CHAPTER FIVE: Interpretation of words and phrases

Ejusdem generis (or the same kind or species)

 General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular
and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or
cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
 Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular
words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced
in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.
 Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words
to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the
specific words.
 Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particularization

Illustration
Mutuc v. COMELEC
 Statute: Act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials and the like”
 Held: and the like, does not embrace taped jingles for campaign purposes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling
of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes,
was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to
respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be
construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of
expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same
day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we
issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to
explain more fully our decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his
being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to
him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers,
an order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of
speech."1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek
a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later
than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3,
1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on
November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful
for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on
November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing
in behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a
week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of
prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed
on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity,
considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was
worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on Elections is permanently
restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4

1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We
view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle
of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its
being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that
fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a
statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score.9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a
cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then
the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What
respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which
this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or
through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him
through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission,
then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done.
It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. 10

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a
postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority
accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive
or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is
a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by
the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although
independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision
of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding
of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any
authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12Our
decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may
its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from
respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is
permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with
its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando
in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order
issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:

This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain
place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting
upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system
by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no jingles
and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."

Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of
election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12
of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern
day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent
Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.

Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech
and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond
a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive
and arbitrary.

Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is
concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of
section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent
Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or
'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and
the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign
appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters'
eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend
some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile
unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be
held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same
constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable
as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest
pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's
limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another
person with his knowledge and consent.

# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando
in the main opinion that "there could be no justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order
issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional
right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:

This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the
due process clause of our Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines
prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and
announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain
place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting
upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system
by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition — "provided that there are no jingles
and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."

Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of
election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election
propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12
of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern
day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively
disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district, respondent
Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his
"jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more expensive and less
effective than using a recorded or taped voice.

Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech
and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond
a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive
and arbitrary.

Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is
concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of
section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent
Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or
'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election advertisements — to make the candidate and
the fact of his candidacy known to the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign
appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through the voters'
eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and
arbitrarily the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend
some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile
unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be
held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same
constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable
as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest
pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's
limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by another
person with his knowledge and consent.

# Footnotes

1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.

2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).

3 Section 12 (E), Ibid.

4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.

5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act.

6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union
Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People vs. Kottinger 45 Phil. 352
(1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil.
605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission, L-
15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.
7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
(1949); Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of Manila v.
Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950);
Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons Construction,
Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957);
Gonzales v. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and
Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950).

9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933).

10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US 558 (1948).

11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The portion of the opinion from which
the above excerpt is taken reads in full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the executive
department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has
given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.' (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines) It has no
authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote.' It may not even pass upon the
legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz., [6],
2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the greater and more far-reaching
authority to determine who — among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by
the Constitution, who have complied with the procedural requirements, relative to the
filing of certificate of candidacy — should be allowed to enjoy the full benefits intended
by law therefore. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits — a candidate
must be capable of 'understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance
of election,' and must have — over a month prior to the elections (when the resolution
complained of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a
substantial portion of the electorate, is a matter of policy, not of administration and
enforcement of the law which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of
its legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such
general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious whether, if so
granted — in the vague, abstract, indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in
order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant
must not be deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect,
which is absent in the case at bar) — the legislative enactment would not amount to
undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed.
1570.)" pp. 141-142.

12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v.

Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections,
104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28, 1962,
6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643; Ututalum v.
Commission on Elections,
L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-28315,
Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173; Abes v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15,
1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on Elections,
 L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of Canvassers,
L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.

13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911. The
other cases are Espino v. Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong v.
Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 241; Mutuc v. Commission
on Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v. Commission on
Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v. Commission on
Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v. Commission on Elections,
L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v. Commission on Elections, L-31380,
Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission on Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21,
1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v. Commission on Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31
SCRA 60; Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72;
Sinsuat v. Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related
provisions.

2 Petition, page 9.

Ejusdem generis (or the same kind or species)

 General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular
and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or
cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
 Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular
words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced
in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.
 Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words
to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the
specific words.
 Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particularization

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA

 Issue: whether the phrase “other lawful beverages” which gives protection to
manufacturer with the Phil. Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles used for
“soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages,”
includes hard liquor?
 Statute title: “An Act to regulate the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks,
kegs, barrels, & other similar containers.”
 Held: The title clearly shows intent to give protection to all marked bottles of all
lawful beverages regardless of nature of contents.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78413 November 8, 1989

CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., Represented by its President, Rogelio Q.

Lim, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA, INC., respondents.

Efren M. Cacatian for petitioners.

San Jose, Enrique, Lacas, Santos and Borje for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals of
December 5, 1986 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06685 which reversed the decision of the trial court, and its
resolution dated May 5, 1987 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The following antecedent facts generative of the present controversy are not in dispute.

Sometime in 1953, La Tondeña, Inc. (hereafter, LTI for short) registered with the Philippine Patent
Office pursuant to Republic Act No. 623 1 the 350 c.c. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin
popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel". This registration was subsequently renewed on December
4, 1974. 2

On November 10, 1981, LTI filed Civil Case No. 2668 for injunction and damages in the then Branch
1, Court of First Instance of Isabela against Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. (Cagayan, for brevity)
for using the 350 c.c., white flint bottles with the mark "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel"
stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Cagayan's liquor product bearing the label
"Sonny Boy" for commercial sale and distribution, without LTI's written consent and in violation of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700. On the same date, LTI
further filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant therein. 3 On November 16, 1981, the court a quo issued a temporary restraining order
against Cagayan and its officers and employees from using the 350 c.c. bottles with the marks "La
Tondeña" and "Ginebra San Miguel." 4

Cagayan, in its answer, 5 alleged the following defenses:

1. LTI has no cause of action due to its failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 166 which requires the giving of notice that its aforesaid marks are registered by
displaying and printing the words "Registered in the Phil. Patent Office" or "Reg Phil.
Pat. Off.," hence no suit, civil or criminal, can be filed against Cagayan;
 2. LTI is not entitled to any protection under Republic Act No. 623, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5700, because its products, consisting of hard liquor, are not among
those contemplated therein. What is protected under said law are beverages like Coca-
cola, Royal Tru-Orange, Lem-o-Lime and similar beverages the bottles whereof bear the
words "Reg Phil. Pat. Off.;"

3. No reservation of ownership on its bottles was made by LTI in its sales invoices nor does it require
any deposit for the retention of said bottles; and

4. There was no infringement of the goods or products of LTI since Cagayan uses its own labels and
trademark on its product.

In its subsequent pleadings, Cagayan contended that the bottles they are using are not the registered
bottles of LTI since the former was using the bottles marked with "La Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra
San Miguel" but without the words "property of" indicated in said bottles as stated in the sworn
statement attached to the certificate of registration of LTI for said bottles.

On December 18, 1981, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the filing of a
bond by LTI in the sum of P50,000.00, enjoining Cagayan, its officers and agents from using the
aforesaid registered bottles of LTI. 6

After a protracted trial, which entailed five (5) motions for contempt filed by LTI against Cagayan, the
trial court rendered judgment 7 in favor of Cagayan, ruling that the complaint does not state a cause of
action and that Cagayan was not guilty of contempt. Furthermore, it awarded damages in favor of
Cagayan.

LTI appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on December 5, 1986 rendered a decision in favor of
said appellant, the dispositive portion whereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and judgment is
rendered permanently enjoining the defendant, its officers and agents from using the
350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of ownership "La Tondeña, Inc." and "Ginebra
San Miguel", blown-in or stamped on said bottles as containers for defendant's
products.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court is therefore made permanent.

Defendant is ordered to pay the amounts of:

(1) P15,000.00 as nominal or temperate damages;

(2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(4) Costs of suit. 8

On December 23, 1986, Cagayan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
respondent court in its resolution dated May 5, 1987, hence the present petition, with the following
assignment of errors:
 I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in the decision granting that "there
is, therefore, no need for plaintiff to display the words "Reg. Phil. Pat. Off."
in order for it to succeed in bringing any injunction suit against defendant
for the illegal use of its bottles. Rep. Act No. 623, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 5700 simply provides and requires that the marks or names shall be
stamped or marked on the containers."

II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in deciding that "neither is there a
reason to distinguish between the two (2) sets of marked bottles-those
which contain the marks "Property of La Tondeña, Inc., Ginebra San
Miguel," and those simply marked La Tondeña Inc., Ginebra San Miguel'.
By omitting the words "property of" plaintiff did not open itself to violation
of Republic Act No. 623, as amended, as having registered its marks or
names it is protected under the law."

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in deciding that the
words "La Tondeña, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel" are sufficient notice to
the defendant which should have inquired from the plaintiff or the
Philippine Patent Office, if it was lawful for it to re-use the empty bottles of
the plaintiff.

IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in deciding that

defendant-appellee cannot claim good faith from using the bottles of
plaintiff with marks "La Tondeña, Inc." alone, short for the description
contained in the sworn statement of Mr. Carlos Palanca, Jr., which was a
requisite of its original and renewal registrations.

V. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in accommodating the

appeal on the dismissals of the five (5) contempt charges.

VI. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in deciding that the
award of damages in favor of the defendant-appellee, petitioner herein, is
not in order. Instead it awarded nominal or temperate, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees without proof of bad faith. 9

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, provides:

SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or

selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful
beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels and other similar containers, or in
the manufacturing, compressing or selling of gases such as oxygen, acytelene,
nitrogen, carbon dioxide ammonia, hydrogen, chloride, helium, sulphur, dioxide, butane,
propane, freon, melthyl chloride or similar gases contained in steel cylinders, tanks,
flasks, accumulators or similar containers, with the name or the names of their
principals or products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may
register with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or marks, and the
purpose for which the containers so marked and used by them, under the same
conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance
of trademarks.

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has succesfully registered the marks of ownership
 in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles,
boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar
containers so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, disposed of, buy or
traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, to use the same, for
drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than
that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more
than one year or both.

SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller,
without written permission of the latter of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel
cylinders, tanks, flask, accumulators, or other similar containers, or the possession
thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in
casks, barrels, kegs boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators or other similar
containers, the same being duly marked or stamped and registered as herein provided,
shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.

The above-quoted provisions grant protection to a qualified manufacturer who successfully registered
with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks and other similar
containers. The mere use of registered bottles or containers without the written consent of the
manufacturer is prohibited, the only exceptions being when they are used as containers for "sisi,"
bagoong," "patis" and similar native products. 10

It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner Cagayan buys from junk dealers and retailers bottles which
bear the marks or names La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" and uses them as containers
for its own liquor products. The contention of Cagayan that the aforementioned bottles without the
words "property of" indicated thereon are not the registered bottles of LTI, since they do not conform
with the statement or description in the supporting affidavits attached to the original registration
certificate and renewal, is untenable.

Republic Act No. 623 which governs the registration of marked bottles and containers merely requires
that the bottles, in order to be eligible for registration, must be stamped or marked with the names of
the manufacturers or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership. No
drawings or labels are required but, instead, two photographs of the container, duly signed by the
applicant, showing clearly and legibly the names and other marks of ownership sought to be
registered and a bottle showing the name or other mark or ownership, irremovably stamped or
marked, shall be submitted. 11

The term "Name or Other Mark of Ownership" 12 means the name of the applicant or the name of his
principal, or of the product, or other mark of ownership. The second set of bottles of LTI without the
words "property of" substantially complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 623, as
amended, since they bear the name of the principal, La Tondeña Inc., and of its product, Ginebra San
Miguel. The omitted words "property of" are not of such vital indispensability such that the omission
thereof will remove the bottles from the protection of the law. The owner of a trade-mark or trade-
name, and in this case the marked containers, does not abandon it by making minor modifications in
the mark or name itself. 13 With much more reason will this be true where what is involved is the mere
omission of the words "property of" since even without said words the ownership of the bottles is
easily Identifiable. The words "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped on the bottles,
even without the words "property of," are sufficient notice to the public that those bottles so marked
are owned by LTI.
The claim of petitioner that hard liquor is not included under the term "other lawful beverages" as
provided in Section I of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, is without merit.
The title of the law itself, which reads " An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked
Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers" clearly shows the legislative
intent to give protection to all marked bottles and containers of all lawful beverages regardless of the
nature of their contents. The words "other lawful beverages" is used in its general sense, referring to
all beverages not prohibited by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. 14 Hard
liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law, hence it is within the purview and coverage of
Republic Act No. 623, as amended.

Republic Act No. 623, as amended, has for its purpose the protection of the health of the general
public and the prevention of the spread of contagious diseases. It further seeks to safeguard the
property rights of an important sector of Philippine industry. 15 As held by this Court in Destileria
Ayala, Inc. vs. Tan Tay & Co.,16 the purpose of then Act 3070, was to afford a person a means of
Identifying the containers he uses in the manufacture, preservation, packing or sale of his products so
that he may secure their registration with the Bureau of Commerce and Industry and thus prevent
other persons from using them. Said Act 3070 was substantially reenacted as Republic Act No.
623. 17

The proposition that Republic Act No. 623, as amended, protects only the containers of the soft drinks
enumerated by petitioner and those similar thereto, is unwarranted and specious. The rule
of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage of the law only to those
enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose
of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to only for the purpose of determining what
the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of
the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by
the appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.18

Moreover, the above conclusions are supported by the fact that the Philippine Patent Office, which is
the proper and competent government agency vested with the authority to enforce and implement
Republic Act No. 623, registered the bottles of respondent LTI as containers for gin and issued in its
name a certificate of registration with the following findings:

It appearing, upon due examination that the applicant is entitled to have the said
MARKS OR NAMES registered under R.A. No. 623, the said marks or names have
been duly registered this day in the PATENT OFFICE under the said Act, for gin,
Ginebra San Miguel. 19

While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, it is entitled to great weight
and consideration. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of
government called upon to implement the particular law involved. 20

Just as impuissant is petitioners contention that respondent court erred in holding that there is no
need for LTI to display the words "Reg Phil. Pat. Off." in order to succeed in its injunction suit against
Cagayan for the illegal use of the bottles. To repeat, Republic Act No. 623 governs the registration of
marked bottles and containers and merely requires that the bottles and/or containers be marked or
stamped by the names of the manufacturer or the names of their principals or products or other
marks of ownership. The owner upon registration of its marked bottles, is vested by law with an
exclusive right to use the same to the exclusion of others, except as a container for native products. A
violation of said right gives use to a cause of action against the violator or infringer.
While Republic Act No. 623, as amended, provides for a criminal action in case of violation, a civil
action for damages is proper under Article 20 of the Civil Code which provides that every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same. This particular provision of the Civil Case was clearly meant to complement all legal provisions
which may have inadvertently failed to provide for indemnification or reparation of damages when
proper or called for. In the language of the Code Commission "(t)he foregoing rule pervades the entire
legal system, and renders it impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provisions, should find himself without relief." 21 Moreover, under Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, a person entitled to the exclusive use of a registered mark or
tradename may recover damages in a civil action from any person who infringes his rights. He may
also, upon proper showing, be granted injunction.

It is true that the aforesaid law on trademarks provides:

SEC. 21. Requirements of notice of registration of trade-mark.-The registrant of a trade-

mark, heretofore registered or registered under the provisions of this Act, shall give
notice that his mark is registered by displaying with the same as used the words
'Registered in the Philippines Patent Office' or 'Reg Phil. Pat. Off.'; and in any suit for
infringement under this Act by a registrant failing so to mark the goods bearing the
registered trade-mark, no damages shall be recovered under the provisions of this Act,
unless the defendant has actual notice of the registration.

Even assuming that said provision is applicable in this case, the failure of LTI to make said marking
will not bar civil action against petitioner Cagayan. The aforesaid requirement is not a condition sine
qua non for filing of a civil action against the infringer for other reliefs to which the plaintiff may be
entitled. The failure to give notice of registration will not deprive the aggrieved party of a cause of
action against the infringer but, at the most, such failure may bar recovery of damages but only under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 166.

However, in this case an award of damages to LTI is ineluctably called for. Petitioner cannot claim
good faith. The record shows that it had actual knowledge that the bottles with the blown-in marks "La
Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" are duly registered. In Civil Case No. 102859 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled "La Tondeña Inc. versus Diego Lim, doing business under the name
and style 'Cagayan Valley Distillery,' " a decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff therein on the basis
of the admission and/or acknowledgment made by the defendant that the bottles marked only with the
words "La Tondeña Inc." and "Ginebra San Miguel" are registered bottles of LTI. 22

Petitioner cannot avoid the effect of the admission and/or acknowledgment made by Diego Lim in the
said case. While a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stock-holders and from other
corporations with which it may be connected, where the discreteness of its personality is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two corporations, merge them into one.
When the corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, it may be disregaded. 23

Petitioner's claim that it is separate and distinct from the former Cagayan Valley Distillery is belied by
the evidence on record. The following facts warrant the conclusion that petitioner, as a corporate
entity, and Cagayan Valley Distillery are one and the same. to wit: (1) petitioner is being managed by
Rogelio Lim, the son of Diego Lim, the owner and manager of Cagayan Valley Distellery; (2) it is a
family corporation; 24 (3) it is an admitted fact that before petitioner was incorporated it was under a
single proprietorship; 25 (4) petitioner is engaged in the same business as Cagayan Valley Distillery,
the manufacture of wines and liquors; and (5) the factory of petitioner is located in the same place as
the factory of the former Cagayan Valley Distillery.

It is thus clear that herein petitioner is a mere continuation and successor of Cagayan Valley Distillery.
It is likewise indubitable that the admission made in the former case, as earlier explained, is binding
on it as cogent proof that even before the filing of this case it had actual knowledge that the bottles in
dispute were registered containers of LTI As held in La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc., et al. vs.
Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana (KKM), et al., 26 where the main purpose in forming
the corporation was to evade one's subsidiary liability for damages in a criminal case, the corporation
may not be heard to say that it has a personality separate and distinct from its members, because to
allow it to do so would be to sanction the use of the fiction of corporate entity as a shield to further an
end subversive of justice.

Anent the several motions of private respondent LTI to have petitioner cited for contempt, we reject
the argument of petitioner that an appeal from a verdict of acquittal in a contempt, proceeding
constitutes double jeopardy. A failure to do something ordered by the court for the benefit of a party
constitutes civil contempt. 27 As we held in Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Jacinto Rubber &
Plastics Co., Inc.:

...True it is that generally, contempt proceedings are characterized as criminal in nature,

but the more accurate juridical concept is that contempt proceedings may actually be
either civil or criminal, even if the distinction between one and the other may be so thin
as to be almost imperceptible. But it does exist in law. It is criminal when the purpose is
to vindicate the authority of the court and protect its outraged dignity. It is civil when
there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party
(3 Moran Rules of Court, pp. 343-344, 1970 ed.; see also Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, 58 Phil. 272; Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741.) And with this
distinction in mind, the fact that the injunction in the instant case is manifestly for the
benefit of plaintiffs makes of the contempt herein involved civil, not criminal. Accordingly,
the conclusion is inevitable that appellees have been virtually found by the trial court
guilty of civil contempt, not criminal contempt, hence, the rule on double jeopardy may
not be invoked. 28

The contempt involved in this case is civil and constructive in nature, it having arisen from the act of
Cagayan in violating the writ of preliminary injunction of the lower court which clearly defined the
forbidden act, to wit:

NOW THEREFORE, pending the resolution of this case by the court, you are enjoined
from using the 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks La Tondeña Inc.,' and 'Ginebra
San Miguel' blown-in or stamped into the bottles as containers for the defendant's
products. 19

On this incident, two considerations must be borne in mind. Firstly, an injunction duly issued must be
obeyed, however erroneous the action of the court may be, until its decision is overruled by itself or
by a higher court. 30Secondly, the American rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively
with the court contemned does not apply in this Jurisdiction. The provision of the present Section 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as to where the charge may be filed is permissive in nature and is
merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish contumacious conduct. Said rules do not
extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. 31 In appropriate case therefore,
this Court may, in the interest of expedient justice, impose sanctions on contemners of the lower
courts.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended, creates a prima facie presumption against Cagayan
for its unlawful use of the bottles registered in the name of LTI Corollarily, the writ of injunction
directing petitioner to desist from using the subject bottles was properly issued by the trial court.
Hence, said writ could not be simply disregarded by Cagayan without adducing proof sufficient to
overcome the aforesaid presumption. Also, based on the findings of respondent court, and the
records before us being sufficient for arbitrament without remanding the incident to the court
a quo petitioner can be adjudged guilty of contempt and imposed a sanction in this appeal since it is a
cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, 32We so impose such penalty concordant with the preservative principle and as
demanded by the respect due the orders, writs and processes of the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner is hereby declared in contempt of court and
ORDERED to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles. Boxes, Casks, Kegs,
Barrels and Other Similar Containers.

2 Original Record, Civil Case No. 2668. 6-12.

3 Ibid., Id., 1-14.

4 Ibid., Id., 44.

5 Ibid., Id., 45-53.

6 Ibid., Id., 71-73.

7 Penned by Judge Efren N. Ambrosia.

8 Rollo. 45-, Justice Jose C. Campos Jr., ponente, with Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr.
concurring and Justice Reynato S. Puno concurring in the result.

9 Rollo, 7-8, 13-14. 16, 18.

10 Sec. 6. Republic Act No. 623, as amended.

11 Rules 128 and 129, Revised Rules of Practice Before the Philippine Patent Office in
Trademark Cases.

12 Rule 33, Id., citing Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 623.

13 Drexel Enterprises, Inc. vs. Richardson, (CA10 Kan) 312 F2d 525, Beech-Nut
Packing Co. vs. P. Lorillard Co. (DC NJ) 299 F 834, affd f(CA3 NJ) 7 F2d 967, affd 273
US 629, 71 L. Ed 810, 47 SCT 481, as cited in 74 Am. Jur. 2d, 726.

14 Burntein vs. U.S., CC. A. Cal., 55 F2d 599, 603; Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth
Edition. 204.

15 Congressional Record, Vol. 11, No. 69, 942; Exh. 6. Civil Case No. 2668, Folio of
Exhibits, 3.

16 74 Phil. 301 (1943).

17 Explanatory Note, House Bill No. 1112, Congressional Record, 2-733-2734, Second
Congress of the Republic, First Session, Vol. I, No. 80. Session of May 18.1950.

18 U. S. vs. Sto. Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909).

19 Exh. B, Original Record,. Civil Case No. 2668, 6.

20 Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 (1967).

21 Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines
(1948), 39.

22 Exh. F, F-2, Original Record, Civil Case No. 2668, 270-275,

23 Yutivo & Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 1 SCRA 161 (1961)

24 Original Record, Civil Case No. 2668, TSN, Sept. 19, 1984. 3

25 Ibid., Id., TSN, Nov. 13, 1984, 120-121.

26 93 Phil.. 160 (1953).

27 Mabale, et al. vs. Apalisok, et al., 88 SCRA 234 (1979).

28 97 SCRA 158 (1980),

29 Original Record, Civil Case No. 2668,109.

30 Harden vs. Pena, et al., 87 Phil. 620 (1950).

31 People vs.De Luna. et al., 102 Phil. 968 (1958).

32 Alger Electric Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 37 (1985); Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 157 SCRA 357 (1988).
 Expressio unius est exclusion alterius
 The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others.
 Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:
o Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
o Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis - A thing not being
excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule
o Expressio unius est exclusion alterius – The expression of one or more
things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all
would have been implied had none been expressed; opposite the doctrine of
necessary implication

Negative-opposite doctrine
 Argumentum a contrario - what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Application of expression unius rule

 Generally used in construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and
remedies, restricting common rights, imposing rights & forfeitures, as well as
statutes strictly construed.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
 Issue: whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i.e., renovation of church
without securing permit for Department of Social Services, is a violation of PD 1564,
making it a criminal offense for a person to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes.
 Held: No. Charitable and religious specifically enumerated only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their
remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that
purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a
community member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic
organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the
purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against
petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that
Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes,
but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied 3 by
the trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits
ensued.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and
petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of
P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its
finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been
criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.

Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10.
However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with
respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the
decision of the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act
committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno
to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the court. 6

Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy
eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for
religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial
sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is
gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions
intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and
(3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an
abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation
Permit Law), provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or

receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit
from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application
for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social
Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative
may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the
application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any
permit issued under Act 4075.

The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed
in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.

I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is
only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two
terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e)
(corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National
Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the
Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.

That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not
have so stated expressly.

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious
activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be
a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term
"charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious
purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has
been done away with by statute. 10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable
of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a
very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given
such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer.
However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been
liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the
term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any
property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be
subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for "religious purposes"
was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance tax. 12

On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under
paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term
"charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes.
Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such
interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to
spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a
penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as
to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to
be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be
criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them
such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its
intendment. 13

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of
description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is
charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not
operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.

Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the
enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the
disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or"
is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. 16 Accordingly,
"charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or"
should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why
the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for,
otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under
the Constitution.

It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and,
consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it
is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to
solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free
exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes
imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise
of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is,
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on
the protected
freedom. 17

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that
the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit
funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports
to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of
religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more
religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve
any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to
any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation
would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21

Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on
by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes,
succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the
fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The State has authority under
the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of
contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of
common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes
should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable
limits the worthy from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are
prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in
 23
campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. Some regulation of public
solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty
imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby
caused damage to the complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other
accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant,
an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult question of
law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.

There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or
otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be reflective
upon her objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional
Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be
vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist any pressure from whatever
source.26

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is
not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for
"charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not
like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and
the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious
faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those
solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does
not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of
fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are
usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against
fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to
lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license
fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because
that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that
religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other
uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be
avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.

Padilla, J., concurs.

# Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is
not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for
"charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not
like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and
the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious
faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those
solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does
not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of
fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are
usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against
fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to
lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license
fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because
that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that
religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other
uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be
avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.

Padilla, J., concurs.

#Footnotes

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.

2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20.

3 Annex D, id.; ibid., 34.

4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 40.

5 Annex H, id.; ibid., 44.

6 Annex J, id.; ibid., 64.

7 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 48886-88, July
21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665.

8 Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d 84.

9 See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep. 424.

10 See Read vs. McLean, 200 So. 109.

11 In re Seaman's Estate, 139 N.E. 2d 17.

12 In re Clark's Estate, 159 A. 500.

13 Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., 183.

14 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 69809, October 16, 1986,
145 SCRA 112.

15 Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. vs. Board, 402 P. ed. 802.

 16 Martin, op. cit., 81.

17 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940).

18 Id., loc. cit.

19 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 283.

20 Ibid., id., 282.

21 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra.

22 Id., loc. cit.

23 City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598.

24 Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et al., 170 A. 720.

25 Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

26 Rule 1.03. id.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

1 101 Phil. 386 (1957).

2 B.P. Blg. 880, § 3(a).

Doctrine of casus omissus

 A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.
 The maxim operates only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and
in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be
included therein.
 Exception: where legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or object
from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may
supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and
will not do violence to its language

Doctrine of last antecedent

 Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated not those which are distantly or remotely located.
 Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia – relative words
refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires
 Rule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant
influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent.
 Illustration of rule
Florentino v. PNB
 Issue: whether holders of backpay certificates can compel government-owned banks
to accept said certificates in payment of the holder’s obligations to the bank.
 Statute: “obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act for
which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches
or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to
any citizens of the Philippines or to any association or corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such
settlement”
 Held: the court, invoking the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase
qualify only to its last antecedent namely “any citizen of the Philippines or
association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines”
 The court held that backpay certificate holders can compel government-owned banks
to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations with the bank.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8782 April 28, 1956

MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee.

Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants.

Ramon de los Reyes for appellee.

JUGO, J.:

The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition
for mandamus against respondent and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to compel it to accept the
backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the
Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by
real estate mortgage on certain properties.

The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which reads as follows:

Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the following facts:

1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus
interest, the same having been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954;.

2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties;.

3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No.

1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897
approved on June 20, 1953; and.
 4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank
with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to
accept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate;

The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides:

SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by Republic Act Numbered
Eight hundred, is further amended to read:

SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in
section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and
regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file
requests for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one
hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state
the total amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be
redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their
issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and
regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may
be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries
or wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the
face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant
may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this
amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its
branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to
any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.

The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement"
refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations
owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the
Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.

The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause
refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.

Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 879 was to include
veterans of the Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay
Law, Republic Act No. 304, in recognition of their great sacrifices in the resistance movement. as
shown by the following quotation from the Congressional Record:

. . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by this public servant for three
objectives: First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or
disabled veterans, and to their wives or orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices
of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause
of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the discrimination that has been committed either
through oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the Philippine Army, the Philippine
Scouts, and guerrillas or the so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the resistance movement.
(Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74;
quoted in Appellant's brief, pages 13-14.).
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should
be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
from the preceding ones.

But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent
and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first
place, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would
render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of the
obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable
within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one.

The other reason is found in the Congressional Record, which says:

Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and "act", insert the word
"amendatory".

Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?.

Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the provision of section 2. I believe,
gentleman from Cebu, that section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the use of
backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government.
(Congressional Record No. 64, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session May 11, 1953 page 41;
quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.).

As there would have been no need to permit by law the use of backpay certificates in payment of
debts to private persons, if they are willing to accept them, the permission necessarily refers to the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies or other instrumentalities, etc.

Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the
Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their
backpay certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its
entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.

The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different
from the present one. In the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was
incurred on January 27, 1950. He brought the action on November 10, 1950, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which was approved on June 18, 1948; that is, one year and almost
eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 304,
because said section provides that the application for recognition of backpay must have been filed
within one year after the approval of said Act No. 304, and the debt must be subsisting at the time of
said approval, Diokno having incurred the debt on January 27, 1950, and brought action on
November 10, 1950. It was, therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation to accept or not his backpay certificate in payment.

The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, held that the phrase "who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not
apply to the Government or its agencies.

The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice, in his letter of June 19, 1953, remarked
that the clause "who may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all antecedents, including the
Government and its agencies. We are not impressed with this observation of the Secretary, for we
believe that his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, correct for the reasons we have stated above.

In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his debt to the Philippine National Bank on
January 2, 1953; hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was
approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of
the Amendatory Act No. 897.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to
accept the backpay certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment
of his above cited debt to the appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he
offered said backpay certificate in payment. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.