OCAMPO VS.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

MARTIN, J.:

This is a case of promotional appointment assailed as having been extended by a former Secretary of
Justice and approved by the then Commissioner of Civil Service in violation of Section 23 of the Civil
Service Act of 1959, as amended, more particularly the principle of seniority and the next-in-rank rule.

Sometime in 1962, the position of Deputy Clerk of Court in the cadastral section of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija was left vacant by the promotion of the incumbent Deputy Clerk of Court.
Respondent-appellee Leonardo T. Joson, a Docket Clerk, high school graduate and Second grade eligible,
applied for the position. Petitioner-appellant opposed the appointment in a letter dated July 27, 1964.
According to her, she is more senior, next in rank, and better qualified than the proposed appointee. She
is a first grade eligible and a holder of a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce, with units earned for Bachelor of
Science in Education. On September 1, 1964, then Secretary of Justice Salvador L. Mariño appointed
Leonardo T. Joson as "Deputy Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija." Because of the
prior protest of petitioner-appellant, the Commissioner of Civil Service returned the appointment to the
Secretary of Justice on September 8, 1964.

Thereupon, the Secretary of Justice referred the protest of petitioner-appellant to Executive Judge Salvador
C. Reyes of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for comment. On September 14, 1964, Judge Reyes
obliged and recommended the promotion of respondent Joson to the vacant position. He commented that"
(w)hile it is true that Stenographer Ocampo is a first grade eligible, there are also other compelling reasons
why Mr. Joson deserves this promotion. Among these are his long government service, experience, high
efficiency, industry, honesty, dedication as a public servant and other personal qualities. Because of these,
the undersigned has full trust and confidence in Mr. Joson." 1 The Secretary of Justice concurred fully in
the recommendation of Judge Reyes, "considering that the rule on seniority has been observed," and
endorsed Joson’s appointment to the Commissioner of Civil Service on September 16, 1964.

On October 8, 1964, Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido returned the appointment "without
action," with the request that the position be filled by promotion of an employee who meets the required
qualifications, while dismissing petitioner-appellant’s protest. Thus,

"Records show that Mrs. Ocampo now holds the position of Stenographer in the CFI Nueva Ecija at P3720
per annum effective September 1, 1963, whereas, Mr. Joson is a Docket Clerk, same Court at P2280 per
annum effective July 1, 1961. Considering their present positions, Mr. Joson and Mrs. Ocampo may not be
considered as next in rank employees to the position of Deputy Clerk of Court; hence, neither of them may
claim preference for appointment thereto under Sec. 23, par. 3 of Rep. Act 2260. There is therefore no
merit to the protest of Mrs. Ocampo.

However, the proposed qualifications standard for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court calls for a holder
of Bachelor of Laws degree with either Bar (RA 1080), Legal Assistant or Legal Researcher eligibility. As
these papers show that Mr. Joson is only a high school graduate, he does not meet the minimum
qualifications requirement for appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court. Moreover, his Second Grade eligibility
(R.A. 186) is not appropriate for appointment to this position."cralaw virtua1aw library

Nonetheless, the Secretary of Justice requested reconsideration of the Commissioner’s disapproval of

respondent Joson’s appointment for the reason that, first, the Department of Justice had not fixed the
Qualification Standard for Deputy Clerk of Court, the Civil Service Commission having granted its request
for extension to file its merit and promotion plan together with the Qualification Standard of positions;
second, the proposed Qualification Standard should apply only to original appointments, otherwise it would
be unfair to deserving employees in the court who have given the best years of their lives serving it and
would be depriving them of the much awaited opportunity for promotion, after having acquired the
experience and training in performing the duties in said office; and third, for every year lacking in college
education, one year of service in the agency would suffice. Correspondingly, the Civil Service
Commissioner considered the experience gained by respondent Joson in the court as sufficient to offset
what he lacked in legal education and approved his appointment on December 24, 1964.

Of this approval, petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration, but the Civil Service Commissioner
denied her motion on March 9, 1966, ruling that "while Mrs. Ocampo may edge Mr. Joson in point of
educational qualification, civil service eligibility and competence, because she is not the employee next in
rank, the appointing authority has discretion to choose another employee for promotion pursuant to Section
23, par. 3 of Republic Act 2260." As a consequence, petitioner-appellant commenced a suit for mandamus
and certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the appointment issued to Leonardo T. Joson
and declare her entitled to the position as the law requires.

On June 7, 1967, upon a motion to dismiss filed by respondent Joson, the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissed petitioner-appellant’s complaint for absence of cause of action. The trial court
resolved:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Under Republic Act 4814, petitioner does not possess the qualification for appointment to the position of
Deputy Clerk of a branch of Courts of First Instance. According to her own complaint, she is only a
stenographer, not a member of the Bar authorized to practice law in the Philippines. Not having the legal
qualification for the position of deputy clerk of Courts of First Instance, her complaint states no cause of
action. On the other hand, Republic Act 4814 exempts respondent Leonardo T. Joson from its operation,
he having been appointed prior to its effectivity."cralaw virtua1aw library

From this order of dismissal, petitioner Ocampo interposed the present appeal.

Does the complaint of petitioner Ocampo state a cause of action? Is she anyway entitled to the position in
question?

1. We do not share the view of the court below in dismissing petitioner-appellant’s complaint for lack of
cause of action on the strength of Republic Act 4814. That law which amended Section 46 of the Judiciary
Act on June 18, 1966, relevantly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The clerks of court, assistant clerks of court and branch clerks of court of Courts of First Instance shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. No
person shall be appointed to any of these positions unless he is duly authorized to practice law in the
Philippines: Provided, however, That this requirement shall not affect persons who, at the date of the
approval of this Act, are holding any of the positions of clerk of court, assistant clerk of court, branch clerk
of court or deputy clerk of court actually performing the work of a clerk of court assigned as such to a branch
of the Court of First Instance, and who shall continue in office and be considered as clerks of court, assistant
clerks of court, and branch clerks of court, respectively, in their corresponding courts or branches thereof
without the need of new appointments . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Proceeding from the assumption that the contested position is "branch clerk of court", as to which the
requirement of membership in the Bar is imposed, the trial court held petitioner-appellant without cause of
action 2 to question the appointment, she not being duly authorized to practice law. Petitioner-appellant is
a mere holder of a Bachelor’s degree in Commerce, not a lawyer by profession. The assumption is, of
course, flawed with falsity. Notwithstanding the amendatory act, the position remained unchanged. It was
not automatically converted into "branch clerk of court." After the effectivity of the amendment on June 18,
1966, respondent Joson stayed as Deputy Clerk of Court;" he did not become a "branch clerk of court." In
fact, from his appointment on September 1, 1964, respondent Joson continued to occupy the same
contested position until the court below ordered the dismissal of petitioner-appellant’s complaint on June
7, 1967, or even up to the present. 3 Possibly, respondent Joson did not meet the condition set forth in the
amendatory act, i.e., "deputy clerk of court actually performing the work of a clerk of court assigned as such
to a branch of the Court of First Instance." That merely because petitioner-appellant is not a member of the
Bar is, therefore, no valid reason to bar her from questioning Joson’s appointment. Membership in the Bar
is required only for the position of clerk of court, assistant clerk of court, or branch clerk of court. Since the
position disputed by petitioner-appellant is that of a "deputy clerk of court," the amendatory law does not
apply.

2. But, the controversy does not end there. Petitioner-appellant claims that she is rightfully entitled to the
position of deputy clerk of court. According to her, she is more senior, next in rank, and better qualified than
the appointee, Leonardo T. Joson, vis-a-vis the latter’s qualifications. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in
Commerce and has earned units in Education, whereas respondent Joson is a mere high school graduate.
She is a first grade eligible, whereas respondent Joson is only a second grade.

Previously, vacancies in the competitive service in the government are filled in accordance with Section 23
of the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended. That section provides, "whenever a vacancy occurs in any
position in the competitive service in the government . . ., the officer or employee next in rank preferably in
the same office, who is competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate
civil service eligibility shall be appointed thereto. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein,
then same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by
re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons with the Civil
Service eligibility appropriate to the position . . ." 4 In other words, a vacant position (be it new or created
by the cessation of an incumbent in office shall be filled by promotion of the ranking officer or employee,
who is competent and qualified to hold the same. 5 Otherwise, the vacancy may be filled by transfer,
reinstatement, re-employment or certification, not necessarily in that order. 6

We do not think that the principle of seniority and the next in rank rule had been transgressed by the
Secretary of Justice in appointing respondent Joson, undoubtedly in the nature of a promotion, as Deputy
Clerk of Court. The Secretary of Justice expressly represented that the rule on seniority had been observed
by his department when the promotional appointment of respondent Joson was prepared. In like manner,
the Commissioner of Civil Service dismissed petitioner-appellant’s protest and denied her motion for
reconsideration because her position of stenographer is not next in rank to the position of Deputy Clerk of
Court. Not being next in rank, she could not claim preference under Section 23 to the vacant office, even
on the assumption that she possesses, as she claims, better qualifications and education than respondent
Joson. 7

3. Respondent Joson’s qualifications are attacked by petitioner Ocampo as insufficient for the position of
Deputy Clerk of Court. We failed to see, however, any existing law or regulation specifically enumerating
the qualifications for said position with which Joson’s qualifications could be compared. On the contrary,
the Secretary of Justice had expressed that the Justice Department had not yet fixed the Qualification
Standard for Deputy Clerk of Court, 8 the Civil Service Commission has granted it further extension to file
its merit and promotion plan together with the Qualification Standard of positions. In the absence of this
Qualification Standard, the Secretary of Justice, as the department head of the Justice Department, enjoys
the clear prerogative to resolve who can best discharge the functions of the vacant office after ascertaining
the nature of the work to be done. This is because a department head is settled in that knowledgeable
position of discerning the primarily needs of the office and the answers thereto, more especially as regards
the proper personnel force. In the words of Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court in Reyes v. Abeleda,
9 "If there be adherence to the concept that public office is a public trust, as there ought to be, the criterion
should be what public welfare demands, what satisfies public interest. For it is axiomatic that public needs
could best be attended to by officials, about whose competency and ability there is no question. To that
overmastering requirement, personal ambition must of necessity yield. Discretion if not plenary, at least
sufficient, should thus be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the officers
concerned, primarily the department heads. They are in the most favorable position to determine who can
best fulfill the functions of the office thus vacated." The exception lies where a law, ordinance, or regulation
specifies the qualifications for a particular position, compliance with which is mandatory.

4. By and large, the appointing power of the Secretary of Justice does not appear to have been
indiscriminately exercised. Respondent Joson’s experience and training in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija since his appointment on August 6, 1946, especially his present duties as Docket Clerk, which
is allied to the position of Deputy Clerk of Court, according to the Secretary, had been viewed by the latter
as enough to qualify him "very satisfactorily" for the said position. His lack of college education is offset by
his years of service in the court. So did the Commissioner of Civil Service similarly hold in reconsidering
the disapproval of Joson’s appointment. It has decided "to consider the experience gained by Mr. Joson in
the Court of First Instance as sufficient to offset what he lacks in legal education." Moreover, the Secretary
of Justice has opined that the proposed Qualification Standard, if at all, should apply only to original
appointments (promotional appointments excluded) in order not to prejudice those deserving employees in
the court who have given the best years of their lives serving it.

We accord respect to the foregoing views of the Secretary of Justice. In essence, the power to appoint is
a matter of discretion. 10 The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for
the position. 11 No "rigid or mechanistic formula" is imposed by law upon it, "compliance with which is
inexorable and a deviation therefrom fatal." 12 Such discretion is generally unhampered by judicial
intervention. Possibility of abuse of power to appoint is not discounted though. But, this is no argument
against the concession of power as there is no power not susceptible of abuse. 13

5. Perforce, certiorari does not lie to render the promotional appointment extended to respondent Leonardo
T. Joson null and void. Nor is the writ of mandamus available to compel the respondent officials to declare
petitioner Dolores T. Ocampo entitled to the position in question. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
14 It only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the officer sought to be compelled to perform
the act, or the duty of appointing petitioner-appellant in the present case, and when the party in whose
favor the appointment is to be extended has a clear legal right to such appointment. 15 Petitioner-appellant
has failed to show that she has a legal right to the position of Deputy Clerk of Court which the respondent
officials could be compelled to do.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of the lower court, dated June 7, 1967, dismissing petitioner-
appellant’s complaint for certiorari and mandamus is hereby sustained. The appointment of respondent
Leonardo T. Joson to the position of Deputy Clerk of Court is declared to be in accordance with law. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA

112 SCRA 294 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – if there is no question of law
involved – BP 129

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was
assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because
of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by
such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles
of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there
is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions.
No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior
to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways
of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”

GARCIA VS. MACARAIG

39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers

Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June
29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from
scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and
functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems
as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that
it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave
(during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties,
never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond
the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced
Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail,
whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and
has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress
of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully
aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a
member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution
of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above
does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to
the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a
sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial
duties.

On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the
practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even
if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the
people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions
in the interest of the public service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from
each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and
among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under
our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic
should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have
legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may
be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

LOPEZ VS. ROXAS

17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined

Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections.
Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The
PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:

“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president
elect of the Philippines.”

In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he
sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is
unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the
Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed
before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the
SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme
Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should
decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not
create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested
in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law”

The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our
political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and
the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable
and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal.
For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is
essentially judicial.

IN RE JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO

DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

PADILLA, J.:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19,
sent this Court a letter which reads:

Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila

Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Sir:

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive
 Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June
1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor
of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready
reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the
appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties
of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I
have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a
Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and

discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the

Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or
of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the
Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary

functions of an Executive Judge.

May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving
the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among
the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who
may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same
to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of
its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that—
 Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the
supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag
not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig
(39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with
pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application,
it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform
a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only
a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is
not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as
expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no
less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance
to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO

ivil Law – Torts and Damages – Negligence – Malfeasance – Quasi-Delict

Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from
Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon
advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s
tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages
for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached
by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages
in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first
class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in
truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the
purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in
court is admissible in evidence.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket
to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso,
there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air
France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue
between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry
in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part
of the res gestae.

VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI

The Case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts: Sometime in 1948 the defendants verbally sold to her the two parcels of land in question for
P3,000.00 Pesos and, in consequence, delivery thereof together with the corresponding transfer
certificates of title (TCT) was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because
private respondents promised they would do so as soon as the titles which were then in the name of
their predecessor in interest were transferred to their names, and that despite demands made by her
for the execution of such deed, said respondents, "without justifiable cause therefor adamantly failed
and refused — to comply with (such) just and valid demand." In their answer, defendants denied that
the transaction was a sale and alleged that it was merely a contract of antichresis whereby petitioner
had loaned to them P1,500.00, for which she demanded the delivery of the lands in question and the
titles thereto as security, with the right to collect or receive the income therefrom pending the payment
of the loan. And by way of affirmative defenses, respondents interposed (1) unenforceability by action
of the alleged sale, under the statute of frauds, and (2) prescription of petitioner's action, the same
having allegedly accrued in 1948. Subsequently, respondents reiterated their said affirmative defense
of prescription in a formal motion to dismiss and as no opposition thereto was filed by petitioner, on
July 31, 1967, respondent court issued the impugned order of dismissal reading as follows:

Submitted for resolution is a motion to dismiss filed counsel for the defendants to which no opposition
has been filed despite the fact that the plaintiff was furnished with a copy thereof. Finding the said
motion to dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons stated therein, this Court grants the same and the
complaint, dated October 16, 1964, is hereby dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed the complaint of October 20, 1964

Issue: Whether petitioner’s right to demand the execution of the TCTs already prescribed.

Held/Ruling:
The right to demand the execution of the document required under Article 1358 is not imprescriptible.

The nature of petitioner’s action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which, to be sure,
cannot be
considered among those rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, for the simple reason that it
has already been, from petitioner’s own point of view, almost fully consummated by the delivery of the
lands and the corresponding titles to her.
X X X. The petitioner’s action, based as it is upon oral contract, prescribes in 6 years according to Artcle
1145 of the Civil Code. Assuming otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioner’s case comes
under Article 1149 and the action prescribes in 5 years. In both case, since the cause of action of
petitioner accrued in 1948 and the present suit was instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none
interrupting circumstances enumerated in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is
unquestionable that petitioner’s action filed in the court below has already prescribed.

BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF: BERNABE
BUSCAYNO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Secretary of National Defense; GEN.
ROMEO C. ESPINO, Chief of Staff, AFP; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief, PC MILITARY
Commission No. 2; and COL. MIGUEL AURE, Philippine Constabulary, Respondents.chanrobles
virtual law library

FERNANDO, C. J.:chanrobles virtual law library

In essence, the decisive issue posed in this habeas corpus and prohibition proceeding, filed on October
25, 1977, namely, the power of military tribunals to try individuals, not members of the armed forces,
was raised and decided adversely to the claim of petitioner Bernabe Buscayno in the leading case of
Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission. 1 A novel aspect is, however, sought to be imparted by the allegation
that respondent Military Commission "lost on October 17, 1976, the judicial power vested in it by the
respondent Secretary, now Minister, of the National Defense 2 to conduct the trial to persons charged
with the commission of crimes defined by the penal statutes of the land, when, on said date, the Filipino
people terminated the authoritarian regime, or military dictatorship established by the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, when they ratified the amendments to the Constitution" 3
and the contention that whatever judgment will be rendered by it against petitioner would be violative
of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution. 4 For reasons to be hereinafter set forth specifically, this Court
sees no valid distinction sufficient to call for a different ruling. There is no justification for granting the
remedies prayed for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Such conclusion gains reinforcement from the fact that in the Comment 5 submitted by respondents to
petitioner's urgent supplemental petition, 6 filed on December 3, 1977, reiterating but this time in a much
more detailed manner, the alleged denial of procedural due process, an order of the President to
respondent Secretary of National Defense dated November 29, 1977 was quoted in full. Insofar as
pertinent, it reads: "While according to the records, ample opportunity has been granted the accused
to exercise their rights under the law and the Constitution, in view of the severity of the charges against
them and the consequent penalty that has been imposed upon them, that is death and although the
trial has lasted several years during which time the Military Commission has given them every
opportunity to have a fair trial, in the interest of justice, you are hereby directed to see to it that they get
another opportunity and that the Military Commission reopen the trial for the purpose of receiving such
arguments, witnesses and other evidences as the two accused and other co-accused may wish to
present. 7 Even on the assumption then that the proceedings before respondent Commission were
vitiated by constitutional infirmity, the above Presidential order to respondent Secretary, now Minister,
of National Defense, if availed of, would attain the purpose sought to be achieved by
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts as set forth in the petition are with some modification petitions admitted in the answer.
Petitioner was arrested in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga, as ranking leader of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP), the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the New People's Army
(NPA), and was accused in two criminal cases, one for violation of R.A. No. 1700 and another for
murder, both pending with respondent Military Commission No. 2. He is likewise an accused in the MV
Karagatan case for rebellion before Military Commission No. 1. Prior to his arrest, his trial before
respondent Military Commission had started; it continued thereafter after he was duly arraigned. Then,
on October 25, 1977, this petition was filed, to be followed by the urgent supplemental petition, of
December 3, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As noted at the outset, this petition must be dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law

library

1. To demonstrate the lack of merit of the argument advanced by petitioner that from and after October
17, 1976, respondent Military Commission was deprived of any power to try petitioner as in the
plebiscite then held, the Filipino people terminated the authoritarian regime "or military dictatorship
established by the Commander-in-Chief" in General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, it suffices
to quote this relevant excerpt from the opinion of then Chief Justice Makalintal in Aquino Jr. v. Ponce
Enrile: 8 "In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence
as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not
only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and events
recited in detail in the different 'Whereases' of the proclamation are of common knowledge. The state
of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several
provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that
therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature
and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between
organized and Identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most
subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.
Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers;
recruitment of armed and Ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material,
fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence - all these are part of the rebellion which by
their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively
unless recognized and dealt with in that context. 9 This, too: Secondly, my view, which coincides with
that of other members of the Court as stated in their opinions, is that the question of validity of
Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art.
CVII, Sec. 3 (2)] that 'all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or
done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal,
binding and effective even after * * * the ratification of this Constitution * * *.' To be sure, there is an
attempt in these cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that,
however, is behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31, 1973), and of course by the existing political realities both
in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other countries." 10 It may be added that in
the address of President Marcos delivered before the American Newspaper Publishers Association in
Honolulu on April 22, 1980, he quoted with approval the view of Willoughby as to the significance of
the martial law provision found in our Constitution, Proclamation No. 1081 being based on the
commander-in- chief clause of the 1935 Constitution vesting on the President the power to do so under
the circumstances therein enumerated: "There is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in American law
as a declaration of martial law whereby military law is substituted for civil law. So-called declarations of
martial law are, indeed, often made, but their legal effect goes no further than to warn citizens that the
military powers have been called upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and
order and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment not commit
any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."
11 The President likewise referred to Burdick and Willis, two other eminent constitutional scholars of

note, who expressed the same view. 12 chanrobles virtual law library
2. It is not to be lost sight of that he is Commander-in-Chief precisely because he is the incumbent
President. Thus this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 13 enabled him to "promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of Martial
Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social
liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or
insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession,
inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed countries."
14 Moreover, this decision reiterated the ratification of such orders and decrees in these words: "To

dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period of
Martial Law, Section 3 (2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution expressly affirms that all the
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts he promulgated, issued or did prior to the
approval by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 and prior to the ratification by the
people on January 17, 1973 of the new Constitution, are 'part of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and specifically modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly. 15 chanrobles virtual law library

3. Whatever doubts may still exist as to the power of respondent Military Commission to try petitioner
should be dispelled, as was set forth in the opening sentence of this opinion by the aforesaid Aquino
Jr. v. Military Commission decision 16 Justice Antonio, now retired, as ponente, left no doubt on that
score. Thus: "We hold that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and
validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. 1. The Court
has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) on September
21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is
justified by the danger posed to the public safety. 2 To preserve the safety of the nation in times of
national peril, the President of the Philippines necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with
the imperative requirements of the emergency. On the basis of this, he has authorized in General Order
No. 8 (September 27, 1972) the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create military
tribunals to try and decide cases "of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them." In General Order No. 12 (September 30, 1972), the military tribunals were vested with
jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others, over crimes against public order, violations of
the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on firearms, and other crimes which in the face of the
emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and
security of the Republic. In order to ensure a more orderly administration of justice in the cases triable
by the said, military tribunals, Presidential Decree No. 39 was promulgated on November 7, 1972,
providing for the "Rules Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure and Other
Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals." These measures he had the authority to promulgate, since this
Court recognized that the incumbent President, under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII
of the new Constitution, had the authority to promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the
period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
the rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof * * *.'Pursuant to the aforesaid Section 3
[1] and [2] of Article XVII of the Constitution, General Orders No. 8, dated September 27, 1972
(authorizing the creation of military tribunals), No. 12, dated September 30, l972 (defining the
jurisdiction of military tribunals and providing for the transfer from the civil courts to military tribunals of
cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion, etc.), and No. 39, dated November 7,
1972, as amended (prescribing the procedures before military tribunals), are now 'part of the law of the
land." 17 chanrobles virtual law library

4. It was likewise held therein that to recognize such competence of a military commission would
amount to sanctioning a disregard of procedural due process. As was made clear in the opinion of
Justice Antonio: "Neither are We impressed with petitioner's argument that only thru a judicial
proceeding before the regular courts can his right, to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due
process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of
competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an
impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not
necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The guarantee of due process, viewed in
its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of
the proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and "the problem of the propriety of the deprivations,
under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness."
It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39,
assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, on essentially
fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense. 18chanrobles virtual
law library

5. This decision likewise authoritatively settles the question as to the alleged lack of impartiality, Justice
Antonio expressing the view of the Court in these words: "It is, however, asserted that petitioner's trial
before the military commission will not be fair and impartial, as the President had already prejudged
petitioner's cases and the military tribunal is a mere creation of the President, and "subject to his control
and direction." We cannot, however, indulge in unjustified assumptions. Prejudice cannot be presumed,
especially if weighed against the great confidence and trust reposed by the people upon the President
and the latter's legal obligation under his oath to "do justice to every man." Nor is it justifiable to
conceive, much less presume, that the members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Board of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with their
corresponding staff judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through whom petitioner's hypothetical
conviction would be reviewed before reaching the President, would all be insensitive to the great
principles of justice and violate their respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises.
19chanrobles virtual law library

6. One other issue raised by petitioner remains. It was likewise contended that a judgment of
respondent Military Commission would be violative of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution. That
provision requires that a decision of a court of record "shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based." The proceeding in a military commission terminates with a guilty or not guilty
verdict. Hence this objection. It can be said of course that a military commission is not a court of record
within the meaning of this Articles on the judiciary. Moreover, the procedure followed, including the form
the judgment takes, was given the seal of approval in the above Aquino decision citing the applicable
section of the Article on Transitory Provisions. 20 That would remove any taint of unconstitutionality. It
may be stated further that the record of the proceedings are available to the reviewing authorities.
Hence any imputation of arbitrariness sought to be avoided by the above provision would not be
warranted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

7. It may be noted that less than a year ago, in an exhaustive opinion by Justice Makasiar, this Court
once again sustained the power of the President to create military commissions or courts martial to try
not only members of the armed forces but also civilian offenders. 21 Counsel for petitioner, in his
voluminous pleadings, was quite vehement in his assertion that there was a marked failure to abide by
constitutional processes. Such an attitude is reminiscent of the aphorism of Holmes that certitude is not
the test of certainty. For beginning with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 22 decided on March 31, 1973,
up to and including Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 23 decided five days before the October 17,
1976 plebiscite, the question raised in the former case being the validity of the ratification of the present
Constitution and in the latter the power of the President to propose amendments, this Court performed
its awesome and delicate power of judicial review. In the three Aquino cases referred to in the body of
the opinion, the question raised and decided dealt with the presidential authority to issue the challenged
decrees. It is quite apparent, therefore, that to stigmatize the existing government between September
22, 1972 to October 17, 1976 as a military dictatorship is bereft of any support in law. The Constitution
remained supreme, with the fundamental principle of civilian supremacy upheld. 24chanrobles virtual
law library

Nothing said in this opinion is to be construed or to be understood as in any way lending approval to
any failure to accord full respect to all the rights of an accused person conformably to my concurrence
and dissent set forth in the aforesaid Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission decision and in accordance with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political
rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

MANGCA VS. COMELEC

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeks to set aside: (1) COMELEC resolution dated
March 31, 1981 — which: (a) revived the effects of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 9520 (thus
allowing Alinader Dagar Balindong and all of those who were proclaimed on March 18, 1980, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, as winners in the January 30,
1980, local elections to sit as officials of that municipality); (b) dismissed PP Case No. 426 without
prejudice to the filing of an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the appropriate
forum for ventilation and (c) declared said resolution as immediately executory — and (2) COMELEC
resolution dated September 16, which denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration of the
March 31, 1981, resolution.

After the January 30, 1980, local elections were held, Alinader Dagar Balindong, the private
respondent, and Mangacop Mangca, the petitioner, who were the official candidate for mayor of Sultan
Gumander, Lanao del Sur, filed pre-proclamation cases with the Commission on Elections. PP Case
No. 158 for the immediate counting of votes, canvass of election returns and proclamation of winning
candidates was filed by Alinader Dagar Balindong (NP) on February 4, 1980, while PP Case No. 426
for the annulment of elections in Sultan Gumander was filed by Mangacop Mangca (KBL) on February
13, 1980. On March 10, 1980, the COMELEC issued in PP Case No. 158 Resolution No. 9520 ordering
the counting and canvassing of votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates. Pursuant thereto,
the votes cast for Sultan Gumander were counted and canvassed and on March 18, 1980, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Sultan Gumander proclaimed respondent Balindong, who obtained a plurality
vote of 2,057, as Mayor-elect, and issued its certificate of canvass of the votes cast and proclamation
of the winning Candidates. The next day, Balindong took his oath of office before Acting Municipal
Circuit Judge Guimba Anan Mandi.

Meantime, petitioner Mangca filed with the COMELEC on March 13, 1980, a motion for reconsideration
of Resolution No. 9520 praying that the COMELEC suspend implementation of the resolution and the
proclamation of winning candidates, declare a failure of elections in Sultan Gumander, and order a
special election when peace and order conditions allow. He also prayed that PP Case No. 158 and PP
Case No. 426 be heard j jointly.

On March 26, 1980, the COMELEC ordered the suspension of the effects of Resolution No. 9520.

On April 18, 1980, respondent Balindong filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC order
dated March 26, 1980, and on May 21, 1980, he filed a motion to intervene in PP Case No. 426 and an
answer to the petition in said case. On May 22, 1980, the COMELEC issued a resolution admitting
Balindong's intervention and answer and ordering an immediate raffle and hearing on the merits of the
two cases.

On March 31, 1981, the Third Division of the Commission on Elections issued the contested resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Division resolves:

1. That the effects of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. (9520) be revived thus allowing
Alinader Dagar Balindong and all of those who were proclaimed on March 18, 1980 as
winners in the local elections in Sultan Gumander by the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
headed by Atty. Zaman M. Marohomsar to sit as municipal officials of Sultan Gumander;

2. That this decision shall be immediately executory pursuant to Sec. 175 of the Revised
Election Code;

3. That PP Case No. 426 be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an election protest
or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the appropriate forum for ventilation.

On April 27, 1981, petitioner Mangca filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 1981, resolution
claiming that the same did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
and, therefore, null and void for being contrary to Art. X, Sec. 9 of the Constitution. He further contended
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to
consider his evidence in PP Case No. 426 and the report of Regional Election Director Mamasapunod
Aguam that there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander and that a special election should be held
therein.

On May 7, 1981, the COMELEC issued an order holding in abeyance the implementation of the March
31, 1981, decision and temporarily restraining Balindong from assuming the position of mayor of Sultan
Gumander pending resolution of Mangca's motion for reconsideration.

On September 16, 1981, the COMELEC issued the other contested resolution denying Mangca's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, lifting the May 7, 1981, restraining order, and ordering the
immediate execution of the March 31, 1981, resolution. The COMELEC likewise emphasized that it did
not pass upon the merits of PP Case No. 426 since the pre-proclamation controversy should no longer
be viable after the proclamation of Balindong and the other winning candidates in Sultan Gumander
and that the issue of whether or not there was a valid election in said municipality can best be ventilated
in an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

The petitioner contends that the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
resolution dated March 31, 1981, and September 16, 1981, on the following grounds:

(1) That the March 31, 1981, resolution did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based — in violation of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution, which reads:

No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
and Sec. 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 dated February 26, 1980, which reads:

In deciding contests, the Commission shall follow the procedure prescribed for the
Supreme Court in Secs. 8 and 9, Art. X of the Constitution of the Philippines.

(2) That the COMELEC did not consider petitioner's evidence, particularly the Memorandum Report of
Atty. Mamasapunod Aguam, Regional Election Director for Region XII, to the effect that there was
failure of election in Sultan Gumander.

Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is null and void for being violative of Sec. 9,
Art. X of the Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of COMELEC Resolution No. 1450 is untenable. Firstly,
both cited provisions are inapplicable to the case at bar since the constitutional requirement applies
only to courts of justice which the COMELEC is not (Lucman vs. Dimaporo, L-31558, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 387) while COMELEC Resolution No. 1450, per Sec. I thereof, applies only to "election contests"
and "quo warranto proceedings" which the pre- proclamation cases are not. Secondly, the questioned
resolution has clearly and distinctly expressed the facts and the law on which it is based. The factual
basis of the dismissal of PP Case No. 426 is the proclamation of Balindong and the other winning
candidates of Sultan Gumander on March 18, 1980; while the legal basis thereof is the settled judicial
doctrine that once a proclamation has been held, a pre-proclamation case should no longer be viable.
Finally, the questioned resolution need not express factual findings relative to the issue of whether or
not there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander since the COMELEC did not pass upon said issue
and reserved resolution of the same in the election contest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, which
petitioner Mangca may thereafter file.

We likewise hold as untenable the petitioner's contention that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it did not resolve his claim that there was a failure of election in Sultan Gumander. In
the first place, the report of Regional Election Director Mamasapunod Aguam that there was a failure
of election in Sultan Gumander was not presented in evidence. In the second place, even if it had been
preserted the COMELEC had no duty to act on it considering that under the circumstances, the alleged
failure of election was not a proper issue in a pre-proclamation case. It should be recalled that the
COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation petition for annulment of the election (PP Case No. 426),
without prejudice to the filing of an election protest or quo warranto, whichever is proper, in the
appropriate forum for ventilation. The COMELEC's action is logical because settled is the doctrine that
once a proclamation has been made, as in this case, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG

Fast facts: JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. However, it only had controlling interest in
Tropicana, as Copacabana wa smanaged by its owners (siblings Yu). The two hotels became direct
competitors. Pertinent financial and business information was being leaked from Copacabana to
Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard
operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to be
the leak who sends important information to the competitor.
Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In response to the application for clearance and
Valladolid’s complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional director issued this order. The Deputy Minister
of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding “no sufficient justification or valid
reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from”.

Contention c/o JRM The order of Hon. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of
law upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional.

Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the
decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but it is not encouraged.

Held & Ratio: The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. 1979
lacks a statement of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation of the constitutional
requirement set forth in Article 8, section 14, whichis required of decisions or courts of record. However,
the assailed order is not a decision of a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative
agency with quasi-judicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary,
and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law drawn from shoes facts by the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the
issues raised therein.

NAPOLCOM VS LOOD (DI MAHANAP)

NUNAL VS. CA

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** dated February 22, 1990 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14889 entitled "Emma Lyon de Leon, et al., plaintiffs-appellees versus
Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased herein represented by Albert Nuñal, et al., defendants appellants,"
dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the trial court's order *** dated January 9, 1987 for the
inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as one of the heirs who shall benefit from the partition.

The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows.

This case originated from a suit docketed as Civil Case No. 872 filed by Emma Lyon de Leon in her
behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors Helen Sabarre and Kenny Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman,
Mercedes Lyon Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las Peñas,
(herein private respondents) against Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased and herein represented by her
heirs, Albert Nuñal and Anita Nuñal Hormigos (herein petitioners), for partition and accounting of a
parcel of land located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned by Frank C.
Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona, Luisa, Mary, Frank and William James.
Private respondents claimed that said parcel of land, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3141 in the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon Nuñal since
1946 and that she made no accounting of the income derived therefrom, despite demands made by
private respondents for the partition and delivery of their shares.

On December 17, 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
court) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the property
but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3141 among the plaintiffs and defendant. The parties shall make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to the Court's confirmation, should the parties
be unable to agree on the partition, the court shall appoint commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to such party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the
Court shall direct. Defendant is further ordered to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000.00."
1

On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
57265-R. The case was remanded to the court of origin for the ordered partition. 2

On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the court a quo. 3

On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon,
assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her
motion, she contends that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership
and participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of
execution is unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said
share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section
12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. 4

On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of the three commissioners
and in lieu thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. 5

On February 4, 1986, the said court issued an order appointing a Board of Commissioners to effect the
partition of the contested property. 6

On May 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the motion to quash order of execution with preliminary
injunction filed by Mary Lyon Martin and directed the partition of the property among the original party
plaintiffs and defendants. 7

On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that in view of the fact that
the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the Transfer Certificate of Title, she could therefore be
construed as one of the heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then sought. 8

On September 29, 1986, the lower court issued an order directing the counsel of Emma Lyon de Leon
to furnish the court within five days from receipt thereof all the names the of heirs entitled to share in
the partition of the subject property. 9

On October 1, 1986, the petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the court issue an order directing
the partition of the property in consonance the decision dated December 17, 1974 of the trial court the
order of said court dated May 28, 1986. 10

Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing the Board of
Commissioners to immediately partition the said property. 11

On January 3, 1987, the private respondents filed motion for clarification as to whether the partition of
property is to be confined merely among the party plaintiffs and defendants, to the exclusion of Mary
Lyon Martin. 12

On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon
Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property, to wit:
"After a perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 57265-R, where this case was
appealed by the unsatisfied parties, there is a finding that Mary now Mary Lyon Martin is one of the
legitimate children of Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom. (Page 3 of the decision).

In view of this finding, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left out in the partition of this property
now undertaking (sic) by the said court appointed commissioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court appointed commissioners is hereby directed to include
Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner in the said property subject of partition with the corresponding shares
adjudicated to her.

SO ORDERED." 13

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 14 of the aforesaid order was denied by the trial court. 15

On February 22, 1990 the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing petitioners' appeal, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no legal impediment to the inclusion of Mary Lyon
Martin by the court-appointed Board of Commissioners as one of the heirs who shall benefit from the
partition, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED." 16

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on June 6, 1990. 17

Petitioners filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court, for the following reasons:

"1.) BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DIRECTING THE COURT
APPOINTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO INCLUDE MARY L. MARTIN TO SHARE IN THE
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION DESPITE THE FACT, OVER WHICH THERE IS NO
DISPUTE, THAT SHE HAS NOT LITIGATED EITHER AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 872, IT HAS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO AMEND OR MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 872 AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 28 MAY 1986 WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.

2.) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THAT MARY L. MARTIN
"NEVER LITIGATED AS ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN SAID CASE," AND HER ONLY
PARTICIPATION THEREIN WAS SIMPLY CONFINED "AS A WITNESS FOR DEFENDANT-SISTER
LUISA LY ON NUÑAL," AND TO ALLOW HER TO SHARE IN THE PARTITION THIS LATE WITHOUT
REQUIRING A PROCEEDING WHERE THE PARTIES COULD PROVE THEIR RESPECTIVE
CLAIMS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO DENYING THE NUÑALS OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 18

The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-
heir entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff
nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property and
that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.
Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872
ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among
plaintiffs and defendants has long become final and executory. Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction
to issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987 ordering the Board of Commissioners to include
Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of said property despite the fact that she was not a party to
the said case. Said Order, therefore, resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision rendered
in Civil Case No. 872.

We find merit in the instant petition.

In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 We held that ". . ., nothing is more settled
in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The
only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."

Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose." 20

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory.
Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification
that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his
authority.

The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872
and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove
their respective claims.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9, 1987 of the trial Court as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated
December 17, 1974 in Civil Case No. 872 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

MANGELEN VS. CA

Assailed in this petition for review is the Resolution dated 12 July 1989 of the public respondent Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04585, 1 reversing its previous Decision therein of 30 January 1989 2
which affirmed in toto the 15 August 1984 Decision of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. 84-22306 entitled DATU SAMAD MANGELEN vesus HABALUYUS
ENTERPRISES, INC., and PEDRO J. HABALUYAS. 3 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P600,000.00
plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of formal demand on
May 25,1983, until the same is fully paid; and
 2 Ordering the same defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the additional
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Defendants are further ordered to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. 4

Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an action for the recovery of the amount of P600,000.00 which
defendant, now private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., represented by its President, private
respondent Pedro Habaluyas, bound itself to pay plaintiff, now petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise
Agreement.

Instead of filing an Answer within the reglementary period private respondents submitted a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, which the trial court denied in its Order of 24
February 1984. The private respondents then filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, dated 9 March
1984, alleging as ground therefore the pendency of another case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. This was followed, on 28 March 1984, by a second supplemental motion to dismiss — amplifying
on the ground of lis pendens — and reply to the opposition to the first supplemental motion to dismiss.
Both supplemental motions were denied by the trial court in its Order of 4 April 1984. On 11 April 1984,
private respondents filed an urgent motion to reconsider said order which was likewise denied by the
court on 30 May 1984. Although they received a copy of the denial order on 5 June 1984, private
respondents still did not file any answer to the complaint. Consequently, on 22 June 1984, petitioner
filed a motion to declare defendants in default and to be allowed to present evidence ex-parte, which
the trial court granted in its 25 June 1984 Order. Pursuant thereto, petitioner presented his evidence
ex-parte on 16 July 1984. 5

On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold in abeyance
further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court on 12
July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising the issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis
pendencia. That case was docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. 6

On 27 July 1984, after considering in open court the said motion, and petitioner's opposition thereto
and in view of the absence of a restraining order from the Intermediate Appellate Court enjoining the
trial court from proceeding with the case, the latter issued an order denying the defendants' motion to
set aside the order of default. The order 7 reads:

For lack of merit, as the Court considers defendants were grossly and excusably
negligent, for it appears that defendants had until June 19, 1984 within which to submit
their responsive pleading but they failed to do so; that the Petition for Certiorari (for (sic)
which this Court has no copy up to the present) which they allegedly filed with the
Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court was made supposedly on July 12, 1984 only;
that defendants knew as early as July 2, 1984 of the Order of Default and of the ex-parte
presentation of plaintiff's evidence scheduled on July 16th, yet defendants' Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default and To Hold in abeyance Further Proceedings is hereby denied.

Thereafter, on 15 August 1984, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner based on
the evidence submitted ex-parte; the dispositive portion of said decision was quoted earlier. It made
the following findings of fact:

Plaintiff (Datu Samad Mangelen) has a logging concession consisting of 3,000 hectares,
under O.T.L. No. 463-123165 located somewhere in Datalblao, Columbia, Sultan
Kudarat. This logging concession of the plaintiff, the extent and boundaries of which are
as indicated in the red lines named "Datu Samad Mangelen", marked Exhibit L-1, appears
to be included in the logging concession located on same general vicinity under T.L.A.
229 with an aggregate area of 50,000 hectares, more or less, supposedly granted
defendants Habalayus Enterprises, Inc. (Exh. L).

On November 2, 1981, the plaintiff, by means of a letter addressed to the President of the
Philippines, requested that this logging concession be segregated from that awarded the
defendant Habalayus Enterprises, Inc. (Exh. A). The matter was referred by the President
to then Minister of Natural Resources (Exh. B). Thereafter, acting in behalf of Minister
Peña, Special Assistant Felipe Corleto of said Ministry endorsed the matter to Director
Edmundo Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development, Central Office (Exh. C). Upon
receipt by the latter government functionary of the papers, he immediately directed the
Regional Director of the same Bureau at Cotabato City to advise Habaluyas Enterprises
to stop its present logging operation inside the area awarded to the plaintiff until such time
as the requested petition shall had (sic) been acted upon. Meanwhile, the parties were
directed to appear in a conference on January 5, 1983, to be presided over by an official
of the bureau (Exh. D). The meeting was thereafter reset to February 2, 1983, as there
had been no complete proposal as yet for settlement. On the latter date, defendant Atty.
Habaluyas appeared with a proposed Compromise Agreement. After studying the matter,
plaintiff suggested, and his suggestion was heeded, that the consideration for the
Compromise Agreement would be the waiver on the part of the plaintiff of whatever rights
he may have over his logging concession in favor of the defendants (Exh. E-2). The
Compromise Agreement was thus finalized between the parties, more specially (sic) the
plaintiff as the Second Party and the defendant Pedro (sic) Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
represented by its President, defendant Pedro Habaluyas, as the First Party. The
pertinent text of their agreement, embodied in Exhibit E, is as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance hereof and as gesture (sic) of gratitude

and good faith, the FIRST PARTY has agree (sic), as he hereby agrees, to
give to the SECOND PARTY the total amount of SIX THOUSAND (sic)
(6,000.00) PESOS, one fourth of the amount of P150,000.00 (sic) shall be
paid and/or delivered on February 28, 1983 and the remaining balance of
P300,000.00 shall be paid in three (3) equal installment (sic) with a 30-day
interval, beginning April 30, 1983.

For this (sic) part, and as a manifestation of reciprocity, the SECOND

PARTY agreed, as he hereby agrees, to continue helping in the concession
area of the FIRST PARTY and that he and his heirs and successors-in-
interests (sic) are hereby relinquishing or waiving whatever right they have
over a portion of the area granted to the FIRST PARTY by the government
under TLA No. 229;

That finally, this compromise agreement shall be subject to the approval of

the Bureau of Forest Development.

Parenthetically, as already stated, the Compromise Agreement was executed by the

parties in the presence of witnesses and duly sworn to, and approved by, Asst. Director
Doroteo U. Antonio of the Bureau of Forest Development.

Despite the compromise, defendant refused to issue checks in compliance therewith, thus
prompting plaintiff to complain to the Bureau of Forest Development. Said office, thru its
 Assistant Director Antonio, responded by directing compliance by defendants of (sic) the
Compromise Agreement as shown in the Order marked Exhibit F. The said Order also
directed therein respondent, herein defendant Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., to refrain from
continuing with the logging operation inside the area complained of by the herein plaintiff.

A consequence of the issuance of the Order marked as Exhibit F was the act of the
defendant in later issuing two (2) post-dated checks in favor of the plaintiff. The first was
dated April 11, 1983, for the amount of P150,000.00 payable to Mayor Samad Mangelen
which is an Allied Banking Corporation check and under the signature of defendant Atty.
Pedro Habaluyas (Exh. G), while the second was dated April 24, 1983, for the same
amount, payee, maker (sic) and with the same bank (Exh. H).

On or about April 28, 1983, defendant Atty. Habaluyas advised plaintiff, thru the Barangay
Captain of the place where plaintiff's logging concession is situated, to inform the plaintiff
that the two (2) checks that were issued last April 15, 1983, were to be encashed or
negotiated (Ipasok) on May 2, 1983 (Exh. I). When the two checks were negotiated to
(sic) the bank concerned, both of the checks were dishonored on the ground of
insufficiency of funds of the marker thereof. Demands were thereafter made on the
defendants to make good the two checks, but despite these verbal demands, there was
no favorable response on the part of the defendants. Plaintiff was thus constrained to
write a formal demand letter dated May 25, 1983, giving the defendants fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof within which to make good the two checks that had bounced (Exh.
J). The original of said letter was received on May 25, 1983 by the defendants (Exh. G-
1). Not still (sic) heeding the demands of the plaintiff, the latter was compelled to initiate
two criminal complaints for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as
the bouncing Check Law , against defendant Pedro Habaluyas. The necessary
Informations were filed with the Makati Branch of the regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, where they are now pending (Exhs. K and K-1).

The present action was filed by the plaintiff to recover the entire amount of plaintiff to
recover the entire amount of P600,000.00 that defendant promised to pay him per the
Compromise Agreement, plus interest from date of demand until fully satisfied; moral
damages due to the embarassment, sleepless nights and other sufferings of the plaintiff
resulting from defendants' obstinate refusal to comply with their undertaking under the
Compromise Agreement (TSN, pages 17 to 17, July 16, 1984 Hearing); attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 which plaintiff had promised to pay his counsel, of which 50% had already
been paid; and the premium payments on the Indemnity Bond and the Sheriff's Fees and
other litigation expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the prosecution of this case. 8

Not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment, private respondents interposed an appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal, specifically on 7 January 1985, the
Fourth Division of said Court dismissed the petition of private respondents in AC-G.R. No. 03742. Their
subsequent petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the dismissal was denied
by this Court in the resolution of 3 July 1985; the motion to reconsider the same was likewise denied
by this Court on 9 October 1985. 9

In the Appellants' Brief filed with the public respondent, private respondents impute upon the trial court
the commission of the following errors:

I. . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS GROSSLY AND INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENT

AND DECLARING THEM IN DEFAULT AND RECEIVING EVIDENCE EX-PARTE.
 II . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT
OF PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF P600,000.00 AS THE REAL AND TRUE
CONSIDERATION FOR THE LATTER'S RELINQUISHMENT OF WHATEVER RIGHTS
HE HAS UNDER O.T.L. 453-123165.

III . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES IN THE

AMOUNT OF P50,000.00.

IV . . . IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN BAD FAITH HENCE LIABLE FOR

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,000.00.

V . . . IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF P100,000.00. 10

After reviewing the records of the case, public respondent promulgated on 30 January 1989 a ten-page
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, being in accordance with the law and the evidence, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in toto. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED. 11

In said decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of the trial court, and explicitly
declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with the provisions of the rules of court" 12 and
committed no reversible error "in declaring the defendents (sic) in default, in allowing plaintiff to adduce
evidence ex parte, and in finding the defendants-appellants grossly and inexcusably negligent (sic)" 13
in view of the latter's failure to make a timely motion for reconsideration of the order of default; appear
in court on 16 July 1984 when petitioner was scheduled to present his evidence ex parte; and furnish
the trial court with a copy of their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate court within a reasonable
time. Its was only on 6 August 1984 –– long after the case had been submitted for decision — that the
same was filed.

Anent the substantive issues raised on appeal, public respondent ruled out any merit in the defendants-
appellants' (private respondents) contention that the consideration for the payment of the P600,000.00
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement was not the waiver of petitioner's rights over the logging
concession, but the maintenance of peace and order in the area covered thereunder. Finding the terms
of the Compromise Agreements between the parties "too clear as to obviate any room for a contrary
interpretation," 14 public respondent found the appellants to have been properly adjudged liable for the
P600,000.00, together with the interest thereon, and for moral and exemplary damages for deliberately
evading the clear and indubitable provisions of the agreement.

Still unable to accept the verdict, defendants-appellants filed a motion to reconsider the decision,
reiterating therein the procedural and substantive issues raised in their Brief, particularly on the
interpretation of the consideration contemplated in the Compromise Agreement. Petitioner filed an
opposition thereto.

On 12 July 1989, public respondent promulgated a resolution reversing its earlier decision of 30 January
1989. Because of its brevity, the resolution is quoted in full:

It appearing (sic) from the motion for reconsideration that defendants-appellants have
good and valid defenses as a amplified in their motion for reconsideration and their reply
to Opposition which in fairness to the lower court, We will not point out, since this is default
 case so that any decision of the lower court will not in any way be preempted in the
interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated
on January 30, 1989 is hereby granted and the said decision is hereby reversed. Let this
case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. 15

Hence, this resource under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner (plaintiff-appellee therein) died during the pendency of the
appeal. The appropriate motion for substitution of parties was filed but public respondent failed to take
any action thereon until rendering its 30 January decision wherein it allowed the substitution of plaintiff-
appellee by his widow, Bai Salilang T. Mangelen 16 Respondents have not raised any issue on this
point. In the interest of justice, therefore, the widow shall be deemed to have been substituted for the
petitioner and, for all legal intents and purposes, shall be considered as the petitioner in this case.

Petitioner contends that:

(a) The Court of Appeals seriously erred in remanding the case to the Lower Court for
further proceedings;

(b) The Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that herein respondents have a valid
and good defense. 17

On 8 January 1990, after the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner submitted his
Reply thereto, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda, 18 which they subsequently complied with.

There is merit in the petition.

The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public respondent was
an ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This necessitated a full-blown decision taking into
account the five (5) assigned errors which touch on both substantive and procedural matters.
Accordingly, public respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision following a meticulous review
of the proceedings had before the trial court and careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before
it. Thus, that decision faithfully complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts of the law on which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside,
upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified
decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation relied upon.
The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to justify
such a sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn
conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public respondent
miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo
the trial court's challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public
respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the
status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal
proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order.
There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial
court would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the
order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be hard pet at
finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.

And now to the errors assigned in this instant petition. The principal issues raised resolve around (a)
the correctness or incorrectness of the trial's declaring private respondents in default for failure to
answer the complaint within the reglementary period in view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss
and the motion for reconsideration, and authorizing the petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte; and
(b) the presence or absence of a good and valid defense to warrant the lifting of the default order.

Private respondents admit that they did not file their Answer within the reglementary period, but allege
that their failure to do so was not due to gross, inordinate and inexcusable neglect as the omission was
the result of the elevation of the issues of litis pendencia and jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari. It is averred that at most, they should be faulted for a mere procedural lapse.
While this sounds appealing, We cannot subscribe to it. The pleadings disclose facts which, as earlier
summarized, clearly reveal respondents' attempt, through different procedural maneuvers, to delay a
simple case. First, they filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of improper venue. Upon denial of
the motion, and without asking for its reconsideration, they filed a so-called supplemental motion to
dismiss, this time on the basis of lis pendens, a ground already available to them before the filing of the
motion to dismiss because the case pleaded as a bar to the prosecution of petitioner's cause is a
complaint which respondents themselves filed. They knew only too well that under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, they had waived the right avail of this ground by their failure to raise the same in
the motion to dismiss. They, however, shrewdly tried to put one over the trial court by denominating
their second motion as a supplemental motion; this, of course, is utterly baseless because the original
motion had already been denied. To further camouflage the weakness of their weakness of their
position and give a semblance of strength to the supplemental motion, they filed a second supplemental
motion to dismiss which, however, merely amplified on the preceding motion. After the denial of the
said motions on 4 April 1984, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial
court likewise denied on 30 May 1984. Private respondents received a copy of this last order on 5 June
1984. They still refused to file an answer, thus prompting the petitioner to file a motion to declare them
in default which was granted on 25 June 1984. If the reason for failure to file the answer was because
they had wanted to file a petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court, they should
have acted immediately. Yet, as borne out by the records, they opted to take their sweet time, filing that
petition only on 12 July 1984. It is obvious that they were unmoved by any sense of urgency to protect
their interests. it appears, therefore, that the filing of the petition much later was but part of a well-
planned strategy to gain more time to delay the case. If the trial court aborted such strategy, private
respondents have only themselves to blame. The trial court acted correctly and in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court in declaring private respondents in default and in authorizing
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.

In order to set aside an order of default, Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court must be complied
with. It reads:

Sec. 3 Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
meritorious defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
In the light of the above narrated circumstances, private respondents cannot take refuse under the
allegations of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect to justify their failure to file the answer. To
Our mind, such inaction was due to their obstinate refusal to comply with the mandated procedural
requirements.

Thus, whether private respondents had a valid or good defense is entirely irrelevant considering the
circumstances obtaining. The public respondent, therefore, gravely erred in "reversing" its decision of
30 January 1989 on the basis of respondents "good and valid defenses".

Under the aforesaid Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, a meritorious defense, which public
respondent considers as synonymous to a "good and valid defense," is not only basis for the lifting of
an order of default; it is merely one of two requisites which a party must comply with. The first is the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. Needless to say, these two requisites must
concur. While it is not required of Us to inquire into the nature, character and quality of the defense
interposed by private respondents, it should nevertheless be stated here that such a defense relates to
the interpretation of the provision in the Compromise Agreement regarding the purpose of the
P600,000.00 consideration. Petitioner claims that it is for the waiver of his rights over a portion of a
logging concession mentioned in the Compromise Agreement; on the other hand, private respondent
claim that it is for the maintenance of peace and order by the petitioner. Both the trial court and the
public respondent in its 30 January 1989 decision upheld the theory of the petitioner. In the latter, public
respondent even made the following apt observation:

What may be said of appellants is that they are deliberately evading or sidestepping the
clear and indubitable provisions of the Compromise Agreement. From a reading of the
above quoted portions of the agreement, it is light as day and subject to no argument that
the true and actual consideration for the payment by appellants of that amount of
P600,000.00 to appellee is the latter's waiver and relinquishment of whatever rights he
may have over a portion of the area supposedly granted as a logging concession to the
former. To subscribe to appellants' trend of thinking would be to countenance blackmail
and to violate public policy, moral and good customs. . . 19

We are thus unable to see how further proceedings by the trial court could produce a result consistent
with the theory of private respondents. Besides, the interpretation of the Compromise Agreement
involves a question of law; the remand of the case would thus serve no useful purpose. The granting
then of the petition and the reinstatement of the public respondent's 30 January 1989 decision are in
order, except that the said decision should be modified insofar as it affirms the awards for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and holds moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
and holds private respondent Pedro Habaluyas jointly and severally liable with the other private
respondent for the amounts adjudged.

The award for moral and exemplary damages is based on the trial court's conclusion that:

Plaintiff is entitled to moral damages due to defendants' persistent and unreasonable

refusal to comply with their undertaking under the Compromise Agreement, thus resulting
to (sic) embarassment (sic), sleepless nights and other sufferings of the plaintiff, things
that may have aggravated his present physical condition. Likewise award (sic) of
exemplary damages to serve as an example for public good is hereby given, in addition
to moral damages, because of the obvious bad faith of defendant (sic) in not complying
with their undertakings. The legal support for the award of attorney's fees to the full extent
of plaintiff's claim are the provisions, or anyone of them, of paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 11 of
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, even as the extensive efforts being exerted by plaintiff's
 counsel in protecting the rights of his client not only in this case but in other related
criminal and civil cases are being noted. 20

We have carefully examined the 15 August 1984 decision of the trial court and the 30 January
1989 decision of the public respondent. Their respective statements of the case reveal nothing
about an allegation and prayer in the complaint for the specific amount of moral and exemplary
damages sought. Neither do they disclose that the petitioner testified on, and therefore proved,
a specific amount. Such non-disclosure constitutes ample proof that indeed, the complaint did
not specify, much less pray, for a specified sum to be awarded as moral damages.

Moreover, the idea of exemplary damages was broached for the first time only in the dispositive position
of the trial court's decision. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that judgment entered
against a party in default, as in the case of the private respondents, shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for. Consequently, an award of exemplary damages should not have
been made since it was not even prayed for. Besides, the complaint is for beach of contract. Exemplary
damages may only be awarded therein if private respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. 21 There is no finding whatsoever on the matter. Also, since no
specific amount of moral damages was prayed for, the maximum limit provided for in said Section 5
can in no case be fixed. Thus, the P50,000.00 award is purely arbitrary and speculative.

It may be pointed out that there is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on
evidence presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence presented ex-
parte and against a defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to appear at the hearing. In the
former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the judgment against the defendant should not exceed the
amount or to be different in kind from that prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the
amount or be different in kind from the prayed for. 22

As regards the attorney's fees, We find the award of P100,000.00 to be unreasonable. The second
paragraph of Article 2208 is not applicable since the acts of private respondents did not compel the
petitioner to litigate with third persons; moreover, there is no proof presented to show that the petitioner
incurred expenses to protect his interest. Besides, the court took into account the services rendered by
counsel in other related civil and criminal cases, and not exclusively in Civil Case No. 84-22306.
Attorney's fees for such other related cases do not appear to have been alleged and the proof offered
is, as summarized by the trial court, limited to the subject civil case. We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that an award of P25,000.00 for attorney's fees would be proper and just.

Finally, We find the basis for holding private respondent Pedro Habaluyas jointly and severally liable
with private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. for the amounts adjudged. The Compromise
Agreement was a corporate act of the latter with the former signing merely as its representative. No
provision therein makes him solidarily liable with the corporation. Additionally, the liability arising from
the obligation is not solidarily. There is solidarily liability only when the obligation expressly so states,
or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. 23 The trial court simply cannot write
into the Compromise Agreement a stipulation or condition which the parties did not contemplate. It
would have been entirely different if petitioner alleged and proved grounds allowing the piercing of the
veil of corporate fiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The resolution of public respondent of 12 July 1989 in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 04585 is SET ASIDE and its Decision of 30 January 1989 is hereby REINSTATED, subject
to the modifications above discussed. As modified, the Decision of the trial court of 15 August 1984 in
Civil Case No. 84-22306 is affirmed in all respects except that the portion holding private respondent
Pedro Habaluyas jointly and severally liable with private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. and
awarding, moral and exemplary damages, is hereby DELETED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the
award of attorney's fees is hereby reduced to P25.000.00.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.