CRIMINAL LAW 1
 REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I
 Atty. Camille B.

Remoroza
 Some cases from the syllabus of Atty. Rene Rizza B. Bernardo-Mamburam

1. Extinction of Criminal Liabilities

a) 2 types of Extinction ▪ Total
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is total
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before the final judgement;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this code.

MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, 170 SCRA 19


Subject:

Presidential Pardon, Effect of Pardon on Reinstatement to Public Office, Pardon does not
Extinguish Civil Indemnity

Facts:

Monsanto, the Assistant Treasurer of Calbayug City, was charged of the complex crime
of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was
sentenced to jail. President Marcos granted her an Absolute Pardon.

By reason of said pardon, she wrote the Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon. However, the Office of the President reversed such ruling and denied the requst
of the petitoner, holding that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the
only ground for reinstatement to her former position and entitlement to payment of her
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to her during the period of her suspension
pendente lite and that the former public official must secure a reappointment before she
can reassume her former position.

Held:

Pardon

1. A pardon is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered.

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Effects of Pardon

2. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Public office is a public trust and all
circumstances must be weighed in order to serve the interest of the people, not a private
interest.

3. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the
true character and purpose of the privilege.

Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that
the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable.

4. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

Pardon does Not Extinguish Civil Liability

5. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.

6. Civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code,
namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
*PEOPLE VS. GUZMAN, G.R. NO. 185843, MARCH 3, 2010

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and reconsideration of
our Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant Ronie de Guzman.

Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two
counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court
found him guilty as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each
case or a total amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision dated March 27, 2008,
appellant's conviction, but modified it with an additional award of P50,000.00 for each
case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral damages.

Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal.

In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for failure of appellant to
sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision as would warrant the exercise
of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision of the CA
was affirmed in toto.

In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant contracted
marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel
Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-
A, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is the pertinent
Certificate of Marriage[1] and a joint sworn statement ("Magkasamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay")[2] executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the existence of
a valid and legal marriage between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of
his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment, pursuant to
Article 266-C[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In its Comment/Manifestation,[4] appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

interposed no objection to the motion, finding the marriage to have been contracted in
good faith, and the motion to be legally in order.

The motion should be granted.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads -
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: x xxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
Article 344 of this Code.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides -
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape,
and acts of lasciviousness. - x x x.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. x x x.

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages contracted between the

offender and the offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of
chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that
may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the felony. Parenthetically, we would
like to mention here that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar
circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or around 36 years ago.

Based on the documents, including copies of pictures[7] taken after the ceremony and
attached to the motion, we find the marriage between appellant and private complainant
to have been contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual
love for each other and their desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy
considerations of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the
solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation
to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman is ABSOLVED of

the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their
subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of Corrections for appropriate action.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

*PEOPLE VS. AMISTOSO, G.R. NO. 201447, AUGUST 28, 2013

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is the appeal of accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca

(Amistosn) of the Decision1 dated August 25,2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04012, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated March 23, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106,
which found Amistoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the qualified rape of his daughter
AAA.3

Amistoso was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate in an Information4 dated

August 30, 2000,5 which reads:
The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor upon a sworn complaint filed by
private offended party, accuses ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA, for VIOLATION OF
ANTI-RAPE LAW OF 1997 (art. 266-A, par. 1 sub par. (d) committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July 2000, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening thereof,
at x x x Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to have carnal
knowledge with AAA, a 12-year old girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and without
her consent.

With the aggravating circumstance of relationship, accused being the father of the victim.

When arraigned on July 23, 2002, Amistoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.6

Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: AAA,7 the victim herself; Dr. Ulysses V.
Francisco (Francisco),8 the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the physical
examination of AAA; and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Restituto Lipatan (Lipatan),9 the
police investigator on duty at the police station on July 13, 2000. The prosecution also
submitted as documentary evidence the Complaint10 dated July 13, 2000 filed by BBB,
AAA's mother, against Amistoso; AAA's Affidavit11 dated July 13, 2000; Dr. Francisco's
Medico-Legal Report12 dated July 13, 2000; AAA's Certificate of Live Birth;13 AAA's
elementary school records;14 and a photocopy of the page in the Police Blotter containing
the entries for July 13, 2000.15

The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:

AAA was born on June 2, 1988, the second of five children of Amistoso and BBB. Their
family lived in a one-room shanty in Masbate. On July 10, 2000, AAA was exactly 12
years, one month, and eight days old.

Prior to July 10, 2000, Amistoso had often scolded AAA, maliciously pinched AAA's thighs,
and even whipped AAA. At around 11:00 a.m. of July 10, 2000, Amistoso was again mad
at AAA because AAA, then busy cooking rice, refused to go with her father to the forest
to get a piece of wood which Amistoso would use as a handle for his bolo. Because of
this, a quarrel erupted between Amistoso and BBB. In his fury, Amistoso attempted to
hack AAA. BBB ran away with her other children to her mother's house in another
barangay. AAA though stayed behind because she was afraid that Amistoso would get
even madder at her.

On the night of July 10, 2000, AAA had fallen asleep while Amistoso was eating. AAA was
awakened at around 8:00 p.m. when Amistoso, already naked, mounted her. Amistoso
reached under AAA's skirt and removed her panties. AAA shouted, "Pa, ayaw man!" (Pa,
please don't!), but Amistoso merely covered AAA's mouth with one hand. Amistoso then
inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina. The pain AAA felt made her cry. After he had
ejaculated, Amistoso stood up. AAA noticed white substance and blood coming from her
vagina. Amistoso told AAA not to tell anyone what happened between them, otherwise,
he would kill her.

The following day, July 11, 2000, AAA left their residence without Amistoso's consent to
hide at the house of a certain Julie, a recruiter. AAA narrated to Julie her ordeal in
Amistoso's hands. BBB subsequently found AAA at Julie's house. On July 13, 2000, AAA
told BBB what Amistoso did to her. BBB brought AAA to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), which in turn, brought AAA to Dr. Francisco for physical
examination.

Thereafter, BBB and AAA went to the police for the execution of AAA's Affidavit and the
filing of BBB's Complaint against Amistoso. A Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Masbate,
after conducting the necessary preliminary examination, issued an Order of Arrest against
Amistoso on July 13, 2000. Amistoso was arrested the same day and the fact thereof was
entered in the Police Blotter by SPO4 Lipatan.

Dr. Francisco's findings in his Medico-Legal Report dated July 13, 2000 were as follows:

Hymen: Old hymenal lacerations noted at 7 and 3 o'clock corresponding to the face of the
clock.

Vaginal canal: Showed less degree of resistance and admits about two of the examiner's
fingers.

REMARKS:

Physical Virginity has been lost to AAA16

Dr. Francisco explained on the witness stand that the cause of AAA's hymenal lacerations
was the penetration of a blunt object, which could be a penis. He also opined that a
hymenal laceration, just like any wound, would take at least a week to heal. Upon further
questioning, he answered that "in minimum it would heal in one week time except when
there is no infection."17

The lone evidence for the defense was Amistoso's testimony.18

Amistoso recounted that on July 10, 2000, he was working, unloading diesel and
kerosene, at his employer's warehouse. After finishing his work at around 8:00 p.m.,
Amistoso had dinner at his employer's place before going home. The distance between
his employer's warehouse and his house was about a kilometer, a 10-minute hike away.

When Amistoso arrived home, he found the door and the windows to the house tied shut.
The house was primarily made of nipa with bamboo flooring. It was raised a foot from the
ground. Amistoso's children were inside the house with BBB and an unknown man.
Although he could not see inside the house, Amistoso heard BBB and the man talking.
Amistoso suspected that BBB and the man were having sexual intercourse because they
did not open the door when Amistoso called out. Amistoso was told to wait so he did wait
outside the house for 15 minutes. Meanwhile, BBB and the man made a hole in the floor
of the house from where they slipped out, crawled under the house, and fled.

Amistoso said the children had been sleeping inside the house, but BBB woke the children
up. When BBB and her lover fled, the children were left together. However, Amistoso also
said that he slept alone in the house on the night of July 10, 2000.19

Amistoso did not take any action after catching BBB and her lover. He did not chase after
BBB and her lover when the two fled on July 10, 2000; he did not report the incident to
the police; and he did not file charges of adultery against BBB in the days after.

Amistoso believed that BBB, afraid she got caught with another man, manipulated AAA to
falsely charge Amistoso with rape. Amistoso averred that BBB actually wanted to reconcile
with him and apologized to him in May 2001 for what had happened, but he refused.20

On March 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Amistoso guilty of qualified
rape, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, this Court is convinced and so holds that the prosecution has
proved the guilt of accused Anastacio Amistoso beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
rape, punished under Article 266-B, par. 5, sub. Par. 1.

WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified

Rape, he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum
of Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim
the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the
costs.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Amistoso's conviction for qualified rape but
modified the penalties imposed. Below is the decretal portion of the Decision dated August
25, 2011 of the appellate court:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated March 23,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.22

Hence, Amistoso comes before this Court via the instant appeal with a lone assignment
of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Amistoso argues that the defense of denial and alibi should not be viewed with outright
disfavor. Such defense, notwithstanding its inherent weakness, may still be a plausible
excuse. Be that as it may, the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of Amistoso's
defense; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence and establish Amistoso's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Amistoso asserts that the prosecution failed even in this regard.

Amistoso was charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The elements of said crime are:
(1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below
12 years of age or is demented.

According to Amistoso, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA. AAA's claim that Amistoso was able to insert his penis into her vagina
on July 10, 2000 was contrary to the physical evidence on record. Dr. Francisco testified
that hymenal lacerations would take a minimum of one week to heal; but in his Medico-
Legal Report, prepared on July 13, 2000, just three days after AAA's alleged rape, he
stated that AAA's hymenal lacerations were already healed. Amistoso also asserts that
AAA had ulterior motive to falsely accuse him of rape. AAA admitted that Amistoso had
been maltreating her and that she had already developed hatred or ill feeling against
Amistoso. Such admission casts doubts on the veracity and credibility of AAA's rape
charge and raises the question of whether the act complained of actually occurred.

Amistoso further claims lack of showing that AAA was below 12 years old or demented
when she was supposedly raped on July 10, 2000. According to the prosecution's own
evidence, AAA was precisely 12 years, one month, and eight days old on July 10, 2000;
while the prosecution did not at all present any evidence of AAA's mental condition.

Amistoso's appeal is without merit.

Reproduced hereunder are the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:

ART. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. - Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases supplied.)

Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA
was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory
rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed
under any of the other circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged
in the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not
be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.24 In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in
stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required
is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in
ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know the offense charged.25

In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the allegations
therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Section 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.

The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.26 But when the offender
is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation, as the Court
expounded in People v. Fragante27:

It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need
not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion
of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a
father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy
or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of
violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome of the case because the
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes the
place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused
who did not have blood relationship with the victim. (Citations omitted.)

Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender must concur.28

The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation
to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are sufficiently
alleged in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years old on
the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAA's father.

Amistoso cannot claim that he had been deprived of due process in any way. He
adequately understood from the Information that he was being charged with the rape of
his own daughter AAA to which he proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally refuting
the fact of AAA's rape regardless of how it was purportedly committed.

Now as to the truth of the charge in the Information, the RTC found, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements and circumstances necessary for convicting Amistoso for the qualified rape of
AAA. The RTC accorded credence and weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, especially the victim AAA, and disbelieved the denial and alibi of Amistoso.

In People v. Aguilar,29 the Court explained that:

Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim
or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so
because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of
observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath" - all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted.)

There is no cogent reason herein for the Court to depart from the general rule and reverse
any of the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
AAA gave a clear, consistent, and credible account of the events of July 10, 2000, in a
straightforward and candid manner:

ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing)

Q Now, remember where you were on July 10, 2000, at about eleven o'clock in the
morning?
xxxx
A At our house.
xxxx
Q Do you recall if there was an incident happened on that particular day and time?
xxxx
A My mother and my father have a quarell (sic).
Q Why did they have a quarell (sic)?
xxxx
A My father got mad at me because I refused to go with him to get a piece of wood for a
handle of our bolo.
xxxx
Q And what happened after that?
A He attempted to hack me.
Q And what did your mother do?
A She ran away.
xxxx
Q Did she return on that day to your house?
A No, she did not.
Q On July 10, 2000, at around eight o'clock in the evening where were you?
A At our house.
Q And who was with you in your house.
A My father.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A I was sleeping.
Q While you were sleeping, do you recall having been awakened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you awakened?
A Because my father mounted on me.
Q And what did you notice from him when he mounted on you?
A That he was already naked.
Q When he mounted on top of you, what did he do?
A He removed my panty.
COURT to the witness)
Q What about your clothes?
A No, only my panty.
xxxx
ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing)
Q What did (sic) you wearing at that time?
A A skirt.
xxxx
Q What did you do when he removed your panty?
A I shouted.
COURT to the witness)
Q What was your shouted (sic) about?
A In order to stop him.
xxxx
ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing)
Q When you shouted "ayaw man", what did your father do?
A He covered my mouth.
Q After he covered your mouth, what did he do next.
A He inserted his penis into my vagina.
xxxx
Q And what did you feel?
A I felt pain.
Q Because you felt pain, did you cry?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened after that?
A After that he stood up.
Q Did you feel if there was an ejaculation?
A Yes, there was.
Q Did you notice a white substance in your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q After your father had sexual intercourse with you, what did you notice after that?
A There was a blood coming from me.
Q What did your father tell you?
A That I must not tell anybody, otherwise he will kill us.30

AAA's aforequoted testimony already established the elements of rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AAA had positively and
categorically testified that Amistoso's penis had entered her vagina, so Amistoso
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA. The Court reiterates that in an incestuous
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering
moral influence of the father would suffice.31

That Dr. Francisco, during his physical examination of AAA on July 13, 2000, already
found healed lacerations, does not negatively affect AAA's credibility nor disprove her
rape. Worth repeating are the following pronouncements of the Court in People v. Orilla32:

The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn's hymen does not prove that appellant did
not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape. In addition, a medical examination and a medical
certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape
case. The credible disclosure of a minor that the accused raped her is the most important
proof of the sexual abuse. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

In addition, while Dr. Francisco testified that hymenal lacerations normally heal in one
week, he did not foreclose the possibility of hymenal lacerations healing in less than a
week when there is no infection, to wit:
COURT to the Witness)
Q In your opinion Doctor, how many days more or less would the hymenal lacerations
heal?
A In most cases this laceration is the same with any wound and it would heal for one
week.
xxxx
PROS. LEGASPI on re-direct)
Q When you made mentioned as to the period of healing of this hymenal lacerations,
when you said within one week time, could it be possible that it heals less than a week?
xxxx
A In minimum it would heal in one week time except when there is no infection.33
(Emphasis supplied.)

Even the twin circumstances for qualified rape, namely, minority and relationship, were
satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. That AAA was 12 years old on July 10, 2000 and
that she is Amistoso's daughter were established by AAA's Certificate of Live Birth34 and
Amistoso's admission35 before the RTC.

The Court is not persuaded by Amistoso's insinuation that AAA and BBB were only falsely
accusing him of rape out of hatred and ill feeling.

Alleged motives of family feuds, resentment, or revenge are not uncommon defenses, and
have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant
who remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a minor
as in this case.36

Moreover, the Court finds it difficult to believe that a young girl would fabricate a rape
charge against her own father as revenge for previous maltreatment, ruling in People v.
Canoy37 as follows:

We must brush aside as flimsy the appellant's insistence that the charges were merely
concocted by his daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live
with them and for maltreating her. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father,
to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny
and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a
simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the very
person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we
believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact
revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her.
(Citations omitted.)

Neither is the Court convinced that BBB would use and manipulate her own daughter AAA
to wrongfully accuse Amistoso, her husband and AAA's father, of rape, just to cover-up
her alleged affair with another man. It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her
daughter's honor to satisfy her grudge, knowing fully well that such an experience would
certainly damage her daughter's psyche and mar her entire life. A mother would not
subject her daughter to a public trial with its accompanying stigma on her as the victim of
rape, if said charges were not true.38

The Court rejects Amistoso's defense of denial and alibi for the very same reasons stated
in People v. Abulon39:

Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily
be fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non- culpability to merit credibility.

The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to
corroborate his alibi. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place
where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. By his own testimony,
appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been
present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except
for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that
he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third
incidents. (Citations omitted.)

Except for his own testimony, Amistoso presented no other evidence to corroborate his
alibi that he was working at his employer's warehouse when AAA was raped. Amistoso
even admitted that his employer's warehouse was only a kilometer or a 10-minute hike
away from the house where AAA was raped, so it was not physically impossible for
Amistoso to be present at the scene of the crime at the time it occurred.

Amistoso's version of events is also implausible and irrational. Amistoso claimed that his
wife BBB was having an affair with another man, but he could not even identify the man.
He did not see the man on the night of July 10, 2000, but purportedly heard BBB and the
man talking inside the house and concluded that the two were having sexual intercourse.
Amistoso further said he wanted to hack BBB and her lover, yet, he patiently waited
outside for 15 minutes before entering the house. It appears physically impossible for BBB
and her lover, both fully grown adults, to escape by crawling through the one-foot space
beneath the house. And finally, Amistoso was unable to explain why he did not run after
BBB and her lover nor took any legal action against the two even days after catching them
having sexual intercourse; where were the children, who BBB supposedly left behind after
running away with her lover on the night of July 10, 2000, as Amistoso claimed he slept
alone at the house that same night; and how would BBB, the spouse allegedly guilty of
having an affair, benefit in influencing AAA to falsely charge Amistoso with rape.

For the qualified rape of his daughter AAA, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing
upon Amistoso the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility of parole, in lieu of
the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346;40 and ordering Amistoso to pay
AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court adds that Amistoso is liable to pay interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision.41

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca
is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further
OHDERED to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this Decision.

✓ c/f Article 113

Death
*People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007,September 2, 1994
Subject: Civil liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment (final and executory judgment); Sendaydiego ruling, re-examined; Present
rule on recovery of civil liability upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme
Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.

The Solicitor General, citing People v. Sendaydiego, expressed his view that the death of
accused did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. Counsel for the accused, citing the Court of Appeals ruling in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia, argued that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

The sole issue therefore is: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?

Held:

Civil liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment (final and executory judgment)

1. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. ---- Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.

2. Hence, with respect to the civil liability, such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. The term 'final judgment' employed
in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall, meaning that that it is already
enforceable. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.

3. Death of offender extinguishes only civil liability ex delicto (arising from criminal
offense), not those which may exist independently from other sources of obligation

4. It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. The survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.

Sendaydiego ruling, re-examined

5. Prior to Sendaydiego, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than
delict.

6. However, in People v. Sendaydiego, the court departed from the above rulings. In
the said case, the accused was convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency
of the appeal of his conviction. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished.

7. A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old

ruling. In Sendaydiego, it was held that the resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil
Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, nowhere in the
text of Article 30, Civil Code is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal.

8. The ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the
effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the
criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.

Present rule on recovery of civil liability upon death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction

9. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
10. However, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law (b) Contracts (c)
Quasi-contracts..(e) Quasi-delicts

11. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.

12. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.

*Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015

Death of an accused pending appeal shall extinguish his criminal liability and civil liability arising from
crime (Article 89 of RPC); but not his civil liability arising from a source other than crime (e.g. quasi-delict,
contract, quasi-contract or law). Civil liability arising from a source other than crime is not deemed
included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the private complainant must file a separate civil
action against either the executor or administrator, or the estate of the accused. During the pendency of
the criminal case, the statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is deemed interrupted (People vs.
Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994). However, in violation of BP Blg. 22, civil liability arising
from a source other than crimeis mandatorily included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the
court, despite the death of the accused pending appeal, must determine his civil liability arising from
contract (Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015). In sum, the private complainant is
not required to file a separate civil action based on contract involving a dishonored check.
*People vs. Egagamao, G.R. No. 218809, August 03, 2016
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Allan Egagamao

(Egagamao) assailing the Decision2 dated April 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01038-MIN, which affirmed the Decision3 dated March 22, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Branch 4 (RTC) in Criminal Case
Nos. 181-2004 to 184-2004 finding Egagamao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1)
count of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,4 otherwise known
as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

On July 26, 2004, a total of four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, each charging
Egagamao of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
RPC, viz.:5

CRIMINAL CASE N0.181-2004

That on or about August 22, 2002, in Moncado Village, Penaplata, Samal District, Island
Garden City of Samal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court said
accused using physical force and intimidation, threatening to kill complainant (AAA) and
her family did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of
said sixteen year old minor (AAA) against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 182-2004

That on or about November 2002, in Moncado Village, Penaplata, Samal District, Island
Garden City of Samal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court said
accused using physical force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge of said sixteen year old minor (AAA) against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 183-2004

That on or about January 2004, in Moncado Village, Penaplata, Samal District, Island
Garden City of Samal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court said
accused using physical force and intimidation, threatening to kill complainant (AAA) and
her family did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of
said sixteen year old minor (AAA) against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 184-2004

That on or about May 27, 2004, in Moncado Village, Penaplata, Samal District, Island
Garden City of Samal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court said
accused using physical force and intimidation, threatening to kill complainant (AAA) and
her family did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of
said sixteen year old minor (AAA) against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The prosecution alleged that AAA,6 a 14-year old minor, used to live at the basement of
her mother's two-storey house in Samal with her elder sister's family. As AAA's elder
sister works in Davao City, she is usually left at home in the house with her sister's
children and husband, Egagamao. On August 22, 2002, AAA was sleeping in her room
when she was awakened as Egagamao went inside her room, wearing only his underwear.
AAA asked why Egagamao was in her room, but the latter simply told her not to make
any noise, and thereafter started kissing her lips and cheeks and touching her body. AAA
resisted and struggled but Egagamao pinned her hands, boxed her legs, and covered her
mouth. He then removed both their underwears, inserted his penis into AAA' s vagina,
and did push and pull movements. After satisfying his lust, Egagamao threatened AAA
that he would kill her and her family if she told anyone what just happened.7 According to
AAA, Egagamao went on to have carnal knowledge of her without her consent in
November 2002, January 2004, and May 2004, and each time, he would repeat his threats
of bodily harm to AAA and her family should she reveal the rape incidents.8 In June 2004,
AAA finally had the courage to tell her ordeal to her mother, who in turn, reported the
incidents to the police and had AAA undergo medical examination at a health center.9

In his defense, Egagamao denied the charges against him, maintaining that he did not
force himself upon AAA as she consented to have sexual intercourse with him. He averred
that their relationship started when he started giving her allowance and other provisions
whenever needed and that it was AAA herself who made sexually inviting remarks when
they first made love. He added that upon learning of the complaint against him, he
voluntarily surrendered to the police.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated March 22, 2012, the R TC found Egagamao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of one (1) count of Rape committed in Criminal Case No. 181-2004
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.12 Egagamao, however, was acquitted of the three (3) other charges against him
for insufficiency of evidence.13

The RTC found AAA's testimony regarding the August 22, 2002 incident to be credible aud
convincing as she was able. to give a straightforward narration on how Egagamao
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. On the other hand, the
RTC did not give credence to Egagamao's "sweetheart theory" defense due to his failure
to adduce even a single proof to sustain such defense. Further, the RTC appreciated the
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and relationship against Egagamao,
opining that while the same was not alleged in the information, Egagamao himself
admitted AAA's minority, as well as the fact that he is her brother-in-law.14 Despite such
finding, it appears, however, that the RTC convicted Egagamao of Simple Rape only, and
not Qualified Rape.15

Aggrieved, Egagamao appealed16 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision17 dated April 30, 2015, the CA affirmed the. RTC ruling in toto.18 Agreeing,
with the findings of the RTC, the CA held that the prosecution had established through
AAA' s straightforward and credible testimony the fact that Egagamao had carnal
knowledge of her against her will.19

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Egagamao is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing one (1) count of Rape.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it appears from the records that in a letter20 dated January 27, 2016, Davao
Prison and Penal Farm Acting Superintendent Gerardo F. Padilla informed the Court that
Egagamao had already died on September 17, 2013 due to Cardiopulmonary Arrest
secondary to Acute Myocardial Infarction, attaching thereto a duplicate copy of
Egagamao's Certificate of Death21 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of B.E. Dujali,
Davao del Norte.

In view of the foregoing, the criminal case against Egagamao, including the instant
appeal, is hereby dismissed.

Under Article 89 (1) of the RPC, the consequences of Egagamao's death are as follows:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
xx xx

In People v. Bayotas,22 the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xx x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases. Where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.23

Thus, upon Egagamao's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.24 However, it is well to clarify
that Egagamao's civil liability in connection with his acts against AAA may be based on
sources of obligation other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of Egagamao, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.25

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a) SET ASIDE the appealed Decision dated April 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 01038-MIN;
(b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 181-2004 before the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City,
Davao del Norte, Branch 4 by reason of the death of accused-appellant Allan Egagamao;
and

(c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Pardon

People vs. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44


* Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No.206666, January 21, 2015

Prescription of Crime
Damasc`o vs. Laqui,166 SCRA 214
Illenes vs. Dicdican, 260 SCRA 207
*Isableita Reodica vs CA, July 8, 1998

✓ Article 90-91


*Romualdez vs. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006 *Recebido vs. People, G.R.
No. 141931. December 4, 2000 *Llenes vs. Dicdican, G.R. No. 122274. July 31,

1996
 *People vs. Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405. March 13, 2001

When does the prescriptive period start?

Discovery by a witness
* Garcia vs. CA, G.R. No. 119063, January 27, 1997
Constructive Notice Rule

* People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989
 * Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994

Non-Actionable Crimes

People vs. Maneja, G.R. No. 47684, June 10, 1941
 Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 143375, July 6, 2001 People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

D. Criminal and Civil Liabilities

 ✓ Article 92 


✓ Article 93 
 *Jovendo del Castillo vs. Rosario Torrecampo, December

18, 2002 *Pangan vs. Gatbalite, G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005 
 Act No.

3326 as amended 
 *Zaldivia vs. Reyes Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992 *PCGG

vs. Deseierto, July 9, 2007
 *Panaguiton Jr., vs. DOJ, November 25,

2008
 *Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Hon. Lidua, October 7, 2013 
 Compromise


 *Trinidad vs Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007


 Novation 
 *People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567,February 5, 1964 *Degaños vs.

People, GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013 *Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726,

January 25, 2012 
 ▪ Partial 


✓ Article 94-95 


✓ Article 96 Commutation of Sentence 


✓ Article 97-98 cf. Article 157 


• Cf As amended by RA 10592, July 23, 2012

✓ Article 99

Total vs Partial
 * Spouses Rodolfo , et al. vs. Judge Dimaculangan, A.M. No. RTJ-02-

1735, April 27, 2007

2. Civil Liabilities in Criminal Cases
 *Romero vs. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17,

2009

✓ Article 100-103
 *Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397
 * Manantan vs . CA,

G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001
 *Salazar vs. People, G.R. No. 151931.

September 23, 2003
 *Phil. Rabbit Lines vs Heirs of Mangawang, G.R. No.

160355. May 16, 2005 *LG Goods Corp vs. Hon. Agraviador, September 26,
 2006
 *Solidum vs. People, March 10, 2014 


✓ Article 104
 People vs. Dianos, 297 SCRA 191
 People

vs.Montesclaros, June 16, 2009- apportionment of civil liability 


✓ Article 105-111 


✓ Article 112-113 


NOTES on Criminal Law 1- SECOND EXAM NOTES| CBR| Page 2 of 2