repudiates the inheritance, there being no
I. CONCEPT OF
SUCCESSION
1. Definition and Concept
Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation
and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by
testate and intestate succession, and in consequence
of certain contracts, by tradition.
INHERITANCE v. SUCCESSION
Inheritance refers to the universality of all the
property, rights and obligations constituting the
patrimony of the decedent which are not extinguished
by his death; Succession, on the other hand, is the
legal mode by which such property, rights and
obligations are transmitted. [Jurado]
2. Elements of Succession
a. Mode of Acquisition
b. Transfer of Property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
c. Transmission through death
d. Transmission to another
e. By will or by operation of law
3. Kinds of Succession
a. Testamentary
Article 779. Testamentary succession is that which
results from the designation of an heir, made in a will
executed in the form prescribed by law.
b. Intestate
Article 960. Legal or intestate succession takes
place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will,
or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or
dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such a case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property of
which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the
institution of an heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
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substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code.
c. Mixed
Article 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly
by will and partly by operation of law.
4. Principal Parties
a. Decedent – person whose property is
transmitted through succession, W/N he left a
will [Art. 775]
i. Testator – decedent with a will
ii. Intestate – decedent without a will
b. Heirs – person called to the succession either by
provision of a will or by operation of law [Art.
782]
i. Compulsory – heirs by operation of law
[inheritance is called legitime]
ii. Voluntary – heirs by virtue of a will
1. Devisees – persons to whom a
specific real property is given
2. Legatees – persons to whom a
specific personal property is given
5. Bases of Succession
a. Natural affection for relatives
b. Preventing wealth from being stagnant –
public policy aspect
c. Attribute of ownership – to give to the
decedent control as to how he wants to dispose
of his property after his death
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Transfer of Property, Rights, and
Obligations
Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
Article 776. The inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon
the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by
the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
1

001 UNION BANK v. SANTIBAÑEZ
(February 23, 2005, Callejo, Sr., J.)
Facts: During the pendency of their deceased
father’s testate proceedings, siblings Edmund and
Florence executed a Joint Agreement distributing to
themselves the tractors the decedent obtained
through loan agreements with FCCC. The said
agreement further provided that the heirs will assume
the debt corresponding to the tractor they took. Union
Bank, FCCC’s assignee of all its assets and liabilities,
sued the siblings for failure to pay the debts upon
demand.
Issues/Held:
(1) Whether or not the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs is valid? – NO. A Joint
Agreement in the nature of an Extrajudicial
Partition executed during the pendency of
testate proceedings requires approval of the
probate court to be valid. 
 one of the other co-owners sold her undivided share
(2) Whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is binding? – NO.
Such was conditioned upon the possession
and use of the heirs’ share in the Joint
Agreement which was found null and void. 

(3) Whether or not UBP can hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased? – NO. The
creditor of the decedent should file its money
claim with the probate court. 
 derived from the testator.
Ratio:
(1) The rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will is probated
(2) The partition being invalid, the heirs did not
receive the properties. Hence, the assumption of
liability cannot be given force and effect.
(3) The filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory
002 ESTATE OF HEMADY v. LUZON SURETY
(November 28, 1956 Reyes, J.B.L., J.)
Facts: LSC filed a claim against the estate of
Hemady based on indemnity agreements which the
latter guaranteed during his lifetime. CFI dismissed
on the ground that the claims are not chargeable to
his estate because upon his death, he ceased to be
guarantor.
Issue/Held: WON the liability of Hemady, as solidary
guarantor is extinguished by death. – NO. The
contracts of suretyship were not rendered
intransmissible by the nature of the undertaking,
by the stipulations in the contract, or by provision
of law.
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Ratio: Heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Art 776 states
that the inheritance includes all the property, rights,
and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by law. Among those rights and
obligations extinguished by law are those mentioned
in Article 1311 – those that are not transmissible (1)
by their nature, or (2) by stipulation or (3) by provision
of law. In this case, however, the contracts do not fall
under those categories – (1) the nature of the
obligation of a surety/guarantor is not personal. A
principal is indifferent as to who pays him, as long as
he is paid; (2) there is no stipulation w/c states so (3)
There is nothing in the law w/c states that a
guaranty/suretyship is extinguished upon death of
guarantor/surety.
003 BUTTE v. MANUEL UY and SONS
(February 28, 1962, Reyes, J.B.L,.J.)
Facts: A co-owner of a property died. After his death,
in the property to Manuel Uy. Butte, an heir of the
decedent, wanted to redeem the undivided share
sold. Manuel Uy argued that Butte did not have the
right to legal redemption.
Issue/Held: WON Butte had the right to redeem. –
YES, upon the decedent’s death, she became a
co-owner herself. Her right to redeem is not
Ratio: Butte had the right to legal redemption as a
testamentary heir, because she became a co-owner
from the moment of the death of her predecessor.
The redemption right vested in the heirs originally
in their individual capacity; they did not acquire it
from their decedent, because when Ramirez died
none of the co-owners had yet sold their undivided
share to the property. 

004 MAGLASANG v. CABATINGAN
(June 5, 2002, Austria-Martinez, J.)
Facts: Cabatingan executed four deeds of donations
denominated as “Donations Inter Vivos” in favor of
petitioners. After her death, her heirs filed an action to
annul the said donations.
Issue/Held: WON the donations are valid. – YES.
Ratio: Donations are not valid. Donations were in the
nature of a donation mortis causa. If the donation is
made in contemplation of donor's death, then it is
mortis causa. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the
following Acceptance and Attestation clauses,
uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation.
Being donations mortis causa, formalities of a will
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under CC Art. 805 and Art. 806 should be complied
with. In this case, it was not followed.
Doctrine: In determining whether a donation is one of
mortis causa, the following characteristics must be
taken into account:
 found out that the lots were in the possession and
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
 sale of the lots should be the sole liability of their
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.
005 LEE v. RTC OF QC Branch 85
(February 23, 2004, Corona, J.)
Facts: Intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of estate of deceased. Pending such,
surviving wife and 2 childred executed a MOA
extrajudicially partitioning the estate consisting of the
shares of stocks which the decedent owned, then
sold their respective shares to Filipino Loan
Assistance Group (FLAG).
Issue/Held: WON the sale of shares of stock to
FLAG is valid. – NO, it is void.
Ratio: An heir may only sell his ideal share or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific
property therein. In this case, the wife and son sold
specific properties of the estate in favor of third
persons. They could not lawfully do so pending the
final adjudication of the estate by intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the
other claimants to the estate. Prior court approval
was necessary.
Doctrine:
(1) Any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval. 
 McLachlins (Lorenzo’s children by legal marriage)
(2) Any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition. 
 representation does not make the representative
2. Obligations Limited to the Value
of the Inheritance
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006 ALVAREZ v. IAC
(May 7, 1990, Fernan, C.J.)
Facts: Lots in question originally owned by Aniceto
Yanes. After his death, and during the war, his heirs
did not occupy said lot. After the war, RESP heirs
registered in the name of ALVAREZ, evidenced by 2
TCTs. So heirs filed a case for reconveyance. During
the pendency of the case, ALVAREZ sold the lots to
SIASON. Lower court ruled in favor of RESPs.
Execution failed as it was in the possession of Siason
who was not a party to the case, so respondent heirs
filed a 2nd case. TC and CA absolved Siason and
adjudged the petitioner heirs liable for the value of the
lots. Petitioners claim that the liability arising from the
father.
Issue/Held: WON the heirs liable to pay the value of
the lots – YES. It is an established doctrine that
the rights and obligations of the deceased are
passed on to his legitimate children.
Ratio: Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co: the
general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
However, they are only liable upto the extent of their
shares.
007 LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
(November 23, 1938, VIllareal, J.)
Facts: In 1922, Lorenzo Quitco executed a P.N. in
favor of his common law spouse (Socorro Ledesma)
to be made payable in full after 2 years. They broke
up and Lorenzo married McLachlin and had 4
children. In 1930, Lorenzo died without any
properties. In 1932, his father (Eusebio) died with
properties, so his legal wife and children inherited
from Eusebio by right of representation. In 1933,
Socorro filed claim before the intestate proceedings
of Eusebio, seeking payment of the amount in the
PN. She filed a subsequent complaint against the
McLachlins in order to recover the amount in the PN.
Issue/Held: WON the property inherited by the
from Eusebio by right of representation is subject to
Lorenzo’s debts and obligations who died wthout any
property whatsoever. – NO. The right of
answerable for the obligations contracted by the
deceased. 

Ratio: Ledesma cannot recover from the McLachlins
because the debt must only be recoverable from the
creditor’s properties. In this case, the McLachlins
received inheritance only from Eusebio, and not from
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Lorenzo who was the creditor.
Per stirpes – inheriting by line
Per capita – inheriting per head; heirs inherit in their
own capacity
008 GENATO v. BAYHON
(August 24, 2009, Puno, C.J.)
Facts: RESP Bayhon obtained a loan, secured by an
REM from PET Genato, which he failed to pay.
During the pendency of the appeal in the CA, RESP
Bayhon died. CA held that the REM and the dacion
en pago are null and void; and the death of RESP
Bayhon extinguished the obligation, it being a
personal obligation.
Issue/Held: WON the death of Bayhon extinguished
the obligation. NO. The principal obligation is
transmissible to his heirs.
Ratio:
(1) As a general rule under Art. 1311, obligations
derived from a contract are transmissible. 
While
RESP Bayhon may no longer be compelled to
pay the loan because he already died, the debt
subsists against his estate. No property may be
transmitted to the heirs unless the debt has first
been satisfied. The remedy of PET Genato is to
file a claim against the estate of deceased RESP
Bayhon, pursuant to Rule 3, Sec. 20 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(2) REM and dacion en pago are NULL and VOID.
These documents are simulated and fictitious
because Genato’s wife was already dead when it
was allegedly signed by them.
3. Rights and Obligations Not
Extinguished by Death
009 BONILLA v. BARCENA
(June 18, 1976, Martin, J.)
Facts: On March 31, 1975, Barcena filed an action to
quiet title against Bonilla et al. On July 9, 1975,
Barcena died. Bonilla et al then filed a MTD on the
ground that Barcena is already dead, hence, she has
no more legal capacity to sue. RTC granted the MTD
and dismissed the case.
Issue/Held: WON Barcena has no more legal
capacity to sue upon her death. NO. Her action,
being one that affects property and property
rights, is transmissible upon death.
Ratio: While it’s true that a person who’s dead cannot
sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. 
Thus, when
Fortunata Barcena died, her claim or right to the
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parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856 was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death. 
Her heirs have thus
acquired interest in the case. 

Doctrine: The question as to WON an action
survives depends on the nature of the action and
the 
damage sued for. The claim of the deceased
plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the
parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally the property and property rights. 

010 CONDE v. ABAYA
(March 23, 1909, Arellano, C.J.)
Facts: Casiano Abaya died on April 6, 1899. Paula
Conde, as the mother of the natural children
(Teopista died in 1902 and Jose died in 1903) she
claims she had with Casiano, moved for the
settlement of the intestate succession of Casiano.
Roman Abaya, Casiano’s brother, opposed the
appointment of administrator and claimed that he is
the nearest relative of the deceased. The TC
declared that Paula Conde is the only heir to the
property to the exclusion of Roman Abaya. Abaya
appealed and questioned whether Paula may bring
an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her
deceased child.
Issue/Held: WON Paula can file the action for
acknowledgement of her natural children. NO. An
action for acknowledgement is a personal right.
Ratio: An action for acknowledgement as a natural
child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be
transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
011 CRUZ v. CRUZ
(September 1, 2010, Carpio, J.)
Facts: Memoracion Cruz filed an Action for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance against her
son, after she found that he fraudulently transferred
the title of the land in her name to his and his wife’s
name. After finishing her presentation of evidence,
she died. RESP Son then filed a MTD on the ground
that reconveyance is a personal action, and that the
situation would result in absurdity where he would be
both a defendant and a plaintiff. RTC granted the
MTD.
Issue/Held: WON the action survives the death of
Memoracion Cruz. YES. The action primarily and
principally affects property and property rights.
Ratio: Same as Bonilla v. Barcena
012 NHA v. ALMEIDA
(June 22, 2007, Puno, C.J.)
4
Facts: When Margarita was alive, she entered into a
Contract to Sell, with NHA as the seller of a lot. She
had 2 daughters – Francisca and Beatriz (deceased
and now represented by Almeida). Margarita
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay stating that, when
she dies, she gives the lot to Francisca who was the
one who actually paid for it. When she died,
Francisca made an application to purchase the lots,
submitting the Salaysay. The NHA granted this,
reasoning that the Salaysay operated as an
assignment of rights.
Issue/Held: WON the award of the subject lots to
Francisca was proper. NO. When the original buyer
died, the NHA should have considered the estate
of the decedent as the next "person” likely to
stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of
the purchase price. 
 parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she
Ratio: The NHA gave due course to the application
made by Francisca Herrera without considering that
the initial applicant's death would transfer all her
property, rights and obligations to the estate
including whatever interest she has or may have
had over the disputed properties. 
To the extent of
the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate. 
 Her
death did not extinguish her interest over the
property. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this
Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked.
This Contract to Sell was 
an obligation on both
parties–Margarita Herrera and NHA. And 
Margarita
Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at
the time of her death either by will or by operation 
of
law. 
 Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of
4. Opening of the Succession
Article 777. The rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.
Consequently, after the death of the decedent,
anyone of the heirs may enter into a contract with
respect to his share in the inheritance even before
partition has been effected. This is so because his
right with respect thereto is already in the nature of a
vested right in accordance with the principle declared
in Art. 777 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the
rights to the succession are transmitted at the
moment of the death of the decedent.
Note: He may dispose ONLY of his undivided share
in the inheritance, and not a specific property. [See
Lee v. RTC and Borja v. vda. De Borja]
Conversely, before the death of the decedent, no heir
may enter into a contract with respect to his future
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share in the inheritance. This is so because, before
the death of the decedent, the heirs have only a mere
hope or expectancy, absolutely inchoate in character,
to their share in the inheritance. [Jurado]
013 USON v. DEL ROSARIO
(January 29, 1953, Bautista-Angelo, J.)
Facts: In 1945, Faustino Nebreda died and left
behind five parcels of lan. Legal wife USON filed an
action for recovery of ownership and possession,
claiming that when Nebreda died, common-law wife
DEL ROSARIO illegally possessed the lands in
question thus depriving her of their possession. DEL
ROSARIO’s special defense: In 1931, USON and late
husband executed a public 
document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of their separation, USON was given a
renounced her right to inherit any other property that
may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI ruled
in favor of USON.
Issue/Held: WON Uson validly renounced her right to
inherit. NO. Future inheritance cannot be the
object of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Ratio: The claim of RESPs that Uson relinquished
her right There is no dispute that USON is the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five
parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute that DEL ROSARIO was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with
whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-
defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino
the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, the five
parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed
from the moment of his death to his only heir, his
widow USON.
014 BORJA v. vda de BORJA
(August 18, 1972, Reyes, JBL, J.)
Facts: Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife
Josefa, filed for the probate of her will. When the will
was probated, Francisco was appointed as executor
and administrator and, Jose de Borja, their son was
appointed as co-administrator. Subsequently,
Francisco took a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco
(Vda. De Borja). Even before the estate of Josefa
was settled, Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings wherein she was appointed special
Administratrix.
Numerous suits b/n Jose and Tasiana arose. A
compromise agreement was eventually entered into.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed
5
and obligated himself to pay Tasiana the amount of P
800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa, and to any properties bequeathed or devised
in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last
Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.”
When Jose submitted the CompAg for Court approval
with the CFI of Rizal (probate of will of first wife) and
the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco),
Tasiana opposed in both instances, claiming that the
heirs cannot enter into a COMPAG w/o first probating
the will of Francisco.
Issue/Held: WON the compromise agreement is
valid. YES.
Ratio: Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s
estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such predecessor in interest,
there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her
or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be
deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to
the vendor heir.
015 LORENZO v. POSADAS
(June 18, 1937, Laurel, J.)
Facts: Thomas Hanley died On May 27, 1922,
leaving a will where he bequeathed all his properites
to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, but with the condition
that it shall be transferred only 10 years after his
death. On March 10, 19924, Moore, one of the
executors mentioned in the will, took his oath as
trustee. After he resigned, petitioner Lorenzo was
appointed. During this period, CIR assessed against
the estate an inheritance tax, and filed a motion in the
probate proceedings praying that the trustee be
ordered to pay. Lorenzo paid under protest, and filed
this case for refund of said amount, alleging that
inheritance tax should accrue only after 10 years.
Issue/Held: When did the inheritance tax accrue.
Upon the death of decedent.
Ratio: Sec 1536 of the Admin Code imposes tax
upon “every transmission by virtue of inheritance,
devise, bequest, gift mortis causa...” And under
Article 657 (now 777), the right to succession is
transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.
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However, the fact that Thomas Hanley died on May
27, 1922, does not follow that the obligation to pay
the tax arose as of the date. Under Article 1544(b),
the tax should have been paid before the delivery of
the properties in question to Moore as trustee on
March 10, 1924. Moreover, delivery to the trustee of
the estate is in esse delivery of the same to the
beneficiary, which is covered by the same subsection.
016 RIOFERIO v. CA
(January 13, 2004, Tinga, J.)
Facts: Alfonso died without a will. He left a widow,
with whom he had 7 children. He also left a
paramour, Teodora, with whom he had 4 children.
RESP (legitimate children) discovered that Petitioner
Teodora and her children executed an EJ settlement
of Alfonso’s estate with quitclaim. RESP Clyde then
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and filed a
complaint for annulment of the EJ Settlement.
Petitioners allege that RESPs are not the real parties-
in-interest but rather the estate of Alfonso.
Issue/Held: WON heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings. YES. Pursuant to
Article 777. And notably because there is no
appointed administrator yet.
Ratio: 
The Court in Gochan v. Young recognized the
legal standing of heirs to represent the rights and
properties of decedent under administration pending
appointment of administrator, stating that while Sec 3,
Rule 3 and Sec 2, Rule 87 of the ROC permit an
executor or administrator to represent or bring suits
on behalf of the deceased, these do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. The rules are
easily applicable to cases when an administrator was
already appointed. BUT no rule categorically
addresses a situation in which proceedings were
already instituted but no administrator was appointed.
In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator.
Even if there was an appointed administrator,
jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions (See
Doctrine (1) and (2)
Doctrine: GR: Heirs have no legal standing to sue for
the recovery of property of the estate during the
pendency of administration proceedings.
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) The executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit
(2) When the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of AND he is
made a party defendant
6
 (3) When there is no appointed administrator
017 PASCO v. HERIS OF DE GUZMAN
(July 26, 2010, Del Castillo, J.)
Facts: Lauro and Lazaro Pasco obtained a 140K loan
from Filomena de Guzman, secured by a chattel
mortgage on an Isuzu jeep. Filomena died, and her
heirs filed a case to recover the amount of the loan.
The heirs also executed an SPA in favor of Cresencia
authorizing her to represent the co-heirs on all
matters concerning the estate of Filomena, file cases
for collection, and do and perform all acts necessary
to carry out the powers conferred. During the pre-trial,
the parties entered into a CompAg – approved by
MTC. However, in the RTC, Pascos filed a motion to
set aside decision alleging that the COMPAG was in
a language not known to them, and they also
challenged the authority of Cresencia to enter into a
COMPAG.
Issue/Held: WON Cresencia can represent
Filomena’s estate. YES. As an heir to the estate.
However release of the funds should be held in
abeyance until a showing that procedure for
settlement of estate had been followed. 
 property during his lifetime, the lot no longer formed
Ratio:
(1) Crecencia was authorized to enter into a
COMPAG. The SPA necessarily included the
power to enter into a compromise agreement.
(2) While Filomena’s estate has a different juridical
personality than the heirs, nonetheless, her heirs
certainly have an interest in the preservation of
the estate and recovery of its properties. At the
moment of Filomena’s death, the heirs started to
own the property subject to decedent’s liabilities.
(3) However, proceeds of the loan should only be
released to her heirs only upon settlement of the
estate. To allow the release of the funds directly
to the heirs would amount to a distribution of the
estate; which distribution and delivery should be
made only after, not before, the payment of all
debts, charges, expenses, and taxes of the
estate have been paid.
(4) Cresencia should deposit the amounts received
from the petitioners with the MTC of Bocaue,
Bulacan. In turn, the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan
should hold in abeyance the release of the
amounts to Filomena's heirs until after a showing
that the proper procedure for the settlement of
Filomena's estate has been followed and after all
charges of the estate have been fully satisfied.
018 BALUS v. BALUS
(January 15, 2010, Peralta, J.)
Facts: The decedent, Rufo, mortgaged a parcel of
land in favor of Rural Bank. He failed to pay so the
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land was foreclosed and sold to the Bank. Upon
failure to redeem, a DAS was issued. Upon Rufo’s
death, the 3 heirs executed an EJ Settlement of
Estate, which includes the mortgaged lot. Thereafter,
2 of the siblings bought the mortgaged property from
the bank. They then filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against their other co-heir,
Celestino. RTC ordered the 2 siblings to executed a
DAS in favor of Celestino, holding that he had a right
to purchase from them his share because of the EJ
settlement. CA reversed.
Issue/Held: WON the siblings’ co-ownership over the
property persist even after the lot was auctioned off
and title was transferred to the Bank. NO. The
property never formed part of the deceased
father’s estate, which means co-ownership never
arose.
Ratio: The siblings never became co-owners,
because the lot never became part of the father’s
estate. The bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
lot during Rufo’s lifetime, upon his failure to redeem
the property. Since Rufo lost ownership of the
part of his estate and did not pass on to the heirs.
Even if the siblings were uninformed that the property
already passed into the bank’s ownership because of
the foreclosure, they cannot declare themselves as
the co-owners unilaterally. 

Doctrine: While the rights to a person’s succession
are transmitted from the moment of his death, the
inheritance only covers the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing 
at the
time of his death.
019 CORONEL v. CA
(October 7, 1996, Melo, J.)
Facts: Ramona Alcaraz and Romulo Coronel entered
into a contract for the sale of a parcel of land for
P1.24M. Agreement, denominated as “Receipt of
Down Payment” contained the ff: conditions: Alcaraz
will make a DP of 50K and the Coronels will cause
the transfer in their names of the title of property
registered w/c was still in their father’s name. And
upon such transfer of title in their names, they will
execute a DAS in favor of Alcaraz. HOWEVER,
Coronels failed to consummate the sale with Alcaraz
even after the title of lot was transferred in their name
because they sold it to another person, MABANAG
for P1.5M. Alcaraz then filed a case for specific
performance. Coronels argue that there was no
perfected contract b/n them and Alcaraz because
when they executed the “Receipt of DP”, they were
not yet the absolute owners of the property.
7

Issue/Held: WON there was a perfected contract
between Coronels and Alcaraz. YES. Upon death of
their father, they became the absolute owners of
the lot even if it was still in the name of their
father.
Ratio: Coronels, being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory
heirs who were called to succession by operation of
law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath
(before the sale), petitioners stepped into his shoes
insofar as the subject property is concerned, such
that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto
became binding and enforceable upon them.
III. TESTAMENTARY
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1. Wills, Arts 783-787
Article 783. A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death.
WILL – act whereby a person controls to a certain
degree the disposition of his estate after his death
• A will MUST dispose of properties; if it
merely states his desired funeral rites or it
merely recognizes an illegitimate child, it is
not a will
TWO TYPES OF DISPOSITION:
(1) Direct – there is an actual provision in the will
wherein the person identifies a certain piece of
property and gives it to a specific individual
(2) Indirect – when the will disposes of a property
by inference of implication (i.e. disinheritance)
LIMITATION: Article 886, CC: A legitime is “part of
the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who
are, therefore, called compulsory heirs”
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAKING OF WILL
(1) Personal – testator cannot delegate the writing
rd
or making of a will to 3 persons
(2) Free or Voluntary
(3) Revocable or Ambulatory – since no rights are
vested until death, the testator can revoke his
will anytime during his lifetime
(4) Formal – making of a will is surrounded by
solemnities; while holographic wills are subject
to no other form, notarial wills are required to
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comply with formalities found in Articles 804-
809
(5) Unilateral
(6) Effective Mortis Causa
(7) Individual
(8) Purely statutory
Article 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal
act; it cannot be left in whole or in part to the
discretion of a third person, or accomplished through
the instrumentality of an agent or attorney.
MAKING OF A WILL MUST BE WHOLLY DONE BY
TESTATOR
While lawyers or agents can assist him in drafting the
will, he still has to approve whatever is drafted.
THUS, a will drafter by a lawyer is still considered as
made personally by a testator.
• When lawyers or agents dictate or influence the
testator in making or changing certain
dispositions, the law invalidates the will on the
ground of undue influence
Article 785. The duration or efficacy of the
designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take,
when referred to by name, cannot be left to the
discretion of a third person.
Article 786. The testator may entrust to a third
person the distribution of specific property or sums of
money that he may leave in general to specified
classes or causes, and also the designation of the
persons, institutions or establishments to which such
property or sums of money are to be given or applied.
Article 787. The testator may not make a
testamentary disposition in such manner that another
person has to determine whether or not it is to be
operative.
PROHIBITED DELEGATION (785 and 787)
(1) Determination of duration or efficacy of
designation of heirs, devisees or legatees
(2) Determination of portions which they are to
take, when referred to by name
(3) Determination as to the effectiveness of a
particular disposition (WON the will is to be
operative)
ALLOWABLE DELEGATION (Article 786)
(1) Distribution of specific property or sums of
money that he may leave in general to
specified classes/causes (i.e. charity; poor?)
(2) Designation of persons, institutions or
establishments to which such property or
sums of money are to be given/applied
8

As to (2), what is delegated is the determination of
recipients WITHIN the specified class or cause.
Hence, there is no testamentary delegation. Third
person merely implements the disposition as to
who are to receive the estate of testator.
PREMISE OF ALLOWABLE DELEGATION
The law permits this type of delegation because of
the basic premise that when a person makes a class
designation, he is unfamiliar with such matter.
020 RABADILLA v. CA
(June 29, 2000, Purisima, J.)
Facts: In a Codicil, Aleja Belleza instituted Dr.
Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land with the
condition that Maria Marlena would be given 100
piculs of sugar until her death. Maria Marlena filed a
complaint alleging that the conditions of the will were
violated. The parties entered into a compromise
agreement for the settlement of the unpaid piculs
of sugar, where they agreed that heirs would just
pay in cash. The agreement was not fulfilled.
Rabadilla claims that the obligations of the will were
complied with through the compromise agreement.
Issue/Held: WON the compromise agreement was
valid. NO. A Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement.
Ratio: A will cannot be the subject of a compromise
agreement. A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of
the testator must be strictly followed. 
 a will, the poem would have been entitled “Ultima
021 HERREROS v. GIL
(March 1, 1951, Jugo, J.)
Facts: Carlos Gil executed a last will and testament.
However, this will was destroyed and needed to be
reconstituted. The parties submitted a stipulation of
facts agreeing “that the will as transcribed in the
record of appeal” in another case is “a true and
correct copy.” CFI admitted the will to probate.
Opposition is based on the invalidity of the will, since
the attestation clause did not state that the testator
signed the will.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. NO. The
attestation clause of the will is fatally defective for
not stating that the alleged testator signed the
will, which is the precise purpose and most
essential element of the clause.
Ratio: The attestation clause does not state that the
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alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it
was signed by witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the
precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify
that the testator signed the will.
Doctrine: A correction by inference cannot be made.
“If we cure a deficiency be means of inferences, when
are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal
deficiencies in wills?” For the court to supply alleged
deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the
law.
022 MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA
(February 14, 1964, Capistrano)
Facts: MONTILLA filed a case against Estanislao
Herbosa, nephew of Dona Trinidad Rizal, to recover 3
Rizal relics in the latter’s possession, w/c he claims
he bought from Trinidad. Rizal relics – (1) alcohol
lamp where the poem “Mi Ultimo Adios” was hidden;
(2) original painting of Rizal in oil by Juan Luna; (3)
original crayon painting of Leonor Rivera by Rizal; (4)
st
silver pen of Rizal, w/c he won as 1 prize in a literary
contest; (5) woolen clothes of Rizal w/c he wore in
Europe and America; (6) 2 top hats of Rizal
TC held that if Rizal had left any property, the same is
still subject to the superior lien of the State for the
payment of the Spanish judgment of indemnity for
100K
Issue/Held: WON Rizal’s Mi Ultimo Adios is
considered a will. NO.
Ratio:
(1) Rizal’s “Mi Ultimo Adios” is a literary piece of
work and was so intended. If it were intended as
Voluntad”. The words “Ahi, te dejo todo, mis
rd th
padres, mis amores” in the 3 line of the 13
stanza merely expresses a thought of parting,
not bequeathing.
Besides, Rizal at the time has no known property
worth bequeathing to his beloved Philippines or
to which his country could be instituted as heir.
And the word “DEJO” whose English equivalent
is “leave” was apparently wrongly translated into
“give” by Charles Derbyshire.
(2) Assuming arguendo that Rizal’s “Ultimo Adios”
(particularly line 3, stanza 13) was a holographic
will, the non-compliance with the mandatory
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code (articles 688
and 689) rendered the will worthless.
- Requisites for validity: made by person of full
age; drawn on stamped paper corresponding
to the year of execution, written in its entirety
9
 by testator and signed by him; must contain
statement of year, month and day of
execution. IF there are erasures or
corrections, testator must identify them over
his signature; [689] it must be protocoled
and presented to judge of first instance of
last domicile of testator, or to the one of the
place where he died w/in 5 years from his
death.
Doctrine: An instrument which merely expreses a
last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain
a disposition of property and was not executed with
animus testandi cannot be legally considered a will.
Such instrument, like Rizal’s “Ultimo Adios,” may be
considered a will in the grammatical sense, but not in
the legal or juridical sense.
023 VITUG v. CA
(March 29, 1990, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Vitug’s wife died. Thereafter, he filed a motion
before the probate court to sell some properties of the
estate of his late wife to cover his alleged advances
to the estate (for estate taxes), using funds he
withdrew from a savings account (in layman’s term,
known as an “and/or” account) with his wife. He
claimed that these were personal funds that were
vested in him through a survivorship agreement with
his wife and the bank.
Issue/Held: WON the survivorship agreement is
valid. YES. It is not a conveyance mortis causa
which must be embodied in a will.
WON the husband is entitled to reimbursement. YES.
Being a separate property, it forms no part of the
estate.
Ratio:
(1) A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a 
capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect
after his death." The bequest or device must
pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies
subject of the savings account were in the nature
of conjugal funds. 
 the testator for the purpose; in default of such person,
(2) The survivorship is NOT a donation inter vivos
nor a donation between spouses. The
agreement involves no modification of the
conjugal partnership. But it is an aleatory
contract, the event being the DEATH of either
spouse.
Aleatory Contract – Article 2010, CC. By an aleatory
contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in
consideration of what the other shall give or do upon
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the happening of an event which is uncertain, or
which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
2. Characteristics of Wills
a. Unilateral
Article 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the
inheritance is an act which is purely voluntary and
free. (988)

Article 1042. The effects of the acceptance or
repudiation shall always retroact to the moment of the
death of the decedent. (989)
Article 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an
inheritance unless he is certain of the death of the
person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to
the inheritance. (991)
Article 1044. Any person having the free disposal of
his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall
belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
article 1030. (992a)
Article 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the
poor in general, without designation of particular
persons or of any community, shall be deemed
limited to the poor living in the domicile of the testator
at the time of his death, unless it should clearly
appear that his intention was otherwise.
The designation of the persons who are to be
considered as poor and the distribution of the
property shall be made by the person appointed by
by the executor, and should there be no executor, by
the justice of the peace, the mayor, and the
municipal treasurer, who shall decide by a
majority of votes all questions that may arise. In all
these cases, the approval of the Court of First
Instance shall be necessary.
The preceding paragraph shall apply when the
testator has disposed of his property in favor of the
poor of a definite locality. (749a)
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Article 1045. The lawful representatives of
corporations, associations, institutions and entities
qualified to acquire property may accept any
inheritance left to the latter, but in order to repudiate
it, the approval of the court shall be necessary. (993a)
Article 1046. Public official establishments can
neither accept nor repudiate an inheritance without
the approval of the government. (994)
Article 1047. A married woman of age may
repudiate an inheritance without the consent of her
husband. (995a)
Article 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write
may accept or repudiate the inheritance personally or
through an agent. Should they not be able to read
and write, the inheritance shall be accepted by their
guardians. These guardians may repudiate the same
with judicial approval. (996a)
Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
 testamentary heir, he is understood to have
An express acceptance must be made in a public or
private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which
the intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which
one would have no right to do except in the capacity
of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity
of an heir has not been assumed. (999a)
Article 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:

(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right
to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of
them;

(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though
gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his
co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his
co-heirs indiscriminately; but if this
renunciation should be gratuitous, and the co-
heirs in whose favor it is made are those upon
whom the portion renounced should devolve by
virtue of accretion, the inheritance shall not be
deemed as accepted.
Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall
be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by
petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over
the testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008)
Article 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to
the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may
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petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the
name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an
extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
The excess, should there be any, shall in no case
pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to
the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
established in this Code, it may belong. (1001)
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having
accepted or repudiated the inheritance his right shall
be transmitted to his heirs. (1006)
Article 1054. Should there be several heirs called to
the inheritance, some of them may accept and the
others may repudiate it. (1007a)
Article 1055. If a person, who is called to the same
inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato,
repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a
repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without
knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may
still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)
Article 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an
inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and cannot be
impugned, except when it was made through any of
the causes that vitiate consent, or when an unknown
will appears. (997)
b. Mortis Causa
Article 783. A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this
estate, to take effect after his death.
Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Article 1080. Should a person make partition of his
11
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family,
desires to keep any agricultural, industrial, or
manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of
the right granted him in this article, by ordering that
the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash.
c. Personal
Article 784. The making of a will is a strictly personal
act; it cannot be left in whole or in part to the
discretion of a third person, or accomplished through
the instrumentality of an agent or attorney. (670a)
Article 785. The duration or efficacy of the
designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the
determination of the portions which they are to take,
when referred to by name, cannot be left to the
discretion of a third person. (670a)
Article 786. The testator may entrust to a third
person the distribution of specific property or sums of
money that he may leave in general to specified
classes or causes, and also the designation of the
persons, institutions or establishments to which such
property or sums are to be given or applied. (671a)
Article 787. The testator may not make a
testamentary disposition in such manner that another
person has to determine whether or not it is to be
operative.
d. Individual
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by
the laws of the country where they may have been
executed.
Article 875. Any disposition made upon the condition
that the heir shall make some provision in his will in
favor of the testator or of any other person shall be
void.
GR: Two persons naming each other as heir is valid.
XPN: Condicion Captatoria: “I will make you an heir if
you make me an heir” à VOID
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e. Revocable
Article 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at
any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of
this right is void.
f. Free expression of testator’s animus
testandi
Article 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done
according to the law of the place where the will was
made, or according to the law of the place in which
the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the
revocation takes place in this country, when it is in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
g. Solemn Act
Article 804. Every will must be in writing and
executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator.
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write
his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.
Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he
must personally read the will, if able to do so;
12
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it
and communicate to him, in some practicable
manner, the contents thereof.
Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be
read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged.
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or
fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed
and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.
Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Article 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it
shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to
in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
Article 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of
the testator written below his signature must be dated
and signed by him in order to make them valid as
testamentary dispositions.
Article 813. When a number of dispositions
appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature
and a date, such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.
Article 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation,
erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.
Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
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(3) If it was executed through force or under duress,
or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
3. Interpretation of Wills
Article 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred.
Article 789. When there is an imperfect description,
or when no person or property exactly answers the
description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the
will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral
declarations of the testator as to his intention; and
when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding
such oral declarations.
Article 790. The words of a will are to be taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can be
gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
Article 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy.
Article 792. The invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to
be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made.
Article 793. Property acquired after the making of a
will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had
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possessed it at the time of making the will, should it (1) Interpretation that will give to every expression
expressly appear by the will that such was his some effect rather than one w/c will render any
intention. of the expressions inoperative
(2) Testacy over Intestacy
Article 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the
interest which the testator could devise or bequeath [Art 792] GR: The invalidity of one of several
in the property disposed of, unless it clearly appears dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
from the will that he intended to convey a less invalidity of the other dispositions
interest. XNP: If it is to be presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first
PURPOSE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION invalid disposition had not been made.
- To ascertain the meaning and intent of the
testator in the will PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 793
- To prevent at least partial intestacy since the
DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISTAKES [Art 789] assets a testator can dispose of are only those
(1) Apparent of Extrinsic – those that appear on which are in existence at the time of execution of
the face of the instrument the will
(2) Non-apparent of Intrinsic – mistake as “when - With Article 793, the properties which were
no person or property exactly answers the acquired in b/n the period of execution of will and
description (i.e. to my BEST FRIEND in school) the opening of succession of the person may still
be distributed IAW the will
PROBLEM REMEDY
Imperfect Description or Mistakes and omissions [Art 794] GR: Every devise/legacy shall cover ALL
when no person or must be corrected, if the the interest w/c the testator could devise/bequeath in
property exactly answers error appears from the the property disposed of
the description context of the will or XPN: It clearly appears from the will that he intended
from extrinisic evidence, to convey a less interest
EXCLUDING oral
declarations of testator
as to his intention SUMMARY OF RULES
Uncertainty upon the Intent is to be (1) If will admits of different interpretations, the
face of the will as to the ascertained from the interpretation by which disposition is to be
application of any of its words of the will, taking OPERATIVE shall be preferred [Art 788]
provisions into account (2) Mistakes or omissions must be corrected by
circumstances under looking at the context of the will or from
which it was made, extrinsic evidence excluding oral declarations
EXCLUDING oral of testator [Art 789]
declarations of testator (3) When there are uncertainties upon the face of
the will, intent is to be ascertained from the
words of the will, taking into account
RULES IN INTERPREATION OF WORDS [Art 790]
circumstances under which it was made,
GR: Words of the will are taken in their ordinary and
excluding oral declarations of testator [Art 789]
grammatical sense
(4) Words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary
XPN:
and grammatical sense, unless a clear
(1) A clear intention to use them in another sense
intention to use them in another sense can be
can be gathered, AND
gathered, and that other can be ascertained [Art
(2) The other can be ascertained
790]
(5) Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
GR: Technical words are to be taken in their technical
technical sense, unless the context clearly
sense
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
XPN:
satisfactorily appears that he was unacquainted
(1) Context clearly indicates a contrary intention or
with such technical sense [Art 790]
(2) It satisfactorily appears that he was
(6) The words of a will are to receive an
unacquainted with such technical sense
interpretation which give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render
PREFERENCES [Article 791]
any of the expressions inoperative [Art 791]
(7) Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy. [Art 791]
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(8) Invalidity of one of several dispositions does
not result in invalidity of the others UNLESS it
is to be presumed that testator would not have
st
made such other dispositions if the 1 invalid
disposition was not made [Art 792]
(9) Property acquired after the making of a will shall
only pass thereby, as if the testator had
possessed it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that
such was his intention. [Art 793]
(10)Every devise or legacy shall cover all the
interest which the testator could devise or
bequeath in the property disposed of, unless it
clearly appears from the will that he intended to
convey a less interest. [Art 794]
024 PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH OF VICTORIA TARLAC v. RIGOR
(April 30, 1979, Aquino, J.)
Facts: Father Rigor died and left a will which was
probated in 1935. In his will, he named as devisees
his sisters and a cousin. A devise of ricelands was
also made in favor of the testator’s nearest male
relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the
meantime, the ricelands would be administered
by the Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac.
A project of partition providing for the delivery to the
devisees of their respective shares of the estate was
approved but devise re: ricelands was not
implemented as no male relative of the testator
claimed the same.
Several years after approval of the project of
partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed a petition in
the testate proceedings for delivery of the ricelands to
the church as trustee. The heirs of Father Rigor
opposed and prayed that the said bequest be
declared inoperative as no ‘nearest male relative’
of the testator had ever studied for the
priesthood.
TC ruled in favor of Parish Priest. CA reversed ruling
that the trust in favor of the ‘nearest male relative’
could only exist for 20 years because to enforce it
beyond that period would violate the rule against
perpetuities, and since no legatee claimed the
ricelands within 20 years from the death of the
testator, said properties should pass to his legal heirs.
Issue/Held: When should it be determined whether
or not there is a male relative who meets the
description in the provision. – It should be
determined at the time of his death.
Ratio: From the testamentary provisions of Father
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Rigor’s will, it may be deduced that the testator
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male
relative who would become a priest, and that the
parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands during the interval of time that no nearest
male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood. What is not clear is how long after the
testator’s death would it be determined that he
had a nephew who would pursue the
ecclesiastical vocation. We hold that the said
bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to
any indefinite time thereafter. In order to be
capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee
must be living at the moment the succession opens.
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly
or reasonably construed. To construe them as
referring to the testator’s nearest male relative at
anytime after his death would render the provisions
difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate.
Doctrine: The will of the testator is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and
literal meaning of his words, except when it may
clearly appear that his intention was different from
that literally expressed. The testator’s intention is to
be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.
025 YAMBAO v. GONZALES
(April 29, 1961, Bautista-Angelo, J.)
Facts: Maria Gonzales died with a will bequeathing to
RESPs all her properties. Will was probated, and
thereafter, Yambao went to RESPs requesting that he
be placed as tenant of the riceland w/c they were
directed to give to him by express provision of the
will. RESPs refused alleging that the provision is not
mandatory.
"Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong
tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA
GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod: 

(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang
makapagtrabajo ng bukid habang panahon, at ang
nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng
Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at
may utang pa. “
Issue/Held: WON RESPs are required to employ
Yambao as tenant. YES. Reading the will as a
whole.
Ratio: the trial court has not properly interpreted the
15
real import of the wish of the testatrix. The words
'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN’ mean to do or
to carry out as a mandate or directive, and having
reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no
other meaning than to impose a duty upon appellees.
To follow the interpretation given by the trial court
would be to devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real
and true meaning.
026 VDA DE VILLANUEVA v. JUICO
(February 29, 1962, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: Don Nicolas Villaflor died with a will. Clause 8
(Octavo) of the will stated that his wife, Doña Fausta,
would have the use and possession of specific
properties mentioned in Clause 7 during her lifetime,
but this right shall cease if she remarries (uso y
posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas
nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propriedad
estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor). Moreover, ownership of such properties
shall belong to his niece, PET Leonor. Upon the
widow’s death, PET Leonor tried to claim the
properties but she was refused on account that it
already belonged to the widow’s estate because she
never remarried.
Issue/Held: WON the properties stated in Nicolas’
will passed on to wife’s estate upon her death. NO.
Ratio: The plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to vest
his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties described in the 7th clause, subject to the
further condition that if the widow remarried, her
rights would cease, even during her own lifetime.
That the widow was meant to have no more than a
life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used
by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use
and possession while alive) instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad". 
 formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which
Doctrine: Speculation as to the motives of the
testator in imposing the conditions contained in
clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to
obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his
plain words, which should be the primary source in
ascertaining his intent.
4. Law Governing Form and
Content, Arts 795, 16, 17, 815, 817-
819
Article 795. The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made.
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Article 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign
country, he is authorized to make a will in any of
the forms established by the law of the country in
which he may be. Such will may be probated in the
Philippines.
Article 816. The will of the alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a
citizen or subject of another country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and
which might be proved and allowed by the law of his
own country, shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
16
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by
the laws of the country where they may have been
executed.
JOINT WILL – will authored by 2 or more persons
and signed by them as co-makers; will made by 2 or
more persons made in ONE instrument
MUTUAL WILL – will authored by 2 or more persons
for their reciprocal benefit
PURPOSE OF PROHIBITION UNDER ART 818
- Joint wills present an opportunity for one
party, who is more dominant than the other,
to exercise undue influence over the other in
the execution of a will resulting in a vitiation
of consent.
- A joint will, if mutual or reciprocal, may
expose a testator to undue influence, and
may even tempt one of the testators to kill
the other
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILS GOVERNED BY
NATIONAL LAW OF PERSON WHOSE
SUCCESSION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION
- Hence, even if a joint will is authorized in a
foreign jurisdiction, it cannot be valid in the
PH, if made by Filipino nationals.
LAWS GOVERNING FORM OF WILLS
TESTATOR APPLICABLE LAW
Filipino in the Philippine Law (Pursuant to Article
Philippines 17, Civil Code)
Filipino in a Authorized to make a will in any of
foreign country the forms established by the law of
the country in which he may be
(Hence, he may also make a will
in accordance with PH law)
Alien in the (1) Philippine Law or
Philippines (2) Law of the country in which he
is a citizen/subject
Effect if executed IAW law of
country of which he is a
citizen/subject: Same effect as if
executed accdg to the laws of the
PH
Alien who is (1) The formalities prescribed by
abroad law of place w/c he resides, or
(2) Formalities observed in his
country, or
(3) In conformity with CC
(4) Lex Loci Celebraciones
(Article 17: law of the country
where it was executed)
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Under Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, wills proved
and allowed in a foreign country, according to the
laws of such country, may be allowed, filed and
recorded by the proper court in the Philippines.
HOWEVER, the probate of the will in the foreign
country must however be proven in the same manner
as any other foreign judgment.
Question to ask as to intrinsic validity: WHAT IS
YOUR NATIONALITY?
Q’s to ask as to form and solemnities:
(1) What is your nationality?
(2) WHERE DO YOU WANT TO EXECUTE YOUR
WILL?
027 IN RE WILL OF REV. ABADIA
(August 9, 1954, Montemayor, J.)
Facts: Rev. Abadia executed a will, written in
longhand. After his death, one of the legatees filed a
petition for the will’s probate. TC admitted the will to
probate ruling that Although holographic wills were
not permitted by law at the time of the execution of Fr.
Abadia’s and his death, the provisions of the NCC,
the law in place at the time of the hearing and when
the case was decided, because carrying out the
intention of the testator is the controlling factor and
may override any defect in form.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. NO. The form of
wills is governed by the law in force at the time of
its execution. And the general rule is that later
legislation cannot cure defect in form.
Ratio: The old Civil Code did not allow holographic
wills and imposed certain requirements for the
execution of wills at the time Rev. Abadia executed
his will (i.e. numbering correlatively each page in
letters, signing on the left hand margin by testator and
3 attesting witnesses).
Doctrine: The validity of a will is to be judged not by
the law in force at the time of the testator’s death or at
the time it is presented in court for probate, but at the
time it was executed.
028 MICIANO v. BRIMO
(November 1, 1927, Romualdez, J.)
Facts: Turkish national stated in his will that he wants
his properties to be disposed in accordance with
Philippine laws, and anyone who fails to comply with
this request would forfeit any disposition in the will in
his/her favor. Administrator filed a scheme of
partition. Brimo, one of the testator’s brothers,
opposed because the partition puts into effect
17
provisions of the will w/c are not IAW Turkish laws.
Issue/Held:
(1) WON PH laws should govern the distribution of
his estate. NO.
(2) WON the provision forfeiting a legatee’s share if
he opposes the will is valid. NO.
Ratio:
(1) Turkish law should apply. But since oppositor did
not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, it is presumed
that it is the same as PH law.
(2) The condition that his properties must be
distributed IAW PH laws is VOID. Article 10,
OCC expressly states that law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
029 IN RE ESTATE OF CHRISTENSEN (AZNAR v.
GARCIA)
(January 31, 1963, Labrador, J.)
Facts: Christensen, California citizen but domiciled in
Philippines, died and left a will. Will provided that his
judicially declared natural daughter Maria Helen was
to receive P3,600 only (in his will, he disclaimed any
relation b/n them), and that her legitimate daughter,
Lucy, was to receive the rest. Maria Helen contested
this, saying that under Philippine law, she was
entitled to 1⁄2 of the entire estate as an acknowledged
natural child. But Probate Court applied California law
where the decedent can dispose of his properties
according to his will (no compulsory heirs), because
the Civil Code (Art. 16) provides that the applicable
law is the “national laws” of the decedent.
Issue/Held: Which law should apply. PH Law.
Ratio: Following the doctrine of renvoi, the “national
laws” in Art. 16 of the Civil Code should not only
include the succession laws of the foreign jurisdiction,
but also its Conflict of Laws rule. Since the Conflict of
Laws rule in California says that the governing law is
the law of the place of the decedent’s domicile, in this
case the Philippines, then the governing law should
be Philippine law.
Doctrine: The renvoi doctrine provides that the court
must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction (including the Conflict of Laws provisions),
and not only its internal laws (just the succession
provisions). 
 to probate. NO.
030 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS v.
EDWARD BELLIS
(June 6, 1967, Bengzon, J.P., J.)
Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas and of US.
He executed a will in the Phils which bequeathed
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amounts of his distributable estate first to his first
wife, then to his three illegitimate children, and the
remainder was to go to his seven legitimate children
from the first and second marriages. The executor
submitted a project of partition as regards the
remainder but the illegitimate children opposed on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes
being compulsory heirs under Philippine Law.
Issue/Held: Which law should apply. Texas law.
Ratio: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of and is domiciled in Texas at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to 
Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. If Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application 
of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. 

And under Texas law, there are no forced heirs of
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. 

031 IN RE ESTATE OF SUNTAY
(July 31, 1954, Padilla, J.)
Facts: Jose Suntay, Filipino citizen and resident, died
in Amoy, China. Intestate proceedings were then
instituted. His widow, Maria, then filed a petition for
the probate of a will claimed to have been executed
and signed by Jose in the PH. CFI denied because
the will was lost after the filing of the petition and
before the hearing, and wife failed to establish loss of
the will. SC reversed but then the Pacific War
intervened. After the war, his heir, Silvino, filed a
petition for the probate of a will allegedly executed by
Jose in China, w/c he claims he found among the files
of his father, w/c was admitted by the Amoy District
Court. CFI denied the petition.
Issue/Held: WON CFI erred in not admitting the will
Ratio: In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matter, it may be
presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are
18
the same as those provided for in our laws. M

 oreover,
the proceedings in the district court were merely for
the purpose of taking the testimony of 2 attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the Court
does not purport to probate the will.
Doctrine: Rule 78, ROC Sec. 1. Wills proved and
allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by
the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
For the will to be allowed, filed, and recorded by a PH
court, the ff. must be proved: (1) the fact that the
municipal district of Amoy is a probate court, (2) law
of China on procedure in probate or allowance of
wills, (3) legal requirements for the execution of a
valid will in China at the time. In this case, heirs failed
to prove them.
032 LLORENTE v. CA
(November 23, 2000, Pardo, J.)
Facts: Lorenzo was married to Paula and then went
to the US to serve in the US Navy. He was then
naturalized as a US Citizen. Upon coming back, he
discovered that his wife was having an affair with his
brother. They then agreed to separate, and upon
returning to the US, he obtained a divorce decree.
After serving in the Navy, he returned and married
Alicia. He executed a will bequeathing all this
property to Alicia and their 3 children. This will was
admitted to probate while he was still alive. After his
death, Paula filed a petition for letters of
administration. Alicia also filed a petition for issuance
of letters testamentary. RTC granted Paula’s and
denied Alicia’s ruling that the divorce is void, hence
the 2nd marriage is void.
Issue/Held: Who should inherit? Alicia.
What law should be applied? US law should apply
in determining the intrinsic validity of the will.
Ratio: Considering that Lorenzo became an
American citizen long before his divorce, subsequent
marriage, execution of his will, and his death, issues
arising from these incidents must be governed by
foreign law. 
Regarding the validity of the will, Court
ruled that the clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to Alicia and their children is shown in the
will, and they do not wish to frustrate his wishes since
he was a foreigner, hence not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity. 

Doctrine: Whether the will is intrinsically valid and
who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by law in w/c he is a national. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required
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is answered by refering to Philippine law. 

033 PALAGANAS v. PALAGANAS
(January 26, 2011, Abad, J.)
Facts: Ruperta, a naturalized US Citizen, executed a
will in California which covered both US and
Philippine properties. Her brother Ernesto filed a
petition for the probate of the will before RTC-
Malolos, Bulacan. Her other siblings opposed the
petition, claiming that since the will was executed in
California, it must first be probated in a California
court before it can be done in the PH.
Issue/Held: WON a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the PH although not
previously probated and allowed in the country of
execution. YES.
Ratio: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of
wills executed by a foreigner abroad in the PH at
first instance. By insisting that Ruperta’s will should
have first been probated and allowed by the
California court, the petitioners were thinking of a
reprobate. Reprobate of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time
before a competent court.
Doctrine: Article 816, NCC; Rule 73, Sec 1. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of
its execution. In a petition for the allowance of a will,
our rules only require the following:
• Jurisdictional Facts, (fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting,
or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province);
• Names, ages, residences of the heirs, legatees,
and devisees of testator/decedent;
• The probable value and character of the property
of the estate;
• The name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and
o If the will has not been delivered to
the court, the name of the person having custody
of it
5. Testamentary Capacity and
Intent, Arts 796-803
Article 796. All persons who are not expressly
prohibited by law may make a will.
Article 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen
years of age cannot make a will.
19

Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the will to know the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act.
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is
of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will;
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that
the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Article 801. Supervening incapacity does not
invalidate an effective will, nor is the will of an
incapable validated by the supervening of capacity.
Article 802. A married woman may make a will
without the consent of her husband, and without the
authority of the court.
Article 803. A married woman may dispose by will of
all her separate property as well as her share of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
WHO MAY MAKE A WILL
(1) All persons not expressly prohibited by law
(2) Persons of legal age (not under 18)
(3) Testator must be of sound mind (compos
mentis) at the time of execution of will
REQUISITES TO BE OF SOUND MIND [Article 799]
Testator was able at the time of making the will to
know:
(1) The nature of the estate to be disposed of;
(2) The proper objects of his bounty;
(3) The character of the testamentary act
It is NOT necessary that:
(1) The testator is in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or
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(2) His mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause
GR: Law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, and burden of proof is on the person alleging
that he is NOT of sound mind
XPN: If testator ONE MONTH or LESS before the
making of his will was publicly known to be insane,
person who maintains validity must PROVE that the
testator made it during a lucid interval
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY is determined at the
time of execution of the will.
034 BAGTAS v. PAGUIO
(March 14, 1912, Trent, J.)
Facts: Pioquinto Paguio died leaving a will. Fifteen
(15) years prior to his death, Paguio suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body, his hearing
impaired and he lost the power of speech. Through
the medium of signs, he was able to indicate his
wishes to his family. The will was presented for
probate by his widow but was opposed by his son
and grandchildren on the ground that the testator was
not in full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties
and was without the mental capacity necessary to
execute a valid will.
Issue/Held: Did the testator have testamentary
capacity? YES.
Ratio: Mere weakness of body and mind, induced by
age or disease, do not render a person incapable of
making a will. None of the witnesses attempted to
state the mental condition of the testator at the time
he executed the will in question. There can be no
doubt that the testator’s infirmities were of a very
serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind
was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of
his life. However, it cannot be concluded from this
that he was wanting in the necessary mental capacity
to dispose of his property by will.
[Article 799] The question is not so much, what was
the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as,
had he a disposing memory? Was he able to
remember the property he was about to bequeath,
the manner of distributing it, and the objects of his
bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory
sufficiently sound to enable him to know and
understand the business in which he was engaged at
the time when he executed his will.
Doctrine:
(1) Presumption of law is in favor of the mental
capacity of the testator and the burden is upon
20
 the contestants of the will to prove the lack of
testamentary capacity
(2) Mental incapacity must be established in a
positive and conclusive manner.
(3) Mere weakness of mind and body, induced by
age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not
require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and
mental powers in order to execute a valid will.
035 TORRES v. LOPEZ
(November 1, 1926, Street, J.)
Facts: Tomas, prior to the execution of his will, was
judicially incapable of taking care of himself and he
was placed under the care of his cousin, Vicente
Lopez. In his will, he bequeathed to Vicente and Luz
(Vicente’s daughter) his entire estate. But Vicente
predeceased Tomas. Margarita, cousin and nearest
relative of Tomas, then claimed 1/2 of the estate and
says that the will was invalid because of the fact that
Vicente was the guardian therefore incapacitated to
be an heir. Luz Lopez de Buena opposed and claims
his father’s share by accretion.
Issue/Held:
WON the will is valid. YES
Who is entitled to inherit Vicente’s share. LUZ, by
virtue of the right of accretion.
Ratio: The provision made in the will of Tomas in
favor of Vicente was a special incapacity due to the
accidental relation of guardian and ward existing
between the parties. However, by the right of
accretion, the will being valid, everything goes to Luz.
Doctrine:
[Article 982, NCC] Accretion takes place in a
testamentary succession in the ff:
(1) When the two or more persons are called to the
same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares,
(2) When one of the persons so called dies before
the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualified to receive it.
036 SANCHO v. ABELLA
(November 13, 1933, Villareal, J.)
Facts: Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of
Sinait, went to San Fernando, La Union so she can
consult with a good physician. She stayed at the
convent of the parish church of the said municipality.
It was found out that she had dyspepsia and cancer
of the stomach. She called for her lawyer and
executed a will. The execution of the will was
postponed twice. After 2 months, she died of senile
debility. Now, Marciana Abella is appealing the
SUCCESSION C2018
allowance of Matea’s will. Marciana claims that Matea
was not in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties
when she executed her will (i.e. deaf, poor eyesight,
poor memory, suffered from disabilities 2 months
prior her death)
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. YES. Evidence is
insufficient to show that she was not in the
enjoyment of her mental faculties or that she was
unduly influenced in executing her will.
Ratio: Various facts show that testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor blind, nor deaf, nor lacking in
intelligence that she could not dispose of her
properties and make a will – going to La Union to
consult a doctor, stopping at a convent, she
personally furnished doctor with all the necessary
data regarding her illness, she was the one who
called for Atty. Reinoso, and she furnished all the
data she wished to embody in her will.
The fact that Matea Abella stopped at a convent and
enjoyed the hospitality of a priest who gave her
accommodations therein, nor the fact that the will was
executed in the convent in question in the presence
of the parish priest and witnessed by another priest,
could certainly not be considered as an influence
which placed her under the obligation to bequeath of
her property to the bishop of said diocese.
Doctrine: Neither senile debility, nor blindness, nor
deafness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to
incapacitate a person for making his will.
037 NEYRA v. NEYRA
(March 25, 1946, De Joya, J.)
Facts: Trinidad and Encarnacion, sisters, had serious
misunderstandings regarding the properties left by
their father. In one case filed by Trinidad, they
entered into a compromise agreement which she
thumbmarked. The next day, Encarnacion died due to
a heart attack. Atty. Javillonar, claiming to represent
Encarnacion, questioned the compromise agreement
and last will and testament.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES.
Ratio: Will should be admitted to probate despite
opinions from the physician that he was not of sound
mind at that time because there is no reason to
discredit the witnesses Even if he was in an
exceedingly feeble condition at the time it was
executed, he was still of sound mind and capable of
making his will. Professional speculation cannot
prevail over the positive statements of five apparently
credible witnesses.
21
Doctrine: Where the mind of the testator is in owned, 
the extent of his shares in them and even
perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill their locations. 
As regards the proper objects of his
health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as
hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to sole beneficiary. 
There being no showing of fraud in
invalidate his will. its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant. 

038 SAMSON v. CORRALES
(December 5, 1925, Ostrand, C.J.) Re fraud: Circumstances not sufficient to prove fraud.
Facts: A petition for probate of the will of deceased Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or
Mariano Corrales Tan was filed. His son, Vicente, pretense by which the subject of it is cheated.
opposed alleging that the testator was not of sound Oppositor has burden of proving fraud, which she has
mind when he executed the will. Oppositor presented failed to do here. Omission of some relatives does not
the attending physician, Dr. Tee Han Kee of the amount to fraud.
deceased, who speculated that the night before the
will was executed, he “seemed” to be in a state of Doctrine: Accdg to Article 799, the 3 things that the
coma. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented 5 testator must have the ability to know to be
witnesses who testified deceased was conscious and considered of sound mind are:
was able to indicate his desires. CFI admitted the will (1) The nature of the estate to be disposed of
to probate. (2) The proper objects of the testator’s bounty
(3) The character of the testamentary act
Issue/Held: WON the will should be admitted to
probate. YES To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired
Ratio: It is evident that the deceased was in an or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been
exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was held that testamentary incapacity does not
executed, but if the witnesses presented in support of necessarily require that a person shall actually be
the petition told the truth, there can be no doubt he insane or of unsound mind. 

was of sound mind and capable of making his
will. T

 here is no reason to discredit PET’s witnesses. 6. Solemnities of Wills
Discrepancies b/n their versions are comparatively
unimportant and far from weakening their testimony.
On the other hand, it actually lends strength to it by a. Formal Requirements Common to
indicating absence of conspiracy. Notarial and Holographic Wills
i. In Writing
As to the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, suffice it to ii. Executed in a Language/Dialect
say that mere professional speculation cannot prevail
over 
the positive statements of 5 apparently credible
known to testator
witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem
unreasonable. 
 Article 804. Every will must be in writing and
executed in a language or dialect known to the
039 ORTEGA v. VALMONTE testator
(December 16, 2005, Panganiban, J.)
Facts: Ortega, at the age of 80, married Josefina a Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
28-year old. After the death of his husband, Josefina jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
presented his will for probate. Leticia, a relative reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
opposed this on the ground that it didn’t comply with
the legal solemnities in the execution and attestation HOLOGRAPHIC WILL NOTARIAL WILL
of the will, and the testator was already incapacitated Only guarantee of Guarantee of
at the time of the execution of the will as he was then authenticity is the authenticity: Testimony of
in the advanced state of senility. handwriting subscribing witnesses
and the notary
Issue/Held: WON probate of the will should be If lost, a photostatic copy If lost, subscribing
allowed. YES. may be used to prove witnesses are available
existence of original to authenticate (also the
Ratio: Presumption of sound mind. It must be noted copy of the notary)
that despite his advanced age, he was still able to If lost, cannot be proven If lost, may be proven by
identify accurately the kinds of property he by oral evidence. oral evidence.

SUCCESSION C2018 22
 can be gleaned from the phrase “las cuales
Ratio: If oral evidence Reason: Difficult to estan paginas correlativamento con las letras
were admissible, only convince 3 witnesses ‘UNO’ y ‘DOS.’”
one man could engineer and the notary to (5) AC clearly sates that Abada signed in the
the fraud deliberately lie presence of 3 witnesses: “Subscribed and
professed by Abada in our presence…”
In case of loss, the In case of loss, the 3 (6) There was substantial compliance. While the
witnesses would testify subscribing witnesses attestation clause does not state the number of
as to their opinion of the would be testifying to a witnesses, a close inspection of the will 
shows
handwriting they fact which they saw – the that three witnesses signed it. 
Abada’s will
allegedly saw, an opinion act of testator subscribing clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and
which cannot be tested in the will of three other persons. It is 
reasonable to
court by oppositors conclude that there are three witnesses to the
because the handwriting will. 

itself is not at hand (7) Precision of language in the drafting of an
attestation clause is desirable. However, it is
040 TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA DE ABADA v. NOT imperative that a parrot-like copy of the
ABAJA (vice 055) words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
(January 31, 2005, Carpio, J.) from the language employed it can reasonably
Facts: Alipio Abada died in 1940. In 1968, RESP be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills
Alipio Abaja filed a petition for probate of the will what the law expects of it.
allegedly executed by Abada in 1932. Oppositors
claimed various defects in the said will: Doctrine:
(1) Will does not indicate that it is written in a (1) There is no statutory requirement to state in the
language or dialect known to testator will itself that the testator knew the language
(2) Will is not acknowledged before a notary public used in the will. This is a matter that a party may
(3) Will has no attestation clause establish by proof aliunde
(4) Attestation clause fails to state number of pages (2) Attestation clause is made for the purpose of
on w/c the will is written preserving, in permanent form, a record of the
(5) Attestation clause fails to state expressly that the facts attending the execution of the will, so that
testator signed the will and its every page in the in case of failure of the memory of the
presence of 3 witnesses subscribing of the witnesses, or other casualty,
(6) AC does not indicate number of witnesses they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should
(7) AC does not expressly state the circumstances NOT be rejected where its attestation clause
that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will serves the purpose of the law.
and all its pages in the presence of testator and
of each other 041 DE LA CERNA v. POTOT
(December 23, 1964, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. YES. Facts: Sps de la Serna executed a joint LWT in the
local dialect where they disposed all of their
Ratio: properties to their niece, Manuela. The husband died
(1) There is no statutory requirement to state in the so his wife and Manuela submitted the will for
will itself that the testator knew the language probate. The will was admitted to probate with finality
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may on 1939. Upon the wife’s death, another petition for
establish by proof aliunde probate of the same will was filed insofar as her share
(2) Under Sec 618 of the Code of CivPro, the is concerned. CFI declared the will null and void
intervention of a notary public is NOT necessary pursuant to the prohibition on joint wills. CA reversed,
in the execution of any will relying on the finality of the 1939 decree of probate,
(3) Will has an attestation clause: “Sucrito y and the fact that joint wills have long been sanctioned
declarado” by use.
(4) The phrase “en al margen izquierdo de todas y
cada una de las dos hojas de que esta Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. YES, with respect
compuesto el mismo” which means “in the left to the husband’s share.
margin of each and every one of the two pages
consisting of the same” shows that the will Ratio: CA correctly ruled that the final judgment
consists of two pages. The pages are numbered rendered on a petition for the probate of a will has
correlatively with the letters “ONE” and “TWO” as conclusive effect despite the fact that the Civil Code

SUCCESSION C2018 23
declares the invalidity of joint wills. The contention in the attestation clause and acknowledgment
that a void will cannot be invalidated overlooks that where Marcelina is repeatedly referred to as
the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or not “testator” instead of “testatrix”.
rests with the court, and here, they have spoken with (3) It is also suspect for instituting granddaughter
finality when the will was probated in 1939. as sole heiress and giving nothing to her father
who was still alive.
HWVR, the probate decree in 1939 could only affect (4) The notary was not presented as witness
the share of the husband. It could not include the
disposition of the wife’s share as she was still alive. It b. Formalities for Notarial or Ordinary
follows that the validity of the joint will, insofar as
Wills
the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her
death, reexamined and adjudicated, since a joint i. Subscription
will is considered a separate will of each testator. The ii. Attestation
fact that joint wills should be in common usage could iii. Marginal Signing
not make them valid when the Civil Code consistently iv. Paging
invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by
v. Acknowledgement
other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary
may prevail against their observance. 

Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will,
042 SUROZA v. HONORADO must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
(January 31, 2005, Carpio, J.) himself or by the testator’s name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express
Facts: Judge Honrado allowed the probate of a will
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
written in English and thumbmarked by the testatrix.
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
The latter is an illiterate Igorot who supposedly
testator and of one another.
bequeathed all of her estate to her alleged
granddaughter. Hence, the legal daughter-in-law of
The testator or the person requested by him to write
the testatrix challenged the probate decree but was
his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
later upheld by Judge Honrado. After 10 months, the
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
daughter-in-law filed an administrative case against
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
the Judge and his clerk of court for corruptly allowing
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
the probate of the will.
placed on the upper part of each page.
Issue/Held:
The attestation shall state the number of pages used
(1) WON the will is valid – NO. The will was not in
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
a language known and understood by the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
testatrix.
caused some other person to write his name, under
(2) WON the judge and clerk are administratively
his express direction, in the presence of the
liable. YES. A judge may be liable for
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
order by reason of inexcusable negligence or
presence of the testator and of one another.
ignorance. Moot as to clerk as she is no longer
employed as clerk of court. (She is now an
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to
assistant City Fiscal in Surigao)
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Ratio: Respondent judge, on perusing the will and
Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before
noting that it was written in English and was
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
have readily perceived that the will is void. 

the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
(1) Opening paragraph of the will stated that
Court.
English was a language “understood and
known” to the testatrix. But in the concluding
Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read
must personally read the will, if able to do so;
to the testatrix and translated into Filipino. That
otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it
could only mean that the will was written in a
and communicate to him, in some practicable
language not known to the illiterate Igorot
manner, the contents thereof.
testatrix and is therefore void. 

(2) The hasty preparation of the will is also evident
Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be
SUCCESSION C2018 24
read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before
whom the will is acknowledged.
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or
fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or
in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed
and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.
Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the
age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness
to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of
this Code. (n)
Article 821. The following are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification
of a document, perjury or false testimony. (n)
Article 822. If the witnesses attesting the execution
of a will are competent at the time of attesting, their
becoming subsequently incompetent shall not prevent
the allowance of the will. (n)
Article 823. If a person attests the execution of a will,
to whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a
devise or legacy is given by such will, such devise or
legacy shall, so far only as concerns such person, or
spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one
claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent
witnesses to such will. However, such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such
devise or legacy had not been made or given. (n)
Article 824. A mere charge on the estate of the
testator for the payment of debts due at the time of
the testator's death does not prevent his creditors
from being competent witnesses to his will. (n)
043 ABANGAN v. ABANGAN
(November 12, 1919, Avancea, J.)
Facts: Ana Abangan executed a will and was
probated by the CFI which consists of two sheets, the
st
1 of which contains all of the disposition of the
testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin
Montalban and by three witnesses. The 2nd sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. RESP
Anastacia Abangan appealed alleging that the
probate should have been denied on 3 grounds: (1)
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by
SUCCESSION C2018
the testatrix and the three witnesses, (2) It was not
numbered by letters, (3) it was written in a dialect not
understood by testatrix.
Issue/Held: WON the will was duly admitted to
probate – YES. Substantial compliance.
Ratio:
(1) In this case, it was not required that the parties
sign on the left margin because all the
st
dispositions were already made on the 1 page,
which was duly signed at the bottom by the
parties. As to the AC, it was not required that the
testatrix sign because the attestation pertains
only to the witnesses.
The object of Act 2645, which requires that every
sheet should be signed on the left margin, is only
to avoid the substitution of any sheet, thereby
changing the dispositions of the testatrix. But
when the dispositions are duly written only on
one sheet, and signed at the bottom by the
testator and the witnesses, the signatures on the
left would be purposeless.
(2) Object in requiring page number was to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed.
But when all the dispositive parts of the will are
written on one sheet only, as in this case, the
object of the law disappears the removal of this
single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be
hidden.
(3) The circumstance appearing on the will itself that
it was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of
the place where the testarix is a resident is
enough to presume that she knew this dialect in
the absence of any proof to the contrary.
For the presumption of knowledge of the
language/dialect to apply, the following must
appear:
a) That the will must be in a language or
dialect generally spoken in the place of
execution, and
b) That the testator must be a native or
resident of the said locality
Doctrine: The object of the solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
25
given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator’s last will, must be
disregarded.
044 PAYAD v. TOLENTINO
(January 15, 1936, Goddard, J.)
Facts: Leoncia Tolentino executed a will 1 day before
her death. The evidence on record establishes the
fact that Leoncia, assisted by Atty. Almario palced her
thumbmark on each and every page of the will and
the Atty. Merely wrote her name to indicate the place
where she placed her thumbmark. TC denied probate
on the ground that the AC was not in conformity w/
the reqts of law in that it is not stated that the testatrix
caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express
direction. Both parties appealed. Oppositor Aquilana
Tolentino’s appeal is based on the fact that the will
was executed after Leoncia’s death.
Issue/Held: WON the will is executed in accordance
with law – YES.
Ratio: It is NOT necessary that the attestation clause
should state that the testatrix requested Atty. Almario
to sign her name because the testatrix signed the will
in accordance with law. Atty. Almario did not sign for
the testatrix. She personally signed it by placing her
thumbmark on each and every page. In de Gala v.
Gonzales and Ona, the Court said that a statute
requiring a will to be signed is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator’s mark.
045 MATIAS v. SALUD
(June 23, 1958, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: The decedent (90 years old, suffering from
herpes zoster), due to her failing health and profuse
weakness, signed the will with her thumbmark and a
witness (Lourdes Samonte) signed in her stead.
Thus, the words “Gabina Raquel” appeared atop the
words “by Lourdes Samonte.” But she was able to
sign her name on the lower half of page 2 (after the
dispositions), w/c had a smudge of violent ink beside
it purported to be her thumbmark. CFI denied the
probate of the will because, among other things,
Gabina “signed” with a thumbmark in lieu of her
signature, and the ridge marks of such finger print
could not be identified as belonging to the decedent.
CFI also held that nowhere in the Ac is it written that it
was intended by the decedent that Samonte sign for
her.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid – YES.
Ratio: The legal requisite that the testator should sign
is satisfied by a thumbmark, and where such mark is
SUCCESSION C2018
affixed, it is unnecessary to state in the attestation
clause that another person signed the testator’s name
at his request.
Doctrine: It is to be conceded that where a testator
employs an unfamiliar way of signing, and both the
attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter,
such silence is a factor to be considered against the
authenticity of the testament; but the failure to
describe the unusual signature by itself alone is
not sufficient to refuse probate when the evidence
for the proponent fully satisfies the court (as it does
satisfy us in this case) that the will was executed and
witnessed as required by law.
046 BARUT v. CABACUNGAN
(February 15, 1912, Moreland, J.)
Facts: Maria Salomon executed a will written in
Ilocano, and translated in Spanish. Because she was
unable to read and write, the will was read to her by
Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Insoldea. Severo
Agayan was instructed to sign her name to it as
testatrix, and this was witnessed by Concepcion,
Insoldea and Jimenez. Barut, the beneficiary, filed a
petition for probate. Opposition was made on the
ground that a later will was executed. Court
invalidated the later will but still denied probate of
original will because the handwriting of the person
who is alleged to sign the name of the testatrix on
her behalf (Agayan) looked more like the
handwriting of one of the other witnesses than of
Agayan.
Issue/Held: WON said dissimilarity in handwriting
invalidates the will – NO.
Ratio: The dissimilarity is not sufficient to overcome
the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses that
the signature of the testatrix was written by Agayan at
her request and in her presence and in the presence
of all the witnesses. The three witnesses to the will
have all attested as to Agayan’s signing on behalf of
the testatrix. 

Doctrine: From the language of Sec 618, Code of
CivPro, it is clear that with respect to the validity of
the will, it is unimportant whether the person who
writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not.
The important thing is that it clearly appears that the
name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that they
attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
presence of each other. It may be wise as a practical
manner that the one who signs the testator’s name
signs also his own, but that is NOT essential to the
validity of the will.
26
The main thing to be established in the execution of
the will is the signature of the testator. If the signature
is proved, whether it be written by himself or by
another at his request, it is nonetheless valid, and the
fact of such signature can be proved as perfectly and
as completely when the person signing for the
principal omits to sign his own name as it can when
he actually signs.
047 GARCIA v. LACUESTA
(June 29, 1951, Paras, C.J.)
Facts: Atty. Florentino Javier signed the will on behalf
of testator, Antero Mercado, by writing the testator’s
name followed below by “A ruego del testator” and his
name. It is alleged that Mercado wrote a CROSS
immediately after his name. TC denied the probate of
the will for being fatally defective. PET argues that
there is no need to recite that Mercado caused him to
write the former’s name under the same’s express
direction because the cross is a sufficient signature
and his signature is a mere surplusage.
Issue/Held: WON the attestation clause is valid –
NO.
Ratio: The AC is fatally defective for failing to state
that Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write his name
under his express direction. Moreover, the cross
cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of
a thumbmark.
048 NERA v. RIMANDO
(February 27, 1911, Carson, J.)
Facts: When the will of Pedro Rimando was being
signed, one of the subscribing witnesses was
allegedly outside, some 8 or 10 feet away, in a large
room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway,
across w/c was hung a curtain w/c made it impossible
for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of affixing their
signatures to the instrument. 
TC admitted the will to
probate relying on Court’s ruling Jaboneta v. Gustilo
that the fact that one of the witnesses was in the
outer room while the others are in the inner room is
not sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.
Issue/Held: WON the requirement that the will was
signed in the presence of witnesses and each other
was fulfilled. – YES.
Ratio: A majority of the members of the court is of
opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small
room with the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses at the time when they attached their
signatures to the instrument thereby disposing of the
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appeal. BUT it said that Had the subscribing witness
been proven to have been in the outer room at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument
in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will,
the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done "in the 
presence" of
the witness in the outer room.
Doctrine: The true test of presence of the testator
and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they 
actually saw each other sign, but
whether they might have seen each other sign,
had they chosen to do so, considering their mental
and physical condition and position with relation to
each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature. 

The question whether the testator and the subscribing
witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon
proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by
each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each
other were such that by merely casting the eyes
in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign. 

049 ICASIANO v. ICASIANO
(June 30, 1964, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate. All of the legal requirements
for a valid will were complied with except that the
original copy did not contain the signature of one of
the attesting witnesses on page 3 thereof. The
duplicate, however, was signed by all witnesses and
testatrix on all pages. CFI admitted the will into
probate.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the failure of witness
Jose to affix his signature to one page of a testament
sufficient to justify denial of probate. – NO.
Ratio: The failure of witness Natividad to sign page 3
was entirely through pure oversight. This was shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy
of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page. 
 The text of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment likewise evidence the fact that
no one was aware of the defect at the time. Also, the
impossibility of substitution is assured by the fact that
the testatrix and the 2 other witnesses signed the
defective page. 

Doctrine: The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
27
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over
whose conduct she had no control.
050 SUROZA v. HONORADO
(April 29, 1953, Paras, C.J.)
Facts: Vicente Cagro’s will was admitted to probate
despite the signatures to the attestation clause being
on the left-hand margin instead of at the bottom.
Issue/Held: WON the attestation clause is valid. –
NO.
Ratio: AC must be signed at the bottom. If an
attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses
at the bottom be admitted as sufficient, it would be
easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any
or all of the witnesses. 
 An unsigned attestation
clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom negatives their participation. 
 before himself his having signed the will. He cannot
Doctrine: The AC is a “memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will” required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses and must
necessarily bear their signatures.
051 JAVELLANA v. LEDESMA
(June 30, 1955, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: CFI Iloilo admitted to probate the will and
codicil of Dona Apolinaria Ledesma vda de Javellana.
Doña Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving
relative of the testatrix appeals this order alleging that
the documents were not executed in conformity with
law. She pointed out, among others, the instrumental
witnesses’ and the notary public’s varying accounts
re: the signing of the certificate of acknowledgment
appended to the codicil.
Issue/Held: WON the will and codicil is valid. – YES.
Ratio: WON the notary signed the certification of
acknowledgement in the presence of the testatrix and
the witnesses does NOT affect the validity of the
codicil.
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of
his certification that the testament was duly
acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of
the acknowledgement itself nor the testamentary act.
Hence, the separate execution of such cannot be said
to violate the rule that testaments should be
completed without interruption.
Doctrine: Unlike the old CC, the new CC does not
require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and
notary should be accomplished in one single act.
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Article 806 of the Civil Code does not contain words
requiring that the testator and the witnesses should
acknowledge the testament on the same day or
occasion that it was executed.
052 CRUZ v. VILLASOR
(November 26, 1973, Esguerra, J.)
Facts: Wife objected to the probate of his husband’s
will alleging that it is invalid because one of the three
witnesses to the valid is also the Notary Public,
hence, the result is that only 2 witnesses appeared
before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
Issue/Held: WON the will was executed in
accordance with law. NO.
Ratio: The notary public before whom the will was
rd
acknowledged cannot be considered as the 3
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge
split his personality into two so that one will appear
before the other to acknowledge his participation in
the making of the will. To allow the notary public to
act as one of the attesting and acknowledging
witness would have the effect of having only 2
witnesses to the will w/c would be in contravention to
Article 805 and 806, CC.
Doctrine: An instrumental witness cannot be the
notary public to whom the will was acknowledged.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses.
For then, he would be interested in sustaining the
validity of the will as it directly involves himself and
the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position and the very purpose of the
acknowledgement, which is to minimize fraud, would
be thwarted.
053 UNSON v. ABELLA
(June 12, 1992, VIllamor, J.)
Facts: Doña Josefa Zalamea, single, 60, executed a
LWT with an attached inventory of her properties in
the presence of 3 witnesses. Upon her death, Pedro
Unson, the appointed executor, filed an application
for the probate of the will. Abella et al opposed,
alleging that the will was not executed in conformity
with the law – it was not paged correlatively, it has no
attestation clause, it was not signed by the testatrix
and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
Issue/Held: WON the will was executed with all the
solemnities required by law – YES.
28
Ratio: The testimonies of the attesting witnesses are
sufficient to uphold validity of the will. The non-
production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus,
as accounted for by the attorney for the proponent at
the trial, does not render void the decree of the court
a quo, allowing the probate.
The inventory may be probated despite the fact that it
has no attestation clause and its paging is made in
Arabic numerals and not letters, in view of the fact
that the inventory is referred to in the will as an
integral of it.
Doctrine: Section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that a will can be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not
remember having attested it, provided the court is
satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has
been executed and signed in the manner prescribed
by the law.
Cabang vs. Delfinado: The general rule is that, where
opposition is made to the probate of a will, the
attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are
exceptions to this rule, for instance, when a witness is
dead, or cannot be served with process of the court,
or his reputation for truth has been questioned or he
appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. In such
cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the
testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs
adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will
has been duly executed.
054 JABONETA v. GUSTILO
(January 19, 1906, Carson, J.)
Facts: As the 3rd witness was signing the will, the 1st
witness was already in the act of leaving the room.
Based on the testimony of W1, he did not actually see
W3 sign, but he believed he did 
because he was
already at the table where the document was and had
a pen in his hand 
readying to sign. 
TC took this as a
failure to comply with one of the formalities of a will
(signing in the 
presence of the other witnesses) so
the probate was denied. 

Issue/Held: WON the will complies with the
requirements of the law - YES
Ratio: The fact that W1 was still in the room when he
saw W3 moving his hand and pen in the act of
affixing his signature to the will, taken together with
the testimony of the remaining witnesses which
shows that W1 did in fact there and then sign his
name to the will is sufficient to prove that the
signature was affixed in the presence of W1. The fact
that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back
was turned while a portion of the name of the witness
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was being written is of no importance. At the moment
W3 signed the document he was actually and
physically present and in such position with relation to
W3 that he could see everything which took place by
merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing
so. 

Doctrine: The true test of vision is not whether the
testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he
might have seen him sign, considering his mental and
physical condition and position at the time of the
subscription.
The purpose of a statutory requirement that the
witness sign in the presence of the testator is said to
be that the testator is said to be that the testator may
have ocular evidence of the identity of that instrument
subscribed by the witness and himself, and the
generally accepted tests of presence are vision and
mental apprehension.
055 INTESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA v. ABAJA
(January 31, 2005, Carpio, J.)
supra 040
056 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
FILOMENA BERMOY
(January 19, 1949 Rodas, J.)
Facts: Nearly 2 years after the death of Filomena
Bermoy, Jose Puzon, her grandson, filed an
application for the administration of her estate. 2
weeks later, Emeranciana, granddaughter of
decedent filed an application for the probate of the
decedent’s so-called LWT. The will bequeathed all
her estate in favor of her daughter, Leopolda
(Emeranciana’s mother). This was thumbmarked by
her and signed by Rom, Bartolini, and Talam;
attested to by Talam, Delaganar, and Murillo (notary
public). Jose and his siblings, and other legitimate
heirs opposed. TC denied the probate
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – NO.
Ratio: The AC failed to mention that the testatrix
signed the will and each and every one of the pages
thereof, or she had caused her name to be signed by
one of the witnesses and affixed her thumbmark in
the presence of each and every one of the witnesses
who signed the AC. It also failed to mention that the
witnesses signed the will and all of the pages in the
presence of the testatrix and of each every one of
them. Evidence aliunde cannot be taken into
consideration, relying on the doctrine that “evidence
aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not
appearing in the AC and where such evidence has
been admitted, it should not be given the effect
29
intended.”
057 GARCIA v. VASQUEZ
(November 26, 1973, Carson, J.)
Facts: Testatrix allegedly executed 2 wills – one in
1956, and one in 1960. RESP, niece of decedent,
nd
filed a petition for the probate of the 2 will. During
the trial, the testatrix’s ophthalmologist testited that 5
years before her death and 6 months before the 1960
will, she went to him for consultation, where it was
found that she had a cataract on the left eye, and that
she could not read print, and could only see forms
and distant objects. Petitioners opposed alleging that
on Dec 29, 1960, the eyesight of testatrix was so poor
and defective that she could not have read the
provisions of the will. However, lower Court still
admitted to probate the 1960 will.
Issue/Held: WON the will was validly executed. –
NO.
Ratio: The testatrix falls under the category of a blind
testator, hence the requirements under Article 808
must be followed. In this case, the requirements were
not followed. At the time the 1960 will was executed,
the decedent was incapable of reading, and could not
have read the provisions of the will supposedly
signed by her. 
 Additionally, upon its face, the 1960
will appears to have been prepared in haste, with all
the typographical errors – “&” instead of “and,
“Hulinh” instead of “Huling”, “Alfonso” for “Alfonsa”,
“Mercrdrs” for “Mercedes”, “instrumrntl” for
“instrumental”. It is difficult to understand that so
important a document should be embodied in an
informal and untidily written instrument, with glaring
spelling errors, and that the testator should not have
noticed them. 

Doctrine: The rationale behind the requirement of
reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is
illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is
to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly
communicated to or understood by the handicapped
testator, thus making them truly reflective of his
desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will
should be read to the latter, not only once but TWICE,
by two different persons, and that the witnesses have
to act within the range of his (the testator’s) other
senses. [Reyes and Puno, citing Alexander on Wills]
058 ALVARADO v. GAVIOLA
(Sepember 14, 1993, Bellosillo, J.)
Facts: Testator was suffering from Glaucoma. He
executed a will disinheriting his illegitimate son, PET
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Cesar Alvarado. During the execution of the said
Habilin and later, its codicil, Brigido did not read the
contents. Instead, Rino, the lawyer who drafted it,
read the contents out loud while the three witnesses
and the notary public followed with their own copies.
Cesar opposed the admission of the will into probate
alleging that it did not comply with the requirements
under Article 808.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES.
Ratio: There was substantial compliance with the
law. Lawyer read the will and codicil aloud to the
testator once, while the others followed with their own
copies. Hence, it can be safely concluded that the
testator was reasonably assured that what was read
to him were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents.
Doctrine: Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators
but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable" of reading their wills. The rationale behind
the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he
is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he
may be able object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes. Substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied.
059 CANEDA v. CA
(May 28, 1993, Regalado, J.)
Facts: The attestation clause failed to state that the
witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and each other.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. NO.
Ratio: The failure to state that the witnesses signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and each other is a FATAL defect.
Substantial compliance rule is NA because this
omission cannot be supplied by an examination of the
will itself.
Doctrine: Enunciated the substantial compliance
rule: Omission w/c can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,
correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to
probate of the will being assailed. HOWEVER, those
omissions w/c cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of
the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must
only be with respect to the FORM of the attestation or
the language or employed therein. This does not
30
apply where the attestation clause totally omits the
fact that the witnesses signed each and every page of
the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
060 GIL v. MURCIANO
(March 1, 1951, Jugo, J.)
Facts: Attestation clause did not state that the
testator signed the will.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – NO. // MR: YES
Ratio:
(1) The testator cannot certify his own signature.
(2) The rules of statutory construction are applicable
to wills, but only to the body and not the
attestation clause. 
 trustworthiness and reliableness, and honesty and
On MR: reversed. Will is valid. Abangan principle +
legal presumption that the will is in accordance with
law.
Doctrine: The so-called liberal rule does not offer
any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The decisions we have cited
to tell us when and where to stop; the dividing line is
drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and
where evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the
document is attempted. They only permit a probe,
an exploration within the confines of the will, to
ascertain its meaning and to determine the
existence or absence of the formalities of
law. They do not allow the courts to go outside
the will or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply
missing details that should appear in the will
itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire
results. [Doctrine still applicable]
061 CUEVAS v. ACACHOSO
(May 18, 1951, Bautista-Angelo, J.)
Facts: Attestation clause of the will was signed by the
testator and not the witnesses. But the witnesses
signed below the name of the testator.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. YES.
Ratio: Will is valid and the AC constitutes substantial
compliance with the law. The fact that the 3 witnesses
signed immediately below the testator’s signature
shows that they attested not only to the genuineness
of the will but also to its due execution
Doctrine: Reiterated the Abangan v. Abangan
doctrine
062 GONZALES v. CA
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(November 26, 1973, Esguerra, J.)
Facts: Lutgarda filed a petition for the probate of the
will of her aunt Isabel. Rizalina, another niece,
opposed her petition, on the ground that there was no
proof of the instrumental witnesses’ good standing in
the community, reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, and honesty and uprightness (as is
required for character witnesses under the
Naturalization Law)
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES, witnesses
need not prove good standing in community,
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness.
Ratio: Witnesses to a will need not prove good
standing in the community, reputation for
uprightness, because they are presumed to be
competent/credible. Naturalization Law does not
apply in probate proceedings because the witnesses
in probate are not character witnesses since they only
attest to the fact of execution of the will and the
formalities attendant thereto.
Doctrine: Instrumental witnesses are competent if
they possess all the qualifications under Art 820 and
none of the disqualifications under Art. 821. For their
testimony to be credible, (worthy of belief and entitled
to credence), it is not mandatory that the witnesses
prove their good standing in the community or that
they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed
to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise.
063 LEE v. TAMBAGO
(February 12, 2008, Esguerra, J.)
Facts: Admin complaint against Atty. Tambago who
notarized a will alleged to be non-compliant with the
law. Allegations: Lee Sr’s never executed a will, the
signatures of 2 witnesses were forged, will was
supposedly acknowledged on June 30, 1965 but
residence certificate of testator was dated January 5,
1962; there was absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the 2 purported witnesses; no copy of
the will was filed in the Records Management and
Archives Office.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – NO, for failure
to comply with the formalities.
Ratio: In this case, there were only 2 witnesses.
There was neither strict nor substantial compliance of
the Acknowledgment Part where there is absence of
a notation of the residence certificates of the
witnesses. Also, it contained the testator's old
residence certificate.
31

064 GUERRERO v. BIHIS
(November 26, 1973, Esguerra, J.)
Facts: Will was acknowledged at Quezon City before
Atty. Directo who was a commissioned notary public
for and in Caloocan City. RTC denied the probate of
the will.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. NO.
Ratio: The will was not acknowledged as required by
law. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned
notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the
authority to take the acknowledgment of the testratix
and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vain, the
testratix and the instrumental witnesses could not
have 
validly acknowledged the will before him.
065 AZUELA v. CA
(April 12, 2006, Esguerra, J.)
Facts: Castillo opposed the probate of the will of
Igsolo on the ground that it was not executed and
attested to IAW law – (1) AC did not state the number
of pages of the will; (2) AC was not signed by the
instrumental witnesses at the bottom, they merely
signed on the left-hand margin; (3) Improper
acknowledgement – Notary public merely stated,
“Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo,
1918 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – NO.
Ratio: A will whose attestation clause does not
contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will
which does not contain an acknowledgment is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public (jurat).
b. Formalities for Holographic Wills
i. Entirely written in the hand of the
testator
ii. Dated
iii. Signed by Testator
066 ROXAS v. DE JESUS
(January 28, 1985, Gutierrez, J.)
Facts: Holographic will dated Feb./61. Probate
opposed alleging that it is not properly dated.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES,
substantial compliance.
Ratio: Generally speaking, when law says dated, it
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means year, month, date. But in this case, there is
substantial compliance. Liberal construction to
prevent intestacy.
Doctrine: The prevailing policy is to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue
or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege
(Icasiano v. Icasiano). If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law,
and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the
exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be
admitted to probate.
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to
comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose
sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
067 LABRADOR v. CA
(April 5, 1990, Paras, C.J.)
Facts: Labrador’s holographic will did not contain a
st nd
date, but 1 par. of the 2 page stated “And this is
the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment
of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of
March, 17th day, in the year 1968…” Probate of the
holographic will opposed on the ground that it
was not dated.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES. It is dated.
Ratio: The law does not specify a particular location
where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will. 

068 AZAOLA v. SINGSON
(August 5, 1960 Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: Fortunata died leaving a holographic will. CFI
refused to probate the will because of the lack of 3
witnesses who could declare that the will was in the
writing of the testatrix.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – YES.
Presentation of witnesses merely directory in
holographic wills.
Ratio: Since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, he was not required to produce more than
one witness; BUT even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, 
Article 811 of our
present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require
the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty
32
of having the probate denied. 
Since no witness may
have been present at the execution of a holographic
will, none being required by law (Art. 810), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control
of the proponent, for it is not merely a question of
finding and producing any 3 witnesses, they must be
witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of
the testator. There may be no available witness of
testator’s hand, or even if so familiarized, the
witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
nd
This is the reason why 2 par of Art 811 provides for
the resort to expert witnesses in cases where
witnesses are unavailable.
Doctrine: Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present (Art. 810), and the rule requiring
production of three witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
069 CODOY v. CALUGAY
(August 12, 1999, Pardo, J.)
Facts: RESPs filed a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased. PETs opposed
alleging said will was a forgery. RESPs presented 6
ordinary witnesses and various documentary
evidence to show that the handwriting is genuine.
PETs filed a demurrer which the RTC granted. CA
reversed.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – Case remanded
for presentation of evidence, and the presentation
of 3 witnesses, which is a mandatory
requirement.
Ratio: A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the
testator. The signature of the testator in some of the
disposition is not readable. There were uneven
strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signatures in the holographic will
dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture
permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated
June 16, 1978, the strokes are different.
Doctrine: Article 811 provides, as a requirement for
the probate of a contested holographic will, that at
least three witnesses explicitly declare that the
signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator. The court is convinced, based on the
language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word “shall” in a statute commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion.
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070 GAN v. YAP
(August 30, 1958, Bengzon, J.)
Facts: Original copy of holographic will not
presented. Petitioners tried to establish the contents
and due execution of the will by testimonies of people
who allegedly witnessed the making of the will.
Issue/Held: WON the will may be admitted to
probate. - NO
Ratio: Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be
proved by testimonial evidence when lost or
destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the
wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is
the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of
the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the
notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary
will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to
authenticate. 

In the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they
saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the
will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the
witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion
which can not be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand. 

071 RODELAS v. ARANZA
(December 7, 1982, RelovaJ.)
Facts: Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Bonilla. The original copy of
holographic will not presented, but a photostatic copy
was presented. RESPs opposed arguing that in case
of holographic wills, the original must be presented
and a photocopy is not sufficient for the probate of the
alleged will.
Issue/Held: WON the will may be admitted to
probate. – YES
Ratio: Footnote 8 of Gan v. Yap says that "Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court," Evidently, the
photostatic copy of the lost or destroyed holographic
will may be admitted because then the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased can be determined
by the probate court.
072 KALAW v. RELOVA
(September 28, 1984, Melencio-Herrera, J.)
33
Facts: There appears 2 alterations in the holographic
will, whic purports to bequeth to Rosa, the sister of
the testatrix, as the sole heir. (1) Rosa's name, as
sole heir, was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was
written above it, and (2) Rosa's name, as sole
executrix, was crossed out and instead "Gregorio"
was written. The 2nd alteration was initialed by the
testator.
Issue/Held: WON the will is valid. – NO.
Ratio/Doctrine: Generally, when a number of
erasures, corrections, cancellation, or insertions are
made by the testator in the will but the same have not
been noted or authenticated with his full signature,
only the particular words erased, corrected, altered
will be invalidated, not the entirety of the will. 
 7. Codicils and Incorporation by
XPNS:
(1) Where the change affects the essence of the will
of the testator
(2) Where the alteration affects the date of the will or
the signature of the testator
rd
(3) If the words are written by a 3 person
contemporaneous with the execution of the will,
even though authenticated by the testator – for
violation of the requisite that the holographic will
must be entirely in the testator’s handwriting
This case falls under (1). When the holographic will
had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another,
but which did not carry the requisite full signature of
the testator, the effect must be that the entire will
is voided or revoked for the simple reason that
nothing remains in the will after that which could
remain valid.
073 AJERO v. CA
(September 15, 1994, Puno, J.)
Facts: RESPs opposed the probate of the
holographic will of Annie Sand on the grounds that (1)
neither the testament’s body nor signature was in the
decedent’s handwriting, (2) it contained alterations
and corrections not duly signed by the decedent, (3) it
was executed through improper pressure and undue
influence. TC still admitted the will to probate. CA
reversed, ruling that will failed to comply with Articles
813 and 814.
Issue/Held: WON the will may be probated. – YES.
Ratio: Only the requirements under Article 810 are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Doctrine: The lists in ROC and Art. 839 of NCC are
exclusive. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic
will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
(1) Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the
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decedent's last will and testament;
(2) Whether said will was executed in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law;
(3) Whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and,
(4) Whether the execution of the will and its signing
were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
Re: Article 814: Unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on
the date of the holographic will or no testator’s
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
Reference
Article 825. A codicil is supplement or addition to a
will, made after the execution of a will and annexed to
be taken as a part thereof, by which disposition made
in the original will is explained, added to, or altered.
Article 826. In order that a codicil may be effective, it
shall be executed as in the case of a will. (n)
Article 827. If a will, executed as required by this
Code, incorporates into itself by reference any
document or paper, such document or paper shall not
be considered a part of the will unless the following
requisites are present:
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will
must be in existence at the time of the execution
of the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the
same, stating among other things the number of
pages thereof;
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory
proof as the document or paper referred to
therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the
witnesses on each and every page, except in
case of voluminous books of account or
inventories. (n)
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
Example: TCT
Q: Is there a need to attach the document to the will?
A: YES. Requirement no. 4 states that it must be
signed by the testator. Signing presupposes that the
document is attached to the will, otherwise, how can it
be signed by the testator.
XPN: Voluminous records
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8. Republication and Revival
Article 835. The testator cannot republish, without
reproducing in a subsequent will, the dispositions
contained in a previous one which is void as to its
form. (n)
Article 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a
previous will has the effect of republishing the will as
modified by the codicil. (n)
Article 837. If after making a will, the testator makes
a second will expressly revoking the first, the
revocation of the second will does not revive the first
will, which can be revived only by another will or
codicil. (739a)
REPUBLICATION
Act of reproducing in a subsequent will the
dispositions in a previous one which is void as to ITS
FORM.
A second will changing the dispositions in the first will
is not a republication. It is an entirely new will.
REVIVAL
(1) Will 2 expressly revokes Will 1. Will 2 is then
revoked by Will 3. Will 1 is not revived
automatically. It can be revived only by another
will or codicil à Will 4, or codicil to Will 3.
(2) [Commentary] Will 2 impliedly revokes Will 1.
Will 2 is then revoked by Will 3. Will 1 is revived
automatically. à THIS HAS NO LEGAL BASIS
ACCORDING TO SIR. BUT most commentaries
agree on this one. So choose who to believe
9. Revocation
Article 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at
any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of
this right is void. (737a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done
according to the law of the place where the will was
made, or according to the law of the place in which
the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the
revocation takes place in this country, when it is in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n)
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the
following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed
as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating
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the will with the intention of revoking it, by the
testator himself, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction. If
burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some
other person, without the express direction of
the testator, the will may still be established,
and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents, and due execution,
and the fact of its unauthorized destruction,
cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court. (n)
Article 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke
the previous ones in an express manner, annul only
such dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent
with or contrary to those contained in the later wills.
Article 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will
shall take effect, even if the new will should become
inoperative by reason of the incapacity of the heirs,
devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their
renunciation. (740a)
Article 833. A revocation of a will based on a false
cause or an illegal cause is null and void. (n)
Article 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child
does not lose its legal effect, even though the will
wherein it was made should be revoked. (741)
CONFLICTS RULES FOR REVOCATION OF WILLS
[Article 829]
(1) Revocation IN the Philippines – Philippine Law
(2) Revocation OUTSIDE the Philippines
Domiciled in the (a) Philippine Law
Philippines (b) Lex loci celebrationis
(Art. 17)
NOT domiciled in the (a) Law of place where
Philippines testator is domiciled
(b) Law of the place
where will was made
a. Doctrine of Presumed Revocation
It is presumed that a will is revoked:
(1) Where a will which cannot be found is shown to
have been in the possession of the testator,
when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the
same was cancelled or destroyed.
(2) Where it is shown that the testator had ready
access to the will and it cannot be found after
his death.
It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge
or authority of the testator. The force of the
presumption of cancellation or revocation by the
35
testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive,
but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
[Gago v. Mamuyac]
b. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Where the act of destruction is connected with the
making of another will so as fairly to raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the
old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of
the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new
will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will
remains in full force.
The doctrine is known as that of dependent relative
revocation, which is usually applied where the
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with a present
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a
substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not
made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason.
074 IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF ADRIANA
MALOTO v. CA
(February 29, 1988, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece
and nephews. Believing that she died intestate, they
initiated intestate proceedings. The heirs executed an
extra-judicial settlement of Adriana’s estate. However,
three years later, a former associate of Adriana's
counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a
document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBULUT-
AN (Testamento)," dated January 3, 1940, and
purporting to be the last will and testament of
Adriana. In the will, while Panfilo and Felino are still
named as heirs, Aldina and Constancio are
bequeathed much bigger shares. Aldina and
Constancio prayed for the allowance of the will. The
TC denied probate and held that the will was revoked
because it was burned. CA while finding as
inconclusive the matter on whether or not the
document or papers allegedly burned by the
househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe, upon instructions
of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself
and found that the will had been revoked. It based its
finding on the facts that the document was not in the
two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix
going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a
copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her
seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a
new will drawn up.
Issue/Held: WON the will should be admitted to
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probate. – YES. Will was not properly revoked.
Ratio: FIRST, the document or papers burned by
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of
Adriana Maloto. SECOND, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express
direction of Adriana. THIRD, the burning was not in
her presence. While animus revocandi may be
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite
alone would not suffice, Animus revocandi is only one
of the necessary elements for the effective revocation
of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will
carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction.
Doctrine: It is clear that the physical act of
destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not
per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It
may be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator.
Of course, it goes without saying that the document
destroyed must be the will itself.
075 CUEVAS v. CUEVAS
(December 14, 1955, Reyes, J.B.L, .J.)
Facts: Antonina executed a notarized “Donacion
Mortis Causa” bequeathing to her nephew, Crispulo
(RESP) the northern ½ of unregistered land in Nueva
Ecija, containing the ff. provision where she reserved
the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and
other rights and attributes of ownership while I am not
deprived of life by the Almighty” and that she will not
take away (the property) “because I reserve it for him
when I die.” 2 years after, she executed another
document revoking the donation, and then filed an
action to recover the land conveyed.
Issue/Held: WON the revocation was proper. – NO.
It was a donation inter vivos, hence irrevocable.
Ratio: The donor, by the terms of the donation,
intended to part with the title of the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, which
makes it a donation IV. By stating that she will not
dispose or take the away the property, she expressly
renounced the right to freely dispose of the property.
Doctrine: An express reservation of the right to
control and dispose at will of the property would be
conclusive indication that the liberality is only at the
donor’s death, and express waiver of free disposition
36
would place the inter vivos character of the donation
beyond dispute.
076 GAGO v. MAMUYAC
(January 29, 1927, Johnson, .J.)
Facts: The testator Miguel Mamuyac died on 2
January 1922. Within the same month, Gago
presented to court a will supposed to have been
executed by the testator on 27 July 1918. The will
was not admitted on the ground that the testator had,
on 16 April 1919, executed a new will and testament.
Gago then petitioned for the probate of the 2nd will
which was denied again by the court on the ground
that the same will had been revoked by the testator
as testified by Fenoy, the person who typed the will
and Bejar, to whom a house and lot in the 1919 Will
was sold to. Another witness testified that the 1919
will was in the possession of the testator but could not
be found after his death. It was also successfully
established that another will was executed in 1920.
The 1919 will presented was found by the lower court
to be a mere carbon copy of the original.
Issue/Held: WON the will should be probated. – NO.
Ratio: The original will was revoked by a 1920 will.
Doctrine: Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator,
when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of
other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access
to the will and it cannot be found after his death.
077 MOLO v. MOLO
(February 29, 1988, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Decedent, Mariano Molo executed two wills
prior to his death – 1918 will and 1939 will. The 1939
will contained a clause expressly revoking the 1918
will. His wife, Juana, then filed a petition for the
probate of the 1939 will. This was originally admitted,
but opon opposition of RESPs (children of his
deceased brother), it was reopened and the probate
of will was denied on the ground that it was not
executed IAW law (it was a donacion captatoria) She
then filed another petition for the probate of the 1918
will. RESPS opposed alleging that Juana is now
estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will.
Issue/Held: WON the 1918 should be admitted to
probate. – YES. The 1939 will having been found
to be invalid, in essence, did not constitute a valid
revocation.
Ratio/Doctrine: A subsequent will, containing a
clause revoking a previous will, having been
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disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce
the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void. (Samson v. Naval)
The doctrine is known as that of dependent relative
revocation is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute
for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if
made, fails of effect for some reason.
Where the act of destruction is connected with the
making of another will so as fairly to raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the
old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of
the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new
will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will
remains in full force.
The failure of the new testamentary disposition,
upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. It must appear that the revocation is
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that
the testator did not intend to die intestate. There can
therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying
testate. 

078 DIAZ v. DE LEON
(May 31, 1922, Romualdez, J.)
Facts: Jesus de Leon executed a will. Shortly after,
he asked that it be returned to him. He then ordered
his servant to tear the document, and this was done
in his presence and before a nurse. Diaz, however,
filed a petition for probate of the will, alleging that
there was no revocation. RESP opposed stating that
the will was destroyed, and a second one was
executed revoking the first.
Issue/Held: WON the will was revoked. - YES
nd
Ratio: While the 2 will presented by RESP is not
clothed will all the necessary requisites to constitute a
st
sufficient revocation, the 1 will is still revoked,
because according to Sec 623, Code of CivPro. the
destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in
itself, a sufficient revocation.
37
In this case, the intention to revoke the will is manifest
st
from the fact that shortly after the execution of the 1
will, the testator was anxious to withdraw or change
the provisions he made in his first will. This fact is
disclosed by the
Doctrine: According to Section 623 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the destruction of a will animo
revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. 
 refuse trust. — A person named as executor in a will
10. Allowance and Disallowance of
Wills
Article 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress,
or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n)
RULE 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to
execution. — No will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance
of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
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Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver. — The person
who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20)
days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to
the executor named in the will.
Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or
shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the
death of the testate, or within twenty (20) days after
he knows that he is named executor if he obtained
such knowledge after the death of the testator,
present such will to the court having jurisdiction,
unless the will has reached the court in any other
manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the
court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his
refusal to accept it.
Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for
neglect. — A person who neglects any of the duties
required in the two last preceding sections without
excused satisfactory to the court shall be fined not
exceeding two thousand pesos.
Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed.
— A person having custody of a will after the death of
the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to
deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court
having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and
there kept until he delivers the will.
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.
— Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is
lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court for the allowance of his will.
Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for the
allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the
property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters are
prayed;
38
 (e) If the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the
allowance of the will, or the issuance of letters
testamentary or of administration with the will
annexed.
Section 3. Court to appoint time for proving will.
Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place
to be published three (3) weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where
the petition for probate has been filed by the testator
himself.
Section 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors
to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at
their places of residence, and deposited in the post
office with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like
manner be mailed to the person named as executor,
if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named
as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of copies of
the notice at lest (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing.
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will,
notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
Section 5. Proof at hearing. What sufficient in
absence of contest. — At the hearing compliance with
the provisions of the last two preceding sections must
be shown before the introduction of testimony in
support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken
under oath and reduced to writing. It no person
appears to contest the allowance of the will, the court
may grant allowance thereof on the testimony of one
of the subscribing witnesses only, if such witness
testify that the will was executed as is required by
law.
In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
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will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. In the absence of any such competent
witness, and if the court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to.
Section 6. Proof of lost or destroyed will. Certificate
thereupon. — No will shall be proved as a lost or
destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the
same be established, and the will is proved to have
been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or
accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2)
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the
provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and
certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and
the certificate must be filed and recorded as other
wills are filed and recorded.
Section 7. Proof when witnesses do not reside in
province. — If it appears at the time fixed for the
hearing that none of the subscribing witnesses
resides in the province, but that the deposition of one
or more of them can be taken elsewhere, the court
may, on motion, direct it to be taken, and may
authorize a photographic copy of the will to be made
and to be presented to the witness on his
examination, who may be asked the same questions
with respect to it, and to the handwriting of the
testator and others, as would be pertinent and
competent if the original will were present.
Section 8. Proof when witnesses dead or insane or
do not reside in the Philippines. — If the appears at
the time fixed for the hearing that the subscribing
witnesses are dead or insane, or that none of them
resides in the Philippines, the court may admit the
testimony of other witnesses to prove the sanity of the
testator, and the due execution of the will; and as
evidence of the execution of the will, it may admit
proof of the handwriting of the testator and of the
subscribing witnesses, or of any of them.
Section 9. Grounds for disallowing will. — The will
shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(f) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(g) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of
its execution;
(h) If it was executed under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;
(i) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his
benefit;
(j) If the signature of the testator was procured by
39
 fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of
fixing his signature thereto.
Section 10. Contestant to file grounds of contest. —
Anyone appearing to contest the will must state in
writing his grounds for opposing its allowance, and
serve a copy thereof on the petitioner and other
parties interested in the estate.
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or
accounted for where will contested. — If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the
notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines
and not insane, must be produced and examined,
and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them
must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or
some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines
but outside the province where the will has been filed,
their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them
testify against the due execution of the will, or do not
remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of
other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner
required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be
allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the
handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses,
and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to.
Section 12. Proof where testator petitions for
allowance of holographic will. — Where the testator
himself petitions for the probate of his holographic will
and no contest is filed, the fact that the affirms that
the holographic will and the signature are in his own
handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence of the
genuineness and due execution thereof. If the
holographic will is contested, the burden of disproving
the genuineness and due execution thereof shall be
on the contestant. The testator to rebut the evidence
for the contestant.
Section 13. Certificate of allowance attached to
prove will. To be recorded in the Office of Register of
Deeds. — If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken
and filed, that the will was duly executed, and that the
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and
disposing mind, and not acting under duress,
menace, and undue influence, or fraud, a certificate
of its allowance, signed by the judge, and attested by
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the seal of the court shall be attached to the will and
the will and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk.
Attested copies of the will devising real estate and of
certificate of allowance thereof, shall be recorded in
the register of deeds of the province in which the
lands lie.
PROBATE OF WILLS
• Special proceeding for establishing the validity of
the will.
• Special proceeding for the purpose of proving:
o That he instrument offered for probate is the
last will and testament of the testator,
o That it has been executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law
o That the testator had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will
• Probate proceeding is a special civil action; in the
nature of a proceeding in rem. Hence, the decree
of probate is held binding on all persons in
interest, whether they appear to contest the
probate or not.
• The proceeding is not a contentious litigation
PROBATE NECESSARY BEFORE REAL OR
PERSONAL PROPERTY IS PASSED
• None of the heirs may sue for partition in
accordance with the will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the Court, because:
o Law expressly provides so [Article 838];
o Probate of a will, which is a proceeding in
rem, cannot be dispensed with and
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial
or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy [Guevarra v. Guevarra (1943)]
Probate of a will may be commenced either during
the lifetime of the testator (probate ante mortem) or
after his death (probate post mortem)
PROCEDURE FOR PROBATE
(1) Who May File: Testator (before his/her
death); Executor, legatees, devisees, or any
person interested in the settlement of the
estate (after testator’s death)
(2) Where to File:
a. Jurisdiction: 100K below (outside
Metro Manila) or 200K below (within
Metro Manila) – MTC; above those –
RTC
b. Venue: Last known residence of
testator, or place where any of the
properties is found.
(3) Notice of hearing should be sent to all heirs,
legatees, devisees, creditors
(4) Hearing: Present witnesses
40
 a. Notarial: present atleast one of the
attesting witnesses (if uncontested);
all the 3 witnesses and the notary
public (if contested)
b. Holographic: Atleast one witness who
knows the handwriting of the testator
(if uncontested); at least 3 witnesses
who know the handwriting (if
contested); in the absence of
competent witnesses, AND if the
Court deems necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to
(5) If the court is satisfied, upon proof taken and
filed, that the will was duly executed, and that
the testator at the time of its execution was of
sound and disposing mind, and not acting
under duress, menace, and undue influence,
or fraud, a certificate of its allowance, signed
by the judge, and attested by the seal of the
court shall be attached to the will and the will
and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk
GENERAL RULE: Probate Court will only rule on the
extrinsic validity of the will:
(1) Testamentary capacity – of legal age and of
sound mind
(2) Due execution – testator freely and voluntary
executed the will
(3) Compliance with the formalities of the law
EXCEPTION: Probate Court may rule on the intrinsic
validity of the will IF the invalidity is patent on its face
079 GUEVARRA v. GUEVARRA
(December 29, 1943 Ozaeta, J.)
Facts: Victorino executed a will disposing of his
estate (including subject property) to his heirs,
naming his son, Ernesto, as executor. His natural
daughter Rosario was in custody of the will. Before
his death Victorino executed a deed of sale over
subject property (which was part of his estate) in
favor of Ernesto. When Victorino died, his will was not
submitted to the Court for probate. In the present
action to recover her strict legitime, Rosario
presented the will to the court, not for probate but to
prove that she was an acknowledged natural
daughter. Ernesto contends that the will was
superseded by the deed of sale.
Issue/Held: WON the procedure adopted was legal.
– NO. The will should have ben admitted to
probate.
Ratio/Doctrine: Presentation of a will to the court for
probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure
and compel the pro bate of a will, the law punishes a
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person who neglects his duty to present it to the court
if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be
committed to prison and kept there until he delivers
the will. 

Sec 1, Rule 74 of the 1940 RoC [Extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs] merely
authorizes the partition of the estate of a decedent
“without securing letters of administration”. It does not
say that in case the decedent left a will, the heirs and
legatees may divide the estate amount themselves
without the necessity of presenting the will in Court.
080 DE LA CERNA v. POTOT (supra 041)
(December 23, 1964, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
Facts: Sps Bernabe and Gervasis de la Cerna
executed a joint will. Husband died, and so, wife filed
a petition of the probate of his will. This was admitted
to probate and became final in 1939. After the wife
died, Petitioner Paula dela Cerna, filed another
petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned. CFI declared the will null
and void. CA reversed on the ground that the 1939
decree was already final.
Ratio/Doctrine: A final judgment rendered on a
petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the
whole world. BUT this should only affect the share of
the husband.
081 GALLANOSA v. ARCANGEL
(June 21, 1978, Aquino, J.)
Facts: Decedent, Florentino, executed a will, where
he bequeathed his half-share to his wife, Tecla, and if
she predeceased him, it would be assigned to his
stepson, Pedro and his wife, who grew up in his care.
The will was admitted to probate over the opposition
of RESP nephews and nieces. 12 years after, RESPs
filed an action for recovery of parcels of land
belonging to Florentino’s estate. TC dismissed on the
ground of res judicata (1952). In 1967, they again
filed an action to annul the will alleging that it was
executed through fraud and deceit. This was initially
dismissed, but reversed on MR citing Art 1410.
Issue/Held: WON the will may be annulled. – NO.
Action is barred by res judicata.
Ratio: The defense of res judicata in this case is two-
pronged: (1) decree of probate and distribution in the
special proceeding, (2) 1952 order dismissing their
action for reconveyance.
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 082 NEPOMUCENO v. CA
(October 9, 1985, Gutierrez, J.)
Facts: Jugo executed a Last Will and Testament
where he named and appointed petitioner Sofia as
his sole and only executor of his estate. He stated
that he is legally married to RESP Rufina and has two
legitimate kids with her but left her in 1952 and lived
with Sofia for 22 years (until his death). RESPs
oppose the probate of the will. CA held that the will
was valid except for the testamentary provision (free
portion) in favor of Sofia because it goes against NCC
Arts. 739 and 1028.
Issue/Held: WON the last will and testament was
validly drawn. – YES.
Ratio: There was no dispute over the extrinsic validity
of the will. SC sustains CA's jurisdiction to declare the
testamentary provision in favor of Sofia as null and
void. Practical considerations induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
validity of the provisions of the will. Testator admitted
concubinage in will, hence, under Article 739, it is
void.
Doctrine: As a general rule, the court’s area of
inquiry in probate proceedings is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of
the will. But in Nuguid v. Nuguid, the Court held that a
will w/c preterited the forced heirs, no matter how
valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and
void.
083 NUGUID v. NUGUID
(June 23, 1966, Sanchez, J.)
Facts: Rosario died without any descendants, but
with ascendants – her parents. Her sister, Remedios
Nuguid, filed in the CFI her alleged holographic will,
instituting her as universal heir. Aside from such
paragpraph, no other legacies or devises were made.
RESP, Parents, opposed the probate on the ground
that they were preterited.
Issue/Held: WON the Court should determine the
intrinsic validity of the will. – YES.
Ratio/Doctrine: Normally, an examination of the
intrinsic validity of the will (WON void) comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated (form or extrinsic validity). 
 contingent. In this case, even if Maloles is the
While the rule in probate proceedings is that the
court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will, if the
case is remanded for probate now, nothing will be
gained and litigation will only be delayed. 
 is not a compulsory heir.
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After all, once probate in the lower court is
determined, the probability exists that the case will
come up once again before the SC on the same issue
of intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
In this case, the invalidity was not patent on the face
of the will. But in the records of the case, one can see
the apparent intrinsic invalidity – in that, the RESPs
were the parents, hence, their pleadings will already
establish the relationship the testator with the RESP
parents, hence, a clear showing of preterition.
084 MALOLES v. PHILLIPS
(February 29, 1988, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Dr. de Santos filed a petition for the probate of
his will wherein he named Phillips as executrix with
RTC Makati Branch 61. He died shortly after his
petition was granted. Maloles sought intervention in
this case which was denied. He also sought
intervention in a petition for issuance of letters
testamentary initiated by Phillips in Branch 65
wherein the latter was appointed special
administrator. Maloles’ motion was granted but
reversed by the CA. He argued that Branch 65 could
not have acted on Phillips’ petition for issuance of
letters testamentary because the probate
proceedings in Branch 61 did not terminate upon the
issuance of the order allowing the will and must
continue until the estate is fully distributed.
Issue/Held: WON the probate proceedings in Branch
61 was terminated upon the issuance of the order
allowing the will. – YES.
WON Maloles had the right to intervene. – NO.
Ratio:
(1) For the probate of wills, the authority of the court
is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of
the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law. 
After the
allowance of the will, there was nothing left for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will.
(2) Under Rule 79, Sec 1, an “interested person” is
one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or
nearest next of kin of Dr. de Santos, he cannot
be considered an heir for it is a fundamental rule
in testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Hence, as nephew, Maloles
42
 085 PASTOR v. CA
(June 24, 1983, Plana, J.)
Facts: Pastor Sr. died and was survived by his wife,
Sofia (who died the same year), two legitimate
children, Alvaro,and Sofia, and an illegitimate child,
Lewellyn. Lewellyn filed a Petition for Probate and
Allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor,
which contained a legacy in favor of Lewellyn
consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the
operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Devt
Corp. He was then appointed as special
administrator, and then, instituted an action for
reconveyance of properties belonging to the estate
against Alvaro and Sofia. On the other hand, the
RESPs opposed the petition of Lewellyn. Probate
Court allowed the probate of will. Affirmed by SC
and remanded. 2 years after remand, Lewellyn filed
pleadings asking for payment of his legacy. RESPs
opposed on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance. While the reconveyance suit was
pending, Probate issued an Order of Execution and
Garnishment resolving the question of ownership as
to the royalties payable to Atlas. A writ was executed
pursuant to the order. RESPS filed an MR alleging
that Probate Court committed GAD in resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties. Before it can
be resolved, RESPs filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the Order of Execution and
Garnshiment. It was denied on the ground that the
filing was premature. They filed an MR calling the
attention of the CA to an Order of the Probate Court
denying the MR (on the Order of Execution), where
the Probate Court declared that the questions of
intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the
mining claims had been finally adjudicated in the
Order Admitting the Will to Probate w/c was affirmed
by the SC and CA, Hence this case. They argue that
before the provisions of the holographic will can be
implemented, the questions of ownership of the
mining claims and intrinsic validity of the will must first
be resolved, and since this was not resolved, the
Probate
Issue/Held: WON the Probate Order admitting the
will to probate resolved with finality the questions of
ownership and intrinsic validity. – NO. Hence,
Probate Court committed GAD in issuing the
Order of Execution and Garnishment
Ratio; Nowhere in the dispositive portion of the
Probate Order is there a declaration of ownership of
specific properties. Order confined itself to the
extrinsic validity of the will, and need for and propriety
of appointing a special administrator. Dispositive
portion (a) stated that Court allows and approves the
will with respect to is extrinsic validity, and (d)
“subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance
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of ownership and possession of real and personal
properties, the intestate estate aspect must proceed,
unless, it is duly proven by the oppositors that debts
of the decedent have already been paid, that there
had been an EJ partition, that the legacy to be given
to petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the
estate of the testator. It was then an error to conclude
that the Probate Court adjudged with finality the
question of ownership of the mining properties and
royalties.
Doctrine: As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
086 COSO v. FERNANDEZ
(December 22, 1921, Ostrand, J.)
Facts: Federico Gimenez Zoboli, a married man and
resident of the PH, became acquainted with Rosario
Lopez in Spain. She had illicit relations with her, and
when he returned to the PH, she followed him, and
they had a child. They remained in close
communication til his death and there is no doubt she
exerted influence over him. In Zoboli’s will, he
bequeathed his tercio de libre dispocision (1/3 of the
free portion) of his estate to his illegitimate son with
Lopez. CFI disallowed the probate on the ground of
undue influence by Rosario over Zoboli.
Issue/Held: WON there was undue influence,
sufficient to invalidate the will. – NO.
Ratio: While it is shown that Zoboli entertained strong
affections for Rosario, it does not appear that her
influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind.
The testator was an intelligent man, a lawyer by
profession, and he appears to have known his own
mind, and may have well been actuated only be a
legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the
welfare of his illegitimate son, and a feeling of
gratitude for Rosario.
Doctrine: In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence
and does not invalidate the will.
Mere general or reasonable influence over a person
is not sufficient to invalidate a will. To have that effect,
the influence must be ‘undue’. The influence exerted
must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates
the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency
43
and make him express the will of another, rather than shares shall inherit in equal parts. (765)
his own.
Article 847. When the testator institutes some heirs
11. Institution of Heirs individually and others collectively as when he says,
"I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of
C," those collectively designated shall be considered
Article 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of
as individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that
which a testator designates in his will the person or
the intention of the testator was otherwise. (769a)
persons who are to succeed him in his property and
transmissible rights and obligations. (n)
Article 848. If the testator should institute his
brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood
Article 841. A will shall be valid even though it should
and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be
not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution
distributed equally unless a different intention
should not comprise the entire estate, and even
appears. (770a)
though the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
Article 849. When the testator calls to the succession
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in
a person and his children they are all deemed to have
accordance with law shall be complied with and the
been instituted simultaneously and not successively.
remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
(771)
(764)
Article 850. The statement of a false cause for the
Article 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may
institution of an heir shall be considered as not
dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
written, unless it appears from the will that the
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
testator would not have made such institution if he
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
had known the falsity of such cause. (767a)
estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of
Article 851. If the testator has instituted only one
said heirs. (763a)
heir, and the institution is limited to an aliquot part of
the inheritance, legal succession takes place with
Article 843. The testator shall designate the heir by
respect to the remainder of the estate.
his name and surname, and when there are two
persons having the same names, he shall indicate
The same rule applies if the testator has instituted
some circumstance by which the instituted heir may
several heirs, each being limited to an aliquot part,
be known.
and all the parts do not cover the whole inheritance.
Even though the testator may have omitted the name
Article 852. If it was the intention of the testator that
of the heir, should he designate him in such manner
the instituted heirs should become sole heirs to the
that there can be no doubt as to who has been
whole estate, or the whole free portion, as the case
instituted, the institution shall be valid. (772)
may be, and each of them has been instituted to an
aliquot part of the inheritance and their aliquot parts
Article 844. An error in the name, surname, or
together do not cover the whole inheritance, or the
circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the
whole free portion, each part shall be increased
institution when it is possible, in any other manner, to
proportionally. (n)
know with certainty the person instituted.
Article 853. If each of the instituted heirs has been
If among persons having the same names and
given an aliquot part of the inheritance, and the parts
surnames, there is a similarity of circumstances in
together exceed the whole inheritance, or the whole
such a way that, even with the use of other proof, the
free portion, as the case may be, each part shall be
person instituted cannot be identified, none of them
reduced proportionally. (n)
shall be an heir. (773a)
Article 856. A voluntary heir who dies before the
Article 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown
testator transmits nothing to his heirs.
person shall be void, unless by some event or
circumstance his identity becomes certain. However,
A compulsory heir who dies before the testator, a
a disposition in favor of a definite class or group of
person incapacitated to succeed, and one who
persons shall be valid. (750a)
renounces the inheritance, shall transmit no right to
his own heirs except in cases expressly provided for
Article 846. Heirs instituted without designation of
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in this Code. (766a)
REQUISITES FOR ANNULMENT OF INSTITUTION
OF HEIRS:
(1) The cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will;
(2) The cause must be shown to be false; and
 institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
(3) It must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause. 
 If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
087 AUSTRIA v. REYES
(February 27, 1970, Castro, J.)
Facts: Decedent, Basilia, filed a probate of her will,
wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her estate to her
5 adopted children. Will referred to them as
compulsory heirs (sapilitang tagapagmana), and it
used the term legitime (sapilitang mana)This was
admitted to probate, over the opposition of
petitioners, Basilia’s nephews and nieces. After
Basilia died, Perfecto, one of the children, was
appointed executor. Petitioners filed a petition for
intervention alleging that RESPs were not legally
adopted. RESPs moved that the intervention be
limited to properties not disposed of in the will. TC
granted RESP’s motion, ruling that the validity of the
adoption is not material or decisive on the efficacy of
the institution of heirs. Even if the adoption was
spurious, RESPs will succeed as testamentary heirs.
Issue/Held: WON the institution of heirs may be
annulled in the event there exists proof that the
adoption is false. NO.
Ratio: Requisites for Annulment of Institution of
Heirs:
(4) The cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will;
(5) The cause must be shown to be false; and
 Facts: Bibiano Barreto executed a will bequeathing
(6) It must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause. 
 portion as legacies to his siblings, nephews and
The will in this case does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for the institution of
st
heirs of the RESPs, hence it does not fulfill the 1
requirement for annulment of institution of heirs. That
she gave the bulk of her estate to the respondents
show her intent to really give properties to them. Her
disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposition) which largely favored the respondent
Perfecto Cruz, the latter’s children, and the children of
the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents
more than what she thought the law enjoined her to
give to them.
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12. Preterition
Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)
Article 855. The share of a child or descendant
omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of
the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is
not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be
taken proportionally from the shares of the other
compulsory heirs. (1080a)
PRETERITION
• Omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because:
1. They are not mentioned therein, or
2. Though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
• The omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as
father, son, etc, by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning
to him some part of the properties. [Manresa]
EFFECT OF PRETERITION: Annulment of the
institution of heirs. Devises and legacies are valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
088 REYES v. BARRETO-DATU
(January 25, 1967, Reyes, J.B.L, J.)
his share of the estate to Salud Barreto (mother of
petitioners) and Lucia Milagros Barreto, and a small
nieces. The usufruct over the fishpond property was
given to his wife, Maria. Maria was appointed
administratrix, and she prepared a project of partition
where the fishpond property was adjudicated to
Salud. This was approved by CFI. So Salud took
immediate possession of her share. Maria then died,
and it was discovered that she executed two wills – in
the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as heirs;
nd
but in the 2 , she bequeathed all of her properties to
nd st
Milagros alone. The 2 will was accepted and 1 will
was rejected, upon the finding of the lower Court that
Salud was not a child of Bibiano and Milagros. Reyes,
husband of Salud, now filed this case to recover the
½ portion of the fishpond property, the remnant of
Bibiano’s estate. Milagros opposed and moved to
45
declare the project of partition null and void on the
ground that Salud is not a daughter of the Sps. Lower
Court declared the partition null and void based on
Article 1081, CC (A partition in w/c a person was
believed to be an heir, without being so, ahs been
included, shall be null and void)
Issue/Held:
(1) WON the partitition is null and void. – NO. Salud
was expressly instituted as an heir in
Bibiano’s will, hence Article 1081, CC is not
applicable.
(2) WON there was preterition. – NO. For
preterition to happen, there must be total
omission.
Ratio:
(1) Where a partition was made between 2 persons
instituted as heirs in the will, and one of htem
was found out later not to be the testator’s
daughter, while the other was really his
daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was
a void compromises on the civil status of the
person because at the time of the partition, the
civil status of the person was not being
questioned.
(2) Where the testator allotted in his will to his
legitimate daughter a share less than her
legiitme, such circumstance would not invalidate
the institution of a stranger as an heir, since
there was no preterition or total omission of the
forced heir.
Doctrine: The omission from the inheritance, as an
element of preterition, must be a total omission,
such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line
received something from the testator under the terms
of the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited.
089 AZNAR v. DUNCAN
(June 30, 1966, Makalintal, J.)
Facts: In his will, Christensen instituted as his heir
acknowledged natural daughter Lucy. In the same will
he gave P3,600 to Helen Garcia but expressly denied
any relationship between them. The SC, in a previous
case, held that Helen is a natural child of Christensen
and hence a compulsory heir. Hence, in the project of
partition, the executor divided the properties equally
between Lucy and Helen. CFI approved a project of
partition dividing the whole estate of Christensen
holding that since Helen had been preterited in the
will, the institution of Lucy as heir must be annulled
and the properties passed to Lucy and Helen as if
Christensen died intestate. Lucy appealed contending
that the applicable provision is Article 906 and Article
918, NCC on disinheritance. Hence, Helen is merely
entitled to her legitime (as an unacknowledged
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natural daughter) – ¼ of the estate – and not to a
share equal that of Lucy.
Issue/Held:
(1) WON there was preterition. – NO. Helen was
not entirely omitted.
(2) WON the estate should pertain to Lucy and
Helen in equal shares. – NO. Inheritance of
Lucy should merely be reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen.
Ratio: Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge
Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her
share to a legacy of P3,600. The fact that she was
subsequently declared judicially to possess such
status is no reason to assume that had the judicial
declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
attitude towards her would have undergone any
change and that he would have willed his estate
equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
expressly recognized by him.
Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a
legacy worth less than the legitime, but without
referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a
relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of
the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed .
The omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father,
son, etc, by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him
some part of the properties.
090 ACAIN v. IAC
(October 27, 1987, Paras, J.)
Facts: Widow and legally adopted daughter of
decedent filed a motion to dismiss in the probate
proceedings of the decedent’s will, alleging that they
were preterited.
Issue/Held: WON the respondents were preterited. –
As to widow, NO. As to legally adopted daughter,
YES.
Ratio: As to the widow, she is not preterited because
she is not in the direct line of the decedent, even if
she is a compulsory heir. As to the legally adopted
daughter, she was preterited because adoption gives
to the adopted child the same rights and duties as if
he/she was a legitimate child of the adopter.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because
46
the nullification of such institution heirs – without any
other testamentary disposition of the will – amounts to
a declaration that nothing at all was written. No
legacies or devises having been provided in the will
the whole property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his siblings. 

Doctrine: Preterition consists in the omission in the
testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited.
Effect of Preterition: Preterition annuls the institution
of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including the free
portion. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the
will for they should not valid and respected except
insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
091 SEANGIO v. REYES
(November 27, 2006, Azcuna, J.)
Facts: Respondents initiated intestate proceedings
for the estate of Segundo Seangio. Petitioners
opposed, alleging that the deceased executed a
holographic will disinheriting Alfredo (eldest son of
Segundo), thus probate proceedings should replace
the intestate proceeding. Petitioners then filed a
petition for probate of Segundo’s holographic will. The
two cases were consolidated. RTC dismissed the
petition for probate, ruling that there was preterition
and that RTC can pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will and deny probate outright.
Issue/Held:
(1) WON there was a valid disinheritance – YES.
The document “Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng
Mana” unmistakeably showed Segundo’s
intention to exclude his son, Alfredo, as an heir.
(2) WON there was preterition. – NO.
Ratio: It was Segundo’s last expression to bequeath
his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Segundo did not institute an heir
to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. 
The
mere mention of Virginia in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was include plainly as witness to the altercation
between 
Segundo and his son, Alfredo. 
 Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal
092 NUGUID v. NUGUID
(June 23, 1966, Sanchez, J.)
Facts: Facts: Rosario died without any descendants,
but with ascendants – her parents. Her sister,
Remedios Nuguid, filed in the CFI her alleged
holographic will, instituting her as universal heir.
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Aside from such paragpraph, no other legacies or
devises were made. RESP, Parents, opposed the
probate on the ground that they were preterited.
Issue/Held: WON there was preterition. – YES.
Ratio: The parents are Rosario’s compulsory heirs
and, by receiving nothing in the will, they were
deprived of their legitime. And since there were no
other provisions in the will aside from the institution of
a universal heir, such preterition mandates that the
will be annulled.
The argument that this is a case of ineffective
disinheritance which would only annul the institution
of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited will not lie. Disinheritance is a disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his legitime. In this
case, there was no such provision, because the will
simply omits their names altogether.
093 JLT AGRO v. BALANSAG
(February 29, 1988, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Don Julian Teves married twice. When the
2nd wife died, his children from both wives entered
into a compromise agreement embodying the
partition of all his properties. On the basis of the
compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of
land known as as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as
property owned in common by Don Julian and his two
children of the first marriage. The property was to
remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.
These children were also given other properties
including an electric plant, house and movie property.
(In short, the children from the first wife inherited a
lot.) The remainder of the properties was retained by
Don Julian. Thereafter, a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities as well as a
Supplemental Deed transferring properties in favour
of Pet. JLT Agro was executed between the Don and
his 2 older children.
Issue/Held: WON there was preterition. – NO.
Ratio: Don Julian did not execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his
properties, as evidenced by the court approved
Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not
irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of
heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. The
supplemental Deed cannot be said to be a will.
47
 MIDTERMS EXAM testator, which of the following statements is not
1. Please state if each of the defects in the will correct. Explain why it is not correct. B. Evidence
listed below is fatal that will invalidate the will of sample handwritten statements of the testator
a. Failure to record in his notarial book the may be admitted to prove testator’s handwriting;
details surrounding the execution of the will D. If the holographic will is contested, the
à NOT FATAL petitioner shall present 3 witnesses who know
b. AC of a holographic will failed to state that the handwriting of the testator
the witnesses and the testator signed in the 7. The laws of which country shall be used?
presence of each other à NOT FATAL, a Australia
holographic will does not require an 8. Abangan v. Abangan doctrine
attestation clause 9. Grounds for disallowance of a will – Article 839
c. The holographic will merely mentions the 10. Write TRUE or FALSE (with explanation)
year and not the month and date it was a. True – the Critical part is that he intended
made and signed à FATAL, “dated” means it to be his signature
Date, Month, and Year; merely stating the b. False – no requirement under the law
year is so broad – testator could have c. True – date is not essential in a notarial
executed another will within the same year will; there are witnesses who can attest to
d. The notarial will states that the testator is a the true date, and to the fact that testator
Filipino citizen when in fact he is an is of sound mind on the date of execution
American citizen and has already lost his of will
Filipino citizenship at the time the will is d. False – the witness is disqualified from
executed à NOT FATAL; citizenship of being a witness
testator not one of those required to be e. True – Capacity is one of the essential
stated requisites to make a will
e. One of the witnesses used a signature
different from his usual signature à NOT 13. Substitution of Heirs
FATAL; there is no requirement under the
law that one should use his usual signature
Article 857. Substitution is the appointment of
in signing; it is not the fault of testator that
another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance
one of his witnesses used another signature
in default of the heir originally instituted. (n)
2. Husband was not mentioned in the will of wife. Is
there preterition? No preterition. Husband is not
Article 858. Substitution of heirs may be:
a compulsory heir in the direct line. [Acain v.
(1) Simple or common;
IAC]
(2) Brief or compendious;
3. Heir claims that one of the properties included in
(3) Reciprocal; or

the estate is not the decedent’s, but his. Can the
(4) Fideicommissary. (n)
probate court rule on the question of ownership
over this property? GR: No. XPN: If it is only for
Article 859. The testator may designate one or more
the purpose of inventory. But ruling is merely
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in
provisional. Heirs must still file the proper case to
case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
rule on this question.
st should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept
4. 1 will constituted his daughter he believed to be
the inheritance.
his as universal heir. After finding that it was not
st
his child, he crumpled the 1 will and threw it in
A simple substitution, without a statement of the
the garbage and executed a new one instituting
cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three
his parents as his universal heirs. One of the
nd mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the
witnesses to the 2 will was his yaya, who is
testator has otherwise provided. (774)
illiterate, to whom he also gave a legacy worth
st
P300K. Which of the 2 wills is valid? NONE. 1
Article 860. Two or more persons may be substituted
will invalid on the ground of preterition or
nd for one; and one person for two or more heirs. (778)
statement of a false cause; 2 will invalid
because one of the 3 witnesses is illiterate.
Article 861. If heirs instituted in unequal shares
5. If a German married couple domiciled in the
should be reciprocally substituted, the substitute shall
Philippines executed a joint will in Germany, is
acquire the share of the heir who dies, renounces, or
the will valid in the Philippines? YES. Nationality
is incapacitated, unless it clearly appears that the
principle.
intention of the testator was otherwise. If there are
6. If a holographic will is lost or destroyed, there
more than one substitute, they shall have the same
being no intent to revoke on the part of the
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share in the substitution as in the institution. (779a)
Article 862. The substitute shall be subject to the
same charges and conditions imposed upon the
instituted heir, unless and testator has expressly
provided the contrary, or the charges or conditions
are personally applicable only to the heir instituted.
(780)
Article 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue
of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect,
provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided
further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second
heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
(781a)
Article 864. A fideicommissary substitution can never
burden the legitime. (782a)
 THREE INSTANCES WHEN SUBSTITUTION WILL
Article 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must
be expressly made in order that it may be valid.
The fiduciary shall be obliged to deliver the
inheritance to the second heir, without other
deductions than those which arise from legitimate
expenses, credits and improvements, save in the
case where the testator has provided otherwise. (783)
Article 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to
the succession from the time of the testator's death,
even though he should die before the fiduciary. The
right of the second heir shall pass to his heirs. (784)
Article 867. The following shall not take effect:
(1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not
made in an express manner, either by giving
them this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary
the absolute obligation to deliver the property
to a second heir;
(2) Provisions which contain a perpetual
prohibition to alienate, and even a temporary
one, beyond the limit fixed in article 863;
(3) Those which impose upon the heir the charge
of paying to various persons successively,
beyond the limit prescribed in article 863, a
certain income or pension;
(4) Those which leave to a person the whole or
part of the hereditary property in order that he
may apply or invest the same according to
secret instructions communicated to him by the
testator. (785a)
Article 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary
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substitution does not prejudice the validity of the
institution of the heirs first designated; the
fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as
not written. (786)
Article 869. A provision whereby the testator leaves
to a person the whole or part of the inheritance, and
to another the usufruct, shall be valid. If he gives the
usufruct to various persons, not simultaneously, but
successively, the provisions of article 863 shall apply.
(787a)
Article 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring
all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty years are void. (n)
SUBSTITUTION [Art 857]
Appointment of another heir so that he may enter into
the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted
TAKE PLACE [Art 859]
(1) If the instituted heir predeceases the
decedent
(2) Refusal, or repudiation, or renunciation
(3) Incapacity of heir
Disinheritance of an heir does not give rise to
substitution.
a. Simple or common
This takes place when the testator designates one or
more persons to substitute the heir(s) instituted in
case such heir(s) should die before him, or should not
wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the
inheritance.
b. Brief or compendious
Where there are 2 or more persons designated by the
testator to substitute for only one heir (brief); when
there is only one person designated to substitute for 2
or more heirs (compendious).
c. Reciprocal
When 2 or more persons are not only instituted as
heirs, but are also mutually or reciprocally substituted.
d. Fideicommissary
This takes place when the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve
and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
the inheritance, provided such substitution does not
go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or
first heir and the second heir are living at the time of
49
the death of the testator. (Arts. 859-61, 863)
According to one view (Manresa, Tolentino, Padilla),
“degree” means generation or relationship. Thus, only
the parent or child of the latter can be appointed as
fideicommissary heir. According to a second view
(JBL Reyes, Jurado), “degree” is the equivalent of
designation or transfer. Thus, any person, whether
natural or juridical, may be appointed as
fideicommissary heir.
Upon the death of the testator, the fiduciary heir
acquires all the rights of a usufructuary until the
moment of delivery, upon the will of the testator or
upon the death of the fiduciary heir, to the
fideicommissary substitute. The obligations of the
fiduciary heir are preservation of the property and
transmission of the property to the fideicommissary
substitute.
REQUISITES OF FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION
(1) First heir (Fiduciary) primarily called to the
enjoyment of the estate
(2) Second heir (Fideicommissary) to whom the
property is transmitted by the first heir, who
must:
(a) Be related by one degree to the first heir
(b) Be living at the time of death of the testator
(3) An obligation clearly imposed by the testator
(Fideicomitente) upon such first heir to preserve
the estate and to transmit it to the second heir
KINDS OF TITLE HELD
Fiduciary – usufruct
Fideicommissary – beneficial ownership (while
fiduciary is alive); absolute ownership (if fiduciary
dies)
Fideicommissary inherits from the testator and not the
fiduciary, even if the transfer of property arises from
the time the fiduciary dies.
AS TO WHO CAN SELL THE PROPERTY
Fideicommissary can sell the property since he is
already the owner of the property; but the sale shall
be subject to the condition that it will only pass to the
buyer upon the death of the fiduciary
On the other hand, the fiduciary cannot sell the
property since he is only given the usufruct.
Moreover, he has the obligation to preserve the
property.
EFFECT OF INVALID FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION
Such substitution shall be deemed unwritten. The
fiduciary (the first heir) will then be considered as the
ultimate/absolute heir.
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FIDUCIARY v. TRUSTEE
A fiduciary may use and enjoy the fruits of the
property until their death.
094 TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ, PALACIOS
v. VDA DE. RAMIREZ
(February 15, 1982, Abad-Santos, J.)
Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national,
died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. The administratrix
submitted a project of partition dividing the estate into
2 parts: 1 part goes to the widow; and the free portion
shall go to his grandnephews. It also granted a
usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion in favor of widow
(with a vulgar and fidecommissary substitution in
favor of Wanda); and over 2/3 in favor of Wanda (with
a vulgar and fideicommisasary substitution in favor of
grandnephews). Grandnephews opposed the project
of partition alleging that the substitution in its vulgar
aspect in favor of Wanda with respect to the widow’s
usufruct and in favor of grandnephews w/ respect to
Wanda’s is void because Wanda survived the
testator; and as to the fideicommissary substitution, it
is void because they are not related to Wanda.
Issue/Held: WON the substitutions are valid. –Vulgar
substitution valid. Fideicommissary substitution
void.
Ratio:
(1) Re vulgar substitution: Dying before the
testator is not the only case of vulgar
substitution.
(2) Re fideicommisary: The 2
nd
heirs
(grandnephews) are not related by one degree
st
to the 1 heir (Wanda)
Doctrine: “Degree” means generation, and it follows
that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or
a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives
who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
095 PCIB v. ESCOLIN
(March 29, 1974, Barredo, J.)
Facts: Linnie and Charles Hodges both made
provisions in their respective wills that upon their
deaths, their whole estates would be inherited by the
surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and
alienate their lands in the Philippines, and that upon
death of the surviving spouse, the residue of the
estate inherited by him would go to the siblings of the
spouse who predeceased him. Linnie died in 1957,
and Charles was appointed executor and special
administrator of her estate. Charles died in 1962.
Avelina was appointed both administratrix of Linnie’s
estate and special administratrix of Charles’ estate.
50
Eventually, PCIB became the sole administrator of
Charles’ estate. At first PCIB and Avelina acted
conjointly, but differences arose and they started
acting separately and independently. Eventually,
PCIB could not perform its functions as administrator,
so it questioned several orders of the CFI approving
individual acts of Avelina in her capacity as
administratrix of Linnie’s estate.
[Relevant Fact] PCIB argues that the brother and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges, as substitutes, will not receive
anything since Charles upon Linnie’s death was the
absolute owner of the properties in question.
Issue/Held: WON the brothers and sisters are
entitled to the properties in Linnie’s estate. – YES.
They were not instituted as substitutes, but as
heirs in their own right with respect to properties
not disposed of by Charles upon his death.
Ratio: Legally speaking, the will provides for neither a
simple nor fideicomissary substitution. 
There is no
vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for cither (1) predecease of the testator by
the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of
the latter to accept the 
inheritance, as required by
Article 859. Neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is
imposed 
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate
or any part thereof for anyone else. 
 substitution:
While it was true that Linnie bequeathed her WHOLE
ESTATE to Charles, and gave him full powers of
dominion over the same during his lifetime – at the
same time, she imposed that whatever should remain
thereof upon Charles’s death should go to her
siblings. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will,
they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not
or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of
from his inheritance; Rather, therefore, they are also
heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject,
however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law.
096 PEREZ v. GARCHITORENA
(February 13, 1930, Romualdez, J.)
Facts: Ana Alcantara left P21,428 on deposit in
Carmen Perez’s name with the association La
Urbana. And in Alcantara’s will w/c was admitted to
probate, she instituted Perez as sole heiress and
gave her the right to enjoy the property [Clause 9].
Clause 10 states that should Carmen die, Ana’s
whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children. Clause 11 states that should Carmen die
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after her WHILE the former’s children are still in
minority, her estate shall be administered by
executrix. Thereafter, the sheriff, pursuant to a writ of
execution, levied an attachment on the amount
deposited with La Urbana in favor of Mariano
Garchitorena, a judgment creditor of Perez’ husband.
Perez prayed for an injunction against the execution
arguing that the deposit actually belonged to Ana’s
fideicommissary heirs.
Issue/Held: WON the amount deposited with La
Urbana may be attached. – NO. The deposit
belonged to Ana’s fideicommissary heirs.
Ratio: There was fideicommissary substitution.
(1) First heir – Carmen Perez; called to enjoy the
property, but not to dispose
(2) Obligation – Clause 10 provides that if Carmen
dies, the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to
the children, showing that the testatrix had in
mind a fideicommissary substitution
(3) Second heir – Children (within 1 degree)
(4) That that the fideicommissary be entitled to the
estate from the time the testator dies – Not really
a requisite, but a necessary consequence,
because the heir does not inherit from the heir
first instituted, but from the testator.
Doctrine: Requisites of a fideicommissary
(1) A first heir called primarily to enjoyment of the
estate
(2) An obligation clearly imposed upon him to
rd
preserve and transmit to a 3 person the whole
or part of the estate
(3) A second heir, who is related by 1 degree to the
first heir
(4) The fideicommisarius be entitled to the estate
from the time the testator dies
14. Conditional Testamentary
Dispositions and Those with a
Term
Article 871. The institution of an heir may be made
conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause.
(790a)
Article 872. The testator cannot impose any charge,
condition, or substitution whatsoever upon the
legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do so,
the same shall be considered as not imposed. (813a)
Article 873. Impossible conditions and those contrary
to law or good customs shall be considered as not
imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir,
51
even if the testator should otherwise provide. (792a)
Article 874. An absolute condition not to contract a
first or subsequent marriage shall be considered as
not written unless such condition has been imposed
on the widow or widower by the deceased spouse, or
by the latter's ascendants or descendants.
Nevertheless, the right of usufruct, or an allowance or
some personal prestation may be devised or
bequeathed to any person for the time during which
he or she should remain unmarried or in widowhood.
(793a)
Article 875. Any disposition made upon the condition
that the heir shall make some provision in his will in
favor of the testator or of any other person shall be
void. (794a)
Article 876. Any purely potestative condition imposed
upon an heir must be fulfilled by him as soon as he
learns of the testator's death.
This rule shall not apply when the condition, already
complied with, cannot be fulfilled again. (795a)
Article 877. If the condition is casual or mixed, it shall
be sufficient if it happen or be fulfilled at any time
before or after the death of the testator, unless he has
provided otherwise.
Should it have existed or should it have been fulfilled
at the time the will was executed and the testator was
unaware thereof, it shall be deemed as complied with.
If he had knowledge thereof, the condition shall be
considered fulfilled only when it is of such a nature
that it can no longer exist or be complied with again.
(796)
Article 878. A disposition with a suspensive term
does not prevent the instituted heir from acquiring his
rights and transmitting them to his heirs even before
the arrival of the term. (799a)
Article 879. If the potestative condition imposed upon
the heir is negative, or consists in not doing or not
giving something, he shall comply by giving a security
that he will not do or give that which has been
prohibited by the testator, and that in case of
contravention he will return whatever he may have
received, together with its fruits and interests. (800a)
Article 880. If the heir be instituted under a
suspensive condition or term, the estate shall be
placed under administration until the condition is
fulfilled, or until it becomes certain that it cannot be
fulfilled, or until the arrival of the term.
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The same shall be done if the heir does not give the
security required in the preceding article. (801a)
Article 881. The appointment of the administrator of
the estate mentioned in the preceding article, as well
as the manner of the administration and the rights
and obligations of the administrator shall be governed
by the Rules of Court. (804a)
Article 882. The statement of the object of the
institution, or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such
was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be
claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his
heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they
may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he
or they should disregard this obligation. (797a)
Article 883. When without the fault of the heir, an
institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator,
it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous
to and in conformity with his wishes.
If the person interested in the condition should
prevent its fulfillment, without the fault of the heir, the
condition shall be deemed to have been complied
with. (798a)
Article 884. Conditions imposed by the testator upon
the heirs shall be governed by the rules established
for conditional obligations in all matters not provided
for by this Section. (791a)
Article 885. The designation of the day or time when
the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence
or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as
called to the succession until the arrival of the period
or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter
into possession of the property until after having
given sufficient security, with the intervention of the
instituted heir. (805)
KINDS OF CONDITION
(1) Suspensive – a condition upon the fulfillment of
which successional rights are acquired
a. While the condition is not yet fulfilled, the
property will be under administration
(2) Resolutory – a condition upon the fulfillment of
which rights already acquired are extinguished
52
 a. The property will pass on the heir upon
death of decedent, but upon fulfillment of
condition, the property will revert back to the
decedent’s estate, and shall pass to the
legal heirs
(3) Potestative – a condition the fulfillment of which
is dependent wholly on the will of the debtor
a. Positive – consists of doing or giving
something
b. Negative – consists of not doing or giving
something
i. The heir must give sufficient security
(4) Casual – a condition the fulfillment of which is
dependent exclusively upon chance or upon the
will of third persons
(5) Mixed – a condition the fulfillment of which is
jointly dependent upon the will of the heir,
devisee, or legatee and upon chance and/or will
of a third person
ABSOLUTE CONDITION NOT TO CONTRACT A
FIRST OR SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE [Art 874]
GR: Condition is considered not written
XPN: [As to subsequent marriage] If such condition
has been imposed on the widow or widower by: (1)
the deceased spouse or (2) the latter’s ascendants or
ascendants
QUESTION: What if the prohibition is only against
marrying a certain person?
ANSWER: No jurisprudential answer yet
DISPOSITION BASED ON CONDITION
CAPTATORIA [Art 875]
The disposition is void
DISPOSITIONS of the testator declaring all or part of
the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are
void. [Art 870]
097 RABADILLA v. CA
(June 29, 2000, Purisima, J.)
Facts: Aleja Belleza instituted Dr. Rabadilla as a
devisee of a parcel of land with the condition that
Maria Marlena would be given piculs of sugar until
her death, and that if this condition is violated, the lot
would be seized and would be turned over to the
decedent’s nearest descnedants. Maria Marlena filed
a complaint alleging that the conditions of the will
were violated. The petitioners contend that the
testatrix intended a substitution not modal institution
of Dr. Rabadilla.
Issue/Held: Was there a substitution or modal
institution. – Modal institution.
Ratio: The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
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Rabadilla is modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the
efficacy of such institution. 
 It can be gleaned from
the Codicil that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Rabadilla. It is also
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation
on the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena during the
lifetime of the latter. Should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. 

Doctrine: In a modal institution, the testator states (1)
the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3)
the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A
"mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights
to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to
succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does
not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition. 

15. Legitime
Article 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs. (806)
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article
287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are
not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do
they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must
be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the
three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in
the manner and to the extent established by this
Code. (807a)
53

Article 888. The legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half,
subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)
Article 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or
ascendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estates of their children and descendants.
The children or descendants may freely dispose of
the other half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided. (809a)
Article 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate
parents shall be divided between them equally; if one
of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass
to the survivor.
If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is
survived by ascendants of equal degree of the
paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be
divided equally between both lines. If the ascendants
should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely
to the ones nearest in degree of either line. (810)
Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (871)
Article 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant
of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall
be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In
case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may
inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for
the same.
If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants.
In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse
shall be taken from the portion that can be freely
disposed of by the testator. (834a)
Article 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate
descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of
the hereditary estate.
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This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the
estate. (836a)
Article 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one- third of
the hereditary estate of the deceased and the
illegitimate children to another third. The remaining
third shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (n)
Article 895. The legitime of each of the
acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children
or descendants.
The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an
acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal
fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken
from the portion of the estate at the free disposal of
the testator, provided that in no case shall the total
legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free
portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse
must first be fully satisfied. (840a)
Article 896. Illegitimate children who may survive
with legitimate parents or ascendants of the
deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary estate to be taken from the portion at the
free disposal of the testator. (841a)
Article 897. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or descendants, and
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by
legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to
a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children which must be taken from that part
of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.
(n)
Article 898. If the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or descendants, and with
illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural,
or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the
surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided
in the preceding article. (n)
Article 899. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate parents or ascendants and with
illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be
entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate of the
deceased which must be taken from the free portion,
and the illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-
fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from the
disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of
54
the remaining one-eighth of the estate. (n)
Article 900. If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the
testator may freely dispose of the other half. (837a)
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the
testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the
sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and
wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the
legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified
in the preceding paragraph. (n)
Article 901. When the testator dies leaving
illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs,
such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half
of the hereditary estate of the deceased.
The other half shall be at the free disposal of the
testator. (842a)
Article 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth
in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. (843a)
Article 903. The legitime of the parents who have an
illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither
legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor
illegitimate children, is one-half of the hereditary
estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or
illegitimate children are left, the parents are not
entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow
or widower survives with parents of the illegitimate
child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the
hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving
spouse also one-fourth of the estate. (n)
Article 904. The testator cannot deprive his
compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases
expressly specified by law.
Neither can he impose upon the same any burden,
encumbrance, condition, or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (813a)
Article 905. Every renunciation or compromise as
regards a future legitime between the person owing it
and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may
claim the same upon the death of the former; but they
must bring to collation whatever they may have
received by virtue of the renunciation or compromise.
(816)
Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the
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testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied. (815)
Article 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive. (817)
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of
the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which
shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be
added the value of all donations by the testator that
are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
(818a)
Article 909. Donations given to children shall be
charged to their legitime.
 Donations made to
strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of
which the testator could have disposed by his last
will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the
disposable portion, they shall be reduced according
to the rules established by this Code. (819a)
Article 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may
have received during the lifetime of his father or
mother, shall be charged to his legitime.
Should they exceed the portion that can be freely
disposed of, they shall be reduced in the manner
prescribed by this Code. (847a)
Article 911. After the legitime has been determined in
accordance with the three preceding articles, the
reduction shall be made as follows:
(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the
legitime can be covered, reducing or annulling, if
necessary, the devises or legacies made in the
will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be
pro rata, without any distinction whatever.
(3) If the testator has directed that a certain devise
or legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall
not suffer any reduction until the latter have been
applied in full to the payment of the legitime.
(4) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or
life annuity, whose value may be considered
greater than that of the disposable portion, the
compulsory heirs may choose between
complying with the testamentary provision and
delivering to the devisee or legatee the part of
the inheritance of which the testator could freely
55
 dispose. (820a)
Article 912. If the devise subject to reduction should
consist of real property, which cannot be conveniently
divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does
not absorb one-half of its value; and in a contrary
case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the
latter shall reimburse each other in cash for what
respectively belongs to them.
The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain
the entire property, provided its value does not
exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime. (821)
Article 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to
avail themselves of the right granted by the preceding
article, any heir or devisee who did not have such
right may exercise it; should the latter not make use
of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the
instance of any one of the interested parties. (822)
Article 914. The testator may devise and bequeath
the free portion as he may deem fit. (n)
LEGITIME
That part of the testator's property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for his
compulsory heirs
COMPULSORY HEIRS
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
 belongs to them.
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article
287.
Legitimate children and descendants exclude
legitimate parents and ascendants.
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The widow and the illegitimate children are not
excluded by legitimate children/descendants or
legitimate parents/ascendants. Nor do they exclude
each other.
DETERMINATION OF LEGITIME
(1) Determine value of property left by decedent at
time of death
(2) Subtract all the debts and charges [excluding
those imposed in the will]
(3) Add the value of the donations that are subject to
collation
RULES ON REDUCTION AFTER DETERMINATION
OF LEGITIME
(1) Donations shall be respected as long as legitime
is covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary,
the devises or legacies
(2) Reduction shall be pro rata
(3) If testator directed that a certain devise or legacy
be paid in preference to others, the
devise/legacy shall not suffer any reduction until
the other devises/legacies have been applied in
full [See Article 950]
(4) If the devise/legacy consists of a usufruct or life
annuity whose value is greater than the
disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may
choose between (a) complying with the
testamentary provision and (b) delivering to the
devisee/legatee the part of inheritance which the
testator could freely dispose
(5) If the devise subject to reduction consists of real
property which cannot be conveniently divided, it
shall go to devisee if the reduction is less than
1/2 of its value, and to the compulsory heir if
otherwise. But the one taking the property must
reimburse the other in cash for what respectively
a. The devisee who is entitled to a legitime
may retain the entire property, provided its
value does not exceed the disposable
portion and his legitime.
(6) If the heirs/devisees do not avail of (5), any
heir/devisee who did not have such right may
exercise it; if he also does not, the property shall
be sold at a public auction.
56
 SUMMARY OF LEGITIME
Legit Legit Illegit Surviving Spouse (SS) ILC A ILC B
Surviving
Children Parents Parents GR: Taken from the free portion
Relatives XPN: Taken from the hereditary estate if there are no LCs or LPs
(LC) (LP) (ILP)
LC, SS, ILC 1/2 [Art 1/4 (if only 1 LC) [Art 892 par 1, 1/2 of 4/5 of
888] 893] share of share
1
LC, SS LC [Art. of ILC
if 2 or Equal to share of each LC [Art. 892 895 par 1] A [Art.
LC, ILC more, par 2, 897, 898] 895 par
divided 2]
equally
LP, SS, ILC 1/2 [Art 888] 1/8 [Art. 899] 1/4 [Art
899]
LP, SS 1/2 1/4 [Art 893]
LP, ILC 1/2 1/4
SS, ILC 1/3 [Art 894] 1/3 [Art
894]
SS alone 1/2
1/3 if testator and the SS were
married in articulo mortis and the
testator died within 3 months from
the time of such marriage
[Art 900]
ILC alone 1/2 [Art
901]
ILP alone 1/2
ILP, SS 1/4 1/4

1
In no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving
spouse must first be fully satisfied. [Art 895, par 3]
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THREE RESERVAS UNDER THE OLD CODE
(1) Reserva Troncal
(2) Reserva Viudal – the surviving spouse is
required to reserve properties for her children
st
by the 1 marriage
(3) Reserva Legal -
RESERVA TRONCAL
Reserva troncal or lineal may be defined as the
reservation by virtue of which an ascendant who
inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. [Jurado]
REQUISITES OF RESERVA TRONCAL
(1) The property was acquired by a descendant
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister·
by gratuitous title;
(2) That said descendant died without an issue;
(3) That the property is inherited by an9ther
ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) That there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property
came.
THREE ACTUAL TRANSFERS
(1) First transfer: from a person to his
descendant, brother, or sister;
(2) Second transfer: from that descendant to an
ascendant other than the prior transferor
(3) Third transfer: from ascendant to the relatives
within the third degree
PARTIES INVOLVED IN RESERVA TRONCAL
(1) Source – ascendant from which the property
came
(2) Prepositus – the descendant who received
property by gratuitous title and died without
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law
(3) Reservista or reservor – ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his
descendant; person obliged to reserve
(4) Resevatario or reserve – relatives within the
rd
3 degree counted from the descendant
(prepositus) and belonging to the line from
which the property came; person for whom the
property is reserved
EFFECTS OF RESERVA TRONCAL [Gonzales v.
CFI]
(1) The reservista can register the and under the
Torrens system in her name, but the fact that
the and was reservable property in favor of her
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brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should
be noted in the title (Edroso v. Sablan) and
(2) The properties held by the reservista
upon 
death would not go to his legal heirs, but
to the reservatarios, byoperation of law (Aglibot
v. Manalac). 

RESERVA TRONCAL CREATES TWO
RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS [ibid]
(1) The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
(2) The survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came.
098 ROSALES v. ROSALES
(February 27, 1987, Gancayco, J.)
Facts: Petra (decedent) and Fortunato had 3 children
– Carterio, Magna and Antonio. Carterio predeceased
Petra. When Petra died, Carterio’s widow, Irenea
Rosales, filed a case to claim a share in the estate of
her mother-in-law supposedly in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of her husband, alleging that she is
a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
Issue/Held: WON the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter,
her mother-in-law. – NO. Art 887 refers to the estate
of the deceased spouse, in w/c case the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to
the estate of a parent-in-law.
Ratio: There is no provision in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of
representation.
099 LAPUZ v. EUFEMIO
(January 31, 1972, Reyes, J.B.L., J.)
Facts: Wife filed petition for legal separation against
husband for allegedly cohabiting with another woman.
Wife died in a vehicular accident during pendency of
action. Wife’s father sought to substitute her; Lower
Court dismissed the case, ruling that her death during
the pendency of the case abated the cause of action
and the action itself
Issue/Held: WON the death of the plaintiff before
final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate
the action? If yes, WON abatement also apply if the
action involves property rights. – YES and YES. An
action for legal separation is purely personal.
Ratio/Doctrine:
(1) Action for legal separation, being purely
personal, the death of one party to the action
58
 causes the death of the action itself
(2) Property rights are mere effects of a decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come in to
existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming; and the
expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn. 
 as special administratrix. This was approved and she
100 BARITUA v. CA
(March 22, 1990, Sarmiento, J.)
Facts: Bus owned by Petitioner Baritua, driven by
PET Bitancor had an accident with a tricycle driven by
Bienvenido. They executed an extrajudicial
settlement with the widow of the latter. Parents then
filed suit for damages against petitioners claiming that
they were promised indemnity, the purchase price of
the tricycle, and funeral expenses. The RTC
dismissed the complaint holding that payment to the
widow and her child, who are preferred heirs and
successors-in-interest of the deceased extinguished
any claim 
against the petitioners. 
CA reversed stating
that the parents were filing in their own capacity, and
not as heirs.
Issue/Held: WON petitioners are still liable to the
parents despite the EJ settlement with the widow. –
NO. The obligation is already extinguished upon
payment to the surviving spouse, who is the one
entitled to payment, being the guardian of their
lone child.
Ratio: Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors-in-interest referred to in Article 1204, CC
as persons authorized to receive payment. And under
Art 887, the parents of the deceased succeed only
when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant
Moreover, the surviving spouse concurs with all the
classes of heirs. Hence, when Alicia and Bienvenido
begot a child, the respondents ceased to be
successors-in-interest. Therefore, petitioners were
correct in settling their obligation with Alicia as widow
and natural guardian of their lone child. Even if Alicia
became an estranged wife, the same fact is not a
legal ground for disqualification of a surviving spouse
as an heir of a deceased spouse.
101 SOLIVIO v. CA
(February 12, 1990, Medialdea, J.)
Facts: This case involves the estate (w/c includes
properties he inherited from his mother) of the late
novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., who died a bachelor,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
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spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia; and (2) the
RESP, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. During his
lifetime, he expressed his intention to leave all his
properties to a foundation named after his mother.
Concordia and Caledonia eventually entered into an
agreement to carry out Esteban’s plan, where they
agreed that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings. She then filed a petition to be appointed
was also declared the sole heir of Esteban. RESP
filed an MR of the order declaring Celedonia as sole
heir. This was denied. So she filed a case for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. RTC ruled in her favor. Celedonia argued
that Concordia has no right to recover because the
properties were subject to reserva troncal.
Issue/Held: Whether the decedent's properties were
subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side
from whom he had inherited them 

Ratio: property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana,
Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was
not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother
from whom he inherited the properties in
question. 
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia
Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on
his mother’s side. 



Doctrine: The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or a brother or a sister. 
It does not apply
to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Art. 891.
Parties in a reserve troncal:
(1) Reservista (Person obliged to reserve) – the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law
property from his descendants
(2) Reservatorios or Resrvees (Person from whom
the property is reserved) – relatives within the
third degree counted from the descendant, and
belonging to the line from which the property
came
(3) Propositus – The descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law
102 PADURA v. BALDOVINO
(December 27, 1958, Reyes, J.B.L., J.)
Facts: Padura contracted two marriages. He had 1
st
child by his 1 marriage – Manuel, and he had 2
59
 nd
children by his 2 marriage – Fortunato and
Candelaria. Fortunata inherited 4 parcels of land. He
died without issue so his properties were inherited by
his mother, Benita (reservista). Upon Benita’s death,
the children of Candelaria (4) filed a petition to have
the properties be partitioned in half, half goes to
them, another half goes to the children of Manuel (7).
PETs filed their opposition maintaining that they each
should be deemed as inheriting in their own right so
they must share equally (
 1/11)
Issue/Held: WON the reservatorios should share
equally. – NO. Full blood relatives get twice more
than the half-blood relatives.
Ratio/Doctrine: Reserva troncal merely determines
the group of reservatarios to whom property should
be returned. But within that group, the individual
rights should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession. The reservable
property should be succeeded by the reservatario
who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules
of intestacy. 
 104 EDROSO v. SABLAN
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished
once property has devolved to the specified relatives
of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the relations
between one reservatario and another of the same
degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any
longer. The respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession. 
 by law to be reserved and that in such a case
103 FLORENTINO v. FLORENTINO
(November 15, 1919, Torres, J.)
Facts: Son, Apolonio III, who was given property by
father, Apolonio II, dies, so his mother, Severina,
succeeded to all his property. When Severina died,
he instituted her daughter, Mercedes (Apolonio III’s
sister), as universal heir. Heirs from first marriage of
father bring an action to compel the sister to transfer
their portion of the property, because it is reservable
property. Sister files a demurrer, arguingthat it the
object of the law is met (not falling into hands of
strangers) and the property is no longer of reservable
character. RTC granted the demurrer.
Issue/Held: WON the property is reservable property
– YES. Upon the death of the descendant
(Apolonio III) the property given by the testator
(Apolonio II) passed to the legitimate mother, and
became reservable property. 
 under an express provision of the law the right to
Ratio: If the property was clothed with the character
and condition of reservable property, Severina did
not thereby acquire the dominion or right of
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ownership, but only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the necessary obligation to
preserve and deliver or return it as reseravble
property to her deceased son’s relatives within
the third degree, among whom is her daughter,
Mercedes. 

While Severina’s will was valid, the provision
concerning the reservable property received from
her so, reducing the rights of the other
reservatarios1 (the half brothers and nephews of
Mercedes), is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
the property is not her own, and she only has a
right of usufruct or fiduciary. 

So, the 6 surviving heirs of Apolonio II are entitled to
1/7 share each. The other 1/7 belongs to Mercedes.
Doctrine: The reservable property does not form part
of the estate of the reservista, hence cannot be
disposed of by will.
(September 13, 1913, Arellano, C.J.)
Facts: Father, Victoriano, died. Son, Pedro, inherited
2 lands. Pedro died without children so his mother,
Marcelina Edroso inherited his properties. Marcelina
tried to register lands, but Victoriano’s brothers
(Pedro’s uncles) opposed on the ground that they
have right of reservation. The Land Registration Court
denied the registration holding that the parcels of land
in question partake of the nature of property required
application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles. 

Issue/Held:
(1) WON the properties were reservable. – YES.
(2) WON Marcelina may register the lands in her
name. – YES. She has absolute title over the
parcels of land despite their nature as being
reservable.
Ratio:
(1) Having acquired the properties by operation of
law, she is obligated to relatives within the third
degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of
Victoriano), where the lands proceeded.
(2) The person required by Article 811 to reserve the
right has the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has
dispose of the property reserved although under
a condition. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition,
reside in him while he lives. After the right
60
 required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine
owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third
degree in whose favor of the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property: (1) because it is
no way, either actually or constructively or
formally, in their possession; (2) because they
have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it.
105 SIENES v. ESPARCIA
(March 24, 1961, Dizon, J.)
Facts: Lot 3368 forms part of the estate of Francisco
(prepositus). Upon his death, her mother, Andrea,
inherited his properties. She then sold the lot to the
petitioners. However, the RESPs also bought the lot,
but from Francisco’s half-sister, who were in
possession of the lot. Petitioners then filed a case for
reconveyance from the respondents now in
possession of property.
Issue/Held:
WON the property is reservable property. – YES.
WON the sale to PETs is valid. – YES.
Ratio:
(1) Upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, the property was inherited, in turn,
by his mother. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any survived her. 

(2) The reservista has the legal title and dominion to
the reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; he may alienate the same
but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the
time of the death of the reservista. 
 administration proceeding (not just mere proceeding
Doctrine:
The reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory
condition.
Reserva creates two resolutory conditions:
(1) Death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and

(2) Survival, at the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to 
the line
from which the property came. 
 reservable property part of the 
reservista's
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106 GONZALES v. CFI
(May 19, 1981, Aquino, J.)
Facts: Benito Jr. died, leaving behind his widow
Filomena (Mother) and 7 children, including Filomena
(Daughter). Filomena(D) died ahead of her mom, who
was her sole heiress. When Filomena(M) died, she
bequeathed the properties she inherited from her
daughter to her grandchildren. Beatriz, a daughter of
Filomena(M) (and sister of Filomena(D)) moved to
exclude such properties from Filomana(M)’s estate –
claiming that such properties were reservable
properties in favor of all of Filomena(D) siblings.
Issue/Held: WON the properties are reservable. –
YES. Hence, Filomena(M) could not have
conveyed such to her grandchildren.
Ratio: As reservor, Filomena Sr cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties
as long as the reservees (her children) survived her.
As held in Florentino v. Florentino, reservable
properties did not form part of the reservor’s estate,
and 
could not be inherited by her testamentary heirs.
As long as during the reservor’s lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees
are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the
property retains its reservable character.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a
testamentary disposition of the reservable properties
in 
favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree 
would be a glaring violation of article 891. 

107 CANO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
(January 16, 1959, Reyes, J.B.L., J.)
Facts: CFI decreed in a land registration case that
Lot 1799 be registered in the name of Cano subject to
the right of reservation of Guerrero. When Cano died,
Guerrero moved to register the lot in her name. The
sons of Cano opposed the motion contending that the
ownership of the lot should be decreed in a judicial
under Act 496) where the rights of reservatorio are to
be declared.
Issue/Held: WON Guerrero may have the lot
registered in her name without the need of another
proceeding. YES. Property passed to her by
operation of law upon the death of reservista.
Ratio/Doctrine: The reservatario is not
the 
reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the
61
estate. 
The reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the 
descendant (prepositus).
The property merely reverts to the line of
origin 
from which it had temporarily and accidentally
strayed during the reservista's 
lifetime. 
Upon the
death of the reservista, the reservatario (Guerrero)
nearest to the prepositus becomes, automatically
and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. 
 the estate of Rafael.
Requisites for the passing of title from reservista to
reservatario:
(1) Death of reservista and
(2) Reservatario survived the reservista.
Reservable property cannot be transmitted by a
reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa
(like Jose and Teotimo) so long as a reservatario
within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line where the property came, is in
existence when the reservista die.
108 VIZCONDE v. CA
(February 11, 1998, Francisco, J.)
Facts: Estrellita purchased Valenzuela property from
decedent Rafael, her father. Using proceeds of that
sale, E bought Parañaque property. E and 2
daughters died in Vizconde massacre; Lauro, E’s
husband, became sole heir. Lauro extrajudicially
settled E’s estate with E’s parents. Decedent Rafael
died and in the intestate estate proceedings, Lauro
was included. The Probate Court also ordered that
the Paranaque property, the car and the balance of
the proceeds of the Valenzuela property sale be
collated.
Issue/Held: WON the probate court’s Order nullifying
the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to
Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque property as
subject to collation valid, - NO. Lauro is not a
compulsory heir of Rafael.
Ratio:
(1) Lauro is not a compulsory heir of Rafael.
(2) Probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
determined the validity of sale of Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and
deemed it gratuitous.
(3) Probate Court’s order subjecting the Paranaque
property to collation is premature
(4) Transfer of Paranaque property was not by
gratuitous title. What was transferred to Estrellita
by deed of sale is the Valenzuela property. The
Parañaque 
property, acquired by Estrellita using
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
does 
not become collationable simply by reason
thereof. 
 natural mother in the future.
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(5) It is futile to ascertain WON the Valenzuela
property may be brought to collation because
Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. Rafael inherited
from Estrellita an amount more than the value of
the Valenzuela property. Even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated, collation
may not be allowed as the value of the
Valenzuela property has long been returned to
Doctrine: Collation is only required of compulsory
heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs
and 
involves property/rights received by
donation/gratuitous title during lifetime of the
decedent. 

Purpose: Attain equality among compulsory heirs. It is
presumed that the intention in making a
donation/gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give
him something in advance on acct of his share in the
estate, and that the predecessor’s will is to treat all
heirs equally, in the 
absence of any expression to the
contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the
property.
109 IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
(March 31, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.)
Facts: Stephanie is the illegitimate child of Honorato.
He adopted her and wants her to be allowed to use
her mother’s surname, Garcia, as her middle name.
Issue/Held: WON Stephanie should be allowed to
use Garcia as her middle name. – YES.
Ratio:
(1) Although the law does not regulate the use of a
middle name the members of the Civil Code and
Family Committees that drafted the Family Code
recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. 

(2) Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother.
(3) The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to
which the Philippines is a signatory, accepted
the principle that the intent of adoption is geared
to favor the adopted child. 

(4) Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname will maintain her maternal lineage. The
Family Code and the law on adoption provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of
his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her


62

110 FRANCISCO v. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO
(March 8, 2001, Pardo, J.)
Facts: When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in
1990, he confided to his daughter Aida (RESP) that
the certificates of title to 2 parcels of residential land
in Bulacan were in the possession of PETs Regina
and Zenaida, his 2 illegitimate daughters. After
Gregorio died, Aida found out that Gregorio sold the
land to them in a “Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan” for
25k. She then filed a complaint against petitioners for
annulment of sale with damages, alleging that the
signature of her late father on the deed of sale was a
forgery. R
 TC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed
RTC.
Issue/Held: WON the sale to Petitioners is valid. –
NO. It was simulated.
Ratio: The Kasulatan was simulated. There was no
consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la
Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that
Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have
any source of income in 1983, when they bought the
property, until the time when Felicitas testified in
1991. Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it
still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as
the transaction affected respondent's legitime.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If
indeed the parcels of land involved were the only
property left by their father, the sale in fact would
deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate.
By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her
father as his only legitimate child.
Doctrine: A compulsory heir cannot be deprived of
his/her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.
111 CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
(December 16, 2008, Reyes, J.)
Facts: Sps. Felix and Felipa died intestate. They left
6 parcels to their 2 compulsory heirs – Teofilo and
PET Juan De Dios. Teofilo also died. Juan then
entered into a compromise agreement with Teofilo’s
widow, Felicidad, and child, Teofilo II. A year later,
Juan filed a case assailing the validity of marriage
(lack of marriage license) of his brother, Teofilo, with
Felicidad, as well as the filiation of Teofilo II. RTC
rendered summary judgment annulling the marriage
of Teofilo and Felicidad 
and that Teofilo II is not a
natural, illegitimate or adoptive child of Teofilo. 
 (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the
Issue/Held: WON Juan has the capacity to sue for
the nullity of the marriage of Teofilo or Felicidad. –
Depends on the final determination of WON
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted or
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illegitimate son of Teofilo
Ratio: If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted child, then Juan has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage. This is
based on the ground that he has no successional
right to be protected, hence, does not have proper
interest. 

16. Disinheritance
Article 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence
of disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for
causes expressly stated by law. (848a)
Article 916. Disinheritance can be effected only
through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. (849)
Article 917. The burden of proving the truth of the
cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the other
heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir should
deny it. (850)
Article 918. Disinheritance without a specification of
the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of
those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution
of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent
as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes
for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found
guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted
of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of
the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by
the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a
63
 dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)
Article 920. The following shall be sufficient causes
for the disinheritance of parents or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children
or induced their daughters to live a corrupt or
immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been
convicted of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been
convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes
specified in this Code;
(7) The refusal to support
the children or descendants without justifiable
cause;
(7) An attempt by one of the parents against the life
of the other, unless there has been a
reconciliation between them. (756, 854, 674a)
Article 921. The following shall be sufficient causes
for disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment
of six years or more, and the accusation has
been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence cause the
testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal
separation;
(1) 
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the
loss of parental authority;
(2) 
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or
the other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
Article 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the
offender and the offended person deprives the latter
of the right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made. (856)
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Article 923. The children and descendants of the
person disinherited shall take his or her place and
shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with
respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent
shall not have the usufruct or administration of the
property which constitutes the legitime. (857)
REQUISITES OF A VALID DISINHERITANCE:

(1) Made in a valid will. [Art. 916]
(2) Identity of the heir is clearly established

(3) For a legal cause. [Articles 919 to 921]
(4) Expressly made

(5) Cause stated in the will. [Art. 916]
(6) Absolute or unconditional
(7) Total

(8) Cause must be true and if challenged by the
heir, it must be proved to be true by the
proponent of disinheritance [Art. 917]
EFFECT OF INVALID DISINHERITANCE
It shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited.
But the devises and legacies and other testamentary
dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not
impair the legitime. [Art. 918]
SUFFICIENT CAUSES FOR DISINHERITANCE
The list under Articles 919-912 is exclusive
EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT RECONCILIATION
A reconciliation between the offender and offended
person:
(1) Deprives the latter (testator) of the right to
disinherit and
(2) Renders ineffectual any disinheritance made
112 CHING v. RODRIGUEZ
(November 28, 2011, Reyes, J.)
Facts: The RESPs filed a complaint captioned as one
for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of
[a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of
Preliminary Injunction” against Ramon Ching to nullify
the transfers he made to his co-defendants of the
properties owned by the decedent, Antonio Ching.
Ramon filed an MTD on the ground that the case is a
proper subject of a special proceeding given that the
complaint prayed for his disinheritance and the
respondents were not yet declared as Antonio’s heirs.
Issue/Held: WON RTC has jurisdiction. – YES.
64
Ratio: While the respondents sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's
estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the
prayer for Ramon's disinheritance the case does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its
limited jurisdiction.


Doctrine: Disinheritance can be effected only

through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. [Art 916, CC]

GROUNDS FOR DISINHERITANCE

Children/Descendants Parents/Ascendants Spouse
(1) Abandonment, or inducement to
daughters to live a corrupt of
immoral life, or attempt against
their virtue
(1) Conviction of an attempt against (2) Conviction of an attempt against (1) Conviction of an attempt against
the life of testator, his/her the life of testator, his/her the life of testator, his/her
spouse, descendants or spouse, descendants or spouse, descendants or
ascendants ascendants ascendants
(2) Groundless accusation of a crime (3) False accusation of a crime for (2) False accusation of a crime for
for which the law prescribes which the law prescribes which the law prescribes
imprisonment of 6 years of more imprisonment of 6 years of more imprisonment of 6 years of more
(3) Conviction of adultery or (4) Conviction of adultery or
concubinage with testator’s concubinage with testator’s
spouse spouse
(4) Fraud, violence, intimidation, or (5) Fraud, violence, intimidation, or (3) Fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence which causes undue influence which causes undue influence which causes
the testator to make a will or to the testator to make a will or to the testator to make a will or to
change one already made change one already made change one already made
(6) Loss of parental authority for (5) When the spouse has given
causes specified in the Code grounds for loss of parental
authority
(5) Refusal without justifiable cause (7) Refusal to support without (6) Unjustified refusal to support the
to support the parent/ascendant justifiable cause children or other spouse
who disinherits
(8) Attempt by one of the parents
against the life of the other,
unless there has been a
reconciliation
(6) Maltreatment, by word or deed
(7) Leading a dishonorable or
disgraceful life
(8) Conviction of a crime which
carries a penalty of civil
interdiction
(4) When the spouse has given
cause for legal separation

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17. Legacies and Devises
Article 924. All things and rights which are within the
commerce of man be bequeathed or devised. (865a)
Article 925. A testator may charge with legacies and
devises not only his compulsory heirs but also the
legatees and devisees.
The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the
extent of the value of the legacy or the devise
received by them. The compulsory heirs shall not be
liable for the charge beyond the amount of the free
portion given them. (858a)
Article 926. When the testator charges one of the
heirs with a legacy or devise, he alone shall be
bound.
Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be
liable in the same proportion in which they may
inherit. (859)
Article 927. If two or more heirs take possession of
the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or
destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even
though only one of them should have been negligent.
(n)
Article 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the
legacy or devise shall be liable in case of eviction, if
the thing is indeterminate and is indicated only by its
kind. (860)
Article 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only
a part of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the
legacy or devise shall be understood limited to such
part or interest, unless the testator expressly declares
that he gives the thing in its entirety. (864a)
Article 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging
to another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the
testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes
his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect.
(862a)
Article 931. If the testator orders that a thing
belonging to another be acquired in order that it be
given to a legatee or devisee, the heir upon whom the
obligation is imposed or the estate must acquire it
and give the same to the legatee or devisee; but if the
owner of the thing refuses to alienate the same, or
demands an excessive price therefor, the heir or the
estate shall only be obliged to give the just value of
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the thing. (861a)
Article 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at
the time of the execution of the will already belonged
to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective, even
though another person may have some interest
therein.
If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed
from such interest or encumbrance, the legacy or
devise shall be valid to that extent. (866a)
Article 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the
legatee or devisee at the time of the execution of the
will, the legacy or devise shall be without effect, even
though it may have subsequently alienated by him.
If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after
such time, he can claim nothing by virtue of the
legacy or devise; but if it has been acquired by
onerous title he can demand reimbursement from the
heir or the estate. (878a)
Article 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise
something pledged or mortgaged to secure a
recoverable debt before the execution of the will, the
estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary
intention appears.
The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or
mortgaged after the execution of the will.
Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which
the thing bequeathed is burdened, passes with it to
the legatee or devisee. (867a)
Article 935. The legacy of a credit against a third
person or of the remission or release of a debt of the
legatee shall be effective only as regards that part of
the credit or debt existing at the time of the death of
the testator.
In the first case, the estate shall comply with the
legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights of action
it may have against the debtor. In the second case,
by giving the legatee an acquittance, should he
request one.
In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests
on the credit or debt which may be due the testator at
the time of his death. (870a)
Article 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding
article shall lapse if the testator, after having made it,
should bring an action against the debtor for the
payment of his debt, even if such payment should not
have been effected at the time of his death.
66
The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him
is understood to discharge only the right of pledge.
(871)
Article 937. A generic legacy of release or remission
of debts comprises those existing at the time of the
execution of the will, but not subsequent ones. (872)
Article 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor
shall not be applied to his credit, unless the testator
so expressly declares.
In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to
collect the excess, if any, of the credit or of the legacy
or devise. (837a)
Article 939. If the testator orders the payment of what
he believes he owes but does not in fact owe, the
disposition shall be considered as not written. If as
regards a specified debt more than the amount
thereof is ordered paid, the excess is not due, unless
a contrary intention appears.
The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the
fulfillment of natural obligations. (n)
Article 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the
choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon whom
the obligation to give the legacy or devise may be
imposed, or the executor or administrator of the
estate if no particular heir is so obliged.
If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been
given the choice, dies before making it, this right shall
pass to the respective heirs.
Once made, the choice is irrevocable.
In the alternative legacies or devises, except as
herein provided, the provisions of this Code
regulating obligations of the same kind shall be
observed, save such modifications as may appear
from the intention expressed by the testator. (874a)
Article 941. A legacy of generic personal property
shall be valid even if there be no things of the same
kind in the estate.
A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid
only if there be immovable property of its kind in the
estate.
The right of choice shall belong to the executor or
administrator who shall comply with the legacy by the
delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior nor of
superior quality. (875a)
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Article 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves
the right of choice to the heir, or to the legatee or
devisee, the former may give or the latter may choose
whichever he may prefer. (876a)
Article 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot
make the choice, in case it has been granted him, his
right shall pass to his heirs; but a choice once made
shall be irrevocable. (877a)
Article 944. A legacy for education lasts until the
legatee is of age, or beyond the age of majority in
order that the legatee may finish some professional,
vocational or general course, provided he pursues his
course diligently.
A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the
legatee, if the testator has not otherwise provided.
If the testator has not fixed the amount of such
legacies, it shall be fixed in accordance with the
social standing and the circumstances of the legatee
and the value of the estate.
If the testator or during his lifetime used to give the
legatee a certain sum of money or other things by
way of support, the same amount shall be deemed
bequeathed, unless it be markedly disproportionate to
the value of the estate. (879a)
Article 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain
annual, monthly, or weekly amount is bequeathed,
the legatee may petition the court for the first
installment upon the death of the testator, and for the
following ones which shall be due at the beginning of
each period; such payment shall not be returned,
even though the legatee should die before the
expiration of the period which has commenced.
(880a)
Article 946. If the thing bequeathed should be
subject to a usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall
respect such right until it is legally extinguished.
(868a)
Article 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right
to the pure and simple legacies or devises from the
death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs.
(881a)
Article 948. If the legacy or devise is of a specific and
determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the
legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof
upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing
fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected
income; but not the income which was due and
67
unpaid before the latter's death.
From the moment of the testator's death, the thing
bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or
devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or
deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or
improvement, without prejudice to the responsibility of
the executor or administrator. (882a)
Article 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific
and determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity, its
fruits and interests from the time of the death of the
testator shall pertain to the legatee or devisee if the
testator has expressly so ordered. (884a)
Article 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to
cover all the legacies or devises, their payment shall
be made in the following order:
(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to
be preferential;
(3) Legacies for support;
(4) Legacies for education;
 legacy or devise for any reason should become
(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate
thing which forms a part of the estate;
(6) All others pro rata. (887a)
Article 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered
with all its accessories and accessories and in the
condition in which it may be upon the death of the
testator. (883a)
Article 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or
devise, or the executor or administrator of the estate,
must deliver the very thing bequeathed if he is able to
do so and cannot discharge this obligation by paying
its value.
Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even
though the heir or the estate may not have any.
The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing
bequeathed shall be for the account of the heir or the
estate, but without prejudice to the legitime. (886a)
Article 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take
possession of the thing bequeathed upon his own
authority, but shall request its delivery and
possession of the heir charged with the legacy or
devise, or of the executor or administrator of the
estate should he be authorized by the court to deliver
it. (885a)
Article 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a
part of the legacy or devise and repudiate the other, if
the latter be onerous.
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Should he die before having accepted the legacy or
devise, leaving several heirs, some of the latter may
accept and the others may repudiate the share
respectively belonging to them in the legacy or
devise. (889a)
Article 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or
devises, one of which is onerous, cannot renounce
the onerous one and accept the other. If both are
onerous or gratuitous, he shall be free to accept or
renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the
testator intended that the two legacies or devises
should be inseparable from each other, the legatee or
devisee must either accept or renounce both.
Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a
legatee or devisee may waive the inheritance and
accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the latter
and accept the former, or waive or accept both.
(890a)
Article 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is
unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if the
ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the
estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right
of accretion. (888a)
Article 957. The legacy or devise shall be without
effect:
(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in
such a manner that it does not retain either the
form or the denomination it had;
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause
alienates the thing bequeathed or any part
thereof, it being understood that in the latter case
the legacy or devise shall be without effect only
with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
alienation the thing should again belong to the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the
contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter
be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been
effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of
repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the
lifetime of the testator, or after his death without
the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged
to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for
eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have
been determinate as to its kind, in accordance
with the provisions of article 928. (869a)
Article 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing
bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence, if it is
possible to identify the thing which the testator
intended to bequeath or devise. (n)
Article 959. A disposition made in general terms in
68
favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood to
be in favor of those nearest in degree. (751)
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS ON LEGACIES AND
THEIR EFFECTS
The testator, heir, or L/D is limited to such part
legatee owns only a part or interest, unless the
of, or an interest in the testator expressly
thing bequeathed declares that he gives
the thing in its entirety
Legacy or devise of a L/D is void
thing belonging to
another person AND
testator erroneously
believed that the thing
pertained to him
Thing bequeathed The L/D shall be without
belonged to the legatee effect
or devisee at the time of
the execution of the will
Legacy of generic Valid even if there be no
personal property things of the same kind in
the estate
Devise of indeterminate Valid only if there be
real property immovable property of its
kind in the estate
Fruits and interests from
the time of the death of
the testator shall pertain
to the legatee or devisee
if the testator has
expressly so ordered
Legacy of a credit Effective only as regards
against a third person or that part of the credit or
of the remission or debt existing at the time
release of a debt of the of the death of the
legatee testator
Generic legacy of release Shall lapse if the testator,
or remission of debts – after having made it,
comprises only those brings an action against
existing at the time of the the debtor for the
execution of a will payment of debt, even if
such payment should not
have been effected at the
time of his death
A legacy or devise made Shall not be applied to
to a creditor his credit, unless the
testator so expressly
declares
A legacy for education Lasts until the legatee is
of age, or beyond the
age of majority in order
that the legatee may
finish some professional,
vocational or general
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course, provided he
pursues his course
diligently.
Legacy for support Lasts during the lifetime
of the legatee, if the
testator has not
otherwise provided
ORDER OF PREFERENCE OF LEGACIES AND
DEVISES
(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to
be preferential;
(3) Legacies for support;
(4) Legacies for education;

(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate
thing which forms a part of the estate;
(6) All others pro rata.
RULES ON ACCEPTANCE OR REPUDIATION OF
LEGACIES AND DEVISES
SITUATION RULE
L/D of one legacy/devise L/D cannot accept a part
[Art. 954] and repudiate the other,
IF the legacy/devise is
onerous
L/D of one legacy/devise Some of the heirs may
dies before accepting, accept and others may
and he left several heirs repudiate the share
respectively belonging to
them in the legacy/devise
L/D of two legacies or L/D cannot renounce
devises, one of which is the onerous one and
onerous [Art. 955] accept the other
L/D of two legacies, and L/D is free to accept or
both are onerous or renounce both, or
gratuitous [Art. 955] renounce either
Except: If the testator
intended the two legacies
or devises to be
inseparable, L/D must
either accept or renounce
both
A compulsory heir who is May waive inheritance
at the same time a L/D and accept legacy/devise
[Art. 955] or vice versa, or waive or
accept both
If legatee/devisee cannot It shall be merged into
or is unwilling to accept the mass of the estate
the legacy/devise, or if Except: In cases of
legacy or devise substitution and of the
becomes ineffective [Art. right of accretion
956]
INSTANCES WHEN LEGACY/DEVISE SHALL BE
WITHOUT EFFECT [Art. 957]
(1) Transformation of the thing
69
 (2) Reacquisition of the testator of the
legacy/devise, even if it be by reason of nullity
of the contract
• Exception: Reacquisition was effected by
virtue of the exercise of right to revoke
(3) Total loss of the thing without the heir’s fault
OTHER RULES:
(1) A mistake as to the name of thing bequeathed
is of no consequence, as long as thing is
identifiable [Art. 958]
(2) Disposition made in general terms in favor of
testator’s relatives is understood to be in favor
of those nearest in degree [Art. 959]
IV. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
1. General Provisions
Article 960. Legal or intestate succession takes
place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will,
or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or
dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property of
which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the
institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code. (912a)
Article 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules
hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate
relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse,
and in the State. (913a)
Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest
in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the
right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal
shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of
article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
the paternal and maternal lines. (912a)
SUBSECTION 1. Relationship
 by the nearest relative, should there be one only, or
Article 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by
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the number of generations. Each generation forms a
degree. (915)
Article 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which
may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (916a)
Article 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those
who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends. (917)
Article 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted
as there are generations or persons, excluding the
progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from
the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from
the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from
his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from
his first cousin, and so forth. (918a)
Article 967. Full blood relationship is that existing
between persons who have the same father and the
same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between
persons who have the same father, but not the same
mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.
(920a)
Article 968. If there are several relatives of the same
degree, and one or some of them are unwilling or
incapacitated to succeed, his portion shall accrue to
the others of the same degree, save the right of
representation when it should take place. (922)
Article 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated
by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed,
70
should there be several, those of the following degree
shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent
the person or persons repudiating the inheritance.
(923)
WHEN INTESTACY TAKES PLACE
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will,
or one which subsequently lost its validity
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or
dispose of all the property belonging to the
nd
testator (in the 2 case, intestacy takes place
only with respect to the part undisposed)
(3) If a suspensive condition does not happen or is
not fulfilled
(4) If heir dies before testator, or repudiates the
inheritance, there being no substitution, and no
right of accretion
(5) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code
Other Instances: Fulfillment of resolutory
term/condition, impossibility of ascertaining the will of
testator
WHO ARE INTESTATE HEIRS
(1) Legitimate children or descendants
(2) Illegitimate children or descendants
(3) Legitimate parents or ascendants
(4) Illegitimate parents
(5) Surviving spouse
(6) Brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces
(7) Other collateral relatives upto the fifth degree
(8) State
Nos. 1 to 5 are both compulsory and intestate heirs
BASIC RULES OF INTESTACY
(1) Rule of Relationship – heir must be related to the
testator
(a) Family – ascendants and descendants
th
(b) Blood – collaterals upto the 5 degree
(c) Spouse
(d) State – right of sovereignty
(2) Rule of Preference of Lines – The descendants
are preferred over the ascending
(3) Rule on Proximity of Degree – the nearer
relatives exclude the further ones
(4) Rule of equality among relatives of the same
degree
• Exceptions:
o Relatives of full and half blood
o Rule of division by line in the ascending
line – maternal/paternal
o Rule on preference of lines
o Distribution between legitimate and
illegitimate children
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o Representation
PROXIMITY OF RELATIONSHIP – determined by
the number of generations
• Each generation forms a degree
• A series of degrees forms a line – either direct or
collateral
o Direct – that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and
descendants
o Collateral – that constituted by the series
of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who
come from a common ancestor
In the direct line, there is no limit as to the degree. In
the collateral line, it is limited only to 5 degrees
If there are several relatives of the same degree and
one or some of them are UNWILLING or
INCAPACITATED to succeed, his portion shall
accrue to the others of same degree, except when
there is a right of representation.
REPUDIATION
An heir who repudiates cannot be represented by his
descendants.
If all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed
repudiate their share, those of the following degree
shall inherit in their own right.
2. Right of Representation
Article 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited. (942a)
Article 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (n)
Article 972. The right of representation takes place in
the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the
full or half blood. (925)
Article 973. In order that representation may take
place, it is necessary that the representative himself
be capable of succeeding the decedent. (n)
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Article 974. Whenever there is succession by
representation, the division of the estate shall be
made per stirpes, in such manner that the
representative or representatives shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would
inherit, if he were living or could inherit. (926a)
Article 975. When children of one or more brothers
or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit
from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions. (927)
Article 976. A person may represent him whose
inheritance he has renounced. (928a)
Article 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not
be represented. (929a)
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION
Right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and acquires the rights
which the latter would have if he were living or if he
could have inherited
General Rule: Rule of Proximity – the relative
nearest in degree excludes the more ones
Exception: Right of Representation – By fiction of
law, more distant relatives belonging to the same
class as the person represented, are raised to the
place and degree of such person, and acquire the
rights which the latter would have acquired if he were
living or if he could have inherited
WHEN REPRESENTATION TAKES PLACE
(1) Incapacity or unworthiness to succeed [Art 1035]
(2) Disinheritance [Art. 923]
(3) Predecease [Arts. 982, 975]
SOME RULES ON REPRESENTATION
(1) Right of representation takes place in the
DIRECT DESCENDING LINE, never in the
ascending. [Art. 972]
(2) In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor
of the children of brothers or sisters, whether full
or half-blood. [Art. 972]
(3) Representative must himself be capable of
succeeding the decedent. [Art. 973]
(4) Whenever there is succession by representation,
the division of the estate shall be made per
stirpes. [Art. 974]
(5) If the children of the siblings of the deceased
survive with their uncles/aunts, they shall inherit
by representation. If they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions. [Art. 975]
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(6) A person may represent him whose inheritance
he has renounced. [Art. 976]
(7) Heirs who repudiate their shares may not be
represented. [Art. 977]
113 TEOTICO v. DEL VAL
(March 26, 1965, Bautista-Angelo, J.)
Facts: Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will of testatrix Mortera. Ana Del Val, claiming to be
an adopted child of the testatrix’s deceased sister and
acknowledged natural child of the testatrix’s dead
brother, opposed the petition. Probate Court admitted
the will to probate but declared the disposition in favor
of Dr. Teotico void, because he was the physician
who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
Both appealed, Teotico as to the portion nullifying the
legacy; del Val as to the portion admitting the will to
probate.
Issue/Held: WON Del Val had the right to intervene
in the proceeding. – NO. She has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator,
nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will.
Ratio: Under the terms of the will, del Val has no right
to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate. Even if the will was denied probate, she would
not acquire any interest in the estate as she was NOT
a legal heir of the deceased. Law does not give her
any right to succeed either as an acknowledged
natural child or as an adopted daughter. As a natural
child, she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her father as provided in Article
992. As an adopted child, she also cannot inherit
because an adopted is an heir of the adopter but not
the relatives of the adopter. Under the law, the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely
to the adopter.
114 BICOMONG v. ALMANZA
(November 29, 1977, Guerrero, J.)
Facts: Maura died without any direct descendant.
She had a niece in full blood, Cristela, by her sister in
full blood, Felipa. She also had nephews and nieces
in half blood (PETITIONERS) by her half-siblings
(children from prior marriage of father). The 5 parcels
of land he inherited from her parents passed onto
Cristela, who administered them. Petitioners filed a
complaint against RESPs, husband and father of
Crisela, claiming their share over the parcels of land.
CFI declared that they were entitled to 10/24 share of
the 5 parcels of land.
Issue/Held: Who is to succeed. – All of them. But
the full-blooded niece is entitled to double the
share of the half-blooded nephews and nieces.
72

Ratio: It appears that Maura died intestate without
any issue, and her husband and all her 
ascendants
had died ahead of her. Therefore, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely
her 
siblings in full blood, and siblings of half blood,
according to Art. 975. 
By virtue of this, the nephews
and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own
right, and not only by right of representation (per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers 
or sisters
of the deceased.
Under the same provision Art. 975, which makes no
distinction if the nephews and nieces are maternal or
paternal, or full or half blood, then the sole niece of
the whole blood 
does not exclude the other
nephews of the half blood. 
The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Ar. 1008 in
relation to 1006, which provides that full blooded
niece is entitled to double the share of the half
nephews and nieces. 
 Article 986. The father and mother, if living, shall
3. Order of Intestate Succession
a. Descending Direct Line
b. Ascending Direct Line
c. Illegitimate Children
d. Surviving Spouse
e. Brothers and Sisters/Nephews and
Nieces
f. Other Collateral Relatives
g. The State
SUBSECTION 1. Descending Direct Line
 per capita. (937)
Article 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to
the descending direct line. (930)
Article 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child. (931a)
Article 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares. (932)
Article 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation. (934a)
Article 982. The grandchildren and other
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descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Article 983. If illegitimate children survive with
legitimate children, the shares of the former shall be
in the proportions prescribed by article 895. (n)
Article 984. In case of the death of an adopted child,
leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs. (n)
SUBSECTION 2. Ascending Direct Line
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of
collateral relatives. (935a)
inherit in equal shares.
Should one only of them
survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate
of the child. (936)
Article 987. In default of the father and mother, the
ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit.
Should there be more than one of equal degree
belonging to the same line they shall divide the
inheritance per capita; should they be of different
lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go to the
paternal and the other half to the maternal
ascendants. In each line the division shall be made
SUBSECTION 3. Illegitimate Children
Article 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants
or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased. (939a)
Article 989. If, together with illegitimate children,
there should survive descendants of another
illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
succeed in their own right and the latter by right of
representation. (940a)
Article 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two
preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be
transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
who shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a)
Article 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the
illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance with
them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the
number of the ascendants or of the illegitimate
73
children. (942, 841a)
Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
Article 993. If an illegitimate child should die without
issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his father or
mother shall succeed to his entire estate; and if the
child's filiation is duly proved as to both parents, who
are both living, they shall inherit from him share and
share alike. (944a)
Article 994. In default of the father or mother, an
illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
surviving spouse who shall be entitled to the entire
estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other
half. (945a)
SUBSECTION 4. Surviving Spouse
Article 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants
and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
article 1001. (946a)
Article 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate
children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse
has in the succession the same share as that of each
of the children. (834a)
Article 997. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate parents or ascendants, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, and
the legitimate parents or ascendants to the other half.
(836a)
Article 998. If a widow or widower survives with
illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. (n)
Article 999. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall
be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child. (n)
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Article 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving
spouse, and illegitimate children are left, the
ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate
children so that such widow or widower shall have
one- fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children
the other fourth. (841a)
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
(953, 837a)
Article 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the
surviving spouse gave cause for the separation, he or
she shall not have any of the rights granted in the
preceding articles. (n)
SUBSECTION 5. Collateral Relatives
Article 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (946a)
Article 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares. (947)
Article 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive
together with nephews and nieces, who are the
children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of
the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and
the latter per stirpes. (948)
Article 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full
blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the
half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share
double that of the latter. (949)
Article 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half
blood, some on the father's and some on the mother's
side, are the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal
shares without distinction as to the origin of the
property. (950)
Article 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the
half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in
accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and
sisters of the full blood. (915)
Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor
sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
74
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood. (954a)

Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not

extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the
collateral line. (955a)

SUBSECTION 6. The State


Article 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed
in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate.
(956a)

Article 1012. In order that the State may take

possession of the property mentioned in the
preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court must be observed. (958a)

Article 1013. After the payment of debts and

charges, the personal property shall be assigned to
the municipality or city where the deceased last
resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the
municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the
same is situated.

If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the

whole estate shall be assigned to the respective
municipalities or cities where the same is located.

Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools,

and public charitable institutions and centers, in such
municipalities or cities. The court shall distribute the
estate as the respective needs of each beneficiary
may warrant.

The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on

its own motion, may order the establishment of a
permanent trust, so that only the income from the
property shall be used. (956a)

Article 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate

of the deceased appears and files a claim thereto
with the court within five years from the date the
property was delivered to the State, such person shall
be entitled to the possession of the same, or if sold,
the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for
such part of the proceeds as may not have been
lawfully spent. (n)

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 TABLE OF INTESTATE SHARES

Survivor LC/D LP/A IC/D SS IP BS/NN

LC Entire estate Excluded
LP
1 LC 1/2 1/2
SS
2 or more LC Divide equally Same as 1 LC
SS (SS
considered as
1 LC)
LC X X/2
IC
LC X X X/2
SS
IC
LP/A 1/2 1/2
SS
LP/A 1/2 1/2
IC
LP/A 1/2 1/4 1/4
SS
IC
SS 1/2 1/2
IC
SS 1/2 1/2
IP
SS 1/2 1/2
BS/NN

PROHIBITION OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
BETWEEN AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND THE
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF HIS
PARENTS
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or
iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to
be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources
of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment. [Diaz v. IAC]
115 SAYSON v. CA
(January 23, 1992, Cruz, J.)
Facts: Eleno and Rafaela begot 5 children –
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilia, Remedios, and Teodoro.
The case involves the (1) estate of grandparents,
Eleno and Rafael and (2) estate of Teodoro and his
wife, Isabel. Delia (legitimate), Edmundo (adopted),
and Doribel (adopted), children of Teodoro, are
claiming to inherit from the estate of their parents and
also their grandparents. RTC ruled in their favor. CA
affirmed with the modification that Delia and
Edmundo cannot inherit from the estate of the
grandparents.
Issue/Held: WON Delia and Edmundo can inherit
from their grandparents. – NO. As adopted children,
they can only inherit from their parents.
Ratio: While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the right
of representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party.

SUCCESSION C2018 76
As to the estate of their parents, all three are the heirs
to the exclusion of the their uncles and aunts.
116 CORPUS v. CA
(October 23, 1978, Aquino, J.)
Facts: Decedent Teodoro Yangco is an
acknowledged natural child of Luis Yangco, Sr. When
he died, he left a will and no forced heirs. His nearest
relatives were his brother Luis, sister Paz, children of
half-brother Pablo, and Juanita, daughter of half-
brother Jose. The will was probated and affirmed by
SC. Eventually, Corpus, the sole heir of Juanita, filed
a case to recover his share in Yangco’s estate. He
argued that since the will is invalid, the rules on
intestacy should apply. Hence, he can recover his
mother’s supposed share in the intestate estate of
deceased.
Issue/Held: WON Corpus can inherit from Teodoro
Yangco by right of representation. – NO. Juanita was
not a legal heir of Yangco.
Ratio: There is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives (Art 992). Hence,
Teodoro Yangco’s half brothers on the Corpus
side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed his estate under the rules of
intestacy. 
Since Jose is not an heir of Yangco, it
follows that Juanita, and Corpus, also is not an heir of
Yangco.
SC, following this rule, has previously held that: 

(1) Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho v. Udan)
(2) Natural child cannot represent his natural father
in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent (Llorente v. Rodriguez)
 be treated differently, in the negative. DURA LEX
(3) Natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of
her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her
natural mother. (Anuran v. Aquino)
117 PASCUAL v. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA
(March 25, 1992, Paras, J.)
Facts: Don Andres Pascual died intestate without
any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children and was survived by the
following: (a) Adela, surviving spouse; (b) Children of
Wenceslao, a brother of full blood of deceased; (c)
Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of half blood of
deceased; (d) acknowledged natural children of
ELIGIO PASCUAL, brother of FULL blood of the
deceased [Petitioners Olivia and Hermes]; (e)
intestate estate of Eleuterio, a brother of half blood of
the deceased. Children of Pedro, Eligio, and the
estate of Eleuterio are the RESPs. Adela filed a
petition for administration of the intestate estate of
Don Andres. PETs then filed a Motion to reiterate
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their hereditary rights. RTC denied the motion. PETs
allege that hey do not fall squarely within the purview
of Art. 992 (in light of 902 and 989) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not
due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such
children were under conception. The term
"illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must
be strictly construed to refer only to spurious
children. 

Issue/Held: WON Art 992 can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from
the i
 nheritance of the deceased. – NO. The term
“illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious.
Ratio: The interpretation of the law desired by the
petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what is says.
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded,
the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than
the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the
former nor add to the latter by implication.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all
illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to
whether or not acknowledged natural children should
SED LEX.
Doctrine: Merely reiterated the doctrine in Ruiz v.
IAC
118 LEONARDO v. CA
(February 28, 1983, De Castro, J.)
Facts: Francisca, who died intestate, was survived by
2 daugthers, Maria and Silvestra, and a grandson,
Sotero. Sotero died 2 years later. Cresenciano,
claiming to be a child of deceased Francisca’s
grandson, Sotero, filed a complaint for ownership
against Maria, one of the children of deceased,
praying that he be declared as one of the lawful heirs
of Francisca. RESP alleged that PET is an illegitimate
child who cannot succeed by right of representation.
Issue/Held: WON Cresenciano has a right of legal
representation. – NO. He is an illegitimate child of
Sotero.
77

Ratio: SC affirmed CA’s finding that Cresenciano
failed to submit any evidence showing that the
Alfredo Leonardo mentioned in the birth certificate
who was born to Sotero is no other than he himself.
even if it is true that Leonardo is the child of Sotero,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a
share in the estate of Francisca considering that he
was born 
outside wedlock. When he was born on
Sept 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother
were not yet married, and his alleged father’s first
marriage was still subsisting.
119 DIAZ v. IAC
(June 17, 1987, Paras, J.)
Facts: [niece of decedent v. illegitimate children of
legitimate child of decedent]
Juliana and Simona are sisters. Simona married
Pascual and they bore a child named Pablo. Pascual
and Pablo died ahead of Simona. Pablo was survived
by his mother, Simona, and his 6 minor natural
children (with 2 different women). Simona thereafter
died. In Simona’s intestate proceedings, Felisa,
Juliana’s only daughter, was declared as the sole heir
of Simona. Felisa was also allowed to intervene in the
intestate estates of Pablo and Pascual. The six minor
children, represented by their mothers, assailed the
order allowing Felisa to intervene. CFI ruled in their
favor, and ordered the exclusion of Felisa from the
settlement of the estates of the 3 deceased, and
declared that Felisa is NOT an heir of Simona. IAC
reversed
Issue/Held: Who is/are the legal heir/s of Simona. –
Only Felisa.
Ratio: Pursuant to Article 992, the illegitimate
children of Pablo cannot represent Pablo in his
succession to the intestate estate of his mother,
Simona. This is not inconsistent with Article 941,
which allows the illegitimate children to represent the
inheritance from another illegitimate family.
Doctrine: Article 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother of said legitimate child. 

They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for this purpose, because between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family,
there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child. 
The illegitimate child considers the
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privileged condition of the legitimate family, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the family,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken
in life. 
The law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
120 DIAZ v. IAC
(February 21, 1990, Paras, J.)
Facts: Niece vs. six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Issue/Held: WON the term “relatives” include the
legitimate parents of the father or mother of the
illegitimate children. – YES.
Ratio: MR denied. The word "relatives" is a general
term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the
person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it
was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
Hence, the phrase "legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of.
Doctrine: Art 982 is the general rule, Art 992 is the
exception. While the New Civil Code may have
granted successional rights to illegitimate children,
those articles, however, in conjunction with Article
992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a
legitimate child.
121 SANTILLON v. MIRANDA
(June 20, 1965, Bengzon, C.J.)
Facts: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving his wife,
Perfecta Miranda, and one son, Claro. Four years
after his death, Claro filed a petition for letters of
administration, which was opposed by his mother,as
well as Sps. Benito and Rosario Miranda. Court
appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition
and distribution of properties. Claro filed a motion to
declare the shares of heirs, stating that the sharing
should be ¼ to the mother, and ¾ to him, citing Art
892. Perfecta claims that her share should be ½,
pursuant to Art. 996. RTC ruled in Perfecta’s favor.
Issue/Held: How should the estate be divided. – ½
spouse, and ½ to illegitimate child.
Ratio: Art 892 falls under Testamentary Succession,
whereas Art 996 falls under Intestate Succession.
And under this article, when the widow survives with
only 1 legitimate child, they share in equal parts.
Although the law refers to ‘children or descendants,’
the rule in statutory construction is that the plural can
78
be understood to include the singular. So Art. 996
could or should be read: “If the widow or widower and
a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has
the same share as that of the child.”
122 BAGUNU v. PIEDAD
(December 08, 2000, Vitug, J.)
Facts: Augusto Piedad died without any direct
descendants or ascendants. RESP, Pastora Piedad,
rd
is the maternal aunt of Augusto (3 degree relative)
while PET is the daughter of a first cousin of Augusto
th
(5 degree relative). TC awarded the entire estate to
Piedad, and this attained finality. PET then filed a
motion assailing the finality of the order, asserting
entitlement to a share of Augusto’s estate. TC denied
the motion.
th
Issue/Held: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of 5
civil degeree, inherit alongside RESP, a collateral
rd
relative of 3 civil degree. – NO. RESP, being a
rd
relative of 3 degree, excludes PET from
succeeding.
Ratio: Among collateral relatives, except only in the
case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962 is an absolute
rule. 
 condition – court approval.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only
in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the
collateral line, the right of representation may only
take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive
with their uncles or aunts (Art. 972). The right of
representation does not apply to “other collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree”.
123 HEIRS OF SANDEJAS v. LINA
(February 05, 2001, Panganiban, J.)
Facts: Remedios died. Her husband, Eliodoro
Sandejas Sr., then filed a petition praying that letter of
administration be issued in his favor. This was
granted. [The Manila City Hall was razed by fire and
the records were reconstituted]. Lina intervened in the
proceedings, alleging that he entered into a sale with
Eliodoro covering parcels of land which formed part of
the intestate estate. There was a condition that,
before the Deed of Absolute Sale be executed, the
probate court must approve the sale. Eliodoro died
pending the proceedings, so he was substituted by
his 4 surviving heirs. Estate proceedings for Eliodoro
was consolidated with his wife’s estate proceedings.
Lina then filed a motion for approval of the Deed of
Sale. RTC granted the motion. CA reversed and held
that the contract between Lina and Eliodoro was a
contract to sell, and since the condition was not
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fulfilled, the obligation did not arise.
Issue/Held:
(1) Whether the contract between Eliodoro and Lina
was a contract to sell or a condiotional contract
of sale. – Conditional Contract of Sale.
(2) WON the sale is valid. – YES, but only limited
to the seller’s pro-indiviso share
(3) Computation of Eliodoro’s share – 11/20
Other issues:
• Jurisdiction of probate court – it has jurisdiction;
Lina’s motion was meant to settle the decedent’s
obligation to RESP
• Standing of Lina – Lina has standing; Sec 8,
Rule 89 states that the property party must be
one who is benefited or injured by the
judgement, or one who is to be entitled to the
avails of the suit]
• Bad faith of Eliodoro – no bad faith; Eliodoro did
not misrepresent these lots to be his exclusive
property.
Ratio:
(1) The contract was a contract of sale because
there was no reservation of ownership until full
payment of price, but it was subject to the
(2) The heirs can sell their pro-indiviso share in the
estate. While Court approval is required in any
disposition of the decedent’s estate, the
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely
affect the rights of the heirs to dispose of their
own pro-indiviso shares. And the stipulation
requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and effectivity of the sale. But because
petitioners did not consent to the sale of their
ideal shares, the sale should be limited to the
share of Eliodoro.
(3) As the conjugal partner of Remedios, Eliodor
owned one half of these lots plus a further one
tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a
one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro’s share
should be 11/20 of the entire property (1/2 (or
10/20) as his conjugal share, plus 1/20 (1/10 of
1/2) as his hereditary share)
Doctrine: Succession laws and jurisprudence require
that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the decedent’s entire estate
under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -
must be divided equally, with one half going to the
surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the
deceased. 
After the settlement of the debts and
obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then
distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. 

79
 124 ARMAS v. CALISTERIO
(April 06, 2000, Vitug, J.)
Facts: [sister v. surviving spouse] Marrieta married
Teoderico after her first husband’s (James William
Bounds) disappearance for 11 years. Antonia, the
sister of Teodorico, filed a petition for the settlement
of Teodorico’s estate, claiming to be the sole
surviving heir of Teodorico, and that Marietta is not
entitled to succeed from the intestate estate of
Teoderico because their marriage was bigamous.
RESP Marietta opposed. RTC ruled in favor of
Antonia. CA reversed.
Issue/Held: WON the marriage between the
Teodorico and Marietta valid, giving Marietta the right
to inherit as a surviving spouse. – YES. Under the
Civil Code (first marriage was celebrated before
the Family Code), a judicial declaration of
absence is not necessary.
Ratio: Under Art. 83(2) of Civil Code (first marriage
was celebrated before the Family Code), a judicial
declaration of absence is not necessary before the
surviving spouse may remarry as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. In this case, it is
undisputed that the first husband had been absent for
11 years. The second marriage should then be
deemed valid.
As to the distribution:
½ goes to spouse as her conjugal share
As to the ½ share of husband: ½ goes to the
surviving spouse, ½ to the sister.
125 BARANDA v. BARANDA
(May 20, 1987, Cruz, J.)
Facts: Paulina BARANDA allegedly sold five parcels
of land to her niece Evangeline and another lot to her
other niece Elisa. The two nieces were children of her
brother Pedro. 6 
 months later, Paulina filed a
complaint against them and prayed for the
reconveyance of the properties. She withdrew the
case upon an agreement that the nieces will execute
a DAS in her favor. Only Elisa complied. Paulina then
died. When she died, the TCTs were still in the name
of the nieces. Petitioners (children of her two
deceased brothers, and a sister) claiming to be heirs
of Paulina, sued Evangeline and Elisa for the
annulment of the sale and reconveyance. CFI
declared the deeds null and void. IAC reversed.
Issue/Held: WON Petitioners have capacity to sue. -
YES. As heirs, they have legal standing.
WON the sale is valid. – NO. It is void for lack of
consent and consideration.
Ratio: As heirs, petitioners have legal standing the
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challenge the deeds of sale for otherwise, property
claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded
therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not
merely contingent or expectant, but are deemed to
have vested in them upon Paulina’s death. Court has
repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are
the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions
arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased,
without separate judicial declaration as to their being
heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate. 

As heirs, they are adversely affected by the supposed
sales of her properties. The real party-in-interest in an
action for annulment or contract includes a person
who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in
the contract if he is PREJUDICED in his rights with
respect to one of the contracting parties.
Other Issues: The 1 year prescriptive period to annul
the registration of land under the Torrens system is
not absolute. Torrens system should not be used as
an instrument for wrongdoing or to validate an illegal
acquisition of title to the prejudice of the real owner of
the property registered.
V. PROVISIONS COMMON TO
TESTATE AND INTESTATE
SUCCESSION
1. Right of Accretion
Article 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which,
when two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the
one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or
who died before the testator, is added or incorporated
to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co- legatees.
(n)
Article 1016. In order that the right of accretion may
take place in a testamentary succession, it shall be
necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same
inheritance, or to the same portion thereof, pro
indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before
the testator, or renounce the inheritance, or be
incapacitated to receive it. (928a)
Article 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in
equal shares" or any others which, though
designating an aliquot part, do not identify it by such
description as shall make each heir the exclusive
owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the
80
right of accretion.
In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of
each heir is not earmarked, there shall be a right of
accretion. (983a)
Article 1018. In legal succession the share of the
person who repudiates the inheritance shall always
accrue to his co-heirs. (981)
Article 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by
the right of accretion take it in the same proportion
that they inherit. (n)
Article 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance
accrues shall succeed to all the rights and obligations
which the heir who renounced or could not receive it
would have had. (984)
Article 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of
accretion shall take place only when the free portion
is left to two or more of them, or to any one of them
and to a stranger.
Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other
co-heirs shall succeed to it in their own right, and not
by the right of accretion. (985)
Article 1022. In testamentary succession, when the
right of accretion does not take place, the vacant
portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has
been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the
testator, who shall receive it with the same charges
and obligations. (986)
Article 1023. Accretion shall also take place among
devisees, legatees and usufructuaries under the
same conditions established for heirs. (987a)
ACCRETION – the right by virtue of which the part
assigned to the one who renounces or cannot receive
his share or who died before the testator is
added/incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-
devisees, or co-legatees.
REQUISITES
(1) Two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance or same portion, pro indiviso
[Plurality of subjects and unity of object]
(2) One of the persons called:
a. Die before/Predecease the testator
b. Renounce the inheritance
c. Is incapacitated to receive it
Note: In case of money or fungible goods, there is a
right of accretion if the share is NOT earmarked
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Use of the words “one-half of each” or “in equal
shares” or any other designation which do not identify
it by such description as to make each heir the
exclusive owner DOES NOT exclude the right of
accretion
2. Capacity to Succeed by Will or
Intestacy
Article 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may
succeed by will or ab intestato.

The provisions relating to incapacity by will are
equally applicable to intestate succession. (744, 914)
Article 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the
heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment
the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of the death of
the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be
born later under the conditions prescribed in Article
41. (n)
Article 1026. A testamentary disposition may be
made to the State, provinces, municipal corporations,
private corporations, organizations, or associations
for religious, scientific, cultural, educational, or
charitable purposes.
All other corporations or entities may succeed under
a will, unless there is a provision to the contrary in
their charter or the laws of their creation, and always
subject to the same. (746a)
Article 1027. The following are incapable of
succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the
testator during his last illness, or the minister of
the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him
during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the
gospel within the fourth degree, the church,
order, chapter, community, organization, or
institution to which such priest or minister may
belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary
dispositions given by a ward in his favor before
the final accounts of the guardianship have been
approved, even if the testator should die after the
approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision
made by the ward in favor of the guardian when
the latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother,
sister, or spouse, shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will,
the spouse, parents, or children, or any one
81
 claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or
children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or
druggist who took care of the testator during his
last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not
permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a)
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article
739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions. (n)
Article 1029. Should the testator dispose of the
whole or part of his property for prayers and pious
works for the benefit of his soul, in general terms and
without specifying its application, the executor, with
the court's approval shall deliver one-half thereof or
its proceeds to the church or denomination to which
the testator may belong, to be used for such prayers
and pious works, and the other half to the State, for
the purposes mentioned in article 1013. (747a)
Article 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the
poor in general, without designation of particular
persons or of any community, shall be deemed
limited to the poor living in the domicile of the testator
at the time of his death, unless it should clearly
appear that his intention was otherwise.
The designation of the persons who are to be
considered as poor and the distribution of the
property shall be made by the person appointed by
the testator for the purpose; in default of such person,
by the executor, and should there be no executor, by
the justice of the peace, the mayor, and the municipal
treasurer, who shall decide by a majority of votes all
questions that may arise. In all these cases, the
approval of the Court of First Instance shall be
necessary.
The preceding paragraph shall apply when the
testator has disposed of his property in favor of the
poor of a definite locality. (749a)
Article 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a
disqualified person, even though made under the
guise of an onerous contract, or made through an
intermediary, shall be void. (755)
Article 1032. The following are incapable of
succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or
induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or
immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
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(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment
for six years or more, if the accusation has been
found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the
violent death of the testator, should fail to report
it to an officer of the law within a month, unless
the authorities have already taken action; this
prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein,
according to law, there is no obligation to make
an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the spouse of the testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence should cause the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents
another from making a will, or from revoking one
already made, or who supplants, conceals, or
alters the latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed
will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a)
Article 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be
without effect if the testator had knowledge thereof at
the time he made the will, or if, having known of them
subsequently, he should condone them in writing.
(757a)
Article 1034. In order to judge the capacity of the
heir, devisee or legatee, his qualification at the time of
the death of the decedent shall be the criterion.
In cases falling under Nos. 2, 3, or 5 of article 1032, it
shall be necessary to wait until final judgment is
rendered, and in the case falling under No. 4, the
expiration of the month allowed for the report.
If the institution, devise or legacy should be
conditional, the time of the compliance with the
condition shall also be considered. (758a)
Article 1035. If the person excluded from the
inheritance by reason of incapacity should be a child
or descendant of the decedent and should have
children or descendants, the latter shall acquire his
right to the legitime.
The person so excluded shall not enjoy the usufruct
and administration of the property thus inherited by
his children. (761a)
Article 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and
acts of administration performed by the excluded heir,
before the judicial order of exclusion, are valid as to
the third persons who acted in good faith; but the co-
heirs shall have a right to recover damages from the
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disqualified heir. (n)
Article 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded from
the succession has a right to demand indemnity or
any expenses incurred in the preservation of the
hereditary property, and to enforce such credits as he
may have against the estate. (n)
Article 1038. Any person incapable of succession,
who, disregarding the prohibition stated in the
preceding articles, entered into the possession of the
hereditary property, shall be obliged to return it
together it its accessions.
He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may
have received, or could have received through the
exercise of due diligence. (760a)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
Article 1040. The action for a declaration of
incapacity and for the recovery of the inheritance,
devise or legacy shall be brought within five years
from the time the disqualified person took possession
thereof. It may be brought by any one who may have
an interest in the succession. (762a)
WHO ARE INCAPABLE OF SUCCEEDING
(1) Priest who heard the confession of testator or
minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid
to testator during his last illness
th
(2) Relatives of priest or minister within the 4
degree, the church, order, chapter, community,
organization, or institution to which such priest or
minister may belong
(3) A guardian with respect to disposition given by a
ward in his favor before the final accounts of
guardianship have been approved, even if
testator dies after the approval
EXCEPTION: If guardian is his ascendant,
descendant, brother, sister of spouse is valid
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will,
the spouse, parents, or children, or any one
claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or
children
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or
druggist who took care of the testator during his
last illness
(6) Individuals, associations, and corporations not
permitted by law to inherit
(7) Those incapable by reason of unworthiness:
(a) Parents who have abandoned their children
or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt
or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue;
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(b) Any person who has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or
her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(c) Any person who has accused the testator of
a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(d) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of
the violent death of the testator, should fail to
report it to an officer of the law within a
month, unless the authorities have already
taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to
cases wherein, according to law, there is no
obligation to make an accusation;
(e) Any person convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(f) Any person who by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence should cause
the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(g) Any person who by the same means
prevents another from making a will, or from
revoking one already made, or who
supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will;
(h) Any person who falsifies or forges a
supposed will of the decedent.
For causes (b), (c), and (e), a final conviction is
necessary.
Cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if
testator (1) had knowledge of such at the time he
made the will and (2) knows of it subsequently and he
condones it in writing
Alienations of hereditary heir by the excluded heir
before judicial order of exclusion is valid as to third
persons who acted in good faith; but the co-heirs
have a right to recover damages from the excluded
heir
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
The action for a declaration of incapacity and for the
recovery of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall be
brought within five years from the time the
disqualified person took possession thereof.
126 PARISH PRIEST v. RIGOR
(April 30, 1979, Aquino, J.)
Facts: Father Rigor died and left a will which was
probated in 1935. In his will, he named as devisees
his sisters and a cousin. A devise of ricelands was
also made in favor of the testator’s nearest male
relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the
meantime, the ricelands would be administered
by the Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac. A project of partition
83
providing for the delivery to the devisees of their
respective shares of the estate was approved but
devise re: ricelands was not implemented as no
male relative of the testator claimed the same.
Several years after approval of the project of
partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed a petition in
the testate proceedings for delivery of the ricelands to
the church as trustee. The heirs of Father Rigor
opposed and prayed that the said bequest be
declared inoperative as no ‘nearest male relative’
of the testator had ever studied for the
priesthood.
TC ruled in favor of Parish Priest. CA reversed ruling
that the trust in favor of the ‘nearest male relative’
could only exist for 20 years because to enforce it
beyond that period would violate the rule against
perpetuities, and since no legatee claimed the
ricelands within 20 years from the death of the
testator, said properties should pass to his legal heirs.
Issue/Held:
Ratio: The “nearest male relative” must be alive at
the time of death of the decedent. Bequest is
inoperative,
Doctrine:
3. Acceptance and Repudiation of
Inheritance
Article 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the
inheritance is an act which is purely voluntary and
free. (988)
Article 1042. The effects of the acceptance or
repudiation shall always retroact to the moment of the
death of the decedent. (989)
Article 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an
inheritance unless he is certain of the death of the
person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to
the inheritance. (991)
Article 1044. Any person having the free disposal of
his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated
persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall
belong to the persons designated by the testator to
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determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
article 1030. (992a)
Article 1045. The lawful representatives of
corporations, associations, institutions and entities
qualified to acquire property may accept any
inheritance left to the latter, but in order to repudiate
it, the approval of the court shall be necessary. (993a)
Article 1046. Public official establishments can
neither accept nor repudiate an inheritance without
the approval of the government. (994)
Article 1047. A married woman of age may repudiate
an inheritance without the consent of her husband.
(995a)
Article 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write
may accept or repudiate the inheritance personally or
through an agent. Should they not be able to read
and write, the inheritance shall be accepted by their
guardians. These guardians may repudiate the same
with judicial approval. (996a)
Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit. An
express acceptance must be made in a public or
private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which
the intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which
one would have no right to do except in the capacity
of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity
of an heir has not been assumed. (999a)
Article 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to
a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though
gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his
co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-
heirs indiscriminately; but if this renunciation
should be gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose
favor it is made are those upon whom the portion
renounced should devolve by virtue of accretion,
the inheritance shall not be deemed as
accepted. (1000)
Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall
be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by
petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over
the testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008)
84

Article 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to
the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may
petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the
name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an
extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
The excess, should there be any, shall in no case
pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to
the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
established in this Code, it may belong. (1001)
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having
accepted or repudiated the inheritance his right shall
be transmitted to his heirs. (1006)
Article 1054. Should there be several heirs called to
the inheritance, some of them may accept and the
others may repudiate it. (1007a)
Article 1055. If a person, who is called to the same
inheritance as an heir by will and ab intestato,
repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a
testamentary heir, he is understood to have
repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without
knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may
still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)
Article 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an
inheritance, once made, is irrevocable, and cannot be
impugned, except when it was made through any of
the causes that vitiate consent, or when an unknown
will appears. (997)
Article 1057. Within thirty days after the court has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate in
accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs,
devisees and legatees shall signify to the court
having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
ACCEPTANCE
Act by virtue of which an heir, legatee or devisee
manifests his desire in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law to succeed to the
inheritance [Jurado]
REPUDIATION
Act by virtue of which an heir, legatee or devisee
manifests his desire in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law NOT to succeed to the
inheritance [ibid]
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CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCEPTANCE OR
REPUDIATION
(1) Purely voluntary and free [Art. 1041]
(2) Retroacts to the moment of death [Art. 1042]
(3) Irrevocable [Art. 1056]
(4) Cannot be impugned except when made through
any of the causes that vitiate consent, or when
an unknown will appears
REQUISITES OF ACCEPTANCE OR
REPUDIATION
(1) Certainty of the death of the decedent
(2) Certainty of the right to the inheritance [Art.
1043]
MANNER OF ACCEPTANCE
(1) Express Acceptance – one made in a public or
private document
(2) Implied/Tacit Acceptance – one resulting from
acts by which the intention to accept is
necessarily implied or one which would have no
right to do except in the capacity of an heir [Art.
1049]
An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to
a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though
gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his
co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-
heirs indiscriminately; but if this renunciation
should be gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose
favor it is made are those upon whom the portion
renounced should devolve by virtue of accretion,
the inheritance shall not be deemed as
accepted.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the
inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity
of an heir has not been assumed. [Art. 1049, par 3]
MANNER OF REPUDIATION
Must be made either in:
(1) Public Instrument,
(2) Authentic document, or
(3) By petition presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings [Art. 1051]
There can be no tacit repudiation [Imperial v. CA
(1999)]
If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the
prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may
petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the
name of the heir.
85
 • Acceptance shall benefit them only to the
extent of their credit
REPUDIATION OF PERSON WHO IS BOTH AN
INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY HEIR
(1) If he repudiates as a testamentary heir, he is
deemed to have repudiated in BOTH capacities
(2) If he repudiates as intestate heir, without
knowing that he is a testamentary heir, he may
still accept as testamentary heir
An acceptance or repudiation is IRREVOCABLE
and cannot be impugned, except:
(1) When it was made through any of the causes
that vitiate consent, or
(2) When an unknown will appears
127 INTESTATE ESTATE OF BORROMEO v.
BORROMEO
(July 23, 1987, Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
Facts: Vito Borromeo died without forced heirs. His
purported will was disallowed, hence his testate
proceedings was converted to intestate proceedings.
The Court then declared 9 people as his heirs
(nephews and nieces and grandnephews and
grandnieces) in the proportion of 4/9 and 5/9. RESP
Fortunato then filed a motion to be declared as an
heir, alleging that he is an illegitimate child. This was
denied, and in his MR, he changed his position and
alleged that he is entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo and presented a waiver of hereditary rights
allegedly executed by 5 legal heirs of Vito in favor of
Fortunato. RTC held that the waiver is valid, hence,
Fortunato is entitled to 5/9.
Issue/Held: Is the waiver of rights valid – NO. There
was no intention to relinquish their rights.
Ratio: Elements of a valid waiver:
(1) Existence of a right
(2) Knowledge of such right
(3) Intention to relinquish said right
The circumstances of this case show that the
signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their
rights:
(1) In a compliance signed by 5 heirs wherein they
allegedly waived their rights to the contested
lots, RESP recognized and conceded that the
petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver
document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate
(2) Majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement of Partition which was approved by
the Court
(3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioners executed a
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Deed of Assignment and Deed of Conveyance
purporting to assign to RESPs their share in the
inheritance
(4) On October 15, the Deeds were cancelled.
Doctrine: The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of
hereditary rights is that "the properties included in
an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs,
who by fiction of law continue the personality of the
former. Nor do such properties have the character
of future property, because the heirs acquire a right
to succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established in Art 657 and
applied by Art 661, according to which the heirs
succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death.
More or less, time may elapse from the moment of
the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment
of the death, in accordance with Art. 989. The right is
vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of
the corresponding hereditary portion."
128 IMPERIAL v. CA
(October 08, 1999, Gonzaga-Reyes, J.)
Facts: Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of
land from his father Leoncio Imperial. Although the
transaction was denominated as a sale, both admit
that it was a donation. Subsequently, Leoncio filed an
action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale
but a compromise agreement was made by both
parties. When Leoncio died, his adopted son, Victor,
substituted him in the Compromise agreement. When
Victor also died, his heirs – natural brothers (RESPs)
filed an action for annulment of the donation on the
ground that the conveyance of said property in favor
of petitioner Imperial impaired the legitime of Victor.
Imperial raises the defense that the donation did not
impair Victor’s legitime and that the action of
respondents has already prescribed. Imperial
questioned the right of RESPs to contest the
donation, relying on Art 772, CC, arguing that when
Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor
who was entitled to question the donation. However,
instead of filing an action to contest the donation,
Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 1177 and even moved for execution, which
amounted to a renunciation of his legitime.
Issue/Held: [Relevant to Topic] WON there was
renunciation, hence, precluding Victor and his heirs
from filing the action. – NO, renunciation must be
express.
Ratio: No renunciation of legitime may be presumed
from said acts (moving for execution). At the time of
86
the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered.
Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the
compromise agreement. More importantly, our law on
succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the
part of the heir.
However, the action is barred by prescription.
Contrary to the lower courts’ ruling, the prescriptive
period applicable is not 30 years, but 10 years
(actions based upon an obligation created by law),
which is reckoned from the time of death of the
donor-decedent. It is also barred by laches. While
Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest
to contest the donation of his deceased father. As a
lawyer, he should have known that the fact that he
actively participated in the case b/n Imperial and
Leoncio did not amount to renunciation. Ricardo, his
natural father, was even a lessee of a portion of the
donated property, and he could also have instituted
an action upon Victor’s death.
4. Executors and Administrators
Article 1058. All matters relating to the appointment,
powers and duties of executors and administrators
and concerning the administration of estates of
deceased persons shall be governed by the Rules of
Court. (n)
Article 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent
which can be applied to the payment of debts are not
sufficient for that purpose, the provisions of articles
2239 to 2251 on Preference of Credits shall be
observed, provided that the expenses referred to in
article 2244, No. 8, shall be those involved in the
administration of the decedent's estate. (n)
Article 1060. A corporation or association authorized
to conduct the business of a trust company in the
Philippines may be appointed as an executor,
administrator, guardian of an estate, or trustee, in like
manner as an individual; but it shall not be appointed
guardian of the person of a ward. (n)
5. Collation
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds
with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
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partition. (1035a)
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Article 1063. Property left by will is not deemed
subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise
provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired. (1037)
Article 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive
with their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit from their
grandparents in representation of their father or
mother, they shall bring to collation all that their
parents, if alive, would have been obliged to bring,
even though such grandchildren have not inherited
the property.
They shall also bring to collation all that they may
have received from the decedent during his lifetime,
unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which
case his wishes must be respected, if the legitime of
the co-heirs is not prejudiced. (1038)
Article 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to
collation in the inheritance of their ascendants any
property which may have been donated by the latter
to their children. (1039)
Article 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of
the child be brought to collation; but if they have been
given by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child
shall be obliged to bring to collation one-half of the
thing donated. (1040)
Article 1067. Expenses for support, education,
medical attendance, even in extraordinary illness,
apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary
gifts are not subject to collation. (1041)
Article 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in
giving their children a professional, vocational or
other career shall not be brought to collation unless
the parents so provide, or unless they impair the
legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum
which the child would have spent if he had lived in the
house and company of his parents shall be deducted
therefrom. (1042a)
Article 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in
satisfaction of the debts of his children, election
expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be
brought to collation. (1043a)
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Article 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and
ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and outfit,
shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as
they may exceed one-tenth of the sum which is
disposable by will. (1044)
Article 1071. The same things donated are not to be
brought to collation and partition, but only their value
at the time of the donation, even though their just
value may not then have been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even
their total loss or destruction, be it accidental or
culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and risk
of the donee. (1045a)
Article 1072. In the collation of a donation made by
both parents, one-half shall be brought to the
inheritance of the father, and the other half, to that of
the mother. That given by one alone shall be brought
to collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a)
Article 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall
be reduced by an amount equal to that already
received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an
equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the
same nature, class and quality. (1047)
Article 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding
article be impracticable, if the property donated was
immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its
equivalent in cash or securities, at the rate of
quotation; and should there be neither cash or
marketable securities in the estate, so much of the
other property as may be necessary shall be sold at
public auction.
If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs
shall only have a right to select an equivalent of other
personal property of the inheritance at its just price.
(1048)
Article 1075. The fruits and interest of the property
subject to collation shall not pertain to the estate
except from the day on which the succession is
opened.
For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the
fruits and interest of the property of the estate of the
same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall
be made the standard of assessment. (1049)
Article 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to
the donee the necessary expenses which he has
incurred for the preservation of the property donated
to him, though they may not have augmented its
value.
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The donee who collates in kind an immovable which
has been given to him must be reimbursed by his co-
heirs for the improvements which have increased the
value of the property, and which exist at the time the
partition if effected.
As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure
of the donee, no reimbursement is due him for them;
he has, however, the right to remove them, if he can
do so without injuring the estate. (n)
Article 1077. Should any question arise among the
co-heirs upon the obligation to bring to collation or as
to the things which are subject to collation, the
distribution of the estate shall not be interrupted for
this reason, provided adequate security is given.
(1050)
COLLATION
An act of returning or restoring to the common mass
of the estate, either actually or fictitiously, any
property which a person may have received from the
decedent during the latter’s lifetime, but which is
understood for legal purposes as an advance from
the inheritance. [Art. 1061]
PURPOSE: To compute the legitime of the
compulsory heirs and equalize the shares of the
compulsory heirs as much as possible
PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO COLLATION
(1) Any property or right received by gratuitous title
during the testator’s lifetime
(2) All that they may have received from the
decedent during his lifetime
(3) All that their parents would have brought to
collation if alive with respect to grandchildren
who survive with their uncles, aunts, or cousins
[Art. 1064]
(4) Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the
debts of his children, election expenses, fines,
and similar expenses [Art. 1069]
NOTE: Only the value of the thing donated is brought
to collation, and the thing itself. The value would be
determined by its value at the time of the donation.
PROPERTIES NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATION
(1) [Art. 1065-Art. 1068; Art 1070]
WHEN COLLATION SHALL NOT TAKE PLACE
(1) When the donor expressly provides so
(2) When the donee repudiates the inheritance,
UNLESS the donation should be reduced as
inofficious
88

STEPS IN DETERMINING SHARE OF A
COMPULSORY HEIR
Before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps
must be taken:
(1) The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all the payable
obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of
his death
(2) The value of all donations subject to collation
would be added to it.
Step by step determination of legitime: [Vda de.
Tupas v. RTC (1986)]
(1) Determine the value of the property which
remains at the time of the testator’s death; 
 to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
(2) Determine the obligations, debts, and charges
which have to be paid out or deducted 
from the
value of the property thus left; 
 (October 3, 1986, Narvasa, J.)
(3) Get the difference between the assets and
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary 
estate; 
 heir. Widow wants to declare as inofficious a donation
(4) Add to the hereditary estate the value, at the
time they were made, of donations 
subject to
collation; and 
 before his death, and were not subject to collation
(5) Determine the amount of the legitimes by getting
from the total thus found the portion 
that the law
provides as legitime of each respective
compulsory heir. 
 to collation – YES.
Where the collatable property is an immovable, what
may be received is:
(1) An equivalent, as much as possible, in property
of the same nature, class and quality;
(2) Af such is impracticable, the equivalent value of
the impaired legitime in cash or marketable
securities; or
(3) In the absence of cash or securities in the estate,
so much of such other property as may be
necessary, to be sold in public auction
129 DE ROMA v. CA
(July 23, 1987, Cruz, J.)
Facts: Candelaria de Roma had 2 legally adopted
daughters – Buhay (Petitioner) and Rosalinda. She
died intestate, and RESP Felicidad, as guardian of
Rosalinda, instituted administration proceedings.
Buhay was appointed administratrix, and eventually
submitted an inventory. RESP opposed on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated (several
parcels of coconut land worth P10297.50) by
Candelaria to Buhay was not included. RTC ruled that
the donation expressly prohibited collation, and that
the donation did not impair the legitimes of the 2
children. CA reversed and ordered the collation.
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Issue/Held: WON these lands are subject to
collation. – YES.
Ratio: There is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an
express prohibition against collation.
Doctrine: The fact that a donation is irrevocable does
not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the
collation required under Article 1061.
The intention to exempt from collation should be
expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception
130 VDA. DE TUPAS v. RTC
Facts: Tupas died, leaving only his widow was his
made before his death to Tupas Foundation. RTC
denied her suit because the properties were donated
because it was not made to a compulsory heir.
Issue/Held: WON the properties donated are subject
Ratio: An inofficious donation is collationable
regardless of whether it is a donation to strangers or
a gift to compulsory heirs, although Art. 1061 would
seem to limit collation to the latter. The fact that the
donated property no longer actually formed part of
the estate of the donor at the time of his death
cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. A claim of inofficiousness does not claim
that he gave what was not his, but that he gave more
than what was within his power to give.
Doctrine: Step by step determination of legitime:
(6) Determine the value of the property which
remains at the time of the testator’s death; 

(7) Determine the obligations, debts, and charges
which have to be paid out or deducted 
from the
value of the property thus left; 

(8) Get the difference between the assets and
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary 
estate; 

(9) Add to the hereditary estate the value, at the
time they were made, of donations 
subject to
collation; and 

(10)Determine the amount of the legitimes by getting
from the total thus found the portion 
that the law
provides as legitime of each respective
compulsory heir. 

89
 131 ADAN v. CASILI
(March 18, 1946, Ozaeta, J.)
VI. PARTITION AND
Facts: Felix Adan filed a case against his sister DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
Victoria and her husband, Casili to secure the
partition of their mother’s estate, consisting of 4
parcels of land (originally 6, but 2 parcels were
1. Partition
discarded – 1 was sold to municipality, 1 was the
Article 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the
property of their half-sister). RESPs countered that
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
these 4 lots were ceded to Victoria as her share, and
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
that Adan received more than his share – consisting
payment of debts of the deceased. (n)
of money (his expenses as a student from 1918-
1925), livestock (12 carabaos worth P30/head), palay
Article 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation,
(300 cavans at P4.20/cavan), and real property (2
division and assignment of a thing held in common
parcels of land). RTC ruled that the 4 lots should be
among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself
collated since the donation to Victoria has not been
may be divided, or its value. (n)
proven, and the alleged receipt of Adan of cash and 2
parcels of land was not proven. But it found that Adan
Article 1080. Should a person make partition of his
received 3k in cash (1/2 of which should be collated),
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
12 carabaos worth P360, and 300 cavans worth
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
P1,260, which more than the value of the 4 lots,
the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
hence it absolved RESPs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family,
Issue/Held: WON collation is proper. – YES, but
desires to keep any agricultural, industrial, or
only as to ½ of the amount received in cash.
manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of
the right granted him in this article, by ordering that
Ratio: Under Art 1041, allowances for support,
the legitime of the other children to whom the
education, attendance in illnesseti, even though
property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a)
unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary
equipment, or customary presents are not subject to
Article 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or
collation. But Art 1042 provides that expenses which
mortis causa, intrust the mere power to make the
may have been incurred by the parents in giving their
partition after his death to any person who is not one
children a professional or artistic career shall not be
of the co-heirs.
brought to collation unless the parent so orders or
they encroach upon the legitime.
The provisions of this and of the preceding article
shall be observed even should there be among the
In this case, it was proven that Adan studied
co-heirs a minor or a person subject to guardianship;
surveying and that during this time, his mother and
but the mandatary, in such case, shall make an
sister sent him money for his support and expenses,
inventory of the property of the estate, after notifying
amounting to ~P500/year. But contrary to RESPs’
the co-heirs, the creditors, and the legatees or
allegation, his studies only lasted 2 years (as it is
devisees. (1057a)
common knowledge that surveying is a 2-year
course). Since the career of surveyor is a
Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an
professional one, and since the expenses incurred by
end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
plaintiff's mother in giving him that career encroached
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
upon the legitime, it is proper to collate 1/2 of the
should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a
amount spent by her for him during the two years he
compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
studied surveying, the other half being considered as
the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he
Article 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the
had lived in the house and company of his mother.
division of the estate unless the testator should have
expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the
Total computation:
period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as
FELIX: Cash – 1,100; 12 carabaos – 360; 300 cavans
provided in article 494. This power of the testator to
at P2.20/cavan – 660; Amount spent for his
prohibit division applies to the legitime.
professional career (1/2 of 1000) – 500 = 2,630
VICTORIA: P2,783.55 (value of 4 lots) – 300 (money
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-
spent for funeral) = 2,483.55
ownership terminates when any of the causes for
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which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when
the court finds for compelling reasons that division
should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-
heirs. (1051a)
Article 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some
condition has been imposed cannot demand a
partition until the condition has been fulfilled; but the
other co-heirs may demand it by giving sufficient
security for the rights which the former may have in
case the condition should be complied with, and until
it is known that the condition has not been fulfilled or
can never be complied with, the partition shall be
understood to be provisional. (1054a)
Article 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality
shall be observed as far as possible, dividing the
property into lots, or assigning to each of the co-heirs
things of the same nature, quality and kind. (1061)
Article 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would
be much impaired by its being divided, it may be
adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided he shall pay
the others the excess in cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that
the thing be sold at public auction and that strangers
be allowed to bid, this must be done. (1062)
Article 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall
reimburse one another for the income and fruits
which each one of them may have received from any
property of the estate, for any useful and necessary
expenses made upon such property, and for any
damage thereto through malice or neglect. (1063)
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of
the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor. (1067a)
Article 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of
each property shall be delivered to the co-heir to
whom said property has been adjudicated. (1065a)
Article 1090. When the title comprises two or more
pieces of land which have been assigned to two or
more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of land
which has been divided between two or more co-
heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having the
largest interest, and authentic copies of the title shall
be furnished to the other co-heirs at the expense of
the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should be
the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a)
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PARTITION
The separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong.
The thing itself may be divided, or its value
WHO MAY EFFECT PARTITION
(1) Decedent himself duing his lifetime by an act
inter vivos or by will
(2) Third person designated by the decedent
(3) Heirs themselves
(4) Competent Court
WHO CAN DEMAND PARTITION
(1) Compulsory Heir
(2) Voluntary Heir
(3) Legatee or Devisee
(4) Any person who has acquired an interest in the
estate
WHEN PARTITION CANNOT BE DEMANDED
(1) When expressly prohibited by testator himself
for a period not exceeding 20 years
(2) When the co-heirs agreed that the estate shall
not be divided for a period not exceeding 10
years
(3) When prohibited by law
(4) When to partition the estate would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is
intended
(5) When the property owned in common is a
family home and the testator has not ordered
its dissolution
If the thing is indivisible or would be impaired by
division:
(1) It shall be sold in a public auction if one of the
heirs demand so
(2) It may be adjudicated to ONE of them,
provided the heir shall pay the others in cash
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
If any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may redeem the property WITHIN 90 days from
notice of the sale by the vendor.
132 LEGASTO v. VERZOSA
(February 21, 1990, Paras, J.)
Facts: Sabina Almadin executed a will devising
parcels of land to her four nieces. She also executed
a deed partitioning her property and assigning the
said parcels to the four nieces. When she died, her
will was not admitted to probate. Hence, the
administrator of her estate filed a complaint to direct
the nieces to deliver the parcels of land to her estate.
91

Issue/Held: WON the partition is valid – NO.
Ratio/Doctrine: It is an indispensable condition
precedent to a testator partitioning his estate inter
vivos that he have made a valid will disposing of said
estate among his heirs; and if this will be declared
null and void, the partition made by the testator in
pursuance of its provisions is likewise null and void. 
 shares to a parcel of land to Sps. Calaliman (RESP)
Since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of
the legal requisites, consequently, the partition which
she made of her estate among her nieces during her
lifetime is likewise null and void. 
 desire to exercise the right to legal redemption. Sps.
The conveyance is also invalid as a donation. Under
Art. 633, in order that a donation of real property be
valid, it must be made by public instrument, in which
the property donated must be specifically described,
and that the acceptance may be made in the same
deed of gift or in a separate instrument. In this case,
there was no acceptance.
133 TUASON v. TUASON JR.
(April 2, 1951, Montemayor, J.)
Facts: Tuason siblings held a parcel of land in
common. Nieves wanted to partition the property but
the 2 others refused, so she sold her share to
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. The three co-owners entered
into an MOA to subdivide the parcel into small lots
and sell them, later on dividing the proceeds among
them. Angela later revoked the powers granted to the
attorney-in-fact and sought the partition of the
property held in common. CFI dismissed her
complaint. Tuason alleged that the contract should be
declared null and void because it violates Art. 400 of
the Civil Code.
Issue/Held: WON the property should be partitioned.
– NO.
Ratio: The contract precisely has for its purpose and
object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the
community by selling the parcel held in common and
dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-
owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to
preserve the co-ownership until all the lots have been
sold is a mere incident to the main object of
dissolving the co-ownership. Art 400 of the Civil Code
then is not applicable. Of the 64,928.6 sqm total
aread of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sqm
or 2.5% of the entire area remained unsold at the
time of trial in 1947. 
The partnership is in the process
of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved. 
 The other compulsory heirs, oppositors-appellants,
Even assuming that Article 400 were applicable,
under which the parties by agreement may agree to
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keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding
10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining
1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four
years 
left of the ten-years period fixed by Article 400. 

134 GARCIA v. CALALIMAN
(April 17, 1989, Paras, J.)
Facts: A group of co-heirs sold their hereditary
without giving due notice to the other co-heirs (PET).
This deed of sale (with Extrajudicial Partition) was
registered in the Register of Deeds. When the other
co-heirs discovered the sale, they expressed their
Calaliman refused, claiming that the right to legal
redemption has already lapsed and the requirement
of notice in writing under Art 1088 is deemed satisfied
upon registration of the deed of sale. TC ruled in
favor of PET. CA reversed.
Issue/Held: WON petitioners validly exercised their
right of redemption. – YES. There was no written
notice of the sale, hence the 1-month period for
redemption has not yet started to run.
Ratio: Registration of the deed of sale sale as
sufficient notice of sale under Sec 51, Act 496 only
applies to registered land. In the case at bar, the
land is unregistered. 
 Written notice is indispensable
notwithstanding actual knowledge of the 
sale
acquired in some other manner. 

Doctrine: Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil
Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope
of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including
therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to
include verbal notice or any other means of
information as sufficient to give the effect of this
notice, then there would have been no necessity
or reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the said
notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a
verbal notice or information was sufficient.
135 RIVERA v. DIZON
(June 30, 1970, Teehankee, J.)
Facts: The testatrix left a will whereby she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
nearly her entire estate. Most of the compulsory heirs
received less than their legitimes. Marina (who
received significantly more than the other
beneficiaries) was appointed executrix and filed a
project of partition involving completion of legitimes.
also filed a counter-project of partition, but involving
reduction of the testamentary dispositions, alleging
that their shares should consist of their legitime PLUS
92
the devises in their favor proportionally reduced. CFI
approved Marina’s project of partition.
Issue/Held: Which project of partition should be
approved. – Marina’s.
Ratio: The testamentary dispositions in the testatrix’s
will was in the nature of hereditary shares. The
adjudications and assignments in the will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appears from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the
testatrix of her whole estate 
(save for small
properties of little value) that her intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will.
The dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition
by will, which by mandate of CC 1080 and of 
the
other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of
the testator's last will and testament, have 
to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the
legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
This was properly complied with in Marina’s project
of partition, wherein the oppositors-appellants were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed
and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and
the differential to complete their respective legitimes
of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their
co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were
favored by the testatrix and received in the 
partition
by will more than their respective legitimes. 
 province once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.
2. Extrajudicial Partition by Heirs
Rule 74, Sec 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no
will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of
the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole
heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or
of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount
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equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties
concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any
just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this
rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of
the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the nest
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
REQUISITES
(1) The decedent died intestate
(2) The estate has no outstanding debts at the time
of the settlement
a. There is a presumption that the decedent
left no debts if no creditor files a petition
for letters of administration within two (2)
years after the death of the decedent.
(3) Decedent’s heirs are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal
representatives
(4) The settlement was made by means of a public
instrument or affidavit filed with the Registry of
Deeds
(5) The fact of such settlement must be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
STEPS:
(1) Execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
which must be in a public instrument
(2) If there is only one heir, the heir must file an
Affidavit of Self Adjudication
(3) Publication in a newspaper of general circulation
for 3 consecutive weeks
a. Get an Affidavit of Publication from the
Publisher
(4) Pay taxes
a. BIR will issue a Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR)
(5) Go to the Registry of Deeds and present all the
documents (Deed of EJ Settlement, or Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication (if there is only 1 heir),
Affidavit of Publication and CAR)
a. RD will then cancel the title and issue new
ones in favor of the heirs
3. Effect of Partition
Article 1091. A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
93
adjudicated to him. (1068)
Article 1092. After the partition has been made, the
co-heirs shall be reciprocally bound to warrant the
title to, and the quality of, each property adjudicated.
(1069a)
Article 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty
referred to in the preceding article shall be
proportionate to the respective hereditary shares of
the co-heirs, but if any one of them should be
insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be liable for his part
in the same proportion, deducting the part
corresponding to the one who should be indemnified.
Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a
right of action against him for reimbursement, should
his financial condition improve. (1071)
Article 1094. An action to enforce the warranty
among heirs must be brought within ten years from
the date the right of action accrues. (n)
Article 1095. If a credit should be assigned as
collectible, the co-heirs shall not be liable for the
subsequent insolvency of the debtor of the estate, but
only for his insolvency at the time the partition is
made.
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only
be enforced during the five years following the
partition.
Co-heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to,
and accepted by, the distributee. But if such debts are
not assigned to a co-heir, and should be collected, in
whole or in part, the amount collected shall be
distributed proportionately among the heirs. (1072a)
Article 1096. The obligation of warranty among co-
heirs shall cease in the following cases:
(1) When the testator himself has made the
partition, unless it appears, or it may be
reasonably presumed, that his intention was
otherwise, but the legitime shall always remain
unimpaired;
(2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the
agreement of partition, unless there has been
bad faith;
(3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent
to the partition, or has been caused by the fault
of the distributee of the property. (1070a)
EFFECT OF PARTITION
(1) Confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him
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(2) Co-heirs are reciprocally bound to warrant the
title to, and the quality of each property
adjudicated
OBLIGATION OF WARRANTY
Proportionate to the respective hereditary shares, but
if anyone is insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be
liable for his part in the same proportion, deducting
the part of the one who should be indemnified
Those who pay for the insolvent heir has a right of
action for reimbursement
Prescriptive period for action to enforce warranty:
10 years from the date the right of action accrues
Prescriptive period for enforcement of warranty of
solvent debtor: 5 years from partition
OBLIGATION TO WARRANT CEASES
(1) When the testator himself has made the
partition, unless it appears, or it may be
reasonably presumed, that his intention was
otherwise, but the legitime shall always remain
unimpaired;
(2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the
agreement of partition, unless there has been
bad faith;
(3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent
to the partition, or has been caused by the fault
of the distributee of the property.
136 DE LOS SANTOS v. DELA CRUZ
(February 22, 1971, Villamor, J.)
Facts: Pelagia dela Cruz died intestate and without
issue. On August 24, 1963, de los Santos and several
co-heirs, including dela Cruz, executed an EJ
partition agreement (EJPA) for the distribution of a
parcel of land for the heirs of Pelagia. The parties
agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to dela Cruz in addition to
his share on the condition that he would undertake
the development and subdivision of the estate, all
expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from
the proceeds of the sale of the 3 lots. de los Santos
(grandniece of testator) filed a complaint for specific
performance against Maximo dela Cruz (nephew),
alleging, among others, that dela Cruz refused to
comply with his obligation despite demands.
RESP Dela Cruz admitted the due execution of the
EJPA, but set up the defense that the delos Santos
had no cause of action because the EJPA was void
with respect to her, since she was not an heir of
Pelagia. He also put up a counterclaim where he
alleged that delos Santos had likewise sold her share
in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the EJPA being
void insofar as she was concerned, he was entitled to
94
1/4 of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
Issue/Held:
(1) WON de los Santos is an heir. – NO.
(2) WON the partition is valid. – YES, but no with
respect to de los Santos.
Ratio: Under Art 962, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. In the present case,
the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz
are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is dela
Cruz. Necessarily, de los Santos, a grandniece, is
excluded by law from the inheritance.
In executing the partition agreement, the parties
thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that
plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia
de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such an heir,
the partition is void with respect to her. The
extrajudicial partition agreement being void with
respect to de los Santos, she may not be heard to
assert estoppel against dela Cruz. Estoppel cannot
be predicated on a void contract.
As to dela Cruz’ counterclaim: SC ruled that delos
Santos should restore/convey to dela Cruz his share
of the property, unless it was already disposed to a
bonafide purchaser for value
, securities of the inheritance shall not cause the
Doctrine: Partition of property effected between a
person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner
thereof and another person who thought he was an
heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by
law to succeed the deceased, is null and void.
Remote relatives or unrelated persons who unduly
received and took possession of the property of a
deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null
and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate
successor in the inheritance.
4. Rescission and Nullity of
Partition

Article 1097. A partition may be rescinded or
annulled for the same causes as contracts. (1073a)
Article 1098. A partition, judicial or extra-judicial, may
also be rescinded on account of lesion, when any one
of the co-heirs received things whose value is less, by
at least one-fourth, than the share to which he is
entitled, considering the value of the things at the
time they were adjudicated. (1074a)
Article 1099. The partition made by the testator
cannot be impugned on the ground of lesion, except
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when the legitime of the compulsory heirs is thereby
prejudiced, or when it appears or may reasonably be
presumed, that the intention of the testator was
otherwise. (1075)
Article 1100. The action for rescission on account of
lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time
the partition was made. (1076)
Article 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the
option of indemnifying the plaintiff for the loss, or
consenting to a new partition.
Indemnity may be made by payment in cash or by the
delivery of a thing of the same kind and quality as that
awarded to the plaintiff.
If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither those
who have not been prejudiced nor those have not
received more than their just share. (1077a)
Article 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole or
a considerable part of the real property adjudicated to
him cannot maintain an action for rescission on the
ground of lesion, but he shall have a right to be
indemnified in cash. (1078a)
Article 1103. The omission of one or more objects or
rescission of the partition on the ground of lesion, but
the partition shall be completed by the distribution of
the objects or securities which have been omitted.
(1079a)
Article 1104. A partition made with preterition of any
of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless
it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the
part of the other persons interested; but the latter
shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person
omitted the share which belongs to him. (1080)
Article 1105. A partition which includes a person
believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void
only with respect to such person. (1081a)
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF PARTITION
(1) Same grounds for rescission of contracts under
Art. 1380-1882
(a) Those entered into by guardians whenever
the wards whom they represent suffer lesion
by more than 1/4 of the value of the things
which are the object
(b) Those agreed upon in representation of
absentees, if the latter suffers lesion by more
than 1/4 of the value of things which are the
object of partition
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 (c) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors Partition is VOID with respect to such person
when the latter cannot in any manner collect
the claims due
(d) Those which refer to things in litigation if
they have been entered into by defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of competent judicial authority
(2) Lesion – occurs when any one of the co-heirs
received things whose value is less, by at least
1/4, than the share to which he is entitled,
considering the value of the things at the time
they were adjudicated

GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF PARTITION

(1) Same grounds for annulment of contracts under
Art. 1390

RESCISSION OF PARTITION ON THE GROUND

OF LESION
For the action to prosper, it must be shown that:
(1) The legitime of the compulsory heirs is
prejudiced, or
(2) The intention of the testator was otherwise

Prescriptive period: Four years from the time the

partition was made

OPTION OF HEIR SUED

(1) Indemnify plaintiff for the loss (either through
payment of cash or delivery of thing of the same
kind and quality); or
(2) Consent to a new partition
(a) The new partition shall not affect those who
were not prejudiced and those who did not
receive more than their share

WHEN ACTION FOR RESCISSION ON THE

GROUND OF LESION WILL NOT PROSPER
When the heir has alienated the whole or a
considerable part of the real property adjudicated to
him in the partition

BUT he has a right to be indemnified for cash

OMISSION OF ONE OR MORE OBJECTS OR

SECURITIES OF INHERITANCE
Not a ground for rescission, but the partition shall be
completed by the distribution of the objects or
securities that were omitted

PARTITION MADE WITH PRETERITION

Not a ground for rescission UNLESS it be proved that
there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other
persons interested

PARTITION WHICH INCLUDES A PERSON NOT

AN HEIR
SUCCESSION C2018 96