“Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose

a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads:

‘Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)’

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it
is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory
construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. 166 We
have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to
exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the
removal.”

The Court ruled that since the permissive term “may” is used, other modes could be
resorted to remove the Chief Justice from office. The Court is correct in ruling that the term “may”
pertains to a permission, that it is not mandatory. However, the interpretation of the Court of the
term’s usage in the provision is erroneous. The term “may” in the aforementioned provision refers
to the possibility of removal from office of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, in cases
of “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust.” It does not pertain to the mode, such that they may be ousted in another
way. Thus, the proper interpretation is that they may be removed or they may not be removed from
office should they commit the aforementioned acts.
It is quite ironic that the Court, declaring Sereno’s ouster as the Chief Justice due to lack
of integrity, has also lost that same integrity, when it acted on the quo warranto case against her,
when it failed to uphold the fundamental law of the land, and when it disregarded justice for some
personal gain. Indeed, the Court bid goodbye to that integrity when the voice of the concurring
majority, condemning the former Chief Justice, prevailed and drowned the voice of the dissenting
minority, the minority which promotes and holds the rule of law. However, it is not late to bring
back to life the lost integrity of the Court; for all that is needed is one honorable justice to be
fearless, to stand up, and to dissent against the conforming majority.