philippines. Their probationary training as required under Section 31 of PPA
AO No. 03-85 shall be undertaken by any member of said Association.

b. Members/employees of any partnership/corporation or association, including

Filipino shipmasters/ captains of vessel (domestic/foreign) of Philippine Registry and
individuals who meet the minimum qualifications and comply with the requirements
prescribed in Sec. 29 of PPA AO No. 03-85, aforestated, and who are appointed by
said firm or association and accredited as harbor pilots by this authority. New Harbor
Pilots who wish to be appointed/accredited by PPA under the open pilotage system
either as an individual pilot or as a member of any Harbor Pilot
partnership/association shall be required to undergo a practical examination, in
addition to the written examination given by the Philippine Coast Guard, prior to their
appointment/accreditation by this Authority.

The UHPAP and MPA, as petitioners below, contended (1) that A.O. No. 02-88 was issued without
the benefit of a public hearing; (2) that E.O. No. 1088 had not been repealed by any other Executive
Order or Presidential Decree and, therefore, should be given effect; and (3) that A.O. No. 02-88
contravened P.D. No. 857.

On August 21, 1989, the Philippine Interisland Shipping Association, Conference of Interisland
Shipowners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators of the Philippines, Lighterage
Association of the Philippines, and Pilotage Integrated Services Corp., were allowed to intervene.

On September 8, 1989, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court, enjoining the PPA
from implementing A.O. No. 02-88 and, on October 26, 1989, judgment was rendered in favor of the
petitioners therein. The dispositive portion of the court's decision 7 reads:

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted.

1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving Resolution
No. 860 and in enacting Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88,
the subject of which is "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service";

2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void;

3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent; and

4. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents and the intervenors below filed a joint petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA
G.R. SP No. 19570), assailing the decision of the trial court. But their petition was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the ground that the issue raised was purely legal.
The parties separately filed petitions for review before this Court. The first one, by the PPA and its
officers, was docketed as G.R. No. 100109 (Hon. Pete Nicomedes Prado, Philippine Ports Authority
and Commodore Rogelio Dayan v. United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines and Manila
Pilots' Association), while the second one, by the intervenors, was docketed as G.R. No. 100481
(Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines, Conference of Interisland Ship
Owners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. v.
The Court of Appeals. United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines and Manila Pilots'
Association.)

The petition filed by the government in G.R. No. 100109 was dismissed for failure of petitioners to
show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. 8 On the other hand, the petition of the
intervenors in G.R. No. 100481 was given due course.

G.R. No. 107720

Following the denial of its petition in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA issued on July 31, 1992,
Administrative Order No. 05-92. placing harbor pilots under the control of the PPA with respect to the
scheduling and assignment of service of vessels. The PPA cited as justification "pilotage delays . . .
under the set-up where private respondents (UHPAP & MPA) assign the pilots. Intentionally or
otherwise, several vessels do not receive the pilotage service promptly, causing them operational
disruptions and additional expenses/costs." 9

Private respondents UHPAP and MPA viewed the matter differently. On October 28, 1992, they
asked the RTC-Manila, Branch 2 which heard and decided Civil Case No. 88-44726 to cite PPA
officials in contempt of court. On the same day, the trial court issued an order restraining the herein
petitioners from implementing Administrative Order No. 05-92. However, the PPA proceeded to
implement its order, prompting the UHPAP and MPA to move again to cite petitioners in contempt,
even as they questioned the validity of A.O. No. 05-92. Accordingly the trial court issued another
order on November 4, 1992, reiterating its previous order of October 28, 1992 to petitioners to refrain
from implementing A.O. No. 05-92 pending resolution of the petitions.

Making a special appearance, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the court and moved for the
dismissal of the petitions for contempt. Allegedly to prevent the disruption of pilotage services,
petitioners created a special team of reserve pilots to take over the pilotage service in the event
members of UHPAP/MPA refused to render pilotage services.

For the third time respondents moved to cite petitioners in contempt of court. Again petitioners
questioned the court's jurisdiction and manifested that they were adopting their previous motion to
dismiss petitions for contempt filed against them.

On November 17, 1992, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and set the contempt petitions
for hearing on November 19, 1992. Hence, this petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 107720
(Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and
Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority, Commodore Rogelio A. Dayan, in his capacity as
General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority and Simeon T. Silva, Jr., in his capacity as the
South Harbor Manager, Philippine Ports Authority v. Hon. Napoleon Flojo, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, RTC, Manila, UHPAP and MPA).

Pending resolution of this case, the Court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo as of
October 31, 1992.

II. THE ISSUES AND THEIR DISPOSITION

The issues raised are:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 41,
WHICH RULED THAT:

(A) CIVIL CASE NO. 87-38913 HAS NOT BECOME

MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE ISSUANCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-88; AND

(B) HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO

COMPLY WITH E.O. NO. 1088;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN DISMISSING CA G.R. SP. NO. 19570 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION?

III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE NAPOLEON FLOJO COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITIONS FOR CONTEMPT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS A RESULT
OF THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 05-92?

These issues will be discussed in seriatim.

A. Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and

Petitioners are Bound to Obey it
(G.R. Nos. 103 716-17)

Executive Order No. 1088 reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 1088

PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED
TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE OR PUBLIC PHILIPPINE PORTS.

WHEREAS, the United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines has clamored for the
rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for
foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, whether public or private;

WHEREAS, the plea of the Association has been echoed by a great number of Members of
Parliament and other persons and groups;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby direct and order:

Sec. 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for services
rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels;

For Foreign Vessels Rate in US $ or

its Peso
Equivalent
Less than 500GT $ 30.00
500GT to 2,500GT 43.33
2,500GT to 5,000GT 71.33
5,000GT to 10,000GT 133.67
10,000GT to 15,000GT 181.67
15,000GT to 20,000GT 247.00
20,000GT to 30,000GT 300.00
30,000GT to 40,000GT 416.67
40,000GT to 60,000GT 483.33
60,000GT to 80,000GT 550.00
80,000GT to 100,000GT 616.67
100,000GT to 120,000GT 666.67
120,000GT to 130,000GT 716.67
130,000GT to 140,000GT 766.67

Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess tonnage.
Rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting other related
special services is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in
government and private wharves or piers,

For Coastwise Vessels: Regular

100 and under 500 gross tons P41.70

500 and under 600 gross tons 55.60
600 and under 1,000 gross tons 69.60
1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons 139.20
3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons 300.00
5,000 and over gross tons

Sec. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made
in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange rate.

Sec. 3. All orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and other issuances
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of February, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-six.

(Sgd.)
FERDI
NAND
E.
MARC
OS
Preside
nt of
the
Philippi
nes
 By the President:

(Sgd.) JUAN C. TUVERA

Presidential Executive Assistant

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that
to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to fix
pilotage rates.

The contention has no merit. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. 10 Indeed, the great
battle over the validity of the exercise of this power by administrative agencies was fought in the
1920s on the issue of undue delegation precisely because the power delegated was legislative. The
growing complexity of modern society, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws made the creation
of administrative agencies and the delegation to them of legislative power necessary. 11

There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative
power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through
the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA
actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees
to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by
the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated
power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No.
1088.

It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would
imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix
the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative
in character.

Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he
issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when
he issued P.D. No. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage
service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the
PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of
uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could
delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without
thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, §20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe,
increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by
any private organization within a Port District."

It is worthy to note that E.O. No. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without
withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees.
The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative
purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and
adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports."

The case presented is similar to the fixing of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act (R.A. No.
6727) whereby minimum wages are determined by Congress and provided by law, subject to
revision by Wage Boards should later conditions warrant their revision. It cannot be denied that
Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with
wage-fixing powers, by virtue of the former's plenary power of legislation. When Congress does so,
the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative
lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required. The Court of Appeals is correct in
holding that —

The power of the PPA to fix pilotage rates and its authority to regulate pilotage still
remain notwithstanding the fact that a schedule for pilotage fees has already been
prescribed by the questioned executive order. PPA is at liberty to fix new rates of
pilotage subject only to the limitation that such new rates should not go below the
rates fixed under E.O. 1088. The rationale behind the limitation is no different from
what has been previously stated. Being a mere administrative agency, PPA cannot
validly issue orders or regulations that would have the effect of rendering nugatory
the provisions of the legislative issuance such as those of the executive order in
question.(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner refused to implement E.O. No. 1088 on the ground that it was issued without notice to the
PPA and that it was nothing but a "political gimmick" resorted to by then President Marcos. This
perception obviously stemmed from the fact that E.O. No. 1088 was issued shortly before the
presidential elections in 1986.

But lack of notice to the PPA is not proof that the necessary factual basis for the order was wanting.
To the contrary, the presumption is that the President had before him pertinent data on which he
based the rates prescribed in his order. Nor is the fact that the order might have been issued to curry
favor with the voters a reason for the PPA to refuse to enforce the order in question. It is not unusual
for lawmakers to have in mind partisan political consideration in sponsoring legislation. Yet that is
not a ground for invalidating a statute.

Moreover, an inquiry into legislative motivation is not proper since the only relevant question is
whether in issuing it the President violated constitutional and statutory restrictions on his power. The
PPA did not have any objection to the order based on constitutional ground. In fact the nearest to a
challenge on constitutional grounds was that mounted not by the PPA but by the intervenors below
which claimed that the rates fixed in E.O. No. 1088 were exorbitant and unreasonable. However,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overruled the objections and the intervenors apparently
accepted the ruling because they did not appeal further to this Court.

There is therefore, no legal basis for PPA's intransigence, after failing to get the new administration
of President Aquino to revoke the order by issuing its own order in the form of A.O. No. 02-88. It is
noteworthy that if President Marcos had legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution 12 so did President Aquino under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution 13 who could,
had she thought E.O. No. 1088 to be a mere "political gimmick," have just as easily revoked her
predecessor's order. It is tempting to ask if the administrative agency would have shown the same
act of defiance of the President's order had there been no change of administration. What this Court
said in La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas, 14 mutatis mutandis may be applied to the
cases at bar:

Was it within the powers of the then Collector Ang-angco to refuse to collect the
duties that must be paid? That is the crucial point of inquiry. We hold that it was not.

Precisely, he had to give the above legal provisions, quite explicit in character, force
and effect. His obligation was to collect the revenue for the government in
 accordance with existing legal provisions, executive agreements and executive
orders certainly not excluded. He would not be living up to his official designation if
he were permitted to act otherwise. He was not named Collector of Customs for
nothing. . . . .

Certainly, if the President himself were called upon to execute the laws faithfully, a
Collector of Customs, himself a subordinate executive official, cannot be considered
as exempt in any wise from such an obligation of fealty. Similarly, if the President
cannot suspend the operation of any law, it would be presumptuous in the extreme
for one in the position of then Collector Ang-angco to consider himself as possessed
of such a prerogative. . . .

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its
provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by
E.O. No. 1088. Finally, the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088 or alter it as it did in
promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86. Much less could the PPA abrogate the rates fixed
and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties as it did through A. O. No.
02-88, §3. Theretofore the policy was one of governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By
leaving the matter to the determination of the parties, the PPA jettisoned this policy and changed it to
laissez-faire, something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with lawmaking authority,
could do.

B. Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the

Appeal of Intervenors from the Decision of the
Trial Court Invalidating Administrative
Order No. 02-88 of the PPA
(G.R. No. 100481)

The Court of Appeals dismissed the joint appeal of the government and the intervenors from the trial
court's decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726 on the ground that the issues raised were purely legal
questions. 15 The appellate court stated:

After a painstaking review of the records We resolved to dismiss the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.

From the facts, it is clear that the main issue proffered by the appellant is whether or
not the respondent Philippine Ports Authority could validly issue rules and regulations
adopting the "open pilotage policy" pursuant to its charter (P.D. 857).

xxx xxx xxx

It must be noted that while the court a quo had clearly recognized the intricate legal
issue involved, it nevertheless decided it on the merits which apparently resolved
only the procedural aspect that justified it in declaring the questioned order as null
and void. While We recognize the basic requirements of due process, the same
cannot take precedence in the case at bar in lieu of the fact that the resolution of the
present case is purely a legal question.

Moreover, it appears that appellants in the court below had filed a manifestation and
motion waiving their presentation of evidence. Instead, they opted to submit a
comprehensive memorandum of the case on the ground that the pivotal issue raised
in the petition below is purely legal in character. (p. 231, Records)
 At this juncture, We are at a loss why appellants had elevated the present action
before Us where at the outset they already noted that the issue is purely legal.

If in the case of Murillo v. Consul (UDK-9748, Resolution en banc, March 1, 1990)

the Supreme Court laid down the rule that "if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, and in the latter Court, the
appellant raised naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction (page 5, Resolution in Murillo)," then with more reason where as in the
case at bar public-appellants thru the Office of the Solicitor General in their
memorandum manifested that the controversy has reference to the pure legal
question of the validity of the questioned administrative order. Consequently, We
have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition on the strength of these
pronouncements.

As already stated, from this decision, both the government and the intervenors separately brought
petitions for review to this Court. In G.R. No. 100109, the government's petition was dismissed for
lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The dismissal of the
government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481
for the review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is
based on substantially the same grounds as those stated in the government's petition. It is now
settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the merits of a
controversy. 16 Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct. 17

It is significant to note that the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA,
petitioners in G.R. No. 100109, have conceded the finality of the dismissal of their appeal.18 Thus, the
administrative policy, the validity of which herein petitioners seek to justify by their appeal, has
already been abandoned by the very administrative agency which adopted it, with the result that the
question of validity of A.O. No. 02-88 is now moot and academic.

C. Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and

Decide the Contempt Charges
against Petitioners
(G.R. No. 107720)

As already noted, following the dismissal of the government's appeal in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA
abandoned A.O. No. 02-88 which provided for "Open Pilotage System." But it subsequently
promulgated Administrative Order No. 05-92, under which the PPA assumed the power of
scheduling and assigning pilots to service vessels, allegedly regardless of whether the pilots
assigned are or are not members of the UHPAP and the MPA which theretofore had been the
exclusive agencies rendering pilotage service in Philippine ports. The UHPAP and the MPA saw the
adoption of this system as a return to the "Open Pilotage System" and, therefore, a violation of the
trial court's decision invalidating the "Open Pilotage System." They considered this to be a contempt
of the trial court.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the motions for contempt against them. They contend that even if the
motions were filed as incidents of Civil Case No. 88-44726, the RTC-Manila, Branch 2 did not have
jurisdiction to hear them because the main case was no longer before the court and the fact was that
the contempt citation was not an incident of the case, not even of its execution, but a new matter
raising a new cause of action which must be litigated in a separate action, even as petitioners denied
they had committed any contumacious act by the issuance of A.O. No. 05-92.
Private respondents maintained that their petitions were mere incidents of Civil Case No. 88-44726
and that the trial court has jurisdiction because in fact this Court had not yet remanded the case to
the court a quo for execution of its decision. Private respondents complain that petitioners are trying
to circumvent the final and executory decision of the court in Civil Case No. 88-44726, through the
issuance of A.O. No. 05-92.

As already noted, however, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44726 enjoined
petitioners from implementing the socalled "Open Pilotage System" embodied in A.O. No. 02-88. If,
as alleged, A.O. No. 05-92 is in substance a reenactment of A.O. No. 02-88, then there is basis for
private respondents' invocation of the trial court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt.

Still it is argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 887426, upon the perfection of
their appeal from its decision. That is indeed true. "The appeal transfers the proceedings to the
appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with
contempts committed after perfection of the appeal."19The trial court would have jurisdiction only in
the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the
case to the trial court. 20 Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged
contemptuous acts.

The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in G.R.
No. 100109, petitioners rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt
by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction as embodied in its decision would be
properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents'
complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of
securing obedience to the lawful processes of a court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and
cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the
court.

We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private
respondent, subject to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose.

III. JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.

Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual
procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-
employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits"
arising out of such employment. 2

The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee
and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to
appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas
employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined
as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a
local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died
while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the
M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its
submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The
second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's
signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano
Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's
own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered
Saco to be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its
shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly
appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen
nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.
This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier
been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this
Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco,
but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the
circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on
board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01
February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date."
In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless
deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, reading as follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had
itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the
POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not whatthe law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled
Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There
is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee
as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation
of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest"
in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience
and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v.
Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of
men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security"
in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract
of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that—

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and

master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate
and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is
entitled to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the

owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not
exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the
National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted,
in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his
beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the
NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine
Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance
with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class,
consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the
protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been
denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates
on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange
Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources
and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been
accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process
as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor
of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the
right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which
he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,

HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR
F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E.
REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M.
MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR
MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests
may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition
as follows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES

UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER
OF PUBLIC MONEYS.

B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE

CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES
FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.

C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE

PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.

D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.

E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE

PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy
fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate,
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.

On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they
did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to
hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to
concretize their respective stands." 3

Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder
with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly
rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal.

In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos.
68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents — both of whom have
gone their separate ways — could be a convenient justification for dismissing the
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose
is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in
effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become
moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute
has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though
gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to
national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to
dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in
the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We
see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.

The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi.
Thus:
 Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request
of a taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view
in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the

requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]

Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that
as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.

The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said
paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.

On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,

however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under
the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e.
public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This,
evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the
rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18
of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the
treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of
specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "...
Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the
basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5The contention of public
respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.

Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's
sphere of responsibility.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little,
Brown and Company, Boston, explained:

... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of
equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and
cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected
to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by
that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The
Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of
the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to
it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some
cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the
legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before
them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a
legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or
revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where
they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they
are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private
citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to
act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high
authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of
the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is
paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.
 Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210
Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *

Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier
mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord
them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.

The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by
the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows
even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our
statute books.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDER RED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,

ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is
never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly
collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and
safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed
legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal
circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory
Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to
enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and
respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of
the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly
Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for
the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the
Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the
attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A
Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on
October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners
and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the
minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed
submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal
aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views
being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion
in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of
the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There
is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then
there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right
and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an
inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so
well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and
public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.'
Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue
has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was
first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step.
Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by
other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that
the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United
States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus
set up if not breached has definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to
demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised
greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the
accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-
A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall
formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days
from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire
Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First
Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On
October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with
this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report.
It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for
what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There
are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time,
to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity,
it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is
imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those
of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an
expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must
be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the
exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans
submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of
the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of
Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as
training of judges for more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a
major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary
Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two
decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy.
New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those
economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously
ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite
novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known,
has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory.
Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the
thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its
realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic
progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National
Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to
"the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the
substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change
compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards
reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory
legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be
effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests
adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go
that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for
injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt
final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably
expected. That is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally
of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity.
Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of
both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time
supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more
cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the
growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon
much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that
calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even
worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the
extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as
"both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major
reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of
1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course,
the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate
Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of
six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same
time." 25 Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely,
the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the
Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of
the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would
be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen
divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next
came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts
for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges
having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its
Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the
reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction,
and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with,
and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some
options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase
rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This
preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the
parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was
submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some
amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed
Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with
the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed
of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership.
Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in
December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench
and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the
invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the
sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in
the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is
expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural
changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of
procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of
the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is
quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was
signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how
lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What
appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to
the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be
without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of
the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also
that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the
abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question
laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v.
Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the
offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the
abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of
Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding
filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year
after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of
original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the
incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth
Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of
then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court
did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless,
the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain
terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due
recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No.
145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an
entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional.
This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to
the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating
new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National
Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the
Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two
sections of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation
of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs.
New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the
argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not
share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin
on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and
circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and
emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding
security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to
cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the
hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed,
the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department
and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges
or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative
department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent
upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved
by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express
provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth
Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid
exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta,
reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act
No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts of first instance.
In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation.
As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical
as to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for
expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged
statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as
in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact
that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new
inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was
for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice
Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la
Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado
extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State,
46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se incapacite no priva
al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation
there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the
peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha
cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that.
Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative
authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a
judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far
as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the
exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably
so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the
transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with
an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the
Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently
constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by
the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has
no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an
assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words.
The amended Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong
executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a
noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in
stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually
govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or
by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by
Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once
again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual division." 64 The president,
under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under
the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the
position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime
Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments
though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a
majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and
not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of
the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the
provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where
to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court
is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect
is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation
of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that
its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from
any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is
to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of
the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no
ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed
in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution.
That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for approval." 80Nor would such a step
be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act,
but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section
44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize
constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to
reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is
hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this
Tribunal. It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting
within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of
reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main,
"the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist,
even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for
which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the
light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini,
Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a
case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in
a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise
expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable
under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated
system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent
necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the existence
in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without
this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power.
That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation
and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the
challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue.
The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate
Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and allowances as may
be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The
existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is
that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal
them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and
legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more
receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may
be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal
scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-
needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation
concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers." 92 Another
objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame
limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme
Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a
staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing
order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The first
sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners
cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning
as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President.
Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose
length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in legal
contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to
assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law
professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary
in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their
standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even
acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a
generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have
the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the
discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was
limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more
in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such
activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had
the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved.
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then
Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted
members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite
this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice
of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been
responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit
institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid
exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of
judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed
with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it
has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A
public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law
may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure
judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer
justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more
likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the
corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely
for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal,
lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the
national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action
necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v.
Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given
character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of
office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one
administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of
the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of
the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as
herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law
jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will
do what becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the
independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good
judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance
with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who
are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other
two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of
justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary
unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in
it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing
power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental
principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in
their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people
as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice
Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half
a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic
postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.
 EN BANC

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, G.R. No. 159796

KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB)
and ENVIRONMENTALIST Present:
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
(ECN), PUNO, C.J.,
Petitioners, QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
-versus- SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
(DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY CORONA,
COMMISSION (ERC), CARPIO MORALES,
NATIONAL POWER AZCUNA,
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER TINGA,
SECTOR ASSETS AND CHICO-NAZARIO,
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GARCIA,
GROUP (PSALM Corp.), VELASCO, JR. and
STRATEGIC POWER NACHURA, JJ.
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG),
and PANAYELECTRIC Promulgated:
COMPANY INC. (PECO),
Respondents. July 17, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist

Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original
action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
Charge,[1] and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)[2] which seeks to
implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray
that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing
the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said
charge.[3] The assailed provision of law reads:

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the
following purposes:

(a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of the amount assumed by
the National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC[5] and as
well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities
resulting from the restructuring of the industry;

(b) Missionary electrification;[6]

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or

renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels;

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per

kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental
fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management.
Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and

(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not
exceeding three (3) years.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be

passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the
distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the
TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on
or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount
due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not
connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal
charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of
the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only
for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All
amount collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the
 respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the
ERC.

The Facts

Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.[7]

On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities

Group[8] (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)
a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.[9]

On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the
Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total
of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special
Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power SectorAssets and

Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)[10] for the rehabilitation and management

of watershed areas.[11]

On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order[12] in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the
NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and
authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution
Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.

On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision[13] (for ERC Case No. 2002-165)
modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional

authority granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic
Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20,
2002 is hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount of P0.0205
per kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour
 provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order.
Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby
APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by
PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary
Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles:

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation

(TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the

UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to
PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month.

In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than

April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements
and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the
prescribed format.

Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all

distribution utilities (Dus).

SO ORDERED.

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the
ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC
granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by petitioner National Power Corporation-Small
Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly.

Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on

the following:

1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;

2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
 5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
SO ORDERED.[15]

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing
the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed
Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge.[16]

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other

end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills
starting from the month of July 2003.[17]
Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and
sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said
law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-
generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function
and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the
same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that
the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.

2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the

funds collected should be used.

3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive

and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the
consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.[18]
 Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax
and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the
cases[19] invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the
charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the
respective funds[20] were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil
and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices,
peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely
monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to
administrative bodies.[21] Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not
for a similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide
income for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of
the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for
a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or
discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.[22]

Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a
tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the
viability of the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the
exercise of the State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal
Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition
would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and
that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed
based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that
there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth
sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the
powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal
Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power
of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.[23]
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund
components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the
Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be
held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any
violation of its provisions or its IRR.[25]

The Issues

The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the

EPIRA is a tax; and

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax

on the part of the ERC.[26]

Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious
procedural lapse.

Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a

Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the
Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus
standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they
sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as
reflected in their electric bills.

However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they

filed this Complaint directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any
allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public
respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or
prohibition.

Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution[27] categorically
provides that:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts
and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
forum from which to seek such relief.[28] It has long been established that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.[29] This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the
present action.
 This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional
issue raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in
a repeat of this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public
interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.

The instant complaint is bereft of merit.

The First Issue

To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States power of

taxation from the police power.

The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,

acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it.[30] It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood
of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious
need.[31] Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from
necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of the people.[32]

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.[33] It is the most
pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental
powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As
an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs,
police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State,
as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.[34] We have held
that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve,
and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then
of the utility and of its patrons.[35]
 The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the
purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation
is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.[36]
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed[37] and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The
EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the

State:

(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;

(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime
of free and fair competition and full public accountability to achieve
greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the
competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership
base of the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private
sector entities in the process of restructuring the electric power
industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services
of electric utilities and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and
infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable
energy resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence
on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and
liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and
system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive
operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of
demand side management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal
Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public
welfare is surely promoted.

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an

implement of police power.[38] In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et
al.[39] and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,[40] this Court held that the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions
made in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v.
Orbos[41] with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the
instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge,
a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of
PSALM.[42] The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the
SSF, viz.:

1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall

conduct a review to determine whether there is under-recovery or over
recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery
charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any
excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall
be created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future
claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At the end of
the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this
account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.[43]

2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount

collected for the same is greater than the actual availments against it,
the PSALM shall retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods
where a shortfall occurs.[44]

3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF

shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as
designated by the DOF Secretary.[45]
 The OSG is in point when it asseverates:

Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund,

under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the
pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government
to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the
community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the
police power of the State.[46]

This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for
which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's
electric power industry.

The Second Issue

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches
of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within
its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in
the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated
cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another. [47]

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative

power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to
this principle.[48] Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it
is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and
respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are
denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.[49]

The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to
Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it
contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the
specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii)
of the EPIRA provides:

SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition,
encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize
abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In
appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue cease and desist order
after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for
the following key functions in the restructured industry:

xxxx

(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and
enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution
Code which shall include, but not limited to the following:

xxxx
 (ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the
TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the
formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function
of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards
are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the
minimum financial standards to protect the public interest. Determine, fix,
and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to
be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;

Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and
(e) of the EPIRA[50] clearly provides:

SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its
functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the following
powers:

xxxx

(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract
costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the
determination of the universal charge;

(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds
from sales and other property contributed to it, including the
proceeds from the universal charge.

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of
legislative power.

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;"[51] "adequate and efficient
instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice and equity;"[54] "public convenience and
welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56] "standardization and
regulation of medical education;"[57] and "fair and equitable employment
practices."[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power[59] and watershed rehabilitation and
management[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were
challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory
Commission,[61] the Court had occasion to say:

In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions

of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be
read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated
by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from
any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a
whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and
reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded
the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the
latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA.
When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they
did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon
ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the
powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate
the objectives of the law.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion[62] in the same case, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power
in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over
electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:

Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer
limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used
to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now
requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses
and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial
economy." Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare a
 concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but
another name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of
society that is the basic end of all government." When police power is
delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise
should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader
dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take
a more active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society.
The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the
State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good
grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the
field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation
and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that
affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in
encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress
may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired.
Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable
electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise
its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.

Energy Regulatory Commission[63] where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator,
should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by
multifarious factors affecting public utilities.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation
of legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the

Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive
and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such
contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution[64] of August 3,
2004.[65] Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact,
and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.[66]
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent

years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and
regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to
tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as
the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to
the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded
structure of the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and
transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution
side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and
uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing
generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor
quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the
government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop
a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the

industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National Power
Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private
entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its
transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.[67]

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution
and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[68] Indubitably,
petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no
clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec.
34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.