TANADA V.

TUVERA

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.

Issue:

1. WON, petitioners have legal standing?

2. WON publication is required before the law takes effect?

Held:

1. Yes. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed
to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

2. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication
is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.

PNB v. CA

Facts:

PNB vs CA and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ,

G.R. No. 98382
May 17, 1993
Facts:

Two parcels of land under the common names of the respondent Epifanio dela Cruz, his
brother and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine National Bank. The lots were
mortgaged to guarantee the by three promissory notes. The first two were not paid by the
respondent. The third is disputed by the respondent who claims that the correct date is June
30, 1961; however, in the bank records, the note was really executed on June 30, 1958.

PNB presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged lots. The lots
were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder. A Final Deed of Sale and a
Certificate of Sale was executed in favor of the petitioner. The final Deed of Sale was
registered in Registry of Property. Inasmuch as the respondent did not buy back the lots
from PNB, PNB sold on the same in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". The Notices of Sale of
foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 in a
newspaper.

Respondent brought a complaint for the reconveyance of the lands, which the petitioner
allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The petitioner states on the other hand that the extrajudicial
foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale were all valid.

The CFI rendered its Decision; the complaint against the petitioner was dismissed.

Unsatisfied with the judgment, respondent interposed an appeal that the lower court erred
in holding that there was a valid compliance in regard to the required publication under Sec.
3 of Act. 3135.

Respondent court reversed the judgment appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the
auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation
of ownership. Hence, the petition with SC for certiorari and intervention.

Issue:

WON the required publication of The Notices of Sale on the foreclosed properties under Sec.
3 of Act 3135 was complied.

Ruling:

No. The first date falls on a Friday while the second and third dates are on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale
shall be "published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, petitioner
bank failed to comply with this legal requirement. The Supreme Court held that:

The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in toto.

Other concepts:

The requirement of weekly publication of notice of extra-judicial

foreclosure of mortgages, means a period of seven (7) days, inclusive of
the 1st day of publication.—We are not convinced by petitioner’s
submissions because the disquisition in support
thereof rests on the erroneous impression that theday on which the
first publication was made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded
pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code.
It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
definition of what is a“week”. In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G.
3139[1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p.
660), this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting
of seven consecutive days—a definition which dovetails with the
ruling in E.M. Derby and Co.

It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969

was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third
week and cannot thus be equated with compliance
in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a
measure of duration of time and without reference
to the calendar, it means a period of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins

Verily, inclusion of the first day of

publication is in keeping with the
computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals
(125 SCRA 122 [1983]) where this Court had
occasion to pronounce, through Justice
Guerrero, that the publication of notice on
June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied
the publication requirement under Act No.
3135. Respondent court cannot, therefore, be
faulted for holding that there was no
compliance with the strict requirements of
publication independently of the so-called
admission in judicio.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

de facto government

CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH

G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during
the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated
during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that
“all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts
and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good
and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of
the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right
to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . .
He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but
this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation
had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become
re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in
speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original
shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Facts:
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during
the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in
his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces,
was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de
facto government of the second kind.

ISSUE:
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of
international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces

HELD:

And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that

where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests
would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be
avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which
declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines
that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and
proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of
liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established
continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by
change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9,
citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on
the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in
law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive
people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists
until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the
next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in
spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by
legislative acts creates a change."

is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment,
the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.

Juliano Alba vs Jose Evangelista

November 4, 2011

100 Phil. 683 – Political Law – Control Power – Removal of Appointed LGU officials
Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the vice
mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar was appointed
as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alajar telling him that he will be
replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then declared as the acting mayor.
Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a quo warranto case before Judge Jose
Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Appointment of City Officials. – The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor,
the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the constitutional
inhibition that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law”, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and
absolutely irreconcilable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the president
upon displeasure.
HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good
behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not
deprive him.
The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the
“term” or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the
“tenure” or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and
constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted
RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor
and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure
of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally
make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore,
Alajar was appointed by the pleasure of the president and can also be removed when that
pleasure ceases.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he
was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First
Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and
void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general
rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a
national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not
defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

Ordinance power of the PRESIDENT
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for

rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders. chanrob les virtual law lib rary

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate

to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or

declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall
have the force of an executive order. chanrob les virtual law lib rary

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of

administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders. chanrob les virtual law lib rary

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters

relating to internal administration, which the President desires to
bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance,
shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. chanrob les virtual law lib rary

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the

President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. chanrob les virtual law lib rary

Philippine presidents issue executive orders to help officers and agencies of the executive branch
manage the operations within the government itself.

administrative order. Enforceable order issued by a public authority (under the powers
conferred to it by one or more statutes) to an individual or an organization to take certain
corrective action, or to refrain from an activity.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
“Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance
of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.”
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2, Section 3

MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS
MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS
“Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires
to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.”
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2, Section 6

GENERAL OR SPECIAL ORDERS

SPECIAL ORDERS
“Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.”
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III, Chapter 2, Section 7

The Ordinance Power is the rulemaking authority of the President of the Philippines defined in Book
III, Title I, Chapter II of Administrative Code of 1987.[1]

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima

undue delegation of power; separation of power

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in
his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
“transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as
it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.

Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction
is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to
the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” 33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335
was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive
function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

US vs.WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDADG.R. No.

L-8848, November 21, 1913

Facts:The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of
vagrancy under theprovisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented
evidence showing that each of thedefendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business sufficient enough to supportthemselves. However, the Attorney-General
defended his clients by arguing that in Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase“no visible
means of support” only applies to the clause “tramping or straying through the
country” and not the first clause which states that “every person foundloitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses,” thus making the 3 appellants guilty of
vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for “without visible means of
support” to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses
would have beenomitted, or else a comma after country would have beeninserted.

Issue: WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-
General’s argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.

Held: An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect
intended by theLegislature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation of
the law. When themeaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of
the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give iteffect. Moreover, ascertaining the
consequences flowing from such a construction of the law isalso helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning.Considering that the argument of the
Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logicalclassification on the part of the
legislature of the various classes of vagrants and since it wasproven that all three of
the defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level of comfort higher
than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

Noscitur a sociis Definition: Latin: that the meaning of a word may be known from
accompanying words. ... Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning of
questionable words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to
themeaning of words or phrases associated with it.

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees
to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that

“(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.

Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a
representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence
of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in
the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of
providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such,
it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned
from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the
phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or

phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain

and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of
the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted

from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after
the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,”
in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body.
While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that
an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the
legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be
applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and
the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice
in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more
than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be

composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees
to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims
and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of

the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair
play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration
of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(
1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.

Ejusdem or Eiusdem Generis Definition: Of the same kind or nature. A rule of

interpretation that where a class of things is followed by general wording that is not
itself expansive, the general wording is usually restricted things of the same type as
the listed items.

Ocampo v. Enriquez

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow
the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a

Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya
regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a

directive to the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for
President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
with the Court.

Issues

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral

committed grave abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed
memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of
President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have
the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violated the Constitution, and domestic and
international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth

from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the
Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier
and former President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of

the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered
into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains
shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines

enumerated in PD 105
Ad Proximum Antecedens Fiat Relatio
Nisi Impediatur Sententia Definition:
Latin: relative words must ordinarily be referred to the last antecedent,
the last antecedent being the last word which can be made an antecedent
so as to give a meaning.
P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D.
No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included
in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the
LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may
be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous
because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No.
105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the
nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military
shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Legal Definition of casus omissus. : a situation omitted from or not provided for by
statute or regulation and therefore governed by the common law.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

Ad Proximum Antecedens Fiat Relatio Nisi Impediatur Sententia Definition:

Latin: relative words must ordinarily be referred to the last antecedent,
the last antecedent being the last word which can be made an antecedent
so as to give a meaning.

BOLOS V. BOLOS

. BOLOS vs. D. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:

 On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211.
 On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RT
C) declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BO
LOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapa
city on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the leg
al consequences provided by law.
 Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
annul the orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007 declaring as final and executory
  On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari under rule 65 entitled “
Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos” reversedthe January 16, 2007 d
ecision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
 The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prer
equisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-
SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages)
is not applicablein this case since the marriage of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the F
amily Code took effect.
 Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating that “cov
erage of A.M. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988”.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a rev
iew of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. 02-
11-10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope.

RATIONALE:

In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads that:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and ann
ulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Phillipines.

The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only to those marriag
es entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became effective on August 3, 1988. The Court t
herefore cannot apply merit to the petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the p
hrase “under the Family Code” when the Rule took effectivity.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and fre
e from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only application. It must theref
ore be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-
meaning rule” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intentio
n”. Additionally, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a status there s
hould be no departure.”