People vs.

Jabinal
February 27, 1974
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession
of a revolver without the required license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because even if h e h a d n o l i c e n s e o r p e r m i t , h e h a d
appointments as Secret Agent from the P r o v i n c i a l G o v e r n o r o f
Batangas and as Confidential Agent from th e Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments express ly carried with
them the authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The
a c c u s e d f u r t h e r c o n t e n d e d t h a t i n v i e w o f h i s appointments, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs.
Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in
Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
W/N the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s
rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is
the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial
decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall f o r m p a r t
of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme
C o u r t constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally
passed, since the court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet”— the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero
and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the l a n d ,
at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and
w h e n h e w a s arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof. C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t p o s s e s s e d
a f i r e a r m p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g doctrine enunciated in Macarandang
and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession
of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
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*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret
agent they were
Deemed to be “peace officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying
firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court
ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential
agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a
firearm.