DIGEST OF CASES IN CRIM PRO

G.R. No. 206878

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MARCELINO CAGA y FABRE, Accused-Appellant

FACTS:

Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of "AAA" 3 after having a
drinking spree with her and her boyfriend, viz.:

That on or about September 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, commit sexual assault upon "AAA'', by then
and here, while sleeping, placing himself on top of her (''pumatong") and inserting his penis into the
vagina of said complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having carnal knowledge with the said "AAA," against her will and consent. Contrary to law.4

ISSUE: WON ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME
OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO CONVINCINGLY PROVE HIS GUILT

HELD: We hold that the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.

Elements of Rape

Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge ofa woman under
any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;

2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious’

3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was asleep and still
under the influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation
because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman
- a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence
during the trial. In the case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for the
simple reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman cannot freely and voluntarily
give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.

ndeed, the CA's findings are in accord with the RTC's assessment that "AAA" is a credible witness
and her testimony deserves full faith and credit.1âwphi1 Time and again, this Court has consistently
ruled that, "[i]n rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things."13 The credibility ascribed by the trial judge to the victim and her testimony
is an essential aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of the unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, and conduct during their direct and
cross-examination. Thus, the RTC pertinently observed:

During her testimony, the victim appeared to be straightforward, positive and convincing in her
testimony. Such personal demeanor of the victim truly persuaded and satisfied this Court that the
crime charged was indeed perpetrated by the accused. The vicitm would not have allowed herself to
undergo the ordeal of public trial and expose herself to humiliation and embarrassment ifher motive
is not to bring to justice the person who sexually abused her.

The Court found no motive on the part of the victim to concoct such a false charge. x x x From all
indications, she does not appear to have any ill motive to falsely testify against the accused.

The fact that she immediately reported the matter to the authorities, which led to the immediate arrest
of the accused and the filing of the instant case, sustained more than ever the credibility of the
victim's testimony.14

We are shown no reason why this Court ought not to defer to the findings of facts ofboth the RTC and
the CA. Indeed, such findings of facts of both courts bear the hallmark of truth and have the ring of
candor and sincerity.

Crespo vs. Mogul

G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court.
5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given
due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused
in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal
to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.

8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10,
1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an
order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.

9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the
motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards
the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened
act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss the information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should,
as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR

REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing
its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of
inspection and production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20 March
2012.

27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala
of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De
Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held
allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases

ISSUE: WON THE WRIT OF AMPARO CAN BE EXECUTED AND REVIEWED -NO THE RTC
COMMITTED SEVERAL PRECODURAL ERRORS IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF AMPARO.

HELD: First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as
the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to
life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

it is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It
is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this
Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right
or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ
and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of
the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted
for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.35

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision, the
RTC stated:

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and
the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from
the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioner's life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1âwphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions
filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances.
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating
the matter to this Court.

in many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 37 The rules can be
suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.38

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial
court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the
Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo,
Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of
this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with
a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
shall be meted with severe consequences.