REAL/OBJECT DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
A team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner (JUNIE
LALLILIN) in Barangay Tugos, SorsogonCity .
The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3
Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and
SPO2 Romeo Gallinera(Gallinera) as members. The search conducted in the
presence of barangay kagawad.
Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his
mother, Norma allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five
(5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance
and was charged with violation of Section 11,[7] Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and was condemned to prison for
twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine
of P300,000.00.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17)
years as maximum.
ISSUE:
WON there are certain irregularities in the manner by which the
warrant of search and seizure conducted.
HELD:
Yes.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that
the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established
with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized
by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.[33] Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.[34] Be that as it may, the mere
fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable
mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than
just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in
the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make
a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has
failed to observe its uniqueness. The exhibits level of susceptibility
to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application
of the chain of custody rule.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not
readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close
its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in
the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or
otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence
was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which
are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to
render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as
to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of
the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only
Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the
identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed
over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia,
the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for
chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to
establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items.
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative
answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the
seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits
were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure
and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of
Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the
circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she
did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she
delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of
establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not
only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to
the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of
substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the
five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the
prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner
and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of
irregularities committed by the police officers from
the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission
of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of
the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife,
that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out
of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the
testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding
team at the door of petitionershouse in order to forestall the likelihood of
petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively
explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in
the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he would
flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two
filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after
petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able
to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude
that he was away.
The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized
from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the
same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly
militates a finding of guilt.
Reversed and set aside. ACQUITTED
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431. May 9, 2003]
SPO2 JOSE B. YAP, complainant, vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ,
JR., respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by SPO2 Jose B. Yap of
Matag-ob, Leyte Police Station against Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Kananga-Matag-ob, same province,
for grave abuse of authority and acts unbecoming a judge.
SPO2 Jose B. Yap, alleged that on March 6, 1999 (Saturday), pursuant
to an alias arrest warrant, he arrested Antonio Laurente, Jr., the for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, pending in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) at
Ormoc City.
On the same day, March 6, Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquezrespondent
judge issued an Order of Release[1] on the basis of a cash bond posted on
March 8, 1999, as shown by the corresponding Official Receipt No.
9215725.[2]also on the same day he issued another Order of Release, based
on a property bond.
Complainant claimed that respondent judge issued the two (2) Orders
of Release on March 6, 1999 although there was yet no cash bond or
property bond, for actually the cash bond was posted on March 8, while the
property bond was filed on March 10.
Clearly, respondent judge ordered the release of the accused
prematurely. Complainant finally alleged that the accused is the relative of
respondents wife.
Respondent judge claimed that O.R. No. 9215725 was actually issued to
Almoroto on March 6 after he had posted the cash bond that same
day. Respondent judge insisted though that it was Clerk of Court Veloso
who altered the date appearing thereon, from March 6 to March 8, 1999,
since complainant angrily protested that Veloso should not issue an official
receipt dated March 6, 1999 as it was a Saturday, a non-working day.
Executive Judge Madrona recommended the dismissal of the charges
for lack of merit.
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, adopted the findings of
Executive Judge Madrona but modified the same.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of two Orders of release by the respondent judge is valid.
HELD:
No it is not valid.
It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral
evidence, the former carries more weight. The cash bond was posted on
March 8 (Monday), not on March 6, 1999, as shown by O.R. No.
9215725. The property bond, in substitution of the cash bond, was filed, not
on March 6, but on March 10 (Wednesday), as shown by the jurat. Both
Orders of Release were issued on March 6 (Saturday).Therefore, there is no
doubt that respondent judge ordered the release of the accused despite the
fact that there was yet no bail filed and approved for his provisional liberty.
That respondent judge issued the release orders prematurely is not
difficult to understand. He admitted that accused Antonio Laurente, Jr. is his
wifes relative. And in his desire to help the accused and please his wife, he
would even involve his Clerk of Court and Interpreter. Considering the facts
of this case, it is safe to conclude that they were constrained to comply with
his instructions. Hence, they should have been spared from any
administrative sanction.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that an accused may only be released on bail after the
corresponding cash or property bond has been properly posted.Respondent
judge violated this Rule when he issued the two Orders of Release on March
6, 1999 in favor of accused Antonio Laurente, Jr. despite the fact that the
corresponding cash or property bond was posted only thereafter, or on
March 8 and March 10, 1999, respectively.
Moreover, records show that upon approval of the property bond filed
after the release of the accused, respondent judge failed to order the
cancellation of the cash bond. Neither did he require the accused, within
ten (10) days from the approval of the bond, to cause the annotation of the
bail as lien in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds and on the
corresponding tax declaration in the office of the provincial, city or
municipal assessor concerned, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, quoted earlier.
WHEREFORE, Judge AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR. is declared GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT and is FINED in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Vda. De Corpuz versus Brabangco 59 O.G. 8262
FACTS:
Tiburcia Brabangco is the declared owner of two parcels of land at
Bu g a n g , A l i m o d i a , I l o i l o , w h i c h t h e s u r v i v i n g w i d o w a n d
c h i l d r e n o f German Corpus alleged were sold by the former to Corpus in
11925 for P450 of which P300 was paid right upon the execution of the
deed of sale in due form, as witnessed by "ablo and Bonifacio
Villareal and acknowledged by Tiburcia before the Notary Public. The
balance was also alleged to have been paid by Corpus to Tiburcia,
as evidenced by a receipt. Corpu’s heirs claim that Corpus had
been in possession of said lands from 1925 until his death.
Six months after Corpus’ death, defendants with the help of the
policemen entered the property cut down and carried away several
bamboos and sacks of corn. Tiburcia denied having sold the land, alledging
that she simply accommodated and allowed the Corpuses to build their
evacuation cottage when Japanese forces occupied the Philippines.
Corpus heirs could not produce the deed of sale which had allegedly
lost during the war. The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs and upheld the
sale.
ISSUE:
WON Corpus heirs able to establish the contents of the deed of sale
despite the absence of the original.
HELD:
Yes.
As the heirs alleged, the original deed of sale signed by Tiburcia
was lost during the war. Corpus’ heirs made efforts to trace the
whereabouts of Notary Public Jose Tirador to get a copy of the deed, but
the latter’s children said that their parents were already dead and that their
house in which their father had kept his documents had burned down.
The existence of the deed,
ho w e v e r , w a s c o n v i n c i n g l y p r o v e n n o t o n l y b y t h e t e s t i m
o n y o f C o r p u s ’ widow, and by the environmental facts
disclosed by the evidence, but also by the disinterested
testimony of Pablo Ableza, a municipal councilor who s e r v e d a s
one of the witnesses in the execution of the sale. After
proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the
i n s t r u m e n t , a n d i t s l o s s o r destruction, oral evidence may be
given of its contents by any person who signed the document or read
it.
[G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XIII, PACITA
MADRIGAL-GONZALES, ANGELITA CENTENO, JULIA CARPIO, CALIXTO
HERMOSA, and CRISPULA R. PAGARAN alias PULA, Respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are charged with the crime of
falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public officials and
employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution
to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and
from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the
said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of
such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita
Madrigal Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever been
made.
The prosecution tried to establish the fact that falsification was done by
presenting booklet receipts containing the triplicate copies, for the original
invoices were sent to the Manila office of the company. However,
judgeBienvenido Tan held that that the triplicates are not admissible unless
it is first proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON triplicate or duplicate copies of invoices/ receipts are admissible as
evidence.
HELD:
Yes, it is admissible.
If the documents or papers to be introduced in evidence were produced by
the use of carbon sheets, and which thereby produced a facsimile of the
originals including the figures and the signatures on the originals, they are
regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as such, even
without accounting for the non-production of the other originals.
"SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest
grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate
sales slip’ (People v. Stone, 349 Ill. 52, 181 N. E. 648) has been held to be
primary evidence, p. 616.
"SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. — Where letters are produced by mechanical
means and, concurrently with the original, duplicate are produced, as by
placing carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at
the same time, all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may be
introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the
other.
"SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on
the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and these have
been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals.
G.R. No. L-28999 May 24, 1977
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALLIED FREE WORKERS
UNION, SALVADOR T. LLUCH, MARIANO LL. BADELLES, individually and in
their capacities as President and Vice-President, respectively of the Allied
Free Workers Union, NICANOR HALEBAS and LAURENTINO LL. BADELLES,
individually and officers of Allied Free Workers Union, defendants-
appellants.
FACTS:
On August 11, 1952 the CompañiaMaritima and the Allied Free
Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to
perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees. vessels at Iligan
City, for a period of one(1) month. CompañiaMaritima has a right to revoke
the contract if union failed to render proper service.
Shippers and consigners paid the union for arrastre work but
refused to pay the stevedoring service, CompañiaMaritima refused to pay
the stevedoring service also for it does not stipulated in the contract. Union
requested CompañiaMaritimato recognize it as SEBA but
CompañiaMaritima refused.CompañiaMaritima thru Teves (branch
manager) terminated the contract; Union filed charges of Unfair Labor
Practice.
CompañiaMaritima entered the same contract with another
association; union picketed the wharf and prevented the new workers from
performing their work; CompañiaMaritima sued the union and its officers
for rescission of contract and to enjoin unjoin union from interfering with
the loading/unloading of cargo recovery of damages.
 RTC ruled in favor of CompañiaMaritima. It was held that the
officers of the union are solidarily liable for the amount adjudged. Union
appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence presented by CompañiaMaritima warrants the award of
damages in its favor.
HELD:
No.
The trial court's award to the company of P450,000 as damages, is not
supported by the evidence. The best evidence on the cost of the said
equipment would have been the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony
of Teves. He did not produce the sales invoices.
The basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by
the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the sum of P
450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants'
reports and in the statement made by the consignees, chief clerk (who did
not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
The rule that accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of the
rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of
the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130,
Rules of Court) cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous
character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based,
was not duly established (U. S. vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am
Jur 2nd 529).
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and
accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the
company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination (29 Am Jur
2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S. 111).
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the
original records, books of accounts, reports or the like" (Anno 52 ALR 1266).
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed
to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending
the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as
evidence by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529).
The documents and records on which the statement was based should have
been proforma as evidence or at least brought to the court for examination
by the union's counsel and its accountant.
To avoid fraud or fabrication, the documents evidencing the alleged
expenses. should have been proformain evidence. Siojo's reports were not
the best evidence on the said operating expenses. The explanation of
Badelles with respect to shutout cargoes and our observations on Jayme's
summaries are applicable to accountant Siojo's reports.
G.R. No. L-23893 October 29, 1968
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSEBIO E. FERRER,
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION,defendants.
EUSEBIO E. FERRER and PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., defendants-appellants.PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., third-party plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE M. VILLARAMA, third-party
defendant-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
FACTS:
Prior to 1959, Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation,
Villa Rey Transit, pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him
by the Public Service Commission.Later, he sold the certificates to the
Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. (Pantranco) with the condition
that the seller (Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10 years, apply for any
TPU service identical or competing with the buyer."
Barely three months thereafter, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
(the Corporation) was organized, NatividadVillarama (wife of Jose Villarama)
was one of theincorporators.
In less than a month after its registration with the SEC, the Corporation
bought five certificates of public convenience and 49 buses from one
Valentin Fernando. Later, the Sheriff of Manila levied on 2 of the 5
certificates , in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, judgment creditor, against Fernando,
judgment debtor. Apublic sale was conducted. Ferrer was the highest
bidder. Ferrer sold the two certificates to Pantranco.The Corporation filed a
complaint against Ferrer, Pantranco and the PSC for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale. Pantranco, on its part, filed a third-party complaint against
Villarama, alleging that Villaramaand/or the Corporation was disqualified
from operating the two certificates in question by virtue of theprevious
agreement. The trial court declared null and void the sheriff's sale
of two certificates of publicconvenience in favor of Ferrer and the
subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco and declaringVilla Rey
Transit, Inc., to be the lawful owner of the said certificates of public
convenience.Pantranco disputes the correctness of the decision insofar as it
holds that Villa Rey Transit, Inc.(Corporation) is a distinct and separate
entity from Villarama. Ferrer, for his part, challenges the decisioninsofar as
it holds that the sheriff's sale is null and void.
ISSUE:
WON the photostatic copies of evidence presented are valid and admissible,
showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions
with those made in the name of the Corporation
HELD:
Yes, admissible as secondary evidence.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of
the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2)
reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory
proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the
original in court.11 Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth
requisites.12As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files
of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them.13 Regarding the
first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the
issuance of the subpoena ducestecum, the originals were already missing,
therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same.
However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary
evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his
adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that
the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required
that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being
notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession.
Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his
possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best
evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court."1 The originals of the vouchers in question must be
deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss.
The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that
Villarama has been too much involved in the affairs of the Corporation to
altogether negative the claim that he was only a part-time general manager.
They show beyond doubt that the Corporation is his alter ego.
It is significant that not a single one of the acts enumerated or mentioned as
proof of Villarama's oneness with the Corporation has been denied by him.
On the contrary, he has admitted them with offered excuses.
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.] 192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y
LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 in the afternoon, Makati Police
Station dispatched several police officers and detectives to conduct a buy-
bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
 The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of
marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit). They arrested Tandoy and his companion and took from
him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and
crushed leaves. Accused denied all the allegations.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the prosecution.
ISSUE:
WON the xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust
money is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
Yes it is admissible.
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are
the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such
document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant
to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin,
op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely
for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other
substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
[G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003]
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S.
TEODORO, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Citibank operates a credit card system which it extends credit
accommodationsto its cardholders for the purchase of goods and services.
Respondent Efren S. Teodorowas one such cardholder. On December
14, 1990, he applied and was approved for membership with Citibank
(petitioner). A card was issued and Teodoromade various purchases through
his credit card.
Accordingly, he was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which
he tenderedvarious payments.
Citibank claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations
ofrespondent amounted to P191, 693.25, inclusive of interest and service
charges.
Severaltimes it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay,
claiming that the amountdemanded did not correspond to his actual
obligations. His refusal prompted petitionerto file a Complaint for collection
The RTC, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over theover
the amount involved but then was then transferred to the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.
MTC ordered Teodoro to pay Citibank the amount of P24,388.36 plus
interest and penalty fee.
The Court held that the Statement of Account alone will not prove that
Teodoro has an outstanding obligation to Citibank in the amount of
P191,693.95. This must be substantiated by the Sales Invoices which
unearthed the purchases made by Teodorowhen he availed himself of the
credit card of Citibank.
The RTC affirmed MTC’s decision.
On appeal, the CA ruled that photocopies of the sales invoices or
charge slips were insufficient evidence to prove any liability on respondents
part. Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original
sales invoices, it failed to prove their due execution or to account for their
loss or unavailability.
ISSUE:
Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips are
admissible in evidence.
HELD:
Not admissible as evidence.
 The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its
case based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil
cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.Petitioner
failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal amount
of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had
presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been
admissible, they would still have had little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove
the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary
evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror,
failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3[ of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of their
admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the
absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if
necessary.
The existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to
prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court
after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not
be used without accounting for the other originals.
Triplicates were produced. Each of these three copies is regarded as an
original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and
that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
FACTS:
VeronicoTenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him
and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro.
In a handwritten letter,Villareyes confirmed that VeronicoTenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Tenebro
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven for the fact
that here being no record of such. He further argued that his second
marriage with Ancajas has been declared ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged with bigamy.
ISSUE:
WON Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD:
Yes, he is guilty of bigamy.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and
oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and
Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy
of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, (2) certification
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila and National Statistics Office
(3) a handwritten letter informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were
legally married.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and
the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to
all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. –
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its
contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing
offices have no record of such a marriage.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after
the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence presented to prove the first and
second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
[G.R. No. 159288. October 19, 2004]
JOHNSON LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE
MARKETING, INC., respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was incorporated on January 27, 1978 with
funds provided by the Uy Family.
On June 11, 1987, the NMI sold and delivered to the Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. (VMCI), several pieces of empty white bags and NMI issued
several Charge Invoices in every transactions. In payment of said purchases
from NMI, VMCI drew and issued two Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
Checks.
Notices were sent to all stockholders of record, confirming the scheduled
meeting for the dissolution of the corporation which was later on approved.
Johnson Lee, failed to turn over to NMI the P1,500,150.00 he received
in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI.
A verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa was filed against the
petitioner and Sonny Moreno which appended were photocopies of Charge
Invoices issued by NMI to VMCI.
To prove the loss, destruction or non-availability of the original copies
of the charge invoices and checks, as well as the authenticity and due
execution thereof, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who testified
that she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner.
That VMCI’s two clerks informed Flores the difficulty of locating the
checks for they were stored in the bodega. Flores also testified the
authenticity of the signatures of PMI’s president whom she had been
working.
Flores, was able to secure microfilm copies of the checks from
Solidbank, and was sure that the copies of the checks and invoices were
faithful reproductions of the original copies thereof.
Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, testified that
the checks, including their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985.
She also testified on the Certification issued by Carolina Diaz, the
Comptroller of VMCI, confirming the loss of the two checks. She, however,
admitted that she did not see the original copies of the checks and that she
was not a signatory thereto.
The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. The defense contends that
the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity and due execution of the
offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission thereof as the
secondary evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the photocopies of invoices offered as secondary evidence be
admitted without proof of its loss or unavailability and execution of the
original
HELD:
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of
electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and
the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has
expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy
a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings
in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as
reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.38
The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the issues such as
the nature, appearance or condition of physical objects or to evidence
relating to a matter which does not come from the foundation of the cause
of action or defense; or when a party uses a document to prove the
existence of an independent fact, as to which the writing is merely collated
or incidental.39
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates
thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the
part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;40 (b) the
proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c)
it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or places.41 It has been
held that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more
strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.42
If the document is one in which other persons are also interested, and
which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the
custodian must be required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such
search must be shown, before secondary evidence can be admitted.43 The
certificate of the custody of the document is incompetent to prove the loss
or destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by some person who has
knowledge of such loss.44
The proponent is also burdened to prove the due execution or
existence of the original as provided in Rule 130, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court:
When the original document is unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure on how the authenticity and due execution of a private
document which is offered as authentic may be proved:
Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private
document must be positive. He must state that the document was actually
executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. The admission
of that party against whom the document is offered, of the authenticity and
due execution thereof, is admissible in evidence to prove the existence,
authenticity and due execution of such document.
G.R. No. 143338 July 29, 2005
The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. (SOLIDBANK) versus Del
Monte Motors Works, Inc. et al.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaintfor recovery of sum of money against
respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales
(respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner, alleges that it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory
note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory
note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation)
and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the
full amount of the loan.
Respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of
the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the
promissory note. Despite oral and written demands made respondents still
failed to pay their indebtedness.
Petitioner attached to its complaint photocopy of the promissory note.
 During trial the court admitted into evidence the photocopy of the
duplicate original of the promissory note and granted respondents motion
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
that they be allowed to amend their respective answers to conform with
this new evidence.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R.
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR.,
The trial court dismissed the case.
GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN
FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES
ISSUE:
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO,
Respondents.
WON the photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note be
admitted as secondary evidence.
FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
HELD:
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was
primarily tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth
The risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the
amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
justification for the best evidence rule, this rule finds no application to this
relatives and associates.
case.
It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office
conditions of the promissory note thus leaving the court to conclude that as
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion,
far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E.
is clear enough and leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive
Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R.
pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of
Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-
consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also
Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity.
These contentions clearly do not question the precise wording[of the
Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive
promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the
participation and collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and
best evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to
Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing
sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.
Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon
Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil
undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten
Procedure is not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions
wealth allegation.
one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the
possession of the adverse party.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein
respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground that the
When the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due
documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.
execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the
plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the
On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the
defendant.
documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their
evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong
Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun
Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their
respective Demurrers to Evidence.
On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers
to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration
orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are
accordingly lifted.
With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene
Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted that their involvement in
the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did the
documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court held
that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and
that the originals were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated
by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out
that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the
originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of
Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all
three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation
in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses
used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus
company PANTRANCO.
Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the
allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate
howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that
they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the
documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for
being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented as
witnesses.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence presented and offered violated the best evidence rule of
the Rules of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated or
photocopied
RULING:
The photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which
mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself.
Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason
why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the
court such documents as secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly
excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original
thereof need not be presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are
not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public
document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the
purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by
the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules
provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer
in custody thereof may prove its contents.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by
satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss,
destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence
and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of
the abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff.
It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they
would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and
identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the
offered documentary evidence futile and worthless in alleged accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were
concerned. Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents
respective Demurrer to evidence.
G.R. No. 142641 July 17, 2006
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law." He obtained a loan
from complainant Josefino Cenizal. Arceo issued a check but when
deposited was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason of insufficient
funds.
A complaint was filed. However, the check in question and the return slip
were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss
regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip.
After trial, Arceo was found guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
Arceo contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check
during the trial. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction is valid despite the non presentation of the dishonored
check.
HELD:
Yes.
Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best
evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or
existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless
check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution
of the check, not its content.
Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip
and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation.
Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by
Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he
was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence
and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in
his testimony during the trial of the case.
[G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004]
ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
An Information for violation of BP 22 was filed against Bayani Magdayao.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to
adduce its evidence, the Magdayao and his counsel were absent.
On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence.
The prosecution marked a photocopy of the check and asked for the
continuance due to petitioner’s absence.
After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, the
prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of the PNB Check which the
court admitted.
The court ruled against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the machine or photostatic copy of the check is admissible as
evidence.
HELD:
Magdayao never produced the original of the check, much less offered
to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the
check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his
numerous unjustified postponements.
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose
of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is
the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the
adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production
would expose and defeat.[10] As long as the original evidence can be had, the
court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature,
such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original
writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such
photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren
of probative weight.[11]
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary
evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that
the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses
to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof
of its existence:
When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done
all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party
to produce the document.[12] The notice may be in the form of a motion for
the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.[13]
[G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998]
HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO
MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed
MADRID, respondents.
FACTS:
Heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz filed an action for reconveyance with
damages against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in
Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela.
In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought
by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid
brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and
since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open
possession of the property. However, sometime in October 1986, much to
their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens
Title over the said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of
sale and assuming that said document exists, the same is fictitious and
falsified.
 During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of
sale since it was lost.
Consequently, they were constrained to offer, a photo copy of the
purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the
transaction.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that photo copy of the
purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale was admissible in
evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it was
offered during trial.
Defendants omission to object on the proper ground operated as a waiver,
as this was a matter resting on their discretion.
CA ruling that photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed
of sale was admissible, concluded that the same had no probative value.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON the photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of
sale is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be
presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and
no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be
regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when photo copy of the
purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale was presented private
respondents failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary
public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private
respondents failure to object to photo copy of the purported original carbon
copy of the deed of sale when it was presented, the same becomes primary
evidence. To be sure, even if photo copy of the purported original carbon
copy of the deed of sale is admitted in evidence, the Court held that its
probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to
be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered
for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value.
Atty. Tabangays failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy
requested by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders photo copy of
the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale unreliable.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
G.R. No. L-18077 September 29, 1962
RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SOCORRO A.
RAMOS, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Defendant, Socorro Ramos purchased from plaintiffs 20 parcels of land
located in Quezon City and for the amount of P235,056.00 of which only the
amount of P35,056.00 was paid on the date of sale, the balance of
P200,000.00 being payable within two years from the date of sale. To secure
the payment of the balance of P200,000.00 defendant executed a mortgage
in favor of plaintiffs upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest
over a parcel of land in Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of
sale; that said deed of sale with mortgage and that as defendant broke
certain stipulations contained in said deed of sale with mortgage, plaintiffs
instituted the present foreclosure proceedings.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action of
plaintiffs was premature. It found that plaintiffs really assumed the
construction of the roads as a condition precedent to the fulfillment of the
obligation stipulated in the contract on the part of defendant, and since the
same has not been undertaken, plaintiffs have no cause of action.
Plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in admitting the evidence and giving weight to the
explanation given.
HELD:
No, the RTC did not err in admitting the evidence.
Parol evidence rule provides that when the terms of an agreement had been
reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all that has been
agreed upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can be
admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule 123). This rule, however,
only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express
the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings,
the same may be the subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such
failure has been put in issue in this case is patent in the answer wherein
defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does
not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of
the roads. Thus, the RTC did not err in admitting the “Explanation” in
evidence.
G.R. No. L-11346 March 21, 1918
ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN ARIANO, defendant-
appellant.
FACTS:
On December 4, 1913, the plaintiff, Espiridiona executed a deed of sale with
a right to repurchase (within 1 yr from date of deed of the same amount) of
a parcel of land to defendant Juan, for the sum of P360.
After the redemption period elapsed and plaintiff, having failed to exercise
her right to repurchase, defendant set up a claim of absolute ownership
over the land notwithstanding the insistent demands of plaintiff that she be
permitted to exercise her right to repurchase pursuant to an alleged oral
agreement for the extension of the redemption period down to the end of
the month of December, 1914.
Plaintiff claims that two days before the expiration of the original
redemption period, she asked the defendant for an extension of time for
the repurchase of the land and that upon her promise to make the
repurchase during the month of December, 1914, the defendant agreed to
extend the redemption set out in the written contract, to the end of that
month.
Said oral agreement was witnessed by a certain Mr. Pascual and the latter
corroborated plaintiff as testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether the oral agreement for the extension of time for payment is
binding upon the parties.
HELD:
Yes The contention that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary,
or contradict the terms of the written instrument by the introduction of oral
evidence is manifestly untenable under the circumstances of the case, as
will readily appear from the following citation from 17 Cyc., p. 734, and
numerous cases cited in support of the doctrine: The rule forbidding the
admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a
written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by
parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into
subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to,
changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the
parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any
way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the
writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have
exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and
independent contract.
 It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract
the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise
unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.
G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915
YU TEK and CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. BASILIO GONZALES, defendant-
appellant.
FACTS:
A written contract was executed. Basilio Gonzales received from Yu Tek and
Co. the amount of P3,000 and in exchange, Gonzales obligated himself to
deliver 600 piculs of the sugar of the first and second grade according to the
result of the polarization, within the period of three months. It was also
stipulated in the contract that in case Gonzales fails to deliver, the contract
will be rescinded, he will be obligated to return the P3,000 received and also
other charges.
Plaintiff proved that no sugar had been delivered to him under the contract
nor had he been able to recover the P3,000.
Gonzales assumed that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise
upon his own plantation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Court erred in in refusing to permit parol evidence.
HELD:
The condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol
evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be
determined by the writing itself.
This case appears to be one to which the rule which excludes parol evidence
to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly applicable.
There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be
raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all
the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible
in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,
unless there has been fraud or mistake.
G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or SALUD GARCIA and
VICENTE B. GARCIA, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Land Settlement and Development Corporation filed a specific action case
against the Garcia Plantation Co., Inc. and/or Salud C. De Garcia and Vicente
B. Garcia, for the recovery of the sum of P5,955.30, as the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of two tractors.
Salud C. de Garcia was made alternative co-defendant because of two
promissory notes executed by her, where she personally assumed the
account of the company with the plaintiff and her husband.
Sps. Garcia claimed that the two promissory notes had been novated
by subsequent agreement. They presented a letter as proof for an extension
of deadline of payment stating certain conditions. Garcia failed to comply
with the obligation. LASEDECO claims the obligation had become due and
demandable.
ISSUE:
WON the Court erred in excluding the parol evidence.
HELD:
Yes, the Court erred in excluding the parol evidence.
The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be
introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently
and hastily excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the subject-matter
treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule. When
the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an
event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be
established by parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written
contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no
contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule.
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not
extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show
prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties,
but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the
written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement.
In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second
paragraph of letter Exhibit L, and although a document is usually to be
interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding
circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties.
Doctrine: When the operation of the contract is to be made to depend upon
the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent,
such may established by parole evidence.
G.R. No. 79962 : December 10, 1990 192 SCRA 209
LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONRADO Q.
SALONGA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages
against petitioner Lucio Cruz alleging that in the course of their business
transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an
amount of P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt.
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga.
By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several
hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that sometime in May
1982, he entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would
purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982 to
August 15, 1982. They also agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga
would sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of one year.
Cruz admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the amount of P35,000.00
and on several occasions from August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, an
aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He contended however, that these
amounts were received by him not as loans but as consideration for their
"pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond. He
added that it was the private respondent who owed him money since
Salonga still had unpaid rentals for the 10-month period that he actually
occupied the fishpond. Cruz also claimed that Salonga owed him an
additional P4,000.00 arising from another purchase of fish from other areas
of his leased fishpond.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lucio Cruz.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
WON the Court can receive oral evidence to alter or modify the contents of
the receipt without violating the parol evidence.
HELD:
Yes, for Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable in
the case at bar.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance,
it is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor its omission of a
consideration conclusive evidence that none passed, nor is its
acknowledgment of a particular consideration an objection to other proof of
other and consistent considerations; and, by analogy, the acknowledgment
in a deed is not conclusive of the fact.
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the
instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied
by parol evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to
the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just
a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of
payment made by the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of
P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part
of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be
introduced to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's
receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount
was received.
G.R. No. 154413 August 31, 2005
SPS. ALFREDO R. EDRADA versus RAMOS
FACTS:
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986
VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA,
CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and
ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from Leoncia
Lasangue, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale which was registered
with the Register of Deeds. Lechugas claimed that the Lozas, by means of
fraud, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered said properties
and appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, refusing to surrender
the same despite demands.
The Lozas, however, deny that the properties which Lechugas bought
from Lasangue in 1950 was the same subject land. They claimed that their
predecessor, Hugo Loza, had bought a parcel of land from one Victorina
Limor, and another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue. The
remaining portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one
bought by Lechugas. This was corroborated by Lasangue in her testimony,
who, although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to
Lechugas.
Such testimony, however, was contrary to the contents of the deed of
sale executed between Lasangue and Lechugas.
ISSUE:
WON parol evidence be admitted to determine the land bought by
Lechugas.
HELD:
Yes. The Parole Evidence Rule does not apply where the controversy is
between one of the parties to the document and third persons. While the
deed of sale was executed between Lasangue and Lechugas, the dispute
over what was actually sold was between Lechugas and the Lozas. Lasangue,
therefore, is a stranger to the dispute and is not bound by the rule. The
Parole Evidence Rule applies only as between parties to the written
agreement or their privies, and not to strangers. It does not apply where
either one of the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to
the written agreement and does not claim under or through one who is
party to it.
Doctrine: The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be
invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least
one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby.
[G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996]
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
Baldomero Inciong, Jr., along with Rene Naybe and Gregorio Pantanosas,
signed a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00, holding themselves
jointly and severally liable to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC).
Having failed to pay their obligation on the expiration date of the note, PBC
sent letters to both Inciong and Naybe, demanding payment of the debt.
When neither Inciong nor Naybe respondend, PBC filed a complaint for the
collection of a sum of money against the three debtors, of whom only
Inciong was served summons. In his answer, Inciong attempted to adduce
evidence in order to defeat the terms of the promissory note, claiming that
parole evidence may should be allowed as the note was not a public deed
but a mere commercial paper which did not bear the signature of attesting
witnesses. Inciong alleged that he was only persuaded by third parties to act
as a co-maker to the loan incurred by Naybe, who was allegedly interested
in a certain falcata logs operation business but was unable to procure
money to buy a chainsaw to be contributed thereto. Inciong claimed he only
signed as co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00, not P50,000.00, stressing that
he indicated such in one of the five copies of the blank promissory note
which he signed. He claimed that, through trickery, fraud and
misrepresentation, he was made liable for P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
WON a promissory note fall under the Parole Evidence Rule
HELD:
Yes.
The first paragraph of the parole evidence rule states: When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public
document. What is required is that such be in writing. Thus, for the parole
evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form
or signed by both partes.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are
not subject ot be varied or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evidence.
In this case, however, Inciong can adduce parole evidence to prove a
contemporaneous agreement that was the inducing and moving cause of
the written agreement. Inciong can prove by alleging fraud that he agreed
to a loan of only P5,000.00.
However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence,
which Inciong failed to do.
Doctrine: For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not
be in any particular form or signed by both partes. As a general rule, bills,
notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied
or contradicted by parole or extrinsic evidence.
[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997]
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon
City . The parties executed two deed of absolute sale.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots,
but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner.
Rafael Ortaez demanded from the respondents the delivery of said titles but
refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of
another person and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is
subject to certain conditions.
Petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance.
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the certain conditions although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale.
Petitioner objected on the introduction of said oral conditions for it was the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
barred by the parol evidence rule. parties.
The lower court dismissed the complaint.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract,
The CA affirmed. "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
Hence, this petition.
unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in
ISSUE: this case.
Can the admissibility of parol evidence is valid to establish the alleged
oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are
silent on such conditions.
HELD:
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party
who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. G.R. No. L-11310 January 31, 1918
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
CARLOS PALANCA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRED WILSON & CO., defendant-
which speaks of a uniform language.[ Thus, under the general rule in
appellee.
Section 9 of Rule 130[ of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain
FACTS:
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof.
Carlos Palanca, entered into a contract with Fred Wilson and Co. for the
Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of purchase of a distilling apparatus for P10,000. Wilson and Co. ordered the
the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived apparatus of Turner, Schon and Co., London.
and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even
make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, About five months after the machine was installed, Palanca wrote Wilson
it is the law between the parties. and Co. that the rectifying machine had been examined and stated that the
machine was not capable of producing the amount of alcohol stipulated in
The deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions
the contract.
or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own
terms.
Getting no satisfaction from the reply of Wilson and Co., action for damages
The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, for breach of contract was filed praying fthat the defendant be ordered to
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to comply strictly with the terms of the contract.
the rule that:
The Court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, this action.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written
instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of
ISSUE:
WON Wilson and Co. complied with the terms of the contract.
HELD:
Under chapter IV title II, book IV of the Civil Code, and chapter X of the Code
of Civil Procedure, especially section 285, to evidence of the circumstances
under which the agreement was made.
Predicated therefore on the description to be found in the catalogue, it is
plain that the defendant sold to the plaintiff the machine there mentioned.
This leaves for interpretation the one word "capacity."
Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written
agreement shall be presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does
not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under which the
agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic
ambiguity."
Wilson and Co. in their offer to Song Fo and Co. on June 9, 1913, while
mentioning capacity, only did so in express connection with the name and
description of the machine as illustrated in the catalogue. They furnished
Song Fo and Co. with plans and specifications of the distilling apparatus; and
these describe a capacity of 6,000 liters of jus (ferment). Wilson and Co.'s
order to manufacturer, while mentioning a capacity of 6,000 liters per day,
does so again in connection with the description in the maker's catalogue.
And, finally, it was stated during the trial, and it has not been denied, that a
machine capable of producing 6,000 liters of rectified alcohol every 24
hours from nipa ferment would cost between P35,000 and P40,000.
G.R. No. L-46943 June 8, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, Branch I, presided by JUDGE
ROMULO P. UNTALAN, CARMEN MYRICK SALVACION MYRICK, CELSO
MILLABAS, JOSEFINA MILLABAS, and CELERINA MILLABAS, respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint to annul a supposed conditional donation of two parcels of land
located at Comum Camalig, Albay was filed by Millabas.
The ground for the annulment was the alleged non-fulfillment of the five
conditions of the donation . No deed of donation or actionable document
was annexed to the complaint.
The PNR denied the donation for lack of sufficient knowledge thereof but it
contradicted that the donation was unconditionally made by the late
Antonio J. A. Myrick . No deed of donation was attached to the answer to
sustain the defense that the donation was pure and unconditional.
The alleged donation was made in 1962 to the Manila Railroad Company
that it was made by Antonio J. A. Myrick (Myrick) and not by the
plaintiffs/respondents.
Deed of donation were identified by the witnesses.
The lower court held that the question should be allowed the objection
should be overruled because to allow the witness answer the question
would not be a transgression of tilt parol evidence rule. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence presented be allowed under the parol evidence rule.
HELD:
The lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining
petitioner's objection based on the parol evidence rule.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms and. therefore, there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
 evidence of the terms The agreement other than the contents of
the writing, except in the following case:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or it failure to
express The true intent and agreement of the parties, or the of
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,
The term 'agreement' includes wills.
Section 7 requires that in order that parol or extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to vary the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection
thereof or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
should be put in issue by the pleadings. In the instant case, the plaintiffs did
not expressly plead that the deed of donation was incomplete or that its
execution was vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention of
the donor and the donee.
Obviously, they could not introduce parol evidence to vary the terms of the
agreement because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in
the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the
contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of the
agreement between the parties.
G.R. No. L-62741 May 29, 1987
FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EASTERN RIZAL
FABRICATORS, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Filipinas Manufacturers Bank [the surviving bank after a merger with the
Filipinas Bank and Trust Co.] filed a complaint against Eastern Rizal
Fabricators. It alleged inter alia that defendant Eastern Rizal Fabricators had
executed on July 30, 1976, a promissory note for P370,000.00 evidencing a
money market loan, with interest thereon at the rate of 14% plus 2%
handling fee per annum until paid; that among the terms and conditions of
said promissory note was that the interest not paid when due would be
added to and become part of the principal, the same to be computed
monthly and would bear the same rate of interest as the principal and an
additional sum equivalent to 10% of the amount due as and for attorney's
fees; the note matured; despite repeated demands, defendant refused to
pay without any valid and legal grounds.
In its answer, defendant admitted its indebtedness.
Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
defendant's answer admitted that material allegations of the complaint and
that it failed to tender an issue. Amplifying on its motion, plaintiff also
alleged that it is contrary to the parol evidence rule. This was granted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the alleged issue is contrary to parol evidence rule.
HELD:
No.
Subsequent agreements to written contracts may be made orally and
evidence in reference thereto does not violate the parol evidence rule.
The reason for the rule is fundamental. The parties cannot be presumed to
have intended the written instrument to cover all their possible subsequent
agreements. Moreover, parol evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement was that which the writing purports to express, but
merely shows that the parties have exercised their right to change or
abrogate their original understanding or to make a new and independent
one. It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written
contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.
Judgment on the pleadings was improper. Appellant's defense of
forbearance indubitably raised a material issue which could not be simply
brushed aside without the presentation of evidence. Reversal of the
judgment and remand of the case to the court of origin for hearing on the
merits should follow as a matter of course.
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING
CORP., respondents
FACTS:
Elias Q. Tan, then President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four
loans from Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in
the amounts of P100,000 each. As of 23 January 1979, the entire obligation
amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the Bank,
Tan and the foundation failed to pay the same.
The Bank was constrained to file a complaint seeking payment by Tan and
the foundation, jointly and solidarily.
In its answer to the complaint, the Foundation denied incurring
indebtedness from the Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by Tan in
his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the
personal information he furnished the Bank.
The Foundation maintained that it never authorized Tan to co-sign in his
capacity as its President any promissory note and that the Bank fully knew
that the loans contracted were made in Tan’s personal capacity and for his
own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly,
therefrom.
The Foundation then interposed a cross-claim against Tan.
For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his
personal capacity.
The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically
renewable (“rolled-over”) every year at an amount including unpaid
interests.
According to Tan, the Bank’s employee required him to affix two signatures
on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be
filled out in accordance with their agreement.
However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to the Bank,
these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such
that the Foundation was included as party thereto. Further, prior to its filing
of the complaint, the Bank made no demand on him.
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the bank.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the
court. Applying the parol evidence rule, the CA rejected petitioner Tans
assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the
respondent Bank that he would pay the loans from the proceeds of his
shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Tan and the foundation filed the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the Court erred in applying the parol evidence rule as basis for
adjudging joint and solidary liability on the part of Tan and Lapulapu
Foundation.
HELD:
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed
upon their faces that they are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation,
as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity.
Moreover, the application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of
the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation, as well as New
Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were
signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner
Foundation. These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically
establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner
Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to
reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement
between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
 In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners
and the respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates
as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5,
1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear
and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on
a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of
petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this
purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the
terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such allegation
had been made by the petitioners in this case.
G.R. NO. 144435 February 6, 2007
GUILLERMINA BALUYUT, Petitioner, vs. EULOGIO POBLETE, SALUD
POBLETE and THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Guillermina Baluyut (Baluyut), loaned from the spouses Eulogio and Salud
Poblete the sum of P850,000.00. As evidence of her indebtedness, Baluyut
signed a promissory note for the amount borrowed. Under the promissory
note, the loan shall mature in one month. To secure the payment of her
obligation, she conveyed to the Poblete spouses, by way of a real estate
mortgage contract, a house and lot she owns.
Upon maturity of the loan, Baluyut failed to pay her indebtedness. The
Poblete spouses subsequently decided to extrajudicially foreclose the real
estate mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold on auction, Poblete
spouses who were the highest bidders.
Baluyut failed to redeem the subject property within the period required by
law prompting Eulogio Poblete to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Title.
Baluyut remained in possession of the subject property and refused to
vacate the same. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order granting the
writ of possession. However, before Eulogio and the heirs of Salud could
take possession of the property, Baluyut filed an action for annulment of
mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the subject property, as well
as cancellation of the title issued in the name of Eulogio and the heirs of
Salud, plus damages.
ISSUE:
WON a decision is valid even the presence of conflict between the date of
maturity loans stated in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the
Promissory Note.
HELD:
It is a long-held cardinal rule that when the terms of an agreement are
reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents of the
agreement itself.
In the present case, the promissory note and the real estate mortgage are
the law between petitioner and private respondents. It is not disputed that
under the Promissory Note dated July 20, 1981, the loan shall mature in one
month from date of the said Promissory Note.
Petitioner makes much of the testimony of Atty. Edwina Mendoza that the
maturity of the loan which petitioner incurred is one year. However,
evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
 In the instant case, aside from the testimony of Atty. Mendoza, no other
evidence was presented to prove that the real date of maturity of the loan is
one year. In fact there was not even any allegation in the Complaint and in
the Memorandum filed by petitioner with the trial court to the effect that
there has been fraud or mistake as to the date of the loan’s maturity as
contained in the Promissory Note of July 20, 1981.

Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove her

allegation that the real agreement of the parties is for the loan to mature in
one year.