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Coastal Engineering Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2016) 1640009 (28 pages)


c World Scientific Publishing Company and Japan Society of Civil Engineers
DOI: 10.1142/S057856341640009X

Storm Surge Awareness in the Philippines

Prior to Typhoon Haiyan: A Comparative Analysis
with Tsunami Awareness in Recent Times

Miguel Esteban∗,††, Ven Paolo Valenzuela† , Ryo Matsumaru‡ ,

Takahito Mikami§ , Tomoya Shibayama§ , Hiroshi Takagi¶ ,
Nguyen Danh Thao and Mario De Leon∗∗
∗
Graduate Program on Sustainability Science – Global
Leadership Initiative (GPSS-GLI), The University of Tokyo,
Kashiwanoha, Kashiwa City T277-8563
†
Center for Disaster Preparedness,
Quezon City, Philippines
‡
Department of Regional Development Studies,
Tokyo University, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan
§
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering,
Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
¶
Graduate School of Science and Engineering,
Tokyo University of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

Department of Civil Engineering,
Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology, Vietnam
∗∗
De la Salle University, Manila, Philippines
††
esteban.fagan@gmail.com

Received 7 April 2015

Accepted 13 November 2015
Published 21 January 2016

Category 5 Typhoon Haiyan was one of the strongest typhoons to hit the Philippines in
modern times, and introduced the term “storm surge” to the vocabulary of many local
residents, who had not heard about such phenomena prior to this event. The storm surge
manifested itself on the 8th November 2013 as Haiyan made landfall, devastating large
areas in the islands of Leyte and Samar. To attempt to gain an understanding of the level
of awareness that local residents had about storm surges the authors conducted structured
questionnaires (n = 172) and focus group interviews with local residents, and discussed the
results obtained with key informants (government officers and disaster risk managers). One

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of the key problems identified during the interviews was how people were not able to clearly
understand the concept of a storm surge, with many respondents emphasizing how it would
have been better for authorities to describe it as a “tsunami”. A discussion is also made
on the recent evolution in world-wide coastal disaster awareness, comparing it to recent
developments in storm surge awareness in the Philippines and other countries in the area,
such as Vietnam and Japan. The authors conclude that, in terms of its influence on world-
wide disaster awareness, typhoon Haiyan constitutes an event of similar importance to
major recent high-impact tsunami events such as the 2004 Indian Ocean and 2011 Tohoku
events. As a result, the authors will outline a number of lessons learnt from Haiyan, such
as the necessity for creating multi-layer safety strategies and improving how information
about storm surges is transmitted to local residents.
Keywords: Typhoon Yolanda; awareness; preparedness; resilience; evacuation preparations.

1. Introduction
There is an increasing worldwide awareness of the risk associated with coastal nat-
ural disasters, namely tsunamis and typhoons, due to the high number of severe
coastal disasters documented since the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 [Esteban
et al., 2015a; Shibayama, 2015b]. This was one of the greatest disasters of recent
times, with the world’s media widely broadcasting its consequences and introduc-
ing the term “tsunami” to the majority of the inhabitants of the planet [though
some countries, such as Japan or Chile, had a long experience and awareness about
these events, see for example Esteban et al., 2013]. However, tsunamis are not the
only type of disaster that can bring about flooding to coastal communities. Tropical
cyclones can also generate storm surges that can cause great damage to unprepared
developing countries, though even developed countries like the United States and
Japan can also be greatly affected by them [see for example Munich Re, 2009; Hal-
legatte, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; Mikami et al., 2012a].
Particularly, events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (over 1800 dead) have
contributed to improving awareness about storm surges [US Army Corps of Engi-
neers, USACE, 2006]. Its effects were particularly felt in New Orleans, which is
situated in the delta of the Mississippi river in an area that is largely below sea
level and surrounded by levees [Shibayama, 2015a; Jonkman et al., 2009a, 2009b].
Essentially the hurricane generated a large storm surge that caused the catastrophic
failure of many of the levees that protected the city. The capital stock destroyed by
Hurricanes Katrina could have been over $100 billion [Hallegatte, 2008], and large
numbers of houses suffered significant damage, especially in areas where the water
flood velocity was high [Pistrika and Jonkman, 2010].
Category 5 typhoon Haiyan in 2013 could be considered as another defining event
in raising awareness about storm surges, not only in the Philippines but within the
entire world. The weather system (known as Yolanda in the Philippines) made land-
fall in the Philippines on the 8th November 2013 at almost the peak of its power,
devastating the islands of Leyte and Samar and causing large damage to other areas
in the Visayas (the central islands in the Philippines). The maximum sustained wind

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speeds were around 160 knots, the largest in the recorded history of the world [Schier-
meier, 2013]. The strong winds, together with the typhoon’s extremely low central
pressure (895hPa), caused great damage to vegetation, infrastructure and buildings
[Takagi et al., 2015a]. A large storm surge was also generated, which engulfed sev-
eral coastal towns and resulted in large damage to Tacloban city [Takagi et al.,
2015a; Tajima et al., 2014]. As a consequence, Haiyan caused a great number of
casualties, with an estimated 6201 individuals reported dead, 28 626 injured and
1 785 still missing [NDRRMC, 2014]. It was one of the deadliest disasters to have
affected the country, surpassing that of the 1991 floods in the Ormoc region in west-
ern Leyte, where 5101 people were killed by Tropical Storm Thelma. The number
of damaged houses is estimated at 1 140 332, with 550 928 of them being completely
destroyed [NDRRMC, 2014]. This is despite the area being frequently affected by
typhoons, typically between 3.6 and 6.0 per year [Kubota and Chan, 2009] in the
October-November period [Brand and Blelloch, 1973]. About half of the strongest
typhoons measured at landfall over the past 80 years have hit the country [TIME,
2013]. Typically these weather events cause great damage to human settlements,
and there are fears that future increases in the intensity of such weather events
could lead to even greater damage [Stromberg et al., 2011; Esteban et al., 2012,
Takagi et al. 2011]. However, although a number of relatively recent storm surge
events have been reported by the media in the country, such as that of Typhoon
Nesat in 2011 causing damage to Manila Bay’s seawall [AFP, 2011], no large storm
surge causing widespread inundation had affected the Philippines prior to Typhoon
Haiyan in recent times. Thus, although the authorities had been increasingly invest-
ing in natural disaster preparedness and extensive preparations were underway in
the days before Haiyan arrived, the population was surprised by the power and
characteristics of the storm surge.
Following each coastal disaster, be it a tsunami or a storm surge, there is typically
a major drive to increase disaster preparedness and resilience through the construc-
tion of defence structures, relocation of communities away from danger zones and
the improvement of evacuation systems [Esteban et al., 2013]. In this sense it is
clear that following Haiyan the Philippines were more prepared to issue warnings
on storm surges during 2014 Typhoon Hagupit [Rappler, 2014]. Essentially, in a
flood risk management system a number of different protection measures can be
attempted, which leads to the concept of multi-layer safety which now forms part of
the philosophy behind disaster preparedness in countries such as the Netherlands,
[National Water Plan of the Netherlands, 2012] and the reconstruction of Tohoku
[Esteban et al., 2015c]. Multi-layer safety introduces the integration of flood risk
probability-reducing measures and loss-mitigating measures (countermeasures that
can reduce damage if flooding actually takes place) in a flood protection system
[Tsimopoulou et al., 2013]. The role of the former is to prevent inundation, whereas
the latter is meant to function only in case when an extreme event exceeds the
expectations of the prevention lines and inundation occurs. Within a multi-layer

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safety system, three safety layers can be distinguished:

• Layer 1 — Prevention: which encompasses various measures such as breakwaters

or dykes that aim to prevent seawater from inundating areas that are usually dry.
• Layer 2 — Spatial Solutions: such as using spatial planning and adaptation of
buildings to decrease the magnitude of the losses if a flood does occur. Spatial
arrangements that can form part of layer 2 measures include the placement of
important social infrastructure buildings on higher grounds and the flood proofing
of high buildings by placing the most important functions on higher floors.
• Layer 3 — Emergency Management: this includes organizational preparation for
floods such as disaster plans, risk maps, early-warning systems, evacuation and
medical help. The main focus of layer three measures is the reduction of risk to
human life. For the case of tsunamis the most important component of the layer 3
would be a rapid evacuation plan, especially against the highest types of tsunami
events [Shibayama et al., 2013].
The degree to which such a multiple-layer system is developed in a given coun-
try varies, depending on the level of priority, awareness and preparedness [Esteban
et al., 2013]. In turn, the level of awareness also varies according to the frequency of
natural disasters in the past, and the degree of preparedness is often related to the
value of the area that needs to be protected in terms of human life, economic assets
and natural environment, and the degree of flexibility in policy-making that allows
economic resources to be available for financing disaster management projects [Tsi-
mopoulou et al., 2012, 2013]. Frequent massive disaster events in the past 10 years
have led to the emergence of a heightened state of disaster awareness not only in
countries affected recently by these events, but also in other countries which have
not experienced them for a long time. This has led many countries to develop layer 3
measures such as early warning systems and evacuation plans, even in places where
such events are rare [Esteban et al., 2015b; Mikami et al., 2012b; Tsimopoulou,
2015].
Typically the level of disaster awareness in a given country changes throughout
time, with recent events reinforcing awareness, and then this awareness gradually
fading in time unless appropriate efforts are made in education and training. This
concept is schematized in Fig. 1, which shows how a given event (in a country
that has not experienced them for several generations) can rapidly raise awareness
[Esteban et al., 2015b]. This awareness would gradually decay as immigrants and
generations born after the event slowly succeed those that had experienced the event
directly, though some awareness might persist in the form of stories told from one
generation to the next. Eventually, all memories of the event would fade unless
significant investments are made in tsunami memorials (see Fig. 2), education and
training, which can succeed in preserving a high state of awareness, similar to that
possessed by those in Japan in 2011 [Suppasri et al., 2015; Esteban et al., 2015c].
Nevertheless some decay is inevitable, as even the best education system might fail to

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Awareness
Awareness decay with effective
disaster education awareness
programs
High

Coastal
disaster event

Natural
awareness decay
Medium
Surrounding countries
(mass media era)

rd
1st generation 3 generation
Low (direct 2nd (grandparents
experience) generation tales)

Time

Fig. 1. Conceptualization of disaster awareness and its decay with time in a country that directly
experiences a given event [Esteban et al., 2015b].

Fig. 2. Tsunami memorial stone next to Akahama elementary school, Otsuchi Town, Japan [see
Esteban et al., 2015c].

reach some members of society and others might think such an event unlikely during
their lifetime. In the case of the Philippines, storm surges have been recorded as far
back as the 1500s [Project NOAH, 2013] but it is only during Typhoon Haiyan that
the destructive nature of such events have become common knowledge [Ranada,

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2014]. In contraposition to previous times, the present era of mass media induces
global awareness every time there is an event in any country. Thus, it can help
preserve a certain stage of “middle” awareness in countries such as Vietnam, who
have not experienced them for a long time [see Esteban et al., 2015b]. However,
there is probably a limit to how much awareness mass media can create by itself,
and it is unlikely that a country can reach a “high” state of awareness unless disaster
education and protection systems are installed, as part of a multi-layer safety system.
Thus, an “education gap” exists (see Fig. 3), and even repetitive media exposure to
distant tsunami or storm surge events cannot succeed in bridging this gap.
In the present paper, the authors will attempt to analyze and compare the degree
of awareness and preparedness against storm surges of low-lying coastal dwellers in
tropical countries frequently affected by typhoon, namely in the islands of Samar and
Leyte in the Philippines and the central coast of Vietnam. The degree of awareness
and preparedness can be reflected by a number of factors, depending on the will-
ingness to evacuate, protection measures undertaken, distance from the coastline,
height of the ground and the various measures taken by authorities or individuals

Awareness

Awareness level after disaster education

High
Maximum
Awareness
level without Education gap
disaster Coastal Coastal
education disaster disaster

Medium
Coastal
disaster Natural
awareness
decay
rd
1st generation 3 generation
Low (direct 2nd (grandparents
experience) generation tales)

Time

Fig. 3. (Color online) Conceptualization of disaster awareness and its decay with time in a country
that does not directly experience a given event, but learns about such events through mass media
[Esteban et al., 2015b].
Note: One event might not fully raise awareness as it might be treated by the inhabitants of a
nearby country as a “one-off” event, and only repeated events will fully raise awareness about the
dangers posed by a given type of natural hazard. The green line indicates awareness if appropriate
disaster education is provided, whereas the red line indicates awareness only from media exposure
to disasters in nearby countries.

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Table 1. Factors that can reflect the degree of awareness at the authority/institution or
private citizen level [Esteban et al., 2013, 2015b].

Authorities/Institutions level Citizen level

(1) The degree of risk awareness, (1) The willingness to evacuate,

(2) The willingness to take measures
for the reduction of risk,
(3) The type of measures where the authorities
have invested in the past
(e.g. multi-layer safety indicates risk awareness)
(2) The willingness to support
authorities’ efforts to reduce risk,
(3) Taking protection measures
individually

[Esteban et al., 2013, see Table 1]. In order to attempt such a comparison, the authors
conducted field surveys in the areas affected by typhoon Haiyan, and interviewed a
variety of local residents and officials. The comparison with Vietnam will provide
insights into another developing country that does not have enough funds to build
an extensive modern multi-layer system (though significant efforts are being made),
and hence awareness is of paramount importance in order to ensure an orderly evac-
uation to minimize casualties. Finally, Japan, where a modern multi-layer safety
system already exists, will be used as an example of a country that can provide some
insights into how such systems should be built. Lessons learnt in the aftermath of
the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami can also provide further insights as to how
such systems should be built. As the storm surge in the Philippines manifested itself
in some places as a “tsunami-like wave”, studying the tsunami countermeasure sys-
tem of Japan could help to provide some guidance on how a multi-layer protection
system could eventually be implemented in the Philippines.

2. Storm Surge Awareness at the Citizen Level

In order to attempt to gain insights into storm surge awareness at the citizen level
the authors conducted a number of structured questionnaire surveys along the areas
affected by typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and the Vietnamese coastline (both of which
had not experienced any major storm surge events in the recent past). These two
countries are located relatively close, and are often affected by the same storm
systems in quick succession, and it is thus interesting to measure the awareness
about storm surges in Vietnam following the 2013 events in the Philippines. It
should be noted that there are some clear limitations to the study conducted, given
the relatively small sample size (n = 172 and 153 for the case of the Philippines
and Vietnam, respectively), though the surveys included members of the poorest
sections of society who typically live closest to the water (and thus have some
validity as these are often the people most affected by natural disasters). Never-
theless, results were triangulated by conducting focus groups discussions and expert
interviews to ascertain that the results could be seen as a wider reflection of society in
the area.

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2.1. Storm surge awareness in the Philippines

Structured questionnaire surveys (n = 172) were carried out in the Philippines
approximately one month after the passage of typhoon Haiyan [see Esteban et al.,
2015d]. Respondents were predominantly young, with 47% being under the age
of 30 (see Fig. 4), which could be considered typical in a country with a young
population such as the Philippines (the median age of the country’s population is
23.4 years, Philippine Statistics Authority as of August 30, 2012). As can be expected
from the age distribution many respondents were students (20%). Housewives and
fishermen formed two of the other main groups of people interviewed, followed by
office workers and officials. Amongst the “other” group there was a wide variety of
other occupations, including service workers, policemen, farmers, security guards,
drivers, domestic workers or construction workers, see Fig. 5.
The areas surveyed were characterized by their low elevation and relatively high
population density, particularly in Tacloban. Damage patterns due to the storm
surge correlated strongly with inundation depth. Housing damage started to be
recorded in areas where the storm surge was over 2–3 m, as the many informal
wooden settlements located close to the coastline were particularly vulnerable to
flooding. Thus, all interviews were conducted in locations where the flooding was
higher than 2 m, as these were the main targets of the survey (and to keep to the
same target areas as those studied for the case of Vietnam, which were also low-
lying areas adjacent to the sea). Interviewees for both the case of the Philippines and
Vietnam were selected in the same way, namely individuals randomly encountered
during inspections of low-lying coastal areas (which, for the case of the Philippines
included also those in refugee camps, which were still located in low-lying coastal
areas at the time of the survey). The most severe damage observed was around
Tacloban city, where inundation levels were consistently in excess of +5 m, and in
places as high as +7 m. Measured storm surge heights gradually decreased as the
team travelled eastward or southward of Tacloban city, with the damage due to the
storm surge gradually subsiding [see Fig. 6, after Takagi et al., 2015a, 2015b].

30%
25% 23% 24%
% or respondents

20%
16%
15% 11%
9% 9%
10%
6%
5% 3%
0%
0%

Fig. 4. Age distribution of respondents from the Philippines (n = 172).

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Fishing
Others 17%
24%

Students
20%

Office
workers
24% Housewife
15%

Fig. 5. Occupation of respondents from the Philippines (n = 172).

Tacloban

Fig. 6. Surveyed locations and the distribution of storm surge heights in the Philippines measured
by the research team during the survey on December 2013 [Takagi et al., 2015a, 2015b].

It is not clear that respondents understood the phenomenon of the disaster before
it struck, with 47% of respondents saying that they understood what a storm surge
was and that the typhoon could bring with it a storm surge. However, it is not even
clear that this 47% of people accurately understood the threat of the storm surge
prior to Typhoon Haiyan [Esteban et al., 2015d]. Interviews with key informants
emphasized that people had been warned that the typhoon would cause coastal
flooding, though they just did not seem to conceptualize the phenomenon itself

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correctly. When asked how local authorities relayed information to the communi-
ties, they described the storm surge as “dagko nga balod ” which essentially translates
as huge waves, which were not considered as a big concern by many of them. More-
over, the interviews with key informants revealed how they were not aware that the
information given to them by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astro-
nomical Services Association (PAGASA) meant storm surge could be destructive.
In this sense, many people expressed the view that it would have been better for
authorities and media to describe it as a “tsunami or tidal wave” [Esteban et al.,
2015d; Leelawat et al., 2014; Lagmay et al., 2015], which would have given people
a better feeling of the danger involved. Figure 7 shows how most thought that the
storm surge was a real danger for them, which can be attributed to the fact that
during the field surveys most people interviewed were residents of coastal settle-
ments.
Regarding evacuation preparedness prior to the event (layer 3 measures) only
20% of respondents confirmed that they had taken part in evacuation drills at some
point in their lives (13% in one evacuation drill, and 7% in 2 or more), though 58%
said they knew how to evacuate (see Fig. 8). Accordingly, around 59% of respondents
confirmed that they had indeed evacuated before the arrival or the typhoon and 36%
said that they had not.

70% 62%
% or respondents

60%
50%
40%
30% 15% 18%
20%
10% 3% 1% 1%
0%

Fig. 7. Distribution of the opinion of respondents from the Philippines regarding whether they
thought the storm surge was a real danger to them (n = 172). An answer of 1 (not at all) indicates
they thought they were not at danger, where 5 (very strongly) indicates the respondent thought
such an event constituted a very real danger.

70%
58%
60%
% or respondents

50%
40%
30% 20% 19%
20%
10% 3%
0%
Yes, have joined No, but knows No, did not join No answer
how to evacuate

Fig. 8. Proportion of respondents from the Philippines who had taken part in evacuation drills
(n = 172).

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People at work 1%

Deduced by himself 4%

NGOs and other aid organisations 3%

Police and/or firefighters 4%

Neighbours 3%

Family, relatives 10%

Internet 12%

Area loudspeaker 1%

Laudspeaker car 2%

TV, Radio 77%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

% or respondents

Fig. 9. Source of information on storm surges and typhoons for respondents from the Philippines
(n = 90, multiple-choice allowed).

Regarding sources of information on the disaster over three quarters relied on

TV or radio, and to a lesser extent on the internet and other members of the family
(see Fig. 9). This is fortunate as mass media is typically considered to be the most
effective way of disseminating information [Rorensen, 1991; Lindell et al., 2009]. Key
informants indeed described how the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) had distributed
information to local media regarding the event, and that this was broadcasted to
the population.

2.2. Storm surge awareness in central Vietnam

To understand the impact that typhoon Haiyan could have had on storm surge
awareness in other countries it is useful to investigate the case of nearby Vietnam. To
do so, structured questionnaire surveys (n = 153) were also carried out in the center
of this country (including the cities of Da Nang, Hoi An, Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon,
Van Phong and Nha Trang), together with a survey to establish the presence of
various safety layers [Esteban et al., 2014]. Respondents were predominantly young,
with 67% being under the age of 40, which could be considered typical in a country
with a young population such as Vietnam (see Fig. 10). Again in this country a large
number of respondents were students (15%), with office workers (39%), fishermen
(15%) and authority figures (10%, mainly policemen and members of the military,
who are tasked with evacuation matters) also figuring prominently amongst the
occupation groups, as shown in Fig. 11. It should be noted that the residents of
both countries frequently experience typhoons, though not storm surges and coastal
flooding similar to that experienced during Haiyan.

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35% 30%
% or respondents 30% 27%
25%
20% 18%
15% 10% 10%
10%
5% 3% 2% 1%
0%

Fig. 10. Age distribution of respondents in Vietnam (n = 153).

Service sector Others

workers 5% Fishing
Laborer /Fisheries
8% 3%
15%

Housewife Fire fighter

5% /policeman
/Military
10%

Students
15%

Office workers
39%

Fig. 11. Occupation of respondents in Vietnam (n = 153).

45% 42%
40%
35%
% or respondents

30%
25% 24%

20% 18%
15%
15%
10%
5% 2%
0%

Fig. 12. Distribution of Vietnamese respondents who think that a storm surge constitutes a real
danger for them. An answer of 1 (not at all) indicates they thought they where not at danger, where
5 (very strongly) indicates the respondent thought such an event constituted a very real danger.

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Over three-quarters of respondents (76%) said that they understood the nature
of storm surges, with the great majority (84%) believing that they represent a
moderate or high danger to them (see Fig. 12). This appears to be higher than for
the case of the Philippines, and indicates how Haiyan could have contributed to
raising awareness in Vietnam, as the interview survey was conducted a couple of
months after Haiyan (it should be noted that respondents in the Philippines were
being asked for their awareness prior to the typhoon, as all of them evidently knew
what a storm surge was after the typhoon, whereas respondents in Vietnam had the
benefit of seeing what had happened in the Philippines months before).
Regarding evacuation preparedness, a minority of respondents (20%) had taken
part in evacuation drills in the last 5 years, and just under half of respondents (43%
of total) did not know how to evacuate in the event of coastal flooding (Fig. 13).

50%
45% 43%
40% 37%
35%
% or respondents

30%
25% 20%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
No, but I know the No Yes
evacuation
route/evacuation place

Fig. 13. Distribution of Vietnamese respondents regarding whether they had taken part in evacu-
ation drills in the last five years.

No answer
Self-taught or understood by observation
NGOs, other aid organisations
Authority Figures
Neighbours
Family, relatives
Internet
Public Address System
Print Media
TV, Radio

0% 50% 100%
% or respondents
Fig. 14. Source of information of Vietnamese respondents regarding disasters (multiple-choice
allowed). Printed media includes newspapers, pamphlets and other brochures. Authority figures
include village leaders, police or firefighters.

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In terms of where this knowledge comes from, most respondents obtained infor-
mation from TV or radio (85%), internet (52%), authorities (including village elders,
fire-fighters or police) or public address systems during flooding events (see Fig. 14).

3. Awareness at the Institutional Level

After every major disaster, the damage to coastal areas generally leaves an important
imprint in the minds of those who experienced it. Major examples of this can be
found in other significant recent events, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
or the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami in Japan. These two events highlight
the link between disaster prevention and economic development, showcasing how a
developed country with high disaster awareness such as Japan can establish a multi-
layer countermeasure system against disasters, which can help reduce the overall
damage [Esteban et al., 2013]. The existence of multiple safety layers clearly indicates
an even higher degree of awareness and preparedness, clearly present in Tohoku
[Esteban et al., 2015d], but less developed in other countries such as Chile, Indonesia
or Vietnam [see Esteban et al. 2014; Mikami et al., 2014; Aranguiz, 2015]. Essentially,
developing countries often do not place much emphasis on disaster mitigation in their
development policies and typically exhibit lower levels of resilience to events such
as typhoons and tsunamis [Esteban et al., 2015d].
At the institutional level one of the most significant types of measures in the
protection against natural disasters are evacuation systems, which can be described
as layer 3 measures. For successful evacuation against coastal disasters to be possible
it is necessary not only to have a warning system, but for the local population to be
aware of the dangers posed by a given disaster [Esteban et al., 2015b] and know what
to do in such an event [Yun and Hamada, 2015]. Esteban et al. [2013] and Mikami
et al. [2014] highlight how even in countries with no recent history of tsunamis such
as Vietnam efforts are being made to create early warning systems, indicating that
there is a certain degree of risk awareness on the part of the Vietnamese authorities
and a willingness to take measures to reduce this risk, even if it is not considered to
be so high [see Ca, 2014].
There is clearly the need for mainstream measures to improve disaster resilience
within the government policies of developing countries. Resilience is generally con-
sidered to have three components: agents (the people and organizations involved,
including local authorities), institutions (referring to the sets of rules that guide
human behavior) and systems infrastructure. Though developing countries often
lack the resources to construct layer 1 “hard measures”, spatial planning and evac-
uation systems do not necessarily require large investments and can prove highly
effective against coastal disasters [Esteban et al., 2013]. If adequately constructed,
certain government buildings and other robust structures can survive storm surges,
and the building of such Evacuation Buildings should take place in all areas at risk
of coastal hazards [Shibayama et al., 2013].

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In the following section, the preparedness and awareness of the Philippines

against natural disasters will be contrasted to that of Japan, using as an exam-
ple the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami.

3.1. Japan
On 11 March 2011, an earthquakes of M 9.0 off the northeast coast of Japan gen-
erated a major tsunami which devastated the Tohoku coastline and caused large
numbers of casualties [The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami Joint Survey
Group, 2012]. Inundation heights were over 10 m in the northern part of Miyagi,
5–10 m along the coast of Sendai Bay and around 5 m along the shores of Ibaraki
and Chiba [Mikami et al., 2012b]. Due to the high frequency of tsunamis in Tohoku
(e.g. The Meiji Sanriku Tsunami in 1896, The Showa Sanriku Tsunami in 1933 and
The Chilean Tsunami in 1960) the Japanese government had built a large variety of
tsunami countermeasures during the course of the 20th century. These countermea-
sures included elements of all layers, indicating a high level of tsunami awareness
at the institutional and citizen level. However, the type of tsunami countermea-
sures employed were not uniform along the affected coastline. Layer 1 measures
included offshore breakwaters, tsunami walls and coastal levees. Layer 2 measures
were slightly less developed, but included schools and hospitals located on higher
grounds that were unaffected or affected less than the majority of buildings. How-
ever, some important administration buildings were destroyed, such as the Disaster
Prevention Centre of Minamisanriku, located close to the waterfront, showing how
layer 2 measures had not always been correctly implemented. Layer 3 countermea-
sures (such as early-warning and evacuation schemes) were well developed, as local
residents and children frequently take part in evacuation exercises [Suppasri et al.,
2015], resulting in a comparative low number of casualties [Yun and Hamada, 2012,
2015].
However, the time available for evacuation in some places was too short [Yamao
et al., 2015], and many perished while attempting to move to higher grounds, or for
a variety of other factors [Yun and Hamada, 2012]. Despite such shortcoming it is
possible to say that the Tohoku area was at the time one of the most prepared against
a tsunami emergency, and throughout the region numerous tsunami memorials, tree
lines and marks of the inundation levels from previous events (including some being
recorded in shrines or temples) could be found, which kept the memory of previous
events alive [see, Suppasri et al., 2015, 2012a, 2012b]. Following this last event, other
monuments, marks and symbols are also being created, which will help to transmit
tsunami awareness to later generations [Esteban et al., 2015d; Suppasri et al., 2015].
The issue of good governance and creating an institutional memory is very impor-
tant, especially with regards to the establishment of effective layer 2 measures, where
the inhabitants of an area do not “forget” past events and the construction of hous-
ing in areas that are at high risk is prevented. One such example is given by Suzuki

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[2012] for the case of Toni-Hongo village in Japan. The village was destroyed by the
1896 Meiji-Sanriku Tsunami, with 88% of its inhabitants perishing, which prompted
the survivors to relocate to the hillside. However, only five houses actually did so
due to the inconvenience this caused to fishermen and their families, and the village
was once again destroyed by the tsunami of 1933, though this time only 53% of the
inhabitants died. Nevertheless, as a result of the 1933 tsunami, residents decided to
relocate to a terraced land on the hillside and the construction of the houses in the
inundated area was forbidden. Following the 1960 Chilean tsunami, the construc-
tion of countermeasures was started, with the first 5 m high wall finished in 1969,
which was then elevated to 11.8 m in 1980. However, after the 1960 Chile tsunami,
some houses were gradually built in lower areas, with the 2011 tsunami eventually
destroying 50 of them (though mortality in the village was only 0.7%, as many vil-
lagers still lived in the higher areas and there was a clear indication that they should
evacuate there in the case of a tsunami). Lessons from this experience are clearly
relevant to the case of the Philippines and Tacloban city, as will be explained in the
next section.

3.2. Philippines
Despite the comparative lack of resources, the country has been making efforts
to increase its preparedness and awareness against natural disasters. Basically, the
Philippine disaster management structure has evolved through learning from earlier
events such as Typhoons Ketsana and Parma in 2009.
The year 2010 saw the passage of the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act, which mandated the creation of the National Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion and Management Council (NDRRMC), which replaced the National Disaster
Coordinating Council (NDCC). This had important implications in that the NDR-
RMC convenes regularly with or without a hazard event, while the NDCC only
convened when there was warning of an event. The head of the NDRRMC is the
minister of the Department of National Defense. The four thematic areas of disaster
reduction are also given focus and ministers of different agencies head each of them
as vice chairs of the NDRRMC: disaster prevention and mitigation (DOST), disaster
preparedness (DILG), emergency response (DSWD) and recovery and rehabilitation
(NEDA) [RA 10121, 2010].
Table 2 shows the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Struc-
ture as mandated in the country’s disaster management law. From the national
level downward the system is replicated both in the regional offices of the OCD and
regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) council. The province and
the municipal level, on the other hand, are asked to create both an office with an
assigned disaster manager called the “DRRM Officer” and a counterpart DRRM
Council where different stakeholders are to create policies on DRR. The barangay
levels (smallest administrative units in the Philippines, somehow equivalent to a

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Table 2. Institutional Arrangement of the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management
structure [RA10121, 2010].

Institutional level Overseeing/Policy-making institution Implementing agency

National National Disaster Risk Reduction Office of Civil Defence

and Management Council
Region Regional Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Council
Province Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Council
City/Municipality City/Municipal Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management
Council
Barangay Barangay Development Council
Office of Civil Defence
(Regional Office)
Provincial Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Office
City/Municipal Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Office
Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Committee

neighborhood or district government) are tasked with incorporating DRR into their
development plans and to create their committees on DRRM. Furthermore, the law
aims to have a bottom-up approach in all phases of disaster risk reduction: pre-
vention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery and rehabilitation. If
a disaster strikes a barangay, the community should be the one responding. For
two or more barangays, the emphasis on preparedness shifts from the communi-
ties to the municipality or the city; when there are two or more cities and towns
everyone takes action but the province is tasked with taking the lead; two or more
provinces, up to the region; and two or more regions, the national level is the overall
in charge [Agsaoay-Sano, 2011]. For the case of Haiyan, since it has affected two or
more regions, preparedness to respond encompassed from the community up to the
national level.
Since the law was passed and enforced since 2010, this means that prior to the
arrival of Haiyan both Leyte and Eastern Samar had disaster mitigation and preven-
tion strategies in place. An early warning system was employed, which made use of
hazard maps and flood drills. These hazard maps were created as part of the READY
project, a joint effort in risk mapping among government and donor agencies [Lag-
may et al., 2015]. However, these maps greatly underestimated the extent of the
inundation [Lagmay et al., 2015]. The provinces also had communication centeres
tasked with relaying information to the various municipalities. These are all impor-
tant elements of community preparedness [Paton and Johnston, 2001]. Despite these
preparations the province was hit badly because they had been preparing mainly for
flooding from upland and river areas, whereas the storm surge was a coastal hazard.
At the country institutional level, the NDRRMC was informed of the devel-
opment of the storm by PAGASA, which is the agency mandated with providing
regular updates on weather events. As early as November 5, information on the dis-
aster was disseminated to the different Barangays, radio and TV stations. Radio and
local TV explained that the water might be 5–7 m height starting from November

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6th (an estimation regarding the inundation height came to the regional OCD from
the NDRRMC around two days before the event). School classes were suspended
and a variety of other preparations started at the barangay, city and province levels
[Lagmay et al., 2015; Esteban et al., 2015d]. Most people took notice of these warn-
ings [Leelawat et al., 2014; Esteban et al., 2015d] and it is possible that recent events,
such as the damage during Typhoon Washi (Sendong) and Typhoon Bopha (Pablo)
that hit Mindanao in 2011 and 2012, might have raised people’s awareness. However,
there were clearly a number of misinterpretations and lack of understanding about
the nature of a storm surge, largely because of the information being provided by
authorities being too technical [Esteban et al., 2015d]. Essentially storm surges were
described as “very big waves” [Esteban et al., 2015d], and people thought that their
houses could withstand them, discouraging evacuation. This is a problem as the
speed of response and evacuation is influenced by the seriousness of the perceived
threat [Sorensen, 1991]. In fact, photographic and witness evidence showed how —
to the surprise also of many coastal engineers — the storm surge in many places was
rather more similar to a tsunami wave, which was corroborated by computer simu-
lations [Bricker and Roeber, 2015]. This phenomenon was actually the consequence
of the extreme high waves generated by Haiyan, reaching up to 19 m off Eastern
Samar, which created substantial breaking-wave-induced setup.
Practice by the OCD for pre-emptive evacuation (layer 3) is contemplated in two
stages: first an evacuation advice and afterward a mandatory evacuation. Prepara-
tory meetings regarding evacuation started on November 4, 5 days prior to the
typhoon’s landfall on November 8 [Esteban et al., 2015d]. The OCD advised peo-
ple to evacuate, and most did so by themselves, so a forced evacuation was not
necessary in most cases, though the officials of certain communities did enforce
evacuation a day prior to the arrival of the typhoon [Esteban et al., 2015d]. For the
case of Tacloban city, the typhoon arrived Friday, but pre-evacuation took place on
November 6 (Wednesday). The city government instructed residents to evacuate and
officials went to the different barangays to provide instructions [such direct prompts
from figures of authority, when combined with media support, appear to have a
profound effect in influencing evacuation decisions, see Lindell et al., 2009]. During
the final meeting on the day before the typhoon the Secretaries (the title given to
cabinet ministers in the Philippines) of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the Department of National Defence (DND) came to the
region to make an assessment of the resources available, and stayed for 1–2 weeks
after the disaster. The Secretary of DND is the chairman of the NDRRMC and the
secretary of DILG is one of the co-vice chairs (in charge of preparedness) of the
NDRRMC. All this indicates that layer 3 measures had been developed to a consid-
erable extent, and most of the population of coastal settlements evacuated prior to
the arrival of the storm surge due to evacuation warnings given by authorities.
Nevertheless, a large number of casualties resulted from the storm surge. As
stated earlier, one of the key problems was how people were not able to clearly

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conceptualize the concept of storm surge during the event [Esteban et al., 2015d;
Leelawat et al., 2014]. Even local authorities, who had been warned about the pos-
sibility of 7 or 8 m high waves, were not aware that these waves would manifest
themselves as an inundation. Many expressed how it would have been better for the
central government and media to describe the event as “tsunami-like” waves. Thus,
one of the key lessons of this disaster is that it is not only important to warn popula-
tion about the danger of an incoming storm surge, but to accurately depict what is
a storm surge. In this case, a lack of awareness about the incoming threat appeared
to have somehow undermined preparation efforts on the side of the authorities. It
appears that many residents, even those that had received information about the
storm surge, “under-estimated” the event, and thought that they could evacuate at
a later stage or during the event, clearly a problem.
Regarding Layer 2 countermeasures, an order from the government banning the
construction of houses within 20 m of the coastline existed in the area affected [Este-
ban et al., 2015d], though many informal settlements had been built right up to the
coastline and even extended onto the sea (these settlements were particularly badly
hit, with all wooden constructions swept away, as shown in Fig. 15). As a con-
sequence of the event authorities would like to extend this zone from 20 to 40 m
[Department of Environment and Natural Resources Region VIII, 2014; Tacloban
City Office, 2015]. This “No Dwelling Zone” would ban all houses, hotels or hospitals

Fig. 15. Devastated informal settlement along the coastline of Tacloban (Photo taken on November
2013).

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from this area, though it would allow some tourism, port and recreational activities
to take place. Furthermore, construction of any buildings (be it commercial, residen-
tial or industrial) in lands under 5 m in elevation would be restricted to low density
and low rise developments [Tacloban City Office, 2015]. Coastal zones along the bays
and San Juanico strait would be designated as recreation zones and replanted with
mangroves. For all this to happen it is necessary for those presently living in areas
close to the water to be relocated, and a number of permanent relocation projects
are currently underway (see Fig. 16), with a target of around 10 000 new houses to
be built [Tacloban City Office, 2015].
Aside from the 40 m “No Dwelling Zone”, the Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabili-
tation and Recovery Plan (CRRP) states that the government, through the Depart-
ment of Science and Technology and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and together with the respective local governments, should undertake
multi-hazard risk assessments in the areas affected by the disaster. The assessments
should inform the establishment of safe, controlled and unsafe zones. Those iden-
tified to be residing in unsafe zones are to be relocated to a safer place [OPARR,
2014].
Although at the time of writing many projects were still underway (the majority
behind schedule) once completed they should theoretically allow for the relocation
of most (if not all) families living in the vicinity of the coastline. Nevertheless, there
are concerns about the long-term viability of these projects, as they are located

Fig. 16. Permanent relocation project in Tacloban (Photo taken on October 2014).

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around 1 h north of downtown Tacloban in an area currently poorly served by public

transport. Given that most families that will be relocated are working-class, issues
about the cost of transportation, the availability of livelihood, schooling and other
matters could deter people, or might result in them accepting the new houses but
keeping another house in the informal settlements close to downtown Tacloban.
This issue of access to basic services such as education, livelihoods and health
can be seen with the poor enforcement of the 40 m “No Dwelling Zone”. As of the
time of writing, many of the inhabitants of these informal settlements had rebuilt
their houses close to the coastline (see Fig. 17), and it is not clear whether these
areas will really be taken over by the municipality. Not doing so would represent a
clear failure of the agent and institutional component of resilience, failing to improve
resilience to future events.
It is also clearly important that for local authorities to establish effective Layer
2 measures there is the necessity of an intergenerational transmission of disaster
information. The inhabitants of an area should not “forget” past events and this
will inform the prevention of the construction of housing in high risk areas, as
proven by the example of Toni-Hongo village. In fact two historical storm surges
had previously devastated Tacloban, one in 1897 killing up to 1500 and another in
1912 killing 15 000 [Lagmay et al., 2015]. While it appears the population and even

Fig. 17. Many inhabitants of informal settlements have rebuilt their houses close to the coastline
(Photo taken on March 2015).

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Fig. 18. Preservation of the front of a boat that was washed onshore in Tacloban (Photo taken on
March 2015).

city officials were not really aware of these events, some efforts are being made to
create storm surge memorials, such as the preservation of the front side of one of
the boats that was washed onshore in Tacloban (see Fig. 18). Such memorials can
serve to raise awareness with newcomers to the area and later generations, something
which can be an issue in developing countries with high birth rates. The creation of a
disaster prevention day, following the example of Japan, which has September 1st as
such date, can also help promote awareness and establish a generational transmission
of information [Suppasri et al., 2015]. The reason why the date of September 1st
was chosen has at its origin the date of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, which
killed more than 100 000 [Suppasri et al., 2015].
The Yolanda CRRP states that in the medium-term, the government and
Local Government Units (LGUs) should be able to increase infrastructure resilience
through the construction of road slope protection structures, seawalls and flood
control facilities, installation of early warning systems and establishment of disaster
response teams [OPARR, 2014]. However, despite such statements currently no layer
1 measures are envisaged by city authorities in the short-term, though a number of
options such as sand dunes or levees have been identified as promising in the middle
or long-term by the Tablocan City Office [2015].

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It is encouraging that city officials would also like to explore the implementation
of a building design code so that buildings can cope with higher strength winds,
in line with a general philosophy of “Building Back Better”. Basically many key
buildings were also not designed to resist such a disaster. For instance, the OCD
and Tacloban City Hall’s own buildings were damaged (the roof was destroyed and
electrical installations damaged due to the heavy rain) so they had moved to a
new temporary office at the time of the author’s first post-disaster survey. In this
sense, various requests are being made to the national government for funds to build
official buildings (schools, hospitals, etc.) to a higher standard. For instance, prior
to the event the building code of the Philippines stated that the roofs of schools and
hospitals should be designed to withstand 250 km/hr winds in Wind Zone 1 Areas
such as Leyte and Eastern Samar. After the event there has been a debate about
whether to increase this or to treat Haiyan as a special case [Del Castillo, 2013], and
the authors understand through meetings that they attended with the Department
of Public Works and Highways that instead of sticking to the wind zones, they will
impose that all buildings should now be able to resist 250 km/hr winds.
Essentially the Philippines appears to have been steadily improving its disas-
ter preparedness and emergency response capabilities. However, this event indicates
that much remains to be done, and that the resilience of coastal communities should
improve so that rebuilding can be more effective after “super-typhoon” events.
Although some degree of damage should always be expected from such events, it is
imperative that the loss of life is minimized and that key infrastructure remains in
operation to faciliate relief operations and reconstruction.

4. Summary and Conclusions

Category 5 Typhoon Haiyan was one of the strongest typhoons to hit the Philippines
in modern times, and introduced the term “storm surge” to the vocabulary of many
local residents, who had not heard the term being used to describe such phenom-
ena prior to this event (though it should be noted that the authors did encounter
some elderly people who had experienced storm surges during earlier typhoons).
The storm surge manifested itself on the 8th November 2013 as Haiyan made land-
fall, devastating large areas in the islands of Leyte and Samar. To attempt to gain
an understanding of the level of awareness that local residents had about storm
surges the authors conducted structured questionnaires (n = 172) and focus group
interviews with local residents, and discussed the results obtained with key infor-
mants (government officers and disaster risk managers). One of the key problems
identified during the interviews was how people were not able to clearly conceptu-
alize the phenomenon of a storm surge, with many respondents emphasizing how it
would have been better for authorities to describe it as a “tsunami”. Indeed, many
coastal engineers were surprised by the nature of the storm surge, which from video

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footage looked more similar to a bore-wave or a tsunami [and as corroborated by

the numerical simulations of Bricker and Roeber, 2015].
Recent coastal disasters, whether tsunamis or storm surges, have contributed
to greatly increase the awareness about coastal disasters throughout the world. In
an era when the mass media can reach every corner of the planet and recording
devices are widespread (in the form of mobile phones or cameras), the horrifying
scenes of disasters can be easily viewed even by those in countries not affected by
the disaster itself. In this respect, separate questionnaire surveys conducted by the
authors in Vietnam after Typhoon Haiyan do provide some evidence how awareness
about storm surges might have increased in this country following the events in the
Philippines. It is also interesting to note how the inhabitants of both Vietnam and
the Philippines are aware of the term tsunami, indicating how the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami and the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami have markedly increased the
awareness of inhabitants of countries that have not recently experienced such events.
Typhoon Haiyan probably constitutes an event of similar importance to these two
high-order tsunamis, and will likely remain in the memory of the world’s population
(through periodic reminders by the mass media of different countries) for some time
to come.
There were clearly a number of lessons that can be learnt from Haiyan, such
as the necessity of creating multi-layer safety strategies and improving how infor-
mation about storm surges is transmitted to local residents. Following the disaster,
plans have been put in place to relocate many of the inhabitants of informal set-
tlements situated close to the coastline. However, at the time of writing many had
returned to their original settlements while awaiting construction of their new homes
by the government or other aid organizations. It is imperative that such plans mate-
rialize to prevent future typhoons from devastating vulnerable areas of the Philip-
pines, in the spirit of “Building Back Better”. Also, the memory of typhoon Haiyan
should be maintained through improvements in disaster education, evacuation train-
ing amongst the general population and the creation of “storm surge memorials”,
so that a true disaster culture can be created and maintained by present and future
generations.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of several Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Office of Civil Defence (OCD), Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical & Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) and
other Philippines disaster management officials, who provided invaluable informa-
tion for the elaboration of this manuscript. Finally, funds for the field survey were
mainly provided by the Strategic Research Foundation Grant-aided Project for Pri-
vate Universities from the Ministry of Education (Waseda University), and partly
by the Global Programme on Sustainability Science Global Leadership Initiative

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(GPSS-GLI, The University of Tokyo) and J-RAPID Program of the Japan Science
and Technology Agency (JST) (Tokyo Institute of Technology).

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