G.R. No.

L-48944 February 26, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADULFO TERROBIAS, defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes convicting the
accused, Adulfo Terrobias, of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to acknowledge the offspring of Delia Bonion as his natural child with all the rights granted
her by law; and to indemnify the victim, Delia C. Bonion, in the sum of P10,000.00 as actual, moral
and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. 1

To the charge of rape, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He does not, therefore, deny the
truth of the testimony of the complainant, the 17-year old Delia C. Bonion, as to her sexual
experience except only to disclaim any participation therein with his assertion of never having had
sexual intercourse with her. The testimony of the complainant on how she was sexually assaulted,
and the events that intervened thereafter, may, therefore, be quoted from the appealed decision
which set forth the said testimony as follows:

... Complainant Delia C. Bonion narrated how on the night of February 17, 1977 as
she was fast asleep because of the days work, she woke up to find Adulfo Terrobias
already on top of her holding her hands and when she resisted was told not to shout
under threats of harm. As Delia continued to struggle, Adulfo covered her mouth with
a wad of cotton soaked with medicine which smell weakened her and caused her to
lose consciousness. When she came to, Delia still saw Adulfo getting his pants and
went out the room. Still laboring under the fear of harm because Adulfo warned her
that nobody should know what he did, Delia continued her usual household work,
awaiting the arrival of her parents. Adulfo did not take breakfast at the table the
following morning, Delia's mother visited her February 27 and she confided to her
what Adulfo did. Florencia Terrobias was informed by Dolores C. Bonion same day
within the hearing of Delia, and after condemning Adulfo as a salvaje her Lola Insay
asked the two to wait for the arrival of Gregorio Terrobias who was in Naga City. The
defense miserably failed to present Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias to rebut the
claim of Delia and Dolores about the report of the RAPE to both of them. Neither did
the defense deny that Gregorio after knowing his son's perfidy told complainant and
her mother Dolores to have the child removed or aborted thru the help of an
'arbulario'. The proposal of abortion refused, Dolores demanded that Adulfo marry
her daughter which the Terrobias Fay scorned. Delia was thereafter taken away by
her own parents. The case went to Court. In retaliation, Dolores and her husband
were summarily removed as tenant-encargado. 2

The assault took place in the house of appellant's parents, Gregorio and Florencia Terrobias, at
Bato, Catanduanes, where complainant was a house helper, her parents being the "encargado" 3 of
the properties of the aforesaid spouses, whom Delia called "Lolo Goyong" and "Lola Insay", 4 and treated
as her foster parents. Appellant, then single and thirty-three years of age, was living with his parents in
the same house. Delia's room was between appellant's room and that of the latter's mother. 5 It is in
complainant's room that the rape took place.
From her plain and straightforward testimony, We have no doubt as to complainant's candor and
sincerity. A 17-year old girl at the time, she could not have merely concocted the story she narrated
in court, directed against a thirty-three-year-old son of her masters. Only truth and a feeling of deep
grievance could have impelled her to charge appellant with the grave offense committed against her,
even at a price she has to pay in terms of her honor being exposed or even tarnished not to mention
the discharge of her parents as "encargados" of appellant's parents.

The circumstances as duly established following the sexual assault could not but strengthen belief in
complainant's honesty and truthfulness. As soon as she had the chance to report the offense done
her to someone of her fullest confidence and who could look at her plight with sympathy and
understanding, she did so. This was on February 27, 1977 on her mother's first visit to her after the
incident when she told her mother about the harrowing experience. 6 The mother, in turn, told
appellant's mother what the latter's son did to her daughter. Right after hearing the daughter's whole
story, appellant's mother, instead of expressing disbelief in what was told her, reproached her son for the
act, calling him "salvage", and suggested that Delia remain until the matter is reported to her husband
who was then in Naga City. 7 When the father of appellant heard of the incident as narrated to him by
complainant's mother, he told the latter to return on April 2 to afford him time to investigate the matter. On
her return as agreed, Delia's mother told appellant's father that Delia was on the family way. Thus
informed, appellant's father suggested abortion by an "arbulario", 8to which Delia's mother disagreed, and
instead demanded that appellant marry Delia who was with her. Appellant's father answered in Bicol:
"Carabaos should be with carabaos and cows with cows." 9

On the same date, April 2, 1977, Mrs. Bonion took her daughter Delia to Virac to seek advice of her
aunt who suggested that a medical certificate be secured as to the condition of Delia. Dr. Masagca
who examined Delia found her one and one-half month pregnant, her last menstruation being on
January 29, 1977.

Because of the complaint filed by Delia and her parents who forthwith reported what happened to
their daughter to the PC at Virac the Terrobias spouses discharged Delia's parents as their
"encargado". 10 Delia later gave birth to a baby girl on October 28, 1977. 11

With the complainant pointing to appellant as the person who ravished her in her room in appellant's
residence on the night of February 17, 1977 the latter's alibi of not being in his house on said time
and day because he attended the birthday part of Teodulo dela Providencia in San Andres,
Catanduanes, some 25 kilometers from Bato where he had to spend the night Teodulos house
because he had drunk too much is unavailing. No motive was given why the complainant should
falsely charge appellant with so grave an offense, considering that she had treated appellant s
parents with so much affection that she called their, "Lolo" and "Lola".

Complainant might have incurred in some inconsistencies, in her testimony during the trial in relation
to statements she gave before the trial as appellant tried graphically to demonstrate in his brief (p.
11). They refer, however, to minor details that do not detract from the truth of the central fact of rape
having been committed by appellant on the complainant. They arise from or are caused by, the
natural weakness, or even fickleness, of memory and rather strengthen credibility, as they erase
suspicion of coaching or of a rehearsed testimony. On the important and decisive details, however,
she was consistent in all the statements she made, such as appellant's being already on top of her
when she woke up, how she resisted his action despite appellant's threat, which was followed by the
latter pressing a wad of cotton soaked with medicine in her mouth and nose which rendered her
unconscious, her feeling pain in, and the bleeding of, her private parts, her "bra" being torn and her
skirt, rolled up.

On the other hand, complainant's mother's testimony that on her first visit to her daughter at her
masters' residence after the incident, Delia reported to her the outrage committed on her, and
appellant's mother called her son a savage on being informed of what he did, while the father
advised the removal of the fetus by an "arbulario," were not rebutted by appellant's parents. They did
not take the witness stand despite that the aforesaid testimony against them lent full credence to
complainant's story. The acts of appellant's parents as aforestated would show that they had no
reason to disbelieve said story, specially considering that the father had all the time he asked for to
investigate the matter. Indeed, a young simple barrio girl like Delia could not have fabricated a
charge of rape against a man twice her age, the son of her masters at that, for whom she had none
but affectionate respect.

Appellant claims of having been denied his constitutional right by the mere fact that the trial of the
case took only four days is entirely without basis. He had presented all his evidence which was duly
submitted by his counsel who never asked for more time to do so. His right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him was exercised to the fullest.

Neither is his claim of lack of authority of the trial judge to decide the instant case with any legal
support to stand on. While by the Resolution of the Supreme Court 12 the authority of the trial judge to
try criminal cases in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes was up to March 2, 1978, it
does not preclude submission of memoranda even after such date, as long as the trial was completed,
and the order to file memorandum given, before the expiration of his authority to try the case. Much less
was the trial judge divested of the authority to decide the case which he can do anytime after the trial of
the case, under Section 51 of the Judiciary Act, the filing of memoranda not being a part of the trial, nor is
the memorandum itself an essential, much less an indispensable, pleading before a case may be
submitted for decision. It is intended primarily to aid the court in the rendition of the decision in
accordance with law and the evidence, and should not, therefore, be the cause for the loss of the
authority of the judge who heard the case to decide it.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the judgment appealed from being in
accordance with law and the evidence, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs.

G.R. No. 178778 August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision1] dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00114, which affirmed with modification the Decision2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, convicting appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus,
Jr. of the crime of parricide in Criminal Case No. 2002-587.
Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information3] dated June 7, 2002, as
follows:

That on or about the 10th day of January, 2002, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less,
at Lanis[i] Patrol Base, Lanis[i], Municipality of Claveria, Province of Misamis Oriental, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, choked and strangled the neck of his legitimate
wife Betty Angus, thereby causing her instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty4 to the offense
charged.

The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-trial, to wit:

1. That the accused and the victim were legally married.

2. That the incident happened on January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi,
Claveria, Misamis Oriental.

3. That T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
particularly the Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis
Oriental.5

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo A. Padulla, Staff
Sergeant Romeo Rhea, Dr. Alex R. Uy, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at, and Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members Romeo I. Malaran, Leoncio P. Jintapa and Alejo O. Carpio.
Their testimonies may be synthesized into the following narration of events:

The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on January 9,
2002. Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later, CAFGU members
Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing about appellant’s relationship with another woman.
Appellant was also seen go out of his bunker around midnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables
for dinner.6

The following day, January 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had breakfast at the mess hall
with Jintapa, Malaran and Carpio. As appellant was not with his wife, Jintapa reminded appellant to
call her. When appellant returned, he told them that he would just leave some food for his wife
because she was still sleeping.

After eating, Malaran and Jintapa asked for permission to fetch water near the barangay elementary
school about a kilometer away. While they were gone, Carpio went to the outpost and started
cleaning his firearm. Appellant went to the comfort room then decided to join Carpio at the outpost.
On his way to the outpost, appellant passed by his bunker and peeped through the door which was
open by about 1 ½ inches.7 Carpio was able to see the door because it was facing the outpost.8 A
few minutes later, Malaran and Jintapa returned and joined appellant and Carpio at the outpost. The
four (4) shared funny stories and joked for a while, after which Carpio went to the mess hall while
Jintapa went to his bunker. Malaran and appellant decided to continue their conversation at the
mess hall.9

On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not able to open the door at
once because something was blocking it from the inside. When appellant pushed the door, Malaran
saw the back of the victim in a slanting position and leaning at the door. Appellant went inside and
almost immediately shouted for help. Malaran and Carpio saw appellant embracing his wife. They
helped appellant carry Betty’s body to the bed. Malaran observed that her skin below the jaw was
reddish and her knees were covered with mud.10 There was food on the table and a multi-
colored tubao11 was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a meter away from the victim. The lower
tip of the tubao was in a circular form and was hanging about four (4) feet from the ground. They
heard appellant repeatedly say, "Why did you do this? How can I explain this to our children?"12

Carpio called Jintapa and told him that something had happened to Betty. This was around 10:00
a.m. When Jintapa entered appellant’s bunker, he noticed that the tubao was still hanging from the
roof. He also saw appellant embracing his wife and crying hard. Appellant exerted effort to revive his
wife by pumping her chest. Malaran tried to help by massaging Betty’s hands, feet, and legs. When
Carpio and Malaran left to look for a vehicle, Jintapa took Malaran’s place and also massaged
Betty’s hands and feet which were already cold. Appellant, who continued to cry very hard, covered
Betty’s neck with his tubao and draped a blanket over her body. The tubao that was hanging on the
roof was not removed until Corporal Teodoro Guibone ordered a meat collector to remove it.13

At the Claveria Municipal Hospital, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at concluded that Betty was already
dead upon arrival for she no longer had a pulse. She asked appellant as to the cause of her death,
and after two (2) minutes, he replied that maybe she suffered a heart attack as she had a history of
heart ailment. Dr. At-at wanted to thoroughly examine Betty’s body but she was not able to do so
because appellant was crying very hard. A commotion also took place at the hospital when a soldier,
later identified as Sgt. Romeo Rhea, tried to box appellant, saying that appellant’s crying was only
an act.14 Rhea and appellant were companions at Bravo Company, while Betty was Rhea’s neighbor
in Basilan. Appellant is also the godfather of Rhea’s child. According to Rhea, he knew about
appellant’s illicit relationship with a certain Jennifer Abao, with whom appellant had been
sweethearts for about three (3) years prior to the incident on January 10, 2002.15

when they could not bring the cadaver to Basilan.the buriaer granmother led herself. and backbiting.
Cheryl Angus, MhDr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory of Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, conducted the autopsy. His examination revealed the
following findings:

HEAD AND NECK

1. Abrasion: Right Mandibular Region: measuring 4 x 2 cm., 4 cm. from the anterior midline.

2. Ligature mark: extending bilaterally around the neck at the level below the hyoid bone,
measuring 42 x 1 cm., bisected by the anterior midline, directed horizontally and
posteriorward. Larynx and Trachea are markedly congested and hemorrhagic.16

Dr. Uy stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking her last meal due to the presence
of partially digested food inside the stomach.17 He believed that the cause of her death was asphyxia
by strangulation and not by hanging, as the victim did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or
hyoid bone and there was no hemorrhage above the trachea and larynx. He explained that the
sudden gravitational force would usually cause a fractured bone. Dr. Uy clarified that the absence of
a fractured bone would only happen if the person hangs herself very slowly without a sudden force
or if she was in a kneeling position.18

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Angeles S. Ociones, Senior Police Officer 1
Victorino Busalla, Cheryl Ann A. Siarez, Master Sergeant Benedicto Palma, Emeliano Bolonias,
Bobby Padilla Lopez and appellant. Taken together, their testimonies present the following narrative:

Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only daughter of Betty and appellant. In the afternoon of January 9,
2002, at around 1:30 p.m., Betty went inside Cheryl Ann’s bedroom and told her to be serious in her
studies. Betty also intimated to Cheryl Ann that she wanted to go to a far place where there would be
no more rumors, no backbiting, and nobody would recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they boarded a bus
bound for Cagayan de Oro City. Betty disembarked at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental to transfer to a
passenger jeepney going to Claveria.19

From Villanueva to Claveria, Betty sat beside Angeles Ociones, an old friend, in the front seat of the
jeepney. She confided to Ociones about her jealousy towards her husband. She also mentioned that
she was angry that she was not able to catch him and his mistress. Ociones advised Betty to
confront her husband regarding the rumors she had heard, as it was common to hear such rumors
every time a soldier is assigned to a place away from home. Betty revealed that she planned to
commit suicide because of the many stories she had heard about her husband. This was the third
time she shared thoughts of suicide. Betty further said she wanted to go to a far place where nobody
would recognize her. At around 7:00 p.m., Betty arrived at Lanisi Patrol Base.20

Appellant met his wife at the gate and went with her to his bunker. Appellant testified that they talked
about only three (3) things: his whereabouts on January 7, 2002, the conference in Mat-i, Claveria,
and whether he was able to borrow money for the renovation of their house. He later admitted,
however, that Betty also confronted him about his relationship with another woman. At around 11:00
p.m. they went to bed. He asked Betty if she has eaten dinner but she said she did not want to eat.
Nonetheless, he brought her some food then went back to sleep. He woke up the following day at
around 6:00 a.m. and heard Emiliano Bolonias knocking at his door. Bolonias confirmed that when
the door was opened, he saw Betty sleeping on the bed. Since Betty was still asleep, appellant
suggested that they proceed to the mess hall to talk about their financial dealings. He did not lock
the door to his bunker when they left. At around 8:00 a.m. appellant went back to his bunker to invite
his wife to have breakfast with them.21

After having breakfast, appellant, Malaran, Carpio and Jintapa went to the outpost while Bolonias left
the patrol base. Malaran and Jintapa asked permission to fetch water but later arrived and stayed at
the outpost. Appellant went to his bunker and found the same locked from inside. He knocked and
called his wife, but there was no response. He forcibly opened the door and saw his wife hanging
with the use of a tubao which was tied at the purlins of the roof. Her body was hanging and almost in
a kneeling position. He shouted for help as he untied the knot around Betty’s neck but was not able
to carry her since she was heavy. The other CAFGU members helped appellant put Betty on the
bed. Malaran massaged Betty’s feet while appellant massaged her chest and even did a mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation. When the vehicle appellant had requested arrived, Betty was brought to the
hospital. The tubao that was used by the victim was left hanging at the purlins.22

That same day, Cheryl Ann was informed that her mother was in serious condition. She was fetched
and brought to Claveria, Misamis Oriental, where she saw her father crying. Appellant told Cheryl
Ann that her mother had committed suicide. The burial was originally scheduled on January 16,
2002 so her grandmother could attend. Betty’s relatives who attended the wake did not attend the
burial because they got angry when appellant did not allow them to bring Betty’s body to Basilan.
Her grandfather, SPO4 Cesar Ocay, told Cheryl Ann to bury her mother’s body in Basilan so that
they will not file a case against appellant. Cheryl Ann believes her mother committed suicide.23

M/Sgt. Benedicto Palma testified that on January 15, 2002, at around 2:00 p.m., he was at the
funeral parlor of Poblacion, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, assisting Dr. Alex Uy, who was conducting
the autopsy on Betty’s body. When he asked Dr. Uy regarding his findings, the doctor replied that
appellant had nothing to do with the death of his wife, and that she indeed committed
suicide.24 Aside from appellant, his brothers-in-law, Edgardo De Vera and Mariano De Vera, Sgt.
Rhea, and appellant’s sister-in-law, Jerry, were also present at the funeral parlor when Dr. Uy
announced his findings that Betty committed suicide.25

On May 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt [of] the crime of Parricide, punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and
taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, including its accessory penalties. He is also directed to
pay FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), as indemnity, to the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, May 20, 2003.26

Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,27 which modified Rules
122, 124 and 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the CA for intermediate
review.

On December 5, 2006, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the
RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads:

FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appealed Decision convicting T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS,
JR. of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is additionally ORDERED to
pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages and P50,000 as moral damages on top
of the decreed indemnity. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.28

Hence, this appeal. In his brief,29 appellant raises a lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and how she was killed. He
asserts that the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have last seen Betty alive on the night of
January 9, 2002. Thereafter, they heard the couple arguing about a woman. The following morning
Betty was found dead. Although there was more than one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that
the prosecution failed to prove that the combination thereof leads to the inevitable conclusion that he
killed his wife.

We find merit in appellant’s contentions.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest
on the strength of its own evidence and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. 30 And if the
prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on
its own behalf. In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.31

We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on
which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead
the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.32 Verily, resort to
circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind" is required.33]

The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a)
there is more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven
in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.34

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal of
the assailed judgment of conviction. The crime of parricide is defined and punished under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:

Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the
accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.35 1avv phi 1

The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening
of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latter’s illicit
relationship with another woman. The following day, appellant went out of his bunker at around 6:00
o’clock in the morning. He had breakfast at the mess area with his companions, but went back to his
bunker at around 8:00 o’clock to ask his wife to join them for breakfast. When he returned, he told
his men that his wife could not join them for breakfast because she was still asleep. At around 10:00
a.m., appellant returned to his bunker followed by Malaran who saw the dead body of the victim.

The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain
which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife.
The trial court relied on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife
arguing about the latter’s illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for
him to commit the crime. However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night
before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to
kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio
merely show a suspicion of appellant’s responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however,
suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.36 In the absence of any other evidence
reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.37

Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a person hangs herself, most of the time there will be a fracture on
the bone of the neck because of the pressure caused by gravity that pulls the rope. However, he
also testified that if the person hangs herself slowly, there will be no fracture on her neck or hyoid
bone. Thus, the fact that Betty did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone, as the
doctor observed, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that appellant strangled the victim.
Given the evidence that the victim had intimated her wish to commit suicide a day before the
incident, it is not farfetched to conclude that she indeed chose to take her life.

An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be
doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2)
or more explanations, one (1) of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction. That which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.38 After all, mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno
inocente.39 Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten (10) men
who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one (1) innocent man for a crime
he did not commit.40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated December 5, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant T/Sgt.
Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Unless detained for some other lawful reasons, appellant is hereby ordered released immediately.

G.R. No. 164443 June 18, 2010

ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Every criminal conviction must draw its strength from the prosecution’s evidence. The evidence must
be such that the constitutional presumption of innocence is overthrown and guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutorial burden is not met when the circumstances can yield to
different inferences. Such equivocation betrays a lack of moral certainty to support a judgment of
conviction.

This Petition for Review1 assails the March 16, 2004 Decision2 and the July 9, 2004 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25775. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Eriberto Masangkay is instead meted the penalty of imprisonment for a term of
Six (6) months and One (1) day of prision correccional minimum.

SO ORDERED.4

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay (Eriberto), his common-law wife Magdalena Ricaros (Magdalena),
Cesar Masangkay (Cesar) and his wife Elizabeth Masangkay (Elizabeth), and Eric Dullano were the
incorporators and directors of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.5

On December 29, 1993 Eriberto filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
Petition for the Involuntary Dissolution6 of MFI for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar and Elizabeth.7 The said petition was made
under oath before a notary public, and alleged among others:

3. At or around September 1, 1993, respondent Elizabeth A. Masangkay prepared or caused

to be prepared a Secretary’s Certificate which states:

That at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the said corporation held at its principal
office on December 5, 1992, the following resolution by unanimous votes of the directors
present at said meeting and constituting a quorum was approved and adopted:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Lot No. 2069-A-2 situated at Bo. Canlalay, Biñan,
Laguna containing an area of 3,014 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-210746 be exchanged with 3,700 shares of stock of the corporation worth or valued
at P370,000.00 by way of a "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct".

xxxx

4. Said secretary’s certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated because the alleged
meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.

xxxx

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the "Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct".

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of a land
(Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto Ricaros
Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

"Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning.

xxxx

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived."

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian
Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

x x x x8

The case remains pending to date.9

Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of the Board held on
December 5, 1992 and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious
instrument, the respondent in the SEC case, Cesar, filed a complaint for perjury10 against Eriberto
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.

Eriberto raised the defense of primary jurisdiction. He argued that what is involved is primarily an
intra-corporate controversy; hence, jurisdiction lies with the SEC pursuant to Section 6 of PD 902-A,
as amended by PD No. 1758. He also insisted that there was a prejudicial question because the
truth of the allegations contained in his petition for involuntary dissolution has yet to be determined
by the SEC. These defenses were sustained by the assistant provincial prosecutor and the
complaint for perjury was dismissed for lack of merit.11

It was however reinstated upon petition for review12 before the Department of Justice.13 Chief State
Prosecutor Zenon L. De Guia held that the petition for involuntary dissolution is an administrative
case only and thus cannot possibly constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal case. He also
rejected the claim that the SEC has exclusive authority over the case. The Chief State Prosecutor
explained that the prosecution and enforcement department of the SEC has jurisdiction only over
criminal and civil cases involving a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is administered and
enforced by the SEC. Perjury, penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is not
within the SEC’s authority.14 Thus, he ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which
eventually resulted in the filing of the following information:

That sometime in the month of December 1992,15 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of perjury in his Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of
Megatel Factors, Inc. based on violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree 902-A against Megatel
Factors, Inc., Cesar Masangkay, Jr. and Elizabeth Masangkay which he made under oath before a
notary authorized to receive and administer oath and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, wherein he made willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood on a material matter
when he declared the following, to wit: a) the secretary certificate dated September 1, 1993,
proposed by Elizabeth Masangkay is fictitious and simulated because the alleged December 5,
1992, meeting never took place; and, b) the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a
fictitious document, whereby the respondents defrauded the minor child Gilberto Ricaros
Masangkay, by exchanging the child’s 3,014 square meters lot with 3, 700 shares of stock of the
corporation, when in fact no consideration for the transfer was made as Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay
or his guardian Magdalena Ricaros has never been a stockholder of the Corporation at any point in
time, when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same statements he made in his
petition and which he reaffirmed and made use as part of his evidence in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are false.16

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 56495 and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59.

Eriberto filed a motion to quash,17 insisting that it is the SEC which has primary jurisdiction over the
case. He also argued that the truth of the allegations contained in the information is still pending
resolution in SEC Case No. 12-93-4650, thereby constituting a prejudicial question to the perjury
case.

The MeTC denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.18 It held that the fact that the parties to the
criminal case are mostly stockholders of the same corporation does not automatically make the case
an intra-corporate dispute that is within the SEC jurisdiction. It likewise held that the fact that the
parties are stockholders is merely incidental and that the subject of the case is a criminal act and
hence within the general jurisdiction of the MeTC. As regards the issue of prejudicial question, the
MeTC ruled that the petition before the SEC has nothing to do with the criminal case. The truth of
the statements for which he is being indicted is a matter of defense which the defendant may raise in
the criminal case.

Eriberto filed a petition for certiorari before Branch 158 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
to assail the denial of his motion to quash. The denial was affirmed.19 He then filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, which was denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.20

Failing to suspend the criminal proceedings, Eriberto entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment.21 He then waived the conduct of a pre-trial conference.22

During trial, the prosecution presented the private complainant Cesar as its sole witness.23 He
testified that on December 5, 1992, a meeting of the Board of Directors was held at 9:00 o’clock in
the morning at the office of MFI in Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna. He presented the minutes of the alleged
meeting and reiterated the details contained therein indicating that the Board unanimously approved
Magdalena’s proposal to exchange her son’s (Gilberto Masangkay [Gilberto]) property with MFI
shares of stock.24 The prosecution established that one of the signatures appearing in the minutes
belongs to Eriberto.25 This allegedly belies Eriberto’s statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting
"did not actually materialize," and shows that he knew his statement to be false because he had
attended the meeting and signed the minutes thereof. The prosecution also pointed out that in the
proceedings before the guardianship court to obtain approval for the exchange of properties,
Eriberto had testified in support of the exchange.26 The guardianship court subsequently approved
the proposed transaction.27 The resulting Deed of Exchange contained Eriberto’s signature as first
party.28
As for Eriberto’s statement that the Deed of Exchange was simulated, the prosecution disputed this
by again using the minutes of the December 5, 1992 meeting, which states that the property of
Gilberto will be exchanged for 3,700 MFI shares.

For his defense, Eriberto asserted that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually take place.
While he admitted signing, reading and understanding the minutes of the alleged meeting, he
explained that the minutes were only brought by Cesar and Elizabeth to his house for signing, but
there was no actual meeting.29

To support the claim that no meeting took place in 1992, the defense presented Elizabeth, the MFI
corporate secretary, who could not remember with certainty if she had sent out any notice for the
December 5, 1992 meeting and could not produce any copy thereof.

The defense also presented a notice of meeting dated October 19, 1993, which called for the MFI
board’s initial meeting "since its business operations started," to be held on November 9, 1993.
Emphasizing the words "initial meeting," Eriberto argued that this proves that prior to November 9,
1993, no meeting (including the December 5, 1992 meeting) had ever taken place.

As for the charge that he perjured himself when he stated that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious
and simulated for lack of consideration, Eriberto explained that MFI never issued stock certificates in
favor of his son Gilberto. Corporate secretary Elizabeth corroborated this statement and admitted
that stock certificates were never issued to Gilberto or any of the stockholders.30

While he admitted supporting the proposed exchange and seeking its approval by the guardianship
court, Eriberto maintained that he did so because he was convinced by private complainant Cesar
that the exchange would benefit his son Gilberto. He however reiterated that, to date, Gilberto is not
a stockholder of MFI, thus has not received any consideration for the exchange.

On rebuttal, the prosecution refuted Eriberto’s claim that the board had its first actual meeting only
on November 9, 1993. It explained that the November 9, 1993 meeting was the initial meeting "since
business operations began", because MFI obtained permit to conduct business only in 1993. But the
November 9, 1993 meeting was not the first meeting ever held by the board of directors. The
prosecution presented the secretary’s certificates of board meetings held on April 6, 199231 and
September 5, 199232 -- both before November 9, 1993 and both signed by Eriberto.33 At this time,
business operations have not yet begun because the company’s hotel building was still under
construction. The said secretary’s certificates in fact show that MFI was still sourcing additional
funds for the construction of its hotel.34

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On October 18, 2000, the MeTC rendered a judgment35 holding that the prosecution was able to
prove that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same
as evidenced by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eriberto’s statement that the Deed of
Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and execution of the
document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court regarding the proposed exchange
all militate against his previous statement. Petitioner was thus found guilty as charged and
sentenced to imprisonment of two months of arresto mayor minimum and medium, as minimum, to
one year and one day of arresto mayor maximum and prison correccional minimum, as maximum.36

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Eriberto appealed37 his conviction to the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, which eventually
affirmed the appealed judgment.38 The fallo of the Decision states that:

WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 2000 by Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City, convicting the accused-appellant Eriberto S. Masangkay of the crime of perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.39

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the prosecution was able to
prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary dissolution were deliberately made. It
explained that Eriberto’s signatures on the two allegedly fictitious documents show that he
participated in the execution of the Deed of Exchange and was present in the December 5, 1992
meeting. Having participated in these two matters, Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and
fictitious, as he claimed in his verified petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately
lied in his petition.40

The CA rejected petitioner’s argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that they
were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition for involuntary
dissolution.41

The appellate court found no merit in the issue of prejudicial question. It held that the result of the
petition for involuntary dissolution will not be determinative of the criminal case, which can be
resolved independently.42

The CA however, corrected the imposed penalty on the ground that the trial court was imprecise in
its application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The CA meted the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of six months and one day of prision correccional minimum.43

Petitioner moved for reconsideration44 which was denied.45

Hence, this petition.46

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for review:

Whether there was deliberate assertion of falsehood

II

Whether the TRUTHFUL allegation in the petition for involuntary dissolution that there was
no meeting is material to the petition

III
 Whether perjury could prosper while the main case remains pending47

Since this is a case involving a conviction in a criminal case, the issues boil down to whether the
prosecution was able to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 183 of the RPC provides:

False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. – The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.

For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law; (2) it must be made
under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a deliberate assertion of
falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a material matter.48

The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner and they are indeed present
in the instant case. The sworn statements which contained the alleged falsehoods in this case were
submitted in support of the petition for involuntary dissolution, as required by Sections 105 and 121
of the Corporation Code. 1avv phi 1

The petition was also verified by the petitioner before a notary public49—an officer duly authorized by
law to administer oaths. This verification was done in compliance with Section 121 of the
Corporation Code.50

It is the elements of deliberate falsehood and materiality of the false statements to the petition for
involuntary dissolution which are contested.

On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry or
any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects
the credit of any witness who testifies.51

Petitioner filed a petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI based on Section 105 of the Corporate
Code, which states:

Section 105. Withdrawal of stockholder or dissolution of corporation. – In addition and without

prejudice to the other rights and remedies available to a stockholder under this Title, any stockholder
of a close corporation may, for any reason, compel the said corporation to purchase his shares at
their fair value, which shall not be less than their par or issued value, when the corporation has
sufficient assets in his books to cover its debts and liabilities exclusive of capital stock: Provided,
That any stockholder of a close corporation may, by written petition to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, compel the dissolution of such corporation whenever any of the acts of the directors,
officers or those in control of the corporation is illegal, or fraudulent, or dishonest, or oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to the corporation or any stockholder, or whenever corporate assets are being
misapplied or wasted.

He stated in his petition for involuntary dissolution that:

xxxx

4. Said secretary’s certificate is absolutely fictitious and simulated, because the alleged
meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 5, 1992 did not actually materialize.

xxxx

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, x x x respondents executed another
fictitious document known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

xxxx

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded
minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any
consideration at all.

xxxx

8. The foregoing acts and deeds of the respondents, done in evident bad faith and in
conspiracy with one another, are seriously fraudulent and illegal because they constitute
estafa through falsification of documents, punishable under Articles 315 and 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.

9. Likewise, said acts and deeds are feloniously prejudicial to the stockholders of MFI,
including petitioner, as corporate assets are being misapplied and wasted.

10. MFI should therefore be ordered dissolved after appropriate proceedings before this
Honorable Commission, in accordance with Sections 105 and 121 of the New Corporation
Code x x x.52

The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he relied upon in his
petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors which are allegedly
fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify corporate dissolution under
Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these statements are material to his petition for
involuntary dissolution. The element of materiality is therefore present.

The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.

The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of petitioner’s
statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize." In other words, the
prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place, i.e., that the directors were
actually and physically present in one place at the same time and conferred with each other.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the alleged December 5,
1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with his statement that the December
5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According to the minutes, a meeting actually took place.
On the other hand, according to the petitioner’s statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting
did not actually materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or
inconsistent with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two
statements merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is
actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally possible
that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the petitioner who
testified that the minutes were simply brought to his house for signature, but no meeting actually
transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the prosecution’s burden to affirmatively prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the first statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other
statement (in the petition for dissolution) is the false one.

We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely
showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both statements are
sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove which of the two statements is false and must show
the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statement.53 The rationale for
requiring evidence other than a contradictory statement is explained thus:

x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be
sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one
oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was
false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each
other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration,
however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the
declarations of testimony of the accused.54

In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing evidence other than the
minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place. It merely presented, aside from the
minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar, who is a respondent in the corporate
dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness.55 The
prosecution did not present the testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting
who could have testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any
explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any evidence that
might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were physically gathered at a
single place, and there conferred with each other and came up with certain resolutions. Notably, the
prosecution failed to present the notice for the alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth,
who was presented by the petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior
notice to the directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the
sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for how could
the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly notified that such a
meeting would be taking place?

The insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence is particularly glaring considering that the petitioner
had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of the meeting. He testified that
while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes were brought to his house for his
signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he believed that the proposed exchange of the
assets, which was the subject of the minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this
belief, he also supported the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say with moral certainty that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place and that the
petitioner’s statement denying the same was a deliberate falsehood.

The second statement in the petition for involuntary dissolution claimed to be perjurious reads:

5. Using the said falsified and spurious document, respondents executed another fictitious document
known as the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct.

The contract purporting to be a transfer of 3,700 shares of stock of MFI in return for a piece of land
(Lot No. 2064-A-2) located at Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna and owned by minor child Gilberto
Masangkay is void.

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states:

Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx

(2) those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

xxxx

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

The aforementioned contract is indeed simulated and fictitious because they defrauded minor child
Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay and deprived him of his own property without any consideration at all.

Records of the MFI revealed that minor child Gilberto Ricaros Masangkay [or] his alleged guardian
Magdalena S. Ricaros never became a stockholder at any point in time of MFI.

In short, the petitioner is being charged with deliberate falsehood for his statement that the deed of
exchange is fictitious. To support the accusation, the prosecution proved that petitioner assented to
the said Deed of Exchange by virtue of his signatures in the minutes of the alleged December 5,
1992 meeting and on the instrument itself, and his participation in procuring the guardianship court’s
approval of the transaction. These allegedly show that the exchange was not fictitious and that
Eriberto knew it.

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. Petitioner’s imputation of fictitiousness to the Deed of
Exchange should not be taken out of context. He explained in paragraph 5 of his petition for
involuntary dissolution that the Deed of Exchange is simulated and fictitious pursuant to Article 1409
of the Civil Code, because it deprived Gilberto Masangkay of his property without any consideration
at all. To justify his allegation that Gilberto did not receive anything for the exchange, he stated in the
same paragraph that Gilberto never became a stockholder of MFI (MFI stocks were supposed to be
the consideration for Gilberto’s land). This fact was subsequently proven by the petitioner through
the corporate secretary Elizabeth, who admitted that MFI never issued stocks in favor of the
stockholders. This testimony was never explained or rebutted by the prosecution. Thus, petitioner’s
statement that the exchange was "simulated and fictitious x x x because they x x x deprived
[Gilberto] of his own property without any consideration at all" cannot be considered a deliberate
falsehood. It is simply his characterization of the transaction, based on the fact that Gilberto did not
receive consideration for the exchange of his land.

As importantly, petitioner’s statements in paragraph 5 of the petition for involuntary dissolution about
the nature of the Deed of Exchange are conclusions of law, and not factual statements which are
susceptible of truth or falsity. They are his opinion regarding the legal character of the Deed of
Exchange. He opined that the Deed of Exchange was fictitious or simulated under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, because MFI supposedly did not perform its reciprocal obligation to issue stocks to
Gilberto in exchange for his land. His opinion or legal conclusion may have been wrong (as failure of
consideration does not make a contract simulated or fictitious),56but it is an opinion or legal
conclusion nevertheless. An opinion or a judgment cannot be taken as an intentional false statement
of facts.57

We recognize that perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws; that it is the policy of the law
that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free from fraud; that litigants and parties be
encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not.58 However, it is also at the
heart of every criminal proceeding that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

Given the foregoing findings, there is no more need to discuss the issue involving the propriety of
proceeding with the perjury case while the civil case for corporate dissolution is pending.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed March 16, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. GR No. 25775 and its July 9, 2004 Resolution, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Eriberto S. Masangkay is ACQUITTED of the charge of perjury on the ground
of REASONABLE DOUBT.

G.R. No. 106634 October 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO MALBOG, AMADEO VIERNES* AND SALVADOR
BAMBILLA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

Appeal interposed by the appellants from the decision, dated March 23, 1992, of Branch 42 of the
Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City, finding them guilty of forcible abduction with rape and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.
On August 28, 1990, Estela Eng y Ulalan lodged her criminal complaint for forcible abduction with
rape against Ninoy Malbog, Amado Viernes and an unnamed suspect (John Doe).

Filed by on August 29, 1990 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Daniel Terrado, the Original Complaint
alleged:

"That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG, AMADO
VIERNES and JOHN DOE, with violence and intimidation against persons, confederating together,
acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, forcibly
abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car and bringing her to INAWA
LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside, with the use of force, accused JOHN DOE
have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, against her will and consent to the damage
and prejudice of the latter."1

Upon arraignment thereunder on December 28, 1990, with the assistance of counsel de parte, Atty.
Santiago Marcella, Ninoy Malbog @ Saturnino Malbog and Amado Viernes entered negative pleas.

Appellant Salvador Bambilla, who was a member of the Philippine National Police (then known as
Integrated National Police) and whose case was first referred to the office of the Judge Advocate
General (JAGO), was included in the charge in the Amended Complaint, dated January 10, 1991,
alleging:

"That on or about the 30th day of January, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NINOY MALBOG @ SATURNINO
MALBOG, AMADO VIERNES and SALVADOR BAMBILLA, with violence and intimidation against
persons, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, forcibly abduct one ESTELA ENG y Ulalan, by dragging her inside a car
and bringing her to INAWA LODGE-INN, Calasiao, Pangasinan and once inside with the use of
force, accused SALVADOR BAMBILLA have carnal knowledge of said ESTELA ENG y Ulalan,
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter."2

With Bambilla pleading not guilty upon arraignment on June 17, 1991, trial proceeded.

Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Estela Eng y Ulalan, and Dr.
Rico Reyes, the examining physician.

Estela Eng y Ulalan, who was 19 years old at the time of the incident and a nursing student at
Lyceum Northwestern University in Dagupan City, testified that at about six o’ clock in the morning of
January 30, 1990, she boarded a Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City to attend her
classes at Northwestern University. Appellant Salvador Bambilla also boarded the same bus and sat
beside her. Upon reaching Dagupan, the bus stopped in front of the Post Office. She was about to
alight from the vehicle when Bambilla held her hand and threatened her. Bambilla continued to hold
her hand tightly even after they had alighted. While standing in front of the Post Office, he told her
that he would kill her if she shouted or made noise. Then, a blue car stopped in front of them and
Bambilla opened the door of the car, pushed her inside and also boarded. Once inside the vehicle,
she recognized appellant Ninoy Malbog as the driver. Seated beside him on the front seat was
Amado Viernes. She recognized Malbog because he was their former family driver, and she
recognized Viernes only by face until he was later identified. She shouted for help but kept quiet
when Bambilla threatened her and poked his gun at her waist.
Upon the order of Bambilla, Malbog drove the car to Calasiao and stopped in front of what she later
came to know as Inawa Lodge-Inn. Malbog drove the car into a garage, and a man immediately
closed the gate after which Viernes and Malbog went out of the car and left while Bambilla pushed
her (victim) out and forced her to go up a staircase. Upon reaching the door of a room, Bambilla
pushed her inside, followed her and locked the door. She screamed and when nobody heard her,
she kneeled in front of Bambilla and pleaded to him not to do anything to her. Bambilla pushed her
to the bed, instead, went on top of her, and began kissing her cheeks, neck and lips. Then, he pulled
her white uniform up to her waist and removed her underwear, after which he (Bambilla) took off his
pants and brief. She struggled and fought against him but he was stronger. Thereafter, he tried to
insert his penis into her vagina while making an up and down movement but she closed her legs.
Later, she felt hot fluid on her thighs. According to her (victim), she did not know if Bambilla was able
to penetrate her private parts because she was too tired and lost consciousness.

When she recovered, she went to the comfort room to wash her private parts. She looked for a
window through which to escape but she found none. When she went out of the comfort room,
Bambilla told her that he was leaving to buy for her a shirt because her uniform was all wet and dirty.

When Bambilla returned, he brought a skirt and T-shirt and ordered her to change her clothes, after
which he told her that he was bringing her to Manila. When she had dressed up they left the Inawa
Lodge and rode on the same blue car driven by Malbog earlier but this time, it was Bambilla who
drove the car. On the way, she gypped Bambilla by telling him that she would go with him to Manila
but he should first take her home to Pozorrubio to get some clothes. When they reached Pozorrubio
at around 12:00 noon, she alighted at Barangay Talogtog and took a tricycle. Upon reaching their
house, she told her brother Cesar what happened. The following day, January 31, 1990, she
submitted herself for medical examination by Dr. Rico Reyes, at the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital.
Two days after the incident, or on February 1, 1990 to be precise, she reported the incident to the
Pozorrubio Police and also to the Dagupan City Police.3

The victim-complainant denied the theory of appellant Salvador Bambilla that he was her boyfriend
and she voluntarily went with him to Inawa Lodge-Inn on January 30, 1990.

The second prosecution witness, Dr. Rico Reyes, recounted that on January 31, 1990, the victim-
complainant, Estela Eng, went to the Don Teofilo Memorial Hospital for physical examination, which
examination revealed that there was:

"erythema on left labia minora xxx; hymenal laceration, healed at 6:00 o’ clock and 10:00 o’ clock
position; vaginal introitus admits 1 finger; cervix closed; uterus was small; adnexae-free; vaginal
smear was done for detection of presence of spermatozoa and the findings was negative for
spermatozoa."

Aside from the said findings, there was no other sign of physical injury. Dr. Reyes explained that
"erythema on left labia minora" meant that there was reddening on the left labia which might be an
irritation caused by tight underwears; and that the healed hymenal laceration at six o’ clock and ten
o’ clock positions could have been sustained more than seven days prior to examination.4

Evidence for the defense consisted mainly of the testimonies of all the three appellants, Ninoy
Malbog @ Saturnino, Amadeo Viernes and Salvador Bambilla.

According to appellant Bambilla, he and the complainant were sweethearts. He first met her in
February 1988, when he was assigned as traffic policeman near complainant’s bakery in Barangay
Poblacion, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Since then, he began courting her and after she answered him
on March 14, 1988, they began going out and he would take her to and from the school.
On January 30, 1990, at around six o’clock in the morning, as he was already off-duty, he boarded a
Balbin-Fernandez bus bound for Dagupan City, to go home to Amagbagan. The bus was already
half full when he boarded it. Upon seeing the complainant, Estela Eng, inside the bus, he sat beside
her. They reached Dagupan at around seven o’clock a.m. and they alighted together in front of the
Post Office. As Estela Eng was already late for her class, he invited her for a date and she acceded
on condition that she was to be brought back to her school at 12:00 noon to attend her afternoon
classes. He then told her that he was going to bring her to Inawa Lodge in Calasiao. She was
reluctant at first, asking him if there was no other place where they could go to but later on she
agreed to go with him but asked him not to touch her - ("Anggapoy galawan").

They were about to board a tricycle for Calasiao when an oncoming blue car blew its horn. He
recognized the driver as Ninoy Malbog who used to drive a passenger mini-bus he usually rode on.
He then approached the car and talked to Malbog. When he found out that Malbog was going to
Dagupan City to buy materials for his employer, he requested him (Malbog) to take him and Estela
to Calasiao. When Malbog agreed, he and Estela sat in the backseat. As they were leaving, they
saw Amado Viernes, waving at them and asking them where they were going. Malbog told Viernes
that he would first bring Bambilla and his companion to Calasiao, buy spare parts for his employer
and then go back to Pozorrubio. Viernes asked Malbog if he could hitch a ride back to Pozorrubio.
After asking permission from his mother, Amado also boarded the car and sat beside him (Malbog).

While they were on their way to Calasiao, Estela Eng was worried that Malbog and Viernes might tell
her brother that she went with them to Calasiao. When they reached Inawa Lodge, he instructed
Malbog to bring the car inside the compound. A man directed them towards a garage where they
parked the car. He asked Estela to go ahead upstairs because he had to tell the two not to report to
her brother. When Estela left, he asked Malbog to leave the car so people would not see him
(Bambilla) and Estela when they leave the place. He assured Malbog that his employer, Rocky
Cancino, was his good friend and he would explain to Cancino when he brings back the car to him.
With such assurance, Malbog agreed to leave the car and he and Viernes left Inawa Lodge.

After the two left, Bambilla proceeded to pay the motel bills after which a roomboy accompanied him
to Room B, handing him a towel and pitcher of cold water. When he went inside the room, he saw
Estela sitting on the bed. When he asked her why she was quiet, she told him that she was worried
that Malbog and Viernes might report to her brother. He told her not to worry and began to kiss her
until both of them were lying on the bed. He then removed her dress, her bra and her panty and
continued kissing her. Then he stood up to remove his clothes while Estela covered her body with
her clothes because she was ashamed of his seeing her naked. When he was already undressed,
he laid on top of her but Estela kept her legs closed. When he tried to open her legs, she told him
"not today because we have pregnancy test next week."5 Thus, he simply inserted his penis in
between her thighs just above her knees because she continued to clutch her dress and covered her
body from the knee up. He ejaculated on her thighs.

Afterwards, Estela got up and went to the comfort room. After a few minutes, she went out of the
comfort room, lied on the bed beside him, embraced him and told him "Do not abandon me." After
assuring her that he will not because he loves her, he suggested that they leave Inawa Lodge as he
was already hungry. While Estela was putting on her clothes, she noticed that they were all
crumpled and told him that she needed new clothes. As he could not convince her to go with him, he
went out alone.

Using the same car driven by Malbog, he went to Ang Ka Tong Store in Dagupan City and bought a
shirt and a blouse. He went back to Inawa Lodge after about 45 minutes. The door to Room B was
locked when he arrived so he knocked and called out to Estela. When Estela opened the door, he
gave her the shirt and blouse he bought and asked her to change. However, she did not immediately
put on the clothes; instead, she sat on the bed and told him, "If you truly love me, do not abandon
me. I will go with you." It was at that point that they agreed to elope and go to Manila. After Estela
was dressed, they checked out of Inawa Lodge riding in the same car that he (Bambilla) borrowed
from Malbog. They agreed to go home first to Pozorrubio so they could get some clothes and
money. They arrived in Pozorrubio around noontime and upon reaching Barangay Talogtog, Estela
suggested that it would be better if she would get off there and take a tricycle home so nobody would
see them together. They agreed to meet at one o’ clock in the afternoon of the same day at the
Pantranco bus terminal near the Pozorrubio town plaza.

While Estela took a tricycle and proceeded to her house, he also went home to Amagbagan to get
money and some clothes. He was two minutes late when he arrived at their meeting place and he
did not find Estela there. He waited for her for forty-five (45) minutes but she did not arrive. Thinking
that she probably changed her mind, he went to her school, Northwestern University, in Dagupan
City. He waited for her until 4:30 but he did not find her. He then went back to Pozorrubio and
returned his clothes in his house, after which he drove to the house of Rocky Cancino to return the
car.

He (Bambilla) reached the house of Cancino at around six thirty. While he was in the house of
Cancino, two policemen, Patrolmen Mina and Perez, arrived and informed Bambilla that he was to
go immediately to the police station because the family of Estela was there. They also instructed
Ninoy Malbog and Rocky Cancino to go with him. Thus, he, together with Malbog and Cancino, went
to the police station in Pozorrubio. Upon arrival at the station, he saw Estela Eng, her two brothers,
her sister and their family maid inside the station. Outside the municipal hall, the Chief of Police
P/Capt. Conrado Rosete asked him what happened and why he tried to elope with Eng (angipatik)
and he told him that nothing happened between him and Estela. Bambilla also claimed that he tried
to talk to Estela after the incident to ask her about the problem but to no avail. Later, he learned that
Estela filed a criminal complaint against him.6

Appellant Amado Viernes, a fish vendor, testified that in the morning of January 30, 1990, his mother
Maria Viernes asked him to accompany her to get the fish she left with a fellow fish vendor in
Dagupan City. They boarded the Balbin-Fernandez mini bus in front of their house in Barangay
Talogtog, Pozorrubio. Inside the bus, he saw Salvador Bambilla, whom he knew to be a policeman,
and Estela Eng, his townmate, seated together and talking to each other. He and his mother alighted
in front of the Mele’s Restaurant in Dagupan City. They found out, however, that the fish they left
was already sent to Pozorrubio so they immediately walked back towards the bus stop to get a ride
home. After waiting for some time and no bus arrived, they walked towards the Post Office. Upon
reaching the said spot, he saw Bambilla and Eng talking. As he knew Bambilla to be a policeman, he
greeted the latter by saying "Sir". Bambilla replied by asking him, "Where are you going?" and he
told him that they were going back to Pozorrubio. Fifteen more minutes passed but no bus arrived.
When Eng and Bambilla were about to board a tricycle, a car arrived and Bambilla waved at the car,
approached the same and talked to the driver whom he recognized as Ninoy Malbog. Thereafter, he
saw Bambilla and Eng board the car. He (Viernes) also approached the car to ask Malbog where he
was going. When he found out that he would be going back to Pozorrubio, he asked Malbog if he
could hitch a ride back and when the latter agreed, he went back to his mother to inform her that he
would be hitching a ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog. When she agreed, he immediately boarded
the car, on the front seat beside Malbog.

He learned that Malbog would first take Bambilla and Eng to Calasiao, buy spare parts for Rocky
Cancino’s truck, and then go back to Pozorrubio. When they reached Calasiao, they took the left
route towards the place called Inawa Lodge Inn. Upon reaching the said place, Bambilla instructed
him to leave and asked Malbog to leave the car, promising that he would be responsible for
explaining what they did to Cancino. Afterwards, he and Malbog left Inawa Lodge together and took
a ride back to Dagupan. Malbog told him that had he known that Bambilla would be asking him to
leave the car, he would not have brought the two to Calasiao. When they reached Dagupan, Malbog
walked towards Perez Boulevard to buy spare parts while he alighted in front of Carried Lumber to
get a ride back to Pozorrubio.7

Amado Viernes’ allegations were corroborated by his mother, Maria Viernes, who attested to the fact
that she was with him on January 30, 1990; that her son went to Dagupan because she asked him to
accompany her to get the fish they were supposed to sell which she left with a fellow fish vendor in
Dagupan City; that while waiting for the bus to take them back to Pozorrubio, Malbog arrived in a
blue car; that his son approached the car and talked to Malbog; that after a few minutes his son told
her that he would be hitching a ride back to Pozorrubio with Malbog.8

Appellant Ninoy Malbog narrated his version of the incident as follows:

In the early morning of January 30, 1990, at around six o’clock in the morning, he was sent by his
employer, Rocky Cancino, to buy spare parts for their delivery truck in Dagupan City. When he
reached Dagupan City, he saw Bambilla with Estela Eng about to board a tricycle. Since he knew
Bambilla, he honked the horn to get the latter’s attention and Bambilla approached and asked him if
he could take him and Estela to Calasiao. As it was early and the shop where he was supposed to
buy the spare parts was still closed, he agreed. They met Amado Viernes on the way and the latter
also hitched a ride. When they reached the Inawa Lodge, Bambilla asked him to leave the car
because he did not want anybody to see him and Estela checking out of the motel. He was reluctant
at first but when Bambilla assured him that he was a good friend of Cancino and he (Bambilla) would
explain to Cancino when he returns the car later in the day, he (Malbog) agreed. He and Viernes
then went back to Dagupan City and parted ways at the junction of Perez Boulevard and del Pilar
Street. He proceeded towards Sampaguita Auto Supply to buy the spare parts while Viernes went to
the Carried Lumber. After buying the spare parts, he took a ride back to Pozorrubio.9

Rocky Cancino, employer of Malbog confirmed that in the early morning of January 30, 1990, he
sent the latter to Dagupan City to buy spare parts of a delivery truck and allowed him to use his blue
car because he wanted the delivery truck repaired immediately. When Malbog went back around ten
a.m., he was told that he (Malbog) lent his car to Bambilla so that he got angry; that around six o’
clock in the evening of the same day, Bambilla arrived and explained to him what happened; that
while he and Bambilla were still talking, two policemen came looking for Bambilla and the policemen
told Bambilla to go with them to the police station such that he and Malbog went with Bambilla to the
police station.

Cancino further testified that he was of the belief that Bambilla and complainant Eng were
sweethearts because on several occasions since the year 1988, he had seen the two together on
dates.10

Willy Napacena, roomboy of Inawa Lodge Inn, testified that he was on duty in the morning of
January 30, 1990; that about seven thirty a.m., Bambilla, with three companions, two males and one
female, arrived in a blue car and he was the one who let them enter the garage; that upon getting
out of the car, the two male companions of Bambilla left while the latter and his female companion
went up to Room B; that after 30 minutes, Bambilla went out of the room alone and boarded the
same blue car; that during the time Bambilla was out, he did not hear any call or buzzer from Room
B, and neither did he hear any noise coming therefrom; that Bambilla returned at around nine a.m.;
and about an hour after Bambilla was back, he and the lady checked out of the lodge.11

On March 23, 1992, the trial court found all the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced them accordingly. In finding for the
prosecution, it ratiocinated:
 "xxx xxx xxx

2. It is very unnatural for two lovers to have a date early in the morning, especially in the
case of Estela who had to attend her classes.

3. It is also unnatural that Estela would voluntarily go with him for a date in the company of
the other two (2) accused, Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes.

4. There were no pictures, cards and letters allegedly given to him by Estela which he
allegedly surrendered to her on January 31, 1990, because he was not foolish enough to
return them to her considering that he was invited to the police station, together with Ninoy
Malbog and Rocky Bell Cancino, to shed light on what happened between him and Estela in
the early morning of January 30, 1990, and that on the same night he saw Estela, together
with her brothers and sister and their maid, being interrogated by Pat. Credo, and
considering that he appeared to be smart as borne out by the way he concocted his defense
and the manner he answered questions; and considering further that the pictures, cards and
letters were very important pieces of evidence.

5. Estela Eng immediately reported what the accused, Pat. Salvador Bambilla, and his
companions did to her. For it is hard to believe that she would sacrifice her honor, being a
good looking girl, to tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and
thereafter present herself to be the subject of a public trial.

xxx xxx xxx

And the circumstances which negated his claim that Estela voluntarily went with him and made the
Court to rule that there is evidence of forcible abduction, are:

1. The testimony of Estela Eng is clear and convincing, the complainant declaring that she
and the accused Bambilla were never sweethearts; that when the mini-bus which she rode
from Pozorrubio to Dagupan City stopped in front of the Post Office and she was about to
alight, Bambilla held her hand and threatened her with bodily harm; that upon alighting from
the mini-bus Bambilla again held her right hand with his left hand tightly and told her that he
will kill her if she will shout or will make some struggle or noise; that just as the mini-bus
moved forward, a car suddenly stopped in front of them and Bambilla pushed Estela inside;
that she asked for help by shouting, but Bambilla immediately poked his gun to her waist and
because of fear, she stopped and just cried. On the way to Calasiao she even awked (sic)
help from Ninoy Malbog, but the latter ignored her.

2. And the fact that Bambilla at that time was armed with a hand gun.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court believes that the following circumstances have sufficiently established the commission of
the crime of Rape:

a] The threat, which is continuing, by Salvador Bambilla, who is a policeman and at that time
armed with a hand gun, against the life of Estela Eng from the time the latter was abducted
in front of the Post Office up to the time said Salvador Bambilla satisfied his desire in having
sex with Estela Eng, which threat put her to crouch in fear, keep silent and obey his orders.
 b] There is resistance or struggle put up by Estela Eng against the intention of Bambilla to lie
and have sex with her. This resistance or struggle is evidenced by the fact that once they
entered the garage of the Inawa Lodge Inn, in Calasiao, Pangasinan, and after accused
Ninoy Malbog and Amado Viernes have left upon instruction of Bambilla, the latter pushed
Estela out of the car and into the room of the hotel and, thereupon, pursued his intention.
Such resistance or struggle by private complainant is also evidenced by the fact that her
white nursing uniform dress was, as testified by accused Bambilla, crumpled , got wet and
dirtied. If really Estela Eng did not put up a resistance or struggle when Bambilla went on to
satisfy his carnal designs, why was her dress crumpled, wet and dirtied? The Court believes
that the foregoing circumstances are indications of the criminal intent of Pat. Bambilla to lie
and have sex with Estela Eng, without the latter’s consent and against her will.

c] There is consummated crime of Rape. This conclusion is evidenced by the findings of Dr.
Rico Reyes who was the one who attended to and examined Estela Eng."12

The lower court disposed thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Salvador Bambilla, Ninoy Malbog, alias Saturnino
Malbog, and Amado Viernes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction With
Rape and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and
severally indemnify the offended party Estela Eng the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay proportionate
costs.

SO ORDERED."13

Hence, this appeal.

In criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt on the strength of its evidence.14 Conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence;15 otherwise, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal.

Under the criminal justice system in this country, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.16 Speculation, conjectures and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot sway
judgment.17

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering that, in the nature of
things, only two (2) persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.18

The lone testimony of the victim of rape, if it meets the test of credibility, may be made the basis of
conviction.19 It is therefore incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the
credibility of the testimony of the victim and to carefully sift through her allegations because such
testimony, standing alone, if it passes the test of credibility, may lead to a finding of guilt.
As a general rule, the factual findings by the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could alter the result of the
case.20

A judicious review of the case under scrutiny, however, shows that the trial court did overlook some
facts and circumstances of weight and substance which cast doubt on the truth and credibility of
complainant’s accusations.

The complainant alleged that while they (she and Bambilla) were still on the bus, the latter poked his
gun at her and threatened to kill her if she shouts. She further claimed that she did, in fact, shout but
the other passengers were probably frightened.21

Such allegation by the complainant cannot be given credence by the Court. It is belied by her very
own testimony with respect to the time and place where the alleged forcible abduction took place.
She herself admitted that the bus was already full when they left Pozorrubio.22 Most of the
passengers were her townmates from Pozorrubio and schoolmates from Lyceum Northwestern
University. Moreover, the alleged threat happened in broad daylight. Given all these circumstances,
the Court finds the testimony of the complainant incredible. If indeed Bambilla threatened her by
poking his gun, it was impossible that nobody noticed if she put up a struggle against him. Then too,
if she tried to shout as she claimed, somebody could have heard her and responded to her shouts.
At the very least, if she shouted, as she theorized, a commotion inside the bus would inevitably
occurred. If Bambilla carried a gun that day, it was sufficiently explained by his being a policeman,
and at the time of the incident, he just got off from his duty and was on his way home.

Complainant likewise averred that Bambilla continued to poke his gun at her and to threaten her
when they alighted from the bus in front of the Post Office. Again, such allegation is unworthy of
belief. Complainant herself admitted that the bus regularly stops in front of the Post Office,23 where
she and Bambilla alighted because students of Lyceum usually get off thereat. The said testimony of
complainant makes her allegations of "threat" unlikely because it would be impossible for anyone not
to notice Bambilla poking a gun at her and threatening her. Not only that, a few meters across the
Post Office was the Dagupan City Police Station. If there was truth to the allegation that she was
forcibly abducted by Bambilla, her normal reaction would have been to resist and struggle against
her abductor. And considering the circumstances of time and place where complainant was
supposedly abducted, there was every opportunity for her to seek help by the simple expedient of
shouting. As earlier mentioned, the road in front of the Post Office is a major bus stop and a lot of
people alighted thereat, as it was already seven o’clock in the morning.24 The police station was only
a few meters from the Post Office and there were passenger jeepneys parked right in front of the
Post Office.25 All the aforesaid circumstances taken together negate the plausibility of the forcible
abduction complained of.

Another significant circumstance overlooked below was the fact that Bambilla went out of the motel,
left the complainant alone and was out for more than thirty (30) minutes. This fact was testified to by
Bambilla,26corroborated by the testimony of Willy Napacena, the roomboy of the motel,27 and
admitted by the complainant herself.28 What is more, Napacena attested to the fact that the doors to
the rooms of Inawa Lodge did not have outside locks and could only be locked from
inside.29 Complainant cannot therefore claim that Bambilla locked her up. Said roomboy also testified
that inside each room was a buzzer which could be used by customers calling for room
service.30 Napacena, declared under oath that he did not hear any call from the buzzer nor any shout
for help coming from Room B where the complainant was left alone for at least half an hour.31
It is thus decisively evident that Estela Eng had ample opportunity to escape or, at least, to shout for
help if she was really brought to the motel against her will and raped, as complained of. But she
never tried to escape nor asked for help, something unnatural for a woman who had been forcibly
abducted and raped. It would have been different if the complainant was physically unable to get up
and escape, because she was beaten up and rendered unconscious. Then, it would have been
understandable why she could not escape even if there was an opportunity to do so. In the case
under scrutiny, there were no signs that complainant Eng was too weakened to even get up and
walk. Unacceptable is complainant’s explanation why she did not try to go out of the room and
escape, to wit:

"Q You also mentioned in your previous testimony that the accused Salvador Bambilla went out for
about 30 minutes?

A Yes, sir.

Q When he was out, do you mean to say that he left you from the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q And for that 30 minutes what did you do in order to escape?

A I was trying to open the door by turning the knob but I could not and how could I also escape since
my clothes were wet and dirty and the jalousies because there are also jalousies, there is still a
screen covering the said window, so how could I go out , sir."32

It is simply unlikely for a woman who has just been robbed of her honor and chastity to still think of
wet and dirty clothes instead of seizing upon every opportunity to escape from her malefactor. In the
case under consideration, the complainant admitted that she waited for Bambilla to return:

"Q Do you mean to say that you waited for Salvador Bambilla to return?

A It is like this, before he left he told me to stay because according to him he will buy me a skirt and
a t-shirt, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words, you want to tell the Honorable Court that it was Salvador Bambilla who suggested
to buy you skirt and t-shirt?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you trusted him to still come back and give you the skirt and t-shirt, am I correct?

A Yes, sir."33

As to the accusation of rape, the trial court did not consider the fact that complainant herself did not
know if Bambilla was able to insert his penis into her vagina:

"Q Did he ever make any movement while on your top and his penis reached your vagina?
A He tried to insert his erect penis into my vagina but I don’t know if it was inserted because I lost
consciousness, sir."34

"Q You also stated that he ejaculated on your thigh?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you mean to say that his penis was not able to penetrate your vagina?

A That’s what I don’t know anymore because I was already tired and had lost my consciousness,
sir."35

Then too, the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the complainant indicated the
probability that no rape was committed. The medical certificate stated that there was no sign of
external physical injuries on the whole body of the complainant, no spermatozoa was found but there
were erythema and healed lacerations.36When asked to explain, the medico-legal officer opined that
the erythema or reddening on the left labia could have been caused by tight underwears and the
hymenal lacerations could have been sustained more than seven days prior to examination or
several days before the alleged rape happened.37

In light of the foregoing circumstances coupled with complainant’s admission that her legs were
closed all the time she was inside the motel,38 the fact that she did not try to escape although a
second assault was very likely, did not try to shout for help and instead, waited for Bambilla to return,
effectively contradict the protestation of complainant that she was raped. If there was sexual
intercourse, evidence is utterly wanting to show that the same was against her will. 1âwphi 1

Equally unaffirmable is the lower court’s finding that all the three appellants conspired together to
forcibly abduct complainant Eng against her will and to bring her to Inawa Lodge so that Bambilla
could have carnal knowledge with her. As sufficiently shown in the testimonies of the appellants, the
fact that they were together on January 31, 1990 was a mere coincidence. Malbog’s presence in
Dagupan City that morning was duly explained by Rocky Cancino, his employer, who attested under
oath that he sent Malbog to Dagupan City on that day to buy spare parts for his delivery truck. The
presence of Viernes in the same place was likewise adequately explained by his mother, Maria
Viernes, who recounted that her said son accompanied her to Dagupan City upon her request.

While the Court has, time and again, stressed that if a woman states that she was raped, she in
effect says all there is to show that she was indeed raped, experience has also shown that it is not at
all impossible that unfounded charges of rape may be proffered by women who are actuated by
some sinister, ulterior or undisclosed motive.39

And as held by this Court in the case of People vs. Alvario,40 judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused,
and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind
that their responsibility is to render justice according to law.41

Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the others may be compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty required for conviction.42
In the case under review, the prosecution has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellants
Salvador Bambilla, Amado Viernes and Ninoy Malbog forcibly abducted complainant Estela Eng y
Ulalan, brought her to the Inawa Lodge and had carnal knowledge with her. With the inability of the
prosecution to discharge its burden of proof, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellants
prevails and therefore, pursuant to law all the three appellants are entitled to acquittal.

Once again, the Court has occasion to quote what Alfonso El Sabio was reputed to have said a long
time ago43 "[m]as vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente".44

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is REVERSED, and on the ground of

reasonable doubt, appellants Saturnino Malbog, Amado Viernes* and Salvador Bambilla are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

The Director of Prisons, National Bureau of Prison, Muntinlupa City, is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellants unless there be any other legal ground for their continued detention,
and to report to this Court within ten (10) days the action taken under the premises. With costs de
oficio.

G.R. No. 191261 March 2, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO, Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about how the credibility of the rape victim’s identification of her attacker often depends
on her spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape.

The Facts and the Case

The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in Criminal
Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

DK,1 the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to sleep, leaving
the lights on, at her cousin’s rented room. She was startled when somebody entered the room after
she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if
she made any noise. He removed DK’s clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in
ravishing her. When the man was about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK
recognized him as the same person who passed by her cousin’s room several times in the afternoon
of the previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist.
On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign of
resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.

Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at the house of
his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m.
Tumambing swore that he never left his employer’s house that night. Ledesma corroborated his
story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that it had something to do
with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked, however, when he learned that he had been
suspected of having committed rape.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also ordered him to
indemnify DK ofP50,000.00 and pay her P50,000.00 as moral damages.

On November 12, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 the decision of
the RTC in its entirety, prompting Tumambing to appeal to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in finding that
accused Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned.

The Ruling of the Court

A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that
a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the
offender’s identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not
demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.2

Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DK’s testimony. They maintained that DK
categorically and positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v. Reyes3 where the Court
ruled that it would be easy for a person who has once gained familiarity with the appearance of
another to identify the latter even from a considerable distance.4 Ordinarily, the Court would respect
the trial court and the CA’s findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses.5 But the courts
mentioned appear to have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical evidence in the case. This
compels the Court to take a look at the same.6

DK’s identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The Court’s reading
of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him
when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DK’s uncertainties
regarding the rapist’s identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing.
PO2 Crispulo Frondozo, one of the apprehending officers, testified as follows:

Q: Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant pinpointed
accused as the person who abused her person?

A: No, Sir.

Q: What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant positively
identified the accused?
A: No, Sir.7

Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident testified:

Q: When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next?

A: Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence.

Q: Then what happened?

A: He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was "akala ko
pakukunan niyo ako ng dugo."

Q: What was the reaction of the accused?

A: As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't be afraid. Tell
me. I will protect you.

I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to turn left, right
and backways.

Q: After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next?

A: The suspect told the complainant "huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako." So she could not
pinpoint the suspect.

I said, "Iha, [i]to ba?" But she cannot point to.8 (Underscoring supplied)

DK’s above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no
confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist
because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousin’s rented room many times. If
this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been one of outright fury
or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairman’s
assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a wronged
woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value.9

The barangay chairman continued:

Q: As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came to know that
there were other suspect, what did you do?

A: I invited the suspect.

Q: Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect?

A: His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And confrontation ensued
between her and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect?

Q: What was her answer?

A: She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s] "makunan ng cells."

The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya.

Q: Presumably to get some sperm?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]?

A: I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do.

Q: After that what happened?

A: So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect. She could
not pinpoint.10(Underscoring supplied)

That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and presumably
compared with that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the possibility that it was
Quiatcho, rather than accused Tumambing, who raped her. The Court cannot thus accept DK’s
testimony that she had been familiar with the looks of the man who violated her and that she could
not possibly be mistaken in identifying him as Tumambing.

Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated the barangay chairman’s
testimony:

Q: So what was the question?

A: The question was that, "Is this the person you saw and who rape you?"

Court: Referring to?

Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing.

Q: What was the reply of the victim, if any?

A: She did not answer, Sir.

Q: What happen next when [DK] did not answer?

A: And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped her
and point to him.

Q: What was the reply of [DK] if any?

A: She did not reply, Sir.

Q: Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]?

A: Four times, Sir.11

The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually attacked her.
They pointed out her insistence at the police precinct that it was Tumambing who really raped her
and that she positively identified him in open court. But this came about much later. The fact is that
she did not refute the testimonies given by neutral witnesses that she could not point to accused
Tumambing as her rapist during their initial confrontation at the barangay chairman’s residence.
These witnesses had no motive or reason to fabricate a story for the defense.

By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the victim. For this
lawphi1

reason, the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It
cannot afford to overlook details that are essential to an understanding of the truth.12 Here, as shown
above, DK’s testimony is anything but believable and consistent.

Although she categorically said on cross-examination that she saw her attacker enter the
room,13 she did not shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape.14 She just lay in
bed.15 In fact, she maintained that position in bed even when her attacker was standing before her
and removing his clothes.16 She did not shout nor struggle when he penetrated her.17

There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt.18 But this is inconsistent
with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, "bigla na lang po siyang
lumabas x x xsinundan ko siya ng tingin."19 Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back
on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room.
Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this
were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt?

With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK’s rapist, the Court cannot affirm the
conviction of accused Tumambing.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 12,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
27, in Criminal Case 04-227897, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo
of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE
from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision
forthwith and to inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 184170 February 2, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ
and LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, Accused.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

VICENTE BONGAT y TARIMAN, Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02610 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 42,
Virac, Catanduanes in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098, 3099 and 3100 finding appellant Vicente
Bongat y Tariman (Vicente) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year
old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an
Information for Rape allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in barangay
[XXX],3 municipality of Virac, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a
common purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of [AAA],4 a minor 16 years of age, against her will
and without her consent.

That the crime of rape was committed with an aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that
[AAA] is a minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the herein-named four (4) accused.5

Appellant Vicente, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested while Larry remained at large. Upon
arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.

The alleged rape victim, AAA, her mother, BBB,6 the medico-legal officer, Dr. Elmer Tatad (Dr.
Tatad), Barangay Kagawad Fernando Tajan (Fernando) and Barangay Tanod Eddie Tajan (Eddie)
testified for the prosecution.

AAA narrated that on 29 August 2002 at around 9:45 p.m., she attended a wake in Barangay
YYY,7 Virac, Catanduanes. Upon leaving the wake to go to her grandmother’s house in Barangay
XXX, she noticed that Jerwin was following her. AAA recognized Jerwin because they go to the
same school. When she was about to enter the house of her grandmother, Jerwin and Felipe, who
were with a certain Maria, approached AAA and invited her to attend a birthday party. AAA acceded
and went with the trio towards Barangay ZZZ.8 They went inside a dark nipa hut near a rice field and
AAA saw Vicente and Larry thereat. AAA was then made to sit on a bench by Felipe and the four
accused went to converse with each other outside the nipa hut. When the accused came back, they
covered her mouth with a handkerchief, and tied her hands and feet to the posts with a nylon string.
The accused watched in delight while each of them took turns in raping her. Jerwin ravished her
twice while the rest of the accused raped her once. After they finished with AAA, Jerwin untied her
hands and feet. Vicente and Larry went home while Jerwin and Felipe accompanied AAA to her
grandmother’s house.9
Two days later, AAA told BBB about the incident only after the latter noticed and asked her why she
could not walk properly. They went to Fernando, who is a Barangay Kagawad and later to Eddie, a
Barangay Tanod to report the incident. Fernando summoned the accused and they were made to
sign a document containing their statement regarding the incident.10

Eddie testified that on 1 September 2002, Jerwin’s parents came to him and expressed their
intention for their son, Jerwin to marry AAA. Appellant Vicente, Jerwin, Larry, Fernando, and BBB
were also present at the meeting. Eddie saw Fernando prepare a one and a half sheet of yellow
paper containing the admissions made by the accused that they raped AAA.11

BBB fetched Fernando and brought him to the house of Eddie to talk about a marriage proposal by
Jerwin. BBB asked Fernando to put into writing all the conversations that transpired inside the
house. He did so while BBB was dictating to him what to write. He stated that the accused admitted
the crime.12

AAA and BBB then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. On 2 September 2002,
they went to the medico-legal and AAA was examined by Dr. Tatad, who later issued a medico-legal
certificate stating his findings as follow:

Abrasion Labia Minora

Round the Clock.13

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of Jerwin, Felipe, appellant Vicente, Maria Talan
(Maria), Ricardo Rin (Ricardo), and Federico Rey (Federico) to prove that there was no crime
committed.

Jerwin, Felipe and Maria attended the wake of Federico’s nephew in Barangay YYY on 29 August
2002 at around 7:00 p.m. While they were playing cards, AAA approached their table and sat beside
Jerwin.14 Federico saw AAA play with Jerwin’s group on the table.15 They stayed at the wake until
11:00 p.m. As Maria’s group was about to leave, AAA asked Jerwin if she could go with him. Jerwin
then introduced AAA to Maria as his girlfriend. While on their way home, Jerwin and AAA were
trailing behind Maria and Felipe. At that juncture, both Maria and Felipe saw Jerwin place his arm
around the shoulders of AAA, while AAA’s arm was wrapped around the waist of Jerwin. Thereafter,
AAA invited Maria to go to the dance with her and Jerwin in another barangay. Maria turned down
the invitation and went home. While Felipe was about to enter his house, Jerwin called him and
asked if he likes to go to the dance, but Felipe declined because he needed to drive his pedicab on
the following morning.16

Jerwin claimed that AAA was his girlfriend; that they had been together since 31 December 2001;
and that they had sexual intercourse for three (3) or four (4) times to date. He admitted that coming
from the dance, it was around 1 a.m. when they proceeded to a nipa hut in Barangay ZZZ where
they had sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they went to sleep. When Jerwin woke up the following
morning, AAA had already left.17

On 30 August 2002, Jerwin saw AAA crying at the house of Maria. AAA told her that she was
scolded by her mother and grandmother when she arrived home in the morning. Jerwin suggested
that he would talk to BBB and let her know that he wants to marry AAA.18

Ricardo, who lives just a few meters away from the nipa hut where the alleged rape was committed,
stated that he did not notice any untoward incident that transpired in the nipa hut. He however
admitted that he went to sleep at around 10:30 p.m.19
Jerwin and Felipe went to the house of Eddie on 1 September 2002 when they were summoned by
the latter. Felipe saw the mother of Jerwin and AAA talking about marriage, but BBB did not consent
to the wedding. His co-accused were also present at Eddie’s house. Felipe denied raping AAA when
he was asked. Jerwin also denied raping AAA and replied that AAA was his girlfriend.20 After a while,
they all went home. In 2004, Jerwin and Felipe were arrested for the crime of rape.21 While Jerwin
was detained, AAA visited her several times.

Appellant Vicente came to know AAA when she was introduced to him by Jerwin as his girlfriend
sometime in January 2002. On 29 August 2002, appellant was harvesting rice at the back of
Catanduanes National High School from 7:00 a.m. until 4:45 p.m. He got home at 4:50 p.m. and
slept at 8:00 p.m. He woke up the following day at 6:30 a.m. On 30 August 2002, he was summoned
to go to the house of Eddie. Upon reaching the house, he saw the parents of Jerwin and AAA
conversing about the wedding of Jerwin and AAA. He was asked by Fernando if she raped AAA, but
Vicente answered in the negative. He was made to sign his name on a blank sheet of yellow paper
by Fernando.22 While in detention, Vicente saw AAA visiting the jail house once.23

The defense also presented the entries in the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP)
logbook, certified by Jail Officer Bernardo Azansa to show that AAA visited Jerwin six (6) times in
jail.24

On 16 November 2006, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds VICENTE T. BONGAT, JERWIN B. QUINTAL AND FELIPE A.
QUINTAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case Nos. 3097, 3098,
3099, 3100 and hereby sentences them as follows:

1) Vicente T. Bongat is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime.

2) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Jerwin B. Quintal is sentenced to

suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.

3) Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of minority, Felipe A. Quintal is sentenced to

suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each crime.

Vicente T. Bongat, Jerwin B. Quintal and Felipe A. Quintal are ordered to individually pay the private
complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages
for each crime.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 9344, the judgment of conviction against Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal is
suspended. The parents or guardians of Jerwin Quintal and Felipe Quintal; the Social Worker of this
Court, Nonita Manlangit; the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes Josefina T.
Ramirez, the Provincial Social Welfare Officer of Catanduanes Priscilla T. Navar, the Director of
Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or his duly authorized
representative; and the Head of the Social Services and Counseling Division of DSWD or his duly
authorized representative are enjoined to attend the disposition conference on November 28, 2006
at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon.25

Jerwin and Felipe were both confined at the Home for Boys in Naga City for rehabilitation pursuant
to the ruling of the RTC.
The RTC found AAA’s testimony as credible and rejected the "sweetheart theory" and alibi of the
defense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 29 September 2008, this Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Appellant manifested that he would
merely adopt their appellant's brief before the Court of Appeals.26 The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Manifestation stating that it would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead
adopt its appellee's brief filed on 31 August 2007.27

On 27 November 2009, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the cases against Jerwin and Felipe. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and upon the recommendation of the DSWD, the cases
against JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal, whose sentence have been suspended,
are hereby DISMISSED.

Finding that the objective of the disposition measures has been fulfilled, the Court orders the final
discharge of the said JICL. Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Regional Office of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Baraguis, Legaspi City and Office of the Regional
Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Home for Boys, Naga City, for them
to cause the discharge of JICL Jerwin B. Quintal and JICL Felipe A. Quintal and their return to their
respective families.

The Municipal Social Welfare Officer of Virac, Catanduanes is ordered to submit a periodic report on
both JICL within one (1) year after their discharge.28

In the main, appellant assails the credibility of AAA’s testimony. He insists that it was impossible for
AAA to have clearly and positively identified him as one of the perpetrators considering that AAA
claimed that it was very dark inside the nipa hut where she was supposedly raped. Appellant assails
the testimony of AAA that she went with Jerwin to a place unknown to her, despite not personally
knowing him. Appellant claims this incredibility in her testimony created serious doubt as to the
reliability of her allegations. Appellant argues that contrary to AAA’s allegations, there was no clear
intent on her part to resist the alleged sexual acts. AAA failed to shout for help. Neither did she
present any proof of body injuries to clearly prove that she resisted the alleged rape. Moreover, AAA
told her mother about the incident only because the latter noticed her to have been walking in an
unusual manner. Appellant asserts that he should have been convicted only of simple seduction as
conspiracy was not proven among the accused.29

The OSG maintains that AAA positively identified appellant as one of the four rapists. It counters that
the visibility inside the nipa hut was not that poor as to render AAA incapable of seeing her rapists’
faces. AAA had a good view of appellant’s face because the moonlight illuminated the surroundings.
It contends that there is nothing unusual when AAA voluntarily went with Jerwin and Felipe before
she was raped. According to the OSG, AAA had a false sense of security because the two accused
were minors like her and were even accompanied by another girl. The OSG avers that force and
intimidation were employed against AAA because her hands and feet were tied to the nipa hut’s
posts during her ordeal. There is likewise no basis for the claim that AAA did not immediately report
the incident. When AAA saw her mother, she informed her at the earliest possible opportunity.
Finally, the OSG asserts that there is conspiracy among the accused in committing rape considering
their actions before, during and after raping AAA.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without
her consent.30Hence, the elements necessary to sustain a conviction in the crime of rape are: (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through
the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.31

The prosecution, with whom the burden of proof rests, seeks to establish these elements through the
testimonies of its witnesses, particularly that of the victim’s.

There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when
a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof.32 A dangerous precedent as it may seem, there is however a
guideline provided also by jurisprudence in scrutinizing the testimony of the victim, namely: (a) while
an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.33

Guided by these principles and upon a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, this Court is not
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, as well as the other accused, committed the
crime of rape against AAA.

The credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as well as the inconclusive medical
finding, tends to create doubt if AAA was indeed raped. The RTC and the Court of Appeals relied
largely on the testimony of AAA that she was raped. This Court is well aware of the rule that findings
of trial court relative to the credibility of the rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on
appeal, more so, if they are affirmed by the appellate court. It is only in exceptional circumstances
that this rule is brushed aside, such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case.34 And one of these exceptions obtains in this
case.

This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the credibility of AAA’s testimony, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported
confession put into writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents relating to
the case.

First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and Felipe. However, when the two
allegedly invited her to go with them to a party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went
with them. Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the wake, as testified
by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.

Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by the accused was very dark. And
yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her.
Incidentally, it was unclear how AAA was able to identify Vicente and Larry because she was never
asked, not by the prosecution nor the defense, on how she came to know the two accused.

Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that there was a "round-the-clock abrasion
in the labia minora." This is not at all conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At
most, this indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse. We find the medical finding lacking in relation
to the testimony of AAA on how she was ravished by four men. Although a medical examination is
not an indispensable element in a prosecution of rape, it could have corroborated an otherwise
vague and dubious testimony of the victim. In fact, Dr. Tatad admitted that he only examined AAA’s
private parts based on her statement that she was raped, thus:

Q: Do you remember Doctor, the date when the examination was conducted?

A: 9/2/02, sir.

Q: That was on September 2, 2002?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when the person of [AAA] came to you, what did you do?

A: She consulted me and told me that she was raped, sir.

Q: And after informing that she was raped, what did you do?

A: I told her to lie down as if she was to deliver a child and I examined the vagina. There was
abrasion in the labia minora round the clock, sir.

Q: How about laceration?

A: There was an abrasion, sir.

Q: What might have caused that abrasion round the clock?

A: It could be that something was inserted, sir.

Q: What kind of object might have been inserted?

A: According to the patient, penis was inserted in her vagina.

Q: Did she tell you as to the number of penis which were inserted in her vagina?

A: According to the patient the penis inserted to her was pushed and pulled, sir.35

Furthermore, in her sworn statement before the police, AAA related that her mouth was injured.36She
also testified in court that her hands and feet were tied to a post by a nylon string.37 Naturally, AAA
would have sustained injuries in her hands and feet. But all these injuries were never examined by
the medico-legal officer nor did AAA allege the existence of those injuries.

Fourth, AAA’s belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in this case, especially when it
appears that she really had no intention at all to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked
her why she was walking in an unusual manner. AAA stated:

Q: You said a while ago that your mother discovered your unusual movement in the morning
of the following day of August 29, 2002, is that correct?

A: It was after two days when my mother noticed my unusual movement during the birthday
of my brother, sir.
 Q: Did you not go out of the house of your grandmother on August 30, 2002?

A: No, sir.

Q: When your mother noticed your movement, what did she do?

A: She asked me, sir.

Q: After she asked you, what did she do?

A: She asked me why I was walking that way and I told her that I was raped, sir.38

Fifth, BBB allegedly went to the Barangay Kagawad and the Tanod, who happens to be her cousin,
to report the rape incidents. However, when Fernando and Eddie testified, they claimed that they
were initially informed by BBB about a marriage proposal by Jerwin’s parents. It was only during the
meeting that they learned about the alleged rape.

Sixth, to fuel further suspicion as to whether a rape incident actually transpired, BBB never bothered
to ask AAA about the whole incident.39 She accepted AAA’s testimony hook, line and sinker. In the
same breadth, it can be recalled that Eddie, the Barangay Tanod, testified that BBB dictated to him
what was written in the yellow paper which contained the supposed admissions of rape by the
accused. Eddie did not appear to have asked or interrogated the accused about the incident.
Likewise, Dr. Tatad merely examined AAA’s private parts on the basis of her claim that she was
raped.

Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six
(6) times. These incidents are documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and which
was not refuted by the prosecution.

The combination of all these circumstances are more than sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as
to whether first, rape was actually committed and second, whether the accused were the
perpetrators.

It is thus unnecessary to belabor the issues raised by the defense for it must be reiterated that
conviction always rests on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense.

For the reasons cited above, we are constrained to entertain reasonable doubt. Hence, we acquit.

WHEREFORE, appellant Vicente Bongat y TARIMAN is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.

He is ordered RELEASED unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
G.R. No. L-43602 January 31, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Raul T. Montesino for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine
years old. 1 The prosecution will have to contend not only with the presumption of innocence but also of
impotence.

The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971 in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of
Bago. 2 It was reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and the corresponding criminal
complaint was filed on July 10, 1972. 4Judgment was rendered on January 30, 1976, sentencing the
accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the costs. 5 He now wants this
decision reversed.

The complainant is Anita Ibañez, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. She
says that on the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-appellant to a bushy place on the
seashore where she was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because he was threatening
her with a scythe he was carrying. In the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then forcibly
took her. She could not cry out because she was afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother
because the accused-appellant bad warned her he would kill her if she did. 6

The accused-appellant has a different version. He does not deny he had sexual intercourse with
Anita, but he insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it was the complainant who
enticed him into the bushes, where she wantonly opened herself to him. He was unable at first to
have an erection because of his age. But Anita herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus
stimulated, he succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards, noticing some people nearby who might
have seen them, the girl put back her panty on and left. He followed a few minutes later. 7

As the medical examination of the complainant was made more than two months afterwards, there
naturally could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and scratches that usually attend forcible rape.
But there was the tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that even the accused-appellant
could not dispute. 8

Given the choice between the separate accounts of the complainant and the accused-appellant, the
court inclines in favor of the latter. It is in our view more believable. Anita never spoke of any
difficulty on the part of Pailano in violating her. She simply said he removed her panty and entered
her. No effort was mentioned; it seemed she was talking of a vigorous stud. Yet, the accused-
appellant was not a teenager or even only in the prime of his life at the time of their sexual
encounter. He was all of sixty-nine years old.
Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the moment, we doubt if Pailano could have
accomplished the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution has not offered any proof of
his sexual prowess, and under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant did not hesitate to
testify, at the risk of his manly pride, that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst with Anita
and that it took some fondling from her before his organ could respond. This was a hard and
humiliating fact but it had to be admitted.

We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita
coupling on the day in question, 9 but not on the other previous occasions claimed by him. His presence
in all of these meetings seems too much of a coincidence to be credible. However, Pailano is also
corroborated by Natividad Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and Pailano caressing each other, with
the girl in fact assuming the more aggressive role. 10 There is no reason not to believe this witness.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method
although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate.
Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not succeeded.

If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita
while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible
under the criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by
"Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who)
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant,
Anita Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her will." No mention was made of the second circumstance.

Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was
unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation, which was the
method alleged would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 11 This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can
prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.

In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified
seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People v.
Montes, 13 the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide
of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was accused of and acquitted was not
homicide but rape. More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, 14where the accused was
charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of
false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The
Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.
It may be argued that although initially deficient, the criminal complaint was deemed corrected when
the prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's mental condition and the defense did not
object, thereby waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has not been adequately
establish established.

In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita reported that he saw no evidence of insanity in her
family history nor was there any indication of such condition in the complainant herself. 15 He did
observe that she had the mentality of a thirteen-year old, 16 which was not that serious an impediment as
her age at the time was only fifteen.

Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not proved that during that encounter in the
bushes, Anita's mental condition was so weakened that she could not resist Pailano's supposed
advances.

The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not been
overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno reported the incident in the bushes on the same day to
Anita's mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, for reasons not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half
months later that she decided to complain to the authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The
only possible explanation for her delay is that the liaison between her daughter and Pailano had already
become a scandal by that time and she must have thought she could redeem Anita's honor by initiating
the criminal complaint. The delay, however, blunts the charge of rape.

What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last lustful fling and a young girl with a rather weak
mind and a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his youth. We do not mean to romanticize this
sordid affair. It is wrong and is not here excused, made light of, or dismissed. It is disdained for what
it is an unseemly seduction where it is not clear who the tempter and the tempted are although
neither can really claim to be blameless. But, in our view, it is definitely not rape.

WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED

on reasonable doubt. No costs.

G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008

JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by
bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.

In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner)
assails the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution3 dated
30 May 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch 525 which found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally
known as shabu, a prohibited drug.

The antecedent facts follow.

On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52,
a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on
4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto
Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera
(Gallinera) as members. The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup
as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,7 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information
whose inculpatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay
Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] "shabu" with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and
four empty sachets containing "shabu" residue, without having been previously authorized by
law to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Petitioner entered a negative plea.9 At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo
and Esternon as witnesses.

Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances
surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by
petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered
Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in
executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves
outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search
from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five
empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the
cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by
Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner.10 On cross examination, Bolanos
admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner's mother, Norma, but
that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.11

Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found "behind" the
door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a
pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.12 On
cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing
behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be
searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets ofshabu were kept;13 that he brought
the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a "true inventory," then to the trial court14 and
thereafter to the laboratory.15

Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized
items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She
revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four
were positive of containing residue of the same substance.16 She further admitted that all seven
sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the
warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received
the items from Esternon at the laboratory.17

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the
police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and
petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers
declared to Bolanos that petitioner's wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear.
Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila's body inside the same bedroom. At
that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence
that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was
found on Sheila's body.18 Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her
children.19

Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the
bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed.
And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the
headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him came
from a pillow on the bed.20 Petitioner's account in its entirety was corroborated in its material
respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila
positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because
at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched
by the lady officer.21 Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the
bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the
bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.22

On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.23 The trial court reasoned that the fact
that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus
possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or
over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's
failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.24

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.25 In his Appeal Brief26 filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search
of his house was conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on
the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's conviction and that the defense never
advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl
false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties
should prevail.27

On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of
the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as
minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum.28 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the appellate court.29Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.

In its Comment,30 the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its duties
in the conduct of the search.31 It points to petitioner's incredulous claim that he was framed up by
Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licup's
presence. It likewise notes that petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the
prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus
possidendi.

This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.

Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.32 In the case at bar, several
circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that
arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.33 Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.34 Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.35

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.36 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.37

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.38 The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination39 and even substitution and exchange.40 In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent
or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives.41 Graham vs. State42 positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence,
the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to
the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.43

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the
chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabuallegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with
the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the
identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed
over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to
establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might
then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same
objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?

The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was
Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure
and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could
have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items
from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she
delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the
seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any
sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of
the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which
cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets
but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure
was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of
irregularities committed by the police officers from the commencement of the search of petitioner's
house until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of
the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of
the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally
telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the
door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no
stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an
errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to
evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were allegedly
discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that
he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was
away.

It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items
to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is
contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon
knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which
the search of Sheila's body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious
doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila
tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioner's
household away from the search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled
sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternon's suspicious presence in the
bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these circumstances
by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise
of duty.

Moreover, Section 2144 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines
the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a
different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search
warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where
the warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at
the close of the search of petitioner's house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police
station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no
reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house when in fact the apprehending
team was able to record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt
therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of
the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While the
final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same
cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternon's course
of action.

Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from
the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court
with a true and verified inventory of the same,45 as required by Rule 126, Section 1246 of the Rules of
Court. People v. Go47characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties.48 Thus, as a reasonable
safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo49 declared that the approval by the court which issued the search
warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would
have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another
agency.50 Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right
because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very
purpose for the enactment.51

Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in
the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind
reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be
regarded as binding truth.52 Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.53 In the
present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner,
coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of
the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.54 In dubio
pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with
modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and
its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez isACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly
ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this
Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

G.R. No. 131588 March 27, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City, reported over
print and broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) who were undergoing an "endurance run" as part of the Special Counter Insurgency
Operation Unit Training. Not much effort was spared for the search of the one responsible therefor,
as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos (hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to cal
authorities. GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated
Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as follows:
 That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within
Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage
of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from … behind in a sudden and
unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle … members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts
and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35 kilometers coming from their
camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp
Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or
less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or
less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to defend themselves, because the
accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in
spite of the continuous warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan
Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor,
Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said
run, acting as guards, by continuously waving their hands at the accused for him to take the
left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away from
the jogger’s rear portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he
proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the
joggers, thus forcing the rear hitting, bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing
the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield,
and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle,
instead of applying his brake, continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting off its
headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on said 1stline, as a result thereof the
following were killed on the spot:

1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco

2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas

3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren

4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez

5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo

6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito

While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while the
following eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the accused thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of some cause other than said accused’s spontaneous desistance, that
is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered on the following victims which prevented their
death, to wit:

1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo

2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit

 3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala

4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo

5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glade Polboroza

6. Arman Neri Hernaiz

While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:

1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera

2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano

3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang

4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion

5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro

After which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the
victims afore-enumerated helpless.

Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit
Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995 and was to
end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of the training was the "endurance run" from said Camp to
Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5 October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP
trainees were divided into three columns; the first and second of which had 22 trainees each, and
the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black
combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they
reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was instructed to dispatch advanced security at
strategic locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the
highway, two rear security guards were assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to jog
backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles to take the left
lane.1

Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were assigned as
rear guards of the first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan
de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of the
road when signaled to do so.2

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed
towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear
security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the
vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer and closer to them.
Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told their co-trainees to "retract." The
guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by
the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were
overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second
columns. The guards then stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit
again.3

The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted an
ocular inspection of the place where the incident happened. They then proceeded to inspect the
Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City Prosecutor manifested, thus:

The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which
[was] involved in the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue with
strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well as in front. We further
manifest that … the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just below
the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower portion was
likewise damaged more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said vehicle was
likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut of the plastic used as a bumper; that the right
side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal light, right side was
likewise damaged. The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck
from the ground to the lower portion of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on
the front level is 5 ft.4

PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct 6,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members of the PNP came to
their station and reported that they had been bumped by a certain vehicle. Immediately after
receiving the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to conduct an ocular
inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle remained on the
highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway, which led him to conclude that the
brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found
them to be 70 ft. long.5

GLENN’s version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:

At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the latter’s
fellow band members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu Forward, that would
bring their band instruments, band utilities and band members from Macasandig and Corrales,
Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there, they were supposed to be taken to Mambajao,
Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored "Sabado Nights" of the Lanzones Festival from
5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting had asked such a favor from him.6 Since the
arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN
immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he
proceeded back to his house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go to
Bukidnon to get his aunt’s Isuzu Forward truck because the twenty band members and nine utilities
and band instruments could not be accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked
to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Peña, and a certain Akut.7

After leaving GLENN’s house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant. GLENN saw
his "kumpare" Danilo Cosin and the latter’s wife, and joined them at the table. GLENN finished three
bottles of pale pilsen beer. When the Cosin spouses left, GLENN joined his travelling companions at
their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with
occasional rains. It took them sometime looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the
truck in Agusan Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had mechanical problems.
Hence, GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use the
Isuzu Elf truck instead.8

GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no moon or
star; neither were there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his companions used the national
highway, traversing the right lane going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan
junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve going slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright
and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of the national highway. GLENN blinked his
headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to dim. GLENN
switched his own lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour.
It was only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other
car’s headlights were switched from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to
adjust from high brightness to sudden darkness.9

It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after passing the
oncoming vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At the sound of the first
bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot on the brake pedal. But the impact was so sudden that he
was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and could not see what were being bumped. At the
succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to pump the brake, nor did he notice that his foot was
pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when one of his companions woke up and said to
him: "Gard, it seems we bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die." Due to its momentum,
the Elf continued on its track and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next
curve.10

GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right headlights of
the truck had been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion and fear, he immediately
proceeded home. GLENN did not report the incident to the Puerto Police Station because he was
not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only when he reached his house that he noticed that the
grill of the truck was broken; the side mirror and round mirror, missing; and the windshield,
splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred, and he
realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor
Emano.11

The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA
Office, Cagayan de Oro City. The former testified that when he went to GLENN’s house at about
10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was moderate.
He corroborated GLENN’s testimony that he (Cerscente) went to GLENN’s house that evening in
order to hire a truck that would bring the band instruments, band utilities and band members from
Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.12 Almazan, on the other hand, testified that
based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain from
8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4
October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she meant by "overcast" is that there was no
break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and stars could not be seen.13

The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100 meters away
from the place where the incident occurred. He testified that he was awakened on that fateful night
by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter, a man came to his house and asked for a glass of water,
claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and
that the soil was dry and not muddy.14
In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple
murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as
the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to
indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of
frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each of the victims of attempted murder in the
amount of P10,000.

Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in finding that
he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear guards waving and the
PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the truck to run even faster after noticing the first
thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters,
despite the bright and glaring light from the oncoming vehicle.

In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that "the accused out of mischief and dare-devilness [sic],
in the exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three bottles of beer earlier, merely
wanted to scare the rear guard[s] and see them scamper away as they saw him and his vehicle
coming at them to ram them down."15

Likewise, the OSG posits that "the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging trainees
was probablybrought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles of beer earlier before
the incident."16

Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., "the possibility that [GLENN]
could have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in the early morning, and
thus was not able to stop his Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping thuds were occurring in rapid
succession; and after he was able to wake up upon hearing the shout of his companions, it was
already too late, as the bumping thuds had already occurred."17

Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more scrupulous in
weighing the evidence. It we are to subscribe to the trial court’s finding that GLENN must have
merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was wanting. In the absence of a criminal
intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to
demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be indulged.18

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a
product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN’s part.

First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very
dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASA’s observed weather report within the
vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place,
the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial
dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there
lampposts that illuminated the highway. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants,
and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy
night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals.

Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the
jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENN’s vehicle was traversing.
Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENN’s truck such that their backs were turned
towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN’s testimony that he had been
momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite
direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of
the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees.

Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one ‘to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment
he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if
the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young
college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were dependent on him for
support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.

The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG the GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the jogging
trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he continued to
accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of brake marks or
skid marks along the traffic scene.

For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENN’s vehicle to the confluence
of the following factors:

1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were applied
the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum, albeit at a reduced
speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.

2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine and
smooth asphalt, free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or excavations.
Moreover, the highway was going a little bit downward, more particularly from the first curve
to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and faster to traverse a distance "20 to 25
meters which was the approximate aggregate distance" from the first elements up to the
22nd or 23rd elements of the columns.

3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only) could
hardly make an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at a speed ranging
from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour.

4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and the
under chassis was elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat on the
ground without its rubber tires running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would not notice any
destabilization of the rubber tires.

5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was proceeding,
the forward movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum of the forward-moving
truck such that there was even much lesser force resisting the said ongoing momentum.

It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations – one
consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused, and the other consistent
with his guilt or graver responsibility – the Court should adopt the explanation which is more
favorable to the accused.19

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and
seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is
no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive
him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the assailant is
positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of two conflicting
theories of the incident is more likely to be true.20 Thus, in People v. Godinez,21 this Court said that
the existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes decisive in determining the probability
or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely accidental.

Neither is there any showing of "a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police elements
disguised in a vehicular accident."22 Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that the motive of the killing
was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be convicted because if such were the
case, the proper charge would be rebellion, and not murder.23

GLENN’s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe
place the movement he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would
have been spared.

We have once said:

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would
have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.24

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person
to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence
of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course
or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.25

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states
that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation;
(2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to
apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to
avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road was
slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He
should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such
as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean
entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite
direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was
driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing
circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single
act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the
definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means
of deceit {dolo) or fault (culpa).26 In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,27 we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,28 the accused was convicted, in conformity with
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of "homicide with serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," and was sentenced to a single
penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v.
Court of Appeals,29 the accused was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby
drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence,
would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not
covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record that
GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before his arraignment.
Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.30 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; and if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher
in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such
help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore,
constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one
degree.31 Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the
court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise
stated, in felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be
considered in the imposition of the penalty.32

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that GLENN
"escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear that
GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365 shall be raised
by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would beprision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said penalty,
which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for
each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.

Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca33 and of
GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such mitigating
circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for
the offense, and whose maximum is that which could properly be imposed taking into account the
modifying circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to
render assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum,
to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.

As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same. Conformably
with current jurisprudence,34 we reduce the trial court’s award of death indemnity from P75,000 to
P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete
the awards of P30,000 to each of those who suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to
each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is
hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE LOS
SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, and sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2) months
of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each group of heirs of the trainees
killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other victims are deleted. Costs against
accused-appellant. 1âw phi 1.nêt

G.R. No. 104498 October 22, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO REMOLLO y RETES, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Saturnino Remollo Y Retes appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
finding him guilty of the crime of rape with homicide.

Appellant was charged under the following information:

That at about past seven o'clock in the evening of April 27, 1991, at Barangay
Cancawas, San Jose, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation and
by the fact that Maryjin Superal was only six years old, did then and there succeed in
having sexual intercourse with said child, Maryjin Superal, against her will.

That by reason on occasion of rape, a homicide was committed on the child, Maryjin
Superal, by said accused.

Contrary to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 1

At arraignment, appellant Remollo entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and judgment was
rendered on 17 January 1992 as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Courtfinds accused Saturnino Remollo Y

Retes guilty ofthe complex crime of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him
to suffer the indivisible penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA with the attendant
accessory penalties under the law.

The accused is hereby given full credit [for] his preventive imprisonment from the
time of his arrest until the promulgation of this judgment.

The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Maryjin
Superal, death indemnity at P50,000.00; exemplary damages at P20,000.00; moral
damages at P50,000.00; plus costs of the proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 2

The prosecution's version of the relevant facts may be outlined as follows:

On the evening of 27 April 1991, Gabriel Superal left his home in Barrio Cancawas, San Jose,
Negros Oriental, to go to the house of Santos and Lucina Remollo, appellant's parents, for a drinking
party. He brought along his six year old daughter, Maryjin Superal, not knowing that this would be
the last night he would see her alive.

At the house of her grandparents, Maryjin was seated beside her father while the latter was drinking
with Manuel and Gabriel Remollo, two brothers of appellant. After a while, appellant Saturnino
Remollo went near the group, pulled Maryjin and forced her to go with him to the kitchen to eat.
Gabriel Superal thought nothing of this because appellant Remollo was an uncle of Maryjin.

At about 7:30 p.m., Gabriel Superal went home alone, believing his daughter had gone home ahead
of him. Upon reaching his house, his wife told him that Maryjin had not yet arrived. Gabriel Superal
then left home to search for his daughter until midnight without success. He resumed the search at
4:00 a.m. the following day.

At around 8:00 a.m. on 28 April 1991, Linda Catilok found the dead body of Maryjin near a big
blackberry (lomboy) tree in the slope a hill about one hundred (100) meters away from the
appellant's house. 3

A post-mortem examination was conducted by Municipal Health Officer Dra. Bienvenida Palong-
Palong at 10:30 a.m. the same day the body was discovered. The examination disclosed the
following:

The cadaver was dead for twelve (12) hours at the time of the examination and it was
at the stage ofrigor mortis which sets in three (3) to six (6) hours after death. The
cadaver was very rigid. The victim was wearing a polka dot dress with white
background and black dots. The dress was drawn at the back of the stomach and the
victim had no underwear. The victim was lying in a prone position and dried banana
leaves were tied around the neck with the tongue protruding from the mouth. The
victim was strangled as evidence (sic) by the ligature, around the neck. The victim
sustained physical injuries consisting of abrasions on the upper left and right thighs,
ligature marks around the neck, hematoma at the left side of the hip. The cause of
death was asphyxia as a result of strangulation. The internal examination revealed
that the vaginal orifice admits one finger easily and the hymen was lacerated. Whitish
fluid was found in the vagina which was positive for spermatozoa. The laceration was
due to the penetration of a hard object, which could be a penis because of the
presence of spermatozoa. The doctor considered the orifice abnormal because even
in adults, the finger is hard to insert. There possibly was a struggle during the
penetration because when something penetrates the hymen, the natural reaction is
to oppose the force and the victim was only six (6) years old. 4

Angelito Remollo and Eddie Singco, ten and thirteen years old, respectively, nephews of appellant,
Remollo were, according to their subsequent testimony before the trial court, in the evening of 27
April 1991, awakened by appellant Remollo who asked them for soap because he wanted to bathe.
Appellant then informed the boys that he had slain Maryjin Superal and warned them not to tell
anybody 5 or else they too would be killed. 6

Appellant Remollo, upon the other hand, offered his own version of the incident, stressing that he
could not have been at the scene of the crime when it happened:

At 5:00 in the afternoon of 27 April 1991, Remollo took a bath in a river which was about 200 arm-
lengths from his house. Later, he went with Rey Boy Ramirez and Loly Bajamunde to a dance in San
Jose, Negros Oriental arriving there at about 6:15 p.m. Before appellant left their house at 6:00 that
night, he saw Maryjin Superal and her father there. Remollo stayed at the dancing place until 4:00
a.m. the following morning, leaving the hall only twice that night with Rey Boy Ramirez to relieve
himself. Later, appellant went home with the same companions. At home, he found everybody
already awake, taking their morning coffee. Eddie Singco and Angelito Remollo were out fetching
water so, he did not have a chance to talk to them. Rey Boy Ramirez stayed with him in his house
until 7:00 a.m. at which time they were fetched by their employer who brought them to Bais City to
cut sugarcane. From there, he and his brother Manuel were taken by the police to the municipal
building in San Jose, Negros Oriental on 28 April 1991. 7

Appellant Remollo contends that the trial court committed serious error in:
 a) according weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
Angelito Remollo and Eddie Singco;

b) admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "G") of appellant which

had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; and

c) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8

In respect of the first assignment of error, appellant argues that the testimony of Angelito Remollo
and Eddie Singco was improbable because it was contrary to human experience that one who had
just committed a grievous crime would reveal such crime casually to anyone, much less to children,
especially children who were related by blood to the victim. 9

The familiar rule is that the assessment by a trial court of the sincerity and credibility of witnesses, is
to be accorded great respect by appellate
courts. 10

In the instant case, the trial court accepted the statements of Angelito Remollo and Eddie Singco as
straightforward and candid. Appellant Remollo has failed to demonstrate that the two (2) young
witnesses were moved by any grudge or evil motive to testify falsely against him. There is no
evidence to suggest that the two (2) witnesses, nephews of appellant who lived in the same house
with them, would fabricate a story falsely implicating their uncle in aterrible crime. The following
statements made at the trial appear relevant:

Testimony of Angelito Remollo:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Since attaining the age of reason this Saturnino Remollo has been
living with you in that house, am I right ?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: From your infancy up to the time you are on your feet you have
known that this Saturnino Remollo had taken care of your mother
(sic)?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And during this time that you were together as a common

occupant of that house this Saturnino Remollo had played with you,
am I correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In fact, not only that you often talked with each other, you had also
played some jokes with you (sic)?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: You remember that Saturnino Remollo, your uncle, as one person
who likes to joke with you ?

A: Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: In fact, you did not suspect your uncle Saturnino Remollo that
before (sic) he had killed anybody at the time you were talking to him
on April 27, 1991, am I right?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 11

Testimony of Eddie Singco:

Q: Now you look (sic) at Saturnino Remollo as one of your elders in

that house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You respect him for that?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: In short, he would never beat but only threaten you several times
when you were misbehaving, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you said that you were threatened by Saturnino Remollo at

times, when you were misbehaving he would tell you something that
will frighten you?

A: No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: He would make you believe he is stern and brutal, am I correct?

A: Not very. 12

In view of appellant's failure to show that the two (2) young witnesses were somehow disqualified as
witnesses, or were moved by some improper motive to speak falsely against their uncle-appellant,
their statements are entitled to full faith and credence.
We turn to the second error assigned by appellant Remollo that the trial court had erred in admitting
appellant's extrajudicial confession in evidence.

Appellant Remollo claims firstly that he had been made to sign his sworn statement in English, a
language he could neither read nor understand, and that that statement had not been translated for
him into the vernacular Visayan. Appellant's claim is, however contradicted by evidence of record.
Atty. Alfredo Renacia who, as will be seen later, acted as appellant's counsel at his investigation and
who was present when the sworn statement was taken on 29 April 1991, testified that the statement
signed by appellant hadbeen read to him first in English and then translated into the Visayan
dialect. 13

Remollo also claims that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights before his extrajudicial
confession was taken. The extrajudicial confession itself, however, states that appellant had been
informed of his rights during custodial investigation, and that he had understood his rights and was
waiving them as evidenced by his signature below the waiver clause. 14 Moreover, Police Sgt.
Gregorio Aniñon testified in court that he had indeed informed Remollo of his rights before the
investigation began. 15 Atty. Renacia too affirmed that before the investigation began, he himself had
apprised Remollo of the latter's rights. 16

Appellant asserts next that the investigation had been conducted in a hostile atmosphere caused by
the number of people watching the process of investigation which he found "intimidating." Appellant
Remollo here in effect seeks to reject his signed confession upon the ground of coercion. The law
presumes that a written extrajudicial confession concededly signed by an accused, was voluntarily
given, upon the basis that no person in his right mind would knowingly confess to being the doer of a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. 17 The accused who executed the confession bears
the burden of proving otherwise. 18

In the instant case, appellant Remollo's written confession was taken down and signed in the
presence not only of the investigating police officers, but also in the presence of his sister Yolanda
Remollo; his own mother Lucina Remollo; and his two (2) young nephews, Angelito Remollo and
Eddie Singco; as well as Atty. Renacia. Thevery number if persons (all non-police) observing the
course of the investigation offered assurance that "police brutality" would be very unlikely. Had his
confession indeed been extracted from him by coercion, violence and intimidation, appellant could
have presented his own mother and sister to testify to such coercion; appellant did not. Atty. Renacia
also testified that appellant had answered the questions put to him without being threatened or
intimidated. 19 The foregoing circumstances lead us to agree with the trial court that the extrajudicial
confession had been given voluntarily by appellant Remollo.

Finally, appellant maintains that his right to counsel had been disregarded because Atty. Renacia
was not his counsel of choice but had been chosen by the police authorities. Atty. Renacia said in
court that he was not counsel of appellant Remollo but, that he had been requested by the police
authorities to assist in connection with the investigation of appellant Remollo. Upon the other hand,
the record shows that Police Sgt. Aniñon had advised the accused of his right to counsel and of his
right to choose one. Because, however, there was no other lawyer available at that time and place,
except Atty. Renacia who lived near the police station, Atty. Renacia's assistance was enlisted by
the police authorities. 20 We do not, however, believe that because Atty. Renacia had been initially
requested by the police to assist in connection with the investigation of appellant, that therefore, he was
forced upon the appellant and cannot be regarded as counsel of Remollo for purposes determining
whether Remollo's constitutional rights had been respected. The investigating officer, Sgt. Aniñon, asked
appellant Remollo, whether he welcomed the presence and services of Remollo as his counsel during the
investigation and that appellant had replied in the affirmative:
 Q: Will you please tell the court it Saturnino Remollo voluntarily
secured the services of Atty. Renacia?

A: In the presence of Atty. Renacia, we told (sic) Saturnino Remollo if

he welcomes Atty. Renacia as his counsel during the investigation.

Q: What was the reply of Saturnino Remollo at that time?

A: He accepted. 21

In People v. Parojinog, 22 this Court said:

Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 12(l). — Any person under investigation for the commission of

an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

It is very clear from aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of a lawyer
in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has
the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.
In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused
throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he
subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzviminda V. Uy. Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first
time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus, it was too late.

xxx xxx xxx 23

As pointed out by this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Herrera, in People v. Alvarez: 24

What is sought to be protected [by the constitutional provision on the rights of

persons under custodial investigation (Section 12 [1], Article III, Constitution)] is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false (People v. Layuco, G.R. No. 69210, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 47)not to provide
him with the best defense. A lawyer is an officer of the court and upon his shoulders
lies the responsibility to see to it that protection has been accorded the rights of the
accused, that no injustice to him has been committed . . . 25 (Emphasis supplied)

More importantly, Atty. Renacia did in fact behave as counsel of appellant Remollo during the
investigation. Upon his arrival at the police station, he talked to appellant and informed him of his
constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent. 26 Atty. Renacia also looked out for any threats
or intimidation employed against appellant Remollo during the investigation; Atty. Renacia, as already
noted, testified in court that none had been employed in his presence. Atty. Renacia also signed the
waiver clause in the extrajudicial confession. 27
Finally, assuming (arguendo merely) that the extrajudicial confession of appellant Remollo should be
rejected as fatally flawed, we believe that, independently of that confession, the circumstantial
evidence made of record in this case is quite sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The multiple circumstances required under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court are the following:

(1) At the house of his own parents, during a drinking party, appellant, got the victim
Maryjin Superal to go with him to the kitchen to eat.

(2) Appellant Remollo was the last person seen with the victim alive, by Maryjin's
father and appellant's mother and brothers. 28

(3) Appellant Remollo went down his parent's house on the same night, with the 6-year
old victim Maryjin following him.

(4) When appellant Remollo went home in the early morning of the following day, he
woke up his young nephews Angelito Remollo and Eddie Singco and asked them for
soap as he wanted to take a bath in the nearby river. Appellant spontaneously told
his nephews thathe had killed Maryjin and simultaneously threatened them with harm
if they reveal that secret to anyone. 29

(5) Most notably, appellant Remollo at the police station during his custodial investigation,
voluntarily admitted to his mother, who was then in tears, that he had killed the child
Maryjin. This admission was made in the presence of Police Sgt. Aniñon, Atty. Renacia,
appellant's sister Yolanda Remollo and his two (2) young nephews. 30 Appellant Remollo
denied in court that he had admitted killing Maryjin to his mother. Appellant, however,
failed to present his mother or his sister or Atty. Renacia or anyone else to corroborate
his denial. Upon the other hand, Sgt. Aniñon stood firm on his testimony on this point
throughout his cross-examination by defense counsel.

Appellant's principal defense on the merits was that of alibi. This Court has in innumerable cases
ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove that he was
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; he must also prove that it was impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. 31 Remollo testified that he was attending a
dance in San Jose when the rape and killing took place. Thesitus of the dance was, however, only about
15 minutes from appellant's house by foot by appellant's own testimony. Appellant also failed to present
his alleged companions — Rey Boy Ramirez and Loly Bajamunde — to corroborate his alibi. At the same
time, appellant himself testified that he took a bath in a river which is only 500 arm-lengths from the spot
where Maryjin's body was found the next morning and only about 200 arm-lengths own house. Appellant's
alibi simply cannot stand.

Where the crime resulted in the death of the victim, the civil indemnity granted by the Court has
commonly been P50,000.00, in the absence of unusual circumstances warranting a higher
indemnity. In the instant case, we consider that a heavier indemnity is appropriate, bearing in mind
the tender age of the victim Maryjin Superal and the close blood relationship (uncle and niece) that
existed between appellant and the victim. These circumstancesindicate an unusual degree of moral
depravity. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages of P20,000.00 andmoral
damages, in addition to the regular indemnity for death of P50,000.00. The moral damages should,
however, be reduced to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the trial court appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, except insofar as the grant of moral damages is concerned which is hereby reduced to
P 30,000. Costs against accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-65647 August 30, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO FLORES, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose C. Espinas counsel de oficio for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J.:

Ernesto FLORES appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
finding him guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to life imprisonment as well as to pay a fine of P20,000 and the costs.

The City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information against FLORES as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1980, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, a person not authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly, without authority, sell and deliver fifteen (15) dried marijuana stalks to a
poseur-buyer in the amount of ten pesos (Pl0.00) along E. de los Santos Avenue,
Balintawak, Quezon City, in violation of the aforesaid Republic Act No. 6425.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 4.)

On arraignment, FLORES entered a plea of not guilty. After due trial, the court a
quo rendered a decision dated 17 October 1983, finding him guilty as charged, the
decision's fallo reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ernesto Flores guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana described and penalized
under Article II, Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended. He is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Costs against accused.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46.)

In arriving at its conclusion, the court relied on the prosecution's version of the incident, culled from
the testimony of Sgt. Angel Nieves as follows:

On 20 August 1980, at about 5:00 p.m., Sgt. Angel Nieves and CIC Godofredo Fider, both of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit, (CANU for short) conducted a "test-buy" operation in Balintawak,
Quezon City in connection with the government drive against violators of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. They were assisted by Annalisa Santos, a
confidential informer who acted as the buyer. After Santos was given P10.00 to buy marijuana, they
all went to an alley in the vicinity of the squatters' area near the Cloverleaf interchange. The CANU
agents waited out of sight as Santos bought five sticks of the illegal drug. The CANU agents then left
with the informer, but did not arrest the pusher.
The next day, the agents planned a "buy-bust' operation in order to nab the culprit. Sgt. Nieves, with
CIC Fider and Pfc. Wilfredo Tamondong, again gave two P5.00 bills to the confidential informer to
purchase marijuana in the same place. From a distance, Sgt. Nieves followed the confidential
informer into the interior of the squatter's area. He saw her talking to a young boy. The boy left, and
the confidential informer, Annalisa Santos, waited beside a store. Sgt. Nieves approached the store
and talked to the storeowner in the pretext of looking for a boarding house. While there, he saw the
accused arrive and give the marijuana stalks to Santos, who in turn gave the two P5.00 bills to him.
Sgt. Nieves then introduced himself as a CANU agent and then arrested the accused. He
confiscated the two (2) five peso bins and the 15 marijuana stalks which were turned over to the NBI
for laboratory examination and were later confirmed to be marijuana as attested to by NBI Forensic
Chemist Nelly Carriaga.

On that same day, Sgt. Nieves and his fellow agents submitted a joint affidavit giving their account of
the event (Exh. "A".)

Refuting the prosecution's version, the accused presented his own testimony corroborated by his
witnesses, Quintin Carpio and Benita Cleofas. He alleged that in the moming of 21 August 1980 he
worked as a painter in the residence of barangay councilman Quintin Carpio. At noontime, he
passed by the store of Benita Cleofas to buy viand as he usually did. Suddenly, without warning,
somebody, poked a gun at him and hit him in the breast and at the back. A man then placed a
plastic packet in his right hip pocket. He was forced to board a car and brought to a building, which
he found out later, was the CANU headquarters in Malabon. He was frisked, and the plastic packet,
taken from him. He was tortured and beaten, and then forced to sign a written confession. He
vehemently denied selling marijuana to the buyer-poseur.

From the decision, FLORES interposed this appeal, and contends that the trial court erred:

FIRSTLY IN ADMITTING THE "CONFESSION" OF THE ACCUSED GIVEN DURING CUSTODIAL

INTERROGATION WITHOUT BEING SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED OF HIS RIGHTS, WITHOUT
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND WITHOUT AN EXPRESS WAIVER OF SUCH RIGHT.

SECONDLY IN GIVING "FULL FAITH AND CREDIT' TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS,
SGT. ANGEL NIEVES DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL INCONSISTENCIES THEREIN WITH
RESPECT TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY AS TO THE TIME
OF THE APPREHENSION, THE ALLEGED MARKED MONEY USED TO ENTRAP THE
ACCUSED, HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCUSED, THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF OTHER
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES TO NEGATE SUCH
BLANKET FAITH IN THE ARRESTING OFFICER.

THIRDLY IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING

THAT HE WAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING THAT THE PRINCIPAL
WITNESS, THE BUYER POSER WAS NOT PRESENTED AS WITNESS, AND THE TOTALITY OF
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONTAINED IN THE RECORD, NEGATE A CONVICTION.
(Rollo, p. 71.)

The principal issues here are: 1) whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible in
evidence against him, and 2) whether from the evidence presented, the guilt of FLORES has been
proved to a moral certainty.

Anent the question of the inadmissibility of his confession, FLORES's statement reveals the
following:
 PASUBALI: Ikaw ginoong Emesto Flores ay nasa ilalim ng pagsi
siyasat sa kasalanang paglabag sa ipinagbabawal na gamot gaya ng
marijuana, ngunit bago kita tanungin ay nais kung (sic) ipaliwanag sa
iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating Bagong Saligang
Batas ng Pilipinas, ng gaya ng mga sumusunod:

Na ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag sumagot sa mga

itatanong sa iyo."

Na sa anumang sasabihin mo sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring

gamiting evidensiya laban pabor sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman dito sa
ating Bansa."

Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng manananggol upang

sumubaybay sa iyo at kung hindi mo kaya ang humirang ng isa ang
tanggapang ito ang bahalang humirang ng isa para sa iyo.

TAGASIYASAT: Naunawaan at naintindihan mo bang lahat ang mga

ipinaliwanag ko sa iyo?

SINISIYASAT: Opo.

TANONG: Matapos mong maunawaan ang iyong mga karapatan

nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng malaya at kusang loob na
salaysay, na ikaw ay hindi pinipilit, tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan
ng anumang bagay ?

SAGOT: Opo sir.

(Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.)

Precedents abound showing that this kind of "advice" given to the accused does not satisfy the
constitutional guarantees accorded a person under investigation for the commission of an offense.
This protection given under the 1973 Constitution is further expanded by the 1987 Constitution
[Article III, Sec. 12 (l)-(4).] In People v. Jara[G.R. Nos. 6135657, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA
5161], this Court had the opportunity to assail the kind of recitation of rights similar to the one in the
present case:

This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which

are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with "Opo" as the answer or ask the
accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.

This Court has observed that the long question of the investigator informing appellant of his right to
remain silent and to counsel followed by a monosyllabic answer, does not satisfy the requirements of
the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution [People v. Taruc, G.R. No.
74655, January 20, 1988, citing People v. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465.]
The questioned confession shows that while the accused was informed of his right to counsel, he
was not definitely asked whether he wanted to avail of such right, contrary to our ruling in the case
of People v. Velasco [G.R. No. 54335, December 14, 1981, 110 SCRA 319 (1981).] Furthermore, he
was not made to understand that, if at any time during the interogation he would wish to have the
assistance of counsel, the interrogation would cease until an attorney is present [People v. Lasac
G.R. No. 64508, March 19, 1987,148 SCRA 624, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).]
With the manifest failure to comply with this constitutional sine qua non, the confession must be held
inadmissible.

In People v. Nicandro [G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986, 141 SCRA 289], this Court explained the
essence of the right of the accused to the apprised of his constitutional rights, thus:

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his

right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule therefore, it
would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only
duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may
or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs.
Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2. In other words, the right of a
Person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is
a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of
his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed' implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed
where the subject is unlettered.

This was reiterated in People v. Duhan [G.R. No. 65189, May 28, 1986, 142 SCRA 100] and recently
in People v. Albofera [G.R. No. 69377, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 123] and People v. Taruc [G.R. No.
74655, January 20,1988.]

Without the extrajudicial confession, the resolution of the question of whether the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt hinges on the credibility of the apprehending
officer who allegedly witnessed the sale, Sgt. Angel Nieves. In this regard, it bears emphasizing that
the trial court's findings on credibility of witnesses are, as a rule not disturbed on appeal except
where certain facts of substance and value are overlooked, which if considered would affect the
result of the case [U.S. v. Estrada, 24 Phil. 401 (1913), People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927),
People v. Caboverde G.R. No. 66646, April 15, 1988, and People v. Capulong, G.R. No. 65674,
April 15, 1988.]

The testimony of Sgt. Nieves is vital, because it is the only evidence left to support the conclusion
that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana when arrested, since Annalisa Santos, the alleged
buyer-poseur, did not testify nor did she appear before the investigating fiscal or, even execute a
statement. Considering the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, the
testimony of Sgt. Nieves must be subjected to close and careful scrutiny.

After a close and painstaking examination of the record, the Court finds that standing alone, the
testimony of Sgt. Nieves fails to satisfy the quantum of proof necessary to support a judgment of
conviction. The inconsistencies and material discrepancies, in his testimony engender serious doubt
as to its reliability and veracity.

In the sworn statement that he and the other CANU officers executed on 21 August 1980, the time of
the apprehension in flagrante was indicated as 12:10 p.m. When he first took the witness stand
however on 19 June 1981, Nieves testified that they conducted the "buy-bust" operation at 8:30 p.m.
When he next testified on 22 July 1981, still on direct examination, he reversed himself and said that
the incident indeed happened at 12:10 p.m. On 27 November 1981 on cross examination, he again
reverted to his original answer, stating that it was really at 9:30 p.m. when the arrest took place. The
record reveals this series of conflicting answers of Sgt. Nieves.

When he first testified on 19 June 1981., he said:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now you said that on the following day you continued yo ur

operation, about what time was that when you started that operation
the following day?

A 8:30 p.m.

Q And who were your companions?

A CIC Tamondong and confidential informer and myself. [tsn, p. 6,

June 19,1981]

Later, during the continuation of the direct examination on 22 July 1981, Sgt. Nieves reversed
himself.

Q Sgt. Nieves, this operation that you conducted on August 21, 1980
where you apprehended accused Emesto Flores concerning fifteen
sticks of marijuana what time of the day did this happen?

ATTY. MARTINEZ

We object because earlier the witness testified that the apprehension

was 8:30 p.m.

FISCAL

That is why the witness is going to explain that.

COURT

May answer.

A Noontime of August 21. [tsn, p. 10, July 22, 1981]

When cross examined on 27 November 1981, he went back to his original stance that the arrest took
place at 9:30 P.M., thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Q So, let us make this clear. On your oath, you will say that on
August 21, 1980 at 9:30 p.m., your CI bought from the person you
call Nestor Flores these 15 marijuana stalks, which is the same
testimony you gave on June 19,1981?

A What I know is that our CI bought the 15 stalks at 9:30 p.m. of

August 21, and I was there. I was the one who poked him.

Q You are sure now of the date, August 21, and the time, 9:30 p.m.,
that your CI bought from the person of Nestor Flores these 15 stalks
of marijuana?

A Yes sir.

Q You are sure of that?

A Yes sir.

Q So, it is not August 21, at 12:00 noon?

A No, it was 9:30 p.m.

Q On July 22, 1981, you remember you testified here?

A Yes sir.

Q And on that date you also declared that you had an operation on
August 21, 1980, and you apprehended Nestor Flores as you claimed
his name was, at 12.00 noon?

A No sir, the question of the fiscal at the time was wrong. The truth is
that as I will now affirm is 9:30 p.m.

Q But is it not true when I asked you to clarify whether it was 12:00
noon or 9:30 when you made the apprehension, you said it was
noontime and you were changing your testimony of June 18?

A No sir, that is not correct. The truth is that it is at 9:30 in the

evening. If ever there was a mistake before, the truth is that it is 9:30
p.m.

xxx xxx xxx

Q I am showing you Exhibit A, will you inform the Court whether this
is the joint affidavit the three of you executed?

A Yes sir.
 Q And I will quote to you this paragraph "that on or about 12:10 p.m.
August 21, 1980, we arrived in the target area and placed ourselves
in strategic positions so that we can arrange signals from our CI-"
(counsel reading entire paragraph) you remember having said that in
your affidavit?

A Yes sir.

Q And the time is 12:10 p.m., August 21, 1980?

A Yes sir.

Q And this is your declaration as the date and time when you
apprehended the accused in this case?

A That is a clerical error, sir. The truth is it was 9:30 in the evening.

Q What is this 12:10 p.m. stated in you affidavit ?

A There must be a mistake when the affidavit was typed.

Q Why did you not correct that before signing it?

A Sometimes we overlook some things sir.

Q Is it not true that you swore to the contents of this affidavit before
Capt. Gutani?

A Yes, but there were portions I overlooked.

Q May we ask that the paragraph be encircled and marked as Exhibit

1. And it was only July 22, 1981, on direct examination by counsel
that you sought to change the date and time from your earlier
testimony of June 19, 1981 that your apprehension was 9:30 as you
are now insisting today and changed it to 12:00 noon when you
testified on July 22, 1981, when this particular affidavit was shaown to
you?

A Did I not say before that that is only a clerical error. It is true that I
was the one who apprehended that person and he has long been
selling marijuana, and it was at 9:30 p.m..

Q Did you not declare on July 22, 1981 that your apprehension was
August 21, at twelve noon?

A I did not understand the fiscal's question before, but now I

understand it very well and I'm trying to explain it because my mind is
clear. [tsn, p. 6, November 27, 1981].

The trial court attached little importance to this discrepancy in the testimony of Sgt. Nieves.
According to the court, the mistake was due to the numerous CANU operations Nieves had
participated in. [Rollo, p. 44.] This is untenable. It is precisely because of these numerous operations
that the witness must be sure that what he is testifying to is the same incident and not any other.
Furthermore, he had no reason at all to mistake that arrest for some other apprehension as he in
fact was allowed by the Court to refer to certain notes to refresh his memory while testifying [tsn, p.
5, June 19,1981.]

As a lingering doubt remains as to whether Nieves was testifying to the same incident, or whether it
was some other, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Due to the harshness of the
penalty imposed by law and specially where a person's liberty for the rest of his life is at stake, the
time of the incident becomes material to prove to a moral certainty, that when arrested, the person
charged was indeed committing a crime.

Thus, the contradictory testimony of Sgt. Nieves, on the vital matter of the time the apprehension
took place casts a grave doubt, nay, destroys his credibility.

If, as Sgt. Nieves insists, he arrested FLORES at night, in the act of selling marijuana, his testimony
is discredited by other evidence tending to show that FLORES was arrested at noontime. After the
arrest, the CANU officers executed a statement (Exh. "A") indicating the time of the arrest as 12:10
p.m. Sgt. Tamondong, one of the arresting officers, also testified that the arrest took place at 12:10
p.m. (tsn, p. 5, February 26, 1982) and that he investigated FLORES that same afternoon. FLORES
himself admitted that he was arrested while buying viand for his lunch from Benita Cleofas's store,
and the latter confirmed this fact.

In the light of this contradictory evidence, the detailed account by Sgt. Nieves of the nighttime arrest
cannot be taken as basis to establish that at noontime, on 21 August 1980, FLORES was arrested in
flagrante.

The record further reveals certain traces of prevarication which cast serious doubt on the credibility
of Sgt. Nieves. He testified that during the "test buy" operation, the day prior to the arrest, he was
with both CIC Fider and Sgt. Tamondong and that the latter was waiting inside the car while they
waited for the informer [tsn, p. 1,19 July 1981.] Sgt. Tamondong however testified that he was not
with Nieves and Fider during that day.

Secondly, Sgt. Nieves stated that the accused had long been selling marijuana. On cross-
examination however, he admitted that he came to know the accused only after apprehending him.

Furthermore, Nieves testified that the two five peso bills he gave to the buyer-poseur were marked,
and that these same bills were the ones taken from FLORES. The evidence on record however
shows that only one bill was marked (Exh. "B") and that the other bill had no markings at all.

While Courts generally give credence to testimonies of police officers, as it is presumed that official
duty has been regularly performed [Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), Rules of Court] this presumption cannot by
itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.

The testimony of Sgt. Nieves being highly suspect, the prosecution is left with no evidence to
establish that when apprehended at 12:10 p.m., FLORES was indeed selling marijuana, the act
which is the essence of the offense sought to be punished.

This fact could have been established by other evidence. But not even the testimony of Annalisa
Santos, the alleged buyer-poseur was presented. Even as this Court is aware of the principle that it
is the prosecution's prerogative to weigh and determine the evidence to be presented, we consider
the non-presentation of Santos as witness to be fatal to the prosecution's case. Being the only
alleged eyewitness other than Nieves, Santos could have corrected the material inconsistencies in
the latter's testimony and, more importantly, could have positively testified on the fact necessary for
conviction: that FLORES was indeed selling marijuana to her when apprehended.

As has been oft repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken
into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is
satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for
conviction [People v. Ramos, G.R No. 76744, June 28, 1988, citing People v. Bania G.R No. L-
46524, January 31, 1985, 134 SCRA 347].

In a fairly recent case, the Court had occasion to pass upon the competing interests of waging a
determined campaign against drug addiction and respecting constitutionally protected rights of the
accused, thus:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would
inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions and
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.
As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble paint." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself [People v. Aminnudin G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988].

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and judgment is entered
ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the offense charged.