BEATINGO V.

GASIS
G.R. No. 179641
February 9, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo bought a piece of land, denominated as Lot No. 7219 from
Flora G. Gasis on May 19, 1998. Petitioner went to the Register of Deeds to have the sale
registered. She, however, failed to obtain registration as she could not produce the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title. She, thus, filed a petition for the issuance of the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title but was opposed by respondent Lilia Bu Gasis, claiming that she
was in possession of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) as she purchased the subject
property from Flora on January 27, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Sale, Reconveyance,

Delivery of Title and Damages against respondent before the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent claimed that she purchased the subject property from Flora without
knowledge of the prior sale of the same subject property to petitioner, which makes her an
innocent purchaser for value.

The RTC considered the controversy as one of double sale and since the two sales – that of
petitioner and that of respondent – were not registered with the Registry of Property, the
RTC held that whoever was in possession had the better right. Hence, it decided in favor of
respondent.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. However, due to pressures
of work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel for petitioner requested for
an extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the brief. Instead of filing the
Appellant’s Brief within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time
to file the brief.

The CA denied the motions for extension to file brief. Thus, for failure to file the Appellant’s
Brief, the appellate court dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has a better right over the thing subject of double sale.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only
within 45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90)
days granted by the appellate court.
The excuse forwarded above is unacceptable. An attorney is bound to protect his client’s
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file brief certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay results in the dismissal of the
appeal.

The failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, though not jurisdictional, results in the
abandonment of the appeal which may be the cause for its dismissal.

Nevertheless, to put an end to the controversy, the Court carefully perused the records of
the case and reached the conclusion that the decision dated December 29, 2005 of the RTC
is in perfect harmony with law and jurisprudence. The rules on double sales, as discussed
above, apply.

MONASTERIO- PE V. TONG
G.R. No. 151369
March 23, 2011

FACTS:

Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the
improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein
petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract
of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by
mere tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that
respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter
they failed and refused to vacate the same.

Petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a
dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as
such, Tong's ownership is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid deed of sale as basis for Tong to recover the subject land.

RULING:

Neither is the Court persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has no cause of
action to recover physical possession of the subject properties on the basis of a contract of
sale because the thing sold was never delivered to the latter.

It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale covering the subject
parcels of land in favor of respondent after the latter paid the outstanding account of the
former with the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they had
no intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they executed the said deed
of sale.

Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the subject
lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed
properties does not prove that there was no delivery, because as found by the lower courts,
such possession is only by respondent's mere tolerance.

LIM V. EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918
January 15, 2014
FACTS:

On November 17, 1988, petitioner Francisco Lim (petitioner) executed an Irrevocable

Special Power of Attorney in favor of his brother, Franco Lim (Franco), authorizing the latter
to mortgage his share in the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
57176, which they co-owned.

On February 9, 1989, Banco De Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount
of ₱8.5 million by virtue of the said Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney, which was entered
in the Register of Deeds of San Juan, Metro Manila.

On December 28, 1992, the loan was fully paid by Franco.

On June 14, 1996, petitioner, Franco, and their mother Victoria Yao Lim (Victoria) obtained
from respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent; formerly Equitable Banking Corporation)
a loan in the amount of ₱30 million in favor of Sun Paper Products, Inc. To secure the loan,
petitioner and Franco executed in favor of respondent a Real Estate Mortgage over the same
property.

However, when the loan was not paid, respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property.

On April 4, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner
was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution
of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that
his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the notarized document.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s signature was forged in the real estate mortgage contract,
making the subsequent contract of sale and transfer certificate of title in favor of the
respondent, null and void.

RULING:

Petitioner failed to prove that his signature was forged.

In this case, the alleged forged signature was not compared with the genuine signatures of
petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted. What petitioner submitted was another
mortgage contract executed in favor of Planters Development Bank, which he claims was
also forged by his brother. But except for this, no other evidence was submitted by petitioner
to prove his allegation of forgery. His allegation that he was in the US at the time of the
execution of the mortgage contract is also not sufficient proof that his signature was forged.

Petitioner failed to prove negligence on the part of respondent.

Likewise without merit is petitioner’s allegation of negligence on the part of respondent.

Before entering into a mortgage contract, banks are expected to exercise due
diligence. However, in this case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent did not
exercise due diligence or that it was negligent in accepting the mortgage. That petitioner was
erroneously described as single and a Filipino citizen in the mortgage contract, when in fact
he is married and an American citizen, cannot be attributed to respondent considering that
the title of the mortgaged property was registered under "FRANCISCO LIM and FRANCO LIM,
both Filipino citizens, of legal age, single."