Digested Cases in Civil Law Review 1 (Persons)

DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: PERSONS 4 S (AY 2017-2018)
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (ART. 2)
1. Tañada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915; December 29, 1986
CRUZ, J.:
ALL STATUTES OF LOCAL APPLICATION AND PRIVATE LAWS SHALL BE PUBLISHED

FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause
the publication of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders, in the
Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the necessity of the publication of the presidential
issuances which are of general application. Petitioners then moved for
reconsideration/clarification asserting that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant that
the publication required therein was not always imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances in question
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is an indispensable requirement for their
effectivity despite the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.” The phrase "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity. On the other hand, interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all laws aforementioned shall be published in full in the Official
Gazette to become effective in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO
ANDE, APA, BAACO, BULUSAN, COS-AGON, CORPUS, CORTEZ, DALUDADO, DELA CRUZ, DEL ROSARIO, DENILA, DENOSTA, EDDING ,
EDILLOR, HUAB, MABANGLO, MACALINO, MARAJAS, MINA, PARAGAS, RECUENCO, U RUBIO, VIEDOR, VILLAMAYOR, VIRAY ||
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2. De Roy v. CA and Bernal

G.R. No. 80718; January 29, 1988
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Feliza De Roy was the respondent in a civil case for damages filed by Luis Bernal.
In the civil case, the RTC found De Roy grossly negligent and awarded damages to Bernal for
the injuries he sustained and for the death of his daughter caused by the collapse of a burned-
out building’s firewall owned by De Roy. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. On the last day of
the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration. The CA denied the motion by applying the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises v. Japzon that said period cannot be extended.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the decision in the Official Gazette when the CA
decision was promulgated.
ISSUE:
Is publication in the Official Gazette required before SC decisions can become binding and
effective?
HELD:
No, publication is not required.
There is no law requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the SC particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of SC decisions and
in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
In this case, petitioner’s contention that the SC decision was not binding and effective because it
lacks publication is without merit.
Since publication is not required, the SC decision is binding and effective even without being
published in the Official Gazette.
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3. The People of the Philippines v. Que Po Lay

G.R. No. L-6791; March 29, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS:
Que Po Lay, who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks,
and US money orders amounting to about USD 7,000, failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agent within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Central Bank Circular No. 20.
The CFI Manila found him guilty of violating the Circular in connection with Section 34 of RA No.
265 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment and to pay fine. On appeal, Que Po Lay argued
that the Circular had no force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette prior
to the act or omission imputed to him.
ISSUE:
Is prior publication necessary for the effectivity of a Circular with a penal provision?
HELD:
Yes. As a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
In the present case, although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it
was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other
words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was
found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
Therefore, Que Po Lay is acquitted, there being no prior publication of the Circular.
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4. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial

G.R. No. 176006; March 26, 2010
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) issued Circular No. 99-75 which set the
guidelines in the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to
decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional
income for NPC."
NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACS
cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. However,
its application for pre-qualification was denied. Pinatubo asked for reconsideration but NPC
denied it.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75, arguing
that that the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, and ran counter to the government policy of competitive public
bidding. For its part, NPC insisted that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not
of general application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely
the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition
of ACSRs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published.
HELD:
NO. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal
rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a
directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient
disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award
of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders,
the approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs.[19] All these
guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap
ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not
involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely,
indirectly and incidentally.
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5. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security
G.R. No. 180643; September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During
the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his
conversations with President Arroyo primarily on the ground that they are covered by executive
privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, the respondent
Committees cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest.
Neri argued that the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to
publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation has a vitiating effect on
them. Consequently, the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of
the contempt order is flawed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation must be
published.
HELD:
Yes. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation must be published.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Respondents violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be
in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." This requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three
years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate are therefore procedurally infirm.
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6. Aquilino Pimentel Jr. v. Senate

G.R. No. 187714; March 8, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
By virtue of Senate Resolution No. 706, the Ethics Committee of the Senate was directed to
investigate Senator Villar on the issue of the “double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road
Extension Project” that was made by the Senator Villar on the 2008 General Appropriations Act.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges
(Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on March 23, 2009.
Senator Villar then stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not
before the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson therafter moved that the responsibility of the Ethics
Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. Said motion was
approved.
The Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009. On both hearings,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that
would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments
were adopted.
On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Notwithstanding the issue raised by Senator
Pimentel, the Senate Committee of the Whole directed that a preliminary conference be set on
May 26, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity?
HELD:
Yes, publication is required for the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole to be effective.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Court
declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the
rights of witnesses.
The Court explained in the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
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If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even
in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective.
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or
Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication
before the rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of
the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate’s exercise of its disciplinary power over one
of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the
Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that
the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. Respondent cannot dispense
with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been
published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process
requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.
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PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS (ART. 4)
7. Valeroso v. People
G.R. No. 164815; February 22, 2008.
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jerry Valeroso was arrested for being a suspect in a case for kidnapping with ransom.
After a body search, a Charter Arms with five (5) live ammunitions was found tucked in his waist.
After verification, it was revealed that the firearm was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under P.D. 1866.
On July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court, R.A. No. 8294 amended
P.D. No. 1866 reducing the penalty for the offense from reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua to prision correccional in its maximum period.
After trial, petitioner was found guilty of the crime and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6
years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of P15,000.00. The CA affirmed his
conviction. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Should RA 8249, reducing the penalty provided in PD 1866, be given retroactive effect as to apply
to petitioner's case?
HELD:
YES. The lower penalty provided in RA 8249 could be given retroactive effect.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the
offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.”
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the lower court is correct.
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8. PNB v. Office of the President

G.R. No. 104528; January 18, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents were the buyers on installment of subdivision lots from the subdivision
developer, Marikina Village Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over
said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, PNB. Unaware
of this mortgage, private respondents continued to pay and constructed their houses on the lots
in question. The subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage and
became the new owner of the said lots.
Private respondents filed suits before the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) which ruled that PNB, as the new owner, can collect only the remaining
amortizations from the private respondents in accordance with the agreements entered into with
the subdivision developer and cannot compel them to pay all over again for the lots they bought,
without prejudice from seeking relief from the subdivision developer.
The HLURB affirmed the decision. The Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise
concurred with the HLURB. Petitioner argued that P.D 957 cannot be applied as the said law was
enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975.
ISSUE:
Whether P.D. 957 may be applied to the mortgage contract which was executed prior to its
enactment.
HELD:
YES. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be
plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from
scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial
institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law -- as an instrument of social
justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with
which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted
the usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes
of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as
collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers.
On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the
land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal
with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to
provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what
P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.
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9. CIR v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.

G.R. No. 168129; April 24, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
REVOCATION, MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF ANY OF THE RULES AND

REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE CIR SHALL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION IF IT IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE TAXPAYER
FACTS:
The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., a corporation whose purpose is to establish, maintain,
conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health
maintenance organization and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities
of the organization, filed a protest questioning the assessment made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
E.O. 273 was issued amending the NIRC by imposing VAT on the sale of goods and services.
Before the effectivity of the said E.O., Philhealth inquired whether the services it provides to the
participants in its health care program are exempt from the payment of the VAT. On June 8, 1988,
CIR issued a ruling stating that respondent, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the
VAT coverage.
However, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for
deficiency in its payment of the VAT and documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and
1997. Subsequently, respondent filed a protest with the BIR.
Petitioner argued that it is entitled to the benefit of non-retroactivity of rulings guaranteed under
Section 246 of the Tax Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its part.
The CIR did not take any action on the protests. Hence, a petition for review was filed with the
CTA. The CTA declared CIR ruling coverage null and void.
ISSUE:
Should a revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated be
given a retroactive effect?
HELD:
NO. It shall not have retroactive application.
Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that any revocation, modification or
reversal of rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the CIR have no retroactive
application if it would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the
taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required
of him by the BIR; (2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different
from the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
There is no showing that respondent deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts
when it obtained VAT Ruling from the BIR. Respondent’s failure to describe itself as a health
maintenance organization, which is subject to VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. Respondent’s
letter which served as the basis for the VAT ruling sufficiently described its business. When the
CIR ruling was issued the term health maintenance organization was yet unknown or had no
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significance for taxation purposes. Respondent, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT
exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997. The CIR is precluded from adopting a position
contrary to one previously taken where injustice would result to the taxpayer.
Therefore, the VAT assessment against respondent for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 is
hereby withdrawn and set side.
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WAIVER OF RIGHTS (ART. 6)
10. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 137873; April 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The victim was rushed to
Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where investigation disclosed that Jose A. Juego
was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted
to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991,
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among
other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The
petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer
damages under the Civil Code, the election being equivalent to a waiver.
ISSUES:
1. Does the election made by the private respondent of one of the two inconsistent remedies
equivalent to a waiver of the other?
2. Is there a valid waiver by the private respondent?
HELD:
1. Yes, the choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence,
a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
deemed to have waived the other.
2. No, there is no valid waiver made by the private respondent in the case at bar because there
was a mistake of fact. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of
understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert
them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom
the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the
party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension
of fact. It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.
In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
petitioner’s employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor
issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. There is no proof that private respondent
knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when she accomplished her application for
benefits from the ECC. There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
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The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court to determine whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor
Code shall be deducted therefrom to prevent double recovery.
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11. Cui v. Arellano University

G.R. No. 15127; May 30, 1961
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui (plaintiff) took up preparatory law course in Arellano University (defendant) and
pursued his law studies in the said university up to and including the first semester of the fourth
year. During all the time he was studying law in defendant university, plaintiff’s uncle was the
dean of the College of Law and Legal counsel. Also, he was awarded scholarship grants for
scholastic merit so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester
and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. He was made to sign a contract covenant
whereas he waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash.
When he enrolled for the last semester of his law studies, he failed to pay his tuition fee because
he had to transfer to Abad Santos University where his uncle accepted deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University, he
applied to take the bar examination. Plaintiff petitioned the defendant to issue his transcript but
the latter refused not until he paid back the P1003.87- the amount refunded by Arellano University.
As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the
said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this
case.
ISSUE:
WON the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived
his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
HELD:
The provision is not valid. If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted the issuance of Memorandum No. 38, it should
have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui which is a direct violation of our Memorandum
and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract
was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad,
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as
to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived
it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
Manresa defines morals as good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which
have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received
some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools.
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So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational
practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and
to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
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REPEAL OF LAWS (ART. 7)
12. Mecano v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 103982; December 11, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Antonio Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized
for cholecystitis on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the Commission on Audit.
Mecano requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) which is a provision
covering allowances of government employees in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in
performance of duty. Undersecretary of Justice Bello III denied Mecano's claim reasoning that the
RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Admin. Code). Mecano
then re-submitted his claim with a copy of the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating
that the Admin. Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including the
particular Section 699 of the latter as the repealing clause of the Admin. Code is merely a general
repealing provision. The request was approved by the Department of Justice and forwarded to
the Commission on Audit.
However, COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo denied Mecano's claim on the ground that Section
699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Admin. Code, solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Admin. Code.
In the present petition, Mecano argue Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative despite the
enactment of the Admin. Code. On the other hand, COA contend that the enactment of the Admin.
Code operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC as such was the clear intent of the
legislature in enacting the Admin. Code.
ISSUE:
Did the Admin. Code repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC?
HELD:
NO, the Admin. Code did not repeal or abrogate Sec. 699 of the RAC.
The Repealing Clause of the Admin. Code provides that “All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.” This is a general repealing provision (implied repeal) for it failed to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. There are two categories of repeal by
implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
It is clear that there can be no implied repeal of Sec. 699 of the RAC by the Admin. Code. Under
the first category, it was not established that there is any irreconcilable conflict between the two
codes. Irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
16
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other. The new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code In fact, there is no provision on sickness benefits of the nature
being claimed by petitioner in the Admin. Code. Nor is there implied repeal under the second
category for such is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself and that it is clear intent of the legislature
that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. As stated in the opinion of Secretary Drilon, the
Admin. Code cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization
and procedure.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed
to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.
Hence, Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative.
17
JUDICIAL DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND (ART. 8)
13. People v. Licera

G.R. No. L-39990; July 22, 1975
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Timeline:
1959 – Macarandang Rule was promulgated
1961 – Licera was appointed as secret agent
1965 – Apprehension of Licera and filing of information against him
1967 – Mapa Rule was promulgated
1968 – CFI convicted Licera of Illegal possession of firearms
Defendant Rafael Licera was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 5 yrs. On appeal to the SC (upon certification by the CA),
Licera invokes as legal justification for his possession of the Winchester rifle (Model 55, Caliber
.30) his appointment as “secret agent” on December 1961 by Gov. Leviste of Batangas. He claims
that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People v. Macarandang, was
exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges
that the CFI erred in relying on the later case of People v. Mapa which held that section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents
by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI was correct in convicting Licera of Illegal Possession of Firearms on the basis
of the Mapa ruling.
HELD:
NO, the Macarandang Ruling should have been used by the CFI as basis of acquitting Licera.
Article 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves
not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by
the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Here, at the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor
in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine
abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively (I guess this should be
“prospectively”) only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the
application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any
other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
18
Thus, pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as
secret agent but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements
relating to firearm licenses.
19
DUTY OF JUDGES (ART. 9)
14. Chu Jan v. Bernas

G.R. No. 10010; August 1, 1916
ARAULLO, J.:
FACTS:
A match was held in the cockpit between two cocks belonging Chu Jan and Lucio Bernas . Both
put up a wager of P160. The referee declared Bernas’ cock the winner. Chu Jan brought a suit
against Bernas in the justice of the peace court, asking that his own rooster be declared the
winner. The justice of the peace decided that the bout was a draw. Bernas appealed to the CFI
praying that a judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules
and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of P160, to return the other like
amount and to assess the costs of both instances against the defendant.
The CFI rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs on the
ground that: (1) the court has always dismissed cases of this nature; (2) that he is not familiar
with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; (3) that he does not know
where to find the law on the subject, and (4) that he knows of no law whatever that governs the
rights in questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE:
May the court dismiss a case for lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case?
HELD:
NO. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain
matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where
to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for
terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is
the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly
applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6 (now Art. 11), provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and
to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to costs.
20
DOUBTFUL STATUTES (ART. 10)
15. People v. Purisima

G.R. No. L-42050-66; November 20, 1978
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to P.D. 9, penalizing the illegal possession of deadly weapons, a total of 26 people were
charged for the mere act of carrying deadly weapons. Respondent Judge Purisima, et. al.
dismissed or quashed all the informations filed in their respective courts for failing to allege that
the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance of or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or
rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Based on the literal import P.D. 9 (3), the
People argue that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities as such are
essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere carrying of deadly weapons constitute a crime under P.D. 9 (3)
HELD:
No, it is not the intention of P.D. No. 9 to punish the mere carrying of deadly weapons.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is
within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
In this case, when P.D. No. 9 was promulgated, there was no intent to work a hardship or an
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. The act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon
must be with a motivation connected with the desired result of Proclamation 1081 (suppressing
criminality, etc.) that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9.
As regards the purpose of P.D. 9 contemplated in its preamble, the carrying of deadly weapons
outside the residence must be related to subversive or criminal activities to constitute a crime.
Penalizing the mere act of carrying deadly weapons would lead to injustice, hardships and
unreasonable consequences, never intended by a legislative measure.
Hence, the mere carrying of deadly weapons do not constitute a crime under P.D. 9 (3).
21
CUSTOMS (ARTS. 11-12)
16. Martinez v. Van Buskirk

G.R. No. L-5691; December 27, 1910
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata when a delivery wagon, belonging to the
defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder and to which was attached a pair of
horses, came along the street in the opposite direction. Thereupon the driver of Carmen’s
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed,
crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped in order to give
defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but instead of passing by the defendant's
wagon it ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
These facts are not disputed, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero
driving the wagon was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the
wagon had to deliver some forage and that the cochero tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out,
another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which
frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was
thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop
the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the
carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The court found the defendant guilty of negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in such
manner.
HELD:
No. The horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was
experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five
or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition
in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time
and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being
delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned
by their employers.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable
or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which
have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why
they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.
22
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants
to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner
in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It
has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.
23
17. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

G.R. No. 55960; November 24, 1988
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration. In said petition they alleged among others
that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego and that they nominate Aida Sy-
Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and that
the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee. Sze Sook Wah is
the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the
estate of Sy Kiat.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that
she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that during the
wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the marriage document; that as to
the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the
document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left
in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that
document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place and it
was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately
together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together.
CFI held in favor of the petitioners and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying
that of the probate court, but still ruled in favor of the petitioners.
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by
respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
ISSUE:
Is Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with the Chinese law and customs conclusive?
HELD:
The pieces of evidence presented in the trial may very well prove the fact of marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage
in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" The law requires that "a custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a
24
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove
the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case
of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia.
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact.
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice
of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was
celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place
in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
25
COMPUTATION OF PERIOD AND TIME (ART. 13)
18. CIR v. Primetown

G.R. No. 162155; August 28, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or
credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered
losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Respondent complied, but the claim was not acted upon.
Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition
having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund
or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted
return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed
its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA reversed the CTA
decision ruling that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish between a regular year and a
leap year.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in referring to Article 13 of the NCC as the basis in the
correct computation of time.
HELD: 
NO. The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that the petition was filed within the prescriptive
period but its basis is should not be the NCC. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the
law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or
the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; “month” of
thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains; “day”, to a day of twenty-four hours
and; “night” from sunrise to sunset.
A calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain.” It is the “period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month.”
To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January
31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February
29, 2008.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. But being the more
recent law, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
26
recent law and having impliedly repealed in its repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
27
CIVIL LAWS (ARTS. 15-17)
19. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. In 1982 they
were divorced in Nevada, USA. Petitioner re-married in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City stating that
petitioner Alice's business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is their conjugal property and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". The Court below denied the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings. Respondent on the other hand
maintain that,the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
HELD:
The divorce decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
28
20. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent Erich
Geiling (Geiling), a German national, in Germany. Geiling obtained a divorce in a German court
on the ground of failure of marriage.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery against petitioner alleging that, she had an affair with two different men while their
marriage subsisted.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio,
since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. However, the said motion was
denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining
a divorce decree
HELD:
No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce
decree.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of
power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. Hence, after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings.
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case.
29
21. San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry
Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce against
Felicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.
Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. Felicidad
San Luis filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death; Felicis imo being then
the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent Felicidad San Luis has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity
to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
ISSUES:
1. Whether venue was properly laid
2. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the
Civil Code
3. Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death."
30
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
2. YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
them to rule in the affirmative.
Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. phi1.net
3. YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
31
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
32
DOCTRINE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT, ETC. (ARTS. 19-21)
22. Uypitching v. Quiamco

G.R. No. 146322; December 6, 2006.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. The
motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons,
Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner. To secure its payment, the motorcycle
was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. However, Davalan stopped paying
the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had
allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."
Thereafter, petitioner accompanied by policemen to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the
police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While the police team leader
and the clerk were talking, petitioner paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
against respondent. Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an
offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners. He sought
to hold the petitioners liable for acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
The RTC ruled that petitioner was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a
thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft
and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms
of human relations. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching,
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code,
provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use
his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It
seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The
exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must
33
not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability
for damages to the injured party will attach.
Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act." Petitioners were bent
on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following
findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:
There was malice or ill-will in filing the complain because petitioner Atty. Uypitching knew or ought
to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against respondent. Petitioner had no personal
knowledge that respondent stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill
collector that Dabalan will no longer pay the remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because
the motorcycle was taken by the men of respondent. The absence of probable cause necessarily
signifies the presence of malice
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly
ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
should indemnify him.
34
23. Wassmer v. Velez

G.R. No. 20089; December 26, 1964.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
WHEN PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE, DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED FOR BREACH
OF PROMISE TO MARRY
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer (Bet) and Francisco Velez (Paking) decided to get married and set the date on
September 4, 1954. Preparations were made including the following: obtaining a marriage
license; printing and distribution of invitations to relatives, friends, and acquaintances; purchasing
the bride-to-be’s trousseau; preparing the dresses of those who are part of the entourage; and
buying a matrimonial bed and its accessories, among others. Bridal showers were given and gifts
were also received.
On September 2 or two days before the wedding, Paking went to his home city in Mindanao and
left a note for Bet postponing the wedding saying that his mother opposes it. The next day,
September 3, he sent her a telegram saying that nothing has changed and assuring her of his
return soon. Thereafter, Paking was never heard from again.
Bet sued Paking for damages and won the suit by default. Almost two months later, Paking filed
a petition for relief from orders, judgment, and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration. Paking lost in his petition so he elevated the same to the Supreme Court. He
argues that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to
marry.
ISSUE:
May a person be held liable even in the absence of a provision authorizing an action for breach
of promise to marry?
HELD:
Yes. Although mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, it must not be
overlooked, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless. Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
In this case, to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
Therefore, Paking should be held liable.
*Note: Aside from the P2,000 actual damages, P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages was
awarded considering the particular circumstances of this case.
35
24. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et. al. v. Reyes

G.R. No. 154259; February 28, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Roberto Reyes (screen name Amay Bisaya), filed an action for damages under Arts. 19 and 21
against petitioners. He alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs.
Filart invited him to join her in a birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka,
and that she will vouch for him. He then carried Filart’s present (basket of fruits) to the party.
However, while lining up at the buffet table, Reyes was stopped by Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary
for Hotel Nikko) and in a loud voice, was told to leave the party. Filart was within hearing distance
but completely ignored him when he said that he was invited by Filart. Thereafter, he was escorted
out by a Makati policeman.
Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain waiter (Mr. Boy Miller), Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto),
and Capt. Batung regarding his presence, and requested Fruto & Batung to tell Reyes to leave.
Because he still lingered, she then approached Reyes when he went to a corner to eat and
requested him to leave, but when she turned around, Reyes began making a big scene. Filart, on
the other hand, stated that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party and that it was Reyes who
volunteered to carry the basket as he was also going to take the elevator, but he was going to a
different floor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed the same. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made
liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave for being a
gate-crasher.
ISSUE:
Did Ruby Lim act abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party where he was not invited
by the celebrant?
HELD:
NO. We find more credible the lower courts findings of fact. We are dealing with a formal party in
a posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager. To unnecessarily
call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s
personnel. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very
close distance.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation
36
for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years
old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her
associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this argument
need not be belabored.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable
and humane under the circumstances. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages,
neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages.
37
25. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA

G.R. No. 97336; February 19, 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent is a 22 year old Filipino citizen residing in Dagupan CIty. Petitioner is an
Iranian medical exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Petitioner allegedly courted and proposed to marry her. Thereafter, private respondent began
living with him. She allegedly was a virgin before such arrangement.
A week before the filing of private respondent's complaint, petitioner's attitute towards her started
to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a result, she sustained injuries. Petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked not to live with her anymore.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable. Petitioner denied the claims of private respondent. Accordingly, he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent nor he forced her to live with him.
The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private
respondent. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Is a breach of promise to marry actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitoner's profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by
a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage,
she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article
19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
38
26. Cecilio Pe, et. al. v. Alfonso Pe

G.R. No. L-17396; May 30, 1962
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe, who is 24 years old and unmarried.
Defendant, Alfonso Pe, on the other hand, is a married man. Because of the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents ,
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Nevertheless,
defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Plaintiffs then brought an action to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective
damages. They based their action on Article 21 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “Any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Defendant set up as a
defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
ISSUE:
Did the defendant commit injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code?
HELD:
YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the Civil Code. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the plaintiffs and even used the praying of rosary as
a reason to get close with Lolita. The defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced Lolita to the extent of making her fall in love with him. No other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her.
39
27. Globe Mackay Cable v. CA

G.R. No. 81262; August 25, 1989
CORTES, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Tobias was an employee of petitioner GLOBE MACKAY as its purchasing
agent and administrative assistant. Anomalies in the petitioner’s company were later allegedly
discovered by Tobias regarding fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions. Hendry,
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY, confronted Tobias stating
the latter as the number one suspect and ordered a one week forced leave.
When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry called him a “crook” and
a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and the specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the
anomalies. The police investigators, however, cleared private respondent from the said
anomalies. Later, petitioners filed criminal complaints for estafa which were all dismissed by the
fiscal. Tobias was also terminated by petitioners from his employment.
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias
was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Eventually, private respondent Tobias
filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the Civil Code
HELD:
YES. Petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
Art. 19 of the Civil Code commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The Court said that when a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Thus, generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper
In the present case, petitioner Hendry showed belligerence and told private respondent that he
was the number one suspect and to take a 1 week vacation leave, not to communicate with the
office, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry). Moreover, the imputation of
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress
the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioners were ordered to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages to private
respondent.
40
28. University of the East v. Jader

G.R. No. 132344; February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Jader sued petitioner UE for damages for the moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence.
Jader alleged that he got an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took the removals exam
for said subject but he was belatedly inform that it was a 5. The graduation ceremony invitation
included his name as one of the candidates but the invitation had a footnote that the list is tentative
and still subject to the completion of requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he marched
with his parents, was given a symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow-out attended by
neighbors, friends, and relatives, took a leave of absence without pay from work, and enrolled at
a pre-bar review class.
In its answer, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led Jader to believe that he
completed the requirements for an LLB degree when his name was included in the tentative list
of graduating students.
ISSUE:
May a university be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter
had satisfied all the requirements for graduation?
HELD:
Yes, it may be held liable.
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code states that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith and every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the
essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate.
Hence petitioner is liable for its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for
the course.
41
RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY, PERSONALITY, ETC. (ART. 26)
29. Tenchavez v. Escano

G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Pastor B. Tenchavez, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
married Vicenta Escaño, a second year USC student and a scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry, without the knowledge of the latter's parents. They
planned to elope, but it did not materialize because Vicenta's mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college when Vicenta went back to her classes after
the marriage.
When Vicenta admitted that she already married Pastor, her parents Mamerto and Mena Escaño
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because
of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke. They wanted a recelebration
of what they believed was an invalid marriage. The recelebration, however, did not take place
because a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos College students was handed to Mamerto,
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and Pacita Noel. Vicenta no longer agreed to
anew the marriage. Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in
Manila.
Vicenta was not prevented from communicating with Pastor but her letters to the latter became
less frequent. Eventually they became estranged. She went to Misamis Occidental to escape from
the scandal of her marriage. She also initiated an annulment case which did not push through
due to her non-appearance. Thereafter she applied for a passport, claiming to be single and left
for the US. She filed in Nevada a complaint for divorce against Pastor, which became final and
absolute.
Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor. Vicenta also sought papal dispensation of her marriage. She eventually
married an American, Russel Leo Moran, in Nevada, and begot children with him. She also
acquired American citizenship.
Pastor initiated the present complaint for damages against Vicenta and her parents, whom he
charged with alienating Vicenta’s affections. He prayed that legal separation be granted. Vicenta
claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff, while Vicenta's parents denied that they had in anyway
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Is the divorce decree obtained by Vicenta recognizable by Philippine laws?
2. Are Vicenta's parents liable for damages for alienating the affections of Vicenta towards
petitioner?
HELD:
1. NO. Vicenta’s claim of a valid divorce cannot be recognized.
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code. For the Philippine
42
courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in
view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
Nevertheless, Vicenta's refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong which entitled her husband to indemnity. Her
marriage to Russel Moran also constitutes "inter-course with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine law, which entitles Pastor to a decree of legal separation under our law,
on the basis of adultery.
2. NO. Vicenta's parents are not liable for damages.
The allegations of alienation of the affection of their daughter and influencing her conduct toward
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house
to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicenta had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding
demanded. Even after learning of the marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event,
the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated. That the
recelebration did not take place was not due to defendants, but due to Vicenta's refusal to proceed
with it. There is also no evidence that, out of improper motives, they aided Vicenta in filing the
annulment case.
Therefore, they cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved. Furthermore, Pastor, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
43
30. St. Louis Realty v. CA

G.R. No. L-46061; November 14, 1984
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio but
without permission of private respondent Dr. Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and faculty member of
UERM Medical Center, in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". The same advertisement was republished in the
Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969.
Private respondent noticed the mistake and wrote a letter of protest. The letter was received by
St. Louis Realty’s officer in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement.
However, no rectification or apology was made. Private respondent’s counsel demanded from St.
Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. It published in the issue of the
Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house
but it did not publish any apology to Dr. Aramil and an explanation of the error. Dr. Aramil filed a
complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15,
1969 a notice of rectification.
St. Louis Realty argued that the case was not covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the case at bar is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio
residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never
made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering
impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
44
31. Gregorio v. CA
G.R. No. 179799; September 11, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Zenaida R. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J.
Datuin.
Complaint for violation of B.P. Blg.22 was filed against petitioner Gregorio as proprietor of Alvi
Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous
appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address in the complaint was wrong,
she was indicted for 3 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure to controvert the charges
against her. Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging
that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking
account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. In the course of the reinvestigation,
Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Gregorio was not one of the signatories
of the bounced checks subject of prosecution. Subsequently, the court ordered the B.P. Blg. 22
cases dismissed.
Gregorio in her complaint for damages stated that incalculable damage has been inflicted upon
him due to the defendants reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. Sansio and Datuin filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of Gregorio’s complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution.
HELD:
It is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code,
rather than on malicious prosecution.
Quasi-delict exist under Article 2176 when the plaintiff suffers damage due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond provided that
there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. On the other hand, Article
26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases
of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right
to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social
intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed
by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the
identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This
fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
45
depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper
notice.
Therefore, Sansio and Datuin are liable for damages.
46
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)
32. Capili v. People

G.R. No. 183805; July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
James Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. James was
previously married to Karla Medina-Capili, and without said marriage being legally dissolved,
contracted a second marriage with Shirley Tismo.
James thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla
Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate
him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity
of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question.
Meanwhile, the RTC of Antipolo declared the voidness or invalidity of the second marriage on the
ground that the subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal
wife is void from the beginning.
James then filed a Motion to Dismiss the criminal case of bigamy, which the RTC granted. Private
respondent filed an appeal in the CA, which reversed the RTC’s decision. James then filed a MR,
but the same was denied. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
HELD:
No, the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been
legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. In the present case, all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present.
It is undisputed that the second marriage was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage. The accused may still
be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
47
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge
for bigamy against him.
48
33. Tenebro v. CA
G.R. No. 150758; February 18, 2004
FACTS:
Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10, 1990. On 1991, Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he was previously married to a certain Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this
previous marriage, Tenebro left Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Villareyes.
Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again contracted another marriage with Villegas.
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against
Tenebro.
During trial, Tenebro denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other claiming
that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he only signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his
work as a seaman. He further avers that there was no record of his marriage with Villareyes.
On November 10, 1997, the RTC found Tenebro guilty for the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC, Tenebro presents a two-
tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2)
argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro may still be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
No, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes
the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To
our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null
and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that
is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for
49
bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses,
which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
50
34. Montañez v. Cipriano

G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores on April 8, 1976. On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.
In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the marriage of respondent with
Socrates was declared null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13,
2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed
a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information
alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus,
there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983.
Hence, the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is wanting.
The RTC dismissed the case ruling that since the second marriage was contracted before the
enactment of the Family Code, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not required as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage thereby rendering the second marriage
valid.
ISSUE:
Is the declaration of the judicial nullity of the first marriage a valid defense for a charge of bigamy?
HELD:
NO. The subsequent nullification of the first marriage is immaterial to the commission of the crime
of bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having
all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as
it had not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Therefore, the dismissal of the charge of bigamy against respondent is improper
51
35. San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez

G.R. No. 166836; September 4, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc., represented by Atty.
Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots in its subdivision in BF
Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were withheld delivery by BF Homes since
Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions; BF
Homes refused to deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this, SMP filed a complaint-
affidavit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas charging respondent directors and
officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Sec. 29 both
of PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree). Simultaneously,
SMP sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to
release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on the ground, among
others, that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action
until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC
en banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP to the DOJ, which denied
the same. Upon elevation of the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, SMP
submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case presented a prejudicial question that called
for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of PD No. 957. CA dismissed SMP’s petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be a reason to suspend
the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of PD No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question.
HELD:
YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency,
raises a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of
Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.
Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to
SMP’s submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action
where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the
charge for the criminal violation of PD No. 957. This is true simply because the action for spec ific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
52
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial

question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific
performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation
of PD No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the
question of guilt in the criminal case.
Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not SMP was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would
decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the
20 TCTs. The resolution of the former (admin case) must obviously precede that of the latter, for
should the HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership
having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Sec. 25
of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
dismissal of SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 for lack of probable cause and
for reason of a prejudicial question
Another contention of SMP:
SMP further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason
to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the
action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the defense of a prejudicial
question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or
initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is
allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.
53
NATURAL PERSONS
36. Quimiguing v. Icao

G.R. No. L-26795; July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing’s family and Felix Icao were neighbors and had close and confidential
relations. Despite being married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen
several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. Despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Isao, Carmen became pregnant and had to stop studying. Hence, she filed for support
at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born. The trial judge sustained Icao’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter,
Carmen moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later
given birth to a baby girl. However, the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.
ISSUE:
May an action for support be filed for an unborn child?
HELD:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
Ilao(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the
parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854,
Civil Code).
The lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage
caused. Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it
for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
54
37. Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Villanueva became pregnant. To
conceal her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by
Antonio Geluz, a physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the
second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on Elections and found it inconvenient,
she had her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she again became
pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by
her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had an abortion for
the third time, an abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos. At that time,
Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.
On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz
filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?
HELD:
No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.
Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights
of the deceased child, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them.
In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
55
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment.
Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
56
JURIDICAL PERSONS
38. Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante

G.R. No. L-770; April 27, 1948
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate
an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission approved the application and
held that evidence showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner by the authorization of the operation of another ice-plant, that Pedro
Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death and that his intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service. The commission ordered that a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante.
Petitioner contends that the commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention
of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person". / Can the estate of Pedro Fragrante be
extended juridical personality?
HELD:
Yes. The SC cited the SC of Indiana which held that “The estate of the decedent is a person in
legal contemplation. The word "person” in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons.” It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural
and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or
succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is
recognized only to a limited extent in our law.”
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.
The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from
the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Moreover, the citizenship of Fragrante is also extended. The fiction of such extension of his
citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction
of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting
his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment
amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this
Court.
57
DOMICILE VS RESIDENCE
39. Moy Ya Lim Yao v. CID

G.R. No. L-21289; October 4, 1971
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung
to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond,
upon her failure to do so."
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on
April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00
to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as
in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly
allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she
could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a
Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers -in-law, or sisters-
in-law.
ISSUE:
Should Lau Yuen Yeung become ipso facto a Filipino citizen, upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen?
HELD:
YES. The Court persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section
4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances
where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering
into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold
that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than
as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
58
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt
with accordingly as it arises.
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, there is at least one decision of this Court, wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied
that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and
children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have to s ubmit
themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings
involving the husband.
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner should
die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are
concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the
petitioner.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense
and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants'
petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his
authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962.
59
40. Republic v. Batuigas

G.R. No. 183110; October 7, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473had been complied with,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion.
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing.
Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has
never departed the Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine
months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-
1976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and
tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School
in 1955, Margosatubig Academy in1959, and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963, graduating with
a degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the
Pax High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High
School in Misamis Oriental for another two years.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino
citizen. They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel
James. All of them studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals, three
of whom are now working abroad.
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged
in the retail business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra.
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the Philippine
National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of
Investigation.
The RTC ruled that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be
admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law,
thus granting the petition.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply
with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed
under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail
60
trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her
business is not a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or that which has an
appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the event
of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that
she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.
In dismissing the OSG’s appeal, the CA found that Azucena’s financial condition permits her and
her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and
consistent with the demands of human dignity.
ISSUE:
Should the application for naturalization of the petitioner be denied based on her alleged failure
to meet the income and public hearing requirement of CA 473?
HELD:
NO. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which
is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473,
which provides that: "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves
to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been
amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent
to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. 030705 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence
that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen as only their marriage certificate was presented to
establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for
judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process
at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from seeking acquisition of
Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign
nationals.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the qualification
required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the
proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen: He must own
real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
61
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to
quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together
with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise
all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s
lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at anytime. Her
profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a
charge to the only country she has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege
to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should
be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and
business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit
of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband
and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should
only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED.
62
41. Frivaldo v. Comelec

G.R. No. 120295; June 28, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with
the Comelec praying that Frivaldo “be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines,” and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled, which the COMELEC granted.
Upon completion of the canvass of the election returns, Frivaldo garnered around 20,000 more
votes than Lee. But because Frivaldo is disqualified, around 8:30pm on June 30, 1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
A week after, Frivaldo filed a petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of the proclamation
of Lee, alleging that on Lee’s proclamation day, 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD No. 725 had been granted,
and, at 5:30 o’clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as
governor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo is valid to seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to
qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor
HELD:
YES. The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on
August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippine laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." But there are settled exception to this general rule, such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the
death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and
other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.
Therefore, all transactions subsequent to the passage of the law are made to apply retroactively
to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos having issues with reacquiring their Filipino
citizenship. In this case, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application, or on August 17, 1994.
63
42. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the COMELEC alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for one year residency on the basis of
petitioner’s declarations in her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy that she’s
been a resident of the First District of Leyte for 7 months.
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"

months to "since childhood”
In her Answer to Montejo’s petition, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation". She averred that,
she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District.
The Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. It ruled that
respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" is untenable. The Certificate
of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent is not persuasive.
Further, it ruled that in election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile". In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Respondent's conduct
reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different
places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and declared her not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Leyte.
In a Supplemental Petition, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte. However, on account of the
Resolutions of the COMELEC disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to the SC for relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
Yes, petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution.
|| CIVREV I (PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS / PROPERTY / WILLS AND SUCCESSION): VICE DEAN DELSON) || ADVINCULA, ADINA, ALVERO,
64
Domicile refers to an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." Domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. If a person's
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence"
in election law, it actually means only "domicile".
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different
places. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
While petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades*, none
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Further, it cannot be said that petitioner has abandoned her domicile of origin:
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements c an
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one
of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
65
Lastly, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The term residence
may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence."
When petitioner married the former President, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Therefore, petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
*Note:
The following set of facts establish the fact of petitioner's domicile:
1. When respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte (Tacloban City).
2. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives.
3. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos and registered in Ilocos Norte as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator, she and her husband lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.
4. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived
with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
5. After returning to the Philippines from Honolulu, she ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
66

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DIGESTED CASES IN CIVIL LAW REVIEW I: PERSONS 4 S (AY 2017-2018)

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (ART. 2)

ALL STATUTES OF LOCAL APPLICATION AND PRIVATE LAWS SHALL BE PUBLISHED

2. De Roy v. CA and Bernal

3. The People of the Philippines v. Que Po Lay

4. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial

5. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

6. Aquilino Pimentel Jr. v. Senate

PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS (ART. 4)

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the lower court is correct.

8. PNB v. Office of the President

9. CIR v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.

REVOCATION, MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF ANY OF THE RULES AND

WAIVER OF RIGHTS (ART. 6)

10. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA

11. Cui v. Arellano University

REPEAL OF LAWS (ART. 7)

12. Mecano v. Commission on Audit

Hence, Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND (ART. 8)

13. People v. Licera

DUTY OF JUDGES (ART. 9)

14. Chu Jan v. Bernas

DOUBTFUL STATUTES (ART. 10)

15. People v. Purisima

CUSTOMS (ARTS. 11-12)

16. Martinez v. Van Buskirk

The court found the defendant guilty of negligence.

17. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

COMPUTATION OF PERIOD AND TIME (ART. 13)

18. CIR v. Primetown

CIVIL LAWS (ARTS. 15-17)

19. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

20. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

21. San Luis v. San Luis

Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

DOCTRINE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT, ETC. (ARTS. 19-21)

22. Uypitching v. Quiamco

23. Wassmer v. Velez

Therefore, Paking should be held liable.

24. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et. al. v. Reyes

25. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA

26. Cecilio Pe, et. al. v. Alfonso Pe

27. Globe Mackay Cable v. CA

28. University of the East v. Jader

RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY, PERSONALITY, ETC. (ART. 26)

29. Tenchavez v. Escano

2. NO. Vicenta's parents are not liable for damages.

30. St. Louis Realty v. CA

Therefore, Sansio and Datuin are liable for damages.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART. 36)

32. Capili v. People

34. Montañez v. Cipriano

Therefore, the dismissal of the charge of bigamy against respondent is improper

35. San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial

Another contention of SMP:

36. Quimiguing v. Icao

38. Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante

39. Moy Ya Lim Yao v. CID

40. Republic v. Batuigas