ARTICLE 151
The appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code,
CASE DIGEST: HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA
GONZALES
FACTS: Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina
Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina
died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his
common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis
(Mariano), he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his
legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita),
with whom he has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his
death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying
properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said
donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,
petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC
against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as
respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at
the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of
his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.
The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification
case. The CA motu proprioproprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint
for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family
Court.
ISSUE: May the appellate court dismiss the order of dismissal of
the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made?
HELD: The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the
complaint.
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.
Art.151.No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Section 1. Grounds. -
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of
the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished
from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals
with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four
instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty
Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporation where we
noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply
exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss
cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the
second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal
can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but
logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint
among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely
a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course.
The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior
motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners
was appealed by respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling
on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the
statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the
complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was
filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the
appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or
objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-
defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not
have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered,
erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual
finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us
with any argument to have it reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. GRANTED.
Case Digest: Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 185922 : JANUARY 15, 2014
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar
(Capitolina) with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died in
March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law
wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr.
Favis and Juana got married in 1974, he executed an affidavit
acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is
married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his
death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying
properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said
donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina,
petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against
Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.
RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at
the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of
his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. . Holding that the
subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of
Mariano, the trial court also declared Juana and Mariano as compulsory
heirs of Dr. Favis and shall inherit in equal shares in the estate of the late
Dr. Favis.
The CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not
subject to compromise as it involves future legitime. CA rejected petitioners’
contention when it ruled that the prohibited compromise is that which is
entered between the decedent while alive and compulsory heirs. The subject
properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime,
as the instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made as mandated by Article 151 of the
Family Court.
HELD: NO. The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing
the complaint. The appellate court’s decision hinged on Article 151 of the
Family Code, which states that “No suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.”
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Section
1. Grounds. - Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
on any of the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of
the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished
from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 thereof which specifically
deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. It provides
for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim,
namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has
been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. It is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In the case at hand, complaint of petitioners was answered by
respondents without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The RTC
decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents at the CA
on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention
having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In
other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to
comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was
such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before
the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or
objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-
defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners’
complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on
earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not
have any authority or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.
ARTICLE 157
RAMOS V. PANGILINAN et. Al
G.R. No. 185920, [July 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and
what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption must
be proved.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch
of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to
pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service
incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of
execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’
name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt
from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company
moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the
family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied
and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the company
appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died
and was substituted by herein petitioners.
The appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan
property was not exempted from execution, for while “Article 153 of the
Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that
the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and
the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the
right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and
what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially
or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the
Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240
to 242..
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially
or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides
therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must
have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply
with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted
as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply
thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.
RAMOS etal. v. PANGILINAN (2010)
FACTS:
In 2003, herein respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
E.M. Ramos Electric Inc., a company owned by Ernesto Ramos, the father of
herein petitioners.
In 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos
and the company to pay respondents aggregate amount representing
backwages, separation pay and other incentive pay.
Having been final, the decision was served by the Labor Arbiter thru a writ
of execution on 08 September 2005 which the Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC
implemened by levying a property in Ramos’ name in Pandacan, Manila
(Pandacan property).
Alleging that Pandacan property is a family home, hence, exempt from
execution to satisfy judgment award, Ramos moved to quash the writ of
execution. However, respondents averred that the Pandacan Property is not
the Ramos family home and in fact served as the company’s business
address as borne by the company’s letterhead. Consequently, the Labor
Arbiter denied the motion to quash.
Ramos appealed to the CA but during the case’s pendency, Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. The latter filed before the NLRC, as
third party claimants, opposition to the case, however, the Labor Arbiter
later on denied it holding that petitioners’ substitution as compulsory heirs
will nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan Property.
Petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in including Pandacan property in
the execution, invoking that at the time Pandacan property was constituted
as family home in 1944, Art. 153 of the Family Code is applicable, hence, no
longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution and thus
exempted from execution.
However, the appeallate court decided that the property in question is not
exempted from execution because Art 153 of the FC has no retroactive effect
to family homes deemed to have been constituted prior to the its enactment.
ISSUE: WON the Pandacan Property is exempted frome execution?
RULING:
As a general rule, the family home is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the person constituiting it and his heirs.
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies.
Under the Family Code (Art 153), there is no need to constitute the family
home judicially or extra-judicially for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code for they are already constituted by operation
of law. Also, exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially
pursuant to the Civil Code.
In both rules, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely
alleges that such property is a family home. Such claim of exemption must
be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, they must comply with the procedure
mandated under the Civil Code. Having no absolute proof that the Pandacan
property was judicially and/or extrajudicially constituted as Ramos’ family
home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
PETITION DENIED.
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural
chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc.
(PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an
action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and
issued a writ of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale,
petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or
set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the
subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the
petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home
judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is,
if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be
shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to
the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly
provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-
payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after
such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 159
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,
Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola
(respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second
wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel
S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola
and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each
without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction.
The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the
house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the
RTC for lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the
respondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and
prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject
land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and
ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on
it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said
motion. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment
of partition but in view of the suspended proscription imposed under Article
159 of the family code, the subject house immediately partitioned to the
heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific
portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a
family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they
began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years
or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
ARTICLE 165
Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA
(G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J. Garcia)
FACTS:
Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila,
leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as
Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made
administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be
the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by
him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the
marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union. She also said that she and Francisco adopted
a child.
Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices,
the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of
Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding
took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little
consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.
Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf,
and she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo,
Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word “Yes” appears on the space below the question
“Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”. Pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as
bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her
scholastic and government service records, were also offered as
evidence.
RTC ruled in favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD:
NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child
is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art
146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor,
i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception
or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed
to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be
presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed
by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only proof
of the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a
matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration
of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn
child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation
or recognition.
Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption
of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming
that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In
fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the
latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res
judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein
petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless
of the form of the latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the
next of kin of the deceased.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS,
petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA
DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER
SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as
being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing,
is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval.
Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a
lawful wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G.
Dizon in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter’s estate under
the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August
23, 1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus
and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born.
However, in a notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following year, Juan
G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus,
on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a
complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate.
On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case.
They argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from
being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their
motion for reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the
issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision of the
lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings.
Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their submission of
their answers and several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the
dismissal of the complaint. They contend that the action instituted was, in
fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate
children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their
status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for partition was not an
appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and filiation because
the same could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. And at
this instance, the trial court favored with the respondents and therefore
dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of action and being
improper.
Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off
springs of the decedent.
Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were
born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so
born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant
petition is DENIED.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
GR No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts:
 Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint
for compulsory recognition with prayer for support against Rogelio Ong
before RTC
o February 1993: Jinky married Japanese Hasegawa Katsuo
o November 1993: Jinky and Rogelio got acquainted and fell in love
o January 1994-September 1998: Jinky and Rogelio cohabited
o February 1998: Joanne was born, Rogelio paid all expenses,
recognized child as his
o September 1998: Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving
support, alleging that he is not the father of the child
 RTC ordered defendant to recognize plaintiff as natural child and provide
monthly support
 RTC granted Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial (because he was declared in
default before)
 RTC declared Joanne to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz. Support to continue until she reaches majority age.
 Rogelio appealed to CA but he died in February 2005 during its pendency
 December 2000: CA granted appeal and remanded case to RTC for the
issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of Joanne
Issue: WoN CA erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact
that it is no longer feasible due to Rogelio’s death
Held: No, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
biological samples of his DNA
 Even if Rogelio already died, any of his biological samples may be used for
DNA testing
 “Biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.
This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs, and bones.
 Death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. According to
jurisprudence, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito, citing Tecson v.
COMELEC)
Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed.
G.R. No. 171713 December 17 2007
FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and
Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor
Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the
illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the
child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of
the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA.
They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that
"DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most
reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.
RULING:
Yes.
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on
DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--
organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body
fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA
testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. (People vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs
Comelec 424 SCRA 277)
Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almont
were married in 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to
Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he
married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to
Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa
by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is
a legitimate child of Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during
the marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage
between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage between Mario
and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was conceived, and
thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private
respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child
because such right is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The petition was denied.
Concepcion vs. CA
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
Facts: Ma. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion, which they begot a
child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his wife was still
married to Mario Gopiao. Hence, he filed for annulment on the ground of bigamy.
Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only a sham and she never lived
with him at all. RTC ruled that Theresa’s marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid
and subsisting thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was
condemned illegitimate. Custody was then given to Theresa.
Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled.
She argued that a putative father cannot have visitation rights over the illegitimate
child and the child’s surname be changed to the mother’s maiden name. Gerardo
opposed the motion and insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the
father’s surname to the child.
Issue: Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered
legitimate.
Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The
fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the spouses had lived
together.
The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate children,
for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein
is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the
law says and not what a parent says it is.
Cabatania v ca
GR No. 124814
October 21, 2004
ISSUE:
Florencia, a married house help had sexual intercourse with Camelo Cabatania and
allegedly had a child from him named Camelo Regodos. Can the court compel
petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son and to
give support to the latter?
APPLICABLE LAW:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
RULING:
The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage
is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Article 167 of the Family Code)
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

KINDS OF RECOGNITION
CAMELO CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124814 October
21, 2004
Facts:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and
she was hired as petitioner’s household help. It was then that petitioner and
Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a month, petitioner’s wife noticed that
Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner’s wife dismissed Florencia and
told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia demanded from him
support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and claimed
that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial,
Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he
rented a house for her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow
when in fact her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation
and used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal appearances
of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondent’s claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his
filiation with petitioner. Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that
petitioner rented a house for her, private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a
valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the
husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the presumed legitimacy
of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court
provided that in this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts
of law.
ARTICLE 172
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF
THE DECEASEDJOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADOVDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of
Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado
and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed
by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the
beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a
legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she
possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she
should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses
were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was
substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC
appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting
that Josefa and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.
Ruling:
The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that marriage between
Josefa and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is presumed that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no marriage had
occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in different proceedings.
Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of
the deceased.
Case Doctrine:
● Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage.
● Every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This
is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and respondents
are their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate.
The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitioners, sometime in 1917,
Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other
children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon
Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in
dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate.
He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between
the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa
and between Felisa and Ramon.
Held:
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx
xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends
knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that
even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make
much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,
its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less
than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more
than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they
primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia
had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity
of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only
in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the
disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio)
of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida
de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural
child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. (Dela Rosa vs Heirs of Rustia Vda De Guzman, G.R. No. 155733,
January 27, 2006).
ARTICLE 175
PARTINITY AND FILIATION
Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her
mother B Lopez
G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
A, represented by her mother B filed for recognition and support against C. C denies
that A is his illegitimate daughter. B bases her claim that B and C had an
extramarital affair which bore the child A. C also refused to affix his signature on
her Certificate of Birth but executed a handwritten note where he would give A
financial support each month.
Issues: Whether or not the note would be sufficient for filiation of an
illegitimate child?
No. A’s demand for support is dependent on the determination of her filiation (Art.
195 par. 4). The note not containing any statement on A’s filiation to C does not fall
under Art. 172(2) vis-à-vis Art. 175 which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to
support the child since it must be notarized and must be accompanied by the
putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Both
requisites in this case is missing.
Another is that the only other documentary evidence submitted by A, a copy of her
Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the
latter not having signed the same.
HERRERA VS. ALBA
Remedial Law – Evidence – Object Evidence – Daubert Test – DNA Evidence –
Vallejo Guidelines
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo
Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son.
Herrera denied Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties
to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera
is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the
validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread
acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said
test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA
testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the
order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002
there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible
object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People
vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible
evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA
test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo
Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data:
1. how the samples were collected,
2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US
jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a
test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More
specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity
inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9%
probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of
paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA
test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically
become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological
father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which
can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged
father is the biological father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the
right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition
on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it
may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample
from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
SALAS vs MATUSALEM
FACTS:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against
Narciso Salas in the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City. Respondent claimed that
petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas. Petitioner, already 56 years old at
the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all
expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the
child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy
of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to
depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child. The testimonial
evidence of the owner of the apartment where petitioner allegedly housed respondent when
she was pregnant was one of the basis for respondent’s claim for support. The RTC ruled
in favour of respondent to which the CA affirmed on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently
proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
RULING:
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which
the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it
was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she
claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as
the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on
the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented
apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity. Showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented
apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is
likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of
affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these
notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
ARTICLE 184/186
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region,
Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and
ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997
Facts:
The spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages
13 and 12 years old, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of
the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base
in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Dye may legally adopt Maricel and Alvin Due
Held: Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the
No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
under Article 184 of the Family Code. The law here does not provide for an alien
who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her Issue:
spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens
Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
may not adopt.
Held:
Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife under Article 185 of the Family Code. Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM Case Digest
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Angel
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
Facts
reads:
On 23 June 1974, Petitioner Monina P. Lim married Primo Lim. They were childless.
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
Subsequently, minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and Primo
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
November 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
American citizen.
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
Michael, who was already 25 years old and already married and 18 years and seven
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
months, before the trial court.
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
Michelle, together with her husband and Michael, gave their consent to the adoption as
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Monina’s husband Angel likewise executed an
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. On the
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
ground that since petitioner having remarried, should have filed the petition jointly with her
consanguinity or affinity; or
new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Angel Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over
the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. Adoption has, thus, the
following effects:
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship
of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as:
(1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Angel Olario has filed a case for dissolution
of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Angel Olario is of no moment. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution
of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being
the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling
above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave
their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was
not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly
exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well-being.
ART. 188
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years
and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was
not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly
exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint
adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well-being.
SHORTER VERSION FOR WRITTEN CASE DIGESTS:
Cang v. CA
GR 105308
Sept. 25, 1998
FACTS:
 Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Clavano married and begot 3 children.
 Upon learning that petitioner had an alleged extramarital affair with another
woman, Anna filed a petition for legal separation.
 The court approved the joint manifestation of the spouses providing that
they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board.
 They further agreed:
o That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support
of P1,000 effective from the date of the filing of the complaint
 o That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any persons without the written consent of the
husband.
 Petitioner left for the US where she sought a divorce from Anna.
 A divorce decree was issued which also granted sole custody of the 3 minor
children to Anna.
 While in the US, petitioner remitted to the Philippines a portion of his
monthly salary to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and deposited
another portion of his monthly salary in a bank in the name of his children.
 Private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respectively
the brother and sister-in-law of Anna, filed a special proceeding for the
adoption of the 3 minor Cang children.
 The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent
to his adoption.
 Anna likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging facts of abandonment by
petitioner.
 Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned
to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although
private respondents were financially capable of supporting the children
while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.
 The RTC issued a decree of adoption and concluded that petitioner has
abandoned his children.
ISSUES:
1. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of the
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
2. Whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his
consent to the adoption unnecessary
RULING:
1. Yes. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that there shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known
living parents who is not insane, or hopelessly intemperate, or has not
abandoned the child x x x. In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of
the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s
consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors by the natural
father. However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had
abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
2. No. Records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over
his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the
United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims. Petitioner’s testimony on the
matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the handwritten
letters to him of both his wife and children. Said petition must be denied as
it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and
under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Art. 190
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed
to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and
heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of
her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to
what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother.
Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was
born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother
(deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has
two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of
the biological mother?
HELD:
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9
thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested
(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition
for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother
went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and
no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by
the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption
and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the
adoptee’s biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological
parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of
the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child
in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that
his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
time of adoption.
ARTICLE 415
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. v Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, Provincial
Assessor of Batangas, Mnicipal Treasurer and Assessor of Nasugbu,
Batangas
May 30, 2016 |Peralta, J. | Real Property Taxation
Digester: Lingat, Anna Mickaella N.
SUMMARY: Provincial Assessor and Treasurer of Batangas issued
Assessments of Real Property Tax against Capitol Wireless Inc (Capwire)
over a submarine cable system in Nasugbu Batangas. Capwire contested
this assessment and argued that the cable system lies outside of Philippine
territory (i.e. on international waters). Capwire filed a petition for prohibition
before RTC. Both RTC and CA dismissed the petition and held that Capwire
failed to follow the requisite of payment under protest and failed to avail
of remedies before administrative bodies (i.e. Local Board of Assessment
Appeals).
The Court affirmed CA and held that:
(1) The petitioner raises factual issues (as the extent and status of Capwire’s
ownership of the system, the actual length of the cable/s that lie in
Philippine territory, and the corresponding assessment and taxes due
because the assessors and treasurers imposed and collected the assailed
real property tax on the finding that at least a portion or some portions of
the submarine cable system that Capwire owns or co-owns lies inside
Philippine territory). Since it is a case raising questions of fact, Capwire’s
filing in a judicial forum is improper because it is instead cognizable by
local administrative bodies like the Board of Assessment Appeals, which
are the proper venues for trying these factual issues.
(2) Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric
transmission lines which are "no longer exempted from real property tax"
and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real property tax under the
Local Government Code
(3) The cable system in not entirely in international waters and some areas
are considered municipal waters; hence, portion of it is within the taxing
jurisdiction of Batangas (Court took judicial notice of UNCLOS provisions)
(4) Capwire failed to allege or provide any other privilege or exemption
that were granted to it by the legislature after the enactment of the Local
Government Code. (LGC, Sections 193 and 234 expressly withdrawn tax
exemptions)
DOCTRINE:
In disputes involving real property taxation, the general rule is to require the
taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax under
protest before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the
assessment itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority.
Under the Local Government Code, every person by or for whom real
property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such property from
real property taxation "shall file with the provincial, city or municipal
assessor within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real
property sufficient documentary evidence in support of such claim."
SECOND DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. L-47943, May 31, 1982 ]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. CENTRAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS OF BATANGAS AND PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF
BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage
tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San
Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The
tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They have a total
capacity of 566,000 barrels. They are used for storing fuel oil for
Meralco's power plants.
According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates
welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a
foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer, a
sand pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous
asphalt stratum as the top layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact
with the asphalt layer.
The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a
circular wall made of concrete, eighteen inches thick, to prevent the
tank from sliding. Hence, according to Meralco, the tank is not
attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the
concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of
the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely
sits on its foundation. Each empty tank can be floated by flooding its
dike- inclosed location with water four feet deep. (pp. 29-30, Rollo .)
On the other hand, according to the hearing commissioners of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals, the area where the two tanks
are located is enclosed with earthen dikes with electric steel poles on
top thereof and is divided into two parts as the site of each tank. The
foundation of the tanks is elevated from the remaining area. On both
sides of the earthen dikes are two separate concrete steps leading to
the foundation of each tank.
Tank No. 2 is supported by a concrete foundation with an asphalt
lining about an inch thick. Pipelines were installed on the sides of
each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the Manila Enterprises
Industrial Corporation whose buildings and pumping station are near
Tank No. 2.
The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their
foundation, the foundation itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which
are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the
pipelines are attached to the tanks. (pp. 60-61, Rollo .)
In 1970, the municipal treasurer of Bauan, Batangas, on the basis of
an assessment made by the provincial assessor, required Meralco to
pay realty taxes on the two tanks. For the five-year period from 1970
to 1974, the tax and penalties amounted to P431 ,703.96 (p. 27,
Rollo). The Board required Meralco to pay the tax and penalties as a
condition for entertaining its appeal from the adverse decision of the
Batangas board of assessment appeals.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals (composed of Acting
Secretary of Finance Pedro M. Almanzor as chairman and Secretary of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos and Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development Jose Roño as members) in its decision
dated November 5, 1976 ruled that the tanks together with the
foundation, walls, dikes, steps, pipelines and other appurtenances
constitute taxable improvements.
Meralco received a copy of that decision on February 28, 1977. On the
fifteenth day, it filed a motion for reconsideration which the Board
denied in its resolution of November 25, 1977, a copy of which was
received by Meralco on February 28, 1978.
On March 15, 1978, Meralco filed this special civil action
of certiorari to annul the Board's decision and resolution. It contends
that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave error
of law in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.
Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any
of the kinds of real property enumerated in article 415 of the Civil
Code and, therefore, they cannot be categorized as realty by nature, by
incorporation, by destination nor by analogy. Stress is laid on the fact
that the tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed
on leased land, not on the land owned by Meralco.
This is one of those highly controversial, borderline or penumbral
cases on the classification of property where strong divergent opinions
are inevitable. The issue raised by Meralco has to be resolved in the
light of the provisions of the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No.
470, and the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464
which took effect on June 1, 1974.
Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on
real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other
improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof. This
provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real Property
Tax Code which provides:
"SEC. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. - There shall be levied,
assessed and collected in all provinces, cities and municipalities an
annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as land, buildings,
machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real
property not hereinafter specifically exempted."
The Code contains the following definition in its section 3:
"k) Improvements - is a valuable addition made to property or an
amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or
replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance
its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes."
We hold that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the
land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the
land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It
is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree
of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil
needed by Meralco for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things
which should generally be regarded as personal property (84 C.J.S.
171, Note 8). It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real
property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be
considered personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs.
Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
The case of Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric
Company, 119 Phil. 328, wherein Meralco's steel towers were held not
to be subject to realty tax, is not in point because in that case the steel
towers were regarded as poles and under its franchise Meralco's poles
are exempt from taxation. Moreover, the steel towers were not
attached to any land or building. They were removable from their
metal frames.
Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co.
vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501 where the tools and equipment in the
repair, carpentry and blacksmith shops of a transportation company
were held not subject to realty tax because they were personal
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The Board's questioned
decision and resolution are affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, petitioners, vs. PCI
LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 137705. August 22,
2000]
Summary: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming the RTC’s decision and its Resolution denying
reconsideration. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City issued a Writ of
Seizure and denied petitioners’ Motion for Special Protective Order, praying
that the deputy sheriff be enjoined “from seizing immobilized or other real
properties in (petitioners’) factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their
original place whatever immobilized machineries or equipments he may
have removed.
FACTS: PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (“PCI”) filed with the RTC-QC a
complaint for sum of money with an application for a writ of
replevin. Respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to
seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days
and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. In implementation of
said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery
with word that he return for the other machineries. Petitioners filed a motion
for special protective order, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer
enforcement of the writ of replevin. PCI Leasing opposed on the ground that
the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ
of replevin. In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to
be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the
parties’ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. The sheriff again sought
to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties
and he was able to take two more machineries. The parties appealed. The
appellate court, citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the subject
machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not
owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the words of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.
ISSUE: WOR the said machineries are personal, not immovable and may be
the subject of replevin.
HELD: The SC ruled that the machines are personal property and therefore
can be the subject of replevin. Pursuant to Rule 60 sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court only personal properties may be the subject of replevin. However,
petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not
proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real
property. Under Art. 415 par. 5 of the Civil code: machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works,
are immovable properties. In the present case, the machines that were the
subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built
on their own land and were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable
or personal property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry. However, the Court has held that contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to
such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
In the case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in
question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section
12.1 of the Agreement states: The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and
remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part
thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or
attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or
any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.”
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of
the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they
are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
Art. 419/420
Heirs of Arturo Reyes v. Socco-Beltran, G.R. No. 176474
Facts:
Elena Socco-Beltran (Socco) filed an application for Lot No. 6-B, alleging
that it was adjudicated in her favor in the extra-judicial settlement of
Constancia Socco’s estate, before the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). The heirs of Arturo Reyes opposed the application on the ground that
Lot No. 6-B was sold by Miguel R. Socco, brother of Socco, in favor of their
father, Atty. Arturo Reyes, as evidenced by the Contract to Sell.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have a better right to the subject property over
the respondent’s?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the petitioners could not derive title of Lot No. 6-B
because Miguel R. Socco was not yet the owner of the said lot and was only
expecting to inherit the same. The contract was a conditional sale,
conditioned upon the event Miguel Socco would actually inherit and
become the owner of the said property. The Court, relying on Article 1459
of the Civil Code on contracts of sale, said that, “The thing must be licit and
the vendor must have the right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time
it is delivered.” The law specifically requires that the vendor must have
ownership of the property at the time of it is delivered. Hence, there was no
valid sale from which ownership of the property could have transferred from
Miguel Socco to Arturo Reyes, since, at the time of the execution, the former
was not yet the owner of the same and was only expecting to inherit it.
Furthermore, Arturo Reyes, not having acquired ownership of the property,
could not have conveyed the same to his heirs.
Art. 421
Laurel v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92013)
Ojeda v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 92047)
ROPPONGI PROPERTY
FACTS:
These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin respondents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also,
prays for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property.
The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparation Agreement entered into with
Japan. The other three (3) properties include Nampeidai Property (present
site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property
(commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for consulate
staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is now vacant).
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M
would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual
schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments. The procurements are to be divided into government sector
and those for private parties in projects, the latter shall be made available
only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in national
development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government
Sector” for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However, the
Roppongi property has remained underdeveloped since that time.
Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to
have buildings built at the expense of the lessee, the same was not acted
favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino issued EO No.
296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital
goods and services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter,
amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch of the
government pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum
floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been
postponed and later restrained by the SC.
Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject property is not
governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the laws of Japan where the
property is located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?
NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion and
the respondents have failed to show that it has become patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that it has not been used for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Such conversion
happens only if property is withdrawn from public use, through an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial property. Abandonment
must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
The EO does not declare that the properties lost their public
character, merely intending the properties to be made available to
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in case of sale, lease or other
disposition. Furthermore, it is based on the wrong premise that the
Japan properties can be sold to end-users, when in fact it cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the properties into patrimonial
properties, merely stating that sources of funds for its implementation
be sourced from proceeds of the disposition of the Government in
foreign countries, but not that the Roppongi property be withdrawn
from being classified as a property of public dominion.
CONFLICT OF LAW
Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that the Japanese law and
not our Civil Code shall apply is incorrect. There is no conflict of law in
this situation. A conflict of law arises only when:
a. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities
of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or
the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined.
b. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. Both elements
does not exist in the case. The issues are not concerned with the
validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the government
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the state and the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should
be governed by Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not apply.
2. Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
NO. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property is needed. None has been
enacted for this purpose.
3. W/N EO No. 296 is constitutional?
The SC did not anymore pass upon its constitutionality.
ART. 423
CLASSES OF CORPORATIONS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CITY OF PARANAQUE
G.R. No. 191109 | July 18, 2012
MENDOZA, J.:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 195, Paranaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, not
exempt from payment of real property taxes.
 The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by
virtue of P.D. No. 1084 to provide a coordinated, economical and efficient
reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands
belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government with the
object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development
consistent with public interest.
 By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City.
Parañaque City Treasurer issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed
properties based on the assessment for delinquent real property for tax years
2001 and 2002.
PRA asserted that:
 It is not a GOCC under the Administrative Code, nor is it a GOCC under
Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because it is not required to
meet the test of economic viability.
 It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing an essential public service. Although it has a capital stock
divided into shares, it may not be classified as a stock corporation because
it lacks the second requisite of a stock corporation: to distribute dividends
and allotment of surplus and profits to its stockholders.
 It may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no
members and it is not organized for charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil
service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers
as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
 It was not created to compete in the market place as there was no
competing reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also,
while PRA is vested with corporate powers under P.D. No. 1084, such
circumstance does not make it a corporation but merely an incorporated
instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated instrumentality
of the National Government holds title to real property does not make said
instrumentality a GOCC.
City of Parañaque (respondent) argued that:
 PRA since its creation consistently represented itself to be a GOCC. PRA’s
very own charter (P.D. No. 1084) declared it to be a GOCC and that it has
entered into several thousands of contracts where it represented itself to be
a GOCC. In fact, PRA admitted in its original and amended petitions and
pre-trial brief filed with the RTC of Parañaque City that it was a GOCC.
 It argues that PRA is a stock corporation with an authorized capital stock
divided into 3 million no par value shares, out of which 2 million shares have
been subscribed and fully paid up. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has
withdrawn tax exemption privileges granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is an incorporated instrumentality of the national
government and is, therefore, exempt from payment of real property tax under
sections 234(a) and 133(o) of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code
vis-à-vis Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Yes it is a Government Instrumentality. However, it is not a GOCC. When the law
vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government
instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
From the above definitions, it is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation" while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate
powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally
autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government
machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do
not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before
an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through
special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the
common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this
case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common good but failed the
second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of
PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to
compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing
reclamation companies being operated by the private sector.
Further, when local governments invoke the power to tax on national government
instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The
rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is
resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer
claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a
national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is
construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197561 April 7, 2014
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA; LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Treasurer of the City of Manila; JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his capacity as OIC, Chief
License Division of the City of Manila; REYNALDO MONTALBO, in his capacity as City
Auditor of the City of Manila, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated December 22, 2010 and June 21, 2011,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC-Manila) in Civil Case No. 00-97081.
The factual and procedural antecedents follow:
This case springs from the Decision2 rendered by the RTC-Manila, dated September 28,
2001, in the case entitled Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, et al.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97081, granting petitioner’s request for tax refund or credit
assessed under Section 213 of the Revenue Code of Manila upon finding that there was
double taxation in the imposition of local business taxes. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to
either refund or credit the tax assessed under Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila and
paid for by plaintiff on the first quarter of year 2000 in the amount of ₱3,036,887.33.
The defendants City of Manila, etc. are enjoined from collecting the tax from plaintiff Coca-
Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. under Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila. The counterclaims
[sic] of respondents is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Injunction bond posted by petitioner is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved by the foregoing, respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals via an
ordinary appeal.5 On April 9, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing
respondents’ appeal on the ground that the same was improperly brought to the said Court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court. Despite respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision in its Resolution dated February
28, 2005.6
On February 10, 2010, this Court promulgated a Resolution denying the Petition for Review
filed by the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 09 April 2003 and 28
February 2005 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74517.
SO ORDERED.7
On May 12, 2010, the Clerk of Court of this Court issued an Entry of Judgment8 relative to the
aforesaid Resolution and declared the same final and executory on March 10, 2010.
On June 3, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC-Manila a Motion for Execution for the
enforcement of the Decision dated September 28, 2001 and the issuance of the
corresponding writ of execution.9 Finding merit therein, on June 11, 2010, the RTC-Manila
issued an Order10 granting petitioner’s Motion for Execution and directed the Branch Clerk of
Court to issue the corresponding writ of execution to satisfy the judgment.
On June 15, 2010, the Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 21 of the RTC Manila issued a Writ of
Execution directing the Sheriff to cause the execution of the Decision dated September 28,
2001, disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid
judgment, including payment in full of your lawful fees for the service of this writ.11
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. In response, petitioner filed
its Opposition thereto on December 12, 2010.12
On December 22, 2010, the RTC-Manila issued an Order13 granting the Motion to Quash Writ
of Execution, ruling:
Finding the motion to be prejudicial to the defendants, if implemented, and considering that
the projects of the City will be hampered, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.14
Herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC-
Manila in its Order dated June 21, 2011, reasoning that both tax refund and tax credit involve
public funds. Thus, pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 10-2000,15 the enforcement or
satisfaction of the assailed decision may still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following assignment of
errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE WRIT OF EXECUTION (FOR SPECIAL JUDGMENT)
ISSUED BY THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT DOES NOT INVOLVE THE LEVY
OR GARNISHMENT OF FUNDS AND PROPERTY USED OR BEING USED FOR
PUBLIC PURPOSE,ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 10-2000 HAS THEREFORE
NO RELEVANCE IN THIS CASE.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE REQUIRES EITHER TAX
REFUND (PAYMENT OF SUM OF MONEY) OR TAX CREDIT (ISSUANCE OF TAX
CREDIT CERTIFICATE).
3. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN ISSUING TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATES TO OTHER TAXPAYERS FOR ILLEGALLY COLLECTED TAXES
EVEN WITHOUT ANY APPROPRIATE MEASURE.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE REASON CITED IN THE ORDER IN QUASHING THE WRIT
OF EXECUTION IS NOT ONE OF THE GROUNDS LAID DOWN BY LAW.
(GUTIERREZ VS. VALIENTE, 557 SCRA 211)
5. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT ITS ASSAILED ORDER HAS IN EFFECT REVERSED THE
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, THUS, DEPRIVING PETITIONER THE FRUITS OF ITS
LABOR BEFORE THE COURTS.17
At the onset, it bears stressing that while petitioner lays down various grounds for the
allowance of the petition, the controversy boils down to the propriety of the issuance of the
writ of execution of the judgment ordering respondents either to refund or credit the tax
assessed under Section 2118 of the Revenue Code of Manila in the amount of
Php3,036,887.33.
After careful consideration of the facts and laws obtaining in this case, we find that the
issuance of the Writ of Execution was superfluous, given the clear directive of the RTC-Manila
in its Decision dated September 28, 2001. We do not, however, agree with respondents’ view
that Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 is applicable to the instant case for reasons
discussed hereinbelow.
In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the writ of execution issued by the Branch
Clerk of Court does not involve the levy or garnishment of funds and property used or being
used for public purpose given that the writ was issued "For: Special Judgment." Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 has no relevance in the instant case.
In its Decision dated September 28,2001, the RTC-Manila directs respondents to either
refund or credit the tax under Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila, which was
improperly assessed but nevertheless paid for by petitioner on the first quarter of year 2000 in
the amount of ₱3,036,887.33. The judgment does not actually involve a monetary award or a
settlement of claim against the government.
Under the first option, any tax on income that is paid in excess of the amount due the
government may be refunded, provided that a taxpayer properly applies for the refund.19 On
the other hand, the second option works by applying the refundable amount against the tax
liabilities of the petitioner in the succeeding taxable years.20
Hence, instead of moving for the issuance of a writ of execution relative to the aforesaid
Decision, petitioner should have merely requested for the approval of the City of Manila in
implementing the tax refund or tax credit, whichever is appropriate. In other words, no writ
was necessary to cause the execution thereof, since the implementation of the tax refund will
effectively be a return of funds by the City of Manila in favor of petitioner while a tax credit will
merely serve as a deduction of petitioner’s tax liabilities in the future.
In fact, Section 252 (c) of the Local Government Code of the Philippines is very clear that "[i]n
the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of
the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his
existing or future tax liability." It was not necessary for petitioner to move for the issuance of
the writ of execution because the remedy has already been provided by law.
Thus, under Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing rules and regulations implementing the
Local Government Code, particularly Article 286 thereof, the tax credit granted a taxpayer
shall be applied to future tax obligations of the same taxpayer for the same business, to wit:
ARTICLE 286. Claim for Refund or Tax Credit. — All taxpayers entitled to a refund or tax
credit provided in this Rule shall file with the local treasurer a claim in writing duly supported
by evidence of payment (e.g., official receipts, tax clearance, and such other proof evidencing
overpayment)within two (2) years from payment of the tax, fee, or charge. No case or
proceeding shall be entertained in any court without this claim in writing, and after the
expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of such tax, fee, or charge, or from the
date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or tax credit.
The tax credit granted a taxpayer shall not be refundable in cash but shall only be applied to
future tax obligations of the same taxpayer for the same business. If a taxpayer has paid in
full the tax due for the entire year and he shall have no other tax obligation payable to the
LGU concerned during the year, his tax credits, if any, shall be applied in full during the first
quarter of the next calendar year on the tax due from him for the same business of said
calendar year.
Any unapplied balance of the tax credit shall be refunded in cash in the event that he
terminates operation of the business involved within the locality.21
Accordingly, while we find merit in petitioner’s contention that there are two (2) ways by which
respondents may satisfy the judgment of the RTC-Manila: (1) to pay the petitioner the amount
of Php3,036,887.33 as tax refund; or (2) to issue a tax credit certificate in the same amount
which may be credited by petitioner from its future tax liabilities due to the respondent City of
Manila,22 the issuance of the Writ of Execution relative thereto was superfluous, because the
judgment of the RTC-Manila can neither be considered a judgment for a specific sum of
money susceptible of execution by levy or garnishment under Section 9,23 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court nor a special judgment under Section 11,24 Rule 39 thereof.
Moreover, given that Presidential Decree No. 1445 and Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
involve a settlement of a claim against a local government unit, the same finds no application
in the instant case wherein no monetary award is actually awarded to petitioner but a mere
return or restoration of petitioner’s money, arising from an excessive payment of tax
erroneously or illegally imposed and received.
It could not have been the intention of the law to burden the taxpayer with going through the
process of execution under the Rules of Civil Procedure before it may be allowed to avail its
tax credit as affirmed by a court judgment. If at all, the City of Manila Local Treasury may be
allowed to verify documents and information relative to the grant of the tax refund or tax credit
(i.e., determine the correctness of the petitioner's returns, and the tax amount to be credited),
in consonance with the ruling in San Carlos Milling Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,25 which may be applied by analogy to the case at bar, to wit:
It is difficult to see by what process of ratiocination petitioner insists on the literal interpretation
of the word "automatic." Such literal interpretation has been discussed and precluded by the
respondent court in its decision of 23 December1991 where, as aforestated, it ruled that
"once a taxpayer opts for either a refund or the automatic tax credit scheme, and signified his
option in accordance with the regulation, this does not ipso facto confer on him the right to
avail of the same immediately. An investigation, as a matter of procedure, is necessary to
enable the Commissioner to determine the correctness of the petitioner's returns, and the tax
amount to be credited.
Prior approval by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the tax credit under then section
86 (now section 69) of the Tax Code would appear to be the most reasonable interpretation to
be given to said section. An opportunity must be given the internal revenue branch of the
government to investigate and confirm the veracity of the claims of the taxpayer. The absolute
freedom that petitioner seeks to automatically credit tax payments against tax liabilities for a
succeeding taxable year, can easily give rise to confusion and abuse, depriving the
government of authority and control over the manner by which the taxpayers credit and offset
their tax liabilities, not to mention the resultant loss of revenue to the government under such
a scheme.26
In its third assignment of error, petitioner postulates that the RTC Manila seriously erred when
it failed to consider that the respondents have been issuing tax credit certificates to other
taxpayers for illegally collected taxes even without any appropriate measure. 1âwphi 1
On the other hand, respondents argue that the same raises a question of fact which would
entail an examination of probative value of documentary evidence which, in fact, were not
introduced in the course of the trial but only as a mere attachment to the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner.27
Petitioner’s sweeping statement cannot hold water as the factual and legal milieu of the tax
refund cases submitted to the City of Manila, as well as the circumstances availing in each of
those cases, vary, requiring a different action from the City of Manila. As such, the case of
Asian Terminals Inc. as well as the case of Tupperware Brands Phils., Inc. and Smart
Communications, Inc., as cited by petitioner,28 should not be compared to the instant case
because it has not been proven that the factual and procedural circumstances availing therein
are similar to the instant case.
For its fourth assigned error, petitioner argues that the reason cited in the Order quashing the
Writ of Execution is not one of the grounds laid down by law.
Respondents aver, on the other hand, that in granting the Motion to Quash, the RTC-Manila
plainly conceded that the Writ of Execution was improvidently issued as it was prejudicial to
the respondents. Respondents also argue that the rule that government funds are generally
exempt from execution is based on obvious considerations of public policy; thus, the primary
functions and devolved public welfare services rendered by the respondent City of Manila
cannot be interrupted or abandoned by the withdrawal of its meager resources from their
lawful and particular purpose based on the appropriation ordinance.29
Finding that the issuance of the Writ of Execution was superfluous in the first place, this Court
finds the foregoing issue inapt for discussion. Nevertheless, this Court disagrees with
petitioner’s fifth contention that the assailed decision of the RTC-Manila granting the Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution has, in effect, reversed the judgment in the instant case.
What is at issue in the instant petition is merely the propriety of the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the RTC-Manila. Clearly, this Court has already ruled upon the validity of
the tax refund or the tax credit due to the petitioner and has rendered the same final and
executory.
The lower court, therefore, has not effectively reversed the judgment in favor of petitioner.
The court a quo’s reason for quashing the Writ of Execution was to allow the parties to
enforce the judgment by complying first with the rules and procedures of P.D. No. 1445 and
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.30
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, petitioner Coca-
Cola Bottlers, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund or tax credit without need for a writ of execution,
provided that petitioner complies with the requirements set by law for a tax refund or tax
credit, whichever is applicable.
SO ORDERED.
ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
G.R. No. 130876
December 5, 2003
FACTS: The Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring that neither Tomas N.
Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of
the lot in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to
establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply
the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does
not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
It declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government of the
Philippines. Wherefore, the petition for review was denied.
Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing
a different aspect of the decision.
ISSUE: Petitioners, in their MR vigorously argue that:
1. the majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of
law and “in a manner shocking to good conscience”;
 2. in invalidating the sale to the late Tomas Alonso, the ponencia unfairly deviated from
established doctrine, using as basis factual findings either unsupported by the evidence or
contradicted by the appellate court’s findings of fact;
3. the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent
Cebu Country Club’s title were not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and
damage of the petitioners; and
4. the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober,
factually accurate, and juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case,
including prescription and laches.
Respondents, in their MR staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that
that the subject land legally belongs to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. Moreover:
1. The Torrens Certificate of Title of respondent, covering subject lot cannot be collaterally
attacked and nullified in this case at bar.
HELD: IN VIEW THEREOF, we DENY with finality the separate motions for
reconsideration of the petitioners and respondent.
Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on a Lot which is adjacent to
the disputed property, and yet petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted
the same effort to reconstitute his alleged title to the subject property. As successors-
in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot
claim a right greater than that of their predecessor.
Moreover, it cannot be over-accentuated that Tomas Alonso, petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest, never asserted any claim of ownership over the disputed property during
his lifetime. When he was alive, Tomas Alonso did not exert any effort to have the title
of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or seek recovery thereof from the
respondent which was in possession since 1931
1. Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides:
“No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of
Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary
of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources).
Thus, petitioners’ claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence
showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the
Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is
explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule.
2. It must be emphasized that in civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by
preponderance of evidence is on the plaintiff who is asserting the affirmative of an
issue. Inasmuch as petitioners pray for the “Declaration of Nullity and Non-Existence
of Deed/Title, Cancellation of Certificates of Title and Recovery of Property” against
the respondent, they had the burden to establish their claims of ownership of the
subject property which they failed to do in this case.
3. While we held that the issue of the validity of respondent’s title is factual which
cannot be reviewed on appeal, nevertheless, we have answered each ground raised by
petitioner in assailing respondent’s title. Needless to stress, mere allegations of fraud
are not enough. Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the “Friar Lands” over
which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial
property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with
the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
Sections 11, 12 and 18 of Act No. 1120 provide:
SECTION 11. Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon and
occupant of any portion of said lands . . . desire to purchase the land so occupied by
him, he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof to the Government, and
shall be allowed ten years from the date of purchase within which to pay for the same
in equal annual installments, if he so desires, all deferred payments to bear interest at
the rate of four per centum per annum on all deferred payments.
SECTION 12. … When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which
shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and
occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the prize so fixed, payable as provided
in this Act . . . and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and
become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of
the Land Registration Act. …
SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under
the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear
and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ
both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property. GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO Promulgated:
Both parties failed to do so. ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-CALINGO
married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. April 11, 2012
On the part of respondent, it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, MENDIOLA, MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD
United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even married to EUSTAQUIO NATIVIDAD, and
one evidence to show when and how its predecessor in interest, United Services ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO
Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody. VELASQUEZ,
Respondents.

Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine
or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The Facts:
reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its
original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale,
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of
by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while the
a. Furthermore, the declaration in the Court’s judgment that the subject property
belongs to the Government is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on respondent’s second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147 square meters was originally declared in
title. The validity of the reconstitution of title to the land in question was directly in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years, these lands lined with
dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
on the legality of respondent’s title.
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose
is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized instrument
respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property’s conversion to private (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold the said property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and
property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent
Cornelia Sanga.
cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained
part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own daughter,
property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso
facto ripen into ownershi Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it to her as part of
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND G.R. No. 175763 inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold
ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a
TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA Present: notarized deed of sale dated October 14, 1964. Petitioners then took possession of
T. VELOSO, the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared the same
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J., for tax purposes issued in 1969 in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag.
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda Dinguinbayan to
- versus - BERSAMIN,
Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on October 22, 1968. Thereupon,
DEL CASTILLO, and
petitioners took possession of said property and declared the same for tax
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly, notoriously and
adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker Juana Quinones;
they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on the land.
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in his name
Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently
caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to 1,763 square
meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on October 28, 1998
over the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of Jose Gabriel was null
and void from the beginning.
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no cause of
action against them for they have not established their ownership over the subject
property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’ name. They further argued that
OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners
failed to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.
Issue:
Who has a better right over the subject property?
Ruling:
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March 2000,
the latter have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the subject
land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for the period and in the
character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right
cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring again the property for tax
purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in their name in 1998.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his
title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person
who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the
land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. In this
case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and
bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared with the technical description
contained in OCT No. 1035, which would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of
147 square meters was erroneously included in respondents’ title. The testimony of
Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said witness merely stated
the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations of his
mother. On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed in the
1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels. However, no such
plan was presented in court.
ART. 427
G.R. No. 86787
CRUZ, J.:
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases
resolving the same issue, the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan,
Subic, Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions
are in the possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the
name of the private respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for
recovery of possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their
rights as registered owners of the land. In their answer, the defendents
claimed that the lots were part of the public domain and could not have
been registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long and continuous
possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in their names. Two of
them maintained that they had acquired their respective lots by virtue of
valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on inheritance.
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.[1] He held in
part as follows:
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in
question, necessarily have the lawful right to the physical
possession ofthe land. The owner of a land has a right to enjoy and possess
it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess the same from any
person occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428 - New Civil Code
"The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
"The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of
the thing in order to recover it."
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered
owners of the land in question have also the corresponding right to the
recovery and possession of the same. The defendants who are in physical
occupancy of the land belonging to the plaintiffs have no right
whatsoever to unjustly withhold the possession of the said land from the
plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the land in question is unlawful
and in violation of plaintiffs' right to the recovery and possession of the land
they owned. The evidence presented by the defendants claiming as per
certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land occupied by them is
within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves scant
consideration as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment
the land in question was titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to
become a part of the public domain as the same became the private
property of the registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of
the land made in the names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it
appearing that the land is already titled to the plaintiffs. The registration of
the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the
defendants can not and does not defeat the title of the plaintiffs to the
land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of the land in
question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not
ripen into ownership because the land is covered by a torrens title.
Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land titled under Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and
so holds that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in
question are entitled to the possession of the same, and that the
defendants who are occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in
violation of the right of the latter, are duty-bound to restore possession of
the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August
22, 1988.[2] Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
petitioners then came to this Court, urging reversal of the courts below.
They allege that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have
been validly registered under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith
entitled to the rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil
Code.
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is
traceable to an Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or
eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now incontrovertible and
conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of regularity applies
to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that
the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore
registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being
void abinitio, it must be shown that the registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the
title.[3] Neither of these requirements has beenestablished by the
petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry
that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The
trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for
lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body
cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be
registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry,
or any other representative of the Government for that matter, entered
any opposition to the land registration proceedings that led to the
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an action to
invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the
expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of
registration[4] and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late
hour. And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of
registered land must also possess it does not merit serious attention. The
non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax declarations on
the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof
or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a
right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is
imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the
petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their
long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are
in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive
prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land
registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.[5]
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby:[6]
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to
land; to put astop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration in thecertificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once the title was registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
"mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished
bright with use and has long become a settled rule of law.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners
cannot invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed
rights to the constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.
A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the
land at the time he builds on it.[7] This definition cannot apply to the
petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had no right at
all to occupy the subject lots.
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the
public domain and even submitted a certification to that effect from the
Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact registered under the Torrens system
and such registration was constructive notice to the whole world, including
the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of
checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land
be public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it
and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters
for having entered, without permission or authority, land that did not
belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the
petitioners are asking us to overturn long established doctrines
guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and the indefeasibility of
titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of the
registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We are
not disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone of their feeble
arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
It is so ordered.
ART. 428
NAME OF THE CASE: FIORELLO JOSE VS ROBERTO ALFUERTO, GR NO. 169380, 26
NOVEMBER 2012
CAUSE OF ACTION: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
FACTS:
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua
Sing located in San Dionisio, Paranaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in
1991, he then leased the property to petitioner Fiorello Jose. The Contract of Lease
was neither notarized nor registered with the Paranaque City Registry of Deeds.
The Lease Contract provided that the lessor transfers all its rights and
prerogative to evict occupants in favor of lessee which shall be responsible for all
the expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from the lessor.
There are however occupants already occupying the property even before
the lease contract was executed. Soon after Chua Sing and petitioner signed the
lease contract, petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the
property within 30 days and that they pay monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully
vacate the property.
Respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. Petitioner then filed an
ejectment case against respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Paranaque. When Petitioner brought the case to the Barangay for conciliation, the
Barangay issued a Certification to File Action. Petitioner claimed that as lessee of
the subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully
occupy the land.
Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent’s possession of the land was not by the
petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. Having been in possession of the land for more
than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through an ejectment case.
CA emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the only
issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a
property. Petitioner’s claim is of accion publiciana (for the recovery of the
possession), wherein he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of
lease. CA dismissed the ejectment case. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which CA denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can treat an ejectment case as an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership).
Ruling:
The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
Ratio Decidendi:
Petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an
action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, the Court should still resolve the case.
However, the Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC
in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria for these cases are different and not interchangeable.
An action for forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. Forcible entry
must be filed within one year after the unlawful dispossession while the latter must
be filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Former is
concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real property
while the latter’s subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real
property. The former is filed in the municipal trial court and summary action, while
the latter is plenary action in the RTC.
The cause of action in the ejectment case is different from accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The ejectment case is brought before the
proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession de facto, not
possession de jure. MeTC’s ruling is only to resolve the issue of the possession and
therefore inconclusive. MeTC resolves only possession de facto, ejectment cases
are summary in nature, while accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria are
plenary action. Hence petition is denied; CA’s decision dismissing the ejectment
case was affirmed.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012.]
RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C.
Agullana, petitioner, vs . SPS. HILARION AGUSTIN and JUSTA
AGUSTIN, respondents.
Parcels of land subject of the case were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao
in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao
sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of
Ruben C. Corpuz.
The elder Corpuz allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties,
the latter being relatives. Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused
to leave the premises. Ruben C. Corpuz (petitioner) filed a complaint for
ejectment against Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin.
Ruben (petitioner): says that he has the better right to possess subject
property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971. And that the
occupation of the Spouses were merely tolerated.
Spouses Agustin (respondent): in their Answer, interposed the defense that
on June 5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject
property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor.
The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976, resulted in the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of
petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not
annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.
MTCC: found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the complaint; that the
Spouses entered the land as buyers disproving the allegation that they
were merely allowed to occupy the subject properties, considering further
the length of time that the defendants have been in possession, as owners,
and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon,
this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is concerned, that
the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession of said property.
RTC: Affirmed the earlier dismissal of the case by MTCC (Corpuz appealed)
COURT OF APPEALS:
Dismissed the appeal- noted that petitioner’s father engaged in a double
sale when he conveyed the disputed properties to petitioner and
respondents.
Also ruled that petitioner had knowledge of the sale of the disputed real
property executed between Francisco Corpuz, petitioner's father, and
respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to respondents,
the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus, in the
context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents' possession
of the property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner —
petitioner's father — but was in the exercise of ownership.
Issue: Who between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed
properties — petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980;
or respondents, who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute
Sale over the same properties?
Ruling: The right of possession belongs with Spouses Agustin since their
possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. CA
was correct to dismiss the unlawful detainer case of Corpuz.
Discussion of the suit filed by Corpuz (unlawful detainer): One of the three
kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion
interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding . . . which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a
summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court."
In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is
entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure. Where the parties to an
ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that
issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess
the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and
binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties,
he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the
lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of
the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership,
and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in
continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than
30 years up to this day.
Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al. (cited by Petitioner Corpuz because of
similarity to present case): the principal issue was who between the two
parties had the better right to possess the subject property. This Court
resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who had the
better right to possession of the disputed property
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the
parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property.
Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied
on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an
established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in
continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the
concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. An
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property (Carbonilla v Abiera)
Canlas v. Tubil enumerated the elements that constitute the sufficiency of
a complaint for unlawful detainer:
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer
Complaint against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have
consistently upheld the entitlement of respondents to continued possession
of the subject properties, since their possession has been established as
one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the
unlawful detainer case of petitioner.
We concur in the appellate court's findings that petitioner's father
engaged in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the
case show that it took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he
acquired the property from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered
the conveyance and caused the issuance of the land title registered in his
name under the Torrens system. Respondents, on the other hand,
continued their possession of the properties, but without bothering to
register them or to initiate any action to fortify their ownership.
We cannot, however, sustain the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents
and oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration
of respondents' unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale.
In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of
petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus,
the sale of the subject properties by petitioner's father to respondents
cannot be considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came
to know of the transaction.
The Spouses Agustin do not dispute the existence of TCT No. T-12980
registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that the land title
issued to him was an "act of fraud" on his part. We find this argument to be
equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of petitioner — an
attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.
It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the
subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be direct and not by a
collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case
wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than
possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's
title is proscribed. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the
instant Petition for lack of merit. Dismissal of case AFFIRMED.
Suarez v. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944 (March 12, 2014) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership > Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property >
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Facts:
A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and
Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who
were claiming that they inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy, who
inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2
and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that
Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita
requiring them to vacate the lot and informed them that she had already
purchased the lot from the former's relatives. Felix and Marilou did not heed
the demand so Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint against
unlawful detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as
to when and how possession by tolerance of them began.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.
Held:
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be
alleged:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show

a statement of facts to determine the class of case and remedies available
to the parties. When the complaint fails to state the facts constituting a
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria.

In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege
and prove how Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon
it. She was also silent about the details on who specifically permitted Emboy
to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the
CA did not commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.