Papandayan, Jr.

vs COMELEC [381
SCRA 133]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials, Residence)

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur,
namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection,
and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del
Sur.

Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile
from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an
agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of
Tubaran, which he later withdraw.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a
resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10
years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must
be a “…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the day of the election…”

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative
of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business,
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

BAUTISTA vs. COMELEC

296 SCRA 480, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Cipriano “Efren” Bautista was a duly registered candidate for the position of
Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A certain Edwin “Efren”
Bautista also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position. Petitioner filed a petitioner
praying that Edwin Bautista be declared nuisance candidate. Comelec, in a resolution dated
April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate and accordingly, his name
was not included in the list of candidates for mayor. Edwin Bautista filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was still pending at the date of election. During the counting of votes,
separate tallies of ballots on which were written “Efren Bautista”, “Efren”, “E. Bautista”, and
“Bautista” were made by the Board of Election Inspectors. The municipal board of canvassers
refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner theses separate tallies.

Issue: Whether or not these votes should have been included to those cast for petitioner.

Held: It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification which
clearly affects the voters’ will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely
what election laws are trying to protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in
the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity.

A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established
that by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notifications, the voters were informed
of the Comelec’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate.

It is improper and strained to limit petitioner’s votes to the ballots which only indicate the name
“Cipriano” when it is of public knowledge that petitioner is also known by the appellation and
nickname “Efren” which he in fact registered as his nickname.

JAPSON VS. COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Topic: Dual Citizenship/ Dual Allegiance

JAPSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
 Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S.
Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
 Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a
Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty
was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in
what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and
Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
 Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a
citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented
therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent
resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
 While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship,
he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991
 Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to
make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006
lasting until 20 January 2007.
 Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
 Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the
disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the
latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
 Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work
and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed,
however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007,
he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in
his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's
application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine
passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur,
in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered
as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again
stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
 He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No.
07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
 The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements
of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than
to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
 Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi
T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225.
Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in
active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed
forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
 Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14
May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost his domicile in [the]
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar
for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy.
 The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing
to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file
the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
 Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31
July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en
banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or
canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the
COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14
May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same
pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of
fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that
Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him
to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court
finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
 . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his
American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
 The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and
the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal
Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to
the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that
he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the
absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on
January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
ISSUE:

Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions.

RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective
position.
 It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which
a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it
does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino
taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law
to allow for dual citizenship.
 There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year
period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered
a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries,
Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May
2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is
only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to
comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing
residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to
prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already
found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and
in which he garnered the most number of votes.
 To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly
demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for

the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing
that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging
Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed

seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s
proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation
of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was
the overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of

legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake

the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the
purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places
of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.

AQUINO vs. CO
MELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
Facts:
On 20 March 1995
, Agapito A. Aqui
no filed his Certifi
cate of Candidacy
for the position of
Representativefor t
he new Second Le
gislative District o
f Makati City. In h
is certificate of can
didacy, Aquino sta
ted that he was are
sident of the afore
mentioned district
for 10 months. Fac
ed with a petition f
or disqualification,
he amended theen
try on his residenc
y in his certificate
of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days.
The Commission
on Electionsdismi
ssed the petition o
n 6 May and allow
ed Aquino to run i
n the election of 8
May. Aquino won.
Acting on amotio
n for reconsiderati
on of the above dis
missal, the Commi
ssion on Election l
ater issued an orde
r suspendingthe pr
oclamation of Aqu
ino until the Com
mission resolved t
he issue. On 2 Jun
e, the Commission
on Electionsfound
Aquino ineligible
and disqualified fo
r the elective offic
e for lack of consti
tutional qualificati
on of residence.
Issue:
Whether “residen
cy” in the certific
ate of candidacy
actually connotes
“domicile” to wa
rrant thedisqualifi
cation of Aquino f
rom the position in
the electoral distri
ct.
Held:
The place “where
a party actually o
r constructively h
as his permanent
home,” where he,
no matterwhere he
may be found at a
ny given time, eve
ntually intends to r
eturn and remain, i
.e., his domicile, is
that towhich the
Constitution refer
s when it speaks o
f residence for the
purposes of electi
on law. The purpo
se is toexclude str
angers or newcom
ers unfamiliar wit
h the conditions a
nd needs of the co
mmunity from tak
ingadvantage of f
avorable circumst
ances existing in t
hat community for
electoral gain. Aq
uino’s certificate
of candidacy in a
previous (1992) el
ection indicates th
at he was a reside
nt and a registered
voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarla
c for more than 52
years prior to that
election. Aquino’s
connection to the
Second District of
Makati City is an a
lleged lease agree
ment of a condomi
nium unit in the ar
ea. The intention n
ot to establish aper
manent home in M
akati City is evide
nt in his leasing a
condominium unit
instead of buying
one. The shortleng
th of time he claim
s to be a resident o
f Makati (and the f
act of his stated do
micile in Tarlac an
d his claims of oth
er residences in M
etro Manila) indica
te that his sole pur
pose in transferrin
g his physical resi
dence is not toacq
uire a new, residen
ce or domicile but
only to qualify as a
candidate for Rep
resentative of the
Second Districtof
Makati City. Aqui
no was thus rightf
ully disqualified b
y the Commission
on Elections.
Chavez vs Comelec

Facts:

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to
endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing
petitioner promoting the products of said establishments.

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section
32:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such

as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image, or name of a
person, and all advertisements on print, in
radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said
candidate and radio
station, print media or television
station within 3 days after the effectivity
of these implementing rules; otherwise, he
and said radio station, print media or
television station shall be presumed to
have conducted premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's
Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may
have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he
be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere
product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under
the rules.

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to
cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the
COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the
assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the
non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exerciseof police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto
law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue:

Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Held:

Police power

Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce
his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate. They
are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their
exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the
people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the
interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates,
on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity
on account of their resources and popularity.

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and
do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code,
election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly
soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he
acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products.
However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name
and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed,
candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial
products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names
to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run
for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their
image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the
start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at
his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact
and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that
contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate
of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such
an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election
offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was
exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in
any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense.
Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It
should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement
or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense
the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes
a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract
with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a
candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is
the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda
materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall
operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him,
under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore,
that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda
through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable.
The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as
lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to
equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources
and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the
COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.

Overbreadth

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the
continued display of a persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a
certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and
advertisements must also show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the
campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental
to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of
opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
overbreadth. Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, Aug 31, 2004

Bondoc v Pineda
FACTS:

- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member

of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4 TH district of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of
Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.

- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for
Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and that they
would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.

- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a
complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.

- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the
tribunal.

- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its
resolution.

ISSUE:

W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE

DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING
THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?

W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND

HIS NOMINATION IS VALID

HELD:

NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO

CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS
AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.

HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE

OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET.
PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF
REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT
OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)

2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA

WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT,
IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH
OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF
MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL

3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.

MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS:
EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY,
RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH
ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!