ARTICLE 9

CASE DIGEST
(From Sec. 1 of B. Civil Service Commission to Sec. 1 of
C. Commission on Elections)
Aquino | Dela Cruz | Ereñeta | Faco | Garing | Hilado | Kumar | Menghrajani
Ng | Ngo | Novera | Paloma | Torres

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B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Section 1.
G.R. No. 140335 (Gaminde v. COA)
1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission December 13, 2000 | Pardo, J. | Term
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
PETITIONER: Thelma P. Gaminde
five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not
RESPONDENTs: Commission on Audit and/or Hon. Celso D. Gangan, Hon.
have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
Raul C. Flores, and Emmanuel M. Dalman
preceding their appointment.
SUMMARY: When the President appointed Gaminde as ad interim
Civil Service Commission
Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, her appointment letter stated that
§ It administers the Civil Service System.
the expiration of her term is February 2, 1999. When she sought clarification from
§ It is composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners appointed by the
the Office of the President, they replied that her term would expire on February 2,
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
2000. Relying on the opinion, she remained in office until after February 2, 1999.
Chairman and Commissioners must be:
When the COA disallowed the salary and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-
§ Natural-born citizens
terminus staff, she appealed to the COA. But they dismissed her appeal, hence
§ At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment
petitioning before the Court. SC held that the term of office under an appointment
§ Proven capacity for public administration o
extended to her by the President expired on February 2, 1999. However, she
§ Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
served as de facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000, and thus entitled to
immediately preceding their appointment
receive her salary and other emoluments for actual services rendered.
The term of Commissioners is set at 7 years and may not be reappointed.
§ Prohibition of reappointment applies even if the Commissioner has
DOCTRINE: According to the Court, the appropriate starting point of the terms
served for les than 7 years.
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commission under 1987
§ Of the 1st Commissioners appointed following the enactment of the 1987
Constitution must be on February 2, 1987. In case of a belated appointment or
Constitution, the chairman serves for 7 years, another for 5, and the third
qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
for 3.
qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
- The intent in staggering the terms of the first appointees is to achieve
continuity by not allowing the term of all Commissioners to expire all at
one time. FACTS:
- Every 2 years, the term of 1 Commissioner expires leaving always 2 1. President Fidel Ramos appointed Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner of
veteran Commissioners behind. the Civil Service Commission (CSC), with the confirmation from the
Commission on Appointments.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President 2. Gaminde sought clarification from Office of the President (OP) as to the
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years expiry date of her term. As a reply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
opined that her term would expire on February 2, 2000, not on February
for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only 2, 1999.

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 3. On February 4, 1999, Chairman de Leon wrote the COA requesting
opinion if Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
because of the expiration of their appointments on 1999.
4. The General Counsel of COA replied that the term of Gaminde has
expired on 1999 as stated in her appointment. The CSC Auditor
disallowed in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-
terminus staff.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the term of Gaminde as Commissioner of CSC expired
on February 2, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper? YES
2. Whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff should be paid their
salaries and emoluments? YES
RATIO:
1. The term of office of the Chairman and members of CSC is prescribed in
Art. IX-B, Sec 1(2) of the Constitution. The SC held that the term of
office of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999, as mentioned in her
appointment paper. She accepted the appointment and thus bound by the
term of the appointment she accepted. The letter from the OP stating that
her term would expire on February 2, 2000, was in error. What was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a
term expiring on February 2, 1999.
2. Gaminde served as de facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000,
and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual
service rendered. COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other
emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff.
Section 2.
1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
2. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.
3. No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
4. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly,
in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
5. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
6. Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as
may be provided by law.
The Civil Service System does not cover all the GOCCs.
§ It only covers those with original charters.
- Corporations created by special law are COVERED.
- Corporations created through the general corporation law are NOT
COVERED.
§ It includes both officers and employees.
- Employee includes any person in the service of the government or any
branch thereof of whatever grade or class.
- Officer includes officials whose duties, not being of a clerical or
manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in
the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are
precisely defined by law or not.
Positions in the Civil Service System for the purposes of determining merit
and fitness are classified into competitive and non-competitive positions.
§ Non-competitive are those by their nature are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical.
- Primarily confidential - not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state
- Policy-determining - charged with the duty to formulate a method of
action for gov’t or any of its subdivisions
- Highly technical - required to possess a technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree
§ The principal significance of the classification is in relation to the
appointing process.
- Non-competitive positions exempts them from competitive
examination as a means for determining merit and fitness
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 - Appointment to a competitive position must be made according to
merit and fitness as determined, as far as practicable, by competitive
exams
§ Under Civil Service law, the competitive and non-competitive
positions roughly correspond in classification into CAREER and
NON-CAREER service [for purposes of determining tenure].
- Career service shall be characterized by:
a. Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive exams
b. Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions;
and
c. Security of tenure
- Non-career service shall be characterized by:
a. Entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized for the career service
b. Tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was mad
§ Basic in a healthy civil service system is a guarantee of security of
tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment, whether total or
partial, of the right to continue in the position held.
§ Suspension or dismissal can be made only “for cause provided by
law”
- Dismissal includes demotion or transfer which involves reduction of
pray or rank
§ The Civil Service Code details both the substantive grounds and the
procedure for disciplinary action
§ Only removable as provided by law o Primarily confidential is an
exception because their term is deemed to be coterminous with the
confidence.
§ Security of tenure cannot be circumvented by resort to abolition of
office. It can only be considered as constitutional if it is made:
a. In good faith
b. Not for personal or political reasons
c. Not in violation of the law
§ Security of tenure also covers transfers.
- Transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position
without his consent violates security of tenure.
- Violates security of tenure if the transfer is done as a preliminary step
for his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from the permanent
position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service or force his
resignation.
143 SCRA 602 [1986] (MWSS v. Hernandez)
August 19, 1986 | Narvasa, J. | Under Civil Service Law (Par. 1) - GOCC’s
with charter and created by special laws
PETITIONER: Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Bienvenido S. Hernandez, Labor Arbiter, National Labor
Relations Commission, Lemuel B. Alegado, Danilo S. Lopez, Frtunato L.
Madrona, etc., et al.
SUMMARY: Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was
charged before the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the wilful failure to pay wage
differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits to its contractual
employees. MWSS assailed that it is a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) so the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case concerning its
employees for they are not governed by the Labor Code. The issue in this case is
whether or not the employees of the MWSS are governed by the Labor Code thus
the NLRC has jurisdiction over this case. The court ruled that since MWSS is no
doubt a GOCC created by R.A. No. 6234, its employees whether regular or
contractual are governed by the Civil Service Law; thus; the NLRC has no
jurisdiction in this case. Wherefore, the previous decision of the Labor Arbiter
against MWSS is declared void and set aside.
DOCTRINE:
1. The Civil Service system under the new Constitution covers only
government owned and controlled corporations with original charter.
2. GOCCs created by special charter are subject to Civil Service, whereas
corporations incorporated under the Corporation Law are not.
3. Civil Service Code (P.D. 807) classification of positions:
• Career service
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 (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as
far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of
tenure.
• Non-career service
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited
to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.
FACTS:
1. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was charged
before the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the wilful failure to pay wage
differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits to its contractual
employees.
2. MWSS assailed that it is a government-owned and controlled
corporation so the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case concerning
its employees. Although the Labor Arbiter conceded that the NLRC has
no jurisdiction over the regular employees of MWSS, the Labor Arbiter
asserted that it still has jurisdiction over non-regular/contractual
employees of MWSS who are concerned in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees of the MWSS are governed by the Labor Code thus
the NLRC has jurisdiction over this case? NO
RATIO:
In National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, it was ruled that employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service
law and civil service rules and regulation. Since MWSS is a GOCC created by
R.A. No. 6234 as a “government corporation to be known as the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System.” employment in MWSS is NOT covered by
the Labor Code but by the Civil Service Law instead. It is also for the same reason
that controversies arising from the employment in MWSS are not under the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Labor Arbiter contends that only regular employees of the MWSS are beyond
the jurisdiction of the NLRC; however, positions in civil service are classified as
either career or non- career service. The contractual personnel of MWSS
concerned in this case are holding the non-career service position so they are well
within the scope of the civil service rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated June 5, 1985 and his
Order of July 8, 1985, having been rendered without jurisdiction, are hereby
declared void and set aside. Said Labor Arbiter is enjoined to take no further
action on Case No. NCR-9-3164-84 save to dismiss the same. Costs against
private respondents.
G.R. No. 80887 (BLISS v. Callejo)
September 30, 1994 | Kapunan, J. | GOCCs under Corporation Code - GOCC’s
without charter and created under corporation code
PETITIONER: Bliss Development Corporation Employees Union (BDCEU)-
SENTRO NG DEMOKRATIKONG MANGGAGAWA (SDM)
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Pura F. Calleja and Bliss Development Corporation
SUMMARY: Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is not a government-owned
and controlled corporation that is subject to Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation. The 1987 Constitution only contemplates GOCC’s with original
charter. BDC is a GOCC created under the Corporation Law. It is without a
charter, governed by the Labor Code and not the Civil Service Law, hence, EO
180 does not apply to it. BDC must not register in accordance with EO 180
granting government employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
Instead, BDC must register in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code.
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DOCTRINE: The matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987
Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution
provides that the “civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or
controlled corporation.” Meanwhile, under the 1987 Constitution, the civil service
only embraces GOCC’s with original charter. By clear implication, the Civil
Service does not include GOCC’s, which are organized as a subsidiary of GOCC
under the general corporation law.
BDC is a GOCC created under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter,
governed by the Labor Code and not the Civil Service Law. Hence, EO 180 does
not apply to it.
FACTS:
1. The petitioner, a duly registered labor union filed with the Department
of Labor a petition for certification election of private respondent, Bliss
Development Corporation (BDC). Majority of the BDC’s stocks is
owned by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a
wholly-owned government corporation.
2. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition and held that given that
majority of the stocks of the BDC are owned by the government, BDC
is a government owned corporation whose employees are governed not
by the Labor Code but by the Civil Service Law. As such, its employees
are prohibited to form or join labor organizations.
3. Meanwhile, Executive Order No. 180 was issued by the then President
Corazon C. Aquino extending to government employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively. Petitioner then filed an appeal with
the Bureau of Labor Relations which also dismissed the appeal of the
petitioner. With the issuance of EO 180, the Bureau enjoins the
Petitioner to register in accordance with EO 180.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BDC is a government-owned controlled corporation subject to
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations? NO
RATIO:
No. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 180 expressly limits its application to
GOCCs with original charters. Hence, public respondent’s order requiring
petitioner to register in accordance with EO 180 is without legal basis.
G.R. No. 199440 (Torres v. De Leon)
January 18, 2016 | Peralta, J. | GOCCs under Corporation Code
PETITIONER: Mary Lou G. Torres
RESPONDENTS: Corazon Alma G. De Leon, in her capacity as Secretary
General of the Philippine National Red Cross and the Board of Governors of the
Philippine National Red Cross, National Headquarters
SUMMARY: PNRC General Santos City Chapter Administrator was charged
with Grave Misconduct with a penalty of one-month suspension in relation to a
technical shortage discovered in an audit by the PNRC Internal Auditing Office.
In appealing her case, she questioned the appellate jurisdiction of CSC in her case,
but the SC ruled that in matters of enforcing labor laws and penal statutes, the
PNRC, although sui generis in character, can be treated as a GOCC. Thus, the
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over her case.
DOCTRINE: According to Liban, et al. v. Gordon, although it is not a GOCC,
the PNRC, as a National Society, is sui generis in character that requires the
Court to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. It
“does not ipso ‘facto imply that it is a ‘private corporation’ in contemplation of
the provision of the Constitution”, requiring it to be organized under the
Corporation Code.
For issues involving enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes, the PNRC can
be treated as a GOCC.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: Mary Lou Geturbos Torres was the Chapter Administrator of
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), General Santos City Chapter
2. Respondent: Corazon Alma De Leon
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 3. In a PNRC Internal Auditing Office auditing report submitted to
respondent, it was discovered that petitioner incurred a “technical
shortage” of PHP4 306 574.23.
4. Respondent charged petitioner with Grave Misconduct in violation of
PNRC Financial Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances, and
Disbursment of Funds in a Memorandum.
5. Post-investigation, respondent issues another Memorandum imposing a
penalty of one-month suspension effective July 1-31, 2007 along with a
transfer to the National Headquarters effective August 1, 2007.
6. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration (MR), but was denied.
She then filed a Notice of Appeal addressed to the PNRC Board of
Governors through respondent in addition to a copy of the same to the
CSC. She also addressed her appeal memorandum to the CSC and gave
copies of the same to both PNRC and CSC.
7. Respondent denied petitioner’s appeal.
8. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s appeal and imposed a penalty of
dismissal from service. Petitioner then filed an MR with CSC, but was
denied as well.
9. Petitioner filed a CA petition for review under Rule 43 and
subsequently an MR, but was denied for both.
10. In the present case, petitioner claims that the CA was mistaken in not
ruling that the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over her case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PNRC is a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC)? YES
RATIO:
Yes (at least for the present case). The SC held that the CA was not mistaken
when it ruled that the CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC since the current issue
involves enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes and is within the ambit of
Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6713.
Since the CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC, the former then can modify the
penalty and order petitioner’s dismissal from service (1987 Administrative Code
and SC decisions: CSC has appellate jurisdiction on administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days or
fine amount exceeding 30 days of salary)
145 SCRA 654 [1986] (Samson v. CA)
January 29, 1986 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) -
positions in competitive service
PETITIONER: Angelina M. Samson
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Heirs of Presbitero Velasco
SUMMARY: Petitioner Angelina M. Samson and respondents Heirs of Presbitero
Velasco are claiming the right to the registration of two subject parcels of land
located in Ternate, Cavite. Both applicants claimed their right of registration over
the land based on open and continuous use of the properties, as well as factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that the
Velascos had a better right to the registration of the two subject parcels of land are
based on substantial evidence based not only on the tax receipts submitted by the
Velascos, but also their oral testimonies and their witnesses who testified on the
open and continuous possession of the Velascos and their predecessors-in-interest
beginning the year 1910 to the present.
DOCTRINE: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals based on substantial
evidence cannot be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari. The Court of
Appeals, as a rule, is the final arbiter on questions of facts.
FACTS:
1. Angelina M. Samson filed an application for registration of title in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite of three parcels of land all located in
Ternate, Cavite.
2. Under sec. 48 of the Public Land Law (amended by R.A. 1942), a person
is entitled to obtain a certificate of title if he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
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 3. Samson claimed that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been
openly occupying and possessing the properties for more than 60 years
before the filing of the application.
4. The trial court ordered the registration of one of the three parcels of land
in favor of Samson. However, the application for the registration of
remaining two parcels of land were contested by the Director of Lands,
Felicisima Rielo, and Jaime T. Alberto.
5. Rielo was the only one who pursued her opposition, but later died during
the proceedings. She was substituted by her sons, the Velascos, to whom
the two previously mentioned parcels of land were adjudicated pursuant
to an extra-judicial partition dated in May 1967 from their deceased
parents.
6. The Velascos claimed ownership of the two parcels of land based on
their open and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
7. The trial court ruled in favor of Samson after a trial on the merits. The
two parcels of land were then ordered to be registered under Samson’s
name.
8. The decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals, to
which Samson filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence opposed to that of the trial court.
9. The motion was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial? NO
RATIO:
• Samson’s predecessors-in-interest were able to sufficiently prove of
actual, peaceful, and adverse possession.
• The appellate court's findings that the Velascos had a better right to the
registration of the two subject parcels of land are based on substantial
evidence based not only on the tax receipts submitted by the Velascos
but their oral testimonies and their witnesses who testified on the open
and continuous possession of the Velascos and their predecessor-in-
interest beginning the year 1910 to the present.
• The sincerity of the petitioner in producing the two documents after so
long a time is doubtful. The case was filed on May 7, 1964 and had been
pending in court for 11 years before the petitioner discovered the said
documents and filed the motion for new trial. In fact, it was only after the
denial of her second motion for reconsideration and the oral arguments
held in the appellate court that she filed the said motion.
G.R. No. 19602 (Griño v. CSC)
February 26, 1991 | Gancayco, J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) - test
of confidentiality of position
PETITIONERS: Hon. Simplicio Griño, Sixto Demaisip, Santos Aguadera,
Manuel Traviña, and Manuel Casumpang
RESPONDENTS: Civil Service Commission, Teotimo Arandela, Cirilo
Gelvezon, Teodulfo Data-on, and Nelson Geduspan
SUMMARY: Griño, newly elected governor of Iloilo, formally terminated the
services of those previously appointed and promoted by the Acting Governor on
the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The Civil Service Commission
affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board who declared the
termination illegal and ordered that they be immediately restored to their positions
with back salaries and other emoluments due them. The issue is whether the
position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are primarily
confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be
terminated upon loss of confidence. By virtue of RA No. 5185, both the provincial
attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for the
civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are
precisely categorized by law to be “trusted services”. The attorney-client
relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of
the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a
government functionary. The personal character of the relationship prohibits its
delegation in favor of another attorney without the client’s consent. However,
there is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which
assists the confidential employer. Since the positions occupied by these
subordinates are remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust
between them is no longer predominant.
DOCTRINE: The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it
involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of
whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. However, there
is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists
the confidential employer. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are
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remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is
no longer predominant.
FACTS:
1. Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo. He
offered to resign which was accepted by the then Acting Governor. In
his resignation letter, Demaisip recommended the elevation of Arandela
from Senior Legal Officer to Provincial Attorney. OIC Governor
Licurgo Tirador later on appointed Arandela as the Provincial Attorney,
Datoon and Geduspan as Legal Officer II, and promoted Gelvezon to
Senior Legal Officer.
2. Griño assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo and
informed respondent Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial
Attorney’s Office about his decision to terminate their services. Griño
formally terminated their services on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. This action taken by the governor was appealed by
respondents to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service
Commission.
3. The Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring the termination
illegal and ordering that they be immediately restored to their positions
with back salaries and other emoluments due them. This was appealed
by Griño to the Civil Service Commission.
4. In Resolution No. 89-736, the Civil Service Commission affirmed the
Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board.
5. Griño seeks the reversal of Resolution No. 89-736 of the Civil Service
Commission and Resolution No. 89-920 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal
subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those
holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence? NO
RATIO:
• In Cadiente vs. Santos, the Court ruled that the position of a city legal
officer is undeniably one which is primarily confidential.
• By virtue of RA No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city
legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for the civil
cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services
are precisely categorized by law to be “trusted services.”
• A comparison of the functions, powers and duties of a city legal
officer as provided in the Local Government Code with those of the
provincial attorney of Iloilo would reveal the close similarity of the
two positions. Said functions clearly reflect the highly confidential
nature of the two offices and the need for a relationship based
on trust between the officer and the head of the local
government unit he serves. The “trusted services” to be
rendered by the officer would mean such trusted services of a
lawyer to his client which is of the highest degree of trust.
• The fact that the position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already
been classified as one under the career service and certified as permanent
by the Civil Service Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly
confidential nature. The Court holds that the position of respondent
Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily
confidential position. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to
classifying two positions with the same nature and functions in two
incompatible categories. Following the principle that the tenure of an
official holding a primarily confidential position ends upon loss of
confidence, the Court finds that Arandela was not dismissed or removed
from office when his services were terminated. His term merely expired.
• The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves
mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of whether
the client is a private person or a government functionary. The personal
character of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another
attorney without the client’s consent.
• However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the
relationship, can be delegated. The practice of delegating work of a
counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the Provincial
Attorney wherein it can be gleaned from the power granted to such
officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts
and decision of his subordinates.
• It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where
lawyers act as counsel in confidential and non-confidential positions by
simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to
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 that of the appointing authority. Occupants of such positions would be FACTS:
considered confidential employees if the predominant reason they were 1. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security
chosen by the appointing authority is the latter’s belief that he can share Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion
a close intimate relationship with the occupant which measures freedom
Hotel on October 1989.
of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state. 2. After two months in the said position, Salas was terminated by the Board
• There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the of Directors of PAGCOR due to loss of confidence after an investigation
legal staff which assists the confidential employer. Since the showed that he was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as stated in two
positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the affidavits executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer were used as gunners by Salas.
predominant. The importance of these subordinates to the 3. Polygraph tests were taken by Salas and it yielded corroborative and
appointing authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills unfavorable results.
to facilitate the work of the confidential employee. Thus, with
4. Salas appealed to the Board of Directors of PAGCOR but was denied. He
respect to the legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial
attorney namely, Gelvezon, Datoon, and Geduspan, the Cadiente then appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) but
ruling cannot apply. was denied on the ground that, as a confidential employee, Salas was not
dismissed fom the office but his term merely expired. He also went to the
G.R. No. 123708 (CSC v. Salas) Civil Service Commission (CSC) wherein his appeal was also denied due
June 19, 1997 | Regalado, J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) - nature of to the same reasons as the MSPB. His last recourse was to the Supreme
duties determinative of the confidentiality of position Court but his case was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
PETITIONERS: Civil Service Commission and Philippine Amusement and 5. The Court of Appeals enunciated that Salas is not a confidential
Gaming Corporation employee and may not be dismissed due to loss of confidence. In coming
RESPONDENT: Rafael M. Salas up with its decision, the CA used the proximity rule in Grino v. CSC.
Further, the CA also said that Sec. 16 of P.D. 1869, which holds all
SUMMARY: Salas was employed as Internal Security Staff for the PAGCOR
PAGCOR employees as confidential employees, has been repealed by
Casino in Manila Pavilion Hotel for two months until he was fired by the Board
due to loss of confidence. Salas assails that this termination was illegal. His Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
appeals to the Board, MPSB and CSC were all denied. Salas then went to the SC 6. The case was appealed to the SC. The SC affirmed the CA’s decision in
but his case was remanded to the CA. The CA decided that Salas was not a toto.
confidential employee and his dismissal was illegal because PD 1869 has been
repealed by Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC appealed ISSUE:
the decision to the SC. The SC affirmed the CA’s decision in toto. Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee? NO
DOCTRINE: Pinero Doctrine - it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or RATIO:
highly technical. The Court shall be the one to determine whether or not a position PD 1989 has been repealed by Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
is primarily confidential. as evidenced by the Constitutional deliberations. The primary purpose of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as

BLOCK 1A 2022
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is to exempt these
categories from competitive examination as a means for determining merit and
fitness.
Pinero Doctrine: the occupant of a particular position could be considered a
confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the
appointing authority was the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion, without fear
of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Where the position occupied is remote from that of
the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
Taking into consideration the nature of his functions (primarily non-confidential),
his organizational ranking (three levels lower than PAGCOR Chairman) and his
compensation level (Level 2 out of 12), it is obviously beyond debate that Salas
cannot be considered a confidential employee.
G.R. No. 93023 (Achacoso v. Macaraig)
March 13, 1991 | Cruz, J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) – temporary
appointments
PETITIONER: Tomas D. Achacoso
RESPONDENTS: Catalino Macaraig and Ruben D. Torres, in their capacities as
Executive Secretary and Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), respectively; and Jose N. Sarmiento
SUMMARY: Achacoso, the POEA administrator, was asked to resign by the
President to which he complied, but later protested. SC ruled that Achacoso was
appointed in acting capacity only, a status which is without fixity and endures
only at pleasure of appointing authority.
DOCTRINE: A person without requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place, or only as an exception to the rule, appointed
merely in an acting capacity in the absence of those eligible. Person named in
acting capacity shall surrender the office once called to do so by the appointing
authority who may end it at their pleasure.
FACTS:
1. Administrator of POEA, Tomas Achacoso was asked to resign by the
President.
2. Achacoso complied, and his resignation was accepted by the President on
April 3, 1990.
3. Secretary of Labour asked him to turn over his office to Deputy
Administrator as OIC.
4. Achacoso protested, but Jose Sarmiento was appointed POEA
administrator.
5. Achacoso filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, asking to annul
Sarmiento's appointment and prohibit respondents from preventing him
from discharging his duties as POEA Administrator
6. He cites security of tenure enjoyed by Civil service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Achacoso's appointment was permanent? NO
RATIO:
• Permanent appointment can only be issued to "person who meets all
requirements for position to which they are appointed, including
appropriate eligibility required.
• Achacoso did not meet this requirement, and was merely appointed in
acting capacity with the condition that he must surrender office once called
to do so by the appointing authority.
• The term of a person appointed in acting capacity is without fixity and
endures only at pleasure of appointing authority
G.R. No. 81467 (Santiago v. CSC)
Oct 27, 1989 | Melencio-Herrera, J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) –
“next in rank rule” not mandatory
PETITIONER: Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr.
RESPONDENTS: Civil Servoce Commission and Leonardo A. Jose
BLOCK 1A 2022
SUMMARY: Santiago, Jr. filed a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court to
review the decision of the CSC in its Resolution No. 87-554. The Resolution
affirmed the appointment of Jose and revoked that of Santiago to Collector of
Customs III.
The Court en banc granted the petition. The Court ruled that the next-in-rank rule
only gives preferential consideration for promotion but is not mandatory. The
Court also ruled that the CSC can only approve or disapprove an appointment
based on whether or not the appointee is eligible or qualified. The CSC may not
use any other criterion and may not choose which candidate is more qualified.
DOCTRINE: The ruling in Taduran v. CSC states that it is not mandatory to
appoint the next-in-rank employee. He is only first to be considered for a vacancy.
Section 4 of CSC Resolution No. 83-343 also states that a next-in-rank eligible
employee who is most competent and qualified shall be promoted but the
appointing authority may promote an employee who is not next-in-rank but with
better qualifications and competence.
The ruling in Luego v. CSC states that the CSC is allowed check whether or not
the appointee is eligible or qualified. If he is, his appointment is approved; if not,
it is disapproved. The CSC has no authority to disregard the discretion of the
appointing authority and make its own choice as to who is the more qualified
candidate.
FACTS:
1. Customs Commissioner Wigberto E Tañada extended a permanent
promotional appointment to Santiago from Custom Collector I to Custom
Collector III based on his outstanding performance and awarded
citations.
2. Jose, a Custom Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems
Promotion Board based on the ground that he was next-in-rank. The
protest was initially denied but was granted on appeal. The CSC affirmed
this decision in its Resolution No. 87-554. Hence, Santiago filed a
Certiorari Petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the next-in-rank rule is mandatory? NO
2. Whether or not the CSC can revoke the appointment of Santiago by
Tañada and appoint Jose to Custom Collector III? NO
RATIO:
The Court granted the petition of Santiago based on the following:
• The next-in-rank rule only gives first consideration for the vacancy but is
not mandatory. Tañada is not required to promote Jose just because he
was next-in-rank.
• The CSC can not encroach on the discretionary powers of the appointing
authority. The CSC may not choose to appoint Jose instead of Santiago
simply because it thinks that Jose is more educationally qualified.
• The CSC can only disapprove an appointment if the appointee is not
qualified or eligible. If the appointee is qualified or eligible, then it must
approve the appointment. Because Santiago has met the minimum
qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness to be appointed to
Custom Collector III, Tañada did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
G.R. No. L-17287 (Hernandez v. Villegas)
June 30, 1965 | Regala, J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2) Cause for
Removal – loss of confidence as ground for termination – expiration of term not
removal from office
PETITIONERS: Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, Eleuterio Capapas,
Commissioner fo Customs, James H. Keefe, Acting Director of Security, and Juan
C. Pajo, Executive Secretary
RESPONDENTS: Epifanio T. Villegas and Court of Appeals
SUMMARY: Epifanio Villegas was appointed Director of Security of the Bureau
of Customs. He was sent to study enforcement techniques and customs practices
in the US. When he returned to the Philippines, he was temporarily detailed to the
Arrastre Service while James Keefe was Acting Director of Security. Villegas was
then permanently appointed as Arrastre Superintendent and Keefe appointed as
BLOCK 1A 2022
Director of Security. Villegas’s appointment involved a change of designation and 6.Villegas filed an action for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of
status from Director of Security, a confidential position to Arrastre Manila. The court gave judgment for Villegas with right to collect
Superintendent, a classified position. Because of this, Villegas filed a quo backpay as Director for Security from January 1, 1958. Its decision was
warranto against Keefe to the CFI in Manila and the CA and both courts ruled in subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
his favor. Current petitioners then brought the case to the SC. The SC ruled that
7. The Secretary of Finance, the Customs Commissioner, the incumbent
such transfer was illegal.
Director for Customs Security and the Executive Secretary have appealed
DOCTRINE: A person occupying a primarily confidential position can only be to the SC asserting that their theory that since the work of the Director —
removed for cause as provided by law. The termination of their official relation which has been delegated to him by the, Customs Commissioner — is to
can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their coordinate the functions of security, patrol and investigation divisions in
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of the Customs Bureau all of which positions have been declared by
office. As long as confidence in them endures, the incumbent is entitled to
Executive Order to be primarily confidential then the Office of the
continue in office.
Director for Security must itself be considered primarily confidential.
They then justify, the transfer of Villegas to the Arrastre Service on the
FACTS:
basis of the statement in De los Santos v. Mallare. 87 Phil. 289, to the
1. Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed
effect that position which are primarily confidential, policy-determining
Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at
and highly technical "are excluded from the merit system and dismissal
P6,000, effective November 1, 1955.
at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
2. In 1956, he was sent to the United States to study enforcement
Constitution."
techniques and customs practices under the technical assistance program
ISSUES:
of the National Economic Council and the International Cooperation
1. Whether or not the office of Director for Security in the Bureau of
Administration.
Customs, is a primarily confidential position? – SC does not need to
3. Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he
determine this
was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin
2. Whether or not the Director for Security can be transferred to another
and, in his stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for
position without cause? NO
Security.
4. On January 14, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo advised Secretary
RATIO:
Hernandez that the President had approved the proposed appointments of
1. For the Court’s purpose, there is no need to consider the position
Villegas and Keefe as Arraste Superintendent and Director of Security
involved in this case is primarily confidential, because, even assuming
respectively.
the position to be, it is nevertheless subject to the Constitutional
5. It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of
provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
Keefe until February 28, 1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was
removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil. Const., Art. XII, sec. 4)
being paid the salary for Director for Security and, on further inquiry,
Villanuevas' removal, is, therefore, concededly without cause.
found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent.
2. It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding
primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence

BLOCK 1A 2022
 in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified
on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation
from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of
office — two different causes for the termination of official relations
recognized in the Law of Public Officers. But the point is that as long as
confidence in them endures — and it has been shown that it has been lost
in this case — the incumbent is entitled to continue in office.
3. We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for
Security is without cause and is therefore illegal.
G.R. No. L-12536 (Briones v. Osmeña)
September 24, 1958 | Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Classifications and Appointments (Par. 2)
– abolition in good faith
PETITIONERS: Concepcion G. Briones accompanied by her husband
Democrito R. Briones, and Faustino O. Rosagaran
RESPONDENTS: Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Mayor of Cebu City, etc., et al.
SUMMARY: Briones and Rosagaran are employees in the office of the City
Mayor of Cebu with good track records. The respondents abolished the positions
of the petitioners, among others, despite creating 35 new positions. Briones and
Rosagaran then assailed the abolishment for violating security of tenure. The SC
held that considering the good performance of the petitioners and the creation of
35 new positions, the abolishment was unreasonable and unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: While abolition of the office does not imply removal of the
incumbent, the rule is true only where the abolition is made in good faith; the right
to abolish cannot be used to cover the discharge of employees in violation of the
civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service eligible.
On August 5, 1937, she was appointed Clerk-Stenographer with
permanent status in the Office of the City Mayor.
ISSUE:
2. On the other hand, Petitioner Faustino O. Rosagaran is a second grade
Whether or not the abolishment of the petitioners’ position violates security of
civil service eligible. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor
of Cebu since July 1940, and promoted to Administrative Officer. In
1955, he was publicly declared and adjudged "Model Employee."
3. On January 5, 1956, the Municipal Board of the City of Cebu, acting
upon the request of the respondent City Mayor embodied in his letter,
dated January 4, 1956, passed Resolution No. 21, series of 1956, creating
35 positions in the City Mayor’s office, and appropriating therefor the
necessary amount for salaries for six months, the amounts of P28,000 for
office equipment, P2,000 for office supplies and an additional amount of
P10,000 for the City Mayor’s discretionary fund.
4. On February 1956, the Municipal Board and the City Mayor approved
Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the City Mayor’s office
and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board, or a total of 32
positions in both offices. Among the positions abolished in the Office of
the City Mayor were those occupied by petitioners.
5. Pursuant to said Ordinance, the City Mayor wrote separate letters to
petitioners notifying them of the abolition of their positions and advising
them of the termination of their services "effective at the close of
business hours on March 15, 1956."
6. In reply thereto, petitioners Briones and Rosagaran wrote in separate
letters to the respondent City Mayor (1) acknowledging receipt his letters
of separation, (2) protesting the abolition of their positions, and (3)
informing him that they will not relinquish their positions "until
otherwise determined by higher competent authorities or courts."
7. As the respondent City Mayor persisted in terminating their services,
added to the fact that the respondents City Treasurer and City Auditor
refused to pay their salaries after March 16, 1956, petitioners filed the
instant petition for reinstatement, back salaries, moral damages and
attorney’s fees.
BLOCK 1A 2022
tenure as provided in the constitution? YES
RATIO:
• In consideration of the good performance of the petitioners as employees
in the office of the Mayor of Cebu and the creation of 35 new positions,
the SC is convinced that the abolishment of the petitioner’s position was
without merit.
• The SC expressed that the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution
dictates that civil service eligibles, like petitioners herein who have
rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of
non-eligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at
the mercy of political changes.
• In Pulutan v. Dizon (supra) the SC said: “It is evident that the mayor
could not legally remove the petitioner without cause, for being a
member of the Civil Service, his tenure of office is protected by Section
4, Article XII of the Constitution, which says ‘No officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law.’
• The Committee on Civil Service of the Constitutional Convention, in
recommending said provision said: ‘... The Committees’ report requires
that removal shall be made only for cause’ and in the manner provided
by law. This means that there should be bona fide reasons and action
may be taken only after the employee shall have been given a fair
hearing. This affords to public employees reasonable security of tenure."
510 SCRA 622 (GSIS v Kapisanan)
December 6, 2006 | Garcia, J. | Right to Self-Organization and Right to Strike
(Par. 5) - no strike
PETITIONERS: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Winston F.
Garcia, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager
RESPONDENT: Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
SUMMARY: GSIS personnel and some members of the Kapisanan held a
strike/walk-out for four days which disrupted the work atmosphere in GSIS.
The president of the said office filed administrative charges against those
who participated in the said strike. The main issue is if those in public sectors
are allowed to engage in such activities. The Court rules in the negative
stating that activities, which disrupt interests of the office and the public,
cannot be tolerated and is thus not allowed.
DOCTRINE: Right of government employees is limited to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
FACTS:
1. A four day concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout was
held in front of the GSIS main building in Pasay City. The mass action
participants were GSIS personnel, among them are members of the
herein KAPISANAN, a public sector union of GSIS rank and file
employees. Said mass action targets the herein petitioner GARCIA and
his management
2. On October 10, 2004 the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued
a Memo directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why
they should not be charged administratively for participating in the rally.
KAPISANAN’s counsel, Atty. Molina sought reconsideration of the said
memo on the ground that the subject employees resumed work in
obedience of the return to work issued.
3. However, the plea of reconsideration was denied by the filing, on
October 25 2004, of the administrative charges against some 110
KAPISANAN members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. KAPISANAN then filed a Petition for
Prohibition before the CA, on the grounds that:
a. Members should not be made to explain why they supported
their union’s cause
b. Petitioner Garcia blatantly disregarded Civil Service Reso
No. 021316 otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action
BLOCK 1A 2022
 4. Pending resolution of the petition for prohibition of the CA, the GSIS
Management proceeded with the investigation of the admin cases which
resolved 207 out of 278 cases, resulting to the exoneration of 20
respondent-employees, reprimand of 182 and suspension of 5.
5. On June 16 2005, the CA rendered the herein ASSAILED decision
holding that Garcia’s filing of admin charges against 361 of
KAPISANAN’s members is TANTAMOUNT to GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION which may be the proper subject of the writ of
prohibition. Unable to accept the above ruling, petitioner GARCIA
sought reconsideration, which was denied.
6. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of public sector to form unions or associations include
the right to strike? NO
RATIO:
• No. Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike. Fact remains that the
erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during
their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was
they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front
of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies
and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus
provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil
sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
personnel.
• To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services
remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during
those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would
be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the
reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil
service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism
exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No.
021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the
public sector.
• It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all
branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,
or those created by special law. As such, employees of covered GOCCs
are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and
regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline,
attendance and general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of
matters involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like
concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism
and rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the Court
in at least a case.
G.R. No. 119903 (Gloria v. CA)
August 15, 2000 | J. Purisima | Temporary Employees
PETITIONERS: Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria, in his capacity as Secretary, and
Director Nilo L. Rosas in his capacity as Regional Director, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Dr. Bienvenido A. Icasiano
SUMMARY: Following the retirement of the superintendent of Marikina Institute
of Science and Technology, Sec. Gloria recommended to the President that Dr.
Icasiano be reassigned to fill the said position. Icasiano requested reconsideration,
but it was denied. He then filed a petition assailing that the reassignment violated
his security of tenure. Gloria repudiated the alleged violation by claiming that the
reassignment was only temporary. The CA held in favor of Icasiano, so Gloria
appealed to the SC.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA because the circumstances attending the
reassignment imply that it was not temporary. On the contrary, it appeared to be
indefinite as there was no period fixed or statement that it would only be
BLOCK 1A 2022
temporary and that it was emphasized that Icasiano’s qualifications and
experience would best fit the position.
DOCTRINE: A reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank,
status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service. While a
temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position,
or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of
office of those who are in the Civil Service
FACTS:
1. On June 29, 1989, private respondent Dr. Icasiano was appointed
Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City,
by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
2. On October 10, 1994, respondent Sec. Gloria recommended to President
Fidel V. Ramos that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the
MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the
vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F.
Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
3. On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of
Secretary Gloria.
4. On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for Icasiano’s
reassignment, as approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary
Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
5. On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the Icasiano of his
reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
6. Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the
reassignment, but the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a
letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking
for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the
same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and
refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
7. On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed a petition before the CA.
8. On March 28, 1995, the CA decided there was a violation of Icasiano’s
security of tenure due to a lack of a period or any indication that the
reassignment was only temporary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reassignment of Icasiano is temporary? NO
RATIO:
No. The SC upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Sec. Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience"
being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that
subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there
is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found
as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of
petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such
feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of
tenure of the private respondent.
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in
the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It
shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.
§ As an administrative agency, it can only perform executive powers,
quasi-judicial powers and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.
§ Enumerates the key functions of the Commissions:
a. Promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions
b. Classify positions
c. Prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and
other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law
BLOCK 1A 2022
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to to a different office, it could simply mean that new functions have been
uphold and defend this Constitution. added to 1 office

Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation G.R. No. 104732 (Flores v. Drilon)
of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or June 22, 1993 | Bellosillo, J. | Political Opportunism and Spoils – prohibition
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of against designation of elective officer during tenure
the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their
positions.
PETITIONER: Roberto A. Flores
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after RESPONDENT: Franklin M. Drilon
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
SUMMARY: The case questions the constitutionality of Section 13, par.(d), of
§ Prohibits the appointment of defeated candidates within 1 year following R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of
their defeat to any office in the government or in any GOCCs or in any of 1992” under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gorodon of Olongapo City was
their subsidiaries. appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA).
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. DOCTRINE: The two paragraphs of Section 17 of Article IX-B contemplates
two different situations. The first paragraph states that an elective official may
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government not be appointed to another post even if it is allowed by law or by the primary
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government- functions of his office. While the second paragraph provides an exception to the
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. general rule by allowing appointive officials to hold multiple offices when
allowed by law or by the primary function of his position.
st
§ 1 paragraph governs elective officials - prohibits elective official
from accepting appointment during their tenure Appointment – the designation of a person, by the person or persons having
- If the elective official accepts an appointment without first resigning his authority thereof, to discharge the duties of some office or trust.
elective position, the appointment is invalid. Neither however, does he
forfeit his elective seat.
- Unlike appointive officers in the next paragraph, Congress may NOT
create additional exceptions to this rule. FACTS:
nd 1. Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and
§ 2 paragraph deals with appointive officers: may not hold any other
Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
office or employment in the gov’t or any subdivision, agency or
(SBMA)
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries
2. The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known
- The prohibition is not absolute as they may hold another office if
as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," is challenged
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their position
in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
- Primary functions of an office does not necessarily mean appointment

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 injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and
unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other
operational expenses attached to the office.
3. Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U. S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain
that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics
infringes on Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Mayor Richard Gordon as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA is constitutional? NO
RATIO:
• The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes
holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph
appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment or designation of an elective official to other
government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and
planning agency; the Vice President, who may be appointed Member of
the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
• Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
• The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may
serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of
public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job.
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities
shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
§ The prohibition against additional or double compensation except when
specifically authorized by law is another constitutional curb on the
spending power of the government.
§ This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a
public office is a public trust. It is expected of a gov’t official or
employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands of public
welfare.
§ Difference b/w additional and double compensation:
- Additional compensation: when for one and the same office for which a
compensation has been fixed there is added an extra reward in the form,
for instance, for a bonus
- Double compensation: refers to 2 sets of compensations for 2 different
offices held concurrently by 1 officer. There is no general prohibition
against the holding 2 offices which are not incompatible; but when an
nd nd
officer accepts a 2 office, he can draw the salary to such 2 office
only when he is specifically authorized by law to receive double
compensation
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1.
1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
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Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
§ Chairman and the Commissioners must be:
a. Natural born citizens
b. At least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment
c. Holders of a college degree but a majority which includes the
Chairman should be members of the Philippine Bar for at least 10 years
d. Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections
§ Appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointment
- Those of the first appointed, 3 shall hold office for 7 years, 2 for 5
years, and the last two for 3 years
- The result is that any one time only 3 or 2 Commissioners retire
together
- Since appointment to any vacancy is only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor, the regularity of the staggered rotational
system remains undisturbed even by vacancies occurring in mid-term
G.R. No. 100113 (Cayetano v. Monsod)
September 3, 1991 | Paras, J. | Composition, qualifications, appointment, term –
meaning of practice of law
PETITIONER: Renato Cayetano
RESPONDENTS: Christian Monsod, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, Commission On
Appointment, and Hon. Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management
SUMMARY: Monsod was nominated by Aquino to the position of COMELEC
Chairman. Cayetano opposed on the ground that he did not possess the
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
The issue is what “practice of law” means.
DOCTRINE: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
FACTS:
1. Christian Monsod was nominated by Pres. Cory to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments.
2. Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
3. The COA affirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. He then took his oath and assumed office.
4. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the COA of Monsod’s
nomination, Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the petition,
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC be declared null and void.
5. Monsod passed the Bar in 1960 with a grade of 86.55%.
6. He worked in the law office of his father; World Bank Group;
MERALCO Group, as CEO; NAMFREL; agrarian reform law; and
Davide Commission.
ISSUES:
1. What is practice of law?
2. Whether Monsod is considered in practice of law for ten years. YES
RATIO:
1. Gist: Practice of law is not limited to litigation
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 Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
“To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23)
2. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

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