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2. CRIME, Defined --- A crime is the COMMISSION or OMISSION (See Art. 208,
Prevaricacion - Negligence) by a person having capacity, of any act, which is either
prohibited or compelled by law and the commission or omission of which is punishable
by a proceeding brought in the name of the government [People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff] whose law has been violated.
2.c. The word CRIME is generic. If the act is defined and punished by the
RPC (Revised Penal Code), it is called a FELONY (although it is not wrong to call
felonies as offenses). Oftentimes, our legal eagles and learned authors would use the
term “offense” in lieu of “felony.” This is true even with some of the provisions in the
Revised Penal Code.
If by a special act or law, e.g., by a P.D. (Presidential Decree) or R.A. (Republic
Act), it is called an OFFENSE. If by an ordinance, it is called an INFRACTION.
Page 1 of 128
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW:
a. Generality --- Art. 14. Civil Code: Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject
to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
b. Territoriality --- Rule 110, Sect. 15 [a] [b] [c] [d] Dec 1, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, infra. See Art. 2 RPC
(a) GENERALITY:
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
Page 2 of 128
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
(b) TERRITORIALITY:
EN BANC
Page 5 of 128
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a
foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by our
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in
such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
a. THE FRENCH RULE --- Crimes committed on board while on the waters of
another country are not triable in that country unless those affect the peace and security
of said country or the safety of that country is endangered.
Page 7 of 128
b. THE ENGLISH RULE --- crimes committed on board are triable in that country
unless such crimes affect merely the internal management of the vessel. [Followed in
the Philippines. U.S. v. Wong Cheng, 19 Oct. 1922, supra.]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9621 January 30, 1957
ANG BENG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41423 March 19, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISANTO TAMAYO, defendant-appellant.
c. The final claim of appellee is that inasmuch as the provisions of the law
under which he was prosecuted are ambiguous and there is doubt as to their
interpretation, that doubt should be resolved in his favor because a penal statute
should be strictly construed against the State. This contention must also fail if we
are to be consistent with our interpretation of the provisions of Section 15 (a) of
the law. We have stated that section is clear and unambiguous and covers the
Page 9 of 128
provisions embodied in Section 3 of the law, and if such is the case then there is
no room for the application of the principle invoked by appellee. [ Sept. 30, 1958,
Pp vs. Alfonso Gatchalian, En Banc]
d. The ruling in People v. Yabut, June 26, 1992, is further instructive, viz:
“Well established is the rule that when the inculpatory (Incriminatory) facts
and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.” [Reiterated in People vs. Tadepa, May 26,
1995]
Page 10 of 128
"he who alleges the affirmative must prove it." Or that "the rule in procedure is that upon
him who affirms devolves the burden of proof."
o. ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS - Act done by me
against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to
reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm
if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense
in equal combat.
p. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA - Damage without injury. (Damage without legal
wrong.)
q. EJUSDEM GENERIS - Where general terms follow a particular enumeration,
the general terms include all those specifically enumerated. (Martin S. Emin, petitioner,
vs. Chairman Corazon Alma G. De Leon, Commissioners Thelma P. Gaminde and
Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., of the Civil Service Commission, respondents., February 27,
2002, En Banc)
r. VERBA INTENTIONI, NONE CONTRA, DEBENT INSERVIR - Words should
be made subservient to the intent not contrary to it.
s. STARE DECISIS – Adherence to judicial precedents is known as the Doctrine
of Stare Decisis. [Doctrine of Stare Decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law,
particularly in the business field, is desirable. But idolatrous reverence for precedent,
simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything else is that the court
should be right. And particularly it is not wise to subordinate legal reason to case law
and by so doing perpetuate error xxx.
( PHIL. TRUST CO. and SMITH, BELL & COMPANY, LTD. vs. L. P. MITCHELL ET AL.,
8 Dec. 1933)]
t. PRO REO DOCTRINE – See page 7 (Rules of Construction of Penal Laws)
December 8, 1930
ACT NO. 3815
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(As amended)
AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS
Preliminary Art. — This law shall be known as "The Revised Penal Code."
BOOK ONE
GENERAL PROVISIONS REGARDING THE DATE OR
ENFORCEMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS CODE, AND REGARDING THE OFFENSES, THE
PERSON LIABLE AND THE PENALTIES
Preliminary Title
Art. 1. Time when Act takes effect. — This Code shall take effect on the first day
of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-two (01 Jan. 1932).
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Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws
of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within
the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and
maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship [Must be
duly registered under Philippine laws so that it may be considered as an
extension of our national territory.];
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine
Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine
Islands; [Ex. --- Art. 163, pars. 1 & 2; Art. 166; Art. 167]
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands
of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions [Those having to do with the discharge of their duties
in a foreign country.]; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. [Art. 114, treason; Art 115,
Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Art. 116, Misprision of treason; Art. 117,
Espionage; Art. 118 Inciting to war; Art. 119 Violation of neutrality; Art. 120,
Correspondence with hostile country; Art. 121, Flight to enemy’s country; Art. 122,
Piracy; Art. 123, Qualified piracy.]
a. Territorial --- Application of this Code within the physical and juridical
boundaries [terrestrial] of the Philippines including its atmosphere, internal waters, and
maritime zone [12 nautical miles from the baseline].
b. Extraterritorial --- Application of this Code beyond the physical limits and
juridical boundaries of the Philippines. Crime is said to be extraterritorial when
committed in a place or country outside of the Philippines.
Art. 3. Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
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(culpa). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
ANNOTATIONS
b. Dolo and Culpa are just the modality by which a felony is committed. So that in
a case of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, what is being punished is not the
reckless imprudence, but the commission of the homicide.
“In view of the facts stated above, said judgment of conviction is untenable, on
the ground that the offense of frustrated homicide requires the concurrence of the
essential requisite of intent to kill, which is incompatible with the charge of reckless
imprudence; although a charge for physical injuries, serious or less serious, through
reckless imprudence, is legally proper under the law; as in that case the act sought to
be punished is the material damage or injury actually done.”
CASES:
Page 14 of 128
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER.-Appellants Corporal Galanta
and Chief of Police Oanis were under instructions to arrest one,
Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an escaped convict, and, if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the
suspected house, appellants went into a room and on seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their 32 and 45 caliber revolvers,
without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The
victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the
wanted criminal. Held: That under the circumstances, the crime
committed by appellants is murder though specially mitigated by
circumstances presently to be mentioned.
2. CASE AT BAR DISTINGUISHED FROM UNITED
STATES vs. AH CHONG (19 March 1910). -In support of the
theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of United States vs. Ah Chong. The
maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah
Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out
again, "if you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise
moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against
the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized
a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was masked as a
footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack
was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that
his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness because the
accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry,
and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and
such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants,
unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time
and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to one eyewitness. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas, at sight, but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Page 15 of 128
5. KILLING AT BAR IS INTENTIONAL AND NOT MERELY
ACCIDENTAL.-The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (Reckless Imprudence, PP vs.
Francisco Sara, 15 Aug. 1931) In the words of Viada. "para que
se califique un hecho de imprudencia espreciso que no hay
amedia doenél maliciani intención alguna de dañar; existiendo
esa intención deberá calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, pormás qua no have side la intención del agente el
causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Torn,)
7, Viada Código Penal Comentado, 5 ed., pág. 7.) And, as once
held by this court, a deliberate intent to doan unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with. the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil, 232: People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16),
and where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence (PP vs. Gona [Mansaca], 15 Mar. 1930 ) to
support a plea of mitigated liability.
n. MALA EN SE & MALA PROHIBITA: The first is a wrong from its very nature,
wrong in itself. Intent is an element, and good faith is a defense. The second is wrong
because it is prohibited and punished by law. Although intent is not an element, but
there must be intent to perpetrate the act, which means that it must be committed
consciously, freely, and voluntarily [With freedom and intelligence.]. In addition,
modifying circumstances and stages of execution are inapplicable in mala prohibita.
Good faith and absence of criminal intent, however, are not valid defenses since
the offense committed is malum prohibitum punished by special law. [Pp v. Neri, Dec.
19, 1985]
ANNOTATIONS
First Paragraph
Page 16 of 128
a. As regards paragraph 1, the aid to memory is DINALOCO, i.e., “A person
committing a felony is liable for all the DIrect, NAtural, and Logical
COnsequence of his felonious act. This does not apply to felonies committed
by culpa because in Art. 4 there must be criminal intent. If the act committed
is lawful, even if an injury ensued, there is no criminal liability. If negligence or
imprudence accompanies the act, the same is not considered lawful. --- re
culpa, see Art. 365.
c. The felony must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury inflicted by
the offender upon the victim.
e. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo,
et al., 18 May 1956, EN BANC.
"A prior and REMOTE CAUSE cannot be made the basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125) [FILOMENO
URBANO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL., supra]
If an active force intervened between the felony and the injury, which
is a distinct act foreign to the crime, there is no liability for such injury. [EN
BANC, Feb. 28, 1947, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Raymundo Rellin]
Second Paragraph
Impossible Crime
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
ANNOTATIONS
Rightly so, because in our jurisdiction there is no common law crime. Nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege.
b. Direct overt act --- an outward act done in pursuance and manifestation of a
criminal intent or design.
Pp vs. LIZADA, 2003 Jan 24, En Banc
The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It
is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or
before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the
reasoFn that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty
what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the
Page 19 of 128
ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense
after the preparations are made. The act done need not constitute the last proximate
one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
c. "Overt acts" has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. [People vs. Mauricio February
28, 2001, EN BANC]
d. Action must be judged not by what a person says, for what a person does is
the best index of that person’s intentions.
g. Objective phase is the result of the acts of the execution --- the felony is
accomplished. The felony is consummated if the subjective phase and the objective
phase are present.
h. There is no hard and fast rule in determining whether the felony is attempted,
frustrated, or consummated. We have to consider the elements and the nature of each
individual felony, including the manner of its execution.
j. Even if the victim was wounded, but the injury was not fatal and could not
cause his death --- attempted stage only. [PADDAYUMAN v. Pp. 23 Jan. 2002; Pp v.
COSTALES, 15 Jan. 2002] N.B. ---These cases effectively overturned Borinaga, Dec.
18, 1930 [State of mind]
k. Since the victim was shot on the knee, which was not fatal, attempted murder
was committed and not frustrated murder. [Pp v. PILONES, 21 July 1978]
Page 20 of 128
l. In attempted homicide or murder, injury to the victim is not a requisite,
PROVIDED, that the offender had started the commission of the intended crime by
direct over act, but does not perform all the acts of execution, which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Accused fired four (4) shots at his intended victim, but the latter was not hit,
either because of poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the
shots. The acts thus committed by the accused constitute attempted homicide. [Pp v.
Kalao, 17 March 1934]
m. In order to justify a conviction for the crime of frustrated murder, the proof
must show that the accused has performed all acts necessary to cause the death of a
human being under circumstances which would have raised the homicide, if
consummated, to the degree of murder, and that the failure to consummate the crime
was due to causes independent of the will of the accused. [U.S. v. Simeon, April 15,
1904]
o. One who raises a weapon against another as if about to strike with it is guilty
of other light threats [Art. 285]. [Simeon, supra]
m. The case of U.S. v. Valdez, 39 Phil., 250, Dec. 10, 1918 where it was stated
that the crime committed was frustrated arson no longer applies.
n. In attempted theft, it is not necessary that there should be real or actual gain
on the part of the offender or that he was able to make use of or derive benefit from the
fruits of his criminal act. [Pp v. FRANCISCO MERCADO, June 15, 1938, EN BANC,
citing United States vs. Adiao (38 Phil., 754, Oct. 8, 1918, EN BANC) In the Adiao
case, a Manila customs inspector took a leather belt from the baggage of a passenger
who had just landed at the port of Manila and kept it in his office desk where the other
employees found it afterwards. He was not able to make use of said belt, but he was
found of guilty of theft for the reason that he had performed all the acts of execution
necessary for the consummation of the crime.
o. If the offender is caught before the actual taking of the thing, after having
performed all the acts of execution or before the offender has final control and
disposal of the thing, the theft is frustrated. So that if the accused was discovered with
the stolen bulky articles at a checkpoint, which must first be passed before the stolen
articles could be subject to the control and disposal of the accused, the theft was only
frustrated because the vehicle was not able to leave the compound. [Pp. v. Flores, 6
CAR 834, citing Pp v. Dino, 45 O.G. 3446]
Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only
when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against
person or property.
[PENALTY: See Art. 9 re amendments as per R. A. 10951]
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to
commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a
penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony
proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
ANNOTATIONS
a. ATM --- (1) Conspiracy RPC COURTS [Coup d’etat, rebellion, treason,
sedition] (2) Proposal RPC COURT only.
a.1. Art. 136 ---Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat & rebellion.
a.2. Art. 115 --- Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason.
a.3. Art. 141 --- Conspiracy to commit sedition. [NOTE: No proposal]
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty
of arrest menor or a fine not exceeding 40,000 pesos or both; is provided. (R.A. 10951,
AUG. 31, 2017)
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses,
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws, are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.
Chapter Two
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability;
1. [SELF-DEFENSE] Anyone, who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
ANNOTATIONS
a.2. Aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our
own person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor, which
is not the least prized of our patrimony [Pp v. Jaurigue, 21 Feb. 1946 --- A beautiful
woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman
represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land
Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women
are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under
the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and upheld this
view.]
Page 23 of 128
b. In DEFENSE OF PROPERTY, there is no requirement that the unlawful
aggression must be directed against the lawful possessor of the property. Unlawful
aggression may be directed even against his property rights. The assault on the
property of the person making the defense, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression
as contemplated by law. In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of
appellant's property, which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. [Pp v. Narvaez, 20 April 1983, GRN L-33466:]
However, attention is drawn to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, viz:
“Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, xxx.” This is not an empty and hollow sequencing. The import of such
statement is that in the event of conflict among said rights, the right to life reigns
supreme, next is the right to liberty, and least among them is the right to property. That
is, in the hierarchy of rights, the right to life occupies the highest echelon. Therefore, it is
strongly suggested that in the justifying circumstance of defense of property, extra care
must be taken in the determination of the “reasonableness of the means employed to
repel the unlawful aggression.”
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may
use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. [DOCTRINE
OF SELF-HELP]
HELD: The law does not require, and it would be too much to ask of the ordinary
man, that when he is defending himself from a deadly assault, in the heat of an
encounter at close quarters, he should so mete out his blows that upon a calm and
deliberate review of the incident, it will not appear that he exceeded the precise
limits of what was absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat [disabled;
out of combat]; or that he struck one blow more than was absolutely necessary to
save his own life; or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal-
Page 24 of 128
wound where a less severe stroke might have served his purpose. Of course, the victim
of an unlawful aggression may not lawfully exceed the bounds of rational necessity in
repelling the assault.
But the measure of rational necessity in cases of this kind is to be found in
the situation as it appears to the victim of the assault at the time when the blow is
struck; and the courts should not and will not, in the light of after events or fuller
knowledge, hold the victims of such deadly assaults at close quarters, to so strict
a degree of accountability that they will hesitate to put forth their utmost effort in
their own defense when that seems to them to be reasonably necessary.
"The reasonableness of the means employed to prevent an aggression
depends upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his
physical condition, his size, his character and the surrounding circumstances vis-
à-vis those of the person defending himself. It is also well settled that in
emergencies, which imperil the life and limb of a person, human nature
acts not upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
imperious [urgent] dictates of the instinct of self-preservation.
b. For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. [Pp v. Geneblazo, July 20, 2001,
citing People vs. Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr., (1999 Dec 9, En Banc).]
That the gauge of rational necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression as against one's self or in defense of a relative is to be found in the situation
as it appears to the person repelling the aggression. The reasonableness of the means
adopted is not one of mathematical calculation or "material commensurability between
the means of attack and defense" but the imminent danger against the subject of the
attack as perceived by the defender and the instinct more than reason that moves the
defender to repel the attack. It has further been stressed in such cases that to the
imminent threat of the moment, one could not be hoped to exercise such calm judgment
as may be expected of another not laboring under any urgency and who has sufficient
time to appraise the urgency of the situation. [Eslabon v. Pp, Feb. 24, 1984]
If, in order to consider that a defendant acted in lawful defense, it is sufficient that
he had well-founded reasons to believe that, under the attendant circumstances, the
means employed by him to prevent or to repel the aggression, was necessary. [(U.S. v.
Mariano Batungbacal, 1918 Jan 10) We have stated that the defendant was justified in
believing reasonably that the lives of his two children and that of Hilaria Tianko were in
imminent peril. But we can say more. We agree that Hilaria Tianko's life was in fact in
imminent peril. The deceased, from the kitchen stairs, had already resolutely assaulted
her with a bolo, and she was able to escape the blow only by having taken timely flight
with the children. Undoubtedly, if the deceased had overtaken Hilaria in the sala of the
house, where the defendant was sleeping, the aggression would have been
consummated there. The danger, as regard the person of Hilaria Tianko, was not
apparent in the defendant's mind, under the circumstances surrounding him, but it was
also a real danger.
For the foregoing reasons, and in consideration of the fact that, according to the
evidence, the assaulted parties did not provoke the assault, nor was the defendant
moved by sentiments of revenge or resent, or any other unlawful motive, and finding
Page 25 of 128
that the defendant acted in lawful defense of the persons of his two children and Hilaria
Tianko, we hold that he should be exempted from criminal liability, and we acquit him,
with the costs de Officio. So ordered.]
e. There is no unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb, or right is not
either ACTUAL or IMMINENT. Thus, there must be actual physical force [material
attack] or a threat to inflict real injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and
positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause an injury. [Pp v.
Basadre, Feb. 22, 2001]
f. Even if appellant believed that the deceased did try to kill him when he saw him
raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when appellant succeeded in grabbing the bolo.
When an unlawful aggression, which has begun, no longer exists, one making a
defense has no right to kill or even injure the former aggressor. [Pp v. Bautista, 27 Feb.
2004]
g. There is a rule that if it is clear that the purpose of the aggressor in retreating
is to take a more advantageous position to ensure the success of the attack already
begun, the unlawful aggression is considered still continuing; and the one resorting to
self-defense has a right to pursue and disable the aggressor. [Pp v. Catbagan, 23 Feb.
2004]
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
a. The rule then is that what one may do in his own defense, another may
do for him. In other words, persons acting in defense of others are in the same
condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves.
[U. S. v. Sabino Aviado, April 1, 1918, En Banc]
b. APPRECIATED: Appellant heard the screams and cries for help of the
victim’s wife, and that of his wife. The appellant at once ran upstairs. He saw the
victim attacking his (victim’s) wife, with a dagger. The appellant, in the defense of
the woman struggled with the victim for the possession of the dagger, in the
course of which he wounded the latter. [Pp v. SilvinoValdez, March 4, 1933] This
court stated in the case of U.S. vs. Batungbacal (10 Jan. 1918): "If, in order to
consider that a defendant acted in lawful defense, it is sufficient that he had well-
founded reasons to believe that, under the attendant circumstances, the means
employed by him to prevent or repel the aggression, was necessary, then the
defendant in this cause undoubtedly acted in lawful defense of Hilaria Tianko
and his two children." In that case the deceased was pursuing the said children
with bolo in hand and with his arm raised as if ready to strike with his weapon
when he was shot dead by the accused. We held that in view of the imminence
of the danger, the act of the defendant could be considered reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent the aggression because its object was "to render
the aggressor harmless".
Page 28 of 128
4. [STATE OF NECESSITY] Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does act which causes damage to another [person or property], provided that the
following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
N.B. --- [a] There is civil liability here, but the same shall be borne by those
who benefited from the act.
Page 29 of 128
[a] REQUISITES ---(A)that the offender acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. [[Pp v. Pajenado, et al., 30 Jan.
1976]
Pp v. Oanis, et al., 27 July 1943
Page 30 of 128
To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of
demoralizing police officers discharging official functions identical
or similar to those in the performance of which petitioner was
engaged at the time he fired at the deceased, with the result that
thereafter we would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts on
their part to comply with such official duty.
[b] However, in the Bentres case, decided by the CA, 49 O.G.4919, the
appellant security guard was found criminally liable for shooting and killing the
thief who was fleeing with the stolen articles and who refused to stop, despite
four (4) warning shots fired by the said security guard. He was found to have
exceeded his duty when he fired the fifth shot that killed the thief. [See also page
18 (b), the due process clause.]
CASES
2. [MINORITY] A person nine years of age and below. (See: R.A. 9344,
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 “RULE 29: Exemption from criminal
liability”)
3. [MINORITY] A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he
has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code [Now Articles
189 to 213 of P.D. No. 603, infra.]
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in
conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80. [Now Articles 189 to 213 of P.D.
No. 603, infra.]
SEE LATEST: R. A. 9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT of
2006:
§6, R.A. 9344 --- Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. --- A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15), but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment. In which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws.
§5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. (R. A. 9344,
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT of 2006)--- Every child in conflict with
the law shall have the following rights, including, but not limited to:
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the
minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether
to impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine being preferred as the
more appropriate penalty;
(l) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if qualified
under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or
misrepresentation.
N.B. --- The term “youthful offender” is no longer used. In its stead is the term
“Child in conflict with the law.”
The term DISCERNMENT means the capacity to distinguish right from
wrong and to perceive or recognize the consequences of his act.
4. [PURE ACCIDENT] Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing
it.
Page 33 of 128
6. Any person who acts under the IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE
FEAR of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented
by some lawful INSUPERABLE CAUSE. [This is a felony by omission, id est,
failing to perform a required act.]
ANNOTATIONS
(b) There is no civil liability in pure accident, Art. 12 (4) [Corpus, et al. vs. Paje, et
al., July 31, 1969] and insuperable cause.
b.1. Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of
article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following
rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who
has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Page 34 of 128
d. IMBECILITY AND INSANITY --- the civil liability is VICARIOUS, i.e., liability
that arises from the act of another. This is exempting in all cases except where the
crime was committed during the actor’s lucid interval. The prosecution has the burden of
proving discernment, which is the mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences
of one’s act or to determine the difference between right and wrong.
(a) Imbecility is absolutely exempting, while Insanity is conditional
because it is not exempting if the criminal act was committed during lucid interval.
(b) Mere mental aberration, eccentricity, mild psychosis, or schizophrenia
is not exempting except where during the commission of the crime, the accused was
totally without control of his will power. At most, those mental illnesses, which merely
diminishes the will power [Note: not total] of the accused, is only mitigating.
(c) Insanity, in order to be exempting the accused must be insane
immediately before the commission of the crime or during such commission.
e. PURE ACCIDENT: ELEMENTS --- (a) performance of a lawful act; (b) with
due care; (c) causes inury to another by mere accident; and (d) without any fault or
intention of causing it. [People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr., November 11, 1998]
e.1. [Biagtan, et al. vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., LTD., March 29, 1972]
Accident was defined as that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen, or that which
takes place without one's foresight or expectation - an event that proceeds from an
unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected
(29 Am. Jur. 706).
Page 36 of 128
To be free of criminal culpability, a person invoking irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. Compulsion
must be, of such character as to leave appellant no opportunity for self-defense in equal
combat or escape. [Pp v. Tami, May 2, 1995]
Page 37 of 128
First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention.
Petitioner claims violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
xxx xxx xxx
However, stock should be taken of the fact that November
7 was a Sunday, November 8 was declared an official holiday; and
November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these
three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look
for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for
the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to
open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. Then, where to locate, and the certainty of
locating those officers and employees could very well compound
the fiscal's difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough
to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily
detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest. [U. S. vs. Vicentillo, 19 Phil, 118, 119 (March 18,
1911); Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, et al., 80 Phil. 859, 870;
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 ed., Vol. II, p. 820, citing
People vs. Acacio, 60 Phil. 1030.]
Page 38 of 128
Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling(Estafa) or malicious mischief
(A.T.M. : MET) committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another;
and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in- law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
Chapter Three
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ANNOTATIONS
1. There are two kinds, viz: Ordinary (OMC), and Privileged (PMC, Art. 69).
c. An OMC lowers the penalty by a period only [see Art. 64, par. 5], but no
limit as there are OMCs proved. While a PMC lowers the penalty by one or two
degrees, as the case may be [Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34940, June 27,
1988, 162 SCRA 563. reiterated in Ulep, supra.];
d. Accused was over 9 but under 15 years old when he committed the
crime. Penalty was reduced by two degrees [Pp v. Daliray, 26 Jan. 2004] See :R. A.
9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT of 2006 ; and
e. An OMC, even as provided for under Art. 64 (5), applies only to divisible
penalties (but see Pp v. MarivicGenosa, 15 JAN. 2004). A PMC applies to both divisible
and indivisible penalties. Two OMCs, sans GAC, partake of the nature of a PMC.
3. Art 13(1) & (2) on MINORITY only [However, see R.A. 9344], but not senility,
are both PMCs. The rest are OMCs. Although the death sentence may not be imposed
upon a convict who is over seventy years old [Art. 47] or if imposed earlier, it is to be
suspended upon reaching the age of more than 70 [Art. 83].
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances; [Note:
the first two are privileged mitigating circumstances and are covered under Art. 69.]
1.b. In People v. Bato, 15 Dec. 2000, the Hon. Supreme Court stated, viz:
”In the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete. [Citing People v. Deopante, [30 OCT.
1996] viz: “Equally well-known and well-understood by now are the
requirements in order for self-defense to be appreciated. The accused must
prove that there was unlawful aggression by the victim, that the means employed
to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression were reasonable, and that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on his part. And having admitted that he killed his
nephew Dante Deopante, "the burden of the evidence that he acted in self-
defense was shifted to the accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when
self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show
Page 40 of 128
that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. Hence, he
must prove the essential requisites of self-defense aforementioned.
In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim,
hence, his claim of self-defense cannot be sustained. The self-serving and
unsupported allegation of appellant that he wrested the knife away from the
victim while they were struggling and rolling around on the ground (in the
process sustaining only a minor scratch on his little finger and abrasion on the
right knee) does not inspire belief, when contrasted with the positive and
categorical eyewitness accounts of Renato Molina and Manolo Angeles that
appellant ran after and stabbed the victim. The latter's testimonies are
corroborated by the number and extent of the stab wounds sustained by the
victim.
3.a. This does not apply to culpable felonies. In culpa, intent is not an
element. In its stead is either negligence (deficiency of action) or imprudence
(deficiency of perception). The intention of the offender at the moment that he
committed the crime, not the intention during the planning stage.
6.d. The following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both
unlawful [or unjust] and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said
act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity.
Page 43 of 128
7.b. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, showing the intent
of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because
he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes
repentance. [Pp v. Abolidor, 18 Feb. 2004]
8.a. But, nocturnity is present since the accused purposely sought the
cover of darkness of the night in committing the crime. However, this aggravating
circumstance is offset by the mitigating circumstance that appellant suffers some
physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or
communication with his fellow beings, to wit: appellant's right hand is missing as
a consequence of an accident involving "kuwitis" which occurred on New Year's
eve of 1966. [Pp v. Garillo, 2 Aug. 1978]
8.b. In the crime of Estafa, this circumstance was not appreciated because
his physical defect has no relationship to the crime committed. But in a case
where a deaf-mute was slandered and who cannot fight back with another
slander because he cannot talk, picked up a piece of wood and hit the victim, this
mitigating circumstance was appreciated.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to
those above mentioned.
11. People vs. Bernal, et al., July 14, 1952: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
HAVING ACTED IN OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED BY A SUPERIOR.
[PMC] - Accused , having fired at the victim following his superior's order, which was
obviously illegal and unwarranted, is liable for the killing, although he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of having acted "in obedience to an order issued by a superior.”
Chapter Four
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AGGRAVATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ANNOTATIONS
a. Must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. [Pp v. Alde, 29 May 1975]
d. GACs and OMCs offset each other, but not QUACs because These are
ingredients of the felony and are included in its definition or provision of the law. An
OMC may offset a QUAC only when the latter partakes of the nature of a GAC, viz: (a)
Excess, like where there are two or more QUACs attendant in the killing; (b) In robbery
with homicide, treachery will only partake of he nature of a mere GAC.
e. No matter how many GACs are proved and appreciated, it will never increase
the penalty beyond the maximum provided by law. For example, the penalty for
homicide is Reclusion Temporal, no mention about the period --- meaning in its medium.
Thus, the penalty would be Reclusion Temporal medium. Even if there were, say, four
GACs proved and appreciated, the maximum of the penalty would not be higher than
Reclusion Temporal maximum. Unlike in OMCs were there is no limit, because it is
favorable to the accused.
i. QUACs and GACs should be proved with the same quantum of evidence as
the crime itself.
(2) That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities.
2.a. The phrase “public authorities” should read as “persons in authority.”
2.b. Requisites: (a) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his
duties; and (b) he is not the object of the crime being committed [Pp v. Gutierrez,
8 Feb. 1999; People vs. Magdueño, September 22, 1986]; and the offender
knows of the identity of the person in authority.
(3) That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be
Page 47 of 128
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation.
3.a. The term dwelling should not be equated with domicile (Home – when
away, there is always the intend to return.
3.b. The first portion [SAR] is only applicable in crimes against persons,
security, or honor. Disregard of age, sex or rank is not aggravating in robbery
with homicide, which is primarily a crime against property, as the homicide is
regarded as merely incidental to the robbery. [Pp. v. Montinola, July 9, 2001]
3.c. If all are attendant in the commission of the crime --- considered as
one only.
But in the case of Pp v. Daos, 27 April 1934; Pp v. Puesca, 05 Dec.
1978, the Supreme Court stated that “When their elements are distinctly
perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of
perversity.” They are to be considered independently.
3.d. Offender must deliberately and intentionally offend or insult the sex or
age of the offended party. So that in a crime where the circumstance of sex is
inherent, e.g., rape, seduction, acts lasciviousness, or parricide disregard of sex
does not apply.
3.e. The term rank refers to a high position in social life or in the
government service, e.g. teacher, priest, judge, consul, ambassador, or regional
directors of government agencies. The offender must have knowledge of the
identity of the victim.
3.d. Assault should not be while the public officer [person in authority or
his agent] was in the act of discharging his function or that it should not be
committed by reason of such performance. Otherwise, the crime is Direct
Assaults.
PERSONS IN AUTHORITY
(not limited to the following enumeration)
a. Chief Executive --- Guillen, 85 Phil. 307
b. Mayors --- Imson, 80 Phil. 285; Gumban, 39 Phil. 76; Dirain, 9 Phil. 162.
c. Judges --- Prudencio Garcia, 20 Phil. 358; Montiel, 9 Phil. 162; Torrecarion, CA
52 O.G. 7644.
d. Brgy. Chairman, Kagawad, members of the LupongTagapamayapa --- Section
388, LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7160).
e. Governor --- Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385; Dano, 87 Phil. 588.
f. Provincial Treasurer --- Gerardo Ramos, 57 Phil. 462.
g. Director of Posts --- Acierto, 57 Phil. 614.
h. Division Superintendent of Schools --- Benitez, 63 Phil. 671.
i. School teacher --- Rosa de Guzman, CA 46 O.G. 3177, Commonwealth Act
578.
j. Election inspector --- Villanueva vs. Ortiz, 108 Pil. 1349; Marapao, 85 Phil. 832.
k. Chief of Police --- Pp v. PO3 Feliciano, 24 Sept. 2001
AGENTS OF A PIA
(not limited to the following enumeration)
a. BIR agent --- Dosal, 92 Phil. 877.
b. Postmaster, Municipal Treasurer, Sanitary Inspector.
c. Chief of Provincial Hospital.
d. Postal Clerk
Page 48 of 128
3.f. Disregard of respect due to sex and age may be included in treachery.
3.g. The killing of a 6-year old child by an adult person is treacherous.
(People vs. Sancholes, [18 April 1997]. N.B. Disregard of age is absorbed.
3.h. Dwelling is aggravating even if the accused did not enter the house,
but he shot the victim from outside the house; or that the commission of the
crime was started from inside the dwelling and was concluded outside of the
dwelling. This is appreciated in adultery where the adulterous act was committed
inside the conjugal dwelling and that the paramour resides elsewhere.
3.i. But calling the deceased down from his house and killing him in the
immediate vicinity thereof is not the commission of the crime in the dwelling of
the murdered person unless it appears that the place is so connected with the
house as to form an integral part thereof. [U.S. vs. J. RAMOS ET AL. ,April 1,
1902.] Especially if there exists a means of communication (passage) between
that place and the house.
3.j. Case:
People vs. Perreras, July 31, 2001 (EN BANC)
(5) That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or
in his presence or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
5.a. The offender must have purposely sought the place in order to commit
the crime. A contrario, if the crime was casually committed in such place, this
GAC is not applicable.
5.b. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally considered, where there is no
evidence to show that the accused had murder in her heart when she entered the
chapel that fatal night. [Pp v. Jaurigue, 21 Feb. 1946]
5.c. The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance
that the commission of the crime was in contempt of or with assault to public
authorities. The REQUISITES of this circumstance are: (1) the public authority is
engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not the person against whom
the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are present in this case. In
the first place, the crime was committed against the barangay chairman himself.
At the time that he was killed, he was not engaged in the discharge of his duties
as he was in fact playing a card game with his neighbors.
5.d. However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a
place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was
committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their
public functions. [Navarro v. CA, et al., Aug. 26, 1999, citing Pp v. Regala, 113
SCRA 613 (1982)]
Page 50 of 128
(6) That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited
place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a
band.
6.a. Generally, if all these aggravating circumstances concur in the
commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only.
However, these can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly
perceived and can subsist independently. [Pp v. Santos, 91 Phil. 320, May 21,
1952; Pp v. Daos, 27 April 1934; Pp v. Puesca, 05 Dec. 1978]
6.b. Nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance when it is deliberately
sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or [taken advantage,
supplied.] to ensure his unmolested escape. There must be proof that this was
intentionally sought to insure the commission of the crime and [Should be or] that
appellants took advantage thereof. In the instant case, there is paucity (dearth) of
evidence that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately
sought by the accused, "the fact that the offense was committed at night will not
suffice to sustain nocturnity." [Pp vs. Fortich, Nov.13, 1997]
6.c. By itself, Nocturnity is a GAC. If Nocturnity is sought as a means,
mode, or form to insure the execution of the crime, it will be absorbed by
treachery [crime against person], a QUAC.
6.d. Nighttime is from sunset to sunrise. [Pp v. Lao, Dec. 9, 1999]
6.e. Nighttime is out of the question where it has no influence in the
commission of the crime, such as malversation, bribery, libel, bigamy, or
falsification .
6.f. The ELEMENTS of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance are: (a)
when it facilitated the commission of the crime; or (b) when especially sought by
the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity,
or (c) when the offender took advantage thereof also for purposes of impunity.
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance:
(a) The objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating
because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and
(b) The subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating
because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be
applied in the alternative. [Pp v. Lomerio, Feb. 28, 2000]
6.g. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of
the nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
[Pp v. Damaso, 20 May 1978] It must be purposely sought, chosen, or taken
advantage to facilitate the commission of the crime. In Pp v. Egot, June 25, 1984,
the Supreme Court stated, thus: “A place where there are no people or any
number of houses within a perimeter of less than 200 meters is uninhabited.” “A
distance of 200 yards to the nearest house is sufficient to make the scene of the
crime uninhabited.”
6.h. Uninhabited cannot be appreciated if it there was no showing that the
accused purposely sought it (subjective test) or took advantage of it to commit
the crime without any interference and that he might better attain his purpose
(objective test).
Page 51 of 128
6.i. Band – at least four persons that are armed with means of violence;
more than three armed malefactors with the common intention of committing a
crime. The manner or degree of participation is immaterial provided the acts are
all geared towards the attainment of a common design, and provided further that
they all directly participated in its commission. If less than four directly
participated, and the other was left in the hideout because he was the
mastermind --- no band. If during trial, only three were convicted and the others
were acquitted then there is no band.
This is inherent in brigandage. In the crime of rape, it is inherent under the
first paragraph of Art. 266-A [[Whenever the rape was committed with the use of
a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.]
APPRECIATED: (1) as GAC in Robbery with homicide, 1st par. Art. 294, Pp
v. Pedroso, EN BANC, 30 July 1982. Note, this case effectively overturned
Ombao (2) as GAC in Robbery with homicide; Robbery with rape, intentional
mutilation, or with phy. inj. resulting in insanity, impotency, or blindness, Pp v.
Puesca, EN BANC, Dec. 5, 1978.
NOT APPRECIATED:(1) Pp. v. Ombao, ist Div., Feb. 26, 1981. Overturned
by Pedroso, supra.
We also note that the trial court failed to make any definitive finding as to the
existence of aggravating circumstances. However, we find that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place did not attend the commission of
the crime.
6.j. A crime is committed by a band whenever more than three (3) armed
malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense. As GAC
only. [Pp v. Lee, et al., Dec. 20, 1991]
6.k. Absorbed by “abuse of superior strength.” They have the same
essence
6.l. Where band is appreciated, the same may also apply to the principal
by inducement. (Pp v. Ilane, 31 May 1938)
Page 52 of 128
(7) That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
7.a. This operates as a QUAC in crimes against persons (Art. 248
murder), also in theft (Art. 310)
7.b. Other calamity: eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, or other
public calamity.
7.c. The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does
not come within the context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in
Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code, which refer to other conditions of
distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, "such as the chaotic conditions resulting from war or
the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The reason for the provision
of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of criminality met in one
who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their
suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them."[People vs. Arpa, et
al., April 25, 1969]
Page 53 of 128
that of either the first and second felony, but limited to FLERTS only, within ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction, whichever applies.
9.f. Not a requirement that the accused shall have served out his sentence
for the previous felony or felonies. What is required is just a final and executory
conviction.
Page 54 of 128
13.c. Does not apply or not appreciated where there was mistake of
identity [error en personae]. (Pp. Romeo Barros, June 27, 1995)
13.d. Inherent in crimes against property. (U. S. vs. Hermosilla, 11 Sept.
1915: In the commission of the crime there are no extenuating nor aggravating
circumstances to be considered, not even that of premeditation, for, as a general rule, in
crimes against property such as, among others, those of robbery, theft, and estafa, the
perpetrator thereof resolves to perform the preconceived act only after having carefully
thought out the method by which he intends to accomplish it. Premeditation, therefore,
is a circumstance ordinarily inherent in the commission of such crimes.)(Pp v. Silverio
Daos, Apr. 27, 1934) May be considered in robbery with homicide if there was evident
premeditation to kill in addition to the robbery.
13.e. In order to be appreciated, there must be proof of planning and
preparation to commit the felony. [Pp v. Clariño, July 31, 2001]
13.f. Elements: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that
determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the
execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the
act. [Pp v. Cortes, July 11, 2001]
13.g. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. [Pp
v. PO3 Tan, et al., June 21, 2001]
13.h. To be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
Premeditation must be based on external acts which must be notorious,
manifest, and evident – not merely suspecting – indicating deliberate planning.
[PO3 Tan, et al., supra]
13.i. Not appreciated where the felony was committed at the spur of the
moment or heat of anger. Except where there was sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution. [Moises Capalac, Oct. 23, 1982]
Page 55 of 128
treachery because they boarded the car, pretending to be bonafide passengers
then assaulted the victim from behind.
14.f. FRAUD is a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to
deceive another. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
14.g. The Court considered DISGUISE as an aggravating circumstance
where the accused, wore masks to cover their faces in order to conceal their
identities. The fact that the mask subsequently fell down thus paving the way for
the accused's identification is immaterial. [Pp v. Cabato, April 18, 1988; citing
People v. Veloso, Feb. 25, 1982]
Page 56 of 128
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
16.a. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend to directly and specially insure the execution of the crime, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [Pp v.
Opuran, March 17, 2004]
16.b. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. [Pp. v. Vera, Aug. 18, 1999].
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is inherent in treachery [People vs.
Reneja, Feb. 26, 1988]
16.c. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Pp v. Macuha, July 16,
1999]
16.d. To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1)
the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. [Pp v. Panida, et al., July 6, 1999; Pp v.
Flores, EN BANC, Feb. 5, 2004]
16.e. APPRECIATED:
a. When the victim was sleeping or had just awakened when killed.
[Pp v. Abolidor, Feb. 18, 2004]
b. The victim was only seven (7) years old. [Pp v. Daliray, Jan. 26,
2004 (Note: killing a child of tender age is treacherous. Treachery is indisputably
presumed. [Pp v. Caritativo, April 1, 1996] The killing of a 6-year old child by an
adult person is treacherous. (People vs. Sancholes, 18 April 1997): Victim is
Rodrigo O. Cabual, a 12 year-old boy. N.B. Disregard of age is absorbed.
Page 57 of 128
17.a. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds
disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. [Pp. v. Ralph
Velez Diaz, Dec. 8, 1999]
17.b. This aggravating circumstance requires that the offense be
committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the
victim, that is, add to his moral suffering. The ignominious act must be committed
while the victim was still alive. [Pp. Carmina, Jan. 28, 1991] That its
commission was purposely sought by the actor or that he deliberately employed
means to add ignominy to the natural effects of the crime
17.c. Where the victim was already dead when his body was or a part
thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. [Pp v.
Cachola, (EN BANC), Jan. 21, 2004]
17.d. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape,
used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also
the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, the aggravating circumstance
of ignominy attended the commission thereof. [Pp v. Siao, March 3, 2000; Pp v.
Lao, Dec. 9, 1999]
17.e. There is ignominy when the culprits successively raped the daughter
in one place and her mother in another place. [Pp v. Velo, March 13, 1948]
17.d. This Court in previous rape cases, has held the following
circumstances ignominious:
(a) where the accused ordered the complainant to exhibit to them her complete
nakedness for about ten minutes before raping her;
(b) where the rape was committed by two or more persons in view of one
another;
(c) where the sexual intercourse was performed in the "dog style" position;
(d) and where the accused plastered mud on the victim's private pArt.
(e) Ignominy was also present where the victim was pregnant and whose pleas
on that ground were ignored by the accused who went on to force his lust on her.
The accused then tied a banana fiber around his penis and inserted it again into
her vagina. Thereafter, he pulled out his organ and forced the victim to suck it.
[Pp v. Bacule, Jan. 28, 2000]
(20) That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen
years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships,
or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).
Page 58 of 128
20.a. The offender is of greater perversity if he takes advantage of the
youthfulness of a person in aiding him to commit a crime.
20.b. NOT APPRECIATED --- The accused and his co-conspirators used
the jeep of the victim merely to facilitate their escape. It was not intentionally
sought to ensure the success of their nefarious plan; and it was not shown that
without the use of the vehicle the offense charged could not have been
committed. [Pp v. Veloso, Feb. 25, 1982]
20.c. APPRECIATED --- Accused loaded their loot on board a jeepney.
[People vs. Moreno, March 22,1993.]
(21) CRUELTY…. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commissions.
21.a. Cruelty refers to physical suffering of the victim purposely intended
by the offender. Hence, the wrong done must be performed while the victim is still
alive. For cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted in
making the victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical or
moral pain in the consummation of the act. [Pp v. Gatcho, Feb. 26, 1981]
21.b. But the number of wounds is not a test for determining whether
cruelty is present. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the victim's suffering. Consequently, there must be proof that the
victim was made to agonize before he was killed. [Pp v. Panida, et al., July 6,
1999]
21.c. The fact that victim's decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab
wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, was found dumped in the street is
not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant, for
his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and
inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. Number of wounds alone
is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance.
Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim's dead body was
dismembered. [Pp v. Ilaoa, June 16, 1994]
Chapter Five
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Art. 15. Their concept. — Alternative circumstances are those, which must
be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the
offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration
when the offended party is
(a) the spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as
(a) a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or not subsequent to [after] the plan to commit
said felony
(b) but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
Page 59 of 128
ANNOTATIONS
. RELATIONSHIP:
N.B. --- persons enumerated in Art. 246 --- Father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse.
g. The Child and Youth Welfare Code, P.D. 603: (see also RA 7610 & RA 9344 of
2006)
Art. 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach to any parent
who:
(8) Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or
deliberately subjects him to indignations and other excessive
chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him.
INTOXICATION:
b. NOT APPRECIATED:
b.1. Where the accused has studied up to sixth grade, the Court was of
the opinion that it is more than sufficient schooling to give a person a degree of
instruction as to properly apprise him of what is right and Wrong. [People vs. Pujinio, et
al., April 29, 1969]
b.2. As a Christian, accused cannot possibly be ignorant of the fifth
commandment (you shall not kill) or that it is contrary to natural law to commit murder.
[People vs. Laspardas, October 23, 1979]
b.3. Low degree of instruction and education are not mitigating in crimes
against chastity like rape. [Garganera vs. Jocson, September 1, 1992]
b.4. Both accused finished elementary grades and, therefore, were not
illiterate. Although the criterion in determining lack of education is not illiteracy alone, but
lack of sufficient intelligence, there is no showing that the accused were of such low
mental capacity that they had not realized the full significance of their acts. No one,
however unschooled he may be, is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or
assault upon the person of another is inherently wrong and a violation of the law. [Pp v.
Ang, Oct. 8, 1985]
c. APPRECIATED:
C.1. People vs. Mengote, July 25, 1975, Where the two accused, who
were ignorant non-Christian, entered a plea of guilty in the crime of robbery with
homicide. In its obiter, the Supreme Court even extended the benefit to ignorant
persons with little or no education, who are unschooled and illiterate.
c.2. Where an accused has committed the crime of murder and it appears
that he lacks education and instruction for the reason that he did not finish even the first
grade in elementary school, the mitigating circumstance of lack of education should be
taken into consideration. [Pp v. Limaco, Jan. 9, 1951]
Title Two
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. — The following are criminally liable for
grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
Page 62 of 128
2. Accomplices.
ANNOTATIONS
CONSPIRACY:
a. In conspiracy, the essential elements are: (1) concurrence of wills; & (2) unity
of action and purpose.
b. Conspiracy is incompatible with negligence [Pp. v. Abdona Montilla,
(CA) 52 O.G.4327
Page 63 of 128
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every
one of the conspirators is guilty with the others in equal degree.
Hence, every member of the group that perpetrated the killing and
robbery of the three victims must suffer the same penalty
prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation
in the commission of the crime [People vs. Salvador, 26 July
1988].
Page 64 of 128
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides for a penalty therefore as in treason, rebellion
and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is
not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the viewpoint of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts
in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the
State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common
scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of liability of the perpetrators.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABULAR PRESENTATION:
A. CONSPIRACY:
All of these also apply to robbery with homicide. [See concurring opinion of J.
Gutierrez in the Escober case.]
Page 66 of 128
CRIMES: XY --- ROBBERY WITH
RAPE
Z --- ROBBERY ONLY
B: B A N D
AUTHORITIES
Page 67 of 128
c. For an act to be considered as direct inducement, it is necessary that such
advice or such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who
acts. It is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or
moral coercion or as violence itself. [Pp v. Indanan, Jan. 29, 1913]
Also, in Indanan, the Supreme Court cited some cases where the act may not be
considered as inducement as contemplated in Art. 17 (2), viz:
That one who during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the
combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say
these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by
inducement, the court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced
were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement
cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced
and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not
have been performed."
A person who advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and
treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the
crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and ill-conceived advice
is not sufficient.
A father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with
another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such
advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that
the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may be
considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be
founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so
powerful that it alone produces the criminal act. "
d. Where the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary
to incite the assailant, the utterer cannot be held accountable for the crime as a principal
by inducement. [Pp vs. Parungao, Nov. 28, 1996, EN BANC]
f. Where the manner, means, or form of executing the crime, e.g., with the use of
explosive, by means of treachery, or with the use of a motor vehicle, was never included
in the inducement, such will not affect the inducer. [Pp vs. Delfin, et al., July 31, 1961]
Page 68 of 128
b. APPRECIATED: when the victim was lying on the ground and being raped by
R, D held the hands of the victim without which rape would not have been
accomplished. [People v. Cortes, September 3, 1993]
Art. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being
included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. [Accessories before the fact]
ANNOTATIONS
a. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1)
the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) the performance of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime. [Pp v. Vera, Aug. 18, 1999]
b. An accomplice does not enter into a conspiracy with the principal by direct
participation. He does not have previous agreement or understanding with the principal
to commit a crime. Nevertheless, he participates to a certain point in the common
criminal design. [Pp vs. Elefaño, Jr., et al., November 25, 1983]
a. Who are accessories? They are neither principals nor accomplices, but ---
1. Have knowledge of the commission of the crime;
2. Take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
a. Profiting economically themselves or assisting the offender to
profit economically from the effects of the crime. [But the principal may not be guilty
because of exempting circumstance, e.g., minority or as in Art. 332, supra, page 70, on
Relationship, Alternative circumstances];
b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
c. By Concealing, Harboring, or Assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime [any kind except light felonies] if he acts with abuse of public
functions or when the author of the crime is guilty of Treason, Parricide, Murder, or an
Attempt to take the life of the president or is known to be Habitually guilty of some other
crime. [Art. 19] ---- (For additional penalty, see Art. 58. See also Art. 208.) [ ATM ---
Three Pretty Maids Always HIde]
b. The phrase “Take part subsequent to its commission” clearly suggests that
accessories neither participate in the criminal design nor in its commission.
d. Related Special Laws are: PD 1829, Obstruction of Justice (16 Jan. 1981),
and PD 1612, Anti-fencing, viz:
Page 71 of 128
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the
infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that
of any immediate member or members of his family in order to
prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition,
whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from
appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in,
criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or
prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the
offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or
fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by
investigating authorities for purposes of background information
and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same
to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any
other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be
imposed.
Sec. 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a
public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties
provided there under, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding
public office.
1. Corpus delicti is the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means
a crime has actually been committed. [People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, July
20, 1999, p. 11.] Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged. In this case, aside from the extra-
judicial confessions, the police found the stolen goods, the murder weapons, and
Page 72 of 128
the dead bodies, thereby conclusively establishing the needed corroborating
evidence of corpus delicti. [Pp v. Moana, et al., June 8, 2000]
2. Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the crime, and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed.” In
theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by
the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. [Pp v. Tan, Aug. 26, 1999]
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect
to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers
and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
ANNOTATIONS
a. They are exempted from any liability provided they did not economically profit
or help the principal profit from the effects of the crime.
b. However, even if they did not, they may still be made liable under P.D.
No. 1829, Obstruction of Justice, supra. See also Art.208 --- Prosecution of offenses;
negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution
for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
.
Title Three
PENALTIES
Chapter One
PENALTIES IN GENERAL
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
Page 73 of 128
convict is serving the same. [See page 6 on IRRETROSPECTIVITY OR
PROSPECTIVITY ]
ANNOTATIONS
a. Also applies to special laws. [EN BANC, G.R. No. L-17905 January 27, 1923,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN MORAN,
FRUCTUOSO CANSINO, and HILARIO ODA, defendants-appellants.]
b. Art. 22 refers to substantive penal laws. It does not apply to procedural rule of
evidence involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions in the
constitution, and therefore cannot be included in the term "penal laws." Also, because
constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a prospective effect. [EN BANC,
March 3, 1975, MAGTOTO vs. MANGUERA et al.]
Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. — A pardon of the offended
party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code;
but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his
express waiver.
a. Article 344, RPC: (As regards rape, see Art. 266-C or R.A. 8353)
Page 74 of 128
b. However, see R.A. No. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which repealed Art.
335 of the RPC. Rape is now considered as a crime against persons, therefore, being a
public crime, may now be prosecuted de officio. Article 266-C of the said law provides:
Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety, which neither are nor considered
penalties. — The following shall not be considered as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their
detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or illness requiring their confinement
in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article
80 and for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in
order to institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their
administrative disciplinary powers, superior officials may impose upon their
subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations, which the civil laws, may
establish in penal form.
Chapter Two
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed. — The penalties which may be
imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are those included in the
following:
Scale
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES
Capital punishment:
Death. (R.A. 9346 debars the imposition of the death penalty.)
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua, [R.A. 7659 --- 20 Y, 1 D to 40 Y, but still considered
indivisible.]
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspension,
Destierro.
Light penalties:
Page 75 of 128
Arresto menor,
Public censure.
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or
calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.
Chapter Three
DURATION AND EFFECTS OF PENALTIES
Section One. — Duration of Penalties
Bond to keep the peace. — The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such
period of time as the court may determine.
Page 76 of 128
Art. 28. Computation of penalties. — If the offender shall be in prison, the
term of the duration of the temporary penalties shall be computed from the day on which
the judgment of conviction shall have become final.
If the offender was not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting
of deprivation of liberty shall be computed from the day that the offender is placed at the
disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty. The duration of the
other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant
commences to serve his sentence.
Art. 29. (R.A. 10592, MAY 29, 2013) “ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment
deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive
imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed
of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
“1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more
times of any crime; and
“2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have
failed to surrender voluntarily.
“If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
“Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetuashall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.
“Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period
equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may
be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if
the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of
immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with
good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without
justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motuproprioorder the rearrest of
the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and
persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In
case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he
shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.”
Sec. 2 — Effects of the penalties according to their respective nature
Page 77 of 128
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held.
Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office,
profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. — The suspension from public office,
profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the
offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having
similar functions during the period of his suspension.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his
property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter
vivos.
Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. — It shall be the duty of any
person sentenced to give bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who
shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be prevented,
and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the
court in the judgment, or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of
the court to guarantee said undertaking.
The court shall determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the
bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be
detained for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, if he shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if for a light
felony.
Page 78 of 128
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. — A pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Art. 37. Cost. — What are included. — Costs shall include fees and
indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings, whether they be fixed or
unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts
not subject to schedule.
Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to
meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject
to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to
the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the
rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules
(Amended by RA 10159, April 10, 2012):
:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine,
he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred to in the preceding
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third
of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one
year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if
for a light felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
Page 79 of 128
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a
penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of
time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations
as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability, which the convict may have suffered by
reason of his insolvency, shall not relieve him, from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969.)
Section Three. — Penalties in which other accessory
penalties are inherent
Art. 40. Death — Its accessory penalties. — The death penalty, when it is
not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual
absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date
sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Art. 42. Prision mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision
mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
Art. 44. Arresto — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of arresto shall
carry with it that of suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during
the term of the sentence.
Art. 47. [NOTE: R.A. 9346 debars the imposition of the DEATH PENALTY]
In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed. — The death penalty shall
be imposed in all cases, in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except in the
following cases:
1. When the guilty person is more than seventy years of age.
2. When upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme court, all the
members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty. For the imposition of said penalty or for the
confirmation of a judgment of the inferior court imposing the death sentence, the
Supreme Court shall render its decision per curiam, which shall be signed by all
justices of said court, unless some member or members thereof shall have been
disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, in which even the
unanimous vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies
in Article 3 as “acts or omissions punishable by law” committed either by means of
deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). In Reodica v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was
convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime
of “homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence,” and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two
penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals, the accused
was convicted of the complex crime of “multiple homicide with damage to property
through reckless imprudence” for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to
death its twenty-eight passengers.
Page 81 of 128
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through
reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies.
Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and
punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been
filed.
d. Does not apply to special complex crime, e.g., Robbery with Homicide
or Rape with Homicide, because the specific article itself provides for the penalty.
e. KINDS: where the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (delitocompuesto); and second, when the felony is a necessary means
for committing the other (delitocomplejo) and/or complex proper. [People vs. Tabaco,
March 19, 1997]
It would, therefore, appear at first blush that the two offenses having arisen from
different criminal intents, this would be, under the philosophical bases for concurso de
delitos, a case of material or real plurality under which different crimes have been
committed and for each of which a separate criminal liability attaches. The flaw in this
approach, however, is that although two crimes have been committed, they are not
altogether separate or disconnected from each other both in law and in fact. The
illegally-possessed firearm having been the weapon used in the killing, the former was
at least the necessary, although not an indispensable, means to commit the other.
Page 82 of 128
The situation thus borders closer to the concept of a complex crime proper,
technically known as a delitocomplejo, rather than to the postulate of two separate
crimes. It is true that former doctrines were to the effect that there can be no complex
crime where one of the component offenses is punished by a special law. The rationale
therefore was that in a complex crime, Article 48 of the Code prescribes that the penalty
shall be for the gravest offense to be applied in its maximum period. Since, at that time,
the penalties for crimes provided in special laws were not divided into periods, it would
be impossible to apply Article 48.
The ratiocination no longer applies now, specifically with respect to the case at
bar, since the penalties in Presidential Decree No. 1866 were all taken from the scale of
penalties in the Code. The only possible difficulty in this novatory approach would be on
the first kind of complex crime, that is, the delito compuesto since it exists “(w)hen a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.” The use of that
particular term for the delicts committed bars the application of that form of complex
crime to offenses under Presidential Decree No. 1866, since “felonies” are offenses
provided and defined in the Code.
That objection would not, however, apply to a delito complejo since it is sufficient
therefore that “an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.” By these
considerations, however, the writer does not mean to imply that a killing through the
use of an illegally-possessed firearm is a delito complejo under Article 48 of the Code.
As was carefully stated, such an offense merely borders closer to or approximates the
concept of a delito complejo, but it thereby emphasizes the thesis that the offenses
should not be considered as separate crimes to be individually punished under the
principle of material plurality.
Page 83 of 128
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there
should be
(1) A plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
(2) Unity of penal provision violated; and
(3) Unity of criminal intent or purpose
This means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to
the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. (11 Derecho Penal,
p. 520; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed)
Applying the concept of delitocontinuado, we treated as constituting
only one offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners
committed by the accused at the same place and at the same period of
time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners, from
the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55
SCRA 563).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 (1926]).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer
every, time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed
that the attorneys fees shall be paid out of said benefits, (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). The collections of the legal fees were
impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered,
and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse
(People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955]).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the
following cases:
(1) Two Estafa cases, one of which was committed during the
period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January
1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] said acts were
committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June, and July 1936,
and falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and
October 1936, the malversations and falsifications were not the result of
only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify. x xx "
(People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938]).
(3) Two Estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving
the failure of the collector to turn over the installment for a radio and the
other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing
machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976]).
(4) 75 Estafa, cases committed by the conversion by the agent of
collection from the customer of the employee made on different dates
(Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 ([1975])
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the
Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special
laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for
services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]).
Page 84 of 128
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in
a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time
creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also American
Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories
that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny"
doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the
same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one
larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine,"
under which there was a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim.
Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion
to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as many distinct offenses
as there are victims (ANNOTATIONS, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State
v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich.
573,45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the
constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the
same offense (ANNOTATIONS, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be
filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for
the rest of his life (ANNOTATIONS, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
a. Art. 48 APPLIES: Pp v. Pama, [C.A.] 44 O.G. 3339 (1947) --- Only one
and the same bullet killed two (2) persons – Double Homicide.
Page 85 of 128
b. DOES NOT APPLY: Pp v. Desierto, [C.A.] 45 O.G. 4542 (1948) ---
where the death of several persons were caused by a single act of the accused.
Because although the burst of shots was caused by a single act of pressing the trigger
of the sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to
keep pressing the trigger and it would fire continually. Therefore, it is not the act of
pressing the trigger that produced the several felonies, but the number of bullets that
actually produced them.
People vs. Mision, February 26, 1991 --- Where the accused stabbed the
two victims who were separated by a distance of three (3) meters from each other.
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is
different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense, which the accused intended to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is lower than that
corresponding to the one, which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the
former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or
frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter
offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Page 87 of 128
ANNOTATIONS
a. ABERATIO ICTUS --- which means mistake in the blow, characterized
by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow. [Pp v. Sabalones,
et al., 31 Aug. 1998]
b. PRAETER INTENTIONEM --- See also Par. 3, Art. 13, lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong.
d. The preceding paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) are covered in the first
portion of Art. 4
f. Art. 49 applies only in the following cases, viz: (a) Error en personae;
and (b) Where the penalty prescribed for the crime actually committed is different from
the penalty prescribed for the crime intended.
Art. 61. Rules for graduating penalties. — For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code,
are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted
felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
Page 89 of 128
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degrees shall be that immediately following that indivisible
penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be impose to their full extent,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of
the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two
indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible penalty, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum
periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper
divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said
respective graduated scale.
4. when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods,
corresponding to different divisible penalties, the penalty next lower in degree
shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum prescribed
and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if
possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above
mentioned respective graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not
especially provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by
analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of
the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices
and accessories.
PENALTIES
Divisible penalties are divided into three [3] equal portions. Each portion is known
as a period. If there is an ordinary mitigating circumstance [OMC], the penalty is to be
lowered by one period for every OMC, except where Art. 64, Paragraph 5 applies.
If there is an aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be increased by one
period for every attendant aggravating circumstance, but not to exceed the maximum of
the penalty prescribed for the crime committed.
If there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the prescribed penalty
should be imposed, in its medium period where no period is mentioned.
When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.
[Art. 64]
SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification
1. Temporary absolute disqualification
2. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for,
and the right to follow a profession or calling
3. Public censure
4. Fine (See Art. 26)
Many penalties, however, are composed of periods. Thus, where the penalty for
a crime is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. It is composed of
two [2] periods. One degree lower is just the next lower 2 periods, or arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods.
On the other hand, before the advent of GONZALES, if the penalty for a crime is,
say, reclusion temporal in its medium period the same is composed of one period only.
The penalty one degree lower is just the next lower period or reclusion temporal
minimum [See People vs. Gonzales, 10 Apr. 1946, infra, which is governing.].
Finally, if the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, as a special
case, this penalty is considered composed of 3 periods. One degree, lower is just the
next lower 3 periods or prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. To
illustrate:
1. Penalty composed of 3 periods: say, reclusion temporal maximum to death.
1. Death - - - - - - - - - prescribed
2. Reclusion perpetua - - - - penalty
3. Reclusion temporal -- max
med
min one degree lower
4. Prisionmayor ------ max
med
min two degrees lower
5. Prision correccional-- max
med
min
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal---max
med -- Prescribed penalty
min
4. Prision mayor--------max
Prision correccional max --- One degree lower [Gonzales Doctrine]
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES, COMPUTATION OF. —
In determining the penalty next lower in degree for the purpose of applying the
law on indeterminate sentence, while some of the justices believe that said penalty
immediately lower should be prision mayor in its medium degree, the majority equally
hold that following the doctrine laid down in the case ofPeople vs. Gonzales (10 Apr.
1946), the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor in its maximum degree is
and should be prision correccional in its maximum degree .
The penalty in criminal case No. 2109 (now L-4215) should therefore be not less
than four (4) years and nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional and
not more than ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. The
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Benito Fernandez should be increased to
P6,000. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs.
Accordingly, the imposable penalty for the crime of attempted murder, following
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of arresto mayor in its
Page 92 of 128
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, and the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Since no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime of attempted murder, the penalty
should be two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum; and
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
NOTE: The crime was committed on August 15, 1990 in Samal, Davao. The
penalty then imposable for MURDER was---
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
=========================================================
1. Range --- 6m 1d to 4y 2m
3. 3y 8m 3 = 1y 2m 20d
4. min 6m 1d to 1y 8m 20d
med 1y 8m 21d to 2y 11m 10d
max 2y 11m 11d to 4y 2m 00d
Page 93 of 128
3. Prescribed penalty: Reclusion temporal medium [1-period penalty]
Page 94 of 128
Section Two. — Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance
inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral
attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or
from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such
circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in
the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects.
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods;
and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced
to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to
the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be
imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual
delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction
[Whichever applies.] of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
Page 95 of 128
hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or
oftener. [FLERTS]
ANNOTATIONS
(b) The accused is sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last
crime of which he was found guilty and to an additional penalty.
(e) Habitual delinquency requires that the second crime was committed
after the first conviction, the third, after the second, the fourth, after the third, and so on
(People v. Gervasio Santiago, 14 Nov. 1930) and hence, the date of commission is an
indispensable allegation. [Cuenca vs. Superintendent of the Correctional Institution For
Women, December 30, 1961]
(f) In imposing the additional penalty, recidivism should not be taken into
account the same being inherent in habitual delinquency. [People vs. Manalo, May
25, 1956]
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Page 96 of 128
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the court shall reasonably allow them to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the
result of such compensation.
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties, which contain three periods.
— In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be
a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there
are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they
shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the
act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the
act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the
court shall reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to
their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed
by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
ANNOTATIONS
Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three
periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three
periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period
of each of the three portions.
Page 97 of 128
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. — In imposing fines the courts may fix any
amount within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention
shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit. (See Art. 26)
Art. 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of
the fourth circumstance of Article 12 (PURE ACCIDENT) are present.— When all the
conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from
criminal liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall
have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if of a less grave felony.(See Art.9)
(See: Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, R.A. 9344, 23 April 2006)
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
— When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under
the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following
rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and less than eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
the proper period.
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several
cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed
proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking.
1. In Pp v. Jaurigue, 21 Feb. 1946, where the court appreciated three
OMCs, viz: voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense and
praeterintentionem, the penalty was lowered by two degrees in consonance with the
provision of Art. 69. But note that none of the OMCs mentioned falls under Art. 11 or Art.
12. N.B. --- See Art. 64 (5)
Art. 70. Successive service of sentence. — When the culprit has to serve
two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties
will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be
followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible,
should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or
should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the
respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following
scale:
Page 98 of 128
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right
to follow a profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration
of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty
to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals
the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( penaperpetua)
shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended).
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribed a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine. (See Art. 26)
SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.
Art. 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. — The civil
liabilities of a person found guilty of two or more offenses shall be satisfied by following
Page 99 of 128
the chronological order of the dates of the judgments rendered against him, beginning
with the first in order of time.
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without
specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of
death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered
as the next higher penalty.
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees.
— it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more
degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of
the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a
fixed amount, but are made proportional.
Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of
duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming
three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown in
the following table:
Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct
penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum the
next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially
provided for in this Code, the periods shall be distributed, applying by analogy the
prescribed rules.
Chapter Five
EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES
Section One. — General Provisions
Art. 80. Repealed and modified by Chapter III of P.D. No. 603, The
Child and Youth Welfare Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 1179 and
P.D. No. 1210, promulgated 15 August 1977 and 11 Oct. 1978.
SEE LATEST: R. A. 9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT, 23 April
2006. The above discussion no longer holds true.
Page 101 of 128
Section Two. — Execution of principal penalties.
[No more death penalty in our jurisdiction, R.A. 9346]
Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. — The death
sentence shall be executed with reference to any other and shall consist in putting the
person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed
under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate
the sufferings of the person under sentence during electrocution as well as during the
proceedings prior to the execution. [N.B. --- Now, by electrocution, R.A. 8177, approved
on 20 March 1996]
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the
moment of the electrocution.
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the
culprit. — The court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour
thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise
of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least
eight hours following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the
notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such
assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or
ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make
a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of
his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.
Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the
date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy years
of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. — The
execution shall take place in the penitentiary of Bilibid in a space closed to the public
view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his
lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and
the necessary personnel of the penal establishment, and by such persons as the
Director of Prisons may authorize.
Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its
burial. — Unless claimed by his family, the corpse of the culprit shall, upon the
completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to the
institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and
investigation, provided that such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the
remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the burial of the body of the
culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the
members of the family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the
burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be held with pomp. [Punishable under
Art. 153]
Art. 88. Arresto menor. — The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in
the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under the surveillance of an
officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into consideration
the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, (30 June1950) this Court found that a lacuna (gap;
hiatus) existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with
destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-
extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the
jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence
of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from
said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also
under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of
courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years
and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it
follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor
under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration
of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs
because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods - the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other
hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it
is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three
days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
Title Four
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other
high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after
the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense."
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this
Code.
Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by
final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto
mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
However, in the case of AdlaidaTanega v. Masakayan, et al., En Banc, 28 Feb. 1967 ---
The accused must evade sentence in order that the prescription period should ran
(Accused escapes during the term of his sentence.).
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. — The period of
prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should
give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this
Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
Chapter Two
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 94. (R.A. 10592, May 29, 2013) Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal
liability is extinguished partially:
“1. By conditional pardon;
“2. By commutation of the sentence; and
“3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.”
SEE ALSO: parole and probation (p. 116)
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. — Any
person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying
strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of
the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of
Article 159 shall be applied to him.
Art. 97. (R.A. 10592, May 29, 2013) “ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good
conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to
Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution,
rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following
deductions from the period of his sentence:
“1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
“2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
“3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment,
he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior
during detention;
“4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
and
“5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of
study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
“An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above
allowances for good conduct.”
Art. 98. (R.A. 10592, May 29, 2013) “ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A
deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities
within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away
of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of
the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in
the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or
catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
“This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving sentence.”
Art. 99. (R.A. 10592, May 29, 2013) “ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. –
Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once
granted shall not be revoked.”
Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Chapter One
PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for
acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit, which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority
of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made
in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of
their property exempt from execution.
Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances
or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of
the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons [VICARIOUS LIABILITY]. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
Page 111 of 128
Chapter Two
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES
Civil Liability:
[DACILLO (En Banc), G.R. 149368, April 14, 2004]
a. P50, 000.00 --- When death occurs as a result of a crime. Requires no proof of civil
injury.
b. P25,000.00 --- with one or more generic aggravating circumstances.
[YATAR, May 19. 2004]
Rape with Homicide
a. P100, 000.00 --- Civil indemnity ex delicto.
b. P75, 000.00 Moral damages.
[LAYUGAN (En Banc), April 28, 2004]
Simple Rape
a. P50, 000.00 --- Civil indemnity.
b. P50, 000.00 --- Moral damages.
Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Art. 105. Restitution. — How made. — The restitution of the thing itself must be
made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as
determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third
person who has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the
proper person, who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the
third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for
its recovery.
Art. 106. Reparation. — How made. — The court shall determine the amount of
damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its
special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.
Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable. — If there are two or more persons
civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must
respond.
Page 112 of 128
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories
of a felony — Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next
preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their
respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their
quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the
principals; next, against that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the
accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the
person by whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others
for the amount of their respective shares.
Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. — Any person who has
participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in
an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.
Chapter Three
EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Art. 112. Extinction of civil liability. — Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101,
102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. — Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged
to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the
fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or
has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence or any other reason.
****************************************************************
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
(Act 4103, as amended)
I. SPECIAL LAW:
The court can impose an indeterminate sentence the minimum of which is not
less than 12 years and 1 day, and the maximum is not more than 20 years.
Example: minimum – 13 years (not less than 12y 1d)
maximum – 19 years (not more than 20 y)
c. Apply the GAC or the OMC in fixing the max of the Indeterminate Sentence
(The GAC or the OMC has nothing to do with the minimum of the I.S.)
Indeterminate Sentence will be:
minimum – prision mayor in any of its periods or anywhere within its range
with no reference as to its period
maximum – reclusion temp minimum (12y 1d ~ 14y 8m) because of the
excess 1 M.C. [but the longest period of incarceration is only
12y 1d, following the Gonzales case)
a. Immediately apply the PMC or Art. 64(5) to the imposable penalty, then
proceed as in (b) and (c) of II.
Example: same case as in II, but 1 PMC
Imposable penalty: Reclusion Temporal – immediately lower this
by 1 degree [Art. 64(5)]
Therefore: Prision mayor – max of I.S.
Prision correccional – min. of I.S.
Same treatment as in II above.
Art. 48 – the penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed in its max.
period
a. X is found guilty of the crime of estafa through falsification of a public
document. The penalty is for the more serious crime of falsification, which is
prision mayor max. (determine the min. of the indeterminate sentence using the
prision mayor max as reference)
Indeterminate Sentence is:
Example: 1M.C.
I.S. max – prision mayor maximum
min. – prision correccional – whole range (supra)
SECTION 2, ACT 4103 [ISLAW] --- This act shall not apply:
(a) to those persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment;
(b) to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
(c) to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, or espionage;
(d) to those convicted of piracy;
(e) to those who are habitual delinquents;
(f) to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
Page 114 of 128
(g) to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the President shall
have violated the terms thereof; and
(h) to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year….
C A S E S:
People vs. Geneblazo July 20, 2001
Based on our findings that homicide, not murder, was committed, the penalty
imposed upon accused-appellant should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion
temporal. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is anywhere within the range of prision
mayor, or from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and the maximum within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months.
avdjr NOTE: Reclusion Temporal: Min: 12y 1d ~14y 8m; Med: 14y 8m 1d ~ 17y 4m;
Max: 17y 4m 1d ~ 20y
Prision Mayor: Min: 6y 1d 8y; Med: 8y 1d ~ 10y; Max: 10y 1d ~12y
----------------------------------------------------------------
As regards the frustrated murder of Rosalinda Mendez, the penalty one (1)
degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal, shall be
imposed pursuant to Art. 250 of The Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 50 thereof.
In the absence of any modifying circumstance,16 the maximum penalty to be imposed
shall be taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion
temporal medium, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor in any of its periods.
xxx xxxxxx
Complaining witness Emily Mendez lost her left index finger by amputation as a
result of the crime, and appreciating treachery as an aggravating circumstance, evident
premeditation although alleged but not having been proved, the imposable penalty shall
be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods the range of which is six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be taken from the minimum of the
imposable penalty, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days, and the maximum shall be taken from its medium period,
Page 115 of 128
which is one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days, to two (2) years
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days.
xxx xxxxxx
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan is MODIFIED as follows:
1) In G.R. No. 140006 (Crim. Case No. 3284-A), accused-appellant
RollyPagador is found guilty of Homicide (instead of Murder as found by the trial court)
and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal maximum, as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Herminigildo Mendez the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 for moral damages;
2) In G.R. No. 140007 (Crim. Case No. 3285-A), accused-appellant is found
guilty of Murder (as likewise found by the trial court) and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Magdalena Mendez the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 for moral damages;
3) In G.R. No. 140008 (Crim. Case No. 3286-A), accused-appellant is found
guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries (instead of Frustrated Murder as found by the
trial court) and is sentenced to suffer a straight prison term of four (4) months and ten
(10) days of arresto mayor maximum;
4) In G.R. No. 140009 (Crim. Case No. 3287-A), accused-appellant is found
guilty of Frustrated Murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight
(8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum; and
5) In G.R. No. 140010 (Crim. Case No. 3288-A, or CA-G.R. CR No. 23485,
erroneously numbered G.R. No. 143934), accused-appellant is found guilty of Serious
Physical Injuries (instead of Frustrated Murder as found by the trial court) and is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
the minimum period of prision correccional minimum and medium, as minimum, to one
(1) year ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of the medium period of prision
correccional minimum and medium, as maximum.
[36] People v. Clores, Jr., G.R. No. 130488, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 210, 222.
In Family Case No. A-436, however, the penalty for rape by sexual assault with
any aggravating circumstance is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty should be within the range of prision mayor or 10 years and
1 day to 12 years as minimum, and 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
***********************************
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO Y LAZARO, Petitioner
---versus---
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 157057, 2007 Jun 26, 3rd Division)
Accordingly, the imposable penalty for the crime of attempted murder, following
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, and the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Since no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime of attempted murder, the penalty
should be two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum; and
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
NOTE: The crime was committed on August 15, 1990 in Samal, Davao. The
penalty then imposable for MURDER was---
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
******************************************************
July 24, 1976
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, (PROBATION)
[as amended by P.D. 1257, P.D. 1990, and R. A. 9344]
Page 117 of 128
Sec. 1. Title and Scope of the Decree. - This Decree shall be known as the
Probation Law of 1976. It shall apply to all offenders except those entitled to the
benefits under the provisions of Presidential Decree numbered Six Hundred and three
and similar laws.
Sec. 2. Purpose. - This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him
with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which
might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.
Sec. 3. Meaning of Terms. - As used in this Decree, the following shall,
unless the context otherwise requires, be construed thus:
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and
sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision
of a probation officer.
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a referral for
probation or supervises a probationer or both.
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.(SEE: Sec. 42, R. A. 9344, below) - Subject to
the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
"Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
"An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.".[Amended by P.D.
1990]
The law enforcement officer may obtain the above documents from any of the
following:
(a) ~ (e)
(2) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such
documents, the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age
by: (a) ~ (d)
TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER I
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. --- Any conduct not considered an offense or not
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be
punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. --- Persons below eighteen (18)
years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution
under Art. 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under P.D. 1563, and sniffing
Page 125 of 128
of rugby under P.D. 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate
counseling and treatment program.
The purposes of Circular No. 4-92-A which are to decongest provincial, city and
municipal jails and to effect better control and supervision over national prisoners are
still served if these prisoners are transferred to the mentioned national penal institutions.
Accordingly, the Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, favorably
act on the manifestations of prosecutors for direct commitment of national prisoners to
these penal institutions.
October 6, 1997.