In The Circuit Court of Miller County, Arkansas

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, ARKANSAS

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE N. DECISIVE, CIRCUIT JUDGE,
TWENTYFIFTH DIVISION, OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS. APPEAL OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN ON THE 26TH
DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2014

JOE DZHUGASHVILI PLAINTIFF

VS NO BR549

SVETLANA ALILUYEVA DZHUGASHVILI DEFENDANT

APPEARANCES

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Adrian Wapcaplet
Mousebat, Follicle, Goosecreature,
Ampersand, Spong, Wapcaplet,
Looseliver, Vendetta and Prang
303 South Romanov Avenue
Texarkana, Arkansas 71854

FOR THE DEFENDANT
Vladimir Ulyanov
Marks, Ulyanov, and Bronshtein
2500 Red Square
Texarkana, AR 71854

INDEX

Caption ………………………………………………………………………………… 1
Docket Sheets ………………………………………………………………………….. 2
Complaint ……………………………………………………………………………… 4
Answer ………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
Motion to Dismiss ………………………………………………………………………. 9
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss …………………………………………………. 11
Response to Motion to Dismiss ………………………………………………………….. 15
Brief in Support of Response to Motion to Dismiss …………………………………….. 17
Judgment ………………………………………………………………………………….. 20
Notice of Appeal ………………………………………………………………………….. 21

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
September 22, 2014

Hearing ………………………………………………………………………………….. 24
Reporter’s Certificate ………………………………………………………………….... 30
Clerk’s Certificate ………………………………………………………………………. 31

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE

The Plaintiff, Joe Dzhugashvili, for his cause of action against Defendant, Svetlana
Aliluyeva Dzhugashvili states as follows:

1. Plaintiff is a resident of Miller County, Arkansas, and has been for more than sixty (60)
days. Defendant is a resident of Bowie County, Texas, and venue in this county is proper.
2. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a common law marriage under the laws of the State
of Texas on or about July 26, 2013.
3. Plaintiff and Defendant separated on May 1, 2014 and they have lived separately and
apart since that date.
4. During the marriage of the parties, Defendant has offered such indignities to the person
of the Plaintiff as to render Plaintiff’s condition in life intolerable.
5. No children were born of this marriage and none are expected.
6. There are property rights and debt responsibilities to be adjudicated.
7. The Plaintiff is unemployed and is seeking temporary support from the Defendant. The
Defendant maintains Plaintiff on her health insurance and should be ordered not to cancel this
health benefit for the Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Joe Dzhugashvili respectfully seeks an Absolute Divorce in
this matter, an adjudication dividing the property accumulated by the parties during the marriage,
and any other just and proper relief as determined by this Court.

. Respectfully submitted,

Joe Dzhugashvili, PLAINTIFF

Adrian Wapcaplet
By: _______________
Adrian Wapcaplet
Ark. Bar No. 99999
(870) 5559876

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549

SVETLANA ALILUYEVA (DZHUGASHVILI) DEFENDANT

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE

Comes Svetlana Aliluyeva, NOT Dzhugashvili, NEVER Dzhugashvili, and for her
Answer to Joe Dzhugashvili’s Complaint for Divorce states:

1. Defendant has no knowledge as to Plaintiff’s current residence, therefore the allegations
of the first paragraph of his complaint are denied.
2. The allegations of the second paragraph of his complaint are likewise denied. Plaintiff
and Defendant never entered into any kind of marriage, common law or otherwise, in
Texas or anywhere else.
3. Defendant agrees that she threw Plaintiff out of the apartment they shared on or about
May 1, 2014, and that they have not lived together since.
4. Defendant denies the allegations of Paragraph 4 for numerous reasons including but not
limited to:
a. Plaintiff and Defendant were not married
b. Defendant did not do anything to render Plaintiff’s life intolerable. To the
contrary, it was Plaintiff who rendered Defendant’s life intolerable
5. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 5 because the parties were not married.
6. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 6 because the parties were not married.
7. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 7 because the parties were not married, but
does admit that she added him to her health insurance. Defendant has no knowledge, but
does not doubt, that Plaintiff is unemployed, as that was his normal condition in life.
8. Defendant affirmatively states that at no time was there any agreement among the parties
to be married.
9. Defendant affirmatively states that at no time did the parties represent to others that they
were married, and in the alternative affirmatively states that at no time did the parties
represent to any other person in Texas that they were married.
10. Defendant affirmatively states that Texas abolished common law marriage in the 2005
Amendment to the Texas Constitution pursuant to which the state may not create or
recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.
11. Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not specifically admitted
herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Joseph Dzhugashvili’s Complaint should be dismissed.
Defendant also asks for all other just and proper relief.

Respectfully Submitted,

Vladimir Ulyanov _____
Vladimir Ulyanov
Ark. Bar No. 99666
2500 Red Square
Texarkana, AR 71854
(501) 5011917

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Vladimir I. Ulyanov, hereby certify that I have served a copy of the above and
foregoing answer upon Adrian Wapcaplet, who really should have known better than to file this
frivolous complaint don't really type that just finish the certificate of service in the first place at
his normal address, by regular mail.

Vladimir Ulyanov

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549

SVETLANA ALILUYEVA DEFENDANT

MOTION TO DISMISS

Comes the defendant, by and through her attorney, and moves this court to dismiss the
complaint of the plaintiff and as grounds therefor states:

1. Pursuant to the 2005 constitutional amendment, Texas law no longer recognizes
common law marriage.
2. In any event, the elements of a common law marriage under Texas law were
never met.
3. The affidavit of Svetlana Aliluyeva is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4. A brief in support of this motion is filed herewith and incorporated herein.

Vladimir Ulyanov
Ark. Bar No. 99666
2500 Red Square
Texarkana, AR 71854
(501) 5011917


foregoing answer upon Adrian Wapcaplet, Mousebat et al, Attorneys at Law, 303 Romanov,
Texarkana, AR at his normal address, by regular mail.
Vladimir Ulyanov

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


AFFIDAVIT

Comes Svetlana Aliluyeva, being duly sworn, states as follows:

1. My name is Svetlana Aliluyeva. I am an adult resident of Texarkana, Texas.
2. At no time did I ever agree to marry Joe Dzhugashvili.
3. On only one occasion, as a joke, did I ever use the name “Dzhugashvili.” At the
wedding of our friends, Wojciech and Barbara Jaruzelski, I caught the bride’s bouquet. The joke
was that it was our turn to marry next. As a joke, on the way out of the reception, I signed the
wedding register as “Svetlana and Joe Dzhugashvili.” That wedding took place in Eureka
Springs, Arkansas.
4. Other than that single occasion, I never suggested to anyone that Joe Dzhugashvili
was my husband, or that I was his wife.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYS NOTHING.

Svetlana Aliluyeva
Svetlana Aliluyeva

On this 22nd day of August, 2014, came before me Svetlana Aliluyeva, being
satisfactorily proven, and swore to the above and foregoing under oath.

Leon Romowicz
Notary Public

My commission expires:
April 1, 2017

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

FACTS

Svetlana Aliluyeva and Joe Dzhugashvili lived together in North Dakota. Aliluyeva got
transferred to her employer’s Texarkana, Arkansas office. They got an apartment together in
Texarkana, Texas under Aliluyeva’s name, as Dzhugashvili did not have a job. Dzhugashvili got
a job for about 6 months, but lost it, and remained unemployed. Aliluyeva, on the other hand,
was doing quite well and received a promotion and stock options. Since Dzhugashvili didn’t
have a job, Aliluyeva called the human resources department, in North Dakota, and asked if
Dzhugashvili could be added to her health insurance. Aliluyeva denies saying that she and
Dzhugashvili were married.
Plaintiff relies on conclusory statements that Ms. Aliluyeva stated that the couple was
married, but only points to a single alleged “representation” that the parties were married. In
2012, the couple attended another couple’s wedding together. The wedding was in Eureka
Springs, Arkansas. It is admitted that Aliluyeva signed the guest book “Svetlana and Joe
Dzhugashvili.” However, the undisputed testimony of Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. Wojchiech
Jaruzelski, the couple married in Eureka Springs, was that the signature was considered by all as
a joke.
Over the years, Dzhugashvili was seldom employed and became increasingly hard to deal
with. At Aliluyeva’s insistence, Dzhugashvilli moved out on May 1, 2014, and moved into an
inexpensive apartment in Arkansas. Three months later, he filed this complaint for divorce in
Miller County.
ARGUMENT
Dzhugashvili contends that he and Aliluyeva had entered into a common law marriage in
Texas. He asks for half of the increase in her net worth during the time they were married.
Common law marriage is created by statute in Texas. The statute refers to it as “informal
marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 2.401 Proof Of Informal Marriage. A common law marriage may
be proved by evidence that, “the man and woman agreed to be married and after the agreement
they lived together in this state as husband and wife and there represented to others that they
were married.”
A.
Dzhugashvili cannot prove that Aliluyeva ever represented to others in Texas that
the two were married.

The three elements of a commonlaw marriage are (1) agreement to be married; (2) after
the agreement, living together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) representing to others in
Texas that they are married. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 2.401(a) (Vernon Supp.2001); Nguyen v.
Nguyen, 355 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. App.Houston [1 Dist.], 2011) In re Estate of Giessel , 734 S.W.2d
27, 30 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A commonlaw marriage does not
exist until the concurrence of all three elements. Winfield v. Renfro , 821 S.W.2d 640, 645
(Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Aliluyeva denied ever agreeing to be married.
She concedes that they had lived together in Texas, but denies ever having held herself out as
Dzhugashvili’s wife, but in the alternative, never having done so in Texas .
The evidence will be in controversy as to whether there was an agreement to be marriad,
but Dzhugashvili cannot prove that Aliluyeva ever
represented to others in Texas,
where they
were living, that they were married, and that the only time she ever so much as pretended to be
married to Dzhugashvili was in the presence of two close friends, in Arkansas , who knew as a
matter of fact that they were not, indeed, married.

B.
Common law marriage has been abolished in Texas under a Constitutional
Amendment approved by the voters in 2005.

In the alternative, the institution known as common law marriage is actually “informal
marriage” under a Texas statute. Aliluyeva argued that in 2005 Texas outlawed marriage, or at
least any form of marriage created by the Texas legislature. Texas Constitution: Article 1 Section
32:

Sec. 32. MARRIAGE.

(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.

(b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage.

Texas has rules of construction that are similar to ours:

When a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts need not resort to rules of construction
or extrinsic aids to construe it, but should give the statute its common meaning. Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc. v. GlynJones , 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994); One 1985 Chevrolet v. State ,
852 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex.1993). The Legislature's intent is determined from the plain and
common meaning of the words used. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist ., 865
S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993 ); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc. , 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.1990).
This Court has reiterated these principles many times. In RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal,
Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. 1985), the Texas Supreme Court stated:

Courts must take statutes as they find them. More than that, they should be willing
to take them as they find them. They should search out carefully the intendment of a
statute, giving full effect to all of its terms. But they must find its intent in its language
and not elsewhere... . They are not responsible for omissions in legislation. They are
responsible for a true and fair interpretation of the written law. It must be an
interpretation which expresses only the will of the makers of the law, not forced nor
strained, but simply such as the words of the law in their plain sense fairly sanction and
will clearly sustain. Id. (quoting
Simmons v. Arnim , 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66, 70
(1920)).

The primary goal in the interpretation of a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give
effect to the apparent intent of the voters who adopted it . See, e.g., Edgewood I.S.D. v. Kirby ,
111 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1989); Williams v. Castleman , 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 265
(1922); see C. Antieau, Constitutional Construction § 3.01 (1982). "[T]he intention of the
framers of a constitution is of but little importancethe real question being, what did the people
intend by adopting [the constitutional] language submitted to them?" Smissen v. State , 71 Tex.
222, 9 S.W. 112, 116 (1888).
In this case, the plain unambiguous language of the Constitutional Amendment approved
by the people of Texas withdraws from the legislature the power to create a status identical or
similar to marriage. It is equally plain that the statute purports to create a status similar or
identical to a true, formal marriage. The Texas statute violates the Texas Constitution, and
therefore must fall.
It is axiomatic that in the absence of a legally cognizable marriage, there can be no
divorce. In the Matter of the Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (2010).
CONCLUSION
This Complaint must be dismissed because the Plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a
common law marriage in Texas. Without a marriage, there can be no divorce.

Vladimir Ulyanov
Ark. Bar No. 99666
2500 Red Square
Texarkana, AR 71854
(501) 5011917


foregoing answer upon Adrian Wapcaplet, Mousebat et al, Attorneys at Law, 303 Romanov,
Texarkana, AR at his normal address, by regular mail.
Vladimir Ulyanov

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

VS NO BR549


RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

Joe Dzhugashvili, by and through his attorney, Adrian Wapcaplet, responds to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as follows:
1. The 2005 amendment to the Texas Constitution was enacted to prevent gay
marriages. That was the clear and unmistakable intention of the voters. There was no intent to
abolish informal marriage also known as common law marriage.
2. The affidavit of Joe Dzhugashvili is attached hereto. That affidavit is legally
sufficient to prove all elements of common law marriage in Texas.
3. A brief in support of this response is filed herewith and incorporated herein.

Respectfully submitted,


Adrian Wapcaplet
By: _______________
Adrian Wapcaplet
Ark. Bar No. 99999
(870) 5559876


I mailed a copy of this response to Vlad Ulyanov today, September 8, 2014.
Adrian Wapcaplet
_______________
Adrian Wapcaplet

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

VS NO BR549


AFFIDAVIT

Comes Joe Dzhugashvili, being duly sworn, and states as follows:

1. My name is Joe Dzhugashvili. I am an adult resident of Texarkana, Arkansas.
2. Svetlana Aliluyeva agreed to marry me on July 26, 2013.
3. Svetlana signed the wedding book at the wedding of our friends, Wojciech and
Barbara Jaruzelski, as “Svetlana and Joe Dzhugashvili.” It was not a joke.
4. Svetlana told our neighbors in the apartment complex, some waitress at Applebys,
in Dallas, and other people that I was her husband, and she didn’t correct people when they
assumed I was her husband. Unfortunately, I don’t remember any of their names, and a lot of
them refused to even talk to me about it, and the Appleby’s in Dallas moved or closed down or
maybe I just couldn’t find it when I went back, so I can’t present any testimony from other
people, but I remember this happening.
5. Svetlana got me put on her insurance at work. I couldn’t be on her insurance if
we weren’t married.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYS NOTHING.

Joe Dzhugashvili
Joe Dzhugashvili

On this 7th of September, 2014, came before me Joe Dzhugashvili, being
satisfactorily proven, and swore to the above and foregoing under oath.

Leon Romowicz
Notary Public

My commission expires:
April 1, 2017

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

FACTS

Joe and Svetlana lived together in North Dakota. Svetlana got a chance for a promotion
and a raise, but she had to move to the Texarkana, Arkansas office of her employer as a
condition of the promotion and the raise.
Joe agreed to move to Texarkana with Svetlana, even though he had no job available, and
there was little call for persons with his skills (snowplow operator and hockey coach) in
Texarkana. He was able to get one job as a greeter at WalMart, which he held for
approximately six months before being fired for being “surly.”
Joe’s affidavit is substantial evidence that Svetlana held herself out to be his wife and
him out to be her husband. Joe disagrees that the signature in the wedding book was a joke.
LAW
The applicable Texas statute sets out the requirements. Joe’s affidavit meets all the
requirements. Joe swears that Svetlana did agree to marry him, and that thereafter she told
various unidentified people in Texas that they were married, and referred to Joe as her husband
and herself as Joe’s wife.
There is no question that if they entered into a common law marriage in Texas, the
Arkansas courts would have to give full faith and credit thereto. Brissett v. Sykes, 855 S.W.2d
330, 313 Ark. 515 (Ark., 1993).
The 2005 Constitutional Amendment did not abolish common law marriage. The
purpose of that amendment was to prevent GAY marriage, or samesex marriage. There is no
reason to believe that common law marriage was ever an issue.

Respectfully submitted,


Adrian Wapcaplet
By: _______________
Adrian Wapcaplet
Ark. Bar No. 99999
(870) 5559876


I mailed a copy of this response to Vlad Ulyanov today, September 8, 2014.
Adrian Wapcaplet
_______________
Adrian Wapcaplet

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


JUDGMENT

On the 22nd day of September, 2014, came on to be heard the Motion of Svetlana
Aliluyeva to dismiss the Complaint in this matter. The Court finds that the parties were never
married in Texas because the status of informal marriage or common law marriage was abolished
by Article I, Section 32 of the Constitution of the State of Texas, as enacted by the voters in
2005. This case must therefore be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED

N. Decisive ____________
Circuit Judge

September 26, 2014
Date

DOMESTIC RELATIONS


VS NO BR549


BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 22nd day of September, 2014, the abovereferenced
proceeding came before the Honorable N. Decisive, Circuit Judge, TwentyFifth Division of the
Eighth Judicial Circuit of the State of Arkansas at Texarkana, Miller County, Arkansas

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Adrian Wapcaplet

FOR THE DEFENDANT
Vladimir Ulyanov
2500 Red Square
Texarkana, AR 71854

THE COURT: Good morning. The first case on the docket is Dazuga.. Zooga. Let me
start again, the first case on the docket is Case Number BR 549. I see Mr. Wapcaplet for the
Plaintiff, and Mr. Ulyanov for the Defendant. We are here on the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Is there anything else before we proceed? Mr. Ulyanov?
MR. ULYANOV: Good morning, your Honor. It is always my preference to resolve
things the simplest way possible, and I think dismissal as a matter of law is often much simpler
than a determination on the facts, as lopsided as the evidence may be.
As a matter of law, Texas voters abolished any status identical or similar to marriage.
Informal, or common law marriage, is strikingly similar to marriage. The plain wording of the
constitutional amendment applies. As such, I would contend that the Court should recognize the
abolition of common law marriage in Texas, and dismiss this case.
The affidavits show you what the evidence would be. There is no evidence that Ms.
Aliluyeva ever held herself out as Mr. Dzhugashvili’s wife in Texas, and highly questionable
evidence that she did it in Arkansas. But we have to look to the Texas statute, and it requires that
the elements be met in Texas. Representations that Ms. Aliluyeva told some unidentified
persons at some unidentified time that she and Mr. Dzhugashvili were married is not enough to
meet the Plaintiff’s burden.
In the interest of judicial economy, the Court should dismiss this case now, rather than
after a lengthy, protracted, and wasteful dispute about how much Ms. Aliluyeva made and how
little Mr. Dzhugashvili made once they were in Arkansas.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Wapcaplet?
MR. WAPCAPLET: I too like to resolve cases the simplest way possible, but sometimes
there is no simple way to resolve them.
If Mr. Dzhugashvili is to be believed, as he must be on a Motion to Dismiss, all the
elements are met. There is no requirement in Texas law that the party alleging an informal
marriage bring in the individuals to whom the party denying the marriage made her statements.
It is enough that she made them, whether to neighbors, waitresses, or unidentified others. The
relevance of the occurrence in Eureka Springs is just that it is consistent with what Mrs.
Dzhugashvili was telling people back home.
As to the argument that Texas abolished common law marriage, no they didn’t. You
know what was going on. The gay marriage controversy was raging, as it still is, and the
election was so that the people of Texas could decide whether to ban gay marriage. It wasn’t
about common law marriage. It was about gay marriage.
THE COURT: Does the amendment say anything about gay marriage?
MR. WAPCAPLET: Not specifically, no, but there were Texas statutes enacted both
before and after that do specifically provide that marriage is between a man and a woman. But
we can’t look at these laws in a vacuum.
THE COURT: Would Texas recognize an Arkansas covenant marriage?
MR. WAPCAPLET: I don’t know. I would think so, but I can’t give you any authority
for that proposition.
THE COURT: Mr. Ulyanov?
MR. ULYANOV: I don’t think it has ever come up. I did some research under Texas
law, but I didn’t run across anything. I think there is a serious danger that Texas would
not, because it is, after all, a status similar to marriage as marriage is commonly
understood.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. WAPCAPLET: I think that covers it.
MR. ULYANOV: Nothing further.
THE COURT: I think the Constitutional Amendment means what it says, whether the
people of Texas had informal marriage in mind or not, I think they wiped it out. Mr. Ulyanov,
will you prepare the order?
MR ULYANOV: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s always good to see you gentlemen.
MR. WAPCAPLET: It’s good to see you, too.
MR. ULYANOV: We can agree on one thing. It’s good to see you too.

In The Circuit Court of Miller County, Arkansas

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MILLER COUNTY, ARKANSAS

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