RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,

vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner was charged for the offense of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM & ITS
AMMUNITIONS and BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE).

three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) created a team
composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city,
for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the COMELEC.

The PNP coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road block with the marking
"COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by the team to stop and their
occupants were then politely requested to alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking of their vehicles.
Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do so.

in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team
and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen through its tinted
windows, SPO1 Requejo, a member of the team, knocked on the vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to
step down for a routine inspection. The eight occupants, which included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is
the Barangay Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture,
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The
firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked
by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession was
exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen
then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence,
SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which was later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial
No. 906347, including its magazine containing seven live ammunitions.

A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP,
Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder

In his defense, accused-appellant tried to establish that the firearm did not belong to and was not recovered from him;
that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was allegedly
left by an unidentified person who hitched a ride somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan Norte
Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar in Pagadian City

Issue: WON the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure violated?

Held: In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked
into his waist uncovered by his shirt.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.19

All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial
intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly
viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
++It must be emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm [on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after he
alighted from the vehicle and before he was frisked. the holstered .45 caliber pistol tucked at the right waist of the
[petitioner] was readily visible to the policemen
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)

Facts; Petitioner was hospitalized following an accident involving an automobile which he had apparently been
driving. A police officer smelled liquor on petitioner's breath and noticed other symptoms of drunkenness at the
accident scene and at the hospital, placed him under arrest, and informed him that he was entitled to counsel, that he
could remain silent, and that anything he said would be used against him. At the officer's direction, a physician took a
blood sample from petitioner despite his refusal on advice of counsel to consent thereto. A report of the chemical
analysis of the blood, which indicated intoxication, was admitted in evidence over objection at petitioner's trial for
driving while intoxicated. Petitioner was convicted, and the conviction was affirmed by the appellate court, which
rejected his claims of denial of due process, of his privilege against self-incrimination, of his right to counsel, and of
his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures.

Issue:1 WON THE PETITIONERS right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures is violated.

2Won the arrest of the petitioner is valid

Held: 1. Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could
be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a
requirement that inferences to support the search "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency,
in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence.

Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts,
we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to
petitioner's arrest.

2. California law authorizes a peace officer to arrest

"without a warrant . . . [w]henever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed."

Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. [Footnote 12] The police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after
the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath, and testified that petitioner's eyes were "bloodshot, watery, sort of a
glassy appearance." The officer saw petitioner again at the hospital, within two hours of the accident. There, he
noticed similar symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner "that he was under arrest and that he
was entitled to the services of an attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he told me would be
used against him in evidence
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period

pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner who
was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2) firearms3 issued to him by
the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and
return them to Congress.

Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched
the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was
then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and
return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case
to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an
election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn
explanation meritorious.4

On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's
sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also
wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as
he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.5

On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that
the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed.6

Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,

Issue: won the warrantless search is valid

Held: An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they
would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The
existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we
upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan
Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report
leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was
there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the
policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs.VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA,

Facts; at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San
Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that
one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" 3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from
San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers
who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as
Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was
holding a yellow bag.10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to
"Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"16 inside the
station.17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed
and Dayao to empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20

Issue: won the warrantless search is valid

Held: The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced
with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern —
based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act.

In some cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with
reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed
was "suspicious."
++"stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime For instance, the situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE
TABLAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS:

federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed under surveillance after
the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan of OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search
warrant before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M.
Hizon St., Caloocan City. Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report[1] of SPO2 Teneros. It stated
that Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of Federico
Veronas runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of
Verona.[2] The search warrant[3] was subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and
paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the second floor
masters bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud
bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door.Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and
conducted a search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they refused to answer. It
was only at the police station where she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police
team, along with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6,
District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant and seized various things related to shabu. The police team also allegedly
seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car documents.
Issue; won the search/search warrant is valid
Held: For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular description of the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it
satisfies the constitutional requirement.[11]
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants.
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for authority to search specifically the premises of
No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was accompanied by a sketch [14] of the area.
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City
was a concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred windows and a terrace. It was owned by a certain Mr.
Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house number. The house marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City
was actually two houses away from accused-appellants house at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the
enforcing officers of discretion.Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the actions of the police officers who
were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge of the place.
The controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the
police
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in evidence. Absent these
items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged loses its basis.