Alfarabi (870–950)
that is, second after Aristotle, Alfarabi has long
Charles E. Butterworth
Introduction
Uncertainty about Alfarabi’s place of birth and
the early years of his life notwithstanding, there
is general agreement that he was born in about
870 beyond the Oxus River – either in Fārāb,
Kazakhstan or Faryāb, Turkestan. His full
name is Abū Naṣr Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad
Ibn Ṭ arkhān Ibn Awzalagh al-Fārābī. In the
course of his life, Alfarabi resided in Bukhara,
Marv, Harran, Baghdad, Aleppo, Cairo, and
Damascus – where he died in 950. The son of
an army officer in the service of the Samanids,
Alfarabi studied Islamic jurisprudence and
music in Bukhara. He then journeyed to Marv
and began to study Aristotelian logic with
Nestorian Christian monks, most notably,
Yūḥannā Ibn Ḥ aylān.
While in his early twenties, Alfarabi left Marv
for Baghdad where he continued to study logic
with Ibn Ḥ aylān and reportedly began to study
philosophy by following the courses of the
famous Nestorian Christian translator and stu-
dent of Aristotle, Mattā Ibn Yūnus. At the same
time, he improved his grasp of Arabic by study-
ing with the prominent philologist Ibn al-Sarrāj.
It is thus quite likely that he was present in
Baghdad for the famous debate between Mattā
Ibn Yūnus and Abū Sa‘īd al-Sīrāfī about the
merits of philosophy and grammar.
Around 905 or 910, Alfarabi left Baghdad for
Byzantium, perhaps making his way to
Constantinople, but remaining away for about
eight years and furthering his study of Greek
sciences and philosophy. On his return, he
busied himself with teaching and writing. In
about 942, political upheavals forced him to
seek refuge in Damascus. Political turmoil there
drove him to Egypt two or three years later
where he stayed until returning to Damascus in
948 or 949, a little over a year before his death.
The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0018
Generally known as “the second teacher,”
been heralded as the most important philoso-
pher within the Arabic-Islamic tradition. His
writings, charming yet deceptively subtle, are
couched in simple language and straightfor-
ward sentences. Most often, he expounds what
resembles a narrative, a story about natural and
conventional things that is seemingly unobjec-
tionable. As the exposition unfolds, the reader
discovers that Alfarabi has accounted for the
natural order, political leadership, prophecy,
moral virtue, political or civic administration,
the relationship between the sciences, even the
philosophic pursuits of Plato or Aristotle – in
short, all the major subjects of interest to
humans – in an unprecedented and seemingly
uncontroversial manner. Often, the narrative
sets forth the reasons leading human beings to
live in political or civic association, how that
can best be ordered to meet the highest human
needs, the way most actual regimes differ from
this best ordering, and why philosophy and
religion deem this particular ordering best.
These writings, extraordinary in their breadth
and deep learning, extend through all the sci-
ences and embrace every part of philosophy.
Alfarabi’s interest in mathematics is evidenced in
commentaries on the Elements of Euclid and
Almagest of Ptolemy, as well as in several writ-
ings on the history and theory of music. Indeed,
his Large Book on Music may well be the
most significant work in Arabic on that subject.
He also wrote numerous commentaries on
Aristotle’s logical writings, was knowledgeable
about the Stagirite’s physical writings, and is
credited with an extensive commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics that has not survived.
Moreover, in addition to two treatises that pro-
vide extensive accounts of the whole of Plato’s
and Aristotle’s philosophy plus a lengthy essay
that curiously insists upon there being basic
agreement between the two on all important
matters notwithstanding the manifest differences
2
readily apparent to most readers, he composed a
commentary on Plato’s Laws.
Greatly appreciated by his contemporaries in
the east, Alfarabi was equally well received in
North Africa and Andalusia. Indeed, in
Cordoba both Averroes and Maimonides
eagerly learned from him. Subsequent to Ibn
Khaldun, however, less attention was accorded
his writings. Only when Moritz Steinschneider
recovered some of his works and introduced
them to learned Europeans in the nineteenth
century did Alfarabi’s thought again excite phil-
osophically inclined readers. Thus, Leo Strauss
discovered how adroitly Alfarabi read and inter-
preted Plato, while Muhsin Mahdi expanded
upon Steinschneider’s work by recovering long
lost writings of Alfarabi and providing critical
editions as well as careful translations of them
plus probing studies of the teaching set forth in
them. Like Strauss, Mahdi focused on the
political aspects of Alfarabi’s teaching – a trend
followed by his own students: Miriam Galston,
Joshua Parens, David DiPasquale, and the pre-
sent author. Other scholars such as Christopher
Colmo and Charles Genequand have found
their way to an appreciation of that aspect of
Alfarabi’s teaching on their own.
Scholars like Nelly Lahoud and Emma
Gannagé acknowledge the political aspect of
Alfarabi’s teaching, but deem it subservient to a
broader metaphysical teaching. Yet others –
Thérèse-Anne Druart, Massimo Campinini,
and Dominic O’Meara – emphasize the meta-
physical perspective to the point of ignoring the
political aspects of his teaching, while Patricia
Crone, Dimitri Gutas, and Philippe Vallat
follow the lead of Richard Walzer and deny any
originality to Alfarabi. They strive, rather, to
portray him as a clever but ignorant imitator of
yet unknown authors beholden to Greek influ-
ences. Given such disparate interpretations, it
seems advisable to consider Alfarabi’s teaching
as expounded in his various writings.
Alfarabi’s Teaching
Alfarabi is nothing if not the founder of Arabic-
Islamic political philosophy, that is, the first
philosopher within the Islamic tradition to
explore the challenge that religion poses to phi-
losophy, especially in its claims that the Creator
provides for human well-being by means of an
inspired prophet legislator. He addresses this
challenge by pointing to the foibles of its propo-
nents and contrasting the political science or
philosophy inherited from the ancients – that
is, Plato and Aristotle – with the teaching of the
jurists and theologians of his day. In the last
chapter of a popular writing, Enumeration of the
Sciences, he expounds upon the old political sci-
ence or philosophy by setting forth two versions
of it. Both presuppose the validity of the tradi-
tional separation between practical and theo-
retical science, but neither is adequate for the
radically new situation created by the appear-
ance of revealed religion. The older approaches
put great emphasis on the actions and ways of
life needed for sound political rule to flourish
and how they may be inculcated among the cit-
izens, but are silent about opinions – especially
the kind of theoretical opinions presented in
religion. They are, consequently, unable to pro-
vide for the kind of rulership needed now that
religion holds sway. Nor can either speak about
the opinions and actions addressed by the juris-
prudence and theology of revealed religion.
These tasks require a political science
combining theoretical and practical science
along with prudence and showing how to order
them in the soul of the ruler.
In other writings – Book of Religion and
Selected Aphorisms – Alfarabi sketches out this
broader political science. It speaks of religious
beliefs as opinions and acts of worship as
actions, noting that both are prescribed for a
community by a supreme ruler who acts as a
lawgiver. The new political science portrays
religion as centered in such a political
community. In no way distinct from the
founder of a religion, the community’s supreme
ruler expounds goals and prescriptions that are
identical to those of the prophet lawgiver. All
that is said or done by the supreme ruler finds
justification in philosophy, and religion thus
appears to depend on philosophy – theoretical
as well as practical. Similarly, by presenting the

art of jurisprudence as a means to identify
particular details the supreme ruler did not
regulate before his death, Alfarabi subordinates
it to practical philosophy and thus to this
broader political science. The opinions articu-
lated in this community are so clear and so
much in keeping with the natural order that no
place is accorded dialectical theology in it.
Alfarabi’s new political science thus offers a
comprehensive view of the universe and indi-
cates what practical acumen permits the one
possessing this understanding, either the
supreme ruler or a successor endowed with his
qualities, to rule wisely. Able to explain the
ranks of the beings, this political science also
stresses the importance of religion for uniting
the citizens and for helping them attain the
virtues that prolong decent political life. Then,
in his Political Regime – with its tantalizing
subtitle, Nick-named Principles of the Beings –
and Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants
of the Virtuous City, Alfarabi offers a detailed
illustration of the opinions guiding the new
political science as well as a devastating cri-
tique of the goals now pursued by leaders and
also by most citizens.
A general overview of this whole under-
taking is provided in the Attainment of
Happiness – the first part of his famous trilogy,
the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle – where
Alfarabi declares that “the idea of the philoso-
pher, supreme ruler, prince, legislator, and
imam is but a single idea” (sect. 58) and first
adumbrates another theme central to his
teaching, namely, the constant danger that phi-
losophy will fall into disfavor or become cor-
rupted, thus generating the need to discover a
way to preserve it while simultaneously striv-
ing to resuscitate it. Awareness of this danger,
urges Alfarabi, prompted both Plato and
Aristotle to speak indirectly about their deep-
est thoughts and employ ruses, ambiguous
speech, and other linguistic devices to conceal
their teaching. In his own response to this
danger and attempt to breathe new life into
philosophy as he follows the lead of his two
illustrious predecessors, Alfarabi proves him-
self equally adept at presenting his ideas in
3
speech eluding all but the most thoughtful and
assiduous reader.
The best way to indicate the validity of these
bold claims about Alfarabi’s teaching is to con-
sider a few of his writings so as to identify their
basic argument and probe for the way a subject
pursued in one leads to it being resolved in
another. Not only does this latter practice imi-
tate how Alfarabi teaches his readers to make
sense of the writings of Plato and Aristotle, it
also becomes obligatory due to the dearth of
evidence about the putative date of his writ-
ings. Moreover, by approaching Alfarabi in the
same manner as he approaches the authors he
studies, it is possible to avoid the conjectures
and intellectual reductionism following from
narrow-minded attempts to explain this
“second teacher” in terms of what is believed to
be known about the sources to which he had
access.
A Novel Style of Writing
At least two dozen of Alfarabi’s writings are
now available in a reliable Arabic edition, and
more than half have also been translated into a
modern European language. As it happens, the
latter also focus on particular aspects of his
political teaching and thus warrant closer scru-
tiny here. Looked at as a whole, they fall into
two distinct categories – those that begin with
a formal introduction and those that do not. In
addition, some of these explicitly political writ-
ings seem to constitute pairs insofar as they
share identical passages as well as have similar
expositions.
Four treatises in which Alfarabi painstak-
ingly prepares the reader for the exposition to
follow are the Enumeration of the Sciences,
Virtuous City, Summary of Plato’s Laws, and
Book of the Harmonization of the Two Opinions
of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle.
He opens the first by emphasizing the work’s
popular character, noting that the sciences to
be explained are the generally known ones.
Then he extols its usefulness for those desiring
to learn about these sciences in an orderly
manner, those intent upon ascertaining the
4
accuracy of claims made by others about their
awareness of these sciences or even their own
grasp of them, the educated person desiring a
summary account of them, and, finally,
someone wishing merely to appear learned in
science so as to be deemed a scientific person.
The impression created by the introduction
and the exposition as a whole that the work
provides only a superficial or preliminary
account of the sciences dissipates once the
reader discerns how Alfarabi’s discussion of
physical science, the divine science to which it
leads, and political science as well as the two
sciences linked with it – namely, jurisprudence
and dialectical theology – thoroughly chal-
lenges received opinion about these subjects.
Although he says little in this work about the
first of those last two sciences, jurisprudence,
he is far from reticent about the second. Indeed,
he concludes the treatise with a devastating cri-
tique of dialectical theology or ‘ilm al-kalām.
From different perspectives, the practi-
tioners of both sciences focus on the opinions
and actions related to the religion established
for a particular nation by its lawgiver. Intent
upon determining what he would have said
about the things he did not mention – opinions
about God and how to describe Him as well as
the world and various things in it, plus how
people should extol God and interact with one
another in cities – the jurist uses what the law-
giver set down as principles to infer those other
things. Dialectical theology differs in that it
aims solely at defending the opinions and
actions of the religion and refuting what
opposes them. Accordingly, the dialectical
theologian defends what the jurist uses as prin-
ciples and infers nothing from them.
For Alfarabi, dialectical theologians are of
two types. One defends religion by claiming
that the positions set forth in it are not such as
to be examined by human intellect. To the
extent that these matters exceed human com-
prehension, religions benefit human beings by
revealing what they would not otherwise dis-
cern. Were they able to perceive such matters
by their intellect, they would have no need of
prophecy or revelation. Even if humans deem
the teachings presented by religion strange or
meriting rejection, they must note that, how-
ever lofty their level of understanding and
accomplishment, they stand in relation to
those receiving revelation as children and
innocent youth to experienced adults.
A second defends religion by restating
verbatim everything the lawgiver declared then
seizing upon whatever corroborates those pro-
nouncements. Any point of opposition encoun-
tered is interpreted in a light favorable to the
religion, however remote the connection.
Indeed, some urge that difficulties in their reli-
gion be defended by pointing to absurdities in
the religions of others. Those who find that
procedure inadequate urge that the adversary’s
assent be gained through stirring up shame or
fear. Finally, some consider opponents of their
religion enemies who can be deceived and
warred against or fools so ignorant of their own
good that it is better to lie to them.
Alfarabi’s portrait of dialectical theology
reveals it as providing little insight into the
major questions raised within the religion itself.
It is not a science devoted to inquiry, but one
that seeks to promote the religion it serves and
to do so by any available means. That lesson,
apparent even to inattentive readers, is one to
which Alfarabi returns in the Book of Letters,
Part Two. A correction is offered in the new
political science set forth in the Book of Religion
by placing the defense of virtuous religion’s
opinions and actions under the arts of philo-
sophically inspired dialectic and rhetoric (sect. 6)
and omitting all mention of dialectical the-
ology. It is clearly not essential to a well-ordered
political regime or to a virtuous religion.
In the introduction to his Summary of Plato’s
Laws, Alfarabi moves from a general lesson
about the way humans come to make practical
judgments to an account of how easily they err
in such endeavors, then offers an intriguing
example of how a wily but pious ascetic used
his awareness of this human foible to avoid
capture by an unjust ruler – an example, claims
Alfarabi, that illustrates the way Plato presents
his teaching in the Laws. But, having whetted
the reader’s appetite for a declaration about the

deeper teaching of this enigmatic book,
Alfarabi turns to a seemingly pedestrian
account of issues raised in the first nine books
of Plato’s dialogue. At no point does he single
out an issue for closer attention or suggest how
it relates to the larger subject, lawgiving. He
does, however, point to what is common to all
laws, that is, to what all lawgivers must and do
address.
At least five lessons are paramount. Law is
presented as the means for improving people –
law, not religion. Laws must be suited to each
people because of the differences among
human beings. This means that, harmful as it is
to the character of the ruler, despotism may be
necessary. For laws to be good, the upbringing
or education of citizens is all important; and it
is linked to both friendship and freedom. Since
the goal of lawgiving is the formation of a
well-ordered city, provision must be made for
justice, a well-ordered soul, and equality – the
kind that accords each person the status or
rank he deserves. Implied in all of this is that
the laws of the Greeks, their conventions, have
the same status as the laws of religions, that is,
as divine or revealed laws. Audacious as such a
teaching is, it is very much in keeping with
what Alfarabi suggests in the rest of his writ-
ings, especially in the Attainment of Happiness.
These reflections are especially pertinent to
the enigmatic Political Regime and Virtuous
City. In both of these writings, the opinions
underlying sound political rule are identified
and their intellectual substance revealed.
Neither is by any means to be understood as
Alfarabi’s defense of the dominant religion, for
that religion is in place and needs no defense.
There is, however, a pressing need for it to be
reformed in a manner that makes it responsive
to the demands of political life. And, since citi-
zens must be alerted to the rational underpin-
nings of the city’s religion, both writings
provide the contours of just such a substratum.
Still, in keeping with Alfarabi’s usual procedure,
it is done indirectly.
The taxonomy of rulership presented in the
Political Regime illustrates the alternatives to
the virtuous city governed by a ruler who
5
strives to lead citizens to what they can achieve
of true happiness, namely, ignorant, immoral,
and errant cities as well as individuals within
the best city who refuse opinions and actions
that would ensure their happiness – these
known as “weeds.” Alfarabi’s analysis of the
ignorant cities focuses on the goods their citi-
zens mistakenly aim at in the belief they will
lead to happiness. The goods range from what
is needful to preserve their bodies, to wealth,
pleasure, honor, domination, and, finally, free-
dom. Lack of resolve to pursue the actions they
recognize as leading to happiness prompts citi-
zens of immoral cities to succumb to their
desires and substitute one of the goals pursued
in the ignorant cities, whereas citizens of errant
cities are prevented from achieving happiness
due to their receiving a representation of the
universe and the beings different from the one
set forth in a work like the Political Regime.
Because the city whose citizens pursue honor,
the timocratic city, introduces a hierarchical
order and obliges them to be useful to one
another, Alfarabi deems it similar to the vir-
tuous city and the best among the ignorant cit-
ies. Nonetheless, he judges it more possible and
easier for virtuous cities and rule to emerge
from the necessary and democratic cities, per-
haps because the wrong things might come to
be honored in the timocratic city or excessive
love of honor lead it to become despotic. What
sets the necessary city apart, despite its focus
on the most basic of human goods – self-
preservation – is that it promotes an orderly
and successful pursuit of this goal. That the
democratic city – the city or association of
freedom – offers promise of such radical trans-
formation arises from the great variety in pur-
suits permitted in it. Freedom and lack of
ordered hierarchy, characteristics that seem at
first glance to be great flaws, are precisely what
allow it to be so malleable. As long as doubt
about the highest human good prevails or to
the extent that it appears to be beyond reach,
there is need for a city that permits variety of
this sort. Such circumstances make freedom
and the association that promotes it – the
democratic city – worthy of praise.
6
The teaching presented in the writings that
have no formal introduction, those in which
Alfarabi simply enters into the subject at hand
as though the reader ought to have a clear idea
of what is at issue, does not differ in any dis-
tinct manner from that presented in the writ-
ings with a formal introduction. In each of
these works – the Attainment of Happiness,
Treatise on the Introduction to the Path to
Happiness, Book of the Utterances Employed in
Logic, Book of Letters, Selected Aphorisms, and
the aforementioned Book of Religion and
Political Regime – Alfarabi explores political
and religious questions that arise for those
intent upon rule or for citizens desirous of
understanding more about the roots of sound
governance. Another anomaly comes to light
when Alfarabi’s writings as a whole are passed
in review. Simply stated, his explicitly political
writings – the Attainment of Happiness, Selected
Aphorisms, Chapter Five of Enumeration of the
Sciences, Political Regime, and Virtuous City –
seem to constitute pairs that can be compared
under two different headings.
First, extensive passages recur verbatim in
particular sets of works. Thus, passages found
in five sections of the Attainment of Happiness
are also present in, or are taken from, a single
aphorism of the Selected Aphorisms (see
Attainment, sect. 12, 10:7–11:1; sect. 16,
12:14–13:1; sect. 17, 13:11–14; sect. 19, 15:6–14;
and sect. 20, 15:16–19 with Selected Aphorisms,
aph. 94, 61:29–62:7; 62:15–24; 62:27–31;
62:34–63:7; and 63:7–10). Similarly, parallels
of  passages found in Chapter Five of the
Enumeration of the Sciences also occur in the
Book of Religion or vice versa (see Enumeration,
sect. 1 with Book of Religion, sects. 11–13,
14a–d, and 15 and also Enumeration, sect. 2
with Book of Religion, sect. 16). And there are
so many instances of almost identical passages
occurring in both the Political Regime and
Virtuous City that it would be fastidious to
enumerate them.
Second, Alfarabi begins a discussion in a
particular way in one or more works, then
returns to the same subject in another and pur-
sues it from a different point of view. The
opinions and actions promoting sound political
rule set forth in the Political Regime and
Virtuous City are thus more fully explored in
Selected Aphorisms. In the last work, Alfarabi
also investigates more thoroughly subjects only
touched upon in the Attainment of Happiness.
It seems then that Selected Aphorisms and
Attainment of Happiness, taken as a pair, sur-
round the repetition of passages and the differ-
ent approach to subjects encountered in the
other four works –that is, in Chapter Five of the
Enumeration of the Sciences, Book of Religion,
Political Regime, and Virtuous City. Considered
as a pair, the first two works show what philos-
ophy must accomplish in order for certain sci-
ence about political action to be achieved and
how the inquiry and investigation leading to
such theoretical insight are to be conducted.
They also indicate how and why true philos-
ophy of this sort is useful to the political
community.
There is more. The exposition in the Political
Regime and Virtuous City illustrates the
opinions and principles that were shown in
the  Attainment of Happiness and Selected
Aphorisms, as well as in Chapter Five of the
Enumeration of the Sciences and Book of
Religion, to be important for rule. Still, a caveat
is in order. By no means is the metaphysical
and spiritual framework set forth in the
Political Regime and Virtuous City to be under-
stood as representing how Alfarabi actually
views the universe and its parts. It is offered
merely to illustrate the teaching of that other
pair of writings – Chapter Five of the
Enumeration of the Sciences and the Book of
Religion. Everything said in the Political Regime
and the Virtuous City presupposes that the
investigation or inquiry elaborated in the
Attainment of Happiness and Selected Aphorisms
has been completed, that true philosophy has
been achieved and its results can now be pre-
sented. Yet, and this is the major problem,
nothing in any of Alfarabi’s other writings pro-
vides grounding or justification for that
assumption. Philosophy remains the search for
knowledge, not its culmination. Even so, the
juxtaposition of the teaching set forth in

Chapter Five of the Enumeration of the Sciences
and the Book of Religion reveals how adamantly
Alfarabi insists on the principle that religion
must be guided by philosophy in order for a
new philosophical politics or political science
to come to the fore. It is, nonetheless, more a
rhetorical than a scientific task.
This taxonomy of Alfarabi’s writings merely
sheds light on what he attempts to do in each
one and on how they fit together as a whole.
Nothing is gained by trying to read the works
that begin with an introduction as though they
set forth a teaching distinct from those that
have no introduction. If anything, with one
exception, the works prefaced by an introduc-
tion should be seen as addressing issues of
significance at the moment – something Alfarabi
points to in the introduction to the particular
work. The exception is the Summary of Plato’s
Laws. It warrants an introduction simply
because one cannot begin a commentary on
such an important work, however novel the
structure of the commentary itself, without
explaining to the reader something about what
is to follow.
The Implications of Alfarabi’s Teaching
For all practical purposes, the contours of
Alfarabi’s teaching expounded in his famous
trilogy – the Attainment of Happiness,
Philosophy of Plato, and Philosophy of Aristotle –
are precisely the ones to be found in all his
other writings. In none, however, does he pre-
sent anything but enticing suggestions. The
fuller teaching must be provided by the
thoughtful reader, a division of labor charac-
terizing that tradition of philosophical learning
Alfarabi sought so earnestly to recover and
pass on in his time. He sets before the reader
the significance and promise of that older
vision in the Attainment of Happiness, then
shows in both the Philosophy of Plato and the
Philosophy of Aristotle how these two illus-
trious predecessors approached the issues
raised in the first work. But at the end of the
final treatise, Alfarabi introduces an unex-
pected, unsettling conundrum – an assertion
7
that metaphysical knowledge is not available
and that Aristotle, his efforts notwithstanding,
recognized it was not. Now, if knowledge of the
whole ends in such an impasse, then it is not
reasonable to consider the abundantly detailed
account of God, the universe, and the place of
human beings in it presented either in the
Political Regime or the Virtuous City definitive.
At best, those works offer likely stories of the
way things are. Simply stated, there are limits
to human knowledge that must be acknowl-
edged. Then, and only then, can one begin the
task of pushing beyond those limits in an intel-
ligent manner.
There is, consequently, tension between
philosophy and religion. The account of the
world’s origin, general structure, and end pre-
sented in the Islamic tradition centers on
divine law, its demands upon human beings,
and the consequences for humans of following
or not following the requirements of that law.
From the perspective of the divine law, philos-
ophers – due to their quest for sources of cau-
sality other than God – are suspect. It is the
jurists or dialectical theologians who receive
acceptance, even praise. Alfarabi and those
who follow in his footsteps – Averroes, for
example – subordinate revelation to reason.
They portray the proponents of revelation – a
prophet or someone prophet-like under the
best of circumstances, but more often jurists
and theologians – as presenting in imaginative,
rhetorical, or poetical terms what the propo-
nents of reason present directly or even
dialectically.
After Alfarabi, and surely due in part to his
critique, the jurists and theologians of Islam
began a massive quarrel with the philosophers.
In the process, they frequently advanced argu-
ments that defied rational analysis. Averroes’s
replies to al-Ghazali in his admittedly popular
writings provide ample evidence of this ten-
dency. Alfarabi successfully avoided those
quarrels. He did so by linking the foundations
of their objections to philosophy to those
raised by the grammarians and seeking to show
precisely how discourse in philosophic inquiry
must be carried out. They are lessons timely
8
even now for those who seem to have replaced
the grammarians, that is, the philologists.
In the Selected Aphorisms and the Political
Regime, Alfarabi acknowledges our aware-
ness of things that appear to be right or just
by nature and inquires into how we can make
sense of them, but stops short of viewing
such phenomena as natural laws. He does so
because he discerns no divine or natural
principle upon which to ground human
conduct. Evil has its source not in the natural
realm or divine order, but in human will or
volition. It arises from human will insofar as
evil must be understood as what is opposed
to happiness or what leads to happiness.
Since being is by nature precisely what it is
supposed to be, evil has no natural being.
Differently stated, there is no natural defect
in being (Selected Aphorisms, aphs. 71 and 74).
Similarly, insofar as happiness is opposite to
misery and the latter is voluntary, so is the
former. Nothing external can be called hap-
piness, nor is it located in any place. Still,
because being is good in itself, the first
cause or reason is the source of good in the
world.
Existence is of three sorts: what must be or
is necessary, what may or may not be or is
possible, and what simply cannot be or is
impossible. Human beings, like other crea-
tures, are of the second sort; and it must be
recognized that possible existence necessarily
implies nonexistence. In other words, pos-
sible beings are entities that come into being
and pass away. Given the way possible
existence works, no moral judgment can be
attached to the fact that big fish eat little fish,
lions kill deer, or forests are sometimes con-
sumed by wildfire. Nor, much as it pains us to
see our own kind suffer or die, is there any
evil connected to the occurrence of natural
catastrophes like tsunamis, earthquakes, or
tornadoes that destroy human life.
Such reasoning permits Alfarabi to identify
two erroneous opinions human beings hold
about existence. Insisting that all being is good
and all nonbeing evil, some people invent
chimeric  beings to represent each. Others
maintain that pleasure is good and pain evil.
Both err, according to Alfarabi, insofar as they
ignore desert. By this, he means that in the
natural realm of possible existence, which is
distinct from the spiritual and celestial realms
of necessary existence, things are always as
they deserve to be and are good. In this realm,
desert has to do with form, matter, and the
types of possible existence.
The condition for justice and merit is an
order such that human beings find completion
in the practice of all the virtues and thereby
attain happiness, yet do so voluntarily. Precisely
those things that prevent them from comple-
tion and happiness – voluntary actions that
lead to misery – are still part of the original
natural order. This account of order is anthro-
pocentric precisely because good and evil, jus-
tice and merit, concern humans above all. The
phenomena in question are based on merit
only to the extent that evil is understood as
voluntary, the sole perspective allowing for
human freedom or choice.
Alfarabi does not address the one serious
objection to the notion that all evil is
voluntary, namely, how to explain the occur-
rence of deformed beings, accidents that
wreak havoc, or natural disasters. Although
his argument seems to suggest that such mat-
ters are to be attributed to human meddling
with an otherwise well-ordered natural realm
(an exculpation made famous centuries later
by Rousseau in his letter to Voltaire), Alfarabi
says nothing about the objection or its resolu-
tion. Yet such a response stands as the only
way for him to defend the idea of natural
goodness and preserve grounding it on merit
in accordance with nature. One reason for his
silence might be a desire to avoid the issue of
the limits upon natural or divine providence.
Here he has insisted upon the principle that
the existing order works well and that it is the
task of thoughtful humans to fathom the
order and determine how to pursue their
good in keeping with it. There is, conse-
quently, no allowance for divine intervention,
miracles, or any other external help when
humans go astray. In other words, there is no

room for revelation or the notion that the
cause behind the order pays heed to the way
things function once they have been set in
motion. (This interpretation of what Alfarabi
means by possible being according to Selected
Aphorisms, aph. 74, is confirmed by his
discussion of the same topic in the Political
Regime, sects. 86–7 and 94.)
For Alfarabi, the attainment of happiness
depends first and foremost on the theoretical
rational faculty, not the practical rational one.
But arriving at an intellectual apprehension of
happiness is only the beginning, however
necessary a beginning it is. Once a human
being apprehends or discerns what happiness
is by means of the theoretical rational faculty,
he must then decide how to attain it. This is
the role of the deliberative rational faculty.
Subsequently, he must use various moral vir-
tues and practical arts to that same end.
Thus, the emphasis on the human will and
its link with evil set forth in the Political Regime,
sects. 71–2, and Selected Aphorisms, aph. 75,
accords fully with the teaching of the
Attainment of Happiness. In identifying the
human will as the source of evil, Alfarabi by no
means claims that affections of the soul and
appetite, desire and anger, or other faculties
leading to passions are always evil. Rather, the
issue is how the affections and passions are
used. They are good if used for the attainment
of happiness, evil if for the attainment of
misery. Differently stated, everything turns on
knowing what happiness is and striving to
attain it. The discussion of being and of the
kinds of being, even defective being, contributes
to the better understanding and thus the
attainment of happiness.
SEE ALSO: Islamic Political Thought; Natural
Law ; Reason; Religion and Politics
Further Reading
Butterworth, C. E. (2007) “Alfarabi’s Introductory
Sections to the Virtuous City.” In Y. Tzvi
Langermann and J. Stern (Eds.) Adaptations
and Innovations: Studies on the Interaction
9
between Jewish and Islamic Thought and
Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the
Late Twentieth Century, Dedicated to Professor
Joel L. Kraemer. Paris and Louvain: Peeters,
pp. 27–49.
Butterworth, C. E. (2007) “Alfarabi’s Plato: A Tale of
Two Cities.” In M. van Ackeren and O. F.
Summerell (Eds.) The Political Identity of the
West: Platonism in the Dialogue of Cultures.
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 55–76.
Butterworth, C. E. (2011) “Alfarabi’s Goal: Political
Philosophy, Not Political Theology.” In
A. Afsaruddin (Ed.) Islam, the State, and Political
Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53–74.
Butterworth, C. E. (forthcoming) Alfarabi, the
Political Writings: “Political Regime” and
“Summary of Plato’s Laws.” Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Campanini, M.(2011) “Alfarabi and the Foundation
of Political Theology in Islam.” In A. Afsaruddin
(Ed.) Islam, the State, and Political Authority:
Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 35–52.
Colmo, C. A. (2005) Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi
as Founder. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Crone, P. (2004) “Al-Fārābī’s Imperfect
Constitutions,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-
Joseph, 57, 191–228.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaS ̣r. (1949) IḥSạ̄ ᾽ al-‘Ul ūm
li-al-Fārābī, ed. ‘Uthmān Amīn. Cairo: Dār
al-Fikr al-‘Arabī.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaSṛ . (1964) Abū NaSṛ al-Fārābī,
Kitāb al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya, al-Mulaqqab
bi-Mabādi᾽ al-Mawjūdāt, ed. F. M. Najjar. Beirut:
al-Mat ̣b‘a al-Kāthūlīkiyya.
Fārābī, al-, Abū ‘NaSṛ . (1985) Al-Farabi on the
Perfect State, Abū NaS ̣r al-Fārābī’s Mabādi’ Ārā’
Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila, trans. and ed. R. Walzer.
Oxford: Clarendon.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaSṛ . (1987) Al-Fārābī, Kitāb
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ed. Beirut: Dār al-Manāhil li-al-Ṭibā‘a wa
al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaS ̣r. (1987) Al-Fārābī, Risālat
al-Tanbīh ‘alā Sabīl al-Sa‘āda, ed. S. Khalīfāt.
Amman: Manshūrāt al-Jāmi‘a al-Urduniyya.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaṢr. (1998) “Le Sommaire du
Livre des ‘Lois’ de Platon (Ǧawāmi‘ Kitāb
al-Nawāmīs li-Aflāṭūn) par Abū NaṢr al-Fārābī,”
ed. T.-A. Druart. Bulletin d’Études Orientales, 50,
109–55.
10
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaS ̣r (2001) Alfarabi: Philosophy of
Plato and Aristotle, trans. M. Mahdi. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaS ̣r. (2001) Alfarabi, the Political
Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts,
trans. C. E. Butterworth. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Fārābī, al-, Abū NaS ṛ . (2007) “Al-Fārābī,
Directing Attention to the Way to Happiness.”
In J. McGinnis and D. C. Reisman (Eds.,
trans.) Classical Arabic Philosophy: An
Anthology of Sources. Indianapolis: Hackett,
pp. 104–20.
Galston, M. (1990) Politics and Excellence: The
Political Philosophy of Alfarabi. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Gannagé, E. (2004) “Y a-t-il une pensée politique
dans le Kitâb al-Hurûf d’al-Fārābī?” Mélanges de
l’Université Saint-Joseph, 57, 229–57.
Genequand, C. (2008) “Loi morale, loi politique:
al-Fārābī et Ibn Bājjah,” Mélanges de l’Université
Saint-Joseph, 61, 491–514.
Gutas, D. (2004) “The Meaning of madanī in
al-Fārābī’s ‘Political’ Philosophy,” Mélanges de
l’Université Saint-Joseph, 57, 259–82.
Lahoud, N. (2004) “Al-Fārābī: On Religion and
Philosophy,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-
Joseph, 57, 283–301.
Mahdi, M. (1967) “Alfarabi against Philoponus,”
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Mahdi, M. (1970) “Language and Logic in Classical
Islam.” In G. E. von Grunebaum (Ed.), Logic in
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Harrassowitz, pp. 51–83.
Mahdi, M. (1971) “Al-Fārābī.” In C. C. Gillispie
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Mahdi, M. (1990) “Al-Fārābī’s Imperfect State,” Journal
of the American Oriental Society, 110 (4), 712–13.
Mahdi, M. S. (2001) Alfarabi and the Foundation of
Islamic Political Philosophy: Essays in Interpretation.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
O’Meara, D. (2003) Platonopolis: Platonic Political
Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Clarendon,
pp. 185–97.
Parens, J. (1995) Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s
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University of New York Press.
Parens, J. (2006) An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous
Religions: Introducing Alfarabi. Albany : State
University of New York Press.
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