JULIO LAGMAY VS.

CA

199 SCRA 501 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial
Review – Legitimizing Function – Proper Raising of Questions of Law

Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Julio Lagmay and 2 others.
Tuason got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent letters to each of her lessees advising
them of her intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are
occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the rentals from
each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters politely advised Lagmay et
al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3
months and this time they agreed to buy the parcel of land. Tuason however did not reply. Lagmay
et al the filed a complaint asserting their right over the land they’ve been occupying for quite some
time as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay
et al waived their right under the said PD when they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer.
Lagmay et al appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA
additionally pointed out that the parcel of land in question is not declared as an “urban land” under
PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of PD
1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they
did not raise the same during the trial of merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is ripe for judicial determination in this
case.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in this
case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The issue of constitutionality of a
statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and
presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination. Although the Court may
deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue considering that numerous persons
are affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by which this case may be
resolved on a non-constitutional determination.

SALONGA VS. PANO

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing
of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member
of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the
months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of
the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock
p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge
sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states
that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary,
he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero
Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for
Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On
4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the
present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no
rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme
Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment
had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions,
if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of
respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek
the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw
the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in
the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned,
this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it
has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth
in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to
the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development
of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was
moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC

Due Process – impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism,
intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd
Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique
to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to
proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 nd
Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986,
during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade
of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts
and the pertinent law.

BATANGAS VS. ROMULO

GR 152774
May 27, 2004

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions
and services devolved to them through the LGC.

The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No.
OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October
6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and
other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for
the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and

void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
“withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by LGUs and must be struck down.

According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of
local governments“. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines
the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do
or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed
but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes.
Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released
to the LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive
the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further action“. To subject its
distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.

The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national
internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd
preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to
supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.

Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not
through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations
bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general &
substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would
unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.

The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they
enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based

LACSON VS. PEREZ

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38)

on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress
the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of
the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of
Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also
contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain
regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1,
2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for
the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer
can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near
future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the
proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been
filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking

earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacañang.

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained
of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks
in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from
the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated
any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo
and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel
v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door
to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of
her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there
is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as
long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in
the exercise of the powers of that institution.

PAGUIA VS. DAVIDE

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate

ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting
Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments
confirmation of nominees.[1] However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on
petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness,[2] we dismiss the petition without
reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel
and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for
the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of
respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No.
7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that
respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him
from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging
the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65.[3] Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for
all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA
ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition.
First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.[4] Second, the Office of the President and the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioners citizenship
nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides
appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the
outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this
petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be
filed by a contender for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated
retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career
appointees such as respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and
mootness.

First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring
this suit. We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they
raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution.[5] Three factors
are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve
the merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the
controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.[6] None of petitioners
allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking
a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel
occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a clear disregard
of constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of
personnel with more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Career ambassadors
forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest
far more substantial and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in
ensuring enforcement of the law.

The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status.
Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for
expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.[7] However, the salaries
and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed
by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the
appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress
passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of
authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw
salary,[8] negating petitioners claim of illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.[9]

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.[10] Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on
equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to
parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for
moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES

CASE: this instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court
which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156
prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

FACTS:

 On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156
entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor
vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision
prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the
Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.
  Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy
Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers
Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring
Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
 The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with
Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227)
or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of
goods and capital within the Freeport.
 The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory
basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of
use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any
enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void.

ISSUE

Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-
legislative power. YES.

SC RULING

 Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to

promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged
primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the
President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the
law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to
carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must
comply with the following requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

(4) It must be reasonable.

The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases.

 Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly
complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the
issuance of EO