PROCEDURAL GROUND

Ground 1: The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to nullify the appointment of Sereno

Sec. 9, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

“SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

Xxx”

The Judicial and Bar Council determines who among the applicants are qualified to be the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as they are the ones who prepares the list of three
nominees. It also provided under the 1987 Constitution that the principal functions of the
Judicial and Bar Council shall include recommending appointees to the Judiciary.1 The
Judicial and Bar Council in determining those who are qualified is guided by the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council. The said rule provides for additional qualifications of a member of
the Judiciary. One of which is integrity, which is the issue at hand.

Integrity is a statutory qualification to the basic qualifications of a member of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution. Unlike the basic qualifications, which are expressly
enumerated under the Constitution, the qualification of integrity has no basis. It is a matter
wherein it must be determined by the authority vested with such power, in this case, the
Judicial and Bar Council.

Before nominating three applicants, the Judicial and Bar Council determines who among the
applicants are qualified. When Sereno was nominated as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
the Judicial and Bar council, therefore, has determined that she is qualified. It comes with it
that Sereno has the basic qualifications of being a Chief Justice as well as the statutory
qualifications such as integrity, competence, and independence

Having the power to determine who are qualified, it is fair to say that it is beyond the power
of the Supreme Court to nullify the appointment of Sereno on the ground of lack of integrity.
The question whether or not a member of the Supreme Court lacks integrity is a matter
determinable only by the judicial and bar council.
1
Par 5, Sec. 8, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
GROUND 2: Even assuming arguendo that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, the petition
for quo warranto is filed beyond the 1 year prescriptive period.

Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides for Quo Warranto. Section 1 provides for the
actions that may be commenced in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against
individuals. Under the subparagraph (b), a quo warranto petition may be brought against a
public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground
for the forfeiture of his office. Former Chief Justice Sereno failed to file some of her SALNs
which dates back to 1985. The submission of a SALN is required by law under Article XI
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, the “Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.” Hence the quo warranto
petition initiated by Solicitor General against Sereno.

Section 11 of Rule 66 provides for the limitations for filing Quo Warranto petitions. It
states, “Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a
public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or
position, arose, nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of
the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry
of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question.” The recent year
wherein there was the non-filing of Sereno’s SALN, which is the cause of ouster, was 2009.
Sol. Gen. Calida’s quo warranto petition was filed nine years thereafter. Hence, the limitation
can be availed of.

Section 2, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

This provision provides for the manner of removing public officers from office.
Relating the second sentence from the first one, there has been a qualifier or distinction not
with the ranks or positions of public officers in the government but with the manner on how
they shall be removed from office. The first sentence provides for the removal by
impeachment whereas the second sentence provides for the removal as provided by law.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed makes what is implied silent. Thus, as
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, it is by impeachment which should have been the
proper recourse to remove her from office.

GROUND 3: Security of tenure (Hahaha di ko alam kung pano i-construct as a ground)

The Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the case as it acquires no jurisdiction thereto
for being time-barred, as provided in Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Said provision states that "a petition for quo warranto against a public officer or employee
shall be filed within one year after the cause of his ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold
such office or position arose."

Maria Lourdes Sereno was appointed and had assumed office in August 2012. From
that period shall the 1 year period of prescription shall reckon, or until August 2013. Upon
the lapse of that one-year period prescribed for filing an action for quo warranto, the right of
a public official to security of tenure arises. Thus, when the petition for quo warranto was
filed, the only remedy available left to oust that public official is by virtue of impeachment as
provided by the Constitution. The granting of quo warranto is a violation of her security of
tenure provided under the Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution of Public Officers. This
decision sets a dangerous precedent which threatens the right of public officials to security of
tenure. It may even cause for the disregard of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers between the branches of the government as quo warranto or fear of being the subject
thereof may be used by a certain branch to encroach upon the sphere of another branch.

Security of tenure is a constitutional or legal guarantee that a political office-holder

cannot be removed from office except in specified or exceptional circumstances. Without this
right, an office-holder may be restricted from carrying his or her functions in fear of easy
removal from office by whomever in disapproval of their decisions. Security of Tenure offers
protection, by ensuring that an office-holder cannot be victimized for exercising their powers,
functions, and duties.
 It is a protected right of public officials under Article XI of our Constitution. When
public officials are appointed in a rank or position in a permanent nature or that which may
be removed only through impeachment, the official obtains his or her right to security of
tenure upon the lapse of 1 year from appointment or assumption of office. But before this
right arises, the appointment must be a valid one, wherein the appointee must possess the
qualifications and eligibilities for the position. Maria Lourdes Sereno was thoroughly
screened together with other applicants by the Judicial and Bar Council. She was even
included in the final list of candidates, a proof of her qualifications and eligibility to the
position.

The right to security of tenure is also safeguarded by international declarations and

treaties: under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 25 of the UDHR states
that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood...."; while Article 11 of ICESCR provides
"The States Parties ... recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions....". The right to security of tenure is essentially, part of the
right to life. It is important to provide a person a decent and standard way of life. The right to
security of tenure in general includes a person’s right to livelihood, or a person’s right to be
secured of office. The pronouncement granting the quo warranto petition opens a perilous
path for the violation of this fundamental human right as every appointee in public office,
from the lowest to even the highest ranking government officials, may be subjected to quo
warranto to deprive them of their office, and collaterally, their livelihood.

The right of security of tenure must always be protected and observed, as it is

provided for by our Constitution. Even in the absence thereof, our State has the duty under
international law to abide by treaties to which the Philippines is a state party and generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land by virtue of Article II,
Sec 2 of our Constitution.
SUNSTANTIAL GROUNDS

(INTERNATIONAL LAW)

Human dignity is a sense of self-worth. It is a sense of pride in oneself that a human

being has with them. This conscious sense makes them feel that they deserve respect and
honour from other human beings.

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

The abovementioned provisions taken from the ICCPR are not merely principles
relating to the positive act of the right to be respected. It comes with the negative act of the
right against assault on one’s honour. Any act that incidentally steps on the person’s dignity
as a human being becomes intolerable in the eyes of the said provisions.

The Decision on Sereno’s ouster started with a discussion of how integrity plays an
essential tool in administering and dispensing justice. It then reiterated that one cannot be a
qualified member of the Judiciary in the absence of the mandatory requirement of “proven
integrity.” The facts from both sides were presented categorically, the issues classified
emphatically, and the ruling insistently. But over the course of the 213 page document in
justifying Sereno’s ouster, she was labelled as an “imposter.” Instead of highlighting the
reasonable grounds that justify her alleged disqualification, the decision emphasized the
absence of the qualifications that should supposedly be present in her character. It stressed on
“what she is not,” rather than delving on “what and how she is as an appointed Chief Justice.”

The judgment, thus, necessarily implies that Sereno is one without proven integrity
and should not be allowed to have a seat in the Judiciary. But that is one issue. What is
another issue is the unendurable manner on how the highest court of the country disrespected
her on procedural and substantial grounds by phrasings which do not reflect a body that
should be dispensing justice. If a human being is in a humiliating or compromising situation
as in this case, then there is a major threat to their dignity and rights that should be protected
by the principles of international law in case the domestic law refuses or fails to do so.
Therefore, if we will allow the Court to use such words against a person who has “unproven
integrity,” we will be allowing the authorities in charged with the execution of the law to
unjustifiably brand everyone, to say the least, with harsh labels that make us dishonourable
and lose our self-respect.

This case reflects that the scales of justice has been tilted by the very pillars that stand
aground to maintain its balance.

Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that:

“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives; xxx”

The abovementioned rule provides with the right of the individuals to participate in
those processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs. By ousting Chief Justice
Sereno through the petition for quo warranto before the Supreme Court, the Senate was
deprived of their right to take cognizance of the proceeding against the petitioner.

Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that “the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.” As expressly provided
under the 1987 Constitution, the Chief Justice through impeachment before the Senate is the
only way to remove the petitioner from her office.

However, the citizens were deprived of the rights granted under Article 25 of the
ICCPR as the court took rule over the case against the petitioner in a quo warranto
proceeding when it should have dismissed it outright as the proper recourse is vested within
the jurisdiction of the Senate. Clearly, by the this procedural error, the right of the people to
participate in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives,
has been violated. The Senate was unduly restricted to perform the duty vested to them under
the Constitution.

The Senate should have take cognizance of the proceeding. In this regard, the
people's right to take part in the conduct of public affairs might have been protected. But
because the Supreme Court granted the quo warrant filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General not only did the Court violate the Constitution by proceeding with an improper
remedy but the citizen's right in the conduct of public affairs has been patently disregarded.

Senate being the chosen representatives of the people should have been given the
opportunity to exercise the mandate given to them under the Constitution. It is not a just right
but a mandate of their office vested in them by the fundamental law.