0XXR

IN THE

HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF XXX

AT XXX

IN THE MATTERS OF

SHAREHOLDERS (RCB & KKR)

APPELLANT

v.

COMPANY (GAYLE INC.)

RESPONDENT

CIVIL APPEAL NO.: 122/XXXX

[XXX]

AND

MR. BILBO BAGGINS

PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF ANDREA

RESPONDENT
 WRIT PETITION NO.: 321/XXXX

[XXX]

AND

STATE OF MANDRAKE

APPELLANT

v.

MR. THOR

RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.: 694/XXXX

[XXX]

AND

MS. JANE

PETITIONER

v.

UNION OF PHANTOM AND NATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY

RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION NO.: 583/XXXX

[XXX]

XXX

© Moot Court Committee, National Law University, Jodhpur

 -ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS-

© Moot Court Committee, National Law University, Jodhpur

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OFAUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. viii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................................................... ix

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ......................................................................................... x

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................ xi

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.

III. THE ACTIONS OF MR. THOR DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY ACT. ................................................................................................................. 1

A. Section 66-A of the IT Act is ultra vires the Constitution. ..................................... 1

B. In any event, Section 66-A is inapplicable to the present case................................ 2

C. Section 66-C of the IT Act is also inapplicable to the present case. ....................... 3

PRAYER FOR RELIEF.......................................................................................................... 4

iv
 INDEX OFAUTHORITIES

Indian Cases

A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271.......................................................................... 8

Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia, (2005) 7

SCC 764 ............................................................................................................................... 11

Archaeological Survey of India v. Narendra Anand, (2012) 2 SCC 562 .................................. 5

Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India, (2005) 1 SCC 679 ................................. 4

Chloro Controls(l) Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641 ........ 1

Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Sky Cell Communications Ltd., (2002) 39 SCL 704 (Mad.). .......... 2

District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, AIR 2005 SC 186 ..................................... 10

Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co., AIR 1981 SC 1368 ..................................... 7

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 .......................................................... 6

Harish Kumar and Ors. v. Seb International SAS, (2013) 7 A.D. 268 (Del.). .......................... 3

I.L. & F.S. Trust Co. Ltd. v. Birla Perucchini Ltd., (2004) 121 Comp Cas 335 (Bom.) ........... 3

Indian Airlines v. Prabha D. Kanan, (2006) 11 SCC 67 ........................................................... 5

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597......................................................... 6, 10

Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 ............................................................... 12

Naresh Chandra Sanyal v. Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Limited, AIR 1971 SC 422 2

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664 ........................................... 6

v
National Insurance Co. Ltd v. M/S Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267 .................. 1

O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812 .......................................................................... 8

Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 .................................................................... 5

Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771 ...................................................................... 8

PUCL v. Union of India, AIR 1997 S.C. 568 .......................................................................... 11

Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 1 ................................................................ 11

S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600....................................................................... 8

S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 ........................................................ 9

Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., 1955 (1) SCR 707 .................................................................... 7

SBP & Co. v. M/S Patel Engineering Ltd., AIR 2006 SC 450 .................................................. 1

Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., AIR 1962 Ori 202 .................................................. 2

Southern Technologies v. CIT, (2010) 2 SCC 548..................................................................... 5

State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 5......................... 10

State of Mysore v. Bhat, (1975) 1 SCC 110. .............................................................................. 6

Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh Pandya, AIR 2003 SC 2252 .......................................... 1

Union of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2005) 8 SCC 760 .................................................................. 4

Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305 ....................................... 11

V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan, (1992) 1 SCC 160....................................................... 2

Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 2696 ...................... 6

vi
World Phone India Pvt. Ltd v. WPI Group Inc. USA, (2013) 178 Comp Cas 173 (Del)........... 2

Statutes

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000. ................................................................................... 8

THE ANCIENT MONUMENTS AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES AND REMAINS (AMENDMENT AND

VALIDATION) ACT, 2010 ........................................................................................................ 6

Rules

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguard for Interception, Monitoring And

Decryption Of Information) Rules, 2009 ............................................................................. 10

Treatises

K.I. VIBHUTE, PSA PILLAI’S CRIMINAL LAW 57-9 (10th ed. 2010) ............................................ 9

Foreign Cases

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins, [2006] UKHL 40 .................................................. 8

Schnek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ..................................................................... 12

vii
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

Phantom is a developing country, known for its rich cultural heritage consisting of

various historical monuments. These monuments have attracted tourists consistently over the

last decade, leading to a significant contribution to the country’s economy.

DATA MONITORING

In 2013, armed terrorists were intercepted near NAMO. Owing to rising terrorist

activities, the Ministry of Home Affairs authorized the National Investigative Agency

[“NIA”] to access email and social networking accounts of certain individuals on the grounds

of threat to the sovereignty, defense and public order of Phantom. The NIA authorized an IPS

officer, Mr. Thor to carry out the investigations. One of the suspects was his wife, Jane.

When Ms. Jane found out that her account was being monitored, she filed a Writ Petition

alleging violation of her fundamental rights.

viii
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondents most humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court:

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 694/XXXX

Under Article X of the Constitution of Phantom read with XXX of the Supreme Court Rules,

1966.

ix
 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

I. WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF MR. THOR VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF THE IT ACT?

x
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE ACTIONS OF MR. THOR VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF THE IT ACT.

Section 66-A of the IT Act is unconstitutional as it unreasonably restricts the right of

free speech and is arbitrary in its terms. Hence, Mr. Thor is not in violation of this provision.

Moreover, no offence is made out under Section 66-C of the Act considering that there has

been no dishonest or fraudulent use of the password.

xi
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THE ACTIONS OF MR. THOR DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT.

The actions of Mr. Thor in logging into Ms. Jane’s account and making personal

communications did not violate any of the provisions of the Information Technology Act

[hereinafter “IT Act”]. Mr. Thor cannot be held liable under Section 66-A of the Act as it is

unconstitutional [A]. In any event, it does not apply in the present case [B]. Further, he is not

liable even under Section 66-C of the Act [C].

A. Section 66-A of the IT Act is ultra vires the Constitution.

Section 66-A unreasonably curtails the freedom of speech and expression under Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution and suffers from the vice of arbitrariness under Article 14 of the

Constitution.

i. The said provision violates Article 19 of the Constitution.

Any provision in a statute which imposes a restriction on the content of an individual’s

communications directly impinges upon the right of free speech guaranteed under Article 19.1

Section 66-A clearly seeks to curtail the freedom of speech and expression by making it

criminal to send certain forms of messages through computer resources. Therefore, it must be

determined if the said restriction is one that satisfies the criterion of reasonability laid down

in Article 19(2). It is undisputed that the circumstances laid down in Article 19(2) are the

only grounds on which the freedom of speech can be curtailed.2 However, Section 66-A

1
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., 1955 (1) SCR 707, 726.
2
Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co., AIR 1981 SC 1368.

1
contains additional grounds for imposing restrictions on communication, such as causing

mere annoyance or inconvenience to another person. Additionally, the restrictions must not

be framed in subjective and wide-ranging terms.3 Thus, Section 66-A goes beyond Article

19(2) and is constitutes an unlawful restriction on the fundamental right to free speech.

ii. Section 69 violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

A provision in a statute containing terms that are imprecise, all-encompassing and vague

does not stand the test of reasonability and non-arbitrariness that are inherent in Article 14.4

Under Section 69, the terms used such as “annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction”

are excessively wide, subjective and in the nature of catch-all phrases. Such wide terms are

capable of extension by the executive and can be wantonly abused.5 In fact, making offences

criminal on such vague and frivolous grounds is in itself a violation of Article 14.6 Hence,

Section 66-A is ultra vires the Constitution.

B. In any event, Section 66-A is inapplicable to the present case.

Section 66-A(a) requires that the messages in question be “grossly offensive” or

menacing in nature. While Ms. Jane alleged that the communications made were lewd and

obscene, there is an absence of any other substantial proof to support these claims. Notably,

the House of Lords has interpreted the words “grossly offensive” and “menacing” to set a

very high threshold of proving that the communications must be of such character as to

completely shock the conscience of reasonable people.7 In fact, the Adjudicating Officer who

3
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812, 816.
4
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271.
5
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771, ¶¶14-16.
6
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600.
7
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins, [2006] UKHL 40.

2
has similar fact-finding powers as that of a civil court8 did not find Mr. Thor guilty in the first

instance, thereby raising a presumption that the messages were not lewd or obscene in nature.

C. Section 66-C of the IT Act is also inapplicable to the present case.

Section 66-C punishes the fraudulent or dishonest use of passwords of another individual.

The terms “dishonest” and “fraudulent” under the IT Act have the same definition as under

Sections 24 and 25 of the IPC.9 Under the IPC, the terms dishonestly or fraudulently have

been used in the context of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss, with an intention to

defraud. Thus, there is a requirement of an intention to materially cause loss to the other

person.10 In the absence of any such intention in the present case, the use of Ms. Jane’s

account by Mr. Thor is not violative of Section 66-C of the Act.

8
§46(5), INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.
9
§66, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.
10
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1; K.I. VIBHUTE, PSA PILLAI’S
CRIMINAL LAW 57-9 (10th ed. 2010).

3
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced,

it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to:

• Hold that Mr. Thor is not criminally liable for any of the offences alleged against him.

And further pass any other order in favour of the Respondents, as this Court may so deem fit

in the ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

Date: 04th February, XXXX. Counsel for the Respondents