CASE# 6

G.R. No. L-49046 January 26, 1988

SATURNO A. VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, and FAR EAST BROADCASTING COMPANY,
INC., respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

Facts:

Saturno Victoria worked as a radio transmitter operator of Far East Broadcasting Company,
Incorporated. Along with some of his co-workers, they organized the Far East Broadcasting Company
Employees Association which they have registered with the Department of Labor; however the
respondent refused to recognize the association on the ground that it is a non-profit, non-stock, non-
commercial and religious corporation, which makes it not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time. When the union members were
advised that the company could not be forced to recognize them or to bargain collectively with them
because it is a non-profit, non-commercial and religious organization, Victoria led the union in declaring
a strike and picketed the company’s premises for the purpose of seeking recognition of the labor union.
Because of what happened, the respondent filed a case for damages against the strikers which was
addressed with an injunction or a ban putting a stop to the three-day-old strike staged against the
company.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision that ordered the striking members of the Far East Broadcasting
Company Employees Association return to their respective positions in the corporation and for the
company to accept back the returning strikers without loss in rank seniority or status. This decision was
appealed and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan rendered a judgment declaring that Far East
Broadcasting Company is a non-profit organization since it does not declare dividends and that the strike
is declared illegal as it was to compel the company to recognize their labor union which cannot be done
since the respondent is not covered by Republic Act 875. With this decision, the petitioner was
subsequently dismissed from the company and he alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior
clearance is needed from the Secretary before the dismissal of employees or cessation of business

Issues:
Whether or not a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still necessary before the petitioner could be
dismissed and whether the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan can be used by the
respondent as basis of authority to dismiss the petitioner without any clearance from the Secretary of
Labor.

Held:
The substantive law on the matter enforced during the time of petitioner's dismissal was Article 267 [b]
of the Labor Code [in conjunction with the rules and regulations implementing said substantive law.]
Article 267 reads:
No employer that has no collective bargaining agreement may shut down his establishment or dismiss
or terminate the service of regular employees with at least one [1] year of service except managerial
employees as defined in this book without previous written clearance from the Secretary of Labor.
The Supreme Court ruled to dismiss the petition as the union’s strike was deemed illegal which granted
the respondent the authority to dismiss the said petitioner from employment. Although there was no
clearance obtained by the respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the respondent explained to
the then Secretary of Labor of its intention to terminate the services of the petitioner, which is in effect
an application for clearance to dismiss the petitioner from employment; this was supported by the
affirmation as evidenced by the conformity to the dismissal of the Secretary of Labor. In addition, the
Supreme Court mentioned that the strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move as the law
enforced then, Republic Act 875, excluded respondent company from its coverage which implies that as
the union leader, the petitioner should have made sure that the conduct of the union’s operations are
within the law. The Supreme Court likewise ruled that petitioner is entitled to separation pay equivalent
to one-half month salary for every year of service now that his dismissal is deemed legal.
Case # 7
G.R. No. 169207 March 25, 2010
WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC., JOHN STEEDMAN, MARK WEBSTER, and NOMINADA
LANSANG, Petitioners, vs. JOCELYN M. GALERA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169239

JOCELYN M. GALERA, Petitioner, vs.WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC., JOHN STEEDMAN,
MARK WEBSTER, and NOMINADA LANSANG, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera is an American citizen who was recruited from the United States of America
by private respondent Chairman of WPP Worldwide and Chief Executive Officer of Mindshare, Co., to
work in the Philippines for private respondent WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. (WPP), a
corporation registered and operating under the laws of Philippines. GALERA accepted the offer and she
signed an Employment Contract with position as managing director. She was given benefits such as
housing allowance, company car as well as medical, health, life and personal accident insurance. She
was also entitled to holidays and given leave credits due to sickness and injury. It was stated in the
contract that her first three months of employment will be a trial period in which the company or the
petitioner may terminate the employment within one week notice.

Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before the Bureau of Immigration an
application for petitioner GALERA to receive a working visa, wherein she was designated as Vice
President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was constrained to sign the application in order that she
could remain in the Philippines and retain her employment.

Petitioner GALERA alleged she was verbally notified by private respondent STEEDMAN that her services
had been terminated from private respondent WPP. A termination letter followed the next day. Galera
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, incentive
plan, actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees against WPP.
The Labor arbiter held WPP liable for illegal dismissal and damages. He stated that Galera was not only
illegally dismissed but was also not accorded due process. The First Division of the NLRC reversed the
ruling of the labor arbiter and stressed that Galera was WPP’s Vice-President, and therefore, a corporate
officer at the time she was removed by the Board of Directors. The appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the NLRC. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the NLRC’s dismissal of Galera’s
appeal is not in accord with jurisprudence. A person could be considered a "corporate officer" only if
appointed as such by a corporation’s Board of Directors, or if pursuant to the power given them by
either the Articles of Incorporation or the By-Laws.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the NLRC has jurisdiction over
Galera’s complaint because she was not an employee but was a corporate officer of WPP from
the beginning of her term until her removal from office.

2. Whether or not the CA should have remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for reception of
evidence on the merits of the assuming that it correctly ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over
Galera’s complaint.

3. Whether or not Galera was illegally dismissed.

4. Whether or not Galera is an alien and therefore is not entitled to recover backwages, other
benefits and damages from WPP.

Held:
1. No. The CA ruled correctly that NLRC has jurisdiction over Galera’s complaint since he is an
employee and not a corporate officer of WPP. An examination of WPP’s by-laws resulted in a
finding that Galera’s appointment as a corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational
title of Managing Director of Mindshare) during a special meeting of WPP’s Board of Directors is
an appointment to a non-existent corporate office. WPP’s by-laws provided for only one Vice-
 President. At the time of Galera’s appointment on December 31, 1999, WPP already had one
Vice-President in the person of Webster. Galera cannot be said to be a director of WPP also
because all five directorship positions provided in the by-laws are already occupied. The
appellate court further justified that Galera was an employee and not a corporate officer by
subjecting WPP and Galera’s relationship to the four-fold test: (a) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s
power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to
be accomplished.

The appellate court found that Sections 1 and 4 of the employment contract mandate where
and how often she is to perform her work; Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7 show that wages she receives
are completely controlled by WPP; and Sections 10 and 11 clearly state that she is subject to the
regular disciplinary procedures of WPP.

2. Yes. Galera being an employee, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over her illegal
dismissal complaint. Article 217 of the Labor Code vests the Labor Arbiter with the jurisdiction to
hear and decide, among others termination disputes, involving workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural.

3. Yes. WPP’s dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due process. WPP failed
to prove any just or authorized cause for Galera’s dismissal. WPP was unable to substantiate the
allegations of Steedman’s December 15, 2000 letter to Galera, (questioning her leadership and
competence). Galera, on the other hand, presented documentary evidence in the form of
congratulatory letters, including one from Steedman, which contents are diametrically opposed
to the December 15, 2000 letter. Also, the law requires that the employer must furnish the
worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can
be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of
the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the requirements taints the
dismissal with illegality. WPP’s acts clearly show that Galera’s dismissal did not comply with the
two-notice rule.

4. Galera could not claim the employees benefits she is entitled under Philippine Labor Laws. The
law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be acquired prior
to employment. Article 40 of the Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the
Department of Labor. Section 4, Rule XIV, Book 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
provides, among others, that if an alien enters the country under a non-working visa and wishes
to be employed thereafter, he may only be allowed to be employed upon presentation of a duly
approved employment permit.