4. [G.R. No. 113725.

June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated
and admitted in a special proceeding. The lot was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children including Johnny (petitioner).

Plaintiff: On August 21, 1989, Maria brought a complaint against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint
alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. It was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic

Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease,
or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one

hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic
sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop
years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which
provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the
buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey
the lot to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

Findings during the Pre-trial: On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private
respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee
of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery.
RTC: On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action
against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-
performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are
the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not
warrant the filing of the present complaint.

CA Division: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It ratiocinated
that the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of the lot. The punitive consequences
enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of lot and its reversion to the
estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to
order the reconveyance of title over lot.

Defendant: It maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal
institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - that the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And
since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and
such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the defendants to fulfill their obligation to herein plaintiff
shall warrant the reconveyance of the subject lot to the descendants of the testatrix.

RULING: Yes. The petition is not impressed with merit. The petitioner, his mother and
sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the
latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional
rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. Such obligation of the
instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the
usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of
action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution.
In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose
or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir.

A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest. However, the testatrix
did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a
devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

5. G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905

CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA vs. MARIA JUANA UGARTE E ITURRALDE

FACTS: Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December,
1900, Maria Juana Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the
deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or
descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant
— that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. The petition of Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate
proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, without prejudice to third parties, to
be the heir of the deceased.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela
Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased. The father of the petitioner
was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria. Pablo Linart, the father of
Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another
sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.
 Manual Josefa
Iturralde Gonzalez

Maria Ramon Maria

Juana Iturralde y Josefa
Iturralde y Gonzalez Iturralde y
Gonzalez Gonzalez

Maria Pablo
Juana Linart
Ugarte
Iturralde

Carmen
Linart

Plaintiff: Although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria
Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased
through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation — that is to say, that even though a
grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had
Maria Juana.

RULING: No. After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative
nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of
representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the right of
representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children of brothers
or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that
the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the
collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the
deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It
would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had
survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited
the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's.

The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into
consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the
children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as
included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate
successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is
evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the
sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

6. G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC.

FACTS: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City
of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which
she executed at her residence at Quiapo, Manila. Among the many legacies and devises
made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's
niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to
her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also
instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First
Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite
publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will
alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the
testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Petitioner: Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing,
allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. The
oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness. The probate court rendered its decision
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should
pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

ISSUES: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the
negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied
probate?

RULING: Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she
has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have
any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has
also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already
disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she was a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. The law
does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. The
oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting
parents.

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
7. G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA,

JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES
WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS
OANES

FACTS: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes-Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are
his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy.

Petitioner: He prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased
father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. He further
alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in
exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios
and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

RTC: The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim
was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights.

RULING: The petition lacks merit. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched
in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give
up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a
person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In
this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver
of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300, 000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind”.
Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents'
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights. Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of
the Civil Code which provides that parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance
left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant
case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased.

Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for
recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, stating that if the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the
action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if
the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the
issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the
same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier
of facts.