PEOPLE V.
GONZALES, 183 SCRA 309 (1990) The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after
completed, a report was made with the following findings:
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO
GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case
No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida
who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd
Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered
by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their
appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the then Ministry, now
Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It
modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court
certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to
surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta
with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the
police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the
Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy
Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla.
Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja,
Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing
incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an
underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which
time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate
surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman
Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain
Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan,
two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the
incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his
sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the
Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of
the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with
an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect
of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1
cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and
7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right,
located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located
at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the
left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle,
located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal
3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine
and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial
border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right
elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd,
forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
1
 4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in
the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the
P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat
by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C.
Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo
against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the
crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other
companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed
and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage
of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which
said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the
record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial,
however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the
prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the
basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed.
Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted
the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt.
Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada,
the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at
around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings
revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab
wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting
the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound)
inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the
wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the
P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in
relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the
death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender
of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on
other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident.
According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed
as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the
vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for
help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was
some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing
and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly
recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that
after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it
into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw
to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not immediately
report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight
months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact
that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the
latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled
from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs.
Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted
to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one kilometer away from
the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it after his
grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform
him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court
erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in
not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the
assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have
difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering
that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking
and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around the
victim.
2
 As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation
is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is
of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country
to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"
at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds
that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance
of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence,
a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in
10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six accused
as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine
found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court: who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each
of them.
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and
1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the A Yes, Sir.
award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that
31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, distance by the herein accused as identified by you?
1987).35
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was
imposed being reclusion perpetua.
hacking the victim?
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not
the appellant of the crime charged.
determine who did the hacking.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman
ATTY. GATON:
Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the
crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated The interpretation is not clear.
thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was
however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, COURT:
considering that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood They were doing it rapidly.
stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version
of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was
circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan
ATTY. GATON:
is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben
Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be
safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the
killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada. according to you it was just flashing?
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the A Yes, sir.39
autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility
that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy (Emphasis supplied)
report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the killing appears not

3
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by
the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which
would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation
under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support
the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission
must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by
means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must
be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." 40 In this
instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted
any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or
who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant
"hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the
appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal
wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as
principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And
this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that
time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it
is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five
fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible,
nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by
Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an
iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's
failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to
testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While
ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility, 41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out
an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one
who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has
not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to
be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true
that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering
that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest
of the accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus
the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that
he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was
because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very
source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In
this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means to
ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported eyewitness
and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto
Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense,
be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord.
This is especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater
urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would
alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for
shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective
wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his
family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable
witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition
and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and
emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger and at the prime
of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant,
in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that
the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that
the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
4
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada,
even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in
which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on
record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

5
 PEOPLE V. SYLVESTRE AND ATIENZA, 56 PHIL. 353 (1931)
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal
by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years
and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the accessories of the law, and to pay
each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in
the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after delivering his argument,
prayed for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the
following assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in
the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the information upon the ground
of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin
Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of
Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace
for that municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor
de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued
by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of the month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal
bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the municipal
president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him
to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and promising
not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The
municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his support.
Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In
consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced
against the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the same municipality
of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de
la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him
home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to
cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night
of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together
with the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the
house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to
set fire to the house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of
Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana
Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not
even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin
Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant,
Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred
arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back
to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse
with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-law, took up the
furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire destroyed about forty-eight
houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio
school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to the house
on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving
it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-appellant de oficio, prays
for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts
related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing, justify this petition of the de
oficio counsel, and establish beyond a reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as charged, as
principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her are: That,
being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were
denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second husband; that in view of the
petition of the accused, who promised to discontinue their life together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol,
and through the good offices of the municipal president of Paombong, the complaining husband asked for
the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both of the accused went to lived in the
barrio of Santo Niño, in the same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her
former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre followed
him to his house in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her codefendant,
Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night of
November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered together at home after supper, Martin
Atienza expressed his intention of burning the house as the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol
resident, who had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against them, which
compelled them to leave the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat
without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength
of these facts, the court below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it,
nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson
committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz
and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going to set fire to their house as the
only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire
to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to give the alarm
when the house was already on fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to
commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit
the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make
her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized in article
550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
6
 ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall
exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was
nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted merely arson less
serious than what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was the means of destroying
the others, and he did not know whether these were occupied at the time or not. If the greater seriousness
of setting fire to an inhabited house, when the incendiary does not know whether there are people in it at
the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are exposed, not less serious is the arson
committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of another inhabited house which the firebrand
knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act, if he did not know whether there were people or
not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been convicted
of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the
information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew that the other
houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of
the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at
the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the
commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who
desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire
to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson,
defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the
accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre,
who is hereby acquitted with one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

7
 UNITED STATES V. APOSTOL, 14 PHIL. 92 (1909) For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the
appellant. Ten days from date let a confirming judgment be entered, and ten days thereafter let the case
G.R. No. 5126 September 2, 1909 be remanded to the lower court of action.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, Without prejudice to the immediate execution of the judgment, let the clerk of this court, as provided in
vs. the said article 2 of the Penal Code, respectfully address a communication to the Honorable, the Governor-
CATALINO APOSTOL, defendant-appellant. General of these Islands, giving the result of this decision and the sentence, requesting him, should he so
ARELLANO, C.J.: desire, to make use of the prerogative with which he is invested in order to reduce or mitigate the penalty
imposed. So ordered.
The judgment entered in this case by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finds that on the 16th of
December, 1907, five individuals, among them being the accused herein, went to the house where Pedro Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and there inquired after some carabaos
that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned inmates answered that they knew nothing
about the matter, ordered them to leave the house, but as the three men named above refused to do so
the accused Catalino Apostol, set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down.
In the opinion of the trial court the responsibility of the accused has been fully established by the testimony
of the injured parties. And inasmuch as, according to the same, the act comes within the provisions of article
549 of the Penal Code, Catalino Apostol was sentenced to sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal,
to the accessories of the law, to indemnify the value of the burnt hut in the sum of P1, and to pay the costs.
An appeal having been taken to this court, the defense claimed, on behalf of the offender: (1) The absence
of proof of criminal intent; (2) that in view of the fact that the burnt hut was situated in an uninhabited
place, it is not proper to apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal Code.
Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person
who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the hut Pedro Tabilisima testified that he and his
friends were in the same; that the accused and his companions arrived at 8 p.m. and questioned them about
carabaos that they said had been stolen from them; that after they replied that they knew nothing, the
former set fire to the house and they jumped out of it; that the witness and two companions lived in the
house; that it was situated in an uninhabited place, surrounded by fields; that the nearest houses were far
away, and cries could not be heard from one house to another; and that the burnt house was not worth
more than P1, because it was a small one, the witness himself having constructed it.
Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at 8 o'clock at night, asked them for carabaos that
they claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who was asleep, and Pedro Tabilisima, forced
them to leave the house, and as they did not want to do so for fear of being assaulted the accused set fire
to the same; they tried to put out the fire as long as they could, but when no longer able jumped out of the
house. The house was in an uninhabited locality, in the fields, the nearest house being a small store to which
the cry of a person night carry, and the neighboring houses could be seen.
Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as this last witness. The argument which the defense
advances, based on article 554, which in connection with 553 punishes the setting fire to a building intended
for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply, because the article question refers to an edifice
intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at a time when the same is unoccupied. It is article
549, which punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall
set fire to any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons
were within the same," that must be applied.
The law must be applied as laid down in the above quoted excerpt.
But the court, in view of the nature of the crime and considering the circumstances attending the same,
recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty; therefore we apply the remedy afforded it by article 2,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, when a strict application of the provisions of the code would result in an
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the crime.

8
 UNITED STATES V. CATOLICO, 18 PHIL. 504 (1911)
G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cagayan, Hon. Charles A.
Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him to
two months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold public office or public employment of any
kind, and to the payment of the costs.
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of Baggao, Province
of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil cases commenced by
Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages resulting from a breach of contract;
that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff; that each one of the defendant in
said cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at
the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which was approved by the court; that on the 12th day of
said month the plaintiff in said cases presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging
that the sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the
appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order,
required each of the appellants to file another bond within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the
appellants in said causes presented new bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to
the appellant, as said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen
cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the
defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of said
judgments; that the accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and
delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment,
conditioned that he would respond for the damages which should result from such attachment.
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases presented a
complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered that the
plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the sums deposited by the
defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court and made the delivery as required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused. We are in entire
accord with that recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential
elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not
convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he feloniously permit
anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief that he was acting
judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants —
appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after
the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered the
said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held in those cases, can not be considered
an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He believed that, as presiding
officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it
was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings,
giving the parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were
not filed, and to declare the judgment final. He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said
judgment had become final, the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in
the actions in which said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in making
such applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of the peace.
He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require the payment by
each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing
the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases, he may have exceeded his authority as
such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or
decide, it was, so far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind
operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the
appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not
an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice
to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they
were legally and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another by criminalmisappropriation. It was an
error committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act;
and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this
presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be
a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it may have been
wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other
proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a
degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from
the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises
from the act.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even though it be
admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in Act No.
1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding section, the
absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person described in said section has charge,
and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on
the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall
be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been put to personal uses
or used for personal ends by such person within the meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that
presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he
present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal uses, then that
presumption is at an end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the
accused to offer any such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own
proofs presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had
not been put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated,
both by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the
absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively
and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the absence of the
funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were presented for the purpose
of creating such presumption were accompanied by other facts which absolutely prevented its creation.
On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined in paragraph 5 of
article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to does not arise. Mere absence of the
funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds
at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U.
S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or
by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. (U. S. vs. Morales, supra.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody forthwith.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
9
 PEOPLE V. PUNO, 219 SCRA 85 (1993)
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended
by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph
5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103,
as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly
committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y
MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment
promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in
accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim
Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the
offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts
in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with
page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called
Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on
account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will
temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes
Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner
of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside
the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where
Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to
get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will
let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them
that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is?
The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed.
Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said
he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called,
asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks
in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to
swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the
car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed
to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able
to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too
(Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that,
according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step
out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a
ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga
and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their
loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability
by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced
as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense
that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his
motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the
specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of
10
rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives
for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case
rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person
in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by
the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at
the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from
her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any
other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way
Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad
person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I
have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we
can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable
proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not
where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently
reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by
the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them,
holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto,
but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your
nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed
to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at
Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to
her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given
you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak
or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached
Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the
circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of
which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is
robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the
information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused
admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway.
They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money
that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out
three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable
under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery
on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said
decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267
which are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate
an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the
pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and
307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law,
that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon
in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or
freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the
early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage
and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws,
the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on
the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for
the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306.
It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the
band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent
means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be
such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery
was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala
a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
11
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have
adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and
strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined
therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts
of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating
all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
(Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable
of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an
obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when
committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore,
the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the
presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime
of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived
victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may
potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532,
in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under
the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed
on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements
which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential
issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed
on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit
or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but
skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder
form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the
application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd,
effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line
of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the
desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle,
either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to
take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions
of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful
asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and
are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely
disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case
was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is
not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated,
the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and
punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as
shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated
against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno,
with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made
with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of
the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple
robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which
has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former
offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through
intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to
gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was
unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as
formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey
that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with
intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for
ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through
intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as
Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party,
Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
12
 PEOPLE V. DELIM, 396 SCRA 386 (2003)
G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and
RONALD DELIM alias "BONG", accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of
death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the
sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias "Bong" and Robert, all surnamed
Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
"That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms
barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery,
evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto
Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the
wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior
strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."2
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended.
Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts3 —
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim.
Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he
was "adopted" by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto's wife, Rita, an illiterate,
and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy
considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the
neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his
family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their
supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years
old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house
and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at
Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was
placed in the mouth of Modesto.4Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their
way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to
leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to
the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house
of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio Labayog,
informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy
was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father.
He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modesto's house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there.
On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to
locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the
police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal,
Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan
and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver
was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and
feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the
incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modesto's cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito
and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken
of the cadaver.5 Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and
Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their
respective sworn statements to the police investigators.6 Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers
scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
"SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto — occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
13
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed would, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
- GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD."7
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police
investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their
firearms.8
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending
cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in
band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.9
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.10
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were
in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto's house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He
theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had
a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at
No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison,
Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where
he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon's alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown
in Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23,
1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag
City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate
to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.11
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29,
1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January
29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against
Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an
offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty
of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders
the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of
P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the
Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City
is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED."12
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior
strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail the decision alleging that:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS'
DEFENSE OF ALIBI."13
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in
the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court
opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that
the accused "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth,
brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and)
guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter." They submit that the
foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of
kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused with the killing
of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from
the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been
violated — these being conclusions of law — but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon,
Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for
kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts
recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the
specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged
in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno,
et al.,14 that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of
action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. This
Court further held:
"x x x Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has
been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for
an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
14
 offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto,
but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention."15
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the
victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing,
and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.16 The crime committed would either be
homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential
element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where
circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively
desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is
the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in
the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping
and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.19
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts
the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and
hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of
the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the
innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.20 The history of crimes shows that murders are
generally committed from motives comparatively trivial.21 Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific
intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there
is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping for ransom, the
motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging
into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant
modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary
intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely
incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of
doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.25 Wharton says
that corpus delictiincludes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26 In
homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased
and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal
act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.27 To prove the felony
of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim
was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after
the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or
by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto
sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,29 defensive in nature. The use
by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as
well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent
by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom.30 As the State Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31
"This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences
of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by
the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes
that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found
to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it
was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was
designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise."
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.32 What was once a rule of
account respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states
that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as
anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
"x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."33
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without
exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense
charged.34 For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.35 If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the
prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove
that accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto
and herded him out of his house:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
15
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that
happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his
name was asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated on
the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they
carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms,
what did they do then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay in your house,' and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir."36
Randy's account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
"PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around
6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered inside your
house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your
Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your
house, are these three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald
Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir."37
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as
a lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m.
of the next day:
"FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons,
what did you and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons
Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
16
 FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you
you, these Leon and Manuel? saw him dead?
A They were armed, sir. A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic)."39
Q What do you mean by armed? The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was
in a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum
A They have gun, sir. were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and
Q What kind of firearm? forearm:

A Short firearm, sir. "PROS. TOMBOC:

Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know? Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?

A Leon is here, sir. WITNESS:

Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his
name was asked, answered, Leon Delim)."38
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with
Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent
them from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper
extremities are flexed and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim,
Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were
so many worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.

4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found Q What else did you observe Doctora?
under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim
house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of decomposition: was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it
"Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father? or not I should do it, sir.

A The same place and at 3:00 o'clock P.M., we were able to find my father. Q What else Doctora?

COURT: Where? A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.

A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir. And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20
ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your
father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 o'clock P.M.? Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?

A Yes, sir. A Yes sir.

Q Who? And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below
middle nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital
A My Aunt, sir. area (POEx).
Q What is the name of your Aunt? Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Nida Pucal, sir. A Five (5) sir.
Q Who else? And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm.
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition? aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and
#3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left
A He was dead, sir. forearm.
COURT: Go ahead. Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
17
 Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora? A Labayog, Sison, sir.
A Yes sir."40 Q Wherelse?
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that
the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors Q What was the result?
determinative of the exact death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states: A Negative result, sir."43
"Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region: 6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto
and Rita:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
"COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23,
1999?
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present.
Moving maggots seen A Yes, sir, I know them.

72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails loose. Tissues soft and Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
discolored."42 A They are my neighbors, sir.
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27,
1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the A I know them, sir.
prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999. Q Why do you know them?
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and A They used to go to our house, sir.
were nowhere to be found:
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your
"COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim? husband's name is Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir."44
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects? The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an
brothers, sir. offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence
against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to
Q What are the names of the brothers? show that they, in fact, killed Modesto.45
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir. It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill
Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation? between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before
A No, sir. the incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless,
it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were
Q Why? criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that nowadays persons
have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.46 In this case, the inscrutable facts are that
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be
Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the
found, they all left the place, sir.
gunpoint, hog-tied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim? Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under
the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained
A Within the vicinity, sir. several gunshot wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the
Q In what place? connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where influences moving the mind.47 The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be
the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir. trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers? Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and
Leon to rebut the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may
Q Wherelse (sic)? have been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However,

18
Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed
the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired
with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.48 Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after
the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime.50 It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed
the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.51 This is based on
the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:
"x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered
and treated as the acts and declarations of his principal. 'What is so done by an agent, is done
by the principal, through him, as his mere instrument.' Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania
D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). 'If the conspiracy be proved to have
existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in furtherance
of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common
design, he does as the agent of the co-conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710."52
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield
one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common
design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.53
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After
Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not
to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he
left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision
evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the
killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were — (a) to act
as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking
assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been
a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty
of the killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon
and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.56 If part of a crime has been committed in
one place and part in another, each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal.
No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan
for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as
principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime.57
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were
marred by inconsistencies.
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later
however, Randy claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their
house. She later changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon
and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified
that after the three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered the house and
guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999,
and she was accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when
he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.58
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court,
its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof
and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment
and conduct of the witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court.
In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved
by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their
testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight.59 The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita
and Randy do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne
in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a person's sense of observation is
impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.
What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements
dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of
witnesses on the same side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight
of their united testimony to the prominent facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve
to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed
testimony. 62
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and
the true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due
consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto.63
Randy's testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his
testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan.
Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they
went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed
to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged
into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon's counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached her
testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give her an
opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13, of the Revised
Rules of Evidence which reads:
"Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them."64
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired
impeachment of her.65 As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely
stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood
guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of
Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the
earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with
consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events
19
which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the
trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence
and probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective
evidence to prove their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal
prosecution because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to
the offender.66 It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court
and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that
they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of the commission of the crime; that it was
physically impossible for them to have committed the said crime.67 They failed to discharge their burden.
Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits.
The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers
away from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a
resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of
the crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that
he resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
in the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and
the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General
contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
are guilty of murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved
clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly
insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68 As this Court held: "No matter how
truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of
aggravating the condition of defendant."69Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a)
the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.70 Although the victim may
have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he
was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the victim was
defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or
conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and
killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the
same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco73 is that the assailants
deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to
show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in
strength.74 In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took
advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors
outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.75
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial,
there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm.
Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD 1866 as amended
by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or
murder.76 Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not
alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court.77 Although this
rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had
been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.78
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should
be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision
mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from
the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4
months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of
P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.79 The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.80 In addition, civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence.81
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins the dissenting opinion of J. Vitug.
Gutierrez, J., joins Justice Vitug in his dissenting opinion.
20
 PEOPLE V. TEMBLOR, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias "RONALD," defendant-appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was charged with the crime of murder in Criminal
Case No. 1809 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City
for shooting to death Julius Cagampang. The information alleged:
That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, and
confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is at large, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot with
firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the vital parts of the body thereby inflicting
mortal wounds, causing the direct and instantaneous death of the said Julius Cagampang.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof under Articles
41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while
Cagampang, his wife and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in
Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald,
arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes,
there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on
the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name
"Jul" Two persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store
through the main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang
armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim.
Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave
the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and
fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by the
Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man who killed her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30,
1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the dreaded NPA (New People's Army) were not
apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other members- followers of the
New People's Army. Temblor surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of
dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim's widow, Victorina, did not know him by name. That
circumstance allegedly renders the Identification of the accused, as the perpetrator of her husband's killing,
insufficient. However, during the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow who recognized
him because she was less than a meter away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a
40-watt flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her testimony was corroborated by another
prosecution witness — a tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal — who was a long-time acquaintance of the
accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the
people scampering away.
Dr. Alfredo Salonga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim sustained
three (3) gunshot wounds.
Rebutting the accused's alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's
Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing
that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on December 30, 1980
from 10:50 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1980. The accused did
not bother to overcome this piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the
deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of allbi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively Identified as the killer of Cagampang? The settled
rule is that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on
the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its
findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on
appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).<äre||anº•1àw>
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish
her credibility, especially because she had positively Identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and
her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and entirely in
accord with human experience.
Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification made by the
prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime. Furthermore, the rule
is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere
else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio
Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a
matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively Identified him could not be
overcome by the defendant's alibi. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People vs. Venancio Ramilo, 146
SCRA 258.)
Appellant's alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that
the defendant's knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings
perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and
ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is
known as the NPA's "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit
has been positively Identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his
firearm. They hid in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People
vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable
to the heirs of the Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
21
 PEOPLE V. HASSAN, 157 SCRA 261 (1988) Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not
see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988 exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.
vs. On cross-examination, Samson testified:
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
SARMIENTO, J.:
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that he was already
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region dead, is that correct?
Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his appearance.
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the one who stabbed
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as
manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15-year- A Yes, Sir.
old pushcart cargador. 4
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with more
A Yes, sir,
jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accused-
appellant, belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor, Q Can you recall what time was that?
marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the odyssey of his
widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the ravages of internicine A I do not know what time was that.
war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the accused?
evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence in this world has not even been
officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to A...
which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
Q For Identification?
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the
A Yes, sir.
sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the
Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the prosecution. Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must, A Yes he was alone.
therefore, be set free.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business, do you have any
The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a blood relationship with them?
resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of
the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982. A Yes. sir. 6

He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he
was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the
Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon
who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit
stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that
after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he
knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle
with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on
his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the assailant
because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these
happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days
after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after
the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was practically
forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The
sworn statement contained the following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person whom I can recognize
by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his
motorcycle parked within the area. That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife

22
 suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other and
immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National Bank (PNB). That this
unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair, dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve),
maong pants height to more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled
the area I immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to
Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did not
whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious condition and few minutes later, he
expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed your companion,
Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La Merced Funeral
Homes, wherein you were confronted with one Usman Hassan, whom this Officer brought
along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my companion, Ramon Pitcher,
Jr., that evening in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by me and this I cannot
forget for the rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while in the process of
buying some mangoes in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman Hassan in stabbing your
companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more to say, add or alter in
this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.
Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the future?
A-23. Yes, Sir. 9
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that embodied
in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This exhibit for
the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an unidentified person, whom he
recognized only by face, appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim and stabbed
the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it confirms the
confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police
Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein the
person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was arrested in connection with
the above stated incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this person Usman due to
his physical appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson. During
his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated in his
possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along at the La Merced Funeral Homes
for a confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson and in this confrontation, Jose Samson
positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and admitted
ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife for slicing
mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof —
beyond reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict
an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce,
without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel,
Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of
convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and
alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales
must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumtion of
innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the State that is
prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the
prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of the
uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and
therefore suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence
sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of
the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the
prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While
Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his
chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the
chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The
same medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause
of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16 at
Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one, we
are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the Identification of the accused
as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the
police investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office
of the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the
prosecution, the procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson,
Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was
23
brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a
turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this tergiversation we
dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-examination, augmented by the
leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the part of the police
investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that
both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented
to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct
erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused
testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was
no such police investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where
there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This
unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles
of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect
nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The
police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the
funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and
the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially.
Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his
statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only
two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor—
from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must
have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation
given as to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting
on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the
scene of the crime, was not also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or
of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio from Usman
(tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all
to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the
deceased. A crime laboratory test — had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted
on it — would have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio
one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The
police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by saying that the knife could have
been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's
having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of
Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly
reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at
Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being
a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of
arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the
stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this
City." The said resolution further states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear
of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on
August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was)
molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of the case at
bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or
question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character
that made the police officers disregard the possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of
the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar
Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link to the
resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman
Hassan was already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a victim
of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he
is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police investigation
with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly circumstanced as he is,
the authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the former
barter trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge
found it "therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade
area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the
morning and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's
explanation — that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home — was
found by the trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that
evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single question
to the accused, and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only to put on
record what the mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy,
the mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the prosecution
witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that sense
and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance of
which was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to
150 meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio
stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the
assailant, he would have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that
the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police
officers immediately responded and appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases
in the past where criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can
explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has no criminal record, and,
therefore, he could not be generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial court's
rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval by this
Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to
Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in
order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for
purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal.
This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is
extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court disregarded
the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
24
 The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such claim on the
testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that her son Usman
Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was born in the year 1967. She testified that she was
just told by a person coming from their place about the year of the birth of her son Usman.
However on cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or year of birth
of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the date or year of birth of
her children is of course understandable, considering that she is unschooled and she belongs to
a tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she only
took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the Court granted a
motion of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein accused examined by a
competent dentist to determine his age. However, the findings of the dentist of Zamboanga
General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows the following: "age cannot be determined
accurately under present mouth conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of
age." This simply means that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of
age, or any age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of this court, the
accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he committed this crime and this
observation is based on his personal appearance, his size and facial features and other personal
characteristics, hence he can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of
Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case of
U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the
Edition, Page 680, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit
is at issue as a basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon the
accused to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the suspension of his
sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more
meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance on
the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the
accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an
accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that
there is the probability that the accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All
the foregoing indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with which the
poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and
procedures are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the
poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal of the
accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

25
 UNITED STATES V. AH CHONG, 15 PHIL. 488 (1910)
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused
himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident
upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially
correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon
a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door
of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small
window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness
and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the
door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described,
one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges,
it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock
at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock,
and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few
moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning
to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them
ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the
wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite
defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he
died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be.
No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning
to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon
him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to
defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant
nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the
fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to
defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
26
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works
an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him,
even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and
cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically
and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in
the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats
of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United
States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly
declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general
provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the
general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed,
and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different
from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing
and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the
place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so
little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them
may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater
or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or
less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded
from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article,
say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention
(intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies
and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in
the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former
code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p.
74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and
in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there
is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence
of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed
from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the
crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial
church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in
the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question
of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of
article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and
the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on
the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the
word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
27
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes
defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent,
more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and
signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and
429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime
that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general
principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent.
In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably
it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can
not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,
"the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non
est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In
this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the
ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason
comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems
another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form
of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not
his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr.
Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be
accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature
from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent
is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance
of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here
to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission
of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will
not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the
law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that
crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if
suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake
in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary,
the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke,
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1
Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509;
Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S.,
28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the
time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably
be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which
the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless
of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the
mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and
property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such
as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt
from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he
would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of
his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice
or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear
28
 that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the
case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched
arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any
reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet
in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before
he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who
try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are
here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company
only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back
to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or
know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of
which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the
house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance
as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained
pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating
great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as
having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal
aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code
condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon
appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was
attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have
executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and
considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might
endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed
was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the
darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of
the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance
of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at
the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one
of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel,
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he
be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in
just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused
two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed
to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison
mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding
that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity
of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness,
etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court,
March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be
burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one
of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next
morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there
existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal,
the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of
May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman
struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door
of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must
have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself
from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
29
 PEOPLE V. OANIS, 74 PHIL. 257 (1943)
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial,
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000.
Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When
the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of
loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate
some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see
anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading
to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached
one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida
trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her
paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking
at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial
Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to
the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a
.32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where
Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at
Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having
said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter
was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that
he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching
and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially
contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in
an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot
Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta
testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these
contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at
once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson
was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed
by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson
when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured
that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the
trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error
was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of
the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even
misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every
detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the
door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this
theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime
committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again.,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck
and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a
friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that
his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time
or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In
the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
30
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by
to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get
him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000,
and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using with costs.
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2,
par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life
of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion
alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas
que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo
7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity
of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have
acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not
the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get
him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing
the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any

31
 QUIZON V. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, G.R. NO. L-6641, 28 JULY 1955
G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955
FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint
against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality
charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence, the value of the
damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00
to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice
of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to
him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant
appealed from this ruling of the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:
Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:
Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.
Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts
of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:
(6) Malicious mischief;.
In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86 Phil., 596;
andNatividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in Section 87 (c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and judges of the
municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the penalty to be
imposed is more than six months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.
The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the court
of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or imprudence
if the amount of the damage is P125.
We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has
jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction over
cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of the latter. This
assumption is not legally warranted.
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall
be guilty of malicious mischief.
It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the general
intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he should act under
the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho concurra animo especifico de
dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of Tribunal Supreme of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909;
12 Feb. 1921).
El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho dañoso
y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar. Si no existe
semejante animo el hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon, p.870-871).
The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of
Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e., not
punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be committed
through negligence, since culpa (negligence) andmalice ( or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible.
Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct.
1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or
negligence.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and
the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide";
or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation
to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of malicious
mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our conclusion is that
"malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive reference to the willful
and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.
A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87 of the
Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses punishable with not more
than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction,
the Judiciary Act added eight (8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without
reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is one of these exceptions, while imprudence
resulting in damage to property is not one of them.
For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies exclusively in
the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice of
the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
32
 VENANCIO M. SEVILLA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 194390, 13 AUGUST 2014
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information,4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Malabon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang
[P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his
official position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he
is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data
Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City
Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending
against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No.
6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for
Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon,
Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether
there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent ofa person in authority before
the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise
filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla
administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the
service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-
à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not intend
to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually
prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. Ataround
two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit
the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then
instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel
office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the
same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the
question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres
testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when
the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter
inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter
having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision,8 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not
appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public
document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla
had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out
that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case
against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned
entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence under Article 36511 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case
against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in its
Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had not been a candidate in any
localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran and served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992
to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21,
he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this
nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with malicious intent
to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations in
his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data
therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a government officer, who prior to his election as
councilor in 2001, had already served as a councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more
mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless Imprudence, as
defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. x x x.12
33
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution13 dated October 22,
2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed
against him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public
documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him
in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed
by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article
365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan
designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of
committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the
last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing
it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission results
in damage, either to person or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and
dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or terminology. In intentional
crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide
through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penaltyfor
the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours) Thus, the proper
designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and
not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the
merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged
in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution. The rules on variance
between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the
offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the
prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional
felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough
falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of
falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel
argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily includedin the offense charged in the
information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the
Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may
however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
34
commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the
situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made
possible the cashing of checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take
proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which
turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between
the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.19(Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification
of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents,
the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep, the
petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then filed
against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the
Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil.
341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional
CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to
qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless
imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18
Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the
middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a
wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is
the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or
injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III,
1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous
recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects
or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966).21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of
public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

35
 PEOPLE V. CARMEN, 355 SCRA 267 (2001)
G.R. No. 137268 March 26, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding
Sibonga, ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUÑEZ @ Rey Nuñez, accused-appellants.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding accused-
appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding
Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuñez @ Rey Nuñez guilty of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
The information2 against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on
one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January
27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were playing takyan in front of the
house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly they heard a child shout, "Tabang
ma!" ("Help mother!"). The cry came from the direction of the house of accused-appellant Carmen, who is
also known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala. The two children ran towards Mother Perpetuala's
house.3 What Honey Fe saw on which she testified in court, is summarized in the decision of the trial court,
to wit:
While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy Luntayao,
. . . being immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the
waist of the body while accused Reynario Nuñez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused
Eutiquia Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boy's head into the
water. She heard the boy shouting "Ma, help" for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or
Rey Nuñez tie the boy on the bench with a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that
Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic container (galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy.
Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused Alexander Sibonga banged the boy's head
against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down. She even heard the banging sound
everytime the boy's head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it. According to this
witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie alias
Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boy's chest with their clenched fists. All the time Rey
Nuñez held down the boy's feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped
her weight, buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or
Deding Sibonga to get a knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the
stainless knife on the left side of the boy's body and with the use of a plastic gallon container,
the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from the left
side of the boy's body. Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from the tortured boy. Much later
she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuñez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and
Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.4
Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy, was 13
years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a "nervous breakdown" which
Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy with him to the farm.
According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the
suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuñez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children (Randy,
Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuñez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuñez's house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo,5 where all of the
accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his son's condition.
He was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit," which accused-appellant Carmen said she could
exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct the healing
prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his wife and two
daughters were locked inside a room in the house.6
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout "Ma, tabang!" ("Mother, help!"). Eddie tried to go out of the
room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an hour, the
Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of the house.7
A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer
room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy's face was bluish and contused,
while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already dead. He
wanted to see his son's body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who
told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 o'clock that evening.8
After 7 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the funeral
parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be transferred
to the house of accused-appellant Nuñez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-
appellant Nuñez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28,
1997, accused-appellant Nuñez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report
Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his son's
burial. Nuñez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.9
At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke, Talisay
to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring their son's body
with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant Carmen that this
was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy
Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.10
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the
Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder against accused-
appellant Nuñez and the other members of his group.11 He also asked for the exhumation and autopsy of
the remains of his son.12 As the incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office in
Cebu City.
Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He testified that he
met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy
Luntayao.13 Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitting that she
and the other accused-appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on January 27,
1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in
the kitchen of Carmen's house, which, with Carmen's permission, he took with him to the NBI office for
examination. Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the examination.14
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy Luntayao,
testified that he, the victim's father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victim's body on February 20, 1997
at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the autopsy on the same day and
later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):15
FINDINGS
36
 Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed
blanket (white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet
deep.
Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.
Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.
Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial
fossae right to left down to the occipital bone, left side.
Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.
Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.
Cranial vault almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head
injury and/or traumatic chest injury.
Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victim's chest was caused by contact with a hard blunt
instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of the skull
followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been caused by the forcible
contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench.16
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victim's body but
explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and examined, it was
already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present, unrecognizable.17
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged eyewitness
to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing, alleged former "patients" of
accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d)
Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant Carmen, whom
she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997,
while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the latter
regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to
"treatment." After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen
to decide not to continue with the "treatment," but the boy's parents allegedly prevailed upon her to
continue. As the boy continued to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga
and Celedonia Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie
Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of
a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Fabie prayed
over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Carmen asked Nuñez to place his
hands under the boy's head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down his head.
To stop the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boy's legs, while accused-appellant Nuñez
held his shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house. Accused-
appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase said she no
longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry.18
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the "pray-over" of their son from beginning to
end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim on his chest with their
fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She claimed that Randy was still
alive when he was taken inside the house.19
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39, who testified
that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying over them and without
applying any form of physical violence on them.20
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to testify on
the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of pneumonia. According
to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the issuance of a death certificate
for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough and fever.21
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she merely relied
on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa, who
examined the victim's body.22
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to identify the
resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)23 on the re-investigation of the case in which he recommended the
dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensed with, however, as the
prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the qualification that Solima's
recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.24
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and Dr.
Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He reiterated his
earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two daughters were locked
inside a room. He disputed Blase's statement that his son was still alive when he was brought into the prayer
room. He said he saw that his son's head slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.25
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-appellant
Nuñez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that his son was suffering
from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown. He took exception to Dr. Carloto's
statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it was Nuñez who insisted that he (Eddie)
accompany him in order to secure the death certificate.26
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay
the costs. The accused, are, however, credited in full during the whole period of their detention
provided they will signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.27
In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it
is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did
commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case
at bar had contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having
immersed the head of the victim into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held
responsible for all the consequences even if the result be different from that which was intended
(Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent
to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of
murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack,
and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. Under the guise of
a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed upside down the head
of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench; pounded his chest
with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these acts
would surely cause death to the victim. . . .
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when
a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view
37
 of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is criminally liable although the
consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by him. . . .
....
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent
may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption.
In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in
inflicting physical harm to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong
done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.28
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of murder.29
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual performed
over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the victim's parents,
accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the boy to a
"treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body. Unfortunately, the strange procedure
resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability
arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about
the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as
homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil
is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time,
and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants which, because
of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latter's death. As
already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group,
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,30 the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the victim
of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the victim's
feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the accused liable
for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was noted that the accused had no intention to
cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,31 the Court ruled that the proper charge to file against a non-
medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not possess the necessary
technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was homicide through reckless
imprudence.
The trial court's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful
act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary. 32 The facts
of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the accused-appellants. Indeed, the
trial court's findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are ignored and the Court limits
itself to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized "treatment" of the victim.
Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery or
the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.33 Viewed in this light, the acts
which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to
restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants' contention that the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of Honey Fe's credibility. Her
testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached or contrived. She was only a few
meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their "pray-over" healing session not
to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her
testimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fe's
testimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victim's skull. With regard to Dr.
Mendez's failure to find any stab wound in the victim's body, he himself had explained that such could be
due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state
of decomposition. Randy Luntayao's cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering
the length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very
likely that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to
determine whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract
the credibility of Honey Fe's testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances Claire
Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecution's evidence. We
do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable.34
Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge Renato C.
Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the case after the
prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.35 However, the fact that the judge who wrote the
decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less competent to render a
decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses.36
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they can.
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals,37 the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa through
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the accused
liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals court
erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged him with
having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense,
upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in
the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which
made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent
but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real
38
 claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts
which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a
case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having
alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time
that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the
concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando,38 the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court. On
appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this case,
taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellants should
suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.39 In addition, they should pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants' gross negligence in
attempting to "cure" the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an example or correction
for the public good.40
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

39
 PEOPLE V. PUGAY, 167 SCRA 439 (1988)
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and
with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body
of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to
weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court
rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused
Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of
murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for
both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following
errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF
SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-
appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run
errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was
held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a
comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived.
These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased
walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece
of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then,
the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some
people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish
the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers
of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible
for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors
thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers
brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation.
Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which
Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the
reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of
gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set
the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that
both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that
they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of
the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the
offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed
in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings
of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G',
there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to
the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only
Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non-
40
presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the
prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there
appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico
Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the
deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as
prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely
corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to
utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter
requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from
liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary
to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state
the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion
and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay
admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had
no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the
deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony
on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed
reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you
saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly
see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later
you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of
fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know
that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask
him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was
going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is
why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can
of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline
when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of
pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped
reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can
of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring
the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw
Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the
crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at
the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted
to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only
for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the
can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the
deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid
could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the
diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by
his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that
the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all
those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his
conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline
had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to
defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased
before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of
their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and
the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
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to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the
deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the
latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their
fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him
of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of
physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused
Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were
stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents
for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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