Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
G.R. No. 77850-51 March 25, 1988
JUAN LOPEZ DUNGOG v CA and Fiscal Inting
Facts:
On October 9,1985, Assistant Fiscal Angel S. Ucat, Jr. issued a resolution
finding a prima facie case for the filing of an information for estafa against Pantaleon
del Rosario. The same resolution was approved by the respondent Provincial Fiscal,
Enrique B. Inting. On October 15, 1985, an information was filed with the RTC. After
the information had been filed, the Del Rosario filed a Motion For Reinvestigation with
Fiscal Inting. Petitioner submitted Ms Opposition And/Or Comment to private
respondent's Motion For Reinvestigation.
On November 9, 1985, acting on the said Motion for Reinvestigation, the
Fiscal Intig reveresed himself and declared that there was no prima facie case against
Del Rosario/ Fiscal Inting filed an Omnibus Motion For Postponement Of Arraignment
And To Allow Withdrawal Of Information. RTC denied the motion. Fiscal Inting filed
PetCert with the CA. CA granted the motion to withdraw.
Issue:
WON fiscals can intervene with a case after it has been filed in court.
Held: No.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as
to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. For while it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had
already been brought to court, whatever disposition the fiscal may deem proper
thereafter should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval.
Fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss
or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted, and pending further proceedings,
and that the power to dismiss is vested solely in the court, i.e., the presiding judge.
1
G.R. No. 181643 November 17, 2010
MICHELLE I. PINEDA v CA and DepEd
Facts:
Pineda and Principal Blas executed August-MOA for the lease of school
canteen. On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd, through Usec. Gascon, declared the
August-MOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also
ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen. Pineda
filed a PetCert with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC.
On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascon’s decision. DepEd
sought the dismissal of Pineda’s petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter
failed to state a cause of action. On June 7, 2005, the trial court denied its motion. For
said reason, DepEd filed a PetCert before the CA seeking to set aside the March 14,
2005 and June 7, 2005 orders of the RTC.
The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the RTC denying DepEd’s motion
to dismiss but reversed its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
Issue:
WON PreInj should be issued.
Held: No.
The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie
for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The
DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled
by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school
canteen since 2005, the RTC’s preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing
more to enjoin.
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in
order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an
action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully.
Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that
precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the
case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such
status.
In the case at bench, the Decision of Undersecretary Gascon dated February
11, 2005, ordering Pineda to cease and desist from operating and managing the school
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
canteen and to revert the management thereof to the Home Economics Department and
to the Principal, has already been partially implemented. This is evident from the
allegations of Pineda in her amended petition.
Grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the
trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status
quo which is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. If there is such a commission, it is correctible through a writ of certiorari.
In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the
filing of the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school
canteen. For said reason, the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to
change said status.
G.R. No. 177420, October 06, 2010
SPOUSES ANTHONY L. NGO VS. ALLIED BANKING
Facts:
In a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction filed with the RTC on May 9, 2002, petitioner-spouses alleged in
the main that Allied Banking unlawfully and unjustifiably refused to discharge/release
the real estate mortgage constituted on the two lots of spouses Anthony Ngo and So Hon
Ngo, and withheld the Owner's Duplicate Copy of the TCT despite spouses Ngo's full
payment of the P12 million loan secured by the mortgage. Allied Bank admitted the
satisfaction of the P12 million loan but clarified that the real estate mortgage on the lots
still secures the unpaid P42,900,000.00 loan of Civic Merchandising for which Anthony
Ngo stands as a surety. In support thereof, the bank presented the Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement executed by Anthony Ngo, both in his
personal capacity and as the company's president and general manager.
On October 1,2002, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, directing Allied Bank to discharge the real estate mortgage constituted on the
subject properties, and to release to spouses Ngo the owner's copy of the TCTs of the
lots. MR denied.
2
On April 19, 2006, the CA annulled the RTC's orders upon finding that
petitioner-spouses failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right to warrant the
issuance of the provisional injunctive writ against Allied Bank. MR of Sps denied.
Issue:
WON PreInj shoul be issued.
Held: No.
A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere
prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo between
the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Accordingly, the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt
or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
improper. While it is not required that the right claimed by applicant, as basis for
seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at
least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
contradiction.
Generally, a trial court's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not
be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. In granting or denying
injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider
and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on clearly erroneous
factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors, clearly gives too much
weight to one factor, relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
factual or legal conclusions.
Contrary to the RTC's ruling, the rights claimed by petitioners are less than
clear and far from being unmistakable. Consequently, without such unequivocal right,
the possibility of irreparable damage would not justify injuctive relief in petitioner's
favor. In addition, the possibility of damage to petitioners is remote compared to the
immediate and serious injury that respondent will suffer if the writ implemented.
Further, in issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction, which was the main
prayer in the complaint, the RTC effectively concluded the main case without proper
hearing on the merits as there was practically nothing left to be determined except
petitioner-spouses' claim for damages. Settled is the rule that courts should avoid issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without
trial.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
G.R. No. 190122 January 10, 2011 SPS CASTRO v SPS DELA CRUZ,
SPS PEREZ and MARCELINO TOLENTINO
Facts:
Spouses Perez obtained a loan from SPS Castro on November 15, 1996, to
secure which they executed a real estate mortgage in petitioners’ favor covering a parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration (TD).
Respondent Spouses Perez having failed to settle their loan, petitioners
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, as the highest bidder at the public auction,
bought the property on February 4, 1999. It turned out that before the foreclosure or
sometime in 1997 respondent Spouses Perez, contrary to a provision of the real estate
mortgage, sold the property to respondent Spouses dela Cruz who had in fact caused the
cancellation of TD.
Petitioners thus filed on April 8, 1999 a complaint against herein two sets of
respondent Spouses, for annulment of Deed of Sale before RTC. Respondent Marcelino
Tolentino, Municipal Assessor was impleaded as defendant.
During the pendency of petitioners’ complaint against respondents spouses,
petitioners filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession over the
property by virtue of the foreclosure of the mortgage of the sale to them of the property.
Petitioners’ motion was granted and a writ of possession dated August 2, 2001 was
issued and enforced against respondent Spouses dela Cruz who were evicted from the
property.
Respondent Spouses dela Cruz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore them to physical possession of the property, which was
granted by Order of October 29, 2004.
Issue:
WON the PreInj should be issued.
Held: No.
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent
irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party
seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.5
The rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. It bears reiterating that
Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the
reason that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not
involve a factual determination which is not the function of appellate courts. Hence, the
exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be
3
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse, which is wanting in the present
case.
For grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground for the nullification of
an injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Or the power must be exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.
Recall that respondent Spouses dela Cruz had long before the foreclosure of
the mortgage or sometime in 1997 bought and took possession of the property, and had
in fact cancelled the seller-respondent Spouses Perez’ TD and had one issued in their
name. By petitioners’ seeking ex parte the issuance to them on February 1999 of a writ
of possession over the property, which was granted and the writ enforced against
respondent Spouses de la Cruz, they disturbed the status quo ante litem. The trial court
did not thus commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in favor of Spouses de la Cruz.
For the enforcement of the writ of possession against respondent Spouses dela
Cruz, who did not take part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount to taking of
real property without the benefit of a proper judicial intervention. The procedural
shortcut which petitioners is impermissible. Even Article 433 of the Civil Code instructs
that "Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property." The contemplated judicial process is not through an ex-parte petition as what
petitioners availed of, but a process wherein a third party, Spouses de la Cruz herein, is
given an opportunity to be heard.
The jurisdictional foundation for the issuance of a writ of injunction rests not
only in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
among other considerations, but also in the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
Since petitioners failed to show that the appellate court erred in upholding the
trial court’s exercise of its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the challenged Decision stands.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1885. July 14, 2004
BENJAMIN A. RIVERA v JUDGE TEODULO E. MIRASOL
Facts:
On September 28, 1999, without summons having been served, the
municipality filed an unverified motion for preliminary mandatory injunction against
them with motion for writ of demolition. On November 24, 1999, respondent issued an
order granting the writ of preliminary injunction and placing the municipality in
possession of the areas occupied by complainants.
Issue:
WON the PreInj was valid.
Held: No.
It should be noted that the respondents application for a writ of preliminary
injunction was not verified and no bond was executed in relation thereto. These are
patent disregard of the rules and an Order granting an application, which did not
conform to the required form and procedure, was obviously issued with certain
irregularity.
Thus, by granting the motion, the reliefs sought by the respondent
municipality in its complaint had already been granted and the respondent Judge had
already decided the main case without any trial. In so doing, Respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect
practically granted the principal relief sought.
4
G.R. No. 170038 July 11, 2012 CHINA BANKING v SPS CIRIACO
Facts:
On March 11, 1996, Sps Ciriaco obtained a loan from the petitioner, secured
by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT. When the respondents
defaulted in the payment of their loan, the petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgaged property and sold it at public auction where the petitioner emerged as the
highest bidder. The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale in the petitioner’s favor on
March 11, 1998. The Register of Deeds annotated the Certificate of Sale on TCT on
March 24, 1998.
The respondents filed a complaint alleging that that fraud attended the
consolidation of title in the petitioner’s favor and to include a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to enjoin the petitioner from disposing of
the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof. RTC granted the respondents’
application since the respondents were entitled to prove their claim of fraud, and their
claim that the interests and penalty charges imposed by the bank had no factual basis.
CA upheld decision.
Issue:
WON PreInj should be issued despite lack of hearing.
Held: No.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary
peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution, affecting as it does the
respective rights of the parties.
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58, pertinent to this case, provide the requirements for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO. Based on the provisions,
before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, a clear showing must be made
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of an established right.32 The holding of a hearing, where both
parties can introduce evidence and present their side, is also required before the courts
may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ.
Generally, an RTC's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be
set aside on appeal, unless the trial court abused its discretion. In granting or denying
injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction; fails to consider
and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination; relies on clearly erroneous
factual findings; considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors; clearly gives too much
weight to one factor; relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity; or misapplies its
factual or legal conclusions.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
In this case, the RTC abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the
respondents’ application for injunctive relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for
reception of a "sampling" of the parties’ respective evidence to give it an idea of the
justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. It failed to
make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
since it did not conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction or TRO. The RTC conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24,
2000 hearings on the respondents’ omnibus motion only – whether to admit the
amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents’ application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
In fact, a perusal of the August 1, 2000 order shows that the RTC granted the
respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction based only on the
respondents’ unsubstantiated allegations.
Clearly, the respondents’ right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and
unmistakably demonstrated. The respondents have not presented evidence, testimonial
or documentary, other than the bare allegations contained in their pleadings, to support
their claim of fraud that brings about the irreparable injury sought to be avoided by their
application for injunctive relief. Thus, the RTC’s grant of the writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of the respondents, despite the lack of any evidence of a clear and
unmistakable right on their part, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the
freedom of the defendant’s action and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It
should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the
emergency demands it; no power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires
greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, that the
issuance of an injunction.
5
G.R. No. 144755 June 8, 2005 SPS ESTARES v CA
Facts:
In a complaitn filed by Sps, they stated that they obtained a loan with
Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC). However, they alleged that the
Promissory Note (PN) and the REM executed in favor of the latter was falsified because
they signed a blank paper.
Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the
promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. In
the interim, they prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged
property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale scheduled on July 13, 1999. On July
12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the Estares spouses. The parties
subsequently agreed to maintain the status quo until August 20, 1999.
After hearing, RTC denied the SPS application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, holding that the latter failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction
to issue. MR denied. CA upheld RTC and denied MR.
Issue:
WON PreInj should be issued.
Held: No.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the
writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury
to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a
special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that
on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that
the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the
litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following
requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to
be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show,
inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to
injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the
amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate
mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the
mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to
the trial court for its conclusive determination. As such, a trial court’s decision to grant
or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its
discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it
lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its
determination, relies on clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or
improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies on erroneous
conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.
In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that they have a
right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of
said right.
G.R. No. 173036 September 26, 2012
AGOO RICE MILL CORPORATION v LAND BANK
Facts:
Petitioner ARMC applied for a loan with respondent LBP secured by a REM
and ChatMort. Due to failure to settle the obli, respondent applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure of ARMC’s mortgaged properties with the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
On August 24, 1998, ARMC filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction
with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
and for recovery of damages. ARMC mainly alleged that LBP’s proposed extrajudicial
foreclosure should be enjoined for being premature, improper and in violation of
ARMC’s contractual and property rights since negotiations for the restructuring of its
6
loans were still ongoing. ARMC contended that, unless enjoined, the foreclosure would
cause its company grave injustice and irreparable injury.
On March 1989, RTC granted the preliminary injunction. On August 5, 2004,
the RTC found no merit in the ARMC’s complaint for injunction on the ground that
injunction cannot issue against the exercise of a valid right, the right of the creditor-
mortgagee to foreclose on the mortgage where the debtor-mortgagor has defaulted in the
payment of its obligations. MR denied. CA upheld RTC and denied MR.
Issue:
WON petitioner is entitled to injunction.
Held: No.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered
to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." For an injunction to issue,
the following essential requisites must be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is
directed to constitute a violation of such right.
Petitioner anchors his case on his right to the restructuring of its loan. The
existence of the ARMC’s claimed right to the loan restructuring, however, was not
clearly established by the ARMC. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must
prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. Such right
must be clear and unmistakable, and not contingent, abstract or future rights, or one that
may never arise.
*Injunction Became Moot and Academic
The present petition must also be denied because the act sought to be enjoined
by the ARMC is already a consummated act. The records show that the foreclosure sale
on the ARMC's JTIOligaged properties was held sometime in June 2005 and the LBP
emerged as the winning bidder. An injunction suit becomes moot and academic after the
act sought to be enjoined had already been consummated.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
G. R. No. 183367 March 14, 2012 AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL
REALTY v MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGGAS
Facts:
On 19 January 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed
between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor Gutierrez. Under the
MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area.
In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces
for a period of 25 years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On
6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent and declared the MOA null and void. Respondent filed
a motion to execute judgment.
On 7 March 2008, petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of
Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC from
"further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of Execution, and
any other court processes" in the case before it. CA denied the motion because the
matter is not of extreme urgency and that there is no clear and irreparable injury that
would be suffered by the petitioners.
Issue:
WON CA gravely abused discretion in denying PreInj.
Held: No.
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists
a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an
act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage.
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said
court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse
of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a
7
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.18
The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is meritorious
ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor.
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not
exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner.
*When is there a clear legal right
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
*What constitutes irreparable damage
Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can
be measured with reasonable accuracy.
Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary estimation.
Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if
proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not
warranted. With respect to the allegations of loss of employment and potential suits,
these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to substantiate them.
G.R. No. 176898 December 3, 2012
GEORGE S. H. SY v AUTOBUS TRANSPORT
Facts:
Respondent purchased Konvecta air conditioning units from petitioner and
petitioner financed respondent’s acquisition of 22 units of bus engine and chassis from
Commercial Motors Corporation (CMC). The parties agreed that respondent would
amortize the payments for the Konvecta air conditioning units and the bus units
separately. Petitioner, however, defaulted in paying the amortizations to CMC, forcing
the latter to demand payment from respondent. Consequently, respondent was
compelled to pay some of the obligations directly to CMC.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
On March 12, 1999, due to the failure of petitioner to settle the obligations
with CMC, respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against petitioner.
RTC decided in favor of the respondent.
On September 16, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Order Petitioner to
Return the 5 TCT to Respondent. The RTC denied the motion. On January 11, 2005,
respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
commanding petitioner to return to respondent the five titles. RTC granted the motion.
MR denied. CA upheld RTC and denied MR
Issue:
WON PreInj was validly issued.
Held: Yes.
A preliminary injunction may be issued at any time before judgment or final
order. It may be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from doing a
particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive
act to correct a wrong in the past. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, however,
is more cautiously regarded because it commands the performance of an act.
Accordingly, it must be issued only upon a clear showing that the following requisites
are established: (1) the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and (3) there is
an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial
court because "the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination." For this reason,
the grant or the denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at
all in contemplation of law." No grave abuse of discretion exists in this case.
*Note
Binigay ng petitioners yung 5 TCT for “safekeeping”. SC said that it is very
unlikely that the purpose for handing over the titles to the bank was merely for
safekeeping when the bank itself conducted inspections and appraisals on the subject 5
properties. This raised the presumption that the 5 TCTs will be sold to the bank thus an
imminent danger to the rights of respondent justifying the issuance of PreInj.
8
RECEIVERSHIP
G.R. No. L-28593 June 25, 1968
JUAN YSASI v HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ
Facts:
Juan Ysasi, petitioner, and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, one of the respondents,
are husband and wife. They own an hacienda.
The wife filed a verified petition dated September 5, 1967 in the CFI. She
sought the administration of the conjugal partnership properties, or, in the alternative, a
separation of property with ex parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite.
Her grounds were that her husband was not in a position to manage the conjugal
properties directly and personally owing to his age (77 years) and his blind left eye; and
that he abandoned petitioner and their conjugal properties without just cause.
On December 22, 1967, CFI held that Hacienda Manucao-A shall be under the
receivership of the BPI who shall use to the operation and financing of the Hacienda out
of the crop loan previously granted by said Bank, and the profits shall be liquidated after
the termination of this case.
Issue:
WON the hacienda was properly placed under the receivership of BPI.
Held: No.
The purpose of receivership, as a provisional remedy, is to preserve or protect
the rights of the parties during the pendency of the main action. To apply this remedy to
the case at hand is to lose sight of its purpose. At stake here are the husband's power of
administration and the wife's right to be protected from abuse thereof. The wife's right
rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wife's right does not exist.
Receivership is also aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure,
existing rights. Certainly, it cannot be use as an instrument for the destruction of those
rights. The conclusion remains: Petitioner may not be forced to surrender his statutory
right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple expedient of merely charging
him with the naked averment that he has forfeited that right.
Receivership at this stage is improper.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018
G.R. No. 125008. June 19, 1997
COMMODITIES STORAGE & ICE PLANT v CA
Facts:
Petitioner spousesTrinidad obtained a loan from respondent Far East Bank to
finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage. The loan was secured
by a mortgage over the ice plant and the land on which the ice plant stands. Petitioner
spouses failed to pay their loan. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and
the ice plant was sold by public bidding on March 22, 1993. Respondent bank was the
highest bidder. It registered the certificate of sale on September 22, 1993 and later took
possession of the property.
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent bank before the RTC for
damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period. As a provisional remedy,
petitioners filed on November 16, 1994 an "Urgent Petition for Receivership." They
alleged that respondent bank took possession of the ice plant forcibly and without notice
to them; that their occupation resulted in the destruction of petitioners' financial and
accounting records making it impossible for them to pay their employees and creditors;
the bank has failed to take care of the ice plant with due diligence such that the plant has
started emitting ammonia and other toxic refrigerant chemicals into the atmosphere.
RTC granted the same. CA reversed the RTC.
Issue:
WON receivership was proper.
Held: No.
A receiver of real or personal property, which is the subject of the action, may
be appointed by the court when it appears from the pleadings or such other proof as the
judge may require, that the party applying for such appointment has (1) an actual interest
in it; and (2) that (a) such property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially
injured; or (b) whenever it appears to be the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving or administering the property in litigation.
A receiver is a person appointed by the court in behalf of all the parties to the
action for the purpose of preserving and conserving the property in litigation and prevent
its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of the
parties. The appointment of a receiver is not a matter of absolute right. It depends upon
the sound discretion of the court and is based on facts and circumstances of each
particular case.
A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the
property or fund which is the subject of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or
material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding principle is
the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature, does not
require such protection or preservation, said remedy cannot be applied for and granted.
9
In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a
receiver. Petitioners have not sufficiently shown that the Sta. Maria Ice Plant is in
danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a "scrap heap." Neither have they
proven that the property has been materially injured which necessitates its protection and
preservation. In fact, at the hearing on respondent bank's motion to dismiss, respondent
bank manifested in open court that the leak in the ice plant had already been remedied
and that no other leakages had been reported since. This statement has not been disputed
by petitioners.
At the time the trial court issued the order for receivership of the property, the
problem had been remedied and there was no imminent danger of another leakage.
Whatever danger there was to the community and the environment had already been
contained.
The "drastic sanctions" that may be brought against petitioners due to their
inability to pay their employees and creditors as a result of "the numbing manner by
which respondent bank took the ice plant" does not concern the ice plant itself. These
claims are the personal liabilities of petitioners themselves. They do not constitute
"material injury" to the ice plant.
Moreover, the receiver appointed by the court appears to be a representative of
petitioners. Respondent bank alleges that it was not aware that petitioners nominated one
Mr. Pesquera as receiver. The general rule is that neither party to a litigation should be
appointed as receiver without the consent of the other because a receiver should be a
person indifferent to the parties and should be impartial and disinterested. The receiver
is not the representative of any of the parties but of all of them to the end that their
interests may be equally protected with the least possible inconvenience and expense.
Again, we reject petitioners' contention. The motion to dismiss is anchored on
improper venue, lack of cause of action and forum-shopping. We agree with the
respondent court that the question of venue relates to the principal action and is
prejudicial to the ancillary issue of receivership. Although the grounds for dismissal
were not specifically raised before the appellate court, the said court may consider the
same since the petition for receivership depends upon a determination thereof.
 Civil Procedure Digests (Rule 58 - 59, Preliminary Injunction and Receivership), Arbues 2018

G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976 Indeed, if it were true that he entered into the agreement and undertaking as a
PACIFIC MERCHANDISING v CONSOLACION INSURANCE receiver, he should have, as such receiver, submitted to the court an account of the status
of the properties in his hands including the outstanding obligations of the receivership.
Facts:
In Civil Case which was an action instituted by Pacific Merchandising
Corporation (plaintiff-appellee) to collect the sum of money from Consolacion
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., (defendant- appellee) who in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Gregorio V. Pajarillo (third-party defendant-appellant). the City Court
of Manila rendered judgment on April 6, 1964 in favor of the plaintiff.

By virtue of the appeal interposed by the third-party defendant Gregorio V.

Pajarillo, the case was elevated, on May 12, 1964, to the CFI.

On the basis of the foregoing Stipulation of Facts, the CFI rendered judgment
on August 8, 1964 affirming the appealed decision of the City Court. The court a quo
likewise declared that the receivership was not terminated by virtue of the appeal
interposed by Leo Enterprises, Inc., one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 50201,
because a decision which is appealed cannot be the subject of execution.

Issue:

Held:

A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an

officer of the court exercising his functions in the interest of neither plaintiff nor
defendant, but for the common benefit of all the parties in interest. He performs his
duties "subject to the control of the Court," and every question involved in the
receivership may be determined by the court taking cognizance of the receivership
proceedings. Thus, "a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any
contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands
without the authority or approval of the court. The custody of the receiver is the custody
of the court. His acts and possession are the acts and possession of the court, and his
contracts and liabilities are, in contemplation of law, the contracts and liabilities of the
court. As a necessary consequence, receiver is f subject to the control and supervision of
the court at every step in his management of the property or funds placed in his hands.
He cannot operate independently of the court, and cannot enter into any contract without
its approval.

Unauthorized contracts of a receiver do not bind the court in charge of

receivership. They are the receiver's own contracts and are not recognized by the courts
as contracts of the receivership. Consequently, the aforesaid agreement and undertaking
entered into by appellant Pajarillo not having been approved or authorized by the
receivership court should, therefore, be considered as his personal undertaking or
obligation.

10