To reiterate, for one to be liable for grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate

the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident. If any of these elements to qualify
the misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not proven by substantial evidence, a person charged
with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct. In this case, no sufficient proof of
these qualifying circumstances was presented, thus, the petitioners’ mere certificates in the
disbursement vouchers cannot be considered as constituting the serious offense of grave misconduct.
(Miranda vs. Raymundo, Jr., A.M. No. P-13-3163, 1 December 2014, citing Judge Calo vs. Dizon, 583 Phil.
510, 524(2008)).

While petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the recent enactment of RA 9184, we, nonetheless
recognize the fact that petitioners have not yet undergone training on the salient features of the new
law. As such, they still followed the methods and procedures under the procurement law believing in
good faith that the same are still followed. To our mind, while petitioners fell short of their statutorily
imposed duty to safeguard government resources, their act can hardly be considered wanton, deliberate
of flagrant. For this reason, they are but liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct.

A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct
does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. Grave misconduct
necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. (Santos vs. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, 8
February 2007)

The object sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.

Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others, (Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Villa, G.R.
No. 208341, 17 June 2015, citing Salazar vs. Barriga, 550 Phil. 45, 49 (2007) while flagrant disregard of
the rules, as shown by jurisprudence, denotes the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly
manifested by his or her actions (Imperial, Jr. vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, 4 October 2011 citing :Narvasa
vs. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No. 169449). Unfortunately, these elements showing an apparent and deliberate
purpose to violate the law and the established rules, were not duly proven by the respondent. It must
be remembered that a presumption or conjecture is not sufficient substantial evidence to sustain a
finding of administrative liability (Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Villa, supra.) especially an offense of
such gravity as the one herein.
It must be borne in mind that to warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment. (GSIS vs. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218, 31 May 2011, citing
Clementino Imperial vs. Mariano F. Santiago, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC Branch 139, Makati City, A.M. No. P-O1-
1449, 24 February 2003, 446 Phil. 104 (2003).

In the same vein, absent a substantial showing that the petitioners were maliciously motivated to distort
the truth or to defraud the government, their signatures alone on the DVs cannot be equated with the
administrative offense of dishonesty. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements; otherwise, the government employee may only liable for negligence, not for
dishonesty.

The petitioners’ are liable only for simple, not gross, misconduct because, as aptly ruled in BIR vs.
Organo, the facts fail to sufficiently establish flagrancy in their acts.