SSSP

Springer
Series in
Social
Psychology
Springer Series in Social Psychology

Attention and Self-Regulation:

A Control-Theory Approach to Human Behavior
Charles S. Carver/Michael F. Scheier

Gender and Nonverbal Behavior

Clara Mayo/Nancy M. Henley (Editors)
SSSP
Charles S. Carver
Michael F. Scheier
Attention and
Self-Regulation:
A Control-Theory
Approach to
Human Behavior

[I] Springer-Verlag New York Heidelberg Berlin

Charles S. Carver Michael F. Scheier
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
University of Miami Carnegie-Mellon University
Coral Gables, Florida 33124 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
U.S.A. U.S.A.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Carver, Charles S.
Attention and self-regulation.

Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Human behavior. 2. Control (Psychology) 3. Attention. 4. Self-percep-
tion. 5. Feedback (Psychology) 6. Behaviorism (Psychology)
I. Scheier, Michael. II. Title. [DNLM: 1. Attention. 2. Behavior. 3. Ego.
4. Models, Psychological. 5. Consciousness. BF 321 C331al
BF632.5.C37 150.19'43 81-2548
AACR2

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© 1981 by Springer-Verlag New York Inc.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1981

987 654 3 2 1
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DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4612-5887-2
For Nora, for Karen, and for our parents
Preface

"Seek simplicity and distrust it."

Alfred North Whitehead

"It will become all too clear that an ability to see patterns in behavior, an
ability that some might feel proud of, can lead more easily to a wrong
description than a right one."
William T. Powers

The goal of the theorist-the scholar-is to take a collection of observations of the

world, and perceive order in them. This process necessarily imposes an artificial
simplicity upon those observations. That is, specific observations are weighed
differently from each other whenever a theoretical account is abstracted from raw
experiences. Some observed events are misunderstood or distorted, others are seen
as representing random fluctuations and are ignored, and yet others are viewed as
centrally important. This abstraction and oversimplification of reality is inevitable
in theory construction.
Moreover, the abstracted vision builds upon itself. That is, as a structure begins
to emerge from continued observation, the structure itself guides the search for new
information. The result is a construction that is more elaborate than what existed
before, but it still is usually simpler than reality.
It is important for scholars to believe in the value of their task, and in the general
correctness of the vision that guides their work. This commitment, and the hope
of progress that follows from it, make it possible to continue even when the work
is difficult and slow. But there is a special danger here, a danger that should not
be discounted. The theorist must always be reluctant to believe that the vision is
complete, that it is wholly accurate. Simplification makes reality intelligible. But
the appeal of simplicity can blind one to the evidence that reality provides. And
it is still reality that we are trying to describe. No matter how pretty the picture,
it is of no use unless it has a reasonably good fit with reality.
These points are applicable to any field of scientific endeavor. But writing this
book has made us particularly sensitive to their implications for the analysis of
human behavior. The planning of this book began with a very simple goal. We
were going to describe a research program in which we had been engaged, and
discuss its relationship to closely related work that had been conducted by others.
Very quickly, however, the project began to escape its initial boundaries. In effect,
the picture that existed in our minds of how self-regulation works began to guide
a search for new information. That new information led in tum to a more elaborated
model of reality. The result of these changes in perspective is a volume that in
viii Preface

certain ways is considerably more ambitious in scope than was its original con-
ception. From a relatively simple (and safe) research monograph, the book has
evolved into a more complex (and riskier) statement about behavioral self-regulation
in general: we are arguing, in fact, for the viability of a model of self-regulation
that departs considerably from traditional models.
In making this statement about self-regulation, we are doing so in the full rec-
ognition that we are not always on firm ground. Some of the assertions in the book
are backed up by a good deal of research evidence. But other assertions are less
well supported. There are large areas in which knowledge simply is lacking, where
the research questions that we regard as centrally important have received only
casual examinations. The picture of self-regulation presented here is far from com-
plete. We are aware of this, and have retained what we hope is an appropriate
measure of "distrust."
A more specific statement of what ultimately became the goals of the book is
contained in Chapter 1. Before we commence, however, we would like to point
out some of the things that we have not attempted to do. This book concerns, in
part, the self. But we have not reviewed the accumulation of historically important
writings about the self or the self concept, ideas upon which we have implicitly
built (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Erickson, 1968; Gergen, 1971; Gordon & Gergen, 1968;
James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Wylie, 1968, 1974). We owe previous theorists in that
area a large intellectual debt, but a statement of their ideas is tangential to the
book's aims.
This book also represents, in part, a statement concerning a control-theory or an
information-processing viewpoint on human behavior. But we need to make a
distinction here between the use of information-processing ideas in analyzing be-
havior, and the use of computer simulations of behavior. Computer simulations can
be important in testing the viability of classes of ideas. But simulation of behavior
is not what this book is about. Thus we have generally ignored the literature of
simulations. (Indeed, we have been quite selective in our treatment of the literature
of human information processing.) Similarly, we have chosen not to discuss the
broader perspective of General Systems Theory-the notion that cybernetic concepts
are applicable at all levels of analysis of behavior (see, e.g., Buckley, 1968; Kuhn,
1974; Laszlo, 1972; Miller, J.G., 1978; von Bertalanffy, 1968).
Finally, we should note quite explicitly that we have not addressed developmental
issues, though there are theoretical perspectives on the development of self that do
seem related to the ideas presented here (e.g., Bannister & Agnew, 1977; Lewis
& Brooks, 1978; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). We have instead assumed a rel-
atively complete and mature adult in our discussion of self-regulation, a perspective
that is commonly taken by personality and social psychologists. Quite obviously,
such a perspective obfuscates many important issues. But we regard the treatment
of those issues as being the domain of persons other than ourselves.
In what remains, we have attempted to be scholarly without being pedantic, to
be comprehensive without being encyclopedic, to be concise without being cryptic,
and to be readable without being flippant or condescending. We hope that we have
succeeded in these attempts more often than we have failed.
Acknowledgments

We wish to make two sets of acknowledgments. One set concerns our professional
backgrounds, the other set is more specific to the book itself.
While in graduate school at the University of Texas, we shared exposures to
three individuals who were particularly important in our professional development.
Arnold Buss provided our introduction to the concepts of human social behavior,
and to the rigors of careful critical thought. His influence on our work is quite
obvious to both of us. Robert Wicklund's presence in the department provided the
vehicle for our earliest research attempts. His self-awareness theory (coauthored
with Shelley Duval) has been perhaps the single most impactful influence on both
of our careers. Finally, David Glass taught us the value of persistence in one's
efforts, of tireless dedication to the pursuit of information. His influence on the
development and presentation of our ideas may be less apparent to most readers
than the influences of the other two men, but it is no less important.
A great many additional people were instrumental in the production of the book
itself. Karen Matthews, Paul Neumann, John Anderson, Paul Blaney, and Margaret
Clark all read and reacted to earlier drafts of specific chapters. Robert S. Baron,
Daryl Bern, Marcel Just, Charles Kiesler, David Klahr, Herbert Simon, Robert
Zajonc, and Mark Zanna all commented on material that was ultimately incorporated
into portions of the book. We are particularly grateful for the critical efforts of two
other readers: William Powers generously reviewed a draft of the material con-
cerning control theory and the hierarchy of control structures. And Clyde Hendrick
took sufficient time away from his busy schedule to read and critique approximately
two thirds of the book's content. As usual, none of these persons should be held
responsible for any remaining errors or unintelligibility.
The manuscript was typed and retyped by Beryl Murray, Shelley Slapion, and
Mary Ryan. We owe Mary Ryan a particularly large debt of gratitude for the many
hours she spent at the word processor, trying to translate our scribblings into English
words. We also thank Lynne Auerbach for producing the figures that occur through-
x Acknowledgments

out the book, Patrick Farrell for providing clerical assistance, and Perk for phy-
siotherapy, without which the book might not yet be done. Last, but assuredly not
least, we thank Nora and Karen for their continued encouragement and support.

Charles S. Carver Michael F. Scheier

Coral Gables, Florida Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Contents

Part I. Background ............................................... 1

1. Introduction ................................................. 3
A Statement of Intentions ....................................... 3
Organizational Plan ............................................ 5

2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control ......................... 11

Information .................................................. 12
Levels of Information Classification of Input
Control ..................................................... 15
Negative Feedback Loop and TOTE Unit Organizations Among
Feedback Loops Positive Feedback Loops Hierarchical
Organization and Time Scales Section Summary
Applications to Living Systems .................................. 25
Homeostasis Adaptation-Level Theory Behavior Regulation
Information, Control, and Personality-Social Psychology ............. 30

3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory . .......... . 33

Defining Terms ............................................... 34
Attention .................................................... 34
Self-Focus and Environment Focus ............................... 35
Maintaining the Distinction
Varying Attention in Research .................................. 39
General Issues in Research Strategy .............................. 40
Experimental Manipulations and Individual Differences
Experimental Manipulations: Their Nature and Timing
Manipulations of Self-Attention ................................ .43
Validation
xii Contents

Individual Differences in Self-Focus ............................. .45

Validation
Convergence of Manipulation and Disposition ...................... 49
Validity Private and Public Self-Awareness
Beyond the Laboratory ......................................... 51
Naturalistic Variations in Attentional Focus ........................ 52
Attention to the Environment Attention to the Self
Conclusion .................................................. 55

Part II. Information and the Use of Recognitory Schemas ............ 57

4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases ....... 59

Models of Abstraction ......................................... 61
Instance Theories Prototype Theories Frequency-Distribution
Theories Section Summary Schemas and Prototypes
Abstraction: Some Additional Issues .............................. 67
A Hierarchy of Attribute Qualities Frames and Scripts
Decision Making ... .......................................... 71
Biases in Decision Making Section Summary

5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons ...... 77

Behavioral Settings and Environmental Taxonomies ................. 77
Person Perception ............................................. 80
Traits as Recognitory Schemas Determinants of Initial Category
Placement Consequences of Initial Category Placement
Organization of Perception of Sequences .......................... 89
Segmenting of Behavior Units
Focus of Attention and Perception of the Environment ............... 93

6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects •...•........•...••• 95

Trait Schemas and the Self ..................................... 95
Self SLhemas and Encoding Component Schemas and Degrees of
Schematicity Conclusion
Access to Self Schemas ........................................ 99
Self-Focus and Encoding by Self-Reference Self-Focus and
Activation of the Self Schema Access and Attribution
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms ......................... 104
Three Sources of Influence on Perceived Internal States Impact
of Each Element on Subjective Experience Schemas and Symptom
Distress Evoked Schemas and the By-Passing of Awareness
Chapter Summary ............................................ 116
Contents xiii

Part III. Attention and Motivation .............................. . 117

7. Standards of Behavior ...................................... . 119

Standards ................................................... 120
What is a Behavioral Standard? Categorization and the
Specification of Behavior Section Summary
A Hierarchy of Standards ..................................... 127
Levels of Behavioral Standards Conceptual Levels and the Physical
Execution of Behavior Distinctions Within Levels Summary
Programs, Principles, and Consciousness ......................... 136
Effects of Attending to Well-Learned Behavior Closing Comment

8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops .............................. . 143

Discrepancy Reduction ........................................ 144
Theory ..................................................... 144
Duval and Wicklund's Theory
The Comparison of Present State Versus Standard ................. 146
Self-Awareness and Information Seeking Self-Consciousness and
Information Seeking Self-Consciousness and the Seeking of
Diagnostic Information Self-Awareness and the Seeking of
Diagnostic Information Conclusions and Boundary Condition
Behavioral Matching to Standard ............................... 151
Nonprovoked Aggression Responses to Erotica Children's Use
of Standards Section Summary
Discrepancy Enlargement ...................................... 157
Reactance .................................................. 157
Self-Awareness and Reactance Self-Consciousness and
Reactance Self-Attention, Reactance, and Feedback Loops
Negative Reference Groups .................................... 162
Self-Consciousness and Use of Negative Reference Groups
Positive Feedback Loop
Social Comparison: A Theoretical Integration ..................... 165

9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation ..................... . 167

A Conceptual Distinction ...................................... 167
The Absence of Regulation .................................... 169
Causes Deindividuation and the Absence of Regulation
Remaining Issues Regarding Deindividuation Related Issues
Misregulation ............................................... 179
Ilustrations from Behavioral Medicine Illustrations from
Social Behavior
Chapter Summary ............................................ 182
xiv Contents

Part IV. Interruption, Expectancy and the Reassertion-Withdrawal

Decision ............................................. . 183

10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of

Expectancy ............................................... . 185
Interruption of the System: An Example ......................... 185
Response to Interruption: Assessment of Outcome Expectancy ....... 187
Bases of Expectancies ........................................ 188
Prior Success and Failure Other Bases for Expectancies
Consequences of Expectancy Judgments ......................... 193
Behavioral Consequences Relationship to Other Theories
Affective Consequences of Expectancy Judgments
Chapter Summary ............................................ 200

11. Research: Persistence and Task Performance .................. . 203

Early Research .............................................. 203
Discrepancy and the Avoidance of Self-Focusing Stimuli
Discrepancy and Selective Exposure to Self
Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy ............. 205
Avoidance and the Flexibility of the Discrepancy Self-Focus and
Expectancies: Persistence and Withdrawal Self-Consciousness.
Prior Outcomes. and Persistence Self-Esteem. Self-Attention. and
Task Performance Self-Awareness. Relevance. and Persistence
Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy .................... 213
Links Between Cognition and Emotion in Achievement Attributions.
Expectancy. and Achievement Behavior Prior Outcomes.
Attribution. and Maze Performance
Chapter Summary ............................................ 221

12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior ........................... 223

Self-Attention and Fear ....................................... 223
Self-Awareness and Phobic Behavior Self-Consciousness.
Standards. and Fear Expectancies. Fear. and the
Approach-Withdrawal Decision Self-Attention and Test Anxiety
Test Anxiety. Self-Focus. and Facilitation of Performance
Theoretical Comparisons ...................................... 234
Theories of Test Anxiety Self-Efficacy
Chapter Summary ............................................ 241
Contents xv

13. Additional Conceptual Issues: Achievement Motivation,

Helplessness, and Egotism ................................... 243
Achievement Motivation ...................................... 243
Atkinson's Formulation Relationship to Present Model
The Role of Causal Attributions Section Summary
Helplessness ................................................ 251
Reassertion and Giving Up Attributions, Behavior, and
Affect Section Summary
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance ........................... 255
Control Theory and Self-Esteem Maintenance Egotism and
Attribution Egotism and Helplessness Expectancies, Outcomes,
and the Effect of Perceived Difficulty Conceptual Similarities
Self-Esteem Protection: Public or Private? Section Summary
Chapter Summary ............................................ 266

Part V. Implications for Specific Problems in Social and

Personality Psychology .................................. . 267

14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior ................ . 269

Problems of Measurement ..................................... 270
Levels of Specificity of Self-Report and Behavior Insufficient
Sampling of Behavior Assessment of Behavioral Inconsistency
Conceptual Problems ......................................... 272
Veridicality of Self-Reports The Role of Direct Experience in
Attitude Formation Relevance of Attitudes as Behavioral
Standards Self-Awareness and the Use of Evoked Attitudes
Types of Self-Report ......................................... 284

15. Social Facilitation ........................................... 287

Drive Theory and Social Facilitation ............................ 287
Alternative Drive Theories
Control Theory and Social Facilitation ........................... 288
Comparisons Among Theories
Evidence Regarding Mediating States ............................ 291
Self-Focus and Comparison with Standards Drive
Palmar Sweat and Social Facilitation ............................ 293
Results and Discussion
Additional Questions ......................................... 297
Social Interference Comparisons Among Manipulations
Physiological Response Patterning
xvi Contents

16. Private and Public Selves .................................... 307

Self-Completion, or Self-Presentation? ........................... 307
Impact on Research Areas
Self, or Selves? ............................................. 309
Aspects of Self Implications
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects ........... 311
Public and Private Selves in a Compliance Setting Public and
Private Selves and Reactions to Coercion The Public Expression
of Privately Held Opinions Private and Public Self-Awareness
Reinterpreting Other Research Section Summary
Self-Monitoring ............................................. 322
Summary, Critique, and Integration

17. Cognitive Dissonance ........................................ 327

Self-Attention and Dissonance .................................. 328
Public and Private Self-Aspects
Tests of the Public-Private Analysis ............................. 329
Self-Focus Manipulations and Dissonance Reduction
Self-Consciousness and Dissonance Reduction
Relationship to Other Dissonance Research ....................... 334
Dissonance, or Impression Management? ......................... 337

Part VI. Conclusion ............................................ 339

18. Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory .......................... 341
Changes in the Learning Paradigm .............................. 341
Meta-Theoretical Issues ....................................... 343
Reinforcement Control Theory
Conclusion ................................................. 346

References .........................•......•........••........... 349

Author Index ................................................... 387

Subject Index ...........................•••.•.•.•.•............. 399

Attention and
Self-Regulation
Part I
Background

Most of this book is devoted to detailing our conception of an infonnation-processing

approach to the analysis of human behavior. Three preliminary chapters have been
written, however, to set the stage for that undertaking. Chapter 1 sketches out our
reasons for writing (his book, and presents an outline of the book's plan. Chapters
2 and 3, in contrast, provide background for the book's conceptual and empirical
themes.
We are arguing here for the usefulness of cybernetic or infonnation-processing
ideas in examining problems of interest to social and personality psychologists. But
these concepts are not, by and large, familiar to most people working in this field.
Before attempting to apply these ideas, we must describe the basic concepts, show
how they are interrelated, and indicate what implicit assumptions they convey. This
is the purpose of Chapter 2. We close that chapter by briefly discussing some of
the applications of cybernetic ideas to human functioning at levels of analysis other
than the social psychological level.
Chapter 3 provides a very different kind of background. Much of the research
discussed in later sections of the book relies on assumptions about attention. This
chapter addresses those assumptions and their empirical basis. Attentional processes
have several aspects, one of which is a selective or directive character. In Chapter
3 we discuss a dichotomy among the possible contents of a person's awareness
(self versus environment), based upon that selective aspect of attention. Several
issues which ariJe from that distinction are examined, and the utility of the distinction
is defended. Most of this chapter comprises a discussion of the ways in which
attentional focus is varied in research, both by experimental manipulations and by
measurement of individual differences. Evidence of the validity of each approach
is presented, along with a discussion of the usefulness of a research strategy that
employs both approaches. Chapter 3 closes with a discussion of the ecological
validity of the postulated distinctions, and a consideration of the kinds of conditions
that might cause shifts in attention outside the laboratory.
Chapter 1

Introduction

A woman seeking a job leaves her eighth interview with no success. As she leaves the
personnel office, tears well up in her eyes. She thinks bitterly to herself that the future holds
nothing for her. Will she try again?
On a sunny afternoon on a crowded street, a person crumples to the sidewalk. Others nearby
stiffen and pause, their minds racing, trying to decide what's going on-how to react. Their
d"cisions might mean the difference between life and death. How will they decide what to
do?
Students are discussing the state of the world economy while waiting for a class. The majority
are agreeing that the heads of the major oil companies are all extortionists. One listener
privately thinks otherwise. Someone turns to him and asks how he feels about the situation.
How will he present himself? What will he say?

All of these examples, taken directly from the subject matter of social and personality
psychology, raise important questions about the regulation of human behavior. How
do we feel and act, for example, when we confront obstacles in the course of trying
to attain goals? How do we respond to unforeseen occurrences in our personal
environments? How aware are we of our feelings and intentions? And to what
degree are those feelings, attitudes, and intentions actually reflected in our overt
actions and verbalizations? These are some of the central questions of our field.
And, in a sense, they provide the basis for this book. That is, this volume is about
the broad topic of behavioral self-regulation, viewed at the level of analysis taken
by the personality and social psychologist.

A Statement of Intentions
We had three purposes in writing this book. One purpose was to present in a
systematic way information derived from several programs of research. This re-
search concerns how people construct impressions of their environments and them-
selves, and the manner in which those impressions influence behavior. Our coverage
has been somewhat selective: We have focused primarily on recent research projects
4 1. Introduction

rather than conducting thorough reviews of background information. In all cases,

however, we have attempted to indicate how the research being discussed fits into
a broader context.
Research findings, while important, are in a sense "neutral" or noncommittal.
To be fully informative, they must be viewed from some theoretical perspective,
must be fit to some matrix of assumptions. In discussing the research that is presented
in this book, we have adopted one specific theoretical position as our vantage point.
To state this position briefly (and somewhat too simply), we hold that attentional
focus is an important determinant of people's perceptions and constructions of
reality, that variations in attentional focus also have a major impact on people's
actions, and that the consequences of attentional focus are best conceptualized in
terms of the processing of information. Presenting this theoretical position (in
considerably greater detail) is the second purpose of the book.
These two purposes, of course, are almost invariably intertwined in scientific
writing. And this book is no exception. The studies that have been emphasized here
are by and large studies with implications for the theoretical model that is developed
over the course of the book. Thus it will be no surprise that discussion of theoretical
issues and presentation of empirical research occur side by side throughout the
volume.
These two goals are the typical aims of a scientific monograph. But there is a
third purpose behind this particular book, as well. This purpose stems from the
following consideration. Any theory about a specific class of events always pre-
supposes one or another type of structure underlying reality. Theories of chemical
processes, for example, might be based on the assumption that there are basic
elements in nature which can be combined, separated, and recombined. An alter-
native set of theories could be based on the assumption that elements simply exhibit
different properties in the presence or absence of other elements, rather than com-
bining with the other elements. The theories based on these two assumptions would
be quite different from each other.
It is no less characteristic of theories concerning behavioral events than those
concerning physical events to take for granted one or another set of broad structural
principles. These suppositions are often implicit, sometimes arbitrary, but ultimately
their character has an impact on how behavior is viewed within the context of a
specific theory. This underlying structure is sometimes termed "meta-theory," and
sometimes a "paradigm" (cf. Kuhn, 1970).
We also have a goal in mind at this meta-theoretical level, as well as the more
typical goals of presenting theory and research. Specifically, in thinking about
behavioral self-regulation, we have come to believe in the potential utility of a set
of ideas known as cybernetics or control theory. The assumptions of cybernetics
are assumptions about the basic nature of organized, self-regulatory systems, be
they electronic systems, mechanical systems, or living systems. These assumptions
thus constitute a sort of meta-theory, an implicit picture of how reality is ordered.
Control theory has already been shown to be of considerable value in other
sciences. It is, in fact, a mainstay of electronics and applied mathematics. It provides
the underlying basis for the elaborate computing machines that we all take for
Organizational Plan 5

granted. But its value is not limited to designing artificial systems. It is also useful
as a way of construing existing biological systems. As is described later on, theorists
in other areas of psychology have made extensive use of such ideas, explicitly or
implicitly, for a considerable number of years. With very few exceptions, however,
cybernetic ideas have not been seen as an appropriate perspective within which to
conceptualize behaviors that are of interest to personality and social psychologists.
An underlying theme of this book is that the control-system perspective is a far
more congenial one than most workers in this field have thus far realized. We would
not attempt to argue that control-theory assumptions were necessary for the pre-
diction of every finding to be discussed in later chapters. Indeed, many of the
findings were initially predicted from quite different underlying assumptions. There
are, however, occasional instances where we see no obvious way to generate the
same predictions from other approaches. Moreover, even though other approaches
can account for aspects of the literature that is surveyed here, we believe that the
control-system perspective yields a picture of this literature that is more internally
consistent than that provided by any other perspective.
In sum, the book is intended to say three different kinds of things at the same
time. It can be read strictly as a description of a program of research, conducted
partly by ourselves and partly by others, a description that is fleshed out by dis-
cussions of research in related areas. Alternatively, it can be read as an extended
statement of a theoretical approach to self-regulation, a statement that is accom-
panied by research findings that tend to indicate its viability. We hope, however,
that at least some of the book's readers will choose to examine its statement at the
third level, and will give serious thought to the meta-theoretical themes that underlie
the theory.

Organizational Plan

We have organized the book in the following way. Because we have assumed a
control-system point of view in our treatment of behavior regulation, we have
devoted a full chapter (Chapter 2) to describing some of the constructs of control
theory. Included therein are examples of how each of these constructs relates to
commonly occurring events, and illustrations of how such ideas have been used in
the past by theorists in other areas of psychology. We have attempted to ensure
that this discussion provides a low-key, intuitively sensible, and accurate intro-
duction to the concepts of information and control.
Chapter 2 provides a background to the book's meta-theoretical themes. But it
is devoid of social psychological research and theory. These two areas are to be
the focus of the remainder of the book (beginning in Part II). There is one more
bit of background to be provided first, however. Much of the research discussed
in later portions of the book relies (explicitly or implicitly) on a distinction between
the self and the environment as potential objects of attention. Consequently, before
describing the theoretical model around which the book is organized, we have
included a chapter that addresses this distinction. This chapter (Chapter 3) provides
6 1. Introduction

an examination of the basis for the distinction, and a discussion of the rationale
behind various operationalizations of self-directed attention. It also incorporates a
description of the research strategy we have employed: i.e., generating a series of
conceptual replications using both experimental manipulations and measures of
individual differences in attentional focus. Because virtually all of the studies pre-
sented in this book are laboratory studies, this chapter also includes a discussion
of the ecological validity of an attention-based analysis of self-regulation.
In Part II we begin to discuss the theoretical and empirical basis for an information
processing approach to social behavior. A starting point for such an approach is
to know how people go about construing their surroundings and themselves. Ac-
cordingly, Chapter 4 describes theories from cognitive psychology which bear on
how perceptions are organized into relatively permanent knowledge structures,
which are then used in tum to identify new perceptions. This chapter also includes
some discussion of how such structures can come to exist at several different levels
of abstraction. A final segment of the chapter describes biases in information-seeking
and judgmental processes, all of which appear to stem in part from the automatic
use of heuristic strategies in decision making. These strategies are usually adaptive,
in that they save time and mental effort, but they sometimes lead to errors and
distortions. It should be apparent from this section of the chapter that the term
"information processing" does not necessarily translate into "thorough and highly
accurate. "
The concepts introduced in Chapter 4 are intended primarily as stepping-stones
to Chapters 5 and 6. That is, what is useful to the social and personality psychologist
about theories of concept formation and the organization of knowledge is the im-
plications that such theories have for the organization of knowledge about one's
world and oneself. There is beginning to develop a literature of research which
indicates that people do evolve and make use of categorizational systems to perceive
both their physical settings and the persons with whom they interact. Moreover,
the kinds of biases that are discussed in Chapter 4 also appear in judgments con-
cerning these categories of social information. This developing literature-i.e., the
application of theories from cognitive psychology to the subject matter of social
perception-is the focus of Chapter 5. Also discussed in that context is innovative
research investigating the way in which people go about separating the continuous
flow of experience into manageable and meaningful segments. Implicitly, all of the
processes discussed in Chapter 5 follow from the focusing of attention outward into
the environment. That chapter closes with a discussion of research which makes
that point more explicit.
Attention can also be focused upon oneself, however. And the result ofrepeated
perception of self-elements is the organization of available information concerning
the self. Chapter 6 addresses the use of such mental organizations in the process
of self-perception. One kind of self-knowledge is conceptual knowledge, infor-
mation that has been refined into trait descriptions, and so on. A variety of research
is discussed in Chapter 6 which suggests that elaborate structures form over time
to organize this kind of information about oneself. There is also evidence that the
Organizational Plan 7

accessibility of such structures is enhanced by self-directed attention. Another kind

of self-knowledge is the awareness of momentary inner states, such as emotions
and symptoms. Several studies suggest the implicit involvement of perceptual cat-
egory structures in experiencing such states. And there is also evidence that self-
focus enhances the tendency to compare those category structures with existing
perceptual input information.
The ideas and research discussed up to this point concern the ways in which the
environment and the self are represented internally, and how these representations
are used to identify new experiences. But these processes-important though they
are-are far from providing us a complete picture of an active, behaving human
being. What is conspicuously lacking from the discussion up to this point is any
sense of motivation, any provision for the guidance of overt behavior. Without such
a provision, we could easily be accused of leaving our human beings in the same
position as Tolman left his rats, sitting in a comer lost in thought. Happily, however,
there is no need to do so. We tum to issues of motivation in Part III. These issues
then remain central throughout most of the remainder of the book.
It is commonly believed that information-processing models of human functioning
have little or nothing to say about motivation. Nothing could be farther from the
truth. Motivation in an informational psychology begins with a consideration of
goal states: how to conceptualize them, where they come from, and what they are
used for. This concept-the goal state, or behavioral standard-is taken up in
Chapter 7. Our basic assumption is that behavior-specifying information is stored
in association with the knowledge structures (discussed earlier) by which we cognize
the world. Categories presumably vary in how much behavior-specifying infor-
mation they convey, some containing little or no such information, but others being
much more explicit. Behavior specifications can exist at a great many levels of
analysis, from the abstract ("write a book") to the very concrete ("grasp a pen").
This fact introduces several kinds of complexity, which are resolved by assuming
a hierarchy of types of standards, such that a very abstract standard ultimately
guides behavior by specifying tension levels of muscle groups. Chapter 7 describes
such a hierarchy. The chapter closes with a discussion of how attention can be
diverted from one level of the hierarchy to another, and some speculation about the
role of consciousness in behavior.
The specification of a behavioral standard is one aspect of motivation in a cy-
bernetic analysis of behavior. The second aspect is a system that regulates behavior
with regard to the standard. In Chapter 8 we present the argument that the behavior
regulation process can be meaningfully construed as the operation of a feedback
loop, and that the feedback loop at the superordinate level of the hierarchy is
invoked by self-directed attention. Recent studies indicate that self-attentive persons
are especially likely to seek out information that is relevant to a comparison between
their present states and salient standards. This sort of evidence suggests that self-
focus engages the comparison process that is inherent in the feedback loop as a
construct. Moreover, a broad range of research shows that self-attentive persons
actively match their behavior to salient standards, a finding that is consistent with
8 1. Introduction

feedback principles. This chapter also addresses another possibility: that there are
situations in which behavior is characterized by an attempt to increase discrepancies
between present behavior and a salient standard.
The regulation of behavior is often smooth and effective, resulting in close
conformity to salient standards. But there are several different circumstances in
which regulation appears to be disrupted. One possibility stems from the fact that
attention can drift from higher-level standards to a lower level of control. Self-
regulation may continue effectively at lower levels, but subsequent behavior may
be quite erratic regarding higher-level standards. This relative absence of self-
regulation at higher levels may be what occurs in states of deindividuation. Chapter
9 discusses this possibility, and describes some research relevant to it. Another
possibility for disruption is that behavior can become "misregulated," so that the
appropriate perceptual input is disregarded in the regulation process. The result is
often an attempt to regulate behavior on the basis of standard-irrelevant information,
which can be quite maladaptive. This process is also discussed in Chapter 9.
Another way in which self-regulation can be disrupted stems from the possibility
that the person cannot behave in such a way as to conform to the standard. This
failure can be a product of a variety of conditions, including task difficulty, in-
adequacies in oneself that preclude the execution of the behavior, or the presence
of debilitating fear. The issues surrounding this potential disruption of self-regulation
are addressed in Part IV. Chapter 10 presents our theoretical position on the problem.
Briefly, we assume that impediments to successful goal attainment lead to an
assessment of outcome likelihood, and that subsequent behavior is dictated by that
assessment. Affective consequences of this interruption are presumed to depend
both on this outcome expectancy, and attributional contingencies surrounding the
expectancy.
Chapters 11 and 12 present data from a series of studies which bear on this
reasoning. The first of these chapters focuses on performance and persistence in
situations where interruptions of task performance come about through mechanisms
other than rising fear. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of data concerning
the affective consequences of outcome perceptions. Chapter 12 applies the reasoning
to fear-related behaviors. Research is reported therein which indicates that rising
fear causes an interruption in behavior, and suggests that subsequent actions depend
upon one's expectancies of being able to execute the behavior successfully. This
reasoning is also applied more specifically to research on the phenomenon of test
anxiety.
The remainder of this chapter and the subsequent chapter focus on theoretical
comparisons between our model and other theories bearing on persistence and
performance. In the closing portion of Chapter 12 we consider current theories of
test anxiety and self-efficacy theory, and indicate points of overlap and integration
between those analyses and ours. In Chapter 13 we make the same sort of comparison
between our approach and three additional areas of theory and research: achievement
motivation, learned helplessness, and egotism.
With the exception of this material, most of the book up to Part V has consisted
of a step-by-step elaboration of a control-theory approach to self-regulation. To
Organizational Plan 9

some degree we have proceeded throughout the book in quite an egocentric fashion:
laying out assumptions, and buttressing those assumptions with research evidence.
Only rarely have we paused to consider the relevance of this model for other issues
in social and personality psychology. In Part V, however, we have taken that extra
step. We suggest there that the model developed in the preceding chapters has
important implications for several of the most widely discussed research problems
in the field. Four illustrations of those implications are addressed in detail in that
portion of the book.
For example, an issue that has plagued research on human behavior for decades
is the poor correspondence between self-reports and the behaviors to which they
logically should relate. Chapter 14 reviews a set of suggestions for improving this
predictive relationship. Some of these suggestions concern issues of measurement,
independent of any specific conceptualization of the nature of the behavior-self-
report link. But several other suggestions are conceptually related to the theoretical
analysis presented in earlier chapters. Most of Chapter 14 is devoted to these
arguments and the data which support them.
Another focal area of social psychology, an area that is particularly intriguing
to theorists who are interested in motivational issues, is social facilitation. Because
it has long been considered a major source of support for drive theories of motivation,
the social facilitation setting represents a challenge to any alternative conceptual-
ization of self-regulation. In Chapter 15 we confront that challenge, and present
data which call into question previously accepted evidence that audience presence
induces a drive state. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the meaning
of physiological indices, and a theoretical comparison among several experimental
manipulations of attentional focus.
That comparison sets the stage for the next chapter, in which we address the
following question: When is behavior guided by internal private needs, and when
is it guided by self-presentational considerations? The distinction between the public
self and the private self-made several times in earlier chapters-is elaborated upon
in this chapter, and is used to predict behavior in four different research settings.
In each of these cases, awareness of one of these two self-aspects was associated
with one influence on behavior; awareness of the other self-aspect was associated
with an opposite influence on behavior. It thus is clear that both aspects of the self
are important in each of these behavioral arenas, but that the influence of a given
self-aspect depends upon its being taken as the object of attention.
The public-private distinction can be fruitfully applied to a great many behavioral
domains. One application that is of special interest concerns the cognitive events
that follow from voluntarily engaging in a behavior which conflicts with one's
attitudes. Dissonance theory holds that such a tum of events results in cognitive
reorganization. But just how that reorganization proceeds depends upon what cog-
nitive element is most resistant to change. This, we suggest, depends in part upon
what aspect of the self is taken as the object of one's attention. Two studies are
described in Chapter 17 in which predictions based on this reasoning were tested
and supported. This chapter closes with a discussion of the implications of these
data for dissonance theory and impression management theory.
10 1. Introduction

We conclude the book by stepping back a bit and considering the broader context
in which we have been writing. No theoretical model of any kind is proposed in
a cultural vacuum. Social-personality psychology is a field that has long been
dominated by theorists whose assumptions derive from S-R learning theories. In
many ways our approach cuts against the grain of that tradition. We would argue,
however, that a very noticeable shift is beginning to take place in the assumptions
that social learning theorists hold. Hard-line behaviorists have begun to talk about
self-made comparisons between one's behavior and self-imposed standards, and
increasingly explicit statements are being made about the role of cognition in
behavior regulation. In many respects, these alterations in the learning-theory ap-
proach are moving that conceptualization closer and closer to what is, without the
theorists necessarily being aware of it, a control-theory approach to self-regulation.
This argument is made, in greater detail, in Chapter 18.
Chapter 2

Cybernetics, Information, and Control

.. . . . the servomechanism has always been only an imitation of the real
thing, a living organism, and the engineers who invented it had to be,
however unwittingly, psychologists. The analogy developed from man to
machine---not the other way."
Powers, 1978

Cybernetics is the science of communication and control. The publication of Norbert

Wiener's book Cybernetics in 1948 is widely accepted as marking the formal
beginning of the field, although most of its central ideas had been anticipated, and
some of them well elaborated, much earlier. In the years that followed Wiener's
statement, interest in cybernetics and control theory grew rapidly among practi-
tioners of a variety of disciplines. A large segment of the field of applied mathe-
matics, for example, is devoted to the intricacies of this approach to regulatory
systems (see, e.g., Berkovitz, 1974; Davis, 1977; Hestenes, 1966; Straus, 1968);
concepts of control playa major role in the engineering profession (e.g., Anand,
1974; Dransfield, 1968; Ogata, 1970); and cybernetic ideas have become increas-
ingly influential among economists (cf. Balakrishnan, 1973; Pindyck, 1973).
When considered in detail, the subject matter of cybernetics can become quite
abstract and complex. Relatively naive readers (of which we are two) might find
tackling a textbook on control systems to be a mind-numbing experience. On the
other hand, the essence of the cybernetic approach is really quite simple. We will
try to demonstrate that simplicity by presenting in this chapter what we consider
to be the central concepts of cybernetics.
We should note that these concepts will be used later in the book to talk about
the regulation of behavior. In the discussion that follows, we examine only concepts
that are relevant to those concerns. Most of the complexity of control theory which
will be ignored here involves parameters that need to be taken into account in
designing systems of control with greater and greater accuracy. If one is trying to
produce a better guidance system or computer, this sort of precision is important.
And ultimately it may be desirable for psychologists to attend to those subtle issues.
For now, however, we believe it is best to stay with the basics. For the same reason,
our description below is also devoid of mathematical equations.
12 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

Information
Let us begin with the term "information." Information is conveyed to us in massive
doses during every waking moment of our lives. It is the stuff of our perceptions
of reality. It is what we respond to, in social interaction as well as in other kinds
of action. Of the several terms that we will be dealing with here, information is
probably the easiest to gain an intuitive feel for. Once momentarily grasped, how-
ever, the term has an unfortunate tendency to become blurred and fuzzy in usage.
Formal definitions of this concept usually revolve around questions of entropy (cf.
Miller, J.G., 1978; Shannon & Weaver, 1949), though more informal definitions
of information typically take the form "anything that reduces uncertainty" (cf.
Brody, 1970). To get a firm grip on even this sort of definition, however, usually
requires that one presuppose one or another kind of system within which concepts
like certainty and uncertainty have meaning.
Let's consider two different kinds of systems, one electronic (a computer) and
the other biological (a nervous system). In a digital computer, information is implied
by (and thus "contained" in) the state of polarity of a binary relay. Such a relay
potentially can be either open or closed. The existence of either of these two states
(which may be ascertained by attempting to pass a current through the relay) reduces
uncertainty with respect to the two possibilities. The state thus constitutes infor-
mation.
The term information can also be applied to biological entities in a comparable
fashion. As an example, consider the sensory receptor cell. A given receptor at a
given time either is or is not stimulating the sensory neuron to which it projects.
The presence or absence of such activity constitutes information. In this case, we
can ascribe an intuitively sensible meaning to the information. That is, it is infor-
mation about whether or not there is an external stimulus present, of sufficient
intensity (and of the appropriate type) to be discriminable to the receptor.

Levels of Information
As was just illustrated, information may exist at an extremely low level of com-
plexity. However, it is also possible for very simple physical states-states precisely
like those described above-to convey much larger amounts of information. In the
digital computer, for example, the state of a given binary relay may depend directly
upon the states of six other relays (or a thousand, or a hundred thousand). That
is, the computer may be arranged so that this specific relay takes one value if and
only if certain other relays have assumed specific values. Any other combination
among those relays would cause the relay of interest to assume its alternative state.
The state of this particular relay thus can convey a great deal of information at
once. It can convey information not only about its own state, but about a complex
configuration of the other relays as well.
Again, there is a fairly obvious analogy to be made between the computer and
the nervous system. It is well understood that sensory information is not represented
directly in higher centers of the nervous system. Rather, it is "processed" along
Information 13

the way. For example, a given neuron in the sensory pathway may fire only if it
receives input signals from several receptors simultaneously, a phenomenon known
as spatial summation. The state of this particular neuron at any given moment (i.e.,
firing or not firing) constitutes information of a different order than that provided
by the state of a receptor cell. The receptor cell tells us that an external stimulus
is or is not present. This particular next-level neuron, in contrast, tells us something
about the size of the stimulus.
It should be obvious from this sketchy account that the nature of the information
provided by neurons along the sensory-input pathway varies considerably with the
number of intervening steps from cell to cell, and the type of transmission occurring
at the various steps (e.g., summation across time, or summation across several
cells all of which project to the same neuron). The information that ultimately
arrives at higher centers in the nervous system is quite different from what left the
sensory receptors. It has been organized, collected, transformed. It has been "proc-
essed."
We do not intend to discuss these intervening steps in any great detail. That is
the business of other kinds of psychologists. But we do wish to stress one point
more thoroughly. As lower-level information becomes "represented" to higher-level
neuronal structures, the higher-level information is fundamentally different from
the lower-level information. Every time one of these integrations occurs, some new
characteristic is being created that was not there before. The newly created infor-
mation pertains to a characteristic that is more abstract than is the lower-level
information. By integrating the lower-level information, this structure conveys
"upward" to higher-level structures information about this new, more abstract char-
acteristic .
Transformations of sensory impulses presumably become progressively more
complex and more abstract as information is sent to higher and higher neural
centers. One way of viewing the result of this process is as follows. The perceptual
event that is being experienced has been analyzed in such a way that its charac-
teristics along a great many logical dimensions have been assessed by the various
integrating centers. Its essence has been abstracted, in terms of characteristics that
exist at the various levels of analysis to which it has been subjected.
Consider an example that you might have experienced yourself at one time or
another. An environmental stimulus is producing activity right now at a group of
visual receptors, and the activity has been of a fairly long duration. Moreover,
instead of being fixed at one locus, the sensory activity is coming from a changing
pattern of receptors that reveals to the observer that the external stimulus (from
which light is reflecting) is moving, and is round in shape and pale green in color.
The relationship between these and other sensory patterns suggests to the person
in whom they are occurring that the stimulus is actually about 30 feet away, that
it is a tennis ball, and that it is a particularly "dead" tennis ball, as inferred from
the wallops that are required on the part of the (expert) players in order to get the
ball to move with any velocity. All of these characteristics-and more-are being
abstracted as the sensory input is being processed.
Note that these abstracted characteristics form a hierarchy, in terms of their
14 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

logical complexity. A characteristic that is derived from one transformation of

sensory input is less complex logically-less abstracted or removed from its raw
sensory experience-than is a characteristic that is derived from four transforma-
tions. The more relationships that are implied in the existence of a characteristic,
the higher that characteristic is in the hierarchy. "Stimulation" is low in the hier-
archy, the sense of "objectness" is higher, and "deadness" in a tennis ball is higher
yet.
In the computer, there is a little more arbitrariness about the physical location
of various things, but the analogy with regard to the system's functioning is easy
to maintain. For example, a series of numbers might be represented in a series of
discrete locations in the computer's "nervous system." A different component of
the system might access several of these areas (receiving information from each
of them), and create something new, for example, a difference between two num-
bers, which it then places in another location. This would represent a very simple
sort of transformation of the computer's "sensory input." Note once again that the
transformation creates something that did not exist before.
It is also easy to see how successive integrations and transformations can result
in successively more abstract entities in the computer. A set of elements before
transformation may merely be numbers. After one transformation, we have dif-
ferences; after another, squared differences; after yet another we have a sum of
squares. Eventually, given enough processings, we have something that is even
more abstract yet: the probability that two original sets of numbers came from the
same population.

Classification of Input
Discussions of the transformation of sensory input information (i.e., the creation
of new information through the kind of integration described above) often make
use of the term "information processing." There is another use of this phrase, as
well. Although this second use seems quite different at first, ultimately its rela-
tionship to the processes we have just described is quite close. The starting point
for this second use of the phrase is the fact that much (perhaps all) of our experience
is encoded in memory to one degree or another. The term information processing
is associated with investigations into the bases by which encoding and retrieval of
stored information take place. Such investigations could concern structural issues-
that is, questions such as where in the nervous system the information is stored,
and what biochemical processes constitute "storage." But the issues that are of
greatest interest here are functional issues. That is, what is the logical/orm of the
processes that are occurring when we store and retrieve information?
The analogue of this question in the case of a computer would be what is the
logic by which a given system-or a given machine language-goes about storing
and "finding" again the information that it is working with. Suppose, for example,
that the computer from our example above wishes to recover a sum that it had
computed a few moments before. How would it go about doing so?
One general conceptualization of the function of the storage process in human
Control 15

memory is the following. Any percept can be stored by isolating and encoding its
characteristics, or attributes. That is, each percept falls somewhere on every logical
dimension that is being analyzed by the organism. By determining the percept's
characteristics (completely or partially), we can locate the percept in memory either
by storing its various attributes, or by placing it in a multidimensional logical space
(one dimension for each type of characteristic being abstracted).
Now let's back up for a moment. This general perspective on memory seems
quite compatible with our portrayal, immediately above, of the processing of sen-
sory input signals. That is, many different characteristics are normally being as-
sessed simultaneously as any percept is created from the raw sensory data. Each
of these characteristics can be stored, or can help to place the percept on some
logical dimension. The percept may be considered to be defined by the totality of
these abstracted characteristics, or by its placement in multidimensional logical
space. (The computer analogy becomes somewhat cumbersome at this point, and
we will not pursue it further.)
This brief discussion of the concepts of information, information processing, and
memory has been presented here for a specific reason. We suggest-and this is no
particular insight of our own (see, e.g., Anderson, 1980)--that the various "end
products" of sensory information processing create records in memory; that these
records assume organization over time and experience; and that the organizational
structures are used to interpret-i.e., to classify-subsequent input information.
Several alternative analyses of these processes are presented in Chapter 4. We
believe that such analyses have important implications for social psychologists.
Those implications are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Control
The concepts of information and information processing represent only one facet
of the approach to self-regulation that we will be describing later. An equally
important concept is "control." In fact, although terms like information processing,
cybernetic, and control systems are often used more or less interchangeably, in
many respects control is really the heart of the matter. The following discussion
owes a great deal to William Powers' (1973a) detailed examination of the nature
of control processes and the way in which they might be realized in the human
nervous system. Readers who find such questions to be of interest will find that
volume an ideal point to begin (see also Powers, 1973b).
Control is a slippery concept. The easiest way to begin to describe it is to say
that control refers to the sequencing that is implicit in a series of instructions, each
of which awaits the execution of a previous instruction and upon which the execution
of a subsequent instruction depends. This sense of sequence is most clearly illus-
trated by the functioning of a computer program. One instruction is executed before
the next is attempted. The execution of the latter depends upon the successful
execution of the former. No matter how long the former takes to be completed,
control will not be transferred to the latter until it has been completed. Indeed, in
16 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

many cases the raw material for the operation of the latter instruction is the end
product of the execution of the former instruction.

Negative Feedback Loop and TOTE Unit

This program-like character is also very salient in the cybernetic construct that is
probably most familiar to psychologists, the TOTE unit of Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960). TOTE is an acronym for test-operate-test-exit (see Figure 2-1).
The test is a comparison between an existing state and some predetermined standard.
The system that engages in this test process is often termed a comparator, because
its function is to compare. The test process is a binary judgment process. What
follows depends on which of two outcomes occurs. The two outcomes are quite
simple: either the existing state differs discrirninably from the standard, or it does
not. If the comparison reveals a discrepancy between present state and standard,
control is transferred to a second process, called operate. In the general case, the
nature of operate is unspecified, except that it alters the existing state in some way.
Once operate has been executed, control is transferred back to test, which determines
anew whether a discrepancy exists. Test continues to alternate with operate until
an operation results in there being no discriminable difference between the present
state and the standard. That outcome causes control to be transferred to a new
process, exit, which ends the sequence.
The TOTE sequence is a general construct, in the sense that it is not bound to
any specific kind of physical system. The same sequence can be realized in many
different kinds of machines and living organisms. Probably the most common
concrete illustration of how such a sequence would work makes use of an electrical
system: the room thermostat. A thermostat senses the temperature of the air in the
room, and compares it to the preset standard (the room temperature desired by the
person inhabiting the room). If the temperature of the room departs from the
standard by a discriminable amount, control is transferred to a different portion of
the thermostat, which turns on a furnace (or an air conditioner, depending on the
situation). The operation of the furnace constitutes an "operate" in the TOTE-unit
sense of the word, changing the present state of the room, albeit indirectly. Once

(congruity)
- - - - - t•• L---.----:-J-------1.( EXIT)

(incongruity)

Fig. 2-1. The functions comprising the TOTE unit. (From G.A. Miller et aI., 1960.)
Control 17

the temperature of the room has become indistinguishable from the standard, the
furnace is shut off.
There are three points about this example that deserve further attention. The
first, and perhaps most obvious point, is that the TOTE sequence describes the
operation of a self-regulating system. The system interacts with the environment
to keep a sensed state in the environment very close to some preset standard. In
control-theory terms, this sort of self-regulating system is termed a negative feed-
back loop--"negative" because its action serves to reduce or negate any sensed
discrepancy. Negative feedback is also given such labels as corrective and com-
pensating feedback, because it corrects a sensed "error," and compensates for an
externally caused deviation. The result of a negative-feedback system is the main-
tenance of stability, whenever possible, relative to some predetermined value.
The second point that is worthy of note is that thermostats typically are designed
to be adjustable. One person likes his room at 68°, another likes hers at 78°. One
thus can cause the thermostat to regulate air temperature with regard to fairly
disparate goal states. The substitution of one standard for another is quite immaterial
to the functioning of the feedback loop, however. Its job is to sense its environment,
compare the sensation to whatever it has been given as a standard, and try to reduce
or prevent any discrepancy between the two.
The third point to be made concerning this example is the fact that we have
oversimplified things by making the functioning of this system appear to be se-
quential and "linear." That is, we have implied that once control has been transferred
from the comparator to another component of the system, the comparator stays idle
until control is transferred back. The truth of the matter is that the thermostat does
not really operate in this sequential fashion. It does not stop sensing the room
temperature while it runs the furnace for a while, and then checks the temperature
again. Rather, the whole system operates as a unit. Control is continuously cycled
among the components of the system, so that sensing is continuous. Indeed, in a
more sophisticated thermostat system, the operation of the heating/cooling device
can be made continuous, so that its output varies in BTUs from one time to another,
but its functioning never ceases.

Sequential VS. continuous control. An obvious advantage of looking at the op-

eration of a feedback loop as a step-by-step sequence is that it is easy to follow
it that way. Because there is clarity about what is going on in each step, the logic
of the control system is easy to assimilate. And ease in assimilation is far from
being a trivial goal. Moreover, certain systems (for example, digital computers)
do function that way. Control is transferred to a second process on the basis of the
outcome of the first process.
But the continuous-feedback perspective also has advantages. And, as is illus-
trated above, there are certain physical systems for which it is clearly the more
appropriate model. The functional advantage of such systems is that they would
seem to be more sensitive and responsive if it is necessary to deal with continuous-
rather than discrete-information. And at least some people (see Powers, 1973a)
18 2. Cybernetics, Infonnation, and Control

believe that the continuous-feedback model is the proper perspective for considering
the functioning of the nervous system, based in part on characteristics of nervous
transmission.
For our purposes in later sections of this book, however, it does not matter
particularly whether thermostats function in a sequence of discrete steps or as a
continuous loop of control. Nor does it matter very much which of these models
gives a more accurate depiction of the nervous system's functioning. Our concern
is going to be with large chunks of behavior. And on the discrete-continuous
question we will take no firm stance. We will often find it convenient to discuss
component processes of feedback loops as though they were discrete events oc-
curring in a sequence. But in other cases it will be just as convenient to think of
the entire feedback loop as the basic unit of discussion. We bring up the dis-
crete-continuous distinction primarily in order to point out the existence of an issue
that is important in other contexts.

Organizations Among Feedback Loops

We must take up at least one issue that is more important for present concerns,
however. It stems from the fact that the single feedback loop, however interesting
in its own right, hardly constitutes a complete model of much of anything. We
need more complexity. Happily, it is very easy to introduce such complexity, with
the not too surprising revelation that feedback loops can be interconnected. There
are two aspects of this potential for interconnection that deserve attention.

Decision-making chains. The first is based on the fact that the comparator of the
TOTE unit serves as a binary decision-making device. If the comparison yields a
discrepancy (no match), control is transferred to operate; if there is no discrepancy,
the transfer does not occur. The result thus can be seen as a simple yes or no
decision. (Note that we are implicitly assuming a sequential-control perspective in
this discussion.)
Such simple decisions can, of course, be easily linked in an endlessly branching
chain. To stay in the vocabulary of the TOTE construct for the moment, an operate
may be simple or it may be very complicated. Exactly how the operate phase is
executed may depend upon other conditions, each of which has to be examined by
the system before it acts. As an example of such a decision-making chain, consider
the "troubleshooting" sequence that is engaged in by an amateur mechanic con-
fronting a problem: The brake warning light of a car has begun to light up upon
applying the brakes. The standard, or desired state, is for the light to stay off. In
determining how to "operate," to bring reality back to the desired state, the mechanic
will typically go through a series of checks, from the simple to the more complex
(or, more commonly, from the easiest to the more difficult). This kind of series
is often described by means of a "flow chart" (see Figure 2-2). One begins this
particular troubleshooting sequence by checking the level of brake fluid in the
reservoir. If the car is low on fluid, one adds fluid; if it is within normal tolerance
limits, one goes to the next possibility. (Note that even checking and adjusting the
Control 19

(ENTER)

~
LOOK AT LIGHT
WHILE PRESSING
BRAKE PEDAL

LET
TIME
PASS

CHECK
LEVEL OF
BRAKE FLUID

YES
FILL
RESERVOIR

CHECK
BRAKE PAD
ADJUSTMENT

NO YES
TAKE TO ADJUST
MECHANIC BRAKES
WHO WILL
FIX PROBLEM
BUT CHARGE
A LOT

Fig. 2-2. Flow chart description of a troubleshooting and repair sequence: responding to
a car's brake system warning light.

level of the fluid comprises a feedback loop, a s:Jbroutine of the overall routine.)
If the light still goes on after the first possibility has been checked, our troubleshooter
goes to the next possibility, and so on.
Trees of decisions such as these are quite common, both in the functioning of
machines and in human behavior. It should be obvious from this illustration that
even a simple binary decision process, when multiplied in this fashion, can become
quite complex. This complexity easily allows for repetitive actions, as well. That
is, one outcome of a decision-making chain may be to reenter the decision sequence
at an earlier stage of the sequence. For example, although our amateur mechanic
may finally get his brakes fixed, he will continue to monitor the state of his warning
light. In this example, all outcomes ultimately result in reentering the flow chart
at that point, as long as he continues to drive the car.
Another example (adapted from a discussion by Turing, 1950) is what occurs
when a person uses a recurring reminder. Imagine that you are forgetful but in-
20 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

ventive. You have a pair of shoes being repaired, but you're not sure when they
will be ready. One way of making sure you don't forget about your shoes is to put
a note on the inside of your front door, which will be obvious to you as you leave.
The note will read something like this: "If you haven't got your shoes back yet,
stop on your way to work and see if they're ready. If you picked them up yesterday,
take down this note." A simple binary decision, but the result can be many rep-
etitions of a behavioral sequence.

Hierarchies. The fact that feedback systems can be interconnected has a second
implication, as well. This implication is more subtle than the mere potential for
numerical complexity in decision making. It stems from the fact that organizations
of control systems are usually hierarchical. There are superordinate goals, and there
are subordinate goals.
This fact allows us to begin to address more fully a point that we touched on
lightly earlier. Any feedback loop regulates behavior with respect to some com-
parison value. We have been calling this value the standard, or set point for the
system. Powers (1973a) has termed it the system's reference signal. In the simplest
regulatory systems this signal is predetermined and unchangeable. But in systems
with greater flexibility, many different values can be inserted as the standard of
comparison, a point that has too often been ignored by behavioral scientists (see,
e.g., Bandura, 1978, p. 352). An important question for systems with this kind
of flexibility, however, is where does the reference value come from?
The answer, for hierarchical systems, is that the reference signal or standard of
a subordinate system comes from the superordinate system. More precisely, its
specification constitutes the output-the operate, if you will~f that superordinate
system.
A simple illustration will clarify this assertion. Let us return to the thermostat
that we left several pages back. The thermostat has a standard of comparison, and
is busy regulating room temperature with respect to that standard. Its functioning
thus comprises a feedback loop. But the standard of comparison of this system is
not predetermined and unchangeable. A moment's reflection should make it clear
that if that were so, we would need a new thermostat every time we wanted a
change in temperature. Instead, the reference value is set by the behavioral output
of another control system, the inhabitant of the building. This person, whose
consciousness has been raised and bank balance lowered by the tightening world
oil supply, has a goal of his own: to conserve energy. And he is now regulating
his own behavior with respect to that goal. This person's goal-oriented behavior
thus constitutes a second feedback loop. More important for present concerns, it
is a superordinate loop. How does he regulate his energy consumption? By lowering
the thermostat in the winter and raising it in the summer. The person's behavior
(output) thus exerts its impact by specifying the reference value for the subordinate
feedback loop, the thermostat.
The hierarchical principle also allows us to explain why our amateur mechanic
would be relatively unlikely to choose what is in one respect the simplest solution
Control 21

of all to the problem of the warning light. That is, if all he wanted was for the light
to go off, he could simply disconnect the light. That would create the desired
condition, at this level of concern. But this solution ignores the likely existence
of a superordinate feedback loop governing the man's behavior. This loop has as
its goal state the maintaining of the car's safety. One aspect of maintaining safety
is ensuring the safe functioning of the brake system. The lower-order system, which
has as its goal the elimination of the warning signal, operates in the service of the
higher-order system. Thus a solution at the lower order that creates problems at
the higher order (that is, creates a mismatch between present state and reference
value) would not be particularly adaptive, and would typically be avoided. (See
Chapter 9 for a discussion of this sort of problem in behavior.)
These examples raise another interesting issue. It is possible for a superordinate
feedback loop to exist, but not to act in a superordinate fashion. And we will
ultimately need to consider the conditions under which this may occur. Return for
a moment to the example of the man with the thermostat. We said that this man
regulates the thermostat's set point so as to conserve energy (and thus money). But
on one particularly cold day he says "the hell with it," turns the heat up, and
luxuriates in warmth. Tomorrow he may be annoyed with himself for using fuel
so lavishly. But today he is unconcerned with that goal, choosing instead a more
primitive goal: warmth. What distinguishes the man's behavior from the one day
to the other? The higher level purpose hasn't gone away. It is simply being dis-
regarded. This issue, the conditions under which a superordinate goal or a lower
level goal is used to guide behavior is addressed again in Chapters 7 and 9.

Positive Feedback Loops

There is one more construct that should be introduced, in order to attain a sense
of closure on the basics of control theory. Up to this point, we have been discussing
negative feedback loops: systems that act to reduce any discrepancy between a
sensed condition and the reference value. But there are also deviation-amplifying
feedback systems. Because they act to further exaggerate sensed discrepancies,
they are termed positive feedback loops.

Time scales. Some instances of positive feedback arise from negative feedback
systems in which a problem exists concerning the time scale of the events that
occur within the system. We have totally ignored the dimension of time thus far
in our discussion, but time variables actually have a major impact on self-regulating
systems. More specifically, it is very important how much time it takes for the
effects caused by the system's action to register on the system's sensor (an interval
that is sometimes termed "dead time").
Consider a control system that senses a discrepancy, and acts to correct it. How
does the system "know" when the error has been corrected? Its only source of
information about the existing state comes via its sensory input channel. What
happens, then, if the action of the control system takes a long time to exert its
22 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

influence, or the influence takes a long time to impinge on the sensor? A negative
feedback system that is "well designed" or "well adjusted" will take the time lag
into account. For example, it may wait a while before sensing again. But if the
time lag is not taken into account, the comparison process continues to reveal a
discrepancy, and discrepancy-reducing action continues to be initiated. At some
point, the comparator will begin to indicate that the discrepancy no longer exists.
However, by that time a good deal of action on the part of the control system has
already taken place, the effects of which have not yet registered on the system's
sensor. When those effects-which were caused by the system itself-begin to be
noticed, they will be seen as a deviation from the standard, in the direction opposite
to the previous deviation. Because it is a deviation, it will be treated just as any
externally induced deviation would be treated. That is, the system will attempt to
counteract it. The result will be the same as before: An overcompensation (but in
the other direction), due to the time lag involved in sensing the effect of the action.
A good illustration of this sort of thing occurs any time a person who has never
handled a motorboat tries to "park" one for the first time. The effects produced by
a motor and propeller in water are much slower developing-and are correspond-
ingly longer lasting-than are the comparable effects of a motor and wheels on
land. Most novice boaters fail to take this into account at first. The result is that
they accelerate in one direction longer than they should, in order to counter their
perceptions of continued movement in the opposite direction.
If the time lag inherent in the system's responses is not properly taken into
account, the system's behavior will be characterized by oscillation: overreaction
first to one side of the reference value, and then to the other. If the overreactions
in either direction are not too large, the system will behave as a negative feedback
loop, but it will do so sloppily (see Figure 2-3-b). That is, deviations from the
standard will recur, but will become gradually smaller on either side of the standard,
until they disappear. (This is in contrast to a smoothly functioning negative feedback
loop, as shown in Figure 2-3-a.)
Ifthe overreactions are too large, however, the oscillations become increasingly
wider (Figure 2-3-c). A system in which this is occurring is functioning as a positive
feedback loop. It is amplifying the existing deviations, although it is doing so
inadvertently. That is, the system's internal organization is actually set up to produce
discrepancy reduction rather than exaggeration. But the failure to take the time lag
into account prevents its successful operation.
In other cases, positive feedback loops may exist with the express purpose of
amplifying sensed deviations (although there is some controversy as to whether this
occurs in living systems, see Powers, 1973a). This sort of positive feedback loop
is not characterized by oscillation, but rather by continuous amplification of sensed
differences (Figure 2-3-d).
Positive feedback systems of either type, if taken by themselves, are inherently
unstable because they are open ended. That is, they are effectively approaching no
specific goal state, but over time are producing an ever-increasing deviation from
some comparison value. They represent a "vicious cycle," and if unrestrained, they
spiral out of control (cf. Maruyama, 1963). Positive feedback loops do sometimes
Control 23

a) Reference b) Reference
Value Value

Time Time
I
/
/
/
/
/
./
/'

c) Reference d) Reference
Value Value

Time Time
Fig. 2-3. Responses of four feedback systems to an initial deviation: (a) a smoothly func-
tioning negative feedback loop, (b) a negative feedback loop with slight overcompensation,
(c) a negative feedback loop with sufficient overcompensation that positive feedback occurs,
and (d) a positive feedback loop.

exist in behavior, and in electronic control systems, but in many instances their
existence is maladaptive.
This is also true in biological systems, as well. For example, as we indicated
above, one kind of positive feedback loop (Figure 2-3-c) represents "overcompen-
sation." It is easy to see how overcompensation in behavior can occur and how it
can be disruptive. Consider the person who thinks he has made a bad impression
on someone else, and tries to undo it by bending over backward to be nice. Having
done that, he may decide he has been too nice, and revert to a brusque manner of
interaction. This person's behavior is erratic and quite unstable, and may be viewed
by others as somewhat strange. It seems unlikely to be very effective in attaining
the goal of creating and maintaining a good impression.
Another illustration of this principle is a behavioral phenomenon that occurs at
a much lower level of analysis. Called "purpose tremor," it results from certain
kinds of cerebellar damage and is characterized as follows (cf. Wiener, 1948, p.
95). The attempt to execute an intentional action (e.g., reaching for something)
leads to an alternation of overshooting and undershooting the mark. That is, the
result is a maladaptive oscillation of motor movement.
It is arguable, however, that when localized within the broader framework of
a more complex system with built-in restraints, positive feedback loops can be
24 2. Cybernetics, Infonnation, and Control

functional and adaptive (cf. Brooks, 1969; McFarland, 1971; Myerson & Miezin,
1980). For a positive feedback loop to have adaptive utility would seem to require
two conditions. First, it would seem necessary that the positive loop be functioning
as a subordinate system in the service of a superordinate negative loop. Second,
its action would probably have to be of a relatively short duration, and would have
to be constrainable by other systems. That is, a positive loop on its own would
continue to amplify a sensed deviation endlessly, unless its operation was inter-
rupted by the actions of a superordinate system.

Identifying a positive loop. There is a caution that should be applied, if one is

attempting to verify the existence of a positive feedback loop. Specifically, it can
sometimes be very difficult to determine whether a system's actions are aimed at
exaggerating a discrepancy between a sensed value and a standard, or acting instead
to reduce a discrepancy between the sensed value and some different standard. Said
another way, the reference value that seems most obvious to the observer may not
be the reference value that is actually being used by the system itself. Given that
negative feedback loops are nearly ubiquitous, and that positive loops are apparently
rarer, the observer must be careful to keep in mind that appearances can be deceiving
in this regard.

Hierarchical Organization and Time Scales

As indicated above, effective functioning of any given feedback system requires
that the time dimension be taken into account. Failure to do so can result in
instability and self-induced oscillation (Figure 2-3). But there is another sense in
which time considerations matter to the stable functioning of control systems. This
issue is introduced when one considers the existence of a hierarchy of control.
We described in a previous section how control systems can be ordered hier-
archically, a superordinate system acting by resetting the reference values for
subordinate systems. A point that was implicit in at least one of our illustrations
of that principle was that the various levels of the hierarchy operate on different
time scales (cf. Pew, 1974; Shallice, 1978). More specifically, a superordinate
loop operates more slowly than do subordinate loops. The thermostat calls for
adjustments of room temperature several times during an hour. But the man who
is "conserving energy" makes adjustments in the thermostat only rarely. The goal
of bringing room temperature into line takes just a few minutes. But the goal of
energy conservation is attained only over a matter of weeks or months.
There are probably several bases for this difference in time scales at the various
levels of a hierarchy. For example, the information that is sensed by a lower-order
system is less abstract than the information sensed by a higher-order system. Said
differently, it may require a lot of processing to create the perceptual input that the
higher-level system compares with its reference value. Producing meaningful input
for a lower-level system requires much less processing. The result is a greater time
lag at the higher level.
Moreover, the need to prevent self-induced oscillation at these higher levels
Applications to Living Systems 25

results in further slowing and smoothing of higher-level activities (cf. Powers,

1979). That is, a superordinate loop reduces its discrepancies by changing reference
values for subordinate loops, which those loops then match. Increased delays at
the upper level are created by the fact that the subordinate systems take some time
to make their own adjustments. Thus, the higher-order system must take into
account not only the delays imposed by its own functioning, but also the delays
inherent in lower-level functioning.
When viewed in this light, it is no surprise that the higher in a hierarchy one
goes, the slower are the corrections of sensed deviations from reference values. In
brief, lower-level discrepancies are more "demanding," in the sense that higher-
level discrepancies cannot be reduced without the reduction of a great many lower-
level discrepancies. The implications of this differences in time scales will become
apparent later on (Chapters 7 and 9).

Section Summary
In the preceding pages we have touched on what we perceive as the essentials of
the control-theory approach to regulatory systems. The basic structure of control
in this context is the negative feedback loop. To recapitulate briefly, the feedback
loop incorporates three functions: the sensing of some condition external to itself,
the comparison of this sensed state against some reference value or standard, and
the exertion of some influence (direct or indirect) on the condition that is being
sensed. The overall function served by this structure is to keep the discrepancy
between the sensed value and the comparison value to a minimum. In very restrictive
systems the comparison value is permanently fixed. But in systems with greater
flexibility, one standard of comparison can be substituted for another. Potential
complexity of organization in cybernetic systems is added by the fact that feedback
loops can be linked to each other. Moreover, because such organizations are often
hierarchical, there is an eminently reasonable basis for postulating a great deal of
flexibility in the conduct of self-regulation. Specifically, in a hierarchical organi-
zation, the action of a superordinate control system constitutes the resetting of the
reference value or standard of comparison for a subordinate control system.

Applications to Living Systems

As has been implicit throughout the chapter, the constructs of control theory are
applicable to self-regulation in living systems as well as electromechanical systems.
Indeed, it is common for medical texts to include discussions of feedback principles,
because of the widespread utilization of such ideas in theories of physiological
regulation (e.g., Guyton, 1976). As we described the central constructs of infor-
mation and control theory, we made an effort to use examples that illustrate the
breadth of potential applicability of the constructs. However, we would like to take
a little time to examine how theorists have for some time utilized these constructs--
explicitly or implicitly-in discussing the regulation of living systems.
26 2. Cybernetics, Information, and Control

Homeostasis
Surely the most obvious application of control theory to living systems is the
concept of homeostatic mechanisms (cf. Jones, R.W., 1973). Homeostasis is the
process by which living organisms regulate their internal environments. It is a
process that goes on constantly. Homeostatic mechanisms regulate the levels of
oxygen and carbon dioxide in our blood, as well as sugar and other nutrients, and
lactic acid and other wastes. Homeostatic mechanisms keep us from drying out or
becoming waterlogged. They keep us from being too cool or being too hot. In
short, homeostatic mechanisms function to maintain stability in the face of con-
tinually changing external conditions.
This summary statement regarding the function of homeostasis is, of course,
very nearly the precise definition of a negative feedback loop. Indeed, Cannon
(1929, 1932), who is widely acknowledged to have been the first to prominently
employ the concept of homeostasis, provided a strong and clear foreshadowing of
the evolution of control theory. Cannon held that the very constancy of the internal
environment constituted evidence that there are active processes for which such
constancy was a never-ending goal. Further, this suggested to him the possible
existence of broader principles of stabilization, and he offered the hope that others
would pursue this possibility.

Feedback control of body temperature. We would like to discuss one example

of a homeostatic mechanism in some detail, because it illustrates fairly clearly at
least two ofthe principles discussed earlier. This example (based on a more complete
account by Hassenstein, 1971) is the process by which body temperature is reg-
ulated. A warm-blooded animal that is exposed to an external temperature that is
too warm or too cold will react in a stereotypic way as heat begins to flow into or
out of its body. For example, human beings respond to too much warmth by
secreting sweat. Once it reaches the skin's surface, the sweat evaporates sponta-
neously, and by doing so lowers the temperature of the skin from which it evap-
orates. The skin of a person who is too warm is suffused with blood. As the skin
cools, this blood near the surface is also cooled. The cooler blood then is carried
into interior sections of the body, thereby cooling the rest of the system.
The most noticeable reaction of a human being who is exposed to too low a
temperature is shivering. Shivering is caused by the simultaneous contractions of
opposed skeletal muscles. Except for some slight trembling, these contractions
produce no movement. Because the tensing of the muscles thus releases so little
mechanical energy, a great proportion of the energy used to produce the contractions
is converted to heat. This heat, then, compensates for heat lost to the environment.
At the core of these responses to heat and cold are the same three functions that
we discussed in the context of feedback loops. There is some sensor that registers
deviations in body temperature. There are organs that produce effects which serve
to reduce or to raise the body's temperature. And presumably there is a mechanism
that monitors the sensor's reports and compares them with a reference value. The
result is that any sensed deviation from the set point is followed by a change in the
Applications to Living Systems 27

body's functioning, "authorized" by the comparator, such that the deviation is

exactly countered. The change in functioning that occurs may be quite broad and
pervasive, involving many bodily systems which vary widely in type as well as
location. But the overall effect is still that of a simple negative feedback system,
maintaining congruity between a sensed value and a reference point (cf. Schwartz,
1979a, 1979b).

Reference input. There is also a second point to be made with this example. This
point is that the reference value for temperature regulation is not precisely fixed.
This feedback system does not always act to maintain the organism's "normal"
temperature. Instead, the reference value for this system is supplied to it by another
control system, which is regulating another aspect of the body's homeostasis.
Consider the condition known as fever. In a fever, body temperature is elevated
to a level higher than normal (for reasons that are not well understood). But the
body's temperature regulation system does not respond to this elevation by seeking
to reduce it, as would normally be the case. Quite the contrary. While the fever
is in progress, this system will act to maintain body temperature at this higher level.
If the fever raises the body's stable temperature from 37°C to 39°C, an externally
imposed stimulus that temporarily lowers the body temperature to 38°C will lead
to shivering (see Hassenstein, 1971, especially pp. 56-58). That is, the momentary
reduction will immediately be opposed and counteracted by the temperature-reg-
ulating feedback loop. But note that 38°C is still a higher temperature than "normal."
In the person who has nO fever, the momentary presence of this temperature would
elicit not shivering but sweating. Thus, the identical state of affairs-a temporary
temperature of 38°C-leads a person with a fever and a person without a fever to
exhibit diametrically opposed corrective actions.
When a fever is in progress, the temperature regulating system has not given up
or gone haywire. It is still faithfully regulating, still reducing sensed error. But now
it is regulating with respect to a new value, a new standard of comparison. It is
now acting to keep the body's temperature elevated slightly above normal. This
shift is easily accounted for in terms of control theory by saying that the comparator
of this feedback system has been provided with a new reference value. This variation
in the set point of the system indicates that this homeostatic mechanism has greater
flexibility than we might have given it credit for having.
Where does the new reference value come from? To anSwer this question requires
that we also address another question: where did the old reference value come from?
In both cases, the anSwer is the same. It is the output of a superordinate control
system.
As was argued several pages ago, control systems can be arranged in a hierarchy,
such that the output of a superordinate feedback loop constitutes the reference value
for a subordinate loop. Our earlier illustration of such an organization was that of
a thermostat regUlating room temperature, and a man regulating the thermostat. The
present situation provides us with another illustration. In this case, the super-
ordinate system has senSors that respond to some stimuli that are associated with
the presence of disease organisms. The standard, or comparison value, for this
28 2. Cybernetics, Infonnation, and Control

system is an absence of such stimuli. Its output when this is the case is to call for
whatever constitutes normal body temperature. When the sensed state differs from
the reference value, i.e., when there is evidence of the presence of disease, this
system changes its output. It now calls for a higher body temperature. In both
cases, however, the output of this superordinate system constitutes the reference
value, or standard of comparison, for the subordinate system (this relationship is
illustrated graphically in Figure 2-4).
An analogy to our previous example-the man with the thermostat-may be
useful here. Forget that the man has concerns about the shortage of heating oil.
Imagine instead that he lives in Florida, and is occasionally bothered by parasitic
visitors. He knows, however, that the visitors have trouble with the heat. Whenever
they arrive, he turns off the air conditioning. After a brief bout with the elevated
interior temperature, the guests depart, and the man reactivates the air conditioner.

Adaptation-Level Theory
The points that were just made regarding homeostatic self-regulation can also be
made with regard to perceptual phenomena. We take it for granted that our per-
ceptions of objects and events depend in part on the context in which they occur.
But this simple assumption obscures some important complexity. Adaptation-level
theory (Helson, 1959, 1964; see also Appley, 1971) was devised to formalize some
of that complexity.
We very clearly can distinguish between different shades of a color on sample
paint chips when they are presented within a short period of time and in the same
lighting conditions. We apparently do this by creating some temporary represen-
tation of the color, and then using it as a standard to which we compare a subsequent
image. These temporary subjective standards are called adaptation levels. This
comparison process apparently is not conscious. We are only aware of the result:
a perception of a second shade that is either lighter or darker than the first. Even
if unconscious, however, the process being postulated is the kind of comparison
that suggests a feedback system.
In addition, we should note that these internal standards are flexible, in the
following sense. If the lighting in the situation is suddenly changed, the absolute
level of visual stimulation from any specific paint chip also changes. But our
perception of the color of that chip stays constant, because the changing environ-
mental condition also causes a shift in the internal standard. It is this shift in standard
that causes the perception to seem constant. What shifts the standard? A superor-
dinate control system that reacts to the change in the context by specifying a different
intensity as the standard.
Usually this relative ease in changing internal standards is useful. It is the mech-
anism that makes perceptual constancies possible. But it is an imperfect process.
Anyone who has bought a can of paint without taking along a sample of the color
to be matched is aware of just how imperfect it can be. The lighting conditions in
the store change one's adaptation level. But the degree of change can be hard to
judge. And more often than not, the result is a terrible mismatch between the old
paint and the new.
Applications to Living Systems 29

SPECIFIED
REFERENCE VALUE:
NO EVIDENCE
OF DISEASE

t
PRESENT ~'l COMPARATOR 1
~
-+ LEVEL OF
DISEASE
INDICANTS t
OUTPUT OF SYSTEM 1
AND REFERENCE VALUE
OF SYSTEM 2:
SPECtFICA nON OF
TEMPERATURE

t
PRESENT ~·I COMPARATOR
2 I
TEMPERATURE

~ ~
t
OUTPUT OF SYSTEM 2:
BEHAVIOR, e.g.,

•
SHIVERING OR SWEATING

(UNSPECIFIED) INTERVENING
INFLUENCE ON DISEASE
ORGANISMS

Fig. 2-4. Temperature regulation: two feedback loops organized in a hierarchical fashion.

Behavior Regulation
The preceding two sections illustrate the high degree of correspondence between
the processes central to control theory and ideas developed by a number of psy-
chologists concerning the regulation of internal states and perceptual experiences.
Other psychologists have also taken up the possibility that the principles of control
theory may have important implications for goal-directed behavior, phenomena that
30 2. Cybernetics, Infonnation, and Control

would more commonly be treated as motivational in nature. There was quite a

flurry of interest in this possibility in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Newell, Shaw,
and Simon (1958) proposed an information-processing analysis of problem-solving
activity (see also Newell & Simon, 1961; Simon & Newell, 1962); A. Jones and
McGill (1967) provided evidence of the homeostatic nature of the regulation of
information seeking; G.A. Miller et al. (1960) presented their TOTE-unit analysis
of behavioral regulation; and several others (e.g., Guilford, 1965; Hunt, 1965;
Taylor, D. W., 1960) talked enthusiastically about the promising possibility of using
constructs from information and control theory in understanding motivation.
Despite the early burst of enthusiasm among this group of theorists, however,
social and personality psychologists in the 1950s and 1960s had little interest in
analyzing self-regulation in information processing terms. In part, this disinterest
seems attributable to the fact that social and personality psychologists were absorbed
in the process of mapping out the basic behavioral phenomena of their field. More-
over, reinforcement and conditioning theories were in full flower during this period,
and there seemed little reason to entertain serious consideration of fundamentally
new motivational principles. In part, however, the lack of interest on the part of
personality and social psychologists is probably attributable to the relative "inac-
cessibility" of control theory: the unfamiliarity of its constructs and assumptions,
and the fact that its origins were very distant from social and personality psychology.
(In fact, this is probably still true today, or we would not have felt the need to
write this chapter.)
There were exceptions to this general rule, of course. Loehlin (1968), for ex-
ample, constructed a computer simulation of the way personality functions in one
relatively restricted domain. This exercise served to point out some of the ways in
which informational constructs could be useful in discussing phenomena such as
changes in attitudes over time and experience. Loehlin's (1968) book on the subject
also discussed the work of several other theorists active in computer simulation.
Other exceptions to the rule appear in books edited by Schroder and Suedfeld (1970)
and Mancuso (1970). All of these people dealt primarily with the transmission and
combining of information, however, rather than with motivational issues. Control
theory retained its promise as a way to analyze the regulation of behaviors of interest
to the social and personality psychologist. But as yet it was a promise that was
largely unfulfilled.

Infonnation, Control, and Personality-Social Psychology

In more recent years, personality and social psychologists have begun to take another
look at the constructs of information and control theory. One basis for this newly
developed interest is the influence that cognitive psychology has begun to exert on
the field of personality-social psychology. Researchers have started to take note of
the fact that "social" stimuli are perceived and categorized in essentially the same
way as any other stimuli. Social psychologists who are interested in these phenomena
have therefore borrowed research paradigms from cognitive psychology, in their
Information Control and Personality-Social Psychology 31

attempts to apply cognitive principles to problems of social categorization. In so

doing, they have also begun to adopt the constructs and vocabulary of cognitive
psychology, an area which is heavily influenced by infonnation processing concepts.
Workers in this area, which we discuss in Chapters 5 and 6, have thus been drawn
to serious consideration of infonnation-processing models of recognition, recall,
decision making, and so on.
A second reason for an awakening interest in control theory among social and
personality psychologists is the fact that it is now possible to point to the components
of a feedback loop that regulates behavior at the level of analysis that is of interest
to them. Thus, there now is a concrete way to approach motivational issues in
social behavior within the context of control theory. Twenty years ago, the notion
that behavior was controlled by a feedback system was an interesting abstraction.
The idea was consistent with many observations, but no one had gotten around to
specifying or manipulating the component processes of the system's functioning.
Within the last ten years, however, that picture has changed. Evidence has accu-
mulated that a system exists within the person which directs behavior by comparing
present behavior with a reference value. Because the system's behavior appears to
take the fonn of a negative feedback loop, or TOTE unit, it may be viewed as
supportive of the applicability of control theory to behavioral self-regulation.
More specifically, this research appears to indicate that the comparator of the
system in question can be rendered more effective or less effective in its functioning,
by experimental manipulations that enhance or inhibit its use. These manipula-
tions-which are discussed in Chapter 3-are intended to vary attentional focus.
Experimental research on this phenomenon was begun by Wicklund and Duval
(1971; see also Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975, 1979). Those authors
provided the first demonstration that variations in focus of attention could influence
the thoroughness with which persons matched their behavior to previously specified
reference values. This matching-to-standard process, which is discussed in detail
in Chapter 8, has subsequently been replicated a great many times, in diverse
circumstances, and utilizing widely varying reference values.
We should point out quite explicitly that these effects were predicted from a
perspective other than control theory, although they are quite consistent with control
theory principles. That is, Duval and Wicklund's analysis of the matching-to-stan-
dard process stemmed from a different set of motivational assumptions, assumptions
that had had a long history of use in social psychology. We have come to believe,
however, that an infonnation-processing model provides a better account of the
behavioral effects in question. That belief is one of the bases for this book.
Chapter 3

Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the

Laboratory

Pay attention. Most of us use these words, in one fonn or another, every day. Said
in a particularly strict tone of voice, they have struck fear into the hearts of school-
children for generations. Said differently, they are a cue that important secrets are
about to be revealed.
The essence of paying attention is simple. It is noticing something, mentally
picking it up, processing it. We take it for granted that people won't follow what
we are saying unless they pay some attention to it. And we assume that our own
experience of events will be enhanced if we attend to them as they occur.
Part of the conceptualization that underlies this book draws upon an assumption
about attention. Stated simply, we assume that attention is a useful variable to
consider in understanding behavioral self-regulation even at the "macro" level at
which we will be approaching it. More explicitly, in much of what follows we are
going to be relying to some degree on a simple dichotomy proposed by Duval and
Wicklund (1972): Attention may be directed outward into the environment, or it
may be directed inward to the self. We believe that this variation in attentional
focus has important consequences.
As was indicated above, we assume that attending to some stimulus means the
relatively selective processing of the infonnation that is represented in that stimulus.
This is true whether the stimulus is part of the environment, or part of oneself.
Certain aspects of this selective processing are discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
The fact that self-focus can have more complex effects, as well, is addressed in
Chapter 8.
This chapter, however, is devoted to the discussion of three points. The first is
the nature of attention, and the plausibility of the dichotomy that we have utilized
throughout the book. There are many subtle issues in deciding where one's starting
place should be in discussing attention and its consequences, and in this section of
the chapter we indicate a number of things that we do and do not mean to imply
by our use of various tenns. We will also point out some of the places where we
are oversimplifying in order to make our task manageable, and where future work
will doubtlessly require the recognition of greater complexity.
The second point to be made in this chapter concerns the research strategy that
34 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

has been employed in the studies to be discussed in later chapters. In most of those
studies, focus of attention has been varied either by experimental manipulations or
by the assessment of individual differences. These techniques represent an important
convergence upon the conceptual variable that the research addresses. We discuss
both of these techniques of operationalization in some detail in the central portion
of this chapter, and review some evidence of their validity.
The final section of the chapter takes up the question of generalization from
artificial manipulations in laboratory studies to the broader reality of day-to-day
life. If the direction of a person's attention is important for the regulation of behavior
outside the social psychological laboratory, then there must also be events and
stimuli in the normal course of life that cause variations in people's attentional
focus. In this final section we present some speculation-and some data--on what
these events and stimuli might be.

DEFINING TERMS

Attention
Theorists have wrestled for some time with the concept of attention in an effort
to define it (cf. Berlyne, 1974; Posner, 1974). In some respects attention seems
almost to be self-defining. As William James (1890, p. 403) put it, "Everyone
knows what attention is." The concept is intuitively grasped with ease, and yet its
meaning is quite subtle. This presents something of a problem for anyone who
wants to specify exactly what the attentional process is. Cognitive psychologists,
who have had the greatest interest in attentional phenomena, have most recently
dealt with this problem by creeping up on the concept sideways, rather than defining
it explicitly. This approach is moderately successful in establishing a feel for the
issues to which the concept is applied, at least, even if it does actually skirt the
problem of definition.
A good illustration of the use of this approach comes from a recent textbook in
cognitive psychology by Bourne, Dominowski, and Loftus (1979). They point out
that whatever attention is, its existence has several discriminable aspects (see also
Kahneman, 1973). One aspect of attention is its distribution. A person's attention
can be diffused (spread over many different stimuli), or it can be concentrated.
Another aspect of the attentional process concerns the degree of vigilance or alert-
ness that it embodies. A person may be very alert (attending quickly and easily to
salient stimuli), or very inattentive to available stimuli from any source. Bourne
et al. refer to these two characteristics as intensive aspects of attention, because
they seem to bear on the "fullness" of the person's awareness of whatever is being
noticed.
A third aspect of the attentional process is its selective, or directive nature (see
also, e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Norman, 1968; Treisman, 1969). The human cognitive
system isolates certain stimuli-and even certain stimulus properties-for more
Self-Focus and Environment Focus 35

extensive processing, and it treats other stimuli or other properties of the stimulus
more perfunctorily. Of course, no single stimulus property remains the focus of
attention forever. Attention is selective, but what is "selected" may change rapidly
from moment to moment. A good illustration of this rapid reselection (adapted from
Bourne et aI., 1979) comes from the behavior of a driver who is unsure he is on
the right road, and is approaching an intersection. At first the driver "searches for"
stimulus properties associated with informational road signs-the proper color, size,
and shape. Once a sign has been located, however, those dimensions are disre-
garded, and attention is shifted to the semantic information contained in the sign's
letters.
It is the selective aspect of attention which we will be emphasizing throughout
the book. This is not to say that the research to be discussed later on incorporated
controls to ensure that no other aspect of attention was inadvertently varied. But
it was the selective aspect that was varied most conspicuously. And we feel it safe
to assert that variations in other aspects of attentional functioning would not typically
have led to the behavioral effects that were observed.

Self-Focus and Environment Focus

Cognitive research on the directional aspect of attention has generally pursued the
selective process within a given perceptual modality, e.g., vision or hearing. Such
research investigates the processes within the person that determine how effective
or impactful a given environmental stimulus will be, compared to other environ-
mental stimuli. We, in contrast, are going to pursue a different course-what is in
certain respects a much more simplified course. Consider the domain of "all in-
formation accessible to awareness." One basic distinction within this domain derives
from a dichotomy of sources of that information. Some information originates in
the environment, but other information originates from within the person (cf. Ban-
nister & Agnew, 1977; Lewis & Brooks, 1978; Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, 1980).
We believe that this dichotomy is an important and useful one. Selectively attending
to information originating in the environment will hereafter be referred to as en-
vironment focus. Selectively attending to information that originates from within
and concerns the self will be termed self-focus. We regard this dichotomy as
important because, as will be seen in later chapters, focus on the self and focus on
the environment have different experiential and behavioral consequences.
We should note briefly that we assume (as did Duval & Wicklund, 1972) a
relatively fixed-capacity model of attention, in the cases that we will be addressing.
As attention outward increases, attention to the self will tend to diminish, and vice
versa. We take no particular stand on whether it is better to conceptualize the
direction of attention as rapidly shifting, or as divided among potential objects. For
our purposes, these two possibilities are quite equivalent. The fact that we tend to
phrase our discussions in terms of "shifts" in attentional focus is largely a matter
of convenience.
36 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

Maintaining the Distinction

Let us elaborate a bit on the dichotomy between self and environment,. and on some
of the difficulties that arise in trying to maintain it.

Use of cognitive structures in perception. One difficulty that arises in attempting

to distinguish self-focus from environment focus stems from the way in which we
have assumed perceptual events are experienced. That is, sensory information is
processed considerably before reaching awareness. As is argued in some detail in
Chapter 4, current theory in cognitive psychology holds that these perceptions
involve comparisons between the sensory input information and stored records of
some sort. Indeed, some theorists believe that the stored material is fully as important
to the percept as is the input information (cf. Neisser, 1976), though others disagree
on that score (see, e.g., Gibson, 1969).
These recognitory structures presumably are relatively permanent (though con-
tinuously evolving over the course of new experiences). Because they are main-
tained internally, they thus could be considered (in some sense) an aspect of self.
Whenever one focuses one's attention on an object or event in the environment,
even when only attempting to recognize that object, one does so by reference to
this aspect of self. Said more plainly, there is a sense here in which attention is
not focused exclusively on the environment, when "environment focus" is occur-
ring.
This point raises questions about whether one set of structures is used to recognize
environment input information and another set is used to recognize self information
(which is suggested by findings reported by Lord, 1980), or whether the same
structures are applicable to information from both sources. Our response to the
issue raised above, however, is not based on any assumption about the existence
of a dichotomy among recognitory structures. Rather, our position is simply that
this degree of involvement of some structures that could plausibly be considered
part of the self in an event that we have labeled environment focus does not bother
us much, for two interrelating reasons. First, it is the perception that ultimately is
represented in awareness, not the nuts and bolts of utilizing the cognitive structures.
Second, the function of this sequence is quite obviously the recognition of a stimulus
input whose point of origin is outside the self. Thus it seems quite reasonable to
go on referring to such activity with such terms as "environment focus," and
"processing of environmental information."

Types of perception. We have characterized environment focus as the immediate

processing of information that is being delivered from the distance receptors: the
eyes and ears. What we are calling self-focus includes a wider variety of perceptual-
cognitive events. Self-focus very definitely is a category that requires further sub-
division. That is, the self has many facets. Some aspects of the self are conceptual
and abstract in nature (cf. Gergen, 1971), for example, the self-concept (see, e.g.,
Self-Focus and Environment Focus 37

Wylie, 1974), which is a more or less coherent personal representation of the self,
stored in one's memory. Attitudes are also components of the self, as is knowledge
of how one behaves and what one is like. Indeed, the way in which one is presently
acting is part of oneself, as well. Attending to any of these component self-aspects
presumably entails self-focus.
In some cases, however, self-attention involves the selective processing of mo-
ment-to-moment perceptual input from receptors that monitor internal states. Ex-
amples of such receptors are those that sense the pounding heart that is characteristic
of fear, the flushing face of embarrassment, or the twinges of pain. As these
examples illustrate, many of the most obvious sensors of the "internal environment"
are those that play some part in awareness of one's states of emotion or other bodily
symptoms.
These are all perceptual events that involve self-focus. They are quite different
from other perceptual events (such as vision) which seem clearly to involve focus
on the environment. But there are yet other perceptual events that are more difficult
to assign to self or to environment without equivocation. Consider the experience
of taste. It definitely involves the sensing of an environmental stimulus. But in
other respects it is more private, more "self'-involved than is the experience of
vision. And there is some evidence (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979) that the
a'vareness of taste intensity may represent a self-awareness phenomenon.
Why would this be so? One possibility is that the aspect of taste that was studied
by Scheier et al. was an aspect of the experience which had self-implications. That
is, the question that subjects were asked was not "what is the taste?" but rather
"how intense is the taste?" Perhaps a "what-is-it" perceptual judgment involves
solely environment focus, but a "what-is-its-impact-on-me" judgment involves both
environment focus and self-focus (cf. Hull & Levy, 1979). More specifically,
perhaps an implications-for-me judgment entails a sequence of two processes: a
what-is-it encoding, followed by the implications-for-me judgment. The latter pre-
sumably would involve the processing of already encoded what-is-it information.
Thus the proximal source of the information contributing to the implications-for-
me judgment is internal. Based on a source-of-information dichotomy, then, im-
plications-for-me judgments would imply self-focus. This reasoning suggests that
such judgments could be made with regard to information obtained through any
sensory modality. We should note, however, that the reasoning is quite speculative.
This example serves to indicate the difficulty of maintaining a dichotomy based
solely on the point of origin of the perceptual information being processed. But it
also suggests another basis for distinguishing between self-focus and environment
focus: i.e., by asking what is the subject of the information being processed. A
dichotomy based solely on this question would hold that self-focus entails the
processing of self-related information, wherever its point of origin. Environment
focus would be the processing of information that is not relevant to the self, again
regardless of its point of origin (see Hull & Levy, 1979). It is quite easy to see how
information that is generated from within the person could be irrelevant to the self
38 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

Table 3-1. Conceptualizing Self-Focus and Environment-Focus

Subject of information attended to

Source of information
attended to Self Nonself

Internal Self-focus Internal focus,

but not self-focus
External a Environment-
focus

'Hull and Levy (1979) have argued that this is the combination that comprises self-
focus. We, on the other hand, are not convinced that this condition ever exists (see
text).

(as happens, for example, when you imagine a large tree). It is less easy to see
how self-relevant information can be directly conveyed by an environmental stim-
ulus. It would seem more reasonable to view that information as being provided
by an interpretation of that stimulus, an interpretation that goes beyond simple
recognition.
Based on these considerations, we suggest the utility of the matrix shown in
Table 3-1 for construing the states of self-focus and environment focus. Self-focus
occurs when the immediate source of the information being attended to is internal
and the subject of that information is self-related. Environment focus occurs when
both source and subject are external to the self. 1
This matrix allows us to deal at least reasonably well with a thorny problem that
arises when a person attempts to recall something, or to reconstruct a previously
experienced perceptual event, or even to generate a previously unexperienced per-
ception. Carver (1979) suggested that these experiences might involve self-focus,
for two reasons. First, in undertaking such an experience, we are accessing infor-
mation that has already been stored. Moreover, the accessing of this information
is not taking place in the service of identifying sensory-input information. This
distinguishes recall or imagination from ordinary perception. Second, in undertaking
recall, or reconstruction, or new synthesis, we simultaneously act to suppress input
from the distance receptors. (Try to remember the phone number you had before
moving to where you live now, and retain at the same time a clear perception of
this page.)
Yet there is a problem with assigning this sort of event uniformly to the self-
focus category. Doing so makes no distinction as to whether the information being

lFor an analysis of the potential for additional complexity in the perception of either the self
or the environment, see a recent discussion by Wegner (1980).
Varying Attention in Research 39

recalled is associated with self or nonself. The matrix suggested in Table 3-1
remedies that problem. Such experiences clearly involve inward focus, but we
suggest that they do not involve self-focus, unless the recalled or imagined infor-
mation is self-related.

Self-focusing effects of environmental stimuli. A related question emerges when

one considers the processes by which the presence of certain physical stimuli-
discussed in more detail a bit later on--enhances self-focus. An example is the
presence of another person looking back at you. When you look at this person,
your initial experience is one of environment focus. The person is an object in the
environment, which is recognized through the mediation of the distance receptors.
However, sooner or later the fact that the person is looking back begins to register.
Cued by this recognition, your awareness may drift to a mental consideration of
your self-aspects. The experience then is one of self-focus. The self-aspects to
which attention is directed may not be visible to the other person. Indeed, in many
cases to be discussed later there is no visible referent for the self-aspect to which
subjects apparently directed their attention. The observer as a physical stimulus-
and other stimuli like it-simply serves as a reminder of the self. Once this has
happened, attention presumably gravitates to whatever self-aspect has been made
salient by other aspects of the behavioral context. It bears repeating, however, that
we assume these stimuli work by drawing enough attention to themselves as objects
that aspects of their own nature can serve as reminders of the self. Do they serve
this function? This question is addressed below.

Section summary. Because our later discussions often concern the effects of var-
iations in attentional focus, we have presented here some description of our as-
sumptions about attention. We will be focusing on the selective aspect of attention,
particularly on a distinction between environment and self as potential objects of
attention. There are definitely some respects in which this differentiation is artificial
and imperfect. But even while acknowledging these problems, we have also in-
dicated some reasons for seeing the distinction as being both useful and repre-
sentative of reality.

VARYING ATTENTION IN RESEARCH

We tum now to research. If we are to discuss the predictable consequences of

attentional focus, we must first be able to argue convincingly that direction of
attention can be varied systematically among research subjects. This argument is
made at considerable length in this section of the chapter. Before turning to the
specifics of the argument, however, we would like to address two more general
aspects of the approach that we and others have taken in pursuing research in this
area.
40 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

General Issues in Research Strategy

Experimental Manipulations and Individual Differences

Ask a social psychologist how to conduct research, and he or she will tell you to
manipulate independent variables and measure their effects on dependent variables.
There will usually be a good deal of stress on the "manipulate" part of the pre-
scription. Social psychologists as a species are typically quite proud of the fact that
their research is experimental in nature. Because they actively manipulate inde-
pendent variables, they feel that they have a closer handle on the link between cause
and effect.
Take the same question to a personality psychologist, however, and the ansWer
will be to measure individual differences among subjects and see how those vari-
ations predict differences on some dependent measure. Personality psychologists
can be rather disdainful of the emphasis on manipulation, noting quite correctly
that it is often hard to be certain exactly what a manipulation has manipulated.
Deep in his heart, one of us is a social psychologist, the other a personality
psychologist. But neither of us is very doctrinaire. In our own research, we have
adopted a strategy that we feel embodies the best of both approaches. Specifically,
much of our work has comprised a series of interlocking conceptual replications.
In studying a given phenomenon we have usually conducted at least two studies.
Rather than simply replicate the initial effect in the second study, however, we have
attempted to enhance the generality of the information by replicating conceptually.
And we have done this, wherever possible, in two different ways simultaneously.
First, we have varied behavioral content from one study to another, by using
paradigms that were conceptually similar but operationally quite divergent. At the
same time we have also varied the way in which two different levels of self-attention
were created. We have typically done this not by manipulating self-focus with two
different stimuli, but rather by experimentally manipulating self-focus in one study,
and measuring dispositions to be self-attentive in another study. With only rare
exceptions, the principles involving self-directed attention that are discussed in this
volume have been tested at least twice, using this strategy (though not always by
ourselves). The research thus may be seen as contributing substantially to an in-
tegration between personality and social psychological approaches to behavior.

Experimental Manipulations: Their Nature and Timing

Research in which focus of attention is experimentally varied suffers from a problem
which, if not actually unique to this area of research, is surely more pronounced
here than in most other areas. The majority of the manipulations used by social
psychologists are designed to vary subjects' personal "histories" by creating dif-
ferences in their feelings, or memories of their own actions, or memories about
General Issues in Research Strategy 41

someone else's actions. For example, studies of attribution often involve the creation
of different informational perspectives among different groups of subjects, per-
spectives which are temporarily encoded in memory. As another example, studies
of angry aggression create different levels of anger in subject groups, by exposure
to different degrees of provocation. In contrast, manipulations of attentional focus
are intended to vary the selective processing of information that is already available
to all subjects. The distinction is subtle, but important. Experimenters in this area
are interested in shifting the direction of the subject's focus momentarily, while
holding constant the subjects' previous memories, levels of affect, and so on.
If, as we saw above, attention itself is a difficult construct to define, deciding
how to vary the focus of attention systematically (while varying nothing else) can
be an even more complex problem. As is often the case when such problems arise,
researchers in this area have fallen back on their intuitions. In some cases, the
researcher's intent was to decrease the degree of attention focused on the self.
Assuming a fixed-capacity model of attention, this goal should be attainable by
providing subjects with an attention-demanding distractor. On the basis of this
reasoning, the pursuit rotor acquired a new research function (cf. Duval & Wicklund,
1973).
In other cases, the goal was to increase focus on the self. Attaining this goal
seemed simply to require the presence of some stimulus that would remind one of
oneself. Such reminders would include things like cameras that were obviously
aimed at the subject, pictures of the subject, the sound of the subject's own voice,
and the mirror-reflected image of the subject's own face or body.
How to vary attentional focus was part of the problem. But another part of the
problem was concern that these various stimuli might lose their effectiveness over
time, as the subject adapted to their presence (see, e.g., Ickes, Wicklund, & Ferris,
1973). Moreover, in most experimental situations it is not just variations of atten-
tional focus that is desired, but variations of focus at some specific point in the
behavioral or cognitive sequence of events. Thus the manipulations sometimes must
be introduced in the midst of an experimental session.
Satisfying these concerns has led to the creation of experimental situations that
are often quite unusual, compared to other research settings in personality and social
psychology. The unusual nature of the experimental manipulations, and the occa-
sional need to present them at odd times, have led to some fairly inventive cover
stories. But they have also led to concerns about the artificiality of the experimental
situations.

Rationale. There are two very important points to be made about these techniques
of varying attentional focus. First, despite the fact that most research reports em-
phasize the active manipUlation of attention, our assumption is that shifts in focus
are presumably occurring constantly, normally, all the time. These laboratory
manipulations simply represent a kind of crude experimental "prod." They are
42 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

intended to create just enough of an impact that the subject is slightly more likely
to be self-attentive, or is more fully self-attentive, at some particularly critical point
in the cognitive or behavioral sequence, than would otherwise be the case.
This point is worth repeating. No one who uses attention-directing manipulations
in research would want to argue that there is anything magical about the manipu-
lation, or that it creates states that are much different from those normally expe-
rienced in whatever behavioral situation is under study. What is at issue is simply
the degree to which, or the probability with which, the state is experienced. Nor
would anyone attempt to argue that the manipulations are highly sophisticated and
precise. Indeed, the lack of precision is reflected in the fact that they are first
environmental stimuli, which attract attention from the self. To the degree that these
manipulations are ultimately successful in enhancing self-focus, their attention-
attracting character is presumably being outweighed eventually by their tendency
to remind subjects of themselves as objects.

Aspects of self. This brings us to a second important point. In most research in

this area, attentional manipulations are relatively general. That is, they serve as
reminders of the self, but they rarely act by directing attention to some specific
aspect of self. (There is one very important and very pervasive exception to this
characterization, which is discussed below.) The assumption is typically made that
the subject's focus will naturally drift to the aspect of self that is relevant in the
behavioral situation under study. This assumption receives indirect support from
research results. But the basis for making it is rarely discussed. Indeed, the casual
fashion in which the assumption is commonly made may suggest to some observers
that researchers in this area are completely oblivious to the complexity of the self
as an entity.
Although the concern is legitimate, we think that such an inference would be
quite mistaken. People who work in this area are fully aware that the self is
multifaceted. And yet the assumption continues to be made that directing attention
to the self as a whole in a given experimental context will lead to focus on the
aspect of self that matters in that context. Said another way, it is expected that some
aspect of the self is salient in that situation, is somehow more ready to be taken
as an object of awareness than other self-aspects.
Why some given aspect of self should be salient when attention is self-focused,
or indeed why some particular aspect of the environment should be salient when
attention is directed outward, is less often articulated. Our own assumptions in this
regard, which we assume are tacitly held more generally, are as follows. Attention
continually shifts back and forth between the self and the nonself. This shifting is
guided in part by the cue implications that are conveyed by the most recent specific
object of focus. When we attend to the self, we are often examining an aspect of
self that has been suggested by some cue in our environmental context. When we
look outward, we are often examining a facet of the external world that has been
suggested by some cue from within. For example, if the last object of attention has
been an environmental event that has been recognized as "typically anger arousing,"
Manipulations of Self-Attention 43

the direction of attention to the self may be guided specifically to those aspects of
self associated with the experience of emotion. If the most recent self-aspect under
scrutiny has been a sense of boredom, focus on the environment may be specific
to a search for novelty.
This sort of back-and-forth process (which would be consistent, for example,
with ideas expressed by Norman, 1968, 1969) would seem to be adequate to account
for the salience of some specific self-aspect in a given experimental situation,
because these situations are usually very heavily loaded with cues implying the
relevance of some specific aspect of the self. Thus, it should be no surprise that
a mirror causes attention to be directed to emotional experience in some settings,
and to attitudes and opinions in other settings. The settings have, in effect, cued
different aspects of the self to be ready for awareness.
This description raises a number of questions that take us well beyond the scope
of this chapter. It may be useful, however, to note them momentarily. One such
question is what the processes are by which a self-aspect is rendered "ready" or
"available" for focus. This presumably happens preattentively. In line with what
we said above, it may be that cues from one perception partially evoke the cognitive
structures associated with another class of perceptions. But this leaves a lot of
ground uncovered and details unspecified.
Another question is how the self is organized. Emotional experiences, moral
principles, and goal-directed strategies, for example, are quite different from each
other in a number of respects. Yet all are aspects of the self. And self-focus has,
at one time or another, led to awareness of each of these, and more. There must
be a way of construing these various self-components systematically. We intend
to discuss this issue, though we cannot provide a complete answer. That discussion
is deferred, however, until Chapter 6.
Having now covered some very general ground dealing with the research strategy
and the underlying assumptions made by workers in this area, we tum to issues of
operational definition. How are varying levels of self-focus created for research
purposes?

Manipulations of Self-Attention
Although the possibility had been discussed earlier by others (Argyle, 1969), the
first researchers to intentionally vary their subjects' levels of self-focus apparently
were two social psychologists, Wicklund and Duval (1971; Duval & Wicklund,
1972). As was indicated earlier, they chose manipulations that seemed intuitively
to serve as reminders of the self: stimuli such as cameras, mirrors, and voice
recordings. Indeed, these stimuli seemed so intuitively reasonable as self-focus-
inducing devices that a good deal of research was done before anyone became much
concerned with the issue of validation. The question of how these stimuli created
their influences on behavior became important, however, when critics pointed out
that what were portrayed as self-awareness effects could often be accounted for in
44 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

other terms (cf. Liebling, Seiler, & Shaver, 1974). Prompted in part by this am-
biguity regarding mediation, a number of researchers have since undertaken studies
providing evidence of the validity of the self-attention construct.

Validation
One of the earliest studies of this type was conducted by Davis and Brock (1975).
They gave subjects false positive information about themselves, false negative
information, or no information. They then presented these subjects with a series
of sentences written in foreign languages, and asked them to determine what English
personal pronoun corresponded to the underlined foreign pronouns. Based on the
assumption that greater awareness of the self would lead to greater readiness to
choose self-relevant words, it was hypothesized that the presence of a self-aware-
ness-inducing stimulus would result in more frequent choices of first-person pron-
ouns.
This was precisely what happened. Subjects who did this task in the presence
of a TV camera chose more first-person pronouns (overall) than did subjects with
no camera. Of greatest importance in the present context is the fact that this finding
was also quite reliable among the subgroup of subjects who had received no in-
formation about themselves. This finding thus appears to offer support for the
position that the camera as an experimental manipulation increased subjects' levels
of self-focus. This research also suggested a more general strategy for obtaining
additional information regarding validity, a strategy that several others have sub-
sequently pursued. The approach is sometimes viewed as a quasi-projective one,
resting on the assumption that enhanced awareness of self will lead to increased
mention of self or of self-relevant words. A cognitive basis for such effects is
discussed in Chapter 4.
A somewhat different approach was taken by Geller and Shaver (1976), who
used a modified version ofthe Stroop (1938) color-word test. This test requires the
subject to examine a series of stimuli (e.g., words) each of which is printed in a
color, and to name the color of the ink in which it is printed. Recent research
(Warren, 1972, 1974) indicates that color-naming latencies for target words increase
when material that is semantically related to those words has recently been activated
in memory. Geller and Shaver reasoned that self-focusing stimuli should activate
self-relevant memory content. This, in tum, should increase color-naming latencies
for self-relevant words, but not for other words. This proved to be the case. Subjects
confronted with a TV camera and a mirror (together) exhibited the expected dec-
rement for self-relevant words, whereas control subjects did not.
These findings are valuable because they are based on quite different methodo-
logical assumptions than were made in other research. However, they suffer from
an unfortunate problem when interpreted as information on the validity of the
experimental manipulations used. Specifically, the authors confounded the two self-
focusing manipUlations with each other. It thus is impossible to be certain whether
the effect is attributable to the combination of stimuli, or whether it was produced
by only one or the other of them. Validating evidence for the camera manipulation
Individual Differences in Self-Focus 45

had already been obtained by Davis and Brock (1975), but as yet there was no
unequivocal evidence pertaining to the mirror manipulation.
In part because of this absence of information regarding the mirror, we conducted
a study which was intended solely as a validational test (Carver & Scheier, 1978,
Experiment 1). Subjects in this study were placed into individual cubicles, and were
asked to fill out a sentence completion blank. The cubicle either was empty, or it
contained a wall mirror, standing on the subject's table and leaned against the wall.
The sentence completion blank had been developed and validated earlier (Exner,
1973) as a measure of egocentricity. Responses to the sentence stems are scorable
as reflecting either focus on the self or focus on the external world. Consistent with
prediction, subjects made a significantly higher proportion of self-focus responses
in the presence of the mirror than when the mirror was absent.
Thus, there is direct confirmation of the self-attention-enhancing properties of
two commonly used experimental stimuli: the TV camera and the mirror. In part
because of this validating evidence, these two manipulations have become the most
commonly used means of experimentally varying self-focus. Indeed, many re-
searchers have treated them as equivalent to each other. We have become convinced,
however, that they are not equivalent. They appear to differ in one important respect.
We have not yet provided enough background to say what that respect is, but we
will do so shortly.

Individual Differences in Self-Focus

Interest in the consequences of self-attention spread fairly quickly from social to
personality psychologists. One of the first steps taken by the latter group of re-
searchers was to reconceptualize the self-attention construct as a dispositional, rather
than a situational variable. Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) termed this per-
sonality construct "self-consciousness" in order to distinguish it from the manip-
ulated state of "self-awareness." (In deference to this distinction, throughout this
volume the term self-awareness will be used to describe the situational variable,
self-consciousness to describe the disposition. "Self-attention" and "self-focus" will
be treated as generic terms, and will be applied to both cases.)
Despite the distinction in nomenclature, the personality construct was intended
to capture the psychological essence of the original self-attention construct. The
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975), which measures the disposition,
assesses not what we speak of coloquially as "self-consciousness"-i.e., nervous-
ness or embarrassment-but simply the general disposition to be attentive to the
self.
Fenigstein et al. (1975) did, however, add one important embellishment to the
self-attention construct. Pointing to the fact that the self is multifaceted, they argued
for the importance of a general distinction between public aspects of the self, and
private aspects of the self. This distinction provided the theoretical basis for two
separate subscales in the Self-Consciousness Scale. Factor analyses have since
confirmed that these subscales are relatively pure and factorially sound (Fenigstein
46 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

et aI., 1975). The items comprising the two subscales and their factor loadings are
presented in Table 3-2.
Private self-consciousness is the disposition to be aware of the covert and hidden
aspects of the self. People who are high on this dimension are presumed to be
particularly conscious of their own thoughts, feelings, attitudes, motives, and be-
havioral tendencies. Public self-consciousness is the tendency to be aware of the
publicly displayed aspects of the self, the self as a social object that creates impacts
on other people. People who are high on this dimension tend to be cognizant of
how they are viewed by others.
Not only are private and public self-consciousness theoretically distinct from
each other, they are also relatively independent empirically. Correlations between
these two subscales are invariably positive, but are also typically quite low. Across
a variety of large samples the correlations have tended to fall in the low .20s.
Note that this pattern has two implications. First, being low in one aspect of self-
consciousness does not imply that a person is high in the other aspect. That is, they
are not two ends of the same dimension. The two tendencies are distinct. The
second and complementary implication of this pattern is that people may be quite
idiosyncratic in what aspect of the self is chronically attended to. The tendency to
be aware of one's private self-aspects does not strongly imply that one is also
particularly aware of one's public self-aspects. Said another way, self-consciousness
is not a uniform "awareness." It is specific to public or private components of the
self. Indeed, there is evidence that further differentiations within these two domains
may usefully be made (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, in press).
Using the Self-Consciousness Scale it is thus easy to isolate four different kinds
of people. One set of people is quite aware of their public self-aspects, but relatively
oblivious to their private selves. Another set is quite attentive to the private aspects
of themselves, but not very conscious of their publicly displayed self-aspects. A
third group is highly cognizant of both facets of self. And the final group is not
particularly attentive to either self-aspect.
The Self-Consciousness Scale also has a third subscale, which measures social
anxiety (see Table 3-2). This scale differs from the two described above, in that
it does not measure simply a tendency to focus on some aspect of the self. Instead,
it measures a particular kind of reaction to being focused on the self, particularly
the public self. Social anxiety presumably derives from public self-consciousness,
in that social anxiety presumes an existence of focus on the public self. Yet aware-
ness of the public self is not a sufficient condition for the development of social
anxiety. There must also be a sense of apprehensiveness over being evaluated by
the people in one's social contexts.
We will have much less to say about social anxiety than about private and public
self-consciousness. Social anxiety may well be an important dimension in many
behavioral settings (see Buss, 1980). But our concerns in this book are more rooted
in the consequences of being aware of aspects of the self than the consequences
of being chronically uncomfortable in the presence of others. For this reason we
will focus primarily on the private and public dimensions of self-consciousness.
Individual Differences in Self-Focus 47

Table 3-2. Items and Factor Loadings of the Self-Consciousness Scale

Factor loading-
Private self- Public self- Social
A priori scale assignment consciousness consciousness anxiety

Private:
I'm always trying to figure myself out. (I) .65
Generally, I'm not very aware of myself. (3)b -.48
I reflect about myself a lot. (5) .73
I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. (7) .45
I never scrutinize myself. (9)b - .51
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings. (13) .66
I'm constantly examining my motives. (15) .62
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere
watching myself. (18) .43
I'm alert to changes in my mood. (20) .55
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through
a problem. (22) .46
Public:
I'm concerned about my style of doing things. (2) .47
I'm concerned about the way I present myself. (6) .65
I'm self-conscious about the way I look. (11) .61
I usually worry about making a good impression. (14) .72
One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look
in the mirror. (17) .51
I'm concerned about what other people think of me. (19) .73
I'm usually aware of my appearance. (21) .60
Social anxiety:
It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
(4) .76
I have trouble working when someone is watching me. (8) .26 .45
I get embarrassed very easily. (10) .70
I don't find it hard to talk to strangers. (l2)b -.66
I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group. (16) .21 .~
Large groups make me nervous. (23) .69

Note. From Fenigstein et al. (1975). The numbers in parentheses indicate the sequence of items on the scale.
"Only factor loadings greater than .20 are listed.
bItem was reversed for scoring.

The public-private distinction is proving to be a powerful and important one in

predicting behavior. We make several more points about it immediately below.
And it crops up repeatedly throughout the book. It is so important, in fact, that we
have devoted a full chapter (Chapter 16) to an in-depth examination of its impli-
cations for behavior.

Validation
The items comprising the Self-Consciousness Scale have a high degree of face
validity. However, a good deal of information has also been gathered to substantiate
other more important aspects of the scale's validity. The construct validity of the
private subscale was demonstrated in a study (described above) that also ascertained
48 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

the self-focusing characteristics of the mirror as an experimental manipulation

(Carver & Scheier, 1978, Experiment 1). Subjects who were high in private self-
consciousness, as measured several weeks earlier, made significantly more sentence
completions reflecting self-focus than did subjects who were lower in self-con-
sciousness. Further analysis revealed, in fact, that among those subjects who were
not confronting a self-focus-enhancing manipulation, the tendency to make self-
focus completions correlated .43 with private self-consciousness scores.
Public self-consciousness did not exert a statistically reliable influence on sub-
jects' sentence completions in this study, though the difference was in the expected
direction. One possible explanation for the weakness of this effect is that the sentence
completion stems may not have been conducive to displaying differences in focus
on the public self. This explanation must be regarded as speculative, however, in
the absence of further data.
Besides this construct validation study, information has also been gathered to
establish convergent and discriminant validity for the Self-Consciousness Scale.
Convergent validation is evidence that the scale correlates with other personality
measures to which it theoretically should be related. In data reported by Turner,
Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978), private self-consciousness was found to be
significantly correlated with the Guilford-Zimmerman Thoughtfulness Scale (Guil-
ford & Zimmerman, 1949) and a revised version of the Paivio Imagery Inventory
(Hiscock, 1976). Thus, persons high in the private dimension report themselves to
be generally reflective, and to create and use mental images in dealing with both
personal and impersonal problems. Carver and Glass (1976) found that public self-
consciousness was reliably related to a measure of the temperament of sociability:
the tendency to spend time interacting with other people (cf. Buss & Plomin, 1975).
This relationship was further substantiated by data from Turner et al. (1978). All
of these findings seem to offer evidence of the convergent validity of both the
private and public dimensions of self-consciousness.
That sort of evidence, though important, is only part of the process of validation.
Of equal importance is knowing that the scale does not measure something that it
was not intended to measure. This process---establishing the scale's discriminant
validity-was also addressed in the research discussed above. Private and public
self-consciousness both were found by Carver and Glass (1976) to be essentially
uncorrelated with measures of IQ (Otis, 1954), need for achievement (Edwards,
A.L., 1957), test anxiety (Mandler & Sarason, 1952), activity level, or impulsivity
(Buss & Plomin, 1975). Turner et al. (1978) added the findings that neither sub scale
was reliably related to social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). they also
found inverse relationships between both subscales and the Morse-Gergen (1970)
self-esteem scale, and positive relationships with both emotionality (Buss & Plomin,
1975) and the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974). In all cases, however, the
relationships were weak, running in the mid .20s across several samples. Thus, it
seems obvious that the degree of shared variance between self-consciousness and
these other measures is not substantial enough to warrant concern as to the validity
of the Self-Consciousness Scale.
Convergence of Manipulation and Disposition 49

This evidence of discriminant validity is critically important, for the following

reason. Alternative interpretations that have been suggested for the effects of self-
attention typically rely on one of two constructs: drive (Hull, c.L., 1952; Spence,
1956) and experimental demand (Orne, 1962). As applied to studies involving
dispositional self-consciousness, such interpretations would seem to imply that some
of the nonsignificant correlations reported above should be strongly positive. Spe-
cifically, if self-consciousness effects were really drive-based phenomena, self-
consciousness should have a strong positive association with test anxiety, social
anxiety, activity level, impUlsivity, or emotionality. In no case has such a rela-
tionship been obtained. If self-consciousness effects were actually reflections of
differential sensitivity to the demand characteristics of the experimental situation,
one would expect to see a strong positive relationship between self-consciousness
and social desirability. Such a relationship has never been found, in tests involving
at least three separate samples from populations in different parts of the country
(Turner et al., 1978; Froming & Carver, in press). The absence of such correlations
seriously damages the credibility of these alternative interpretations.

Convergence of Manipulation and Disposition

At this point it becomes useful to reexamine our general research strategy, which
was described earlier in the chapter. Reconsideration of the approach we have taken
allows us to make two important points.

Validity
The first point concerns the overall validity of the self-attention construct. As was
indicated earlier, there is considerable evidence of construct validity for the two
most commonly used manipulations of self-focus. Evidence of discriminant validity
for such manipulations is less readily available, however. There is some evidence
(discussed in Chapter 6) that mirror effects are not based on enhanced drive or
sensitivity to demand characteristics. But this evidence is fairly indirect.
Evidence of discriminant validity is easier to gather for measures of individual
differences than for experimental manipulations, however. One simply computes
the correlations between relevant scales among fairly large samples. And as was
detailed in the preceding section, a good deal of support has been obtained for the
contention that the Self-Consciousness Scale (a) measures the disposition to be self-
focused, and (b) does not measure anything that can easily be construed as reflective
of enhanced drive or sensitivity to experimental demand.
If differences in dispositional self-consciousness then were found to lead to the
same behavioral effects as are caused by manipulations of self-attention, additional
credibility would thereby accrue to the self-attention construct overall (cf. Gamer,
Hake, & Eriksen, 1956). That is, whereas one might account for a specific effect
caused by a manipulation in other than attentional terms, it would be much harder
50 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

to account for similar findings based on the disposition to be self-conscious. This

converging evidence would render the attentional explanation highly parsimonious.
It is of no small import, therefore, that such converging evidence has been gathered
in at least a dozen cases, all of which are discussed in later chapters.
In sum, we believe we are fairly safe in making the following rather bold assertion.
Very few, if any, constructs in social psychology have been more thoroughly
validated than the self-attention construct. The strategy of establishing converging
support for research predictions by using both manipulations and personality meas-
ures; the unusually large amount of research providing evidence of construct and
discriminant validity; taken as a whole, they go a long way toward easing concern
over the atypicality of the experimental manipulations.

Private and Public Self-Awareness

The second point to be made here concerns the distinction made by Fenigstein et
al. (1975) between the private self and the public self. Although it was originally
made in the context of individual differences, this distinction has more recently
assumed considerable importance in understanding the effects of experimental ma-
nipulations, as well. In brief, a number of workers in this area have begun to argue
that some manipulations--e.g., TV cameras, audiences, and voice recordings-
induce an awareness of public self-aspects, and that other manipulations--e.g.,
mirrors-create an awareness of more private self-aspects.
This suggestion is partly grounded in logic, and is partly based on research
evidence. The notion that mirrors increase focus on the private self is largely based
on empirical parallels: mirror effects have been replicated using differences in
private self-consciousness on a great many occasions. The reasoning that comple-
ments this evidence is somewhat more speculative, however. Ordinary mirrors are
usually encountered in relatively private circumstances (despite the fact that their
function is usually to help in checking on and adjusting a public facet of the self).
Moreover, the mirror as a research manipulation is typically unrelated to the pos-
sibility of observation by other people. That is, in most cases the mirror is con-
spicuously an ordinary wall mirror, which is obviously leaned against a wall or
suspended in the air. If a mirror is perceived by subjects as being a two-way mirror,
however, its private nature very likely disappears. That is, the presence of this sort
of mirror implies the possibility of being observed by others.
This or any other manipulation that suggests the presence of unseen observers
would seem to enhance one's awareness of public aspects of the self. This is the
reasoning behind the suggestion that a TV or movie camera, or even seeing oneself
displayed on a TV monitor, creates a state of public self-awareness. This logic is
quite straightforward. An observer can only perceive aspects of the self that are
being overtly displayed, are "public." Observers cannot gain access to the private
aspects of oneself. There is a fair amount of support for this reasoning, as well.
For example, in research that is discussed in detail in Chapter 17, we found that
the presence of a TV camera led to the same behavioral effect as was produced by
Beyond the Laboratory 51

differences in public self-consciousness. Moreover, this occurred in a paradigm in

which public and private self-focus had quite divergent influences.
Additional support for the assumption that a TV camera enhances awareness of
the public self comes from research reported by Hass (1979). The research was
portrayed to subjects as bearing on dexterity and "handedness." Subjects expected
to do a series of tasks with their dominant and nondominant hands during the course
of the experimental sessions. Speed of performance was emphasized, in order that
subjects' behavior on the target task would be spontaneous. The target task, which
followed two warm-up exercises, required the subjects to print a capital "E" on
their foreheads with their dominant hands. Some subjects did this with a videotape
camera prominently facing them, and after being told that they would be videotaped.
For other subjects the camera was turned away and there was no mention of
videotaping.
In the first of two experiments, 55% of the subjects in the camera condition drew
the "E" so that it would be properly oriented from the perspective of an external
observer. Only 15% of the control subjects drew the "E" in that orientation. A
second experiment demonstrated that this effect was not dependent on the camera
being aimed at the subjects' faces. In this experiment the camera stood slightly
behind subjects. Even so, if its presence and purpose had been pointed out to
subjects, they were significantly more likely to draw the letter so that it would be
correctly oriented for an external observer.
These various effects suggest considerable support for the reasoning that some
manipUlations enhance awareness of private self-aspects, and other manipulations
enhance awareness of public self-aspects. The findings thus contribute to the further
convergence of manipulated and dispositional self-focus.

BEYOND THE LABORATORY

We now tum to the question of the "ecological" validity of research findings

involving focus of attention. For convenience in research, self-focus is often ex-
perimentally enhanced by the intrusion of stimuli such as mirrors and TV cameras.
But we actually face stimuli of this sort very rarely in our day-to-day lives. The
credibility of an attentional analysis of behavioral self-regulation depends on being
able to transfer research findings believably from the laboratory to the outside world.
This, in tum, depends on being able to argue convincingly that the self-attention
construct has some meaning outside the laboratory.
To some degree, we feel that concerns about the ecological validity of the
paradigms in this research area are misplaced. As was indicated earlier, we assume
that shifts in attentional focus between self and environment occur constantly, with
little or no prodding. Implications about the self that are contained in some envi-
ronmental information may cue self-focus; similarly, implications about the envi-
ronment that are contained in some self-information may cue environment focus.
We do feel, however, that certain kinds of stimuli or stimulus qualities normally
52 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

exert a major impact on the direction of people's attention. In some cases these
qualities draw attention outward into the environment. In other cases they lead
attention to the self.

Naturalistic Variations in Attentional Focus

Attention to the Environment

At least two kinds of stimulus characteristics would seem naturally to lead to an

outward direction of attention. The first is novelty in an environmental event.
Novelty attracts attention, for further processing of the input information. Indeed,
Berlyne (1963) has argued that novelty represents only one of a larger class of
"collative" properties-properties of a stimulus that lead to comparison between
the raw stimulus and a variety of cognitive structures. Such comparisons are required
because the stimulus is not immediately recognizable according to the structure(s)
that it initially evoked. As we indicated earlier, we see the process of perceiving
environmental events as implying outward focus of attention. Thus, an unusual or
novel occurrence will draw attention away from the self, at least momentarily.
A second aspect of the environment that attracts attention outward and away from
the self is the increased processing demand that can stem from an event being
rapidly paced, or becoming increasingly complex. Provided that the person is
already engaged in attending to the event, increasing its speed should cause an even
greater proportion of attention to be devoted to following it. Increasing the com-
plexity of the environmental display should similarly result in greater focus on its
components. The result in each case is a reduction in attention to the self. This
would seem to be consistent, for example, with the observation that when one is
in pain, concentrating on a perceptual event such as music tends to diminish the
awareness of the pain (cf. Morgan & Pollock, 1977).

Attention to the Self

The suggestion above that there are natural enhancers of environment focus are
speculative. In contrast, there is considerable evidence that three common events
in everyone's life lead to increases in self-directed attention. These events are the
presence of physical arousal, the presence of an audience or observer, and the
experience of eye contact.

Bodily activity. Just as there are aspects of the environment that seem to compel
attention--e.g., novelty, complexity-there are aspects of the self that draw atten-
tion inward. We have all had the experience of a nagging ache that was hard to
keep out of our awareness. And we have also all had emotions that were hard to
ignore. Our intuitions tell us that such self-stimuli draw attention to themselves.
And there is now evidence that confirms this intuition. Indeed, data from at least
Naturalistic Variations in Attentional Focus 53

two sources indicate that bodily events as simple as salient states of physical activity
can draw attention not just to that activity, but to the self more generally.
The first suggestion that this might be so came from two experiments conducted
by Fenigstein and Carver (1978). The first of these studies utilized two indirect
measures of self-focus: The Stroop color-naming task used by Geller and Shaver
(1976), and a measure of self-attribution. The latter measure was adapted from
research by Duval and Wicklund (1973), who showed that responsibility for hy-
pothetical outcomes may be self-attributed to a greater degree when self-focus is
high than when it is low. Fenigstein and Carver (1978) presented subjects with a
rhythmic auditory stimulus while they completed the Stroop task and the attribution
task. The auditory stimulus was identified as being either the subject's heartbeat,
or an irrelevant environmental noise. Results from both dependent measures sug-
gested that identifying the sound as the subject's heartbeat led to enhanced self-
focus. That is, latencies for the naming of colors of self-relevant words (but not
for self-irrelevant words) were longer in the heartbeat condition than in the noise
condition. And greater self-attributions were made in the heartbeat than in the noise
condition.
A second study further investigated these effects, but using only the self-attri-
bution measure. This study indicated that presenting an "environmental" noise did
not decrease self-focus compared to a no-noise control, nor did simply attaching
a heartbeat-measuring device to the subject lead to increases in self-focus. As
before, however, the presence of stimuli that subjects thought were their own
heartbeats caused an increase in self-focus. Moreover, this increase was about the
same whether the heartbeat stayed constant or accelerated. This latter finding may
have reflected a psychological "ceiling" on self-focus in that situation, or it may
be that whether the self-stimulus indicates arousal or quiescence is irrelevant to its
self-focus-enhancing characteristics. That is, what may be sufficient for the self-
focusing effect to occur is that the stimulus in question is salient.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that outside the laboratory the salience
of such internal cues-and thus the degree to which they increase self-focus-may
often be a function of the degree to which they depart from resting levels. That is,
in the absence of some other self-focusing cue, one's attention will not often be
drawn to one's heartbeat. But if one's heart rate is elevated, the chances that it will
draw attention inward may increase.
This reasoning has been supported in recent research by Wegner and Giuliano
(1980). They asked their subjects either to lie down on a comfortable lounge chair,
or to sit in a standard classroom chair, or to run in place for a short time. These
manipUlations were intended to vary subjects' general arousal in a systematic way,
from relatively low arousal to relatively high arousal, respectively. Several minutes
later the subjects were given a form containing a series of sentences with words
missing. Subjects were to choose a word to go into each blank from three alternatives
that were provided. In the target sentences, the three words were personal pronouns.
As was the case in the Davis and Brock (1975) research, preferential selection of
first-person pronouns was the measure of self-focus. As had been predicted, subjects
54 3. Focus of Attention, Inside and Outside the Laboratory

who had relaxed prior to completing this measure made the fewest choices of self-
relevant words, subjects who had sat in the chair made an intermediate number of
self-relevant choices, and the greatest number were made by subjects who had run
in place. It seems reasonable to conclude from this that attention, in vivo, is drawn
to the self by internal stimuli that are indicative of physiological arousal.
One additional point concerning this research should be noted briefly. Neither
Fenigstein and Carver (1978) nor Wegner and Giuliano (1980) measured the at-
tention that subjects directed to the specific self-stimuli that were expected to draw
attention inward. Instead, both projects used very general measures of self-attention.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that when attention shifts from the environment to
one's heartbeat or one's arousal, it fairly easily gravitates to other aspects of the
self. The result seems to be a cognizance of the self in broader terms than merely
the self-aspect that induced the shift in focus.

Observation and eye contact. Attention is sometimes drawn to the self by stimuli
from within. But there are also external stimuli that are encountered in the normal
course of life whose nature is such that they redirect attention inward to the self.
An example is the presence of one or more onlookers. The presence of other people
who are observing us reminds us of ourselves. (In particular, we would suggest,
observers remind us of our public selves.) Evidence that audiences do enhance self-
attention comes from the research project that provided construct validation for
mirror presence and private self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1978, Experiment
2). Subjects in this research filled out a sentence completion blank either in an
empty room, or with another person seated on the opposite side of the table. This
person had been introduced simply as a graduate student who would be observing
during a later part of the session. Analysis of the data revealed that subjects made
significantly more completions reflecting self-focus when the observer was present
than when she was absent.
This finding is an important one in several respects. First, it was the first direct
demonstration that self-focus could be experimentally induced by social stimuli.
This extends the applicability of attention-based theorizing to a broad range of
social encounters. Second, the presence of an audience is an experimental manip-
ulation that has had a considerable history, in the literature of social facilitation,
for example. The finding that an audience enhances self-focus thus would appear
to have important implications for phenomena such as social facilitation. Chapter
15 is devoted to exploring those implications in detail.
The mere presence of an observer caused an increase in self-focus among subjects
of the Carver and Scheier study. But other findings (Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss,
1974) suggest that the influence of the audience is not always so automatic. This
research was conducted in quite a different behavioral setting, in which the subjects
had greater demands on their attention. Scheier et al. 's findings indicated that mere
presence of observers did not enhance self-attention. Self-focus apparently was
increased, however, when the experimental procedures caused subjects to make
periodic eye contact with the observers.
The reasoning that eye contact is a mediator of self-focus received some additional
Conclusion 55

support-albeit indirectly-from a study conducted by Fenigstein (1979, Experi-

ment 2). This study made use of procedures developed by Ellsworth and Carlsmith
(1968), who had been interested in the effects of eye contact in an interview
situation. Subjects in the paradigm in question receive pleasant or unpleasant in-
formation about themselves from an interviewer. Later on they rate their feelings
about the interviewer and the interview itself. Ellsworth and Carlsmith (1968) found
that the effects of the information were greater if the interviewer made a great deal
of eye contact than if eye contact was minimal. That is, negative information led
to more negative reactions, positive information led to more positive reactions,
when eye contact was high than when it was low (see also Ellsworth, Friedman,
Perlick, & Hoyt, 1978).
Fenigstein (1979) replicated this effect, but with one important difference. His
experimenter maintained a very low level of eye contact throughout the session.
But self-focus was enhanced among half the subjects by the presence of a mirror.
The result was a pattern of findings that was quite similar to those of Ellsworth and
Carlsmith (1968). The implication is that eye contact may serve as a vehicle for
enhancing self-attention. This support is indirect. But taken together with the find-
ings of Scheier et al. (1974), the findings are quite suggestive.

Dispositional self-consciousness. One final point should be made regarding the

ecological validity of an attentional analysis of behavioral self-regulation. This point
concerns the fact that people differ in the degree to which they chronically attend
to themselves. The existence of differences in dispositional self-consciousness was
discussed earlier as providing a way of varying self-focus for research purposes.
But we should also point out that the disposition is not left at the laboratory door.
It exists across all behavioral contexts, and it presumably influences peoples' aware-
ness of themselves regardless of the setting. The ecological validity of this particular
realization of self-attention seems beyond dispute.

Conclusion
In sum, we believe a strong argument can be made that attention shifts back and
forth between environment and self. We believe further that certain stimuli or
stimulus qualities will predictably lead to shifts in focus, from the self to the
environment, or vice versa. And, as is the case in most domains, personality
variables exert an important impact of their own. People differ, and will continue
to differ, in what they take as the objects of their scrutiny. These variations in
attentional focus have important consequences-both in the laboratory and in the
world---consequences that are addressed in later chapters.
Part II
Information and the Use of Recognitory
Schemas

How do we create and organize our impressions of reality? The chapters comprising
Part II provide a partial answer to this question. Our discussion begins with theories
developed by cognitive psychologists to account for coherence and stability in
perceptual and conceptual knowledge. We then consider applications of such ideas
to the perception of the environment and the perception of the self.
In Chapter 4, we address the ways in which information is organized in memory
and new percepts are categorized and recognized. This chapter focuses on cognitive
theories of abstraction, of which there are several distinct types. In addition to
presenting the basic theories in this area, we also address several issues concerning
the levels of analysis at which information is encoded, and indicate the conceptual
relationships among a variety of constructs, including schema, prototype, and script.
This chapter also includes a discussion of biases in information processing that
result in predictable errors of judgment.
Chapter 4 is written largely from the perspective of cognitive psychology. Chap-
ters 5 and 6, in contrast, make use of the ideas developed in Chapter 4 by applying
them to areas of interest to social and personality psychologists. Chapter 5 concerns
the processes that we assume take place when attention is directed outward toward
the environment. A discussion of environmental taxonomies and the categorization
of behavior settings is followed by an examination of person perception and the use
of organizing schemas to cognize such social stimuli. The strategies by which
people organize their impressions of ongoing sequences of behavior are also dis-
cussed in some detail. Chapter 5 closes with a brief description of data suggesting
that the accurate encoding of environmental information does in fact require attention
to be directed outward to the environment.
Chapter 6 concerns the perceptual consequences of directing attention to the self.
This chapter includes a discussion of self-schemas, the use of self-reference as an
encoding device, and the activation of self-schemas by manipulations of self-focus.
This chapter also includes an extensive examination of the role of attentional proc-
esses and interpretive schemas in the experience of emotions and other internal
states. It closes with a discussion of attentional influences on placebo effects and
other suggestibility phenomena.
Chapter 4

Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and

Decision Biases

"The rudiments of memory are laid in the perpetual recurring of the same
impressions, and clusters of impressions."
Hartley, Observations on Man, 1749

The world surrounding us presents us with a constantly changing flow of stimu-

lation. We are bombarded by an ever-shifting pattern of light and heat radiation,
surges of sound impulses, and other stimulus qualities to which we are sensitive.
How do we ever make sense of it? How is it possible that we come to "know" our
environments and ourselves, with a sense of easy familiarity? These questions
provide the basis for this chapter. In the present chapter we discuss some ideas
from cognitive psychology about how our knowledge of the world is acquired and
organized, and how it is utilized in new settings. In the following two chapters we
consider the implications of these ideas for understanding how people organize and
use knowledge of themselves, and of their physical and social environments (cf.
Kelly, 1955).
Cognitive psychologists are in general agreement that people organize their ex-
perience by developing categories and identifying new experiences on the basis of
their resemblance to the categories. These categories are sets of perceptual or
conceptual representations of objects or events, which are mentally grouped together
because of some similarity or cluster of similarities. For example, the category
"birds" consists of perceived objects which have in common (among other char-
acteristics) wings, feathers, smooth beaks, and two legs with rather bony-looking
feet.
Categories help us to impose order on our experiences, thus reducing demands
on our limited capacities (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956). Though the term
"schema" was apparently first applied to the organization underlying categories by
a neurologist (Head, 1920), the concept of schema formation was subsequently
introduced into psychology by Bartlett (1932). The meaning of the term was further
specified by Oldfield (1954), in a fashion that is quite comparable to the meaning
that is commonly implied by the term today: a set of organizing principles that
allow the identification of members of a category, and of the features common to
those members (cf. Reed, 1973).
60 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

The appeal of the schema concept is that it suggests a way for there to exist an
impressive economy in the recognition and storage of experiences. That is, by
identifying a perceptual experience-or percept-as being representative of some
specific schema, one also thereby conveys a great deal of subsidiary information
quite easily. Said more concretely, membership in a category is typically taken to
imply the presence of other characteristics common to that category, even if those
characteristics have not yet been observed. Knowing that an object is a car, for
example, also conveys the information that it very likely has four round tires made
of a rubberlike substance, an internal combustion engine, at least one seat, and a
variety of controls for starting, stopping, and turning. All of these characteristics,
and more, are components of the normal "car" schema.
An important question in cognitive psychology is exactly what constitutes a
categorizational schema (see, for example, Anderson, 1980). That is, (a) what kind
of structures contain the information base for category determination, and (b) how
is information incorporated into and retrieved from these structures? The process
of schema formation is termed abstraction. Theories of abstraction all assume that
some commonality is "abstracted" from a series of similar experiences. This com-
monality-whatever form it takes-provides the oasis for the category's existence.
Specific exemplars can then be identified as being members of that category on the
basis of having one or more elements that define the category.
Category membership is not an all-or-none phenomenon, however. Rather, stim-
uli can be ranked in terms of their goodness of membership. Goodness of mem-
bership is a judgment of the degree to which the exemplar fulfills the requirements
of membership in the category. The range of possibilities goes from perfect mem-
bership (often termed "prototypic," because it is the best possible member) to perfect
nonmembership. Even among stimuli that are all clearly members of a category,
there is likely to be considerable variability in perceived goodness of membership.
For example, we tend to see "robin" as being a better representative than "chicken"
of the category "bird," and "football" as more representative than "weight lifting"
of the category "sport" (Rosch, 1973). It isn't that the poorer representatives are
seen as outside the category. It is simply a case of different degrees of "belong-
ingness. "
Other research has demonstrated that goodness of membership is very much a
matter of degree even at the fringes of category membership. Not only do subjects
disagree with each other in deciding as to whether or not "stroke" is a disease and
"pumpkin" is a fruit, but many subjects shift their judgments regarding these dif-
ficult-to-place items over the course of time (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).
Thus the "boundaries" of categories are apparently subject to shifts, as well as
being difficult to determine in the first place. A similar point is that the boundary
between two closely related categories is quite vague and ill-defined. Moreover,
the placement of the boundary between categories depends considerably upon the
context in which the exemplars are embedded (Labov, 1973). For example, a piece
of porcelain with dimensions that are half-way between a cup and a bowl is more
likely to be classified as a bowl when it has potatoes in it than when it does not.
Models of Abstraction 61

Models of Abstraction
As we stated initially, there is general agreement that abstraction occurs, and that
it has two aspects: the representation in some fashion or other of the commonality
or commonalities that define the category, and the existence of some basis for
assessing how well any given exemplar fits the category. There is far less agreement,
however, about how best to conceptualize these two functions. Thus there are
several theoretical approaches to the understanding of abstraction. These varying
approaches may themselves be abstracted into three fairly distinct categories of
theories.

Instance Theories
One approach is to assume that each instance that has been experienced is encoded
as a unit, with no processing to determine separate attributes, or even central
tendencies that develop over repeated experiences (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978;
see also Brooks, 1978). In effect, this sort of model involves very little "abstraction"
at all. There are several problems with this approach, the most serious of which
may be its difficulty in accounting for experimental results of the following type. 1
Reed (1972) presented subjects with a series of cartoon faces, which were varied
systematically in four separate respects to create two distinct categories. After
viewing the initial set, subjects viewed additional faces, and attempted to determine
which category the new exemplars belonged to. Among these new faces were two
that had been constructed so that each one would incorporate the exact "average"
values of one of the previously generated categories. Subjects had never seen these
two specific faces before, but they were extremely accurate in identifying the
categories to which the faces belonged. It seems apparent that subjects were in
some sense extracting information about "central tendencies" of features from the
initial set of faces, and were using that information to identify the subsequent
stimuli. This sort of finding is not at all unusual. Similar effects have been obtained
by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1977) and by Posner and Keele (1968, 1970).
Moreover, there is even evidence that subjects can spontaneously report their
awareness of abstract characterizations of the category rule (e.g., Reed, 1972).

Prototype Theories
What is essentially the opposite approach to abstraction is to emphasize the fact
that we apparently do extract central-tendency information. Pushed to its limits,
this approach would hold that we form a single prototypic representation of a
category, which represents the average of the experienced features, combined across

lWe should note that Medin and Schaffer have provided a logical basis for arguing that this
is less a problem than others have perceived it to be.
62 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

all dimensions relevant to the category. The category description, then, would be
a combination of this prototype and some information about the breadth of feature
diversity that is acceptable on each dimension of variation.
At least two theories emphasize the existence of a prototype for each category
that has been abstracted. But they differ from each other in other respects, for
example, in their assumptions about how deviations from the prototype are gauged.

Prototype-distance theory. Some theories conceptualize the prototype as a single

point in a multidimensional space. Each dimension of this logical space corresponds
to a conceptual dimension that is relevant to the category, along which stimulus
values can vary. Each new exemplar may also be located in the same multidimen-
sional space. The degree to which this new stimulus is a "good" representative of
the category is reflected by the distance (accumulated across dimensions) between
the new stimulus and the prototype.
An example of this sort of theory is the model developed by Posner and his
colleagues (e.g., Posner, Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967; Posner & Keele, 1968;
Posner, 1969). In this model the prototype is the point where the total distance to
all previously encoded exemplars is the smallest. Every time a new exemplar is
encoded, the prototype is recomputed (Reed, 1973). Note that in this theory it is
perfectly possible to have a prototype that is wholly composed of values that have
never actually been experienced. This is consistent with the findings discussed
above that central tendencies which have developed across previous experiences
exert a powerful influence on subjects' classification of a new experience (Posner
& Keele, 1968, 1970; Reed, 1972). Note also that there is a sense in which this
specific theory represents a kind of composite between the prototype and instance
approaches. That is, it emphasizes the role of the prototype in determining the
goodness of membership of new stimuli; but it also assumes that each exemplar is
encoded separately, thereby influencing the continued evolution of the prototype.

Prototype-transformation theory. Some theorists have assumed that goodness of

membership in a category is best expressed in terms of "transformations" of a
prototype. This approach is exemplified in the model developed by Franks and
Bransford (1971), which draws conceptually from Chomsky's (1957) theory of
transformational grammar in linguistics. It assumes that what is encoded is a pro-
totype and a set of formal transformation rules which, if applied, would create
deviations from the prototype. In this theory, individual exemplars are not them-
selves encoded. What is represented in memory is the transformations required to
generate each exemplar. The prototype is defined as the exemplar from which all
other category members can be created using the fewest total transformations. The
goodness of membership of a new exemplar is determined by the number of trans-
formations required to generate it from the prototype.
As noted above, theories that emphasize prototypes have some advantages over
instance theories. But they have problems of their own. In effect, their problem is
the opposite of that mentioned earlier for instance theories. A prototype theory can
account for cases where never-experienced values are easily recognized. But it has
Models of Abstraction 63

trouble accounting for the fact that subjects find previously encoded exemplars to
be more memorable or better category members than are new exemplars which are
the same distance or the same number of transformations away from the prototype
(Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970). It seems clear that subjects remember something
about specific instances as well as central tendencies, and that something besides
a single prototype is used in determining goodness of membership.
Before leaving prototype theories, we should note that Rosch (1973, 1978) has
also emphasized the importance of prototypicality in category use. She has argued
that prototypes are simply "members of a category that most reflect the redundancy
structure of the category as a whole" (Rosch, 1978, p. 37). Yet she also argues that
the use of the term prototype need not commit one to any particular theory of
category learning, or any particular processing model. Instead she discusses pro-
totypes in terms of the degree to which exemplars are (a) representative of the
category to which they belong, and (b) distinguishable from other categories to
which they do not belong. Rosch (1978) has noted that for natural language cate-
gories, at several different levels of analysis, these two characteristics are strongly
negatively correlated, and suggests that this relationship is inherent in the structure
of real-world categories. Furthermore, it is often the case that use of each principle
by itself produces results that are equivalent to each other (Rosch, Simpson, &
Miller, 1976). Thus, she sees any attempt to determine even which of these two
principles is critical to be a meaningless exercise.
Rosch's position appears to stem in part from the fact that she has been interested
in the nature of naturally occurring categories, rather than in the abstraction process
per se. Although her perspective is commonly identified as a prototype theory, there
is a real sense in which it is not really a theory of abstraction at all. Instead it is
an analysis of the ways in which people are able to use the categorizational schemas
that their culture (and nature) provides them. Her emphasis on the prototype con-
struct seems largely a function of her having adopted the philosophical position that
categories are best defined in terms of clear cases rather than in terms of boundary
definitions (Wittgenstein, 1953).

Frequency -Distribution Theories

Other theorists have argued that the concept of prototype is both unnecessary and
misleading. They propose that categories are defined not on the basis of a single
prototype, but according to frequency distributions of attributes. According to this
sort of theory, what is stored is the attribute, some information about its frequency
of occurrence over instances, and some information about its co-occurrence with
other attributes. According to this approach, the goodness of membership of a new
exemplar is determined by two things: the form of the frequency distributions of
previously encoded attributes relevant to that category, and the attributes that are
perceived in the new exemplar. Mapping these latter attributes against the existing
frequency distributions will result in an estimate of belongingness.
Frequency-distribution theories vary, however, in their assumptions about how
the frequency-count information is stored and utilized. For example, Reitman and
64 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

Bower (1973) proposed a model in which not only are single attributes encoded
one at a time, but information about co-occurrences of attributes are also stored
separately (see also Anderson, Kline, & Beasley, 1979; Elio & Anderson, 1980).
Indeed, their model assumes that a great many such feature combinations are stored
(see Reitman & Bower, 1973, for greater detail). This theory holds further that
frequency counts are maintained separately for each attribute and attribute com-
bination. The possible membership of new exemplars in the category is evaluated
by determining which of its attributes and attribute combinations are represented
in memory at a level over some critical threshold. Because the prototype-transfor-
mation model of Franks and Bransford (1971) had assumed the encoding of a
prototype and not much else, Reitman and Bower characterized it as a "store
nothing" theory. Because their own model assumes the separate encoding of each
attribute and attribute combination, they have referred to it as a "store everything"
theory.
Neumann (1975, 1977) has taken an approach that differs from the
Reitman-Bower model in several respects, while retaining the central assumption
that it is the frequency of attribute representation in memory that is critical to
recognition and identification of exemplars. Neumann assumes that single attributes
and some relationships among attributes are encoded sequentially, each "tagged"
with a semantic category label, so that it can be referenced either by the attribute
itself, or by the category to which it is tagged as belonging. How many and what
kinds of attributes and relationships are encoded depends heavily on the situational
context. Something about the structure of the situation or the stimulus itself suggests
that certain attributes and relationships are important. These will be attended to and
encoded, whereas others will be ignored. For example, exposure to a series of
stimuli in which color is varied among red, blue, and yellow will probably lead a
subject to distinguish these colors from each other. But the subject is much less
likely to notice and thus encode small variations in shades of red. This situation
could be changed very easily, however, either by limiting the color dimension to
varying shades of red, or by telling the subject that there will be several shades of
red amid the blue and yellow.
This point seems particularly important in considering the kind of stimuli that
people confront outside the laboratory. That is, most such stimuli contain far too
many attributes and co-occurrence information-all of which are potentially cod-
able-for all to be encoded systematically. Some sort of internal guidance system
would seem to be necessary, to point us to the characteristics that seem most
important in whatever context we are presently in.
Unlike Reitman and Bower, Neumann holds that frequency of encoding exerts
its effect on recognition and goodness of membership solely due to variations in
the probability that an attribute will be encountered in a memory search during
recognition. The more frequently represented in memory an attribute is, the more
likely it is that one of those representations will be accessed. When a new exemplar
is perceived, its salient attributes are temporarily encoded and memory is scanned
for stored representations of those same characteristics. In this model the search
process is a random function of time. Goodness of membership is determined by
the amount of time it takes to find a match for the exemplar's attributes.
Models of Abstraction 65

Neumann's theory accounts well for the fact that subjects vary across repeated
presentations in their confidence that a specific exemplar belongs to a category. It
also accounts for the fact that when we are asked to think of a representative of a
category, we don't always repeatedly come up with identical representations. In
both cases these effects are seen as depending upon the fact that the memory scanner
is moving randomly through the information tagged with that category label, and
thus varies in how long it takes to find a particular stored attribute (in the first case)
or varies in what attribute is encountered first (in the second case).
The most problematic aspect of this theory appears to be in the realm of category
formation. Prototype theories .implicitly assume that the existence of a category-
or a sense of "category-ness"---depends solely upon the accumulation of a relatively
large number of exemplars in a hitherto sparsely occupied region of logical space.
There is never a specific point at which a category appears full-blown where none
existed before, unless the existence of a category is defined in terms of some sort
of threshold. In Neumann's model, on the other hand, no category exists as such
until a semantic tag has been placed onto a set of attributes. But where does the
tag come from the first time it is used? In the laboratory where only one or two
categories are typically being created for the subject, this poses no problem. Outside
the laboratory, however, this would seem to be a very arbitrary and haphazard
business. In some cases, Neumann's argument fits reasonably well with intuition.
For example, when one person points to an object and names it, another person
may create a new category in memory, of which this is the first exemplar. But in
other cases, the argument fits less well. Some similarities seem to creep up on us
without our being aware of what they are. Even before we realize the nature of the
similarity, the sense of category-ness seems inescapable.

Section Summary
There are several points to be made about the material presented in the preceding
sections. First, and perhaps most obviously, it should be apparent that cognitive
psychologists are far from unanimous in their assumptions about how abstraction
works. These assumptions range from the belief that all experiences are encoded
separately as representatives of categories (instance theories) to the belief that only
"best" representatives of categories are separately encoded (prototype theories).
Each of these approaches has problems as well as strengths, and none seems to
account perfectly for all of the existing data (cf. Elio & Anderson, 1980). Yet
despite these differences in approaching the problem, theorists in the area are in
basic agreement about what phenomena need to be accounted for. Specifically,
theories of abstraction are organized so as to explain the formation of categories
from sets of experiences, and to explain the ability to recognize and categorize new
experiences. From the viewpoint of personality and social psychologists, it may be
this consensus of purpose that is most important, rather than the details of the
disagreements among theorists.
To repeat briefly, and in very general terms, the assumptions behind theories of
abstraction are these: As people examine their environments (and themselves), they
abstract the input information into basic components, which cognitive psychologists
66 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

term attributes, features, relationships, and the like. Over the course of repeated
experiences, a category structure is created in memory, based on commonalities
of these abstracted elements among experiences. The recognition and categorization
of new perceptual experiences occur by reference to these previously developed
categories, and the implicit rule systems that define them. That is, the experience
is perceived as belonging to an event category on the basis of the features that are
extracted from the experience itself, and the relationship of these features to the
membership requirements of various event categories. (If there is insufficient re-
semblance to any category, of course, the percept will not be recognized.) Given
that the percept has been fit to some categorizational schema, there then may be
a tendency to assume that other aspects of the schema (e.g., other attributes) are
applicable to it as well. Finally, new experiences also have an impact on the category
structure, so that categories can be expected to shift, change, and subdivide over
time.
Note that this process implies an interaction between the information inherent
in the incoming stimulus, and the representations that have previously been encoded
in memory. The result of the interaction is an awareness of the nature of the stimulus
that is being attended to. But this awareness, according to the theories described
in the preceding section, is clearly a product of both sources of influence.

Schemas and Prototypes

This is probably a good place to make explicit a matter of terminology that was
implicit but never actually addressed in much of the preceding discussion. This is
the difference in the implications conveyed by the terms "schema" and "prototype."
Many cognitive psychologists have used these terms interchangeably. But others
have begun to argue that they should be distinguished from each other. For example,
Anderson (1980) has proposed that the use of the term prototype should be restricted
to mean a hypothetical "most typical" instance of a category, in which all relevant
dimensions have values filled in. That is, to Anderson a prototype-in addition to
being a particularly good member of a category-is completely specified. This
usage, of course, it very much in line with the assumptions of most prototype
theorists, who hold that such a complete representation for a category's "average"
member is encoded in memory. [An exception to this rule is Rosch's approach,
and Rosch (1978) expresses a viewpoint on the use of the term prototype that is
quite different from Anderson's position.]
In contrast to the high degree of specification that may be inherent in the word
prototype, the term schema is widely accepted as being broader and more general
in its implications. A schema is a set of rules that define knowledge structures. The
set of features that are organized by a schema may be quite incomplete, in the sense
that specific dimensions relevant to the category may be disregarded. But the word
schema does convey a sense of common co-occurrence, a sort of implicit central
tendency, while being considerably less rigid in that respect than prototype. In sum,
in comparison to the term prototype, the term schema appears simply to leave out
two things: (a) some implicit theoretical assumptions about the form in which
categories are represented in memory, and (b) the assumption that the representation
Abstraction; Some Additional Issues 67

is completely specified. In deference to this distinction, we have attempted to restrict

ourselves to the term schema throughout the remainder of the book when referring
to such knowledge structures.

Abstraction: Some Additional Issues

Two additional points regarding the events of abstraction deserve further attention.
The first is how we should view the collection of all the attribute qualities that are
potentially discernible in perceptions. Are they equivalent to each other, or are
there distinctions among them that are useful to the theorist? We intend to argue
for the latter position. The second point is that there are other constructs bearing
a family resemblance to the concept of schema, which have proven to be useful
in thinking about the organization of social behavior. Those constructs also merit
some mention.

A Hierarchy of Attribute Qualities

A great many attributes or characteristics are perceptible in sensory input. And
these attributes are not limited to simple characteristics such as "presence" of some
stimulus, or "color" of the stimulus, or simple relationships such as "co-occurrence."
To the contrary, features that could be encoded presumably range from the simple
and concrete to the complex and exceedingly abstract. As was discussed in Chapter
2, the nervous system appears to be organized in such a way that new information
is created from existing information at many integrating points along the input
pathways. Each new information quality that is created in this fashion presumably
represents an integration-an abstraction, in its own way--of the preexisting in-
formation. 2
Furthermore, the sorts of features that could be abstracted from perceptual input
would seem necessarily to form a hierarchy, in terms of their logical complexity
(cf. Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976). Because there are many potential bases for creating
hierarchical arrangements, it would greatly overstate the case at this point to assert
that there is only one such possible arrangement. However, we would like to call
some attention to what we feel is one plausible basis for organizing abstracted
perceptual qualities. The appeal of this particular arrangement stems at least in part
from the fact that it was created in the context of a discussion of self-regulating
behavioral systems.

2Note that this use of the word "abstract" differs slightly in its implications from the use of
the same word to indicate the process of category formation. Category formation involves
extracting the essence or commonality of several different experiences. The present use
implies perceiving the essence of a single perceptual event at varying levels of complexity.
The simple illustration that we gave in Chapter 2 was the creation of "size" from a set of
separate indications of "presence." There is no particular reason, however, why comparable
integrating systems should not also be abstracting far more complex qualities from the
available stimuli.
68 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

Powers (1973a, 1979) has suggested a hierarchy of perceptual classes, which

corresponds to what we are discussing as differences in abstracted qUalities. The
lowest level of this hierarchy is termed Intensity. What is experienced here is degree
of stimulation (at the level of the sensory nerve endings), without regard to what
type of stimulation is being sensed. According to Powers, it takes one specific kind
of integration before a percept is identifiable even as to the type of stimulation being
sensed. This integration results in a second level of the hierarchy, termed Sensation.
Sensation is a weighted combination of intensity values, which results in the ex-
perience of some sensory quality, in the ordinary meaning of the term: color, sound,
force, and so on. At the next level of integration these sensations are grouped into
recognizable clusters, resulting in what Powers terms Configurations. In visual
perception, for example, the sense of "objectness" represents a configuration, which
is presumably a product of this sort of abstraction.
Up to this point, the feature qualities under discussion have been relatively static,
in the sense that they are discrete experiences of the moment. Not all experiential
features have this characteristic, however, and the remaining levels ofthe hierarchy
suggested by Powers take us beyond this limitation. Transitions is the name given
to the level at which one perceives a sense of change, or movement. A transition
results from a series of configurations being transformed from one to another over
time. The sense of movement while in a car, and the shift in perceived pitch as a
pianist executes a run are examples of transition perception.
Even this level of abstraction is relatively primitive in some respects, however.
Many perceptual events are identifiable on the basis of the fact that their config-
urations or their transitions occur in a particular order. This sense of order in
perception gives rise to the fifth level of the hierarchy, termed Sequence. "Events"
are sequences. A person opening and going through a door, for example, is a
sequence, comprised of a series of relatively distinct configurations (e.g., hand
clasped on doorknob) and transitions (e.g., turning the doorknob). And the sense
of sequentiality that is part of the observation of such an event is as much a separate
attribute of the experience as is the "objectness" or the color of the door.
Powers defined Relationships as being the next level above Sequences. A rela-
tionship requires at least two items of experience. The relationship characteristic
does not reside in either of the items alone, but rather in-well, in the relationship
between them. The relationship may be as simple as co-occurrence, or it may be
quite complex. For example, it is common for social psychologists to hypothesize,
and sometimes to discover, that two or more predictor variables have an interactive
relationship in influencing behavior. A social psychologist observing a sequence
of behavior in which the necessary elements were present would perceive an in-
teractive relationship being exerted on the subject's actions. The "interactive effect"
would implicitly be a quality of the percept, and it would occur at the Relationship
level.
In many cases relationships (e.g., "on," "above," etc.)--for all their abstract-
ness-do not seem more logically complex than sequences. Indeed, many sequences
would seem to imply the creation of a series of relationships. For example, in the
earlier illustration of sequence, the configuration that was mentioned-hand clasped
on the doorknob-implies a relationship. For this reason it seems arguable to us
Abstraction; Some Additional Issues 69

that relationships should be considered as existing at a lower level of abstraction

than sequences. Regardless of its placement, however, it is clear that relationships
is an important category of perceptual properties.
The next two levels of this hierarchy are the Program level and the Principle
level. These two levels assume a good deal more importance in Chapter 7. But for
the present they are a bit difficult to deal with in a way that doesn't both strain our
own intuitions and beg the reader to take too large a leap of faith in following our
illustrations. The Program level concerns sequences that are more than simply lists
of acts: they are strings of choice points, of "if-then" decisions. These program
sequences are the kind of things that we described in Chapter 2 by a flow chart
illustration of a troubleshooting sequence. From the present perspective, however,
it is simply the sense of implicit decision making or strategy utilization that defines
a perceptual attribute at this level. Normally perceptions with this character are
perceptions of people, or other strategy-employing animals. (Incidentally, it may
be the very sensing of an attribute at this level that gives rise to anthropomor-
phizing.)
This is quite an abstract type of attribute to perceive in a person's behavior, and
it often requires integration over a considerable amount of time to perceive it, but
it clearly is perceptible. For example, consider the illustration that we used earlier
fr· a sequence: a person going through a door. If an observer had the sense that
the per~on was deciding whether or not the door was locked as he tried the knob,
that sense would constitute a perceptual attribute at the Program level. That is,
testing the lock implies an if-then decision.
If the essence of programs is the sense of strategy execution, the essence of the
next level is the sense that the strategy is being executed in the service of some
broader principle. Maintaining a good public image, achieving to the limits of one's
capabilities, being honest-all of these are principles that could be implicit in
behavior. The hallmark of principles is that they could be realized by many strat-
egies, in many behavioral domains. Thus, in Powers' view, they represent a char-
acteristic at a higher level than the Program level. To return to our concrete example
from above, if an observer senses that the person walking through the door is
leaving the room in order to maintain his or her integrity, that characteristic of the
percept would be an attribute at the Principle level.
This does not exhaust the hierarchy suggested by Powers (1973a, 1979), but it
does take us as far as we feel we can meaningfully go in this context. As we
indicated earlier, Powers developed this hierarchy as a way of discussing self-
regulating systems. The implications of the hierarchy for such activities are ad-
dressed in detail in Chapter 7. For the present, we wish simply to reiterate that it
seems reasonable to assume that perceived attributes can be organized hierarchically.
In a sense, such an organization would seem to add additional complexity to the
task of negotiating our environments. That is, not only are there many different
stimulus dimensions available for potential encoding, but those dimensions differ
widely in the kind of information that they convey, based on the degree of integration
across features, and so on, that is required to create them. On the other hand, the
bases by which these dimensions differ from each other indicate a way of under-
standing their use. Presumably attributes at different levels of the hierarchy assume
70 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

varying degrees of importance at different times and under different circumstances.

We leave consideration of that possibility to Chapter 7, however.

Frames and Scripts

By implication, the earlier discussion of schemas and their use in identifying new
experiences was limited to relatively simple categories of experience, or at least
experiences of relatively short duration. As we noted earlier, there are other con-
structs with similarities to the schema construct, which introduce a greater sense
of continuity among experiences.
Minsky (1975), for example, has criticized psychologists and theorists in the area
of artificial intelligence for their tacit assumption that people's understanding of
reality is composed of minute bits of information. He urged that theorists attempt
to generate more connections across experiences in their theories, on the grounds
that the sense of "connectedness" is a salient and important part of the normal
experience for which the theories are intended to account. As a step in this direction,
Minsky proposed the concept of "frame": a remembered knowledge structure used
to represent a stereotyped situation. He postulated that frames incorporate infor-
mation about how to use them, about what can be expected to happen next, and
about what to do if these expectations are disconfirmed. Because they represent
stereotyped situations, frames were said to include a good deal of "default" infor-
mation: details that are likely to be true, but which have not yet been specified by
the situation to which the frame corresponds. Minsky (1975) has applied this concept
to problems in vision and imagery, and to linguistic understanding.
The frame construct implied a more dynamic picture of perception, in the sense
that a frame was said to convey information about not yet executed events. But it
was a very general construct that has since been eclipsed. Schank and Abelson
(1977; see also Abelson, 1975, 1976), pursuing similar concerns, have created a
construct that is both more specialized and more articulated than Minsky's frame.
Their construct is the "script": a cognitive representation of a coherent sequence
of events expected by a person, either as a participant or as an observer. Others
who have made use of this construct (Langer, 1978; Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz,
1978) have argued that the event sequence of a script is likely to be highly ster-
eotyped, as was true of Minsky's frame, but Schank and Abelson have been more
equivocal on this point. It is clear, however, that the script is intended to refer
solely to event sequences-almost "stories"-a point that makes the script a less
general construct than the frame.
Scripts can be used in two ways. They can be used in the understanding of
observed event sequences, and they can be used to guide behavior. It is the former
use that is most relevant at present: the understanding of perceived events. The
observer gains some information about what is happening; if this information plugs
into a script that the observer has previously learned, the entire sequence of events
is accessed and used as a guide for understanding. As with the frame, and schemas
more generally, the script usually brings with it some "default" assumptions, which
will be held until some specific observation in the sequence displaces them. A
commonly used example is the following. Telling someone that a man went into
Decision Making 71

a restaurant, ordered soup, and paid his bill by credit card usually also creates the
impression in the listener that the man received and ate the soup that he had ordered,
and that his bill was for the meal, rather than for breaking tables, chairs, and lamps.
Such assumptions are typically made unless contradictory information is encoun-
tered.
Abelson (1978) has characterized the script construct, when applied to the un-
derstanding of observed events, as being a category whose attributes are spread out
primarily in time rather than in space. This characterization makes two points. First,
the term script refers to a subset of the phenomena encompassed by the term schema,
a statement that is also true of Minsky's frame construct. Just as importantly,
however, these constructs make explicit something that is only implied in other
theories concerning schemas: attributes of a perceptual experience can be organized
temporally, as well as in other ways. (Powers made the same argument about
attributes, of course, but not in a discussion of schemas.)
There are other aspects of the script construct that are intriguing, as well. Abelson
adds that scripts are more than simply linear lists of events. Among other things,
scripts typically include branch points, decision points at which more than one
event could occur. Note that Powers made precisely the same distinction. His
Sequences were said to be linear strings of events; at the point where a branching
network of possibilities was being undertaken, perception assumes a higher level
of abstraction, termed the Program level. We believe that a careful examination
will reveal that Powers' Programs and Schank and Abelson's scripts are almost
precisely equivalent.
It is interesting that Abelson has also considered a higher level of abstraction
than the script, which he termed "meta-scripts." A meta-script is a knowledge
structure that allows event clusters and scenes to be variable, rather than constant.
They are used to organize understanding in circumstances where there is little
similarity between the concrete event chain under observation and any specific
script. They provide general guiding principles, rather than specific schemas. This
conceptualization seems to be nearly the same as the Principle level in the Powers
hierarchy.
It is of considerable interest that so much attention has been directed by Schank
and Abelson (among others) to the importance of processing at the level of scripts,
or Programs. We have more to say about that when we tum our own attention to
behavior regulation in Chapter 7. For now, however, we bring our discussion of
this point to a close. There are several other issues yet to be discussed in this
chapter.

Decision Making
The preceding sections have mainly concerned the generation of cognitive schemas
that represent categories of various sorts, and the use of such schemas to identify
new stimuli as belonging (or not belonging) to the categories. But it should be noted
that most theories of abstraction assume these judgments of belongingness to be
probabilistic in nature: that is, an exemplar may be a good member of the category,
72 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

a poor member, or somewhere in between. Moreover, these judgments often depend

on secondary searches for information after a partial categorization has occurred,
particularly when the perception is of an event that occurs over time. It is important,
therefore, to consider whether decisions about category membership, or decisions
about what information to seek out, are subject to predictable biases. The result of
such biases may be an inappropriate placement (inclusion or exclusion) of the
stimulus under consideration, with regard to a category.

Biases in Decision Making

It turns out that there are, in fact, several well-known biases in normal decision
making (e.g., Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1980). Before exam-
ining these biases, however, we should say a word about the reasons why such
biases might arise. It is widely accepted that people do not typically process in-
formation exhaustively in making decisions. Rather, they utilize "heuristics," short-
cuts that enable the substitution of simpler procedures for more complete ones (cf.
Einhorn, 1980). This saves effort, and results in a decision that is at least partially
informed. Heuristics thus are useful. Unfortunately, however, their use sometimes
leads to systematic errors in judgment.

Representativeness. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have discussed in some detail

three commonly used heuristic principles, and the biases that they may introduce.
One of these is the "representativeness" heuristic. Put simply, this is the inference
of category membership from a partial resemblance to the category. This heuristic
in itself is not too misleading. Its biasing effect lies in the fact that its use tends
to preclude the examination of other information. That is, using this heuristic causes
people to disregard or minimize the importance of other facts that demonstrably
have a direct bearing on the probability of belongingness.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discussed six separate ways in which the repre-
sentativeness heuristic can lead to bias. As an illustration of the principle, consider
one of these ways, termed "insensitivity to prior probability of outcome." Imagine
that you are given a personality sketch of a person drawn from a set of descriptions
of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. Knowing this base-rate information, you have
available to you a crude estimate of the probability that this person is an engineer
before you even begin to read the person's description. If you are prevented from
reading the personality sketch, your estimate of the probability will be (or should
be) 0.7.
But the results of an experiment by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) indicate that
if you do read the sketch, the chances are very good that you may largely ignore
the base-rate information (see also Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976;
Trope, 1978). Instead, you will compare the personality description against your
stereotypes of lawyers and engineers, and use that as the primary basis for your
judgment. Indeed, the research in question found that this tendency to discount
base-rate information was present even when the personality sketch was completely
uninformative. In the latter case, subjects fell back on a .5 probability estimate,
Decision Making 73

apparently because there were two classes of careers. The act of reading the per-
sonality profile seemed to have put subjects into a specific cognitive orientation:
to search for personality information to compare against their stereotypes of en-
gineers and lawyers. These subjects apparently hardly ever thought to take the base
rates into account, even when the description proved not to fit either stereotype.
Others have more recently found that there are limitations on this effect. For
example, Ginosar and Trope (1980) found that subjects ignored base rates primarily
when category labels fit well with personally held stereotypes. When the diagnostic
usefulness of a category label was diminished, subjects apparently shifted to a more
deliberate mode of thinking, in which they attended to and incorporated other useful
sources of information, such as base rates (see also Manis, Dovalina; Avis, &
Cardoze, 1980).

Approximation and adjustment. A second judgmental heuristic discussed by Tver-

sky and Kahneman (1974) may be called "approximation and adjustment." This is
the process of beginning an estimate by making a first approximation, and then
reaching a final judgment by adjusting this approximation somewhat. The first
approximation may be based on a partial computation (or partial decision), or it
may be suggested by the form of the problem (or the decision being undertaken).
In any case, the initial approximation typically exerts a biasing effect called "an-
choring." That is, secondary adjustments are usually insufficient to compensate for
the error of the first approximation. For example, if two subjects are led to begin
the same estimation task from two different starting points on opposite sides of the
true value, their secondary judgments will converge only partially. Their final
estimations will be reliably affected by their starting points. This bias is a very
pervasive one, even if there is a substantial payoff for accuracy (see Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).

Availability. A third important judgmental heuristic is called "availability." The

availability heuristic is treating the ease with which something is brought to mind
as being a guide to its probability. This is often a useful tactic, because instances
of large classes are usually recalled more quickly than instances of less frequently
represented classes. Unfortunately, this heuristic disregards the fact that the retrieval
process is influenced by many variables other than class size. For example, some
kinds of information search are inherently easier than others. Consider the following
question: Do more English words begin with the letter "r," or have the letter "r"
as their third letter? It is easier to mentally search for words by their first than their
third letters. Thus the chances of running across a beginning r in one's memory are
greater than the chances of finding a third-letter r, given the same amount of search
time. The common conclusion after such a search is that beginning r's are more
common, which is in fact an error (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
A number of other variables also have an impact on a schema's availability. It
is apparently the case that evoking a conceptual category causes that category to
be more easily accessed in the immediate future (Higgins, Rholes, Jones, 1977;
Srull & Wyer, 1979), a point to which we return in Chapter 5. The result of this
74 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

enhanced accessibility is that the category is more likely to be utilized in interpreting

ambiguous stimuli than would otherwise be true. Another illustration of this influ-
ence is the finding that imagining an event makes the occurrence of that event seem
subjectively more likely (e.g., Carroll, 1978; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz,
1977). All of these findings are interpretable as reflecting the inappropriate use of
the availability heuristic. That is, on the basis of easy access, subjects infer high
probability, apparently ignorant of the fact that easy access has been artificially
manipulated beforehand (see also Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980). Salience
effects (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978), some of which we discuss later on, are also
interpretable as reflections of this availability heuristic. The salience of some specific
piece of information presumably renders that information more available for po-
tential use, and more likely to be used in a subsequent judgment.

Illusory correlation. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have argued that the avail-
ability heuristic is also at least partially responsible for a phenomenon termed
"illusory correlation" (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969). This, in its simplest
form, is an overestimation of the frequency with which two events co-occur, when
the two events are conceptually linked to each other. This bias is extremely strong
and resistant to contradictory data, persisting even when the true correlations are
actually negative in direction (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969). The availability
heuristic would account for illusory correlation in the following way. Evoking one
of the associated pair tends to render the other more available (because of the mental
association), and thus makes it more quickly and easily accessed than would oth-
erwise be the case. This, in tum, leads to the judgment that the two events have
been paired with each other frequently in the past-i.e., are correlated.
Although the use of the availability heuristic may contribute to the illusory
correlation phenomenon, it is doubtful that availability is its sole cause. Other
research has demonstrated that most people, when attempting to determine the
degree of association between two variables, inappropriately restrict their sampling
of information. More specifically, people judge the strength of relationships almost
solely on the basis of the frequency of positive co-occurrences of the two variables,
and ignore all other sources of information, including occurrences of either variable
in the absence of the other (e.g., Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Smedslund, 1963, 1966;
Ward & Jenkins, 1965). This is a point that comes up repeatedly in later chapters.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have recently argued that these effects are symp-
tomatic of a general difficulty that people--even experts-have in effectively uti-
lizing potentially disconfirming evidence. That is, discerning the existence of a
confirming case, or even a thousand, is simply not sufficient to test the validity of
a rule. One must also look for cases that should, if the rule is correct, produce the
absence of an affirmative outcome. But in practice, people testing rules typically
attempt only to generate instances that fit the rule. Only rarely do they purposely
try to create instances that fail to fit the rule (see, e.g., Wason, 1960). The result
is that people rarely give themselves a chance to find out that the rule they have
been assuming is true is actually wrong (Einhorn, 1980). Similarly, in assessing
correlations, people typically look only to the co-occurrences, rather than to the
Decision Making 75

event classes where disconfirmation of the relationship is possible. Indeed, it ap-

parently is often only the co-occurrence that have been encoded in the first place
(e.g., Estes 1976a, 1976b).
Why do people selectively seek out and encode confirming cases, positive co-
occurrences? Why are other data disregarded? There are at least two answers to
these questions, which are quite compatible with each other. Einhorn and Hogarth
(1978) have taken the position that this bias is a product of long years of naturalistic
experience. In most decision-making contexts outside the laboratory, decisions lead
to actions (e.g., to hire someone, or to accept a student into a graduate program).
The nature of such an action typically renders a large amount of potentially important
evidence virtually unobtainable (e.g.,Jailing to hire someone makes it difficult to
follow their subsequent behavior). The result is a tendency to lose track of the fact
that such information even exists and that it is potentially useful.
It is also arguable that this encoding bias is partly attributable to the fact that
naturalistic processing of co-occurrence information is typically sequential. Sup-
porting this assertion is the fact that the tendency to ignore disconfirming evidence
can be diminished by providing subjects with all relevant sources of information
simultaneously rather than sequentially (Jenkins & Ward, 1965). It seems reasonable
to suggest that a simultaneous presentation forces subjects to attend to the entire
matrix of possibilities, thus causing all relevant information to be taken into account.
Sequential presentation, on the other hand, requires subjects to determine for them-
selves as they go along what is the most relevant information, and forces them to
remember over longer periods of time everything they consider important. Appar-
ently the increased demand involved in such mental record-keeping causes people
to cut back their efforts and attend to only those instances that are either the most
salient and familiar type, or are considered to be most informative-specifically,
positive co-occurrences. The result is that what is available for recall is not a
probability of co-occurrence, but rather a frequency of co-occurrence (Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1978; Estes, 1976a, 1976b). The result of that biased availability, then,
is biased impression.

Section Summary
In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed a variety of biases in decision
making, which often result from the application of heuristic strategies. These heu-
ristics are used because they are usually more effective than wild guessing. But the
structure of many-perhaps most-judgmental tasks causes the heuristics to intro-
duce biasing tendencies. Because these biases can be overcome only by the most
scrupulous attention to detail in the testing of one's hypothesis (cf. Einhorn, 1980),
there is good reason to believe that they have an impact on most decisions of a
probabilistic nature that are made by most people. Why is this important in the
present context? Because these decisions include judgments of category member-
ship, and implicit judgments regarding the applicability of categorizational schemas
to specific cases. More simply, these biases influence our perceptions, including-
as will be seen later--our perceptions of other persons.
76 4. Cognitive Theory: Schemas, Attributes, and Decision Biases

Important heuristics and the biases they can introduce include the following.
Representativeness is the tendency to make decisions about category membership
on the basis of partial resemblance to the category. Use of this principle causes
people to ignore other information that is available and is obviously relevant to the
judgment. Adjustment from an approximation is the tendency to make a first guess
and then adjust it. When people do this they are usually unaware of, and unable
to control, the fact that their adjustments are "anchored" by the initial approximation.
The adjustments thus are too small. Availability is the tendency to assume that
schemas are applicable if they are easily brought to mind. Use of this principle
rarely includes any consideration of why the schema is easily brought to mind. And
sometimes schemas are very accessible for reasons that have nothing to do with
whether the schema is appropriate. Finally, people tend to encode things by fre-
quencies, and are biased toward the encoding of positive occurrences. As Ross
(1977) has noted, we do not usually attend to things that do not happen. The result
may be a grossly distorted set of data in memory. Judgments based on the recall
of those data are likely to result in illusory correlations: the perception of a rela-
tionship where in fact there is none.
This has been a rather long excursion into the realm of cognitive psychology.
But the excursion has had a purpose. The principles that have been discussed in
this chapter presumably have relevance beyond the cognitive laboratory. To the
degree that they are valid, they are also applicable to the way in which we perceive
and construe our environments, other people with whom we interact, and even
ourselves. These applications of the ideas presented here are discussed in the fol-
lowing two chapters. In addition, the hierarchy of attributes suggested by Powers
will prove to have relevance for understanding the actions that follow from our
perceptions. The importance of that hierarchy will become apparent in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places
and Persons

The preceding chapter focused on theories of schema formation and use developed
by cognitive psychologists. But these theories-and the research paradigms from
which they have been derived-have increasingly come to be viewed by personality
and social psychologists as useful tools for examining social knowledge as well.
This chapter centers more explicitly on the implications that such theories have for
the perception and cognitive organization of our physical and social surroundings.
This discussion is divided into three sections. The first deals with schemas that are
applied to the physical and behavioral environments within which social interaction
takes place. The second focuses upon the perception of other persons. And the third
takes up the organization and encoding of cognitive representations of event se-
quences.

Behavioral Settings and Environmental Taxonomies

When our attention is directed outward to the environment, we search out recog-
nizable elements of that environment, in order to identify it, and ultimately in order
to behave effectively in it. Social and personality psychologists tend to emphasize
the social aspects of that environment. But we should also acknowledge the im-
portance of the physical settings in which social interaction takes place. Environ-
mental psychologists have recognized for some time that the settings of behavioral
events often have a major impact on the form taken by the events themselves. As
a simple example, some environments (termed sociopetal) facilitate social inter-
action, e.g., by placing people in face-to-face orientations, whereas other environ-
ments (termed sociofugal) actually seem to inhibit interaction (Osmond, 1957).
The notion that environments have a strong--even coercive-influence on be-
havior was greatly expanded upon by Barker and his colleagues (e.g., Barker,
1968, 1979; Barker & Associates, 1978; Moos, 1976). Barker developed the concept
of the "behavior setting," which is now widely treated as the basic environmental
unit in the subdiscipline of ecological psychology (cf. Wicker, 1972, 1979). The
78 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

behavior setting is a small-scale social system, which has three types of features.
Perhaps most obvious are the nonbehavioral characteristics of the environment
itself, and it is this type of feature upon which we wish to focus here. But the
behavior setting as defined by Barker also includes standing behavioral patterns that
are evoked by the physical characteristics of the setting, as well as relational
characteristics that create a "fit" between the behavioral and nonbehavioral factors.
Barker purposely attempted to integrate the behavioral and the nonbehavioral in
this construct, because he wished to analyze the setting and the events that occurred
therein as a self-regulating ecosystem (Barker, 1968; Wicker, 1972; Stokols &
Shumaker, 1980). We do not take issue with his assumption that behavioral elements
merge with physical elements in the setting. But for present purposes, we think it
is useful to separate these elements from each other (cf. Stokols, 1978). Conse-
quently, the physical setting is addressed here, and the evoked behavior patterns
in Chapter 7.
As has been noted elsewhere (Craik, 1973), even when restricting oneself to the
purely physical aspects of a setting, environments can be assessed at many different
levels. There are the physical-spatial properties of the objects in the setting; there
are implicit organizations of physical artifacts, which can be conceptualized sep-
arately from the artifacts themselves; and there are also more abstract qualities that
are implied by aspects of the overall arrangement. Each of these represents a
different level of assessment. For example, a doctor's waiting room contains many
specific physical objects, each of which has many attributes. But one can also see
that some of the objects form distinguishable clusters. For example, a pile of
magazines is typically perceived as a pile of magazines rather than as twelve distinct
objects. In addition, there are organizational characteristics of such places that imply
(or sometimes shout) that this is a "waiting" room. Finally, most of us would agree
that there are stylistic elements, even in doctors' waiting rooms, that allow us to
distinguish between subcategories of the larger set-things like the type and con-
dition of the furniture, the presence or absence of artwork, and so on, which
contribute to the overall "feel" of the place.
The process of perceiving environmental settings at these various levels is quite
analogous to the process of perceiving stimuli in the cognitive laboratory. The only
differences are the fact that complexity increases when one turns to real environ-
ments, and the fact that the process is more continuous, rather than artificially
separated into discrete exposures to exemplars of experience.
Early research on behavior settings took the form of exhaustive observation and
data coding by expert observers. For example, Barker and his co-workers did
extensive analysis of the characteristics of a variety of specific behavior settings
in two small towns. This work was guided by a desire for base-rate information
about the characteristics of these settings, rather than by any specific theoretical
framework. An enormous amount of data was collected, but the effort was hampered
by a lack of focus. More recently, however, others have attempted to make the
task more manageable in several different ways. For example, it has been shown
that a great many of the descriptors used by Barker could be reduced to a much
smaller set of dimensions (Price & Blashfield, 1975). And there has been an in-
Behavioral Settings and Environmental Taxonomies 79

creased effort to focus on dimensions that have theoretical meaning (e.g., Stokols
& Shumaker, 1980; Willems, 1976).
One implicit goal of much of this work has been to evolve a taxonomy, or
classification system, within which a broad variety of environments could be ca-
tegorized. Indeed, the assumption that such a system must be developed, if eco-
logical psychology is to flourish, is widespread (cf. Craik, 1973; Fredericksen,
1972; Moos, 1974; Sells, 1963; Stokols, 1978). Despite this consensus of purpose,
however, progress toward creating such a taxonomy has been quite slow (cf. Moore,
1979). Recent attempts in the area illustrate the breadth of the task. For example,
groups of researchers have measured variables as diverse as the physical-spatial
properties of rooms (cf. Craik, 1973), and the social-climate aspects of larger
settings (e.g, Astin & Holland, 1961; Battistich & Thompson, 1980; Moos, 1973).
And while some efforts have focused on relatively molecular characteristics of the
settings (e.g., Barker, 1968), other theorists point to the need to assume that settings
have coherent multidimensional structure (Sells, 1963; Stokols & Shumaker, 1980).
We believe that environmental taxonomies will eventually be developed. But
more importantly for our present purposes, we see this effort on the part of envi-
ronmental psychologists as reflecting a more general cognitive tendency on the part
of all people. We think that most people carry around with them an implicit
taxonomy of environments (cf. Gump, 1971), and use the taxonomy to differentiate
classes of behavior settings from each other. Indeed, people make widespread use
of this knowledge, in arranging settings so as to create specific impressions when
entered by other people. Thus, we find the generation of taxonomies of settings by
researchers to be of interest. But even more interesting is the notion that the experts
are attempting to consciously recreate processes that are engaged in every day, in
the course of normal human cognition.
It is encouraging, in this regard, that recent studies have begun to examine the
perceptions of behavior settings which are held by the participants in those settings.
It is also of interest that the conceptualizations guiding this work have placed an
increased emphasis on using the ideas of cognitive psychology to understand how
nonexperts construe their surroundings (e.g., Moore & Golledge, 1976; Ittelson,
1973). Among the results of this sort of research is the finding that an increased
familiarity with an area is associated not just with greater encoding of detail, but
also with a tendency toward hierarchical organization of information (Beck & Wood,
1976; Devlin, 1976; Stokols & Shumaker, 1980). This sort of finding fits nicely
with the argument that there is a natural tendency to organize information into sets
of categories and subcategories. For example, Rosch and her colleagues (e.g.,
Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976)
have shown that common objects are typically organized in hierarchical taxonomies.
And Cantor and Mischel (1979a) have made a similar argument regarding the
categorization of persons.
We suspect that one area in which considerably more research will be conducted
in the near future is the way in which environmental variables are categorized by
naive observers (rather than by psychologists). It seems likely that the perceptual-
cognitive functions that are involved in the formation and use of simpler categories
80 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

are involved here. as well. And it seems reasonable to assume that the biases to
which other category systems are subject may also be important in our impressions
of places.

Person Perception
In addition to the physical environment. there is also a social environment. made
up of the people with whom we share behavior settings. These people vary in their
chronic dispositions. and in their temporary. situationally induced characteristics.
They vary in the relationships that they have with each other and with ourselves.
All of these attributes of the persons around us contribute to our social environments.
The ways whereby we take these various elements into account in perceiving others
has been formalized as the study of person perception (e.g., Hastorf. Schneider.
& Polefka, 1970; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). A good deal of interest has developed
recently in the possibility that the principles underlying person perception are similar
to the processes studied by cognitive psychologists, and are subject to the same
biases as were discussed in Chapter 4. Some of the results of this emerging interest
are described in the following sections.
In considering the possibility that persons are subjected to the same abstraction
and categorizational processes as are less complex stimuli. several distinct questions
occur (cf. Taylor & Crocker. 1979). The most basic is this: What is the evidence
that people develop and use schemas for the recognition of persons as stimuli?
There are several intuitive grounds for making such an assumption. But more
importantly. the assumption has been tested directly in at least one recent study.

Traits as Recognitory Schemas

We should note at the outset that people, like environments. are categorizable at
many different levels of analysis, based on many different types of information.
In perceiving others we may attend to their physical characteristics, their actions,
or to available information concerning their psychological predispositions (traits).
The research that provides the clearest illustration of the applicability of cognitive
concepts to person perception made use of the latter sort of information-trait
labels.
This research (Cantor & Mischel. 1977) incorporated procedures that were care-
fully modeled after previous studies of abstraction (e.g., Bransford & Franks. 1971;
Posner & Keele. 1968, 1970; Reitman & Bower, 1973). The only difference from
previous research was that the exemplars used in this study were personality traits.
Subjects received an acquisition set (in the form of descriptive sentences), bearing
on four separate "fictional characters." One character had been carefully constructed
to be a stereotypic introvert, another to be a stereotypic extravert, and two control
characters were constructed to be neither introverts nor extraverts. After an inter-
polated task (designed to interfere with short-term memory), subjects were presented
with a recognition series. They were asked to indicate the degree of their confidence
Person Perception 81

that each item of the recognition series either had or had not been in the acquisition
set. Some of these items had in fact been selected from the acquisition set, and
others were new. Of the new items, some were relatively unrelated to the trait
exemplified in the fictional characters, others were highly related (as assessed by
a preliminary study). )
The results of this experiment indicated that subjects were able to distinguish
between items that had previously been viewed and items that had not been viewed.
But the data also revealed a pronounced memory bias among the items that had not
been seen before. In particular, subjects expressed greater confidence of having
seen items that were highly related to the target trait than items that were less related
to the target trait. For the previously described extravert, for example, subjects
were more confident that "outgoing" had been part of the description than "ethical,"
although neither of these words had actually been in the acquisition set. As Cantor
and Mischel (1977) pointed out, these findings essentially duplicated the results of
a variety of earlier abstraction studies conducted by cognitive psychologists. This
appears to lead to the conclusion that trait concepts serve as an important set of
classificatory schemas for use in categorizing people. 1
It is worthy of some note that this effect did not depend on the use of the summary
trait's name during the acquisition set. That is, for some subjects the initial set of
exemplars had included the explicit use of the terms "introvert" and "extravert" to
describe the two characters who were being portrayed in those fashions. For other
subjects these summary labels were not included, though the other descriptors-
which define introversion and extraversion-were retained. The two groups proved
not to differ from each other in their patterns of memory bias. This suggests that
it is the evoking of a cluster of characteristics that induces the bias, rather than the
explicit providing of the label.

Trait clusters and implicit personality theories. The demonstration by Cantor and
Mischel that trait information is used in much the same way as other stimulus-
attribute information makes several points. It is an interesting illustration of the
applicability of cognitive techniques to the domain of person perception. And the
results appear to indicate quite clearly that person categorization follows principles
that are substantially the same as are involved in object perception.
But the aspect of their work that has received the greatest attention thus far is
the following. Presenting a cluster of trait-relevant characteristics caused subjects
to assume the presence of other characteristics that were consistent with the trait,
but were unmentioned in the acquisition set. This finding was quite consistent with
the results of previous research (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968) in
indicating that trait concepts are encoded in interrelated clusters, rather than sep-
arately. Though the finding thus was not new conceptually, it confirmed in a new

lThough Cantor and Mischel have continued to use the term "prototype," they explicitly
acknowledged in this article that their data argue against the viability of a model in which
only a prototype is represented. Thus throughout our discussion of their work we have used
the more general term "schema."
82 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

paradigm the existence of an "implicit personality theory" (Hastorf et al., 1970;

Schneider, 1973; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977). We do seem to perceive personality
traits as occurring in clusters. And when part of the cluster is identified in someone,
we tend to assume that the rest of it is there as well.
Where do these implicit personality theories come from? Keep in mind that such
structures are beliefs about association, about correlation. As with other correla-
tional judgments, these beliefs are based partly on true co-occurrences, and partly
on biases in the processing of information. Let us consider these sources in tum.
It has been argued with some force (Rosch et aI., 1976) that the world is not an
unstructured set of independent attributes. To the contrary, animals with feathers
are more likely to also have wings than are animals with fur. Some combinations
of attributes are in fact very probable, others are quite unlikely. Rosch et aI. (1976)
suggested, in the context of object perception, that a co-occurrence relationship is
not likely to be encoded at all unless there is at least some evidence of its prevalence
in the domain of experience. This position also has some support in the realm of
person attributes. There is evidence that general patterns of consistency and co-
herence do exist in human behavior (cf. Bern & Allen, 1974; Block, 1971; Epstein,
1979; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980), although demonstrations of trans situational
consistency of specific behaviors have typically been more rare (cf. Mischel, 1968).
This suggests that there is some basis in the world for the belief that there are
naturally occurring correlations among elements of personality (cf. Cantor & Mis-
chel, 1979a).
On the other hand, as was discussed in some detail in Chapter 4, there is also
a substantial body of evidence that perceptions of correlations between variables
are influenced by several biases in information processing. Developing an accurate
perception of association requires that the observer accumulate a record of instances
of both co-occurrence and non-co-occurrence. And, as was discussed in Chapter
4, people are more likely to notice and recall positive instances than disconfirming
instances (cf. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Swann,
1978; Taylor, Crocker, & D 'Agostino , 1978; Tversky, 1977). The result is that
weak correlations are perceived as strong, and even inverse correlations can be
perceived as positive (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969).
In sum, associative structure appears to be partly a function of what is observed,
and partly a function of the selective encoding of what is observed (Rosch et aI.,
1976; Mischel, 1977). How much of the perceived correlation to attribute to one
source and how much to the other is still a matter of some controversy, however
(see e.g., Block, Weiss, & Thome, 1979; Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979).

Determinants of Initial Category Placement

The development of categories, and the perception of associations among categories
are both part of the process of person perception. But an equally important process
is the fitting of new exemplars (persons) to preexisting schemas. For example, how
do we go about deciding whether a given person is or is not an extravert? The
importance of this process derives from the fact (illustrated above) that placing a
Person Perception 83

person in a category leads to considerable subsequent inference about the person.

There is a good deal of evidence of two kinds of influences in identifying persons
and actions. The first of these is that categorization can be expected to be influenced
by the observer's perceptual "set" (cf. Hebb, 1949). That is, anticipating that a
person will fall into a given category should increase the likelihood of perceiving
exactly that. Note, however, that a set effect can be interpreted as being only one
illustration of a broader principle: the use of the availability heuristic to determine
category membership. That is, anticipating a given type of person renders that
category more accessible, and thus more likely to be used in the subsequent clas-
sification.

Category accessibility. The reasoning that category accessibility is important in

the initial classification process has been carried several steps farther in recent
experiments, in which subjects' perceptual orientations were manipulated in a very
indirect fashion. The manipulation did not create any expectations that a particular
person type would appear. Instead, it simply involved the activation of a perceptual
category prior to the presentation of the stimulus person. It was reasoned that this
activation by itself would render that category more accessible, and thereby increase
its use in perceiving the stimulus person (cf. Bruner, 1957).
In the first of these studies Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) reasoned that
inducing subjects to use trait terms in a seemingly unrelated task would result in
activation of the entire trait-related category. They asked subjects to perform a
color-naming task, which included the encoding and recall of four traits. In one
condition these traits were all potentially applicable to a behavior that the subjects
were later asked to characterize. In the other condition the traits were not relevant
to the behavior, even with stretching of the imagination. After the color-naming
procedures, subjects were given what ostensibly was an unrelated task: to read a
story about a stimulus person, and then describe that person. As predicted, if
subjects had been presented earlier with trait terms that were applicable to the
stimulus person's behavior, they used those terms (and semantically related words)
to characterize the person. Subjects who had not been presented with applicable
traits did not characterize the person in the same fashion, nor did they utilize the
traits which had been "primed" for possible use. The conclusion was that priming
has an impact on the use of descriptors to categorize stimulus persons, but the effect
does not override the tendency to apply trait descriptors only where they are plau-
sible.
Srull and Wyer (1979) subsequently replicated and extended these findings in
three important ways. First, they found that the effect could be produced without
explicitly using the trait name. Srull and Wyer simply activated schemas that were
associated with the trait dimension in question. More concretely, subjects were
exposed to lists of behavioral statements (again, under a guise) rather than to trait
terms. In this research, moreover, the degree of priming was varied by varying the
number of times the concept was evoked. As expected, greater amounts of priming
led to greater subsequent utilization of the concept in describing a stimulus person.
A second advance contributed in this study was to test the assumption that
84 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

utilization of a primed category would decrease as a function of the passage of time.

Some subjects completed the impression formation phase of the experiment im-
mediately after the priming phase, others had a one-hour delay, and others a 24-
hour delay. As expected, the effect of priming diminished with longer delays.
Finally, Srull and Wyer tested the possibility that once subjects had made use
of the primed descriptors, they would then treat those descriptors as being repre-
sentative of the stimulus person's personality. It was hypothesized that subjects
would then access their implicit personality theories, and perceive additional char-
acteristics to be applicable to the stimulus person-<:haracteristics that were only
indirectly related to the primed descriptors. This prediction stemmed from earlier
work showing that once a judgment is made, its content serves as the basis for later
inferences, independent ofthe basis for the initial judgment (e. g., Lingle & Ostrom,
in press; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz,
1977). This prediction was supported in the data, as well.
Taken together, the findings of Higgins et al. (1977) and Srull and Wyer (1979)
provide strong support for the following assumption. Evoking a category-even
indirectly, and even in a completely unrelated context-makes that category more
likely to be applied to the encoding of observed behavior in a new setting, provided
that the application of the category is at least plausible, and provided the new
application occurs relatively soon.

Salience. Very much related to these effects are a wide variety of salience phe-
nomena (see Taylor and Fiske, 1978, for a broader discussion of such effects).
Salient features of a stimulus are features that are very noticeable. Features that
are noticed quickly are likely to exert a disproportionate influence on categorization.
What kinds of variables influence salience? Some variables are chronically sa-
lient, probably by virtue of their culturally dictated importance-things like sex,
race, and age range (see Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson, & Ruderman, 1977).
Another attention-attracting attribute is the presence of some stigmatizing char-
acteristic (e.g., Langer, Taylor, Fiske, & Chanowitz, 1976). Another is physical
attractiveness.
It also seems apparent that salience sometimes accrues to stimulus characteristics
that are novel or unexpected. 2 Perfection of physical features or athletic performance
is about as rare as physical stigma or a stunningly bad performance. Research has
also demonstrated that there are other respects in which the distinctiveness or novelty
of an attribute draws notice. For example, Taylor et al. (1977) found (through
indirect measures) that the novelty associated with a person being the only male
or female in an otherwise opposite-sex group attracted greater attention to that

2There is a rather subtle issue here that we should mention in passing. It seems likely that
during the formation of a category, stimulus attributes that are relatively central are more
salient than those that are novel. During this period, what is at issue is what sort of char-
acteristics are common in the category. Only later, after the category has stabilized somewhat,
should relative novelty be salient. This reasoning is implicit in some theories of abstraction,
but we know of no research in which it has explicitly been tested.
Person Perception 85

person than occurred in evenly mixed groups. Similarly, they found that being the
only black or white in an otherwise uniform racial group attracted more attention
than if the groups had been more balanced racially. In another program of research,
Hamilton and Gifford (1976) found that relatively distinctive behaviors (as opposed
to persons) were more salient than other more common behaviors (see Fiske, 1980,
for related findings). Indeed, Hamilton and Bishop (1976) have suggested that
behavioral evidence which is inconsistent with an observer's expectancies ultimately
becomes very salient by virtue of its distinctiveness and consistency over time.
The power of salience is hard to ignore. Recent research indicates that salience
effects occur in many circumstances where other influences might normally be
expected to predominate (Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, & Winkler, 1979).
These studies found that neither distracting the perceiver nor involving the perceiver
more deeply in the experimental situation interfered with the impact of a visually
salient stimulus person. Moreover, this impact proved to be a long-lasting one,
operating even when the judgments made by subjects were made a full day after
the salience manipulation (see also Smith & Miller, 1979).

Categorizational heuristics. Cantor (1978) has recently suggested that category

placement may be determined by two different sets of heuristics, depending upon
how familiar the perceiver is with the person being classified. She holds that
decisions about classification of relatively familiar persons are based on three things:
the number of category-consistent attributes the person has; the ratio of category-
consistent attributes to the total number of attributes the person has; and the number
of attributes the person has which are incompatible or inconsistent with the category
in question (see also Cantor & Mischel, 1979a). This reasoning was given general
support in a study in which subjects described people whom they knew well, and
whom they viewed as good, moderate, and poor examples of an extravert. The
expected variables did prove to be related to rated goodness-of-membership in the
extravert category. But also of interest was the fact that the weakest of the predictors
was the number of category-inconsistent attributes possessed by the person. This
finding lends additional support to the assertion that people are differentially sen-
sitive to theory-confirming evidence, and tend to ignore theory-disconfirming evi-
dence.
Cantor proposed that a different set of processes would dominate when catego-
rization is based on more limited observation (Cantor & Mischel, 1979a). According
to Cantor, these situations evoke a search for information as to whether the target
person displays the single attribute that is most relevant to the category, does so
consistently across situations (cf. Kelley, 1967, 1971), and particularly in situations
where that attribute is nonnormative (cf. Kelley, 1967; Jones & Davis, 1965).
Research tending to support this line of reasoning is summarized by Cantor
and Mischel (1979a).
It should be noted, however, that whether different heuristics are employed when
observing relatively unknown versus familiar persons remains quite speCUlative.
Although the predictions of each model received support in the research summarized
by Cantor and Mischel, the two models were never explicitly contrasted with each
86 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

other in any given set of data. Thus, the possibility remains quite viable that all
of these factors enter into goodness-of-membership judgments, irrespective of de-
gree of familiarity. Resolution of this issue awaits further research.

Consequences of Initial Category Placement

Besides evoking an implicit personality theory, and thus assumptions about other
traits that the person has, are there other consequences of initial placement in a
category? For example, what processes are set into motion by the high salience of
a particular stimulus attribute in a person? One possibility is that salience induces
a more thorough processing, or more complete encoding, of information concerning
that salient attribute. Taylor and Fiske (1975, Experiment 2) found, for example,
that more information was recalled about an actor who was highly salient than one
who was less salient. Similar results have been reported by others (Berscheid,
Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976), though this pattern of findings does not
invariably occur (see Taylor & Fiske, 1978).
Another possibility is that salient stimuli are simply encoded in a more easily
retrievable form than are less salient stimuli. There is at least some support for this
reasoning, though from a study that was concerned with salience of words rather
than salience of persons or person attributes (Pryor & Kriss, 1977). In that research
salience led to quicker recognition, but did not influence volume of recall. These
findings are consistent with an ease-of-access interpretation, but suggest that ac-
cessibility is not simply a function of the amount of information encoded.
Perhaps even more important than how the salient attribute is encoded, however,
is the suggestion that subsequent processing is guided by the initial salience-based
categorization. This would be quite consistent with the assumption that perception
is an interactive process, involving the use of environmental cues to access schemas,
and the use of such schemas to guide a search for further cues (e.g., Neisser, 1976).
The notion that schemas influence learning and retention of available cues is not
new (cf. Bartlett, 1932). But there have been a variety of recent tests of the notion.
These studies have examined the effects of initial schema use on both the encoding
of new information and the later retrieval of previously stored information.

Effects of schemas on data-search and encoding. There are several illustrations

in the person perception literature of the fact that salient stimulus attributes can bias
the encoding of subsequently received information. For example, Rothbart, Evans,
and Fulero (1979) induced expectancies about a stimulus group among subjects by
characterizing the stimulus group as "more intellectual than average" or "more
friendly and sociable than average." These instructions presumably allowed subjects
to make a preliminary classification of the stimulus group. Subjects then received
a set of sentences describing members of the group. "Intelligent" and "friendly"
behaviors were mentioned with equal frequency in these sentences. Yet afterward,
subjects who had been led to anticipate an "intellectual" group estimated that more
"intelligent" than "friendly" behaviors had been in the list; the opposite pattern
occurred among subjects led to anticipate a "friendly" group.
Person Perception 87

This finding is consistent with the notion that a preliminary identification evokes
an implicit personality theory, and leads to the perception of a more coherent cluster
of characteristics than actually exists. But it differs from previous work of this sort
(e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977, described earlier in the chapter) in indicating that
the orientation given to subjects had specifically primed them to selectively notice
and encode schema-consistent information when it was later made available. More
specifically, the Rothbart et al. (1979) study also included subjects for whom the
biasing orientation was induced after exposure to the sentences. These subjects
failed to display the effects, thus indicating that the bias was exerted on encoding
rather than retrieval processes.
Additional confirmation of bias in the encoding process comes from a series of
studies by Zadney and Gerard (1974). Subjects were shown a videotape in which
ambiguous behaviors and statements were made by actors, which could reasonably
be seen as reflecting any of several different intentions. Before viewing the tapes,
subjects were given orienting instructions in which one or another specific intent
was ascribed to the actor. This research revealed that more information related to
the ascribed intent was subsequently recalled than information related to other
possible intents. Moreover, these effects occurred only when ascription of intent
occurred before viewing the videotape, not when subjects were given the orienting
instructions after seeing the tape. As was true of the Rothbart et al. (1979) findings,
this result indicates that the bias was introduced during the encoding of the behaviors.
Presumably this reflects both selective attending to intent-related actions, and an
encoding process that includes recording information about the implications of the
actions.
Srull and Wyer (1980) have also found that priming subjects by making a trait
category accessible for use exerts an impact on subjects' encoding of new stimuli,
but not on retrieval of previously encoded information. That is, when the category
was evoked prior to interpreting ambiguous information, the category had a sub-
stantial influence on subjects' perceptions. If the priming occurred after the stimuli
had been interpreted and encoded, however, the category was not utilized.
Nor do these studies exhaust the list of demonstrations that biases are introduced
into the encoding process when some specific attribute is salient. Lord, Ross, and
Lepper (1979), for example, have presented a conceptually similar set of findings
in a very different behavioral domain. They argued that people who hold strong
opinions on some issue will interpret ambiguous or mixed evidence in a fashion
that is consonant with their preexisting opinions. In brief, the initial opinion rep-
resents an informational schema. Once the schema has been activated, it helps to
direct the search for, and encoding of, new information on the issue.
To test this reasoning, subjects with strong initial opinions were presented with
the results of two fictitious studies, studies which had yielded opposing results.
Subjects were asked to indicate their opinions on the issue afterward, and to indicate
the credibility of each of the two studies. The subjects expressed strong biases in
favor of the credibility of the study that supported their own position. And they
also gave evidence of increased polarization of their attitudes. Apparently the initial
belief caused them to weight disconfirming evidence less heavily than confirming
88 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

evidence. And the additional confinuing evidence further buttressed their initial
opinions. Indeed, Mahoney (1977) has found that even well-trained social scientists
are not immune to this sort of effect. As was mentioned several times previously
in this chapter and in Chapter 4, the selective encoding of hypothesis-confinuing
infonuation is an important basis for strong beliefs in relationships that simply do
not exist.
There are at least two other findings that are consistent with the general reasoning
behind all these studies, though each has a caution associated with it. Cohen (1977)
reported the finding that labeling a woman in a videotape as a waitress led to more
errors of recall about events in the tape, errors that were generally consistent with
the occupational schema that had been evoked. The results were less clear-cut,
however, for another occupational label. Finally, Duncan (1976) found that the race
of an actor led to differing interpretations of an ambiguous behavior on the actor's
part. The potential difficulty with this finding is the inability to precisely equate the
actors' behaviors in the two experimental conditions, because of the necessity of
using two different actors (cf. Hamilton, 1979).

Effects of schemas on retrieval. Though there are certainly biases in encoding,

there is also evidence that there are circumstances in which biases can be introduced
by making some attribute salient after encoding, but prior to the retrieval process.
For example, Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) had subjects examine a fictitious
woman's case history, which was filled with extensive material concerning both
her childhood and her adult career. A week later, these subjects returned for a
recognition memory test concerning the material they had read earlier. Before the
retrieval phase, however, subjects were told either that the woman in question was
now living a lesbian lifestyle, or that she was living a heterosexual lifestyle. The
result of making this new attribute salient was a bias in recognition memory for
details of the woman's life, a bias consistent with the new attribute. Additional
demonstrations of this sort of influence have been reported by Snyder and Cantor
(1979).
Other research (Dutta, Kanungo, & Freibergs, 1972) indicates that both encoding
and retrieval of affective material are influenced by the degree of emotional in-
volvement induced among subjects during either the encoding or the retrieval phase.
This research also indicates that introduction of new infonuation prior to retrieval-
infonuation that induces a change in orientation to the previously encoded material-
can have an impact on the retrieval process.
The fact that evoking schemas in these studies biased subjects' retrieval processes
appears to conflict with the findings discussed in the preceding section. That is,
Rothbart et al. (1979), Zadney and Gerard (1974), and Srull and Wyer (1980) all
found that inducing biasing orientations after encoding but before retrieval did not
influence subjects' perceptions. It should be noted, however, that the experimental
circumstances differed greatly between these two sets of studies. For example,
Rothbart et al. (1979) explicitly asked subjects to recall as many behaviors of each
category as they could recall. In contrast, subjects in the Snyder and Uranowitz
(1978) and the Snyder and Cantor (1979) research were induced to engage in a
Organization of Perception of Sequences 89

self-directed memory search. It seems reasonable to assume that the latter procedures
would lead subjects to search relatively selectively for hypothesis-confirming in-
formation. Thus the bias in recall in these studies may not reflect what people are
capable of recalling but rather what they are inclined to recall.

Further consequences ofpreliminary categorization. Regardless of whether biases

occur during the encoding process or the retrieval process, there are other perceptual
consequences of perceived category membership. Some categories have affective
as well as conceptual significance. Placement of a person in a category can result
in favorable or unfavorable biases, if the category represents an ingroup or an
outgroup (see e.g., Brewer, 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). This
is true even despite the fact that in studies of this phenomenon the ingroup and
outgroup categories are often determined quite arbitrarily. Assignment to a group
on an arbitrary basis has been found to foster more favorable ratings for ingroup
than outgroup members on evaluative personal characteristics, including desirable
physical characteristics (Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen, & Ostell, 1972).
In other research, subjects perceived that ingroup members had beliefs which were
more similar to their own than were the beliefs of outgroup members (Allen &
Wilder, 1979). Yet other research found that an arbitrary assignment of persons to
groups led subjects to ascribe more positively valued personality characteristics to
members of their own group than to other groups (Howard & Rothbart, 1978,
1980). Such impressions can also have an impact on the attributional judgments
subjects make regarding the causes of a stimulus person's behavior (cf. Hamilton,
1979).
These findings, taken as a group, have a certain similarity to the use of implicit
personality theories, despite the fact that the information that initiates the process
is not really "personality" information. It is simply group membership information.
In these studies, an arbitrary division into categories resulted in a kind of "we-they"
mentality (cf. Hornstein, 1976). Membership in the same category as the subject
apparently conferred upon the stimulus person an aura of acceptability and goodness,
perhaps partly as a function of perceived similarity. Membership in the alternative
group conferred a sense of inferiority or rejection. As has been noted by others
(Hamilton, 1979; Hornstein, 1976), this apparently automatic, simple perceptual
bias contains the potential seeds of considerable intergroup conflict.

Organization of Perception of Sequences

In the research discussed in the preceding sections, information about stimulus
persons was conveyed to perceivers in a wide variety of ways. In some cases it was
presented as a set of trait descriptors (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977). In other cases
it was a list of behavioral events (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979). In yet other cases
information was presented visually and auditorily. That is, subjects viewed a be-
havioral sequence, and listened to remarks made by the behaving persons (e.g.,
Cohen, 1977; Duncan, 1976; Zadney & Gerard, 1974). This is, in fact, a common
90 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

way of gaining information about other people outside the laboratory: viewing them
as they engage in sequences of behavior, and making judgments based on these
observations.
An important question in this context is how we organize and encode behavioral
sequences. What do we look for, and how do we analyze what we are observing?
In dealing with such sequences, we once again confront the problem that was
identified by Minsky (1975) and Schank and Abelson (1977): Specifically, behavior
is not a series of discrete bits, but rather has a continuous flow. How is this sort
of information dealt with by the perceptual-cognitive apparatus that we have been
describing?

Segmenting of Behavior Units

A partial answer to this question has been provided by Newtson and his colleagues.
Based on earlier assertions of Heider (1958), those researchers have argued con-
vincingly that behavioral sequences are perceived and encoded as a string of action
units. They have argued further that these units have an objective basis in the
behavior being observed.
Newtson (1973) developed a technique for determining the perceived boundaries
between action units, boundaries that he termed "breakpoints." This technique
entails having subjects view a filmed behavioral sequence, and indicate with an
event marker the points at which one meaningful action ends and another begins.
Newtson (1973) found that the degree to which subjects segmented these action
sequences was greatly influenced by the instructional set that they had been given.
The degree of segmentation, in tum, greatly influenced subjects' later judgments
about the behaviors that they had viewed. More specifically, some subjects were
asked to segment the behavior into the smallest units that seemed natural and
meaningful to them; other subjects were asked to mark the largest units that seemed
natural and meaningful. Subjects given the small-unit instructions not only produced
more segmentation, they also expressed greater confidence in their impressions of
the filmed actor, and made greater attributions to the actor, than did subjects given
the large-unit instructions (Newtson, 1973, Experiment 1).
Although this research initially stemmed from an interest in the processes un-
derlying causal attribution, the project was subsequently broadened to address more
basic questions. For example, several studies were conducted to assess the validity
of the assumption that the units that are established by the segmenting procedure
do in fact function as perceptual units (Newtson & Engquist, 1976). In the first
study, visual information was deleted from filmed action sequences by deleting
either 4, 8, or 12 frames of film. Some of these deletions were at previously
identified breakpoints; others were at points that had been determined not to be
breakpoints. This study determined that the absence of information was more reliably
detected when the deletions came at breakpoints than when they were elsewhere.
Moreover, the effect of the length of the deleted clip influenced recognition only
when the deletion had been at a breakpoint.
Clearly something about these breakpoints is important. Newtson and Engquist
noted, however, that there were two plausible interpretations for that effect. Dele-
Organization of Perception of Sequences 91

tions at breakpoints could have been easily noticed because subjects were relaxing
at those points-not encoding-and thus had their attention free. Alternatively,
these deletions could have been noticed because subjects were actively engaged in
encoding at those points, and the deletions were disruptive of that process. A second
experiment gave strong support to the second hypothesis. For this experiment, still
slides were made from three successive breakpoints and three successive nonbreak-
points of previously studied action sequences. Subjects viewed a series of three-
slide sets, and rated the intelligibility of each set. This study ascertained that more
information is conveyed at breakpoints than between breakpoints, as revealed by
intelligibility ratings and other measures. This sort of finding, together with in-
spection of the points identified as breakpoints, has led Newtson and his co-workers
to characterize a succession of breakpoints as providing almost a comic strip sum-
mary of a behavioral sequence. In short, behavior varies considerably from moment
to moment in the amount of information that it conveys. And the points that subjects
spontaneously choose as breakpoints of action units are those points where a great
deal of meaning is being conveyed.
A third experiment extrapolated from this conclusion, as follows. If greater
meaning is conveyed at breakpoints, breakpoints should be selectively represented
in memory, compared to nonbreakpoints. To test this possibility Newtson and
Engquist (1976, Experiment 3) showed subjects half of a behavioral sequence, and
then later showed them a mixture of slides made from that half of the sequence and
from the unviewed half. The subjects' task was to determine whether or not they
had seen the image previously. Greater accuracy was obtained for slide images that
came from breakpoints than for those that did not.
What kind of information is being conveyed at breakpoints? At least two pos-
sibilities exist: the achievement of distinctive "states," or the occurrence of dis-
tinctive "changes" (Newtson & Engquist, 1976). There are a number of reasons,
however, for believing that the latter is the more accurate depiction (Newtson,
Engquist, & Bois, 1977). For example, whether a specific state is identified as a
breakpoint or not turns out to vary considerably, depending on what state has just
preceded the state in question. Newtson et al. (1977) conducted a series of analyses
of action sequences, the results of which provided additional support for this notion.
In these analyses, behavioral sequences for which breakpoints had previously been
identified were coded using a movement notation system previously developed for
use in choreography. The two hypotheses were compared to each other by generating
predictions from each about where maximal differences in position should be ob-
servable (see Newtson et al., 1977, for greater detail on this point). The results
were clear and consistent in supporting the "meaningful change" hypothesis. Per-
ceived action units are defined by changes, not by states. Newtson et al. (1977)
suggest that these changes constitute points at which uncertainties about the course
of an action are eliminated. For example, they point out that the same action as is
involved in putting a cup down onto a flat surface also occurs in tapping a cup on
the surface, right up to the point where the cup is released. Because the release
removes the ambiguity, it constitutes a breakpoint.
It should be noted that there is not a single "correct" way to segment a behavioral
sequence. More specifically, the perceptual process rarely if ever exhausts all mean-
92 5. Focus on the Environment: Perception of Places and Persons

ingful changes that are there to be observed. In any action sequence there is pre-
sumably a range of segmentation strategies that could be utilized, one end of which
would be very fine grained, the other very global. Another question in that regard
is what determines the level at which segmentation takes place. A number of such
influences have been investigated. For example, it has been hypothesized that if
a distinctive change-which would normally define a breakpoint-was not available
to be perceived, the perceiver would tum to smaller units of segmentation in order
to maintain comprehension. This hypothesis was tested (Newtson, Rindner, Miller,
& La Cross, 1978) in a study in which a repetitive behavioral sequence was shown
to subjects, varying between subject groups in one respect: A concluding step
(placing a booklet in one of two orientations, alternating across trials) which created
a clear change from one repetition to the next, either was or was not visible to
subjects. Those subjects for whom this element was not visible generated a much
more fine-grained analysis of the sequence than did subjects for whom the element
was visible. The latter subjects tended to use this element as the sole breakpoint,
once the sequence had become familiar.
The mention of familiarity leads us to another point. Finer-grained segmenting
typically occurs early in the observation of a behavioral sequence, and is replaced
by coarser segmenting as the sequence becomes more familiar and thus more
predictable (e.g., Newtson et aI., 1978). The interjection of an unexpected action,
however, produces a subsequent increase in segmentation (Newtson, 1973; Wilder,
1978). Presumably the novelty of an unusual behavior attracts greater attention to
the components of the behavior than had previously been devoted to it, thus leading
to greater coding of the lower-level breakpoints. 3
Familiarity with the components of a sequence presumably implies a growing
awareness of changes that define breakpoints at relatively higher levels of analysis.
As Newtson et al. (1978) have pointed out, expertise in observation lies not simply
in the awareness that higher-order organizations exist in behavior, but rather knowl-
edge of the stimuli that define that organization. The skilled observer knows what
to watch for, and thus has more attention free for noticing additional information
that might be missed by someone less skilled, who is busy noting lower-level
breakpoints.
Another variable that influences the structure imposed on an observed sequence
is the perceiver's psychological orientation to that sequence. This has been dem-
onstrated in at least two experiments. In one study, Massad, Hubbard, and Newtson
(1979) presented subjects with one of two psychological frameworks within which
they might view an event sequence. Subjects then watched a film in which actions
were ambiguous enough to be amenable to either of the interpretive frameworks.
Analysis of the breakpoints marked by the two groups indicated a considerable

3As Newtson (1973) pointed out, this has important implications for the judgments people
make about unusual or unexpected behaviors. Specifically, unexpected behaviors may receive
greater attention than expected behaviors. The more thorough encoding promoted thereby
may lead to the assumption of proportionally greater causal responsibility. Similar mecha-
nisms may be responsible for primacy effects in attribution (Newtson & Rindner, 1979).
Focus of Attention and Perception of the Environment 93

difference between them in the location of breakpoints. Apparently the interpretation

that had been provided to subjects strongly influenced their search for meaningful
changes in the behavioral sequence.
Massad et ai. (1979) also found that providing subjects with the alternative
perceptual orientation (under a guise) after they had viewed the action sequence
did not alter their impressions of the actions unless the sequence was reobserved.
This suggests that the initial set had guided subjects' information search and en-
coding to such a degree that information consistent with the alternative set was
rarely even encoded. Thus, it could not be retrieved without a second viewing-
which of course enabled subjects to execute a new segmentation. These findings
are supportive of the perspective on perception discussed earlier, in which people
make use of anticipatory schemas to guide a search for certain kinds of stimulus
qualities (cf. Neisser, 1976). They are also wholly consistent with the findings
discussed above that indicated that anticipatory schemas lead to biases in the en-
coding process (e.g., Rothbart et aI., 1979).
Further support for this conclusion comes from research in which subjects were
led to view an action sequence with one of two purposes: either to form an impression
of the actor, or to remember as much as possible about the task in which the actor
would be engaging (Cohen & Ebbesen, 1979). It was expected that these different
purposes would lead subjects in the two conditions to attend to very different aspects
of the action sequence, thus leading to very different patterns of segmenting. This,
in fact, was the outcome of the study. The subject groups sought out different
features of the action, segmented differently, and later exhibited different patterns
of recall of what had been viewed.

Focus of Attention and Perception of the Environment

Although we have not said so explicitly, our focus in this chapter has been on the
processing of information acquired through the distance receptors. The information
thus derives from directing attention outward into the environment. We have written,
in the preceding pages, about the perception of behavior settings, and the perception
of persons in those settings. Most authors who write about those topics do not
discuss them in terms of directional focus of attention. Instead, to the degree that
they invoke attention as a construct, it is primarily to point to distinctions among
the various possible attributes of the stimulus being observed which might be
encoded (e.g., Fiske, 1980). As an example, whether one perceives an apartment,
or instead a collection of walls and floors depends upon the level of analysis at
which one is attending to the stimulus. Note, however, that both of these possibilities
implicitly involve directing one's attention outward.
We continue to feel that the distinction between self-focus and environment focus
has important implications for the perception of places and people. And there are
studies from at least three sources that support us in this feeling. For example, Lord
(1980) has found that recall is interactively influenced by the mode in which in-
formation is encoded (trait labels versus visual images) and the person to whom
94 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

the information is applied (self versus another person). More precisely, he found
that recall for trait labels was better when they had been referred to the self than
when they had been referred to someone else. But recall was better for concrete
nouns when they were visualized with another person than when visualized with
the self. This evidence is quite indirect, but it suggests that visual memory is less
easily applied to the self than to other objects, whereas the self represents a very
prominent structure in semantic memory.
More direct evidence of the influence of self-focus on perceiving environmental
events comes from a study by Vallacher (1978). Vallacher found that experimentally
enhanced self-focus partially interfered with the encoding of information about
stimulus persons whom the subject was supposed to be viewing. Self-attention was
increased among half the subjects by the presence of TV cameras and by telling
the subjects that they would be videotaped while they were observing the experi-
mental stimuli. All subjects in this study then watched a tape of five women being
interviewed (separately) for a job. After observing the tape, subjects completed
impression formation scales for each of the interviewees.
It was reasoned that increased self-focus would be accompanied by a decrease
in focus on the stimulus persons. This, in tum, would result in less pronounced
impressions of those persons, given that there was no specific characteristic highly
salient about any of them (cf. Taylor et aI., 1979). Thus the dependent measure
of interest was the degree to which subjects differentiated among the five inter-
viewees. As Vallacher had predicted, ratings were more differentiated among sub-
jects whose environment focus was undisturbed than among the more self-attentive
subjects. This, in tum, suggests that self-focus had impeded the encoding of in-
formation about the stimulus persons.
This finding has recently been conceptually replicated (Thompson & Collins,
1980), in a study in which subjects viewed and listened to a series of videotaped
remarks, and rated the degree to which each remark conveyed approval to the
subject. Self-attention was increased among half the subjects by the presence of a
TV camera. Analyses of subjects' judgments made use of two signal-detection
measures. One measure revealed that in order to infer approval, self-focused subjects
required a greater ratio of approval indicants to irrelevant information than did less
self-focused subjects. Another analysis revealed that in the absence of the self-
awareness manipulation, subjects high in private self-consciousness were also less
sensitive to the message being conveyed than were subjects lower in self-con-
sciousness. These findings (which appear to contradict an alternative analysis of
self-awareness effects developed by Hull & Levy, 1979) are quite consistent with
the point made by Vallacher (1978).
Taken together, these findings suggest that directing attention to the self interferes
with the encoding of environmental stimuli. Self-directed attention does not invar-
iably interfere with perception, however. Indeed, it is probably a necessity for
certain kinds of perceptions that attention be directed inward. More specifically,
inward focus would seem to be a prerequisite for the perception of certain aspects
of the self. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 6

Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

In Chapter 4 we discussed the processes of abstraction: the creation of structures

in memory corresponding to classes of objects and events, and the use of those
structures for recognizing new stimuli. In Chapter 5 we discussed how the concepts
of abstraction might be applied to the perception and knowledge of environments
and persons. We now tum to a consideration of how these concepts can be applied
to the perception and knowledge of the self. I
As was the case in Chapter 5, the most basic question here is what evidence
exists that these concepts from cognitive psychology are applicable at all to the
subject matter in question. That is, what support is there for the notion that the self
can be usefully construed as a knowledge structure (cf. Greenwald, 1980; Mancuso
& Ceely, 1980), which is organized and used in fundamentally the same fashion
as other knowledge structures? Interestingly enough, some of the research bearing
on this question is strikingly similar to research discussed in Chapter 5, which had
provided support for the position that schemas are used in categorizing other persons.

Trait Schemas and the Self

The clearest support for the notion that schemas are used in conceptualizing other
people came from a study by Cantor and Mischel (1977). Recall that they provided
subjects with a list of trait information about fictitious persons, and then gave
subjects a new list of traits, asking them to indicate which items had been presented
during the earlier set and which had not. Among items that had not been viewed
earlier, the greatest number of errors (false recognitions) were made on items that

IKnowledge structures can coalesce at many different levels of analysis, of course, as was
discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we discussed primarily schemas that had evolved
around conceptual know ledge about others (e. g., trait characteristics). We begin the present
discussion at the same level of analysis. Later on in the chapter, however, the importance
of other levels of analysis will become apparent.
96 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

were conceptually related to those presented initially. Cantor and Mischel's con-
clusion was that the earlier items had evoked a conceptual schema, and that errors
in recognition reflected the increased availability of other aspects of the schema.
A similar sort of finding has recently been reported by Rogers, Rogers, and
Kuiper (1979). In this study, however, the knowledge structure that was evoked
by the initial items was a schema concerning the self. Rogers et al. began their
study by having subjects indicate (on 9-point scales) whether each of a list of
descriptive adjectives was "like" or "unlike" them. Two and a half months later,
the same subjects viewed half of these same items as an acquisition set. They then
viewed all of the items, and were asked to indicate whether each had or had not
been a member of the acquisition set.
As was true in Cantor and Mischel's (1977) study, the Rogers et al. subjects
were able to discriminate reasonably well between the two sets of items. The
findings of greatest interest, however, were the kinds of errors of recognition that
they made. The treatment of the data of this study was somewhat complex. For
each subject, Rogers et al. looked up which of the unviewed items had been rated
(two and a half months earlier) as being like him or her, and which items had been
rated as unlike him or her. (Note that the composition of each set depended entirely
on the subject's previous ratings. Thus, these sets varied greatly from subject to
subject.) Errors of recognition were assessed separately for the two categories of
unviewed items. Most of the errors-i.e., saying an item had been shown when
it had not-occurred among items that had earlier been rated as being highly related
to the self.
Rogers et al. concluded from this finding that the acquisition set had evoked in
each subject a very general schema of trait descriptors applicable to the self. And
the availability of that schema caused easier access to other schema-consistent words
on the recall task, leading them to be incorrectly identified as members of the
acquisition set. To repeat, this finding is quite consistent with the results of Cantor
and Mischel (1977), except that a "self' schema was involved rather than a schema
bearing on a social stereotype. These findings also support the notion that people
have "implicit self theories" (cf. Epstein, 1973), as well as implicit theories about
the personalities of others.

Self Schemas and Encoding

Based on the assumption that knowledge about the self constitutes an elaborate and
articulated schema, Rogers and his colleagues have also studied the possibility that
this schema can serve as a powerful encoding device. For example, Rogers (T. B . ,
1977, Experiment 2) told some subjects to decide whether or not each of a series
of sentence items described them, and to use that decision as an aid to memory.
Other subjects were not given that orientation. As expected, these instructions led
to more accurate recognition on a later test. Moreover, a subsequent experiment
(Rogers, 1977, Experiment 3) determined that the facilitation caused by self-ref-
erence was specific to items that had been written in the first person. That is, this
strategy helped only for items that were structurally amenable to self-reference
encoding. Statements concerning "society," or "most people," simply did not ben-
Trait Schemas and the Self 97

efit from the self-reference-decision strategy. This appears to indicate that the
instruction to make a self-reference decision about items leads specifically to the
involvement of a self schema, rather than to a more general increase in processing
efficiency.
The effects of self-reference on memory have also been studied in other ways.
Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977), for example, have made use of an "incidental
recall" paradigm (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975) to assess
"depth" of encoding. They systematically varied the mode by which subjects en-
coded descriptive adjectives, by asking them to answer a specific question about
each word as it was presented. (Because this questioning was portrayed as the
central task, and subjects did not expect to have to remember the words, encoding
of the word itself was incidental.)
The nature of the question asked for a given item was used to vary depth of
incidental encoding, which in tum has an important influence on the strength of the
resulting memory trace. More specifically, two questions-does the word have big
letters, and does the word rhyme with (another specified word}--were chosen
because they produce relatively shallow encoding (see Craik & Tulving, 1975).
This, in tum, should result in relatively poor recall of the word later on. A question
involving a semantic issue-does the word mean the same as (another specified
word}--was used to produce deeper encoding, leading to better recognition later.
The final question used in this research was does the word describe you. After
answering questions for 40 adjectives, the subject was asked to recall as many as
possible of the words that had been shown. The comparison of greatest interest in
this research was whether the self-reference question would produce recall com-
parable to that provided by the semantic type of question.
The self-reference mode of encoding proved to be not only comparable to the
semantic mode, but superior to it. Rogers et al. (1977) interpreted this as indicating
that the self-reference question had forced subjects to access their concepts of self,
in order to be able to answer it. This, in tum, caused a firmer and deeper incidental
encoding of the item. Thus conceptual knowledge about the self appears to function
as a complex schema, a schema which can aid in the encoding and retrieval of even
incidental material (see also Bower & Gilligan, 1979). Subsequent research (Kend-
zierski, 1980) suggests, in fact, that this schema is richer and more elaborated than
comparable schemas concerning situations or other people. The self-reference strat-
egy thus appears to be a useful encoding device; there is even evidence that it is
used spontaneously by many people to improve their recall (Rogers, 1977, Exper-
iment 1).

Component Schemas and Degrees of Schematicity

As conceptualized and studied by Rogers and his colleagues, the self schema is
presumed to be very broad and general in its applicability, though presumably it
is also quite articulated and elaborate (see also Rogers, Kuiper, & Rogers, 1979).
Some of the potential articulation of the self as a knowledge system is suggested
by the research of Markus (1977). Markus explicitly considered the possibility that
within the cognitive structure that constitutes conceptual knowledge about the self,
98 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

component schemas exist for specific domains or facets of behavior. Moreover, she
reasoned that persons should be expected to differ from each other in the degree
to which knowledge about the self has been organized in any given behavioral
domain. That is, in any specifiable area some persons will have comprehensive
schemas--elaborate constructions regarding themselves-and other persons will
not. The latter group may be referred to as being "aschematic" regarding that area
of behavior.
Markus (1977) has suggested that the presence or absence of an articulated schema
on a behavioral dimension has an important impact on the processing of information
regarding that dimension. In an initial study of this possibility, some subjects were
chosen who had well-developed schemas of themselves as being independent, others
who had well-developed schemas of themselves as being dependent, and others
who had no articulated self schema on this dimension. As expected, the aschematics
proved to be less consistent (across two tasks) in picking words that represented
themselves than were persons with fully-developed schemas. And they tended
(weakly) to identify fewer instances of behavior in explaining why those words fit
them than was true of subjects with comprehensive self schemas.
In a second study, aschematics once again demonstrated inconsistency in their
choices of what descriptive words fit themselves. And aschematics incorporated
bogus feedback about their degree of independence or dependence more readily
than did subjects with more developed schemas in that area. The latter finding must
be regarded as somewhat ambiguous, however, for the following reason. The bogus
feedback given to the highly independent and dependent subjects was not just
inconsistent with their self schemas, it was diametrically opposed to those schemas.
Thus, this information may well have been outside those subjects' "lattitude of
acceptance" as persuasive information (cf. Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Sherif
& Hovland, 1961). For aschematics, on the other hand, the information was sub-
stantially less incongruous with their self-perceptions. Thus it is unclear whether
it is schematicity per se that produced the resistance to incorporate the information,
or simply the degree of discrepancy between the new information and previously
encoded information.
Indeed, all of the findings of this research have a certain degree of ambiguity
associated with them, because of the way in which Markus defined schematicity.
Specifically, in her definition she confounded the extremity of subjects' self-ratings
of independence with the importance that they ascribed to that dimension of self.
Thus, no persons who had elaborate schemas of themselves as moderately dependent
were included in the study. This confound makes it impossible to know whether
the various effects obtained were a product of differential schematicity (which
presumably is reflected in the importance measure), or differential extremity of self-
perceptions on this behavioral dimension.

Conclusion
Despite this ambiguity about just how self schemas shape the encoding and incor-
poration of new information about the self, the research reviewed in the preceding
pages seems to provide converging support for the proposition with which we began.
Access to Self Schemas 99

That is, it seems both meaningful and useful to postulate the existence of a conceptual
schema, with many component subschemas, which comprises the abstracted or-
ganization of accumulated self-knowledge. There is, with one exception, no com-
pelling evidence to indicate that this schema (or set of schemas) is formed or used
any differently from other elaborate and well-articulated knowledge structures. The
only exception is recent evidence indicating that the schema corresponding to the
self-concept is more rigidly fixed as a point of reference than are many other
knowledge structures (Rogers et aI., 1979). This is hardly surprising, if the self-
concept is as elaborated as the research reviewed above suggests it is.

Access to Self Schemas

What causes a person to access this organization of self-related knowledge? It is
relatively easy to think of specific conditions that might cause one to do so. For
instance, any time we fill out personality self-reports, we presumably are doing so
by referring to our organized knowledge about ouselves [see Rogers (T.B., 1974)
for an interesting analysis of that process]. We would take the position, however,
that the answer to this question is both simpler and broader than this example
suggests. In our judgment, some kind of self schema may be involved whenever
one attends to an aspect of the self about which previous experiences have been
organized and abstracted.

Self-Focus and Encoding by Self-Reference

The notion that attending to the self evokes a self schema would seem to be
consistent with the work of Rogers and his colleagues (discussed above) concerning
the role of self-reference in encoding. That is, thinking about whether a word applies
to oneself would seem to be one way in which attention is directed to a "conceptual"
aspect of the self-i.e., the abstracted set of descriptors that are applicable to
oneself. As has been noted above, this process results in deeper encoding of the
word than would otherwise be the case, presumably reflecting the activation and
involvement of a rather elaborate and well-formed knowledge structure.
Indeed, at least three studies have established an even more direct link between
self-focus and the process of encoding by self-reference. In one of these studies
(Hull & Levy, 1979, Experiment 1), subjects were tested with the same incidental
recall paradigm as was used by Rogers et aI. (1977). More specifically, subjects
responded to a question for each word. The questions concerned the length of the
word, whether the word was meaningful, and whether the word described the
subject. Subjects then attempted to recall as many of the words as possible. The
only difference between this and the previous research was that Hull and Levy
separated subjects according to their dispositions to be self-conscious.
The results of this study indicated that the use of self-reference encoding facilitated
incidental recall among subjects high in private self-consciousness, but not among
subjects low in private self-consciousness. We would argue that highly self-con-
scious persons quite commonly access their knowledge about themselves through
100 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

their chronic tendencies to attend to themselves and think about what they are like.
(An unanswered question is whether they may also thereby have developed more
complex or fully articulated self schemas.) This constant accessing presumably
facilitates subsequent accessing. Thus, subjects high in private self-consciousness
evoked their self-schemas more readily, or involved them more completely, when
making self-reference decisions.
Further evidence that persons high in self-consciousness are particularly prone
to refer to the self in encoding incidental material is provided by Turner (1980).
Under the guise of a reaction-time task, Turner presented his subjects with a set
of trait-descriptive adjectives and a set of nontrait nouns. After the reaction-time
session had been completed, each subject was asked to recall as many words as
possible that had been used in the experiment. Turner reasoned that trait-descriptive
words would be likely to elicit a spontaneous self-reference decision, and that this
likelihood would be greatest among persons who are dispositionally most self-
attentive.
The results of this study were generally consistent with the predictions. Subjects
high in private self-consciousness recalled more words overall than did persons low
in private self-consciousness. And this difference proved to be statistically reliable
only among self-relevant words (see Turner, 1980, for more detail).
Based on the reasoning that a well articulated schema should be accessed more
quickly than a poorly articulated schema (cf. Markus, 1977), Turner has also
investigated the speed of processing of self-related material among persons varying
in their levels of dispositional self-consciousness. He found (Turner, 1978a) that
private self-consciousness (but not public self-consciousness) is positively related
to speed of deciding on the applicability to oneself of undesirable trait labels.
Presumably this is because persons high in private self-consciousness have thought
a lot about what they are like. Subsequent research (Turner, Gilliland, & Klein,
in press) determined that the effect of private self-consciousness was specific to
knowledge of the self that was defined in terms of traits. In the latter research,
public self-consciousness (but not private) was associated with easy access to in-
formation about subjects' physical characteristics (e.g., their smile, hand size,
height). More specifically, persons high in public self-consciousness made quicker
evaluations (like-dislike) of these characteristics in themselves than did persons
lower in public self-consciousness. In sum, in both of these studies the disposition
to attend to a particular aspect of the self (private or public) was associated with
ease of access to a component self schema bearing on that aspect of self.

Self-Focus and Activation of the Self Schema

Additional support for the assumption that self-focus causes an activation of a
semantic schema concerning the self comes from research by Geller and Shaver
(1976). This project was discussed in Chapter 3 as providing evidence for the
validity of experimental manipulations of attention. In that research some subjects
were exposed to self-attention-enhancing stimuli (a TV camera and a mirror) and
others were not, while completing a modified version of the Stroop color-word test.
Access to Self Schemas 101

Previous research had indicated that when an item of the Stroop test is semantically
related to an area of memory that has recently been activated, the latency to name
the color in which the item is printed becomes longer (Warren, 1972, 1974). Thus,
this test can be used to demonstrate the activation of specific aspects of memory.
Geller and Shaver found that subjects who had been exposed to self-awareness-
inducing stimuli displayed longer latencies than did control subjects for self-relevant
trait-descriptive words, but not for self-irrelevant words. This suggests that the
experimental manipulations had caused the activation of self-related schemas in
these subjects' memories, thereby rendering those schemas more accessible. This,
in tum, resulted in interference with the color-naming task.
The Geller and Shaver finding is based on the assumption that a state of self-
focus leads the person to access a general self schema in a preliminary way. In the
Stroop task, this activation disrupts performance. But disruption of performance
is not always the consequence of accessing a schema. Recall that activation of a
schema often results in enhanced availability of the schema during a subsequent
task. Greater availability, in tum, increases the likelihood that a schema will be
reaccessed and used (cf. Higgins et aI., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980, discussed
in Chapter 5).
This possibility brings to mind another set of findings that are consistent with
the notion that self-focus enhances the availability of the self schema. In this research
(also discussed in Chapter 3), subjects filled out a sentence completion blank under
conditions of either high or low self-attention (Carver & Scheier, 1978). More
responses involving the self were made when self-attention was high--either sit-
uationally or dispositionally-than when it was lower. Sentence completion forms
are commonly regarded as reflecting quasi-projective processes. But it is just as
sensible to construe them as indicating the ease of access that subjects have at that
moment to various kinds of schemas, as a function of the availability induced either
by elements in the situation or by chronic biases in information processing. Ac-
cording to this reasoning, what was measured in the Carver and Scheier research
was the availability of selfschemas. This availability was increased by self-directed
attention.

Availability and length of self-description. There are other ways to measure peo-
ple's relative access to their self schemas, as well. One indicant of easy access
might be the amount of information that a person spontaneously provides when
requested to give a self-description. That is, easier or more thorough access to
knowledge about oneself might lead to self-descriptions that are more extensive and
more detailed than would be the case when access is more limited. If self-directed
attention enhances access to one's self schema, persons who differ from each other
in their degrees of self-focus should be expected to differ in the completeness or
length of their self-descriptions.
This reasoning has been supported in research conducted by Turner (1978b),
which investigated the self-descriptions made by persons who were dispositionally
low or high in self-consciousness. Turner simply asked his subjects to "list the
adjectives or traits that best describe yourself." Reliably more descriptors were
102 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

listed by subjects who were high in private self-consciousness than by those who
were lower in private self-consciousness. Unfortunately, Turner did not report the
degree of specificity that was implicit in the adjectives listed by the two groups.
Thus we cannot be sure whether highly self-conscious subjects named a greater
range of traits, or whether they described the same range of traits using more internal
differentiations than were used by less self-conscious subjects.
The notion that self-directed attention provides people with more thorough access
to knowledge about what they are like has some very important implications. In
particular, it suggests a way of analyzing the predictive relationship between self-
report and behavior. Those implications are sufficiently important to warrant a more
extensive discussion than is appropriate here, however. That topic is taken up in
detail in Chapter 14.

Access and Attribution

Self-focus and self-attribution. There is also evidence that the enhanced acces-
sibility to self schemas that occurs as a function of self-focus can, under some
circumstances at least, lead to exaggerated judgments of one's involvement in and
causal responsibility for outcomes. For example, Duval and Wicklund (1973) ex-
perimentally manipulated the self-focus of subjects who were making attributions
of causal responsibility for hypothetical outcomes. Greater degrees of self-attri-
bution were made when self-focus was high than when it was lower. Buss and
Scheier (1976), using similar procedures, replicated this finding and also found that
persons high in private self-consciousness made more self-attributions than did
persons lower in private self-consciousness. Using different paradigms, Arkin and
Duval (1975), and Duval, Duval, and Neely (1979) found that subjects' perceptions
of their responsibility for neutral events, and even for the plights of unfortunate
others, were also influenced by their focus of attention (see also Duval & Hensley,
1976). In each of these cases, it could be argued that enhanced access to self
schemas (via self-focus) led to increased self-attribution, by use of the availability
heuristic.
Converging support for this argument comes from research which used quite
different methods from those employed in any of the research summarized in the
preceding paragraph. Ross and Sicoly (1979, Experiment 5) led graduate students
to think about their previously completed theses either from the point of view of
their own inputs (self-focus condition) or from the point of view of their supervisor's
inputs (supervisor-focus condition). These manipulations led to differences in recall,
and to differences in attribution of responsibility. Subjects in the self-focus condition
presumably had greater access to encoded memories about themselves than did
subjects in the supervisor-focus condition. The result was that self-focused subjects
recalled suggesting more of the methodology, initiating more of the discussions
concerning the thesis, and controlling the direction of the discussions to a greater
degree than did supervisor-focused SUbjects. These differences were also reflected
in the degree to which subjects reported considering themselves responsible for the
thesis as a whole.
Access to Self Schemas 103

Ross and Sicoly argued that their findings (grouped across five studies) suggested
a bias in retrieval of infonnation from memory. More specifically, asking subjects
to consider their own contributions (to a wide variety of events) apparently led
subjects to weight their responses according to how much infonnation about their
own involvement they were able to retrieve. Said differently, they tended to use
frequency infonnation, rather than consider the proportion of the total that was
represented by their own input. This, it will be recalled, is a common judgmental
bias in many other areas as well (see Chapter 4). It was only when subjects were
artificially removed from that perspective (in Ross & Sicoly's Experiment 5) that
the relatively easy availability of their own inputs was reduced.

Limitations. We should note, however, that a number of authors have pointed to

restrictions on the generality of the proposition that focus on the self leads to self-
attribution of outcomes. For example, Federoff and Harvey (1976) have argued that
the hypothetical character of the outcomes in the research reviewed above influenced
subjects' responses by diminishing their psychological involvement in the events.
A hypothetical failure is, after all, much less threatening than a real failure, par-
ticularly if the failure has an adverse impact on another person. Federoff and Harvey
(1976) presented data showing that when this sort of failure was personally expe-
rienced, subjects tended to deny responsibility for it. Furthennore, this denial of
responsibility was exaggerated by camera-induced self-focus. As was suggested in
Chapter 3, and as will be argued further in Chapter 17, this manipulation appears
to direct attention selectively to the public aspects of self. Perhaps it thereby en-
hanced the salience of self-presentational concerns, thereby causing people to avoid
a public statement of responsibility.
In this vein, Hull and Levy (1979, Experiment 3) have suggested, based on
reasoning from Frey (1978), that the effect of self-focus on attributions of hypo-
thetical outcomes may depend on whether one's attributional judgments are private
or public. Presumably people are willing to take the blame for hypothetical (and
thus nonthreatening) outcomes publicly, but they would privately prefer not to do
so. Using the paradigm of Duval and Wicklund (1973), Hull and Levy found that
mirror-induced self-focus enhanced self-ascribed responsibility for negative hypo-
thetical outcomes, but only when the judgment was made in public conditions. Self-
focus decreased the ascription of failure to the self when the judgments were
perceived as being private. The latter finding conflicts with the assumption that self-
focus leads to self-attribution.
Unfortunately, the Hull and Levy study appears to have raised as many questions
as it answered. Most problematic is the finding that in conditions of low self-
awareness, subjects made greater self-attributions for unpleasant outcomes in private
than in public circumstances. Hull and Levy had argued that private conditions
allow people to make self-esteem-protective attributions. This reasoning would
seem to have predicted a result opposite to what actually occurred in this comparison.
This aspect of the findings-which Hull and Levy failed to address-would seem
to be inconsistent with their reasoning.
Nevertheless, the findings of Hull and Levy (1979), taken together with those
104 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

of Federoff and Harvey (1976), suggest that there are important limitations on the
proposition that self-focus leads to self-attribution, although it is less clear what
constitutes the basis for those limitations. Federoff and Harvey (1976) and Hull
and Levy (1979) concur in arguing for the importance of self-esteem maintenance
in this process, however, a position that other theorists have taken in other contexts.
The issue of self-esteem maintenance is an important one, which we wish to address
in some detail. Further discussion of that issue is taken up in Chapter 13.

Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms

In the preceding discussion we have focused on aspects of the schematic represen-
tation of self that are relatively abstract and conceptual in nature. That is, we have
talked about trait descriptors (summary labels) that are applied to the self; we have
considered the self as an agent of action; in some cases we have treated the self
as a rather global, undifferentiated entity. As is true of any naturally occurring
stimulus object, however, the self can be perceived at many different levels. Thus
schemas concerning the self presumably exist at a variety of different levels of
analysis (cf. our discussion of Powers' levels of abstraction in Chapter 4). The
levels addressed up to this point represent a useful beginning, but they are only a
beginning. In the sections that follow, we will be dealing with cognitive structures
at increasingly lower levels of analysis.
The trait-based self-conception is only one aspect of the self that can be perceived
and encoded. Another important aspect of the perceived self is the internal events
that are associated with experiences such as emotions and physical symptoms.
These experiences all involve some sort of informational input from within one's
body. This input is no less a perceptual experience than is vision or hearing, but
it is a perception of the self, rather than of the environment (cf. Lewis & Brooks,
1978).

Three Sources of Influence on Perceived Internal States

Concerning emotional experience. Following the lead of Schachter and Singer
(1962), a great many personality and social psychologists have come to view the
in vivo conscious experience of emotion as being strongly influenced by three
elements: the existence of some perceptible internal state that differs from one's
baseline or adaptation level; the focusing of sufficient attention on that internal state
to result in awareness of its existence; and the use of some knowledge structure to
interpret the state.
We should note that there is a considerable divergence of opinion as to whether
these three factors merely influence emotional experience (on the one hand) or
whether they comprise emotional experience (on the other hand). That is, the
Schachter and Singer analysis, though influential, is far from being the only approach
to emotion (see, e.g., Arnold, 1970; Izard, 1976, 1978; Levi, 1975; Plutchik &
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms 105

Kellennan, 1980), and not all of its assumptions are universally accepted. Recent
alternative theories have generally been responsive to the need to account for data
generated from the Schachter and Singer model, however. Thus they typically
incorporate component processes that have conceptual similarities to the processes
suggested by Schachter and Singer.
An illustration of this may be seen in work done by Leventhal (1980), who has
proposed a theory of emotion that appears to handle successfully a broader variety
of data than does the Schachter and Singer model. Leventhal cites a good deal of
evidence which indicates, for example, that none of the three factors listed above
is actually necessary for the generation of an emotion. On the other hand, his
analysis does allow that all of these elements are capable of exerting powerful
influences on the subjective emotional experience. We have more to say about
Leventhal's theory in a later section ofthis chapter. But for now, our point is simply
this: It is not necessary to adopt Schachter and Singer's assumptions in toto to
accept the notion that changes in internal state, variations in attention to the state,
and interpretive schemas can all have an impact on the nature of a person's subjective
emotional experience.
Though the three factors listed above derive from Schachter and Singer, other
theorists have elaborated upon them in a number of respects. For example, Valins
(1966) reported the now familiar finding that subjects will commonly assume bogus
feedback of arousal to be veridical, and will treat the infonnation conveyed by that
feedback as indicating the intensity of their bodily responses in an emotion-inducing
setting. This finding has subsequently been replicated many times (e.g., Carver
& Blaney, 1977a, 1977b; Misovich & Charis, 1974). In fact, Barefoot and Straub
(1971) reported that even verbally delivered infonnation is accepted as veridical,
leading to a comparable chain of inferences on the part of subjects. The acceptance
of such feedback has limits, for example if actual arousal is sufficiently different
from the experimentally induced perceptions (Goldstein, Fink, & Mettee, 1972).
But findings such as those of Valins (1966) and Barefoot and Straub (1971) appear
to indicate that it is the noticing and encoding of infonnation indicative of bodily
change that exerts the influence on emotional experience, rather than the actual
degree of change experienced at the receptor level. Said more simply, we respond
to the representation of a state, rather than to the state itself.
Another elaboration, or variation, of the model comes from the following sug-
gestion: that the recognition of emotional states depends not on autonomic arousal,
but on the implicit muscle movements associated with facial expressive behavior
(e.g., Kleck, Vaughan, Cartwright-Smith, Vaughan, Colby, & Lanzetta, 1976;
Lanzetta, Cartwright-Smith, & Kleck, 1976; but see Buck, 1980, for a critique of
this hypothesis). What is usually emphasized about this statement is the contrast
between it and Schachter and Singer's assumption that visceral arousal underlies
emotional experience. Indeed, those various theorists might well complain loudly
at being treated as variations on the same theme. For the present purpose, however,
it is important to note that both theories presume the existence of infonnational
input from one or another kind of internal sensor. Schachter and Singer assumed
106 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

input from sensors that are responsive to changes in heart rate, blood pressure,
flushing of the skin, and so on. In the alternative theory, the input is proprioceptive
information, coming from sensors that are responsive to changes in muscle con-
figurations. But both of these inputs constitute information about the present status
of some aspect of self. In that sense they are alike.
Finally, we should note that we have generalized from Schachter and Singer's
reasoning in stating that the perceived emotional activity must be interpreted by
means of some identifying schema. Indeed, this statement actually obscures a
distinction that was emphasized by Schachter and Singer. Specifically, they argued
that persons for whom the source of arousal is ambiguous will search for contextual
cues to aid in interpretation of the state. This will not happen if information is
readily available as to the cause of the arousal. Note, however, that in both cases
the person is attempting to use a recognitory schema to identify the state. In one
case, the identifying knowledge base is easy to access. In the other case, it may
not be. As a consequence, the person is forced to engage in a broader search for
information that may evoke a plausibly applicable schema.
This discussion illustrates once again the degree of interplay between self schemas
and environmental schemas-between self-focus and environment focus (an issue
that we also addressed in Chapter 3). That is, the categorization of an environment
may also result in the recognition that that environment class is typically associated
with a specific emotion (e.g., a dark, shadowy alley is associated with anxiety).
That "typically occurring" emotion, however, is also elaborated in some detail as
a schema associated with internal experiences, i.e., a self schema. Realizing what
is the typically occurring emotion in a situation may lead the person to access that
emotional-experience schema, which then may be used subsequently to identify and
assist in perceiving an existing internal arousal state.

Concerning symptoms. Theorists have also begun to examine the multifaceted

nature of the experience of symptoms in much this same fashion (e.g., Mechanic,
1972; Leventhal, 1975; Leventhal & Everhart, 1979; Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz,
1980; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1978). It is usually assumed that the experience of
a symptom begins with the deviation of some physiological internal state from a
normal baseline. And it has been implicit for a long time that the intensity with
which such events are experienced, or the probability of experiencing them, is
influenced by attentional factors. A person who carefully scrutinizes his or her
internal state is especially likely to notice changes from resting levels, and may
thus be more likely to perceive them as symptoms. (Indeed, if not cautious, a person
who is overly attentive to these states may wind up classified as a hypochondriac.)
A person who carefully diverts attention from such changes may remain unaware
of them (cf. Morgan & Pollock, 1977). But emphasis is also increasingly being
placed on other factors that influence just how a given internal sensation is expe-
rienced. In particular, the argument is being made with greater conviction that the
schemas with which people approach these sensations have a profound impact on
the subjective nature of the perception of the physiological event, and thus the
secondary affective reaction that the experience induces.
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms 107

Impact of Each Element on Subjective Experience

The impact that can be exerted by each of these three components has been assessed
in research where two of the components were held constant and the third was
varied. Representative evidence is briefly reviewed in the following sections.

Internal sensory input. Evidence regarding the influence of change in internal

state upon perceptions of emotion comes from several sources. Research by Kleck
et al. (1976) and Lanzetta et al. (1976) found that when facial responses are minimal,
subjects reported minimal degrees of the affect that is normally associated with the
responses. When subjects were led to be more expressive, on the other hand, they
reported more intense affect. [Leventhal (1980) points out, however, that changes
in facial expressiveness are normally far greater than changes in self-reported affect,
and suggests some possible reasons why; see also Buck (1980).]
There is also evidence that visceral arousal may exert an important influence on
certain types of emotional experiences. Schachter and Singer (1962), for example,
found that an "emotional" context did not lead to the inference of an emotional
state among subjects injected with a placebo, though this inference did occur among
subjects injected with epinephrine (see also Schachter, 1964). Additional research
by Schachter and Wheeler (1962) further confirmed the important role that can be
played by physiological arousal. Another program of research (McCaul, Solomon,
& Holmes, 1979) has found an association between level of GSR arousal and self-
reported anxiety while preparing to receive painful shocks, thus indicating once
again some degree of covariation between physical state and subjective experience.
It bears repeating, however, that these effects may depend more on the encoding
of a change of internal state rather than on the mere existence of the change (Valins,
1966; Barefoot & Straub, 1971). And it also bears repeating that these cues, though
they can have an impact on emotional experience, may not be necessary for emo-
tional experience (cf. Leventhal, 1980).

Awareness. Let us now consider the second hypothesized influence on such ex-
periences: the direction of attention to the change in state. It has been known for
some time that attentional factors play an important role in symptom experience.
Distracting a person who is in pain can alleviate the pain (e.g., Walters, 1961;
Morgan & Pollock, 1977), and instructing a person to attend to pain often leads
to an increase in reported pain levels (Kanfer & Goldfoot, 1966).
The role of awareness in other kinds of emotional experience has typically been
taken for granted, rather than studied. That is, it has seemed reasonable that a
person will experience emotional states, however the emotion is construed, only
to the degree that the emotional cues are attended to. Thus distracting a person who
is angry or upset can alleviate the feeling in some measure, whereas inducing the
person to focus on it should only make the experience subjectively more intense.
Indeed, to the degree that an emotional experience happens to be the salient aspect
of oneself, it follows that attention directed to the self should gravitate to the
emotion, thereby intensifying the subjective experience of emotion.
This reasoning has been tested in a recent series of studies. In one experiment,
108 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

Scheier (1976) exposed half the participants to an anger provocation. He later asked
all subjects to report their moods, including a self-rating of anger level. Among
subjects in the provocation condition, significantly more intense anger was reported
by subjects who had been self-attentive than by those who were less self-attentive
(cf. Konecni, 1975). This, in tum, led to significant differences in aggressive
behavior.
Scheier and Carver (1977) subsequently pursued this intensification effect further,
by testing its generality to a wider variety of emotional states. In one experiment
male subjects were shown a series of slides of nude women, under conditions of
experimentally enhanced self-focus or with no manipulation. SUbjects were asked
to rate the attractiveness of the women in the slides according to the degree of
bodily responses that they experienced. Subjects in whom self-focus had been
increased made reliably more favorable ratings than did subjects with less self-
focus. This finding was subsequently replicated using subjects who varied in their
levels of dispositional private self-consciousness (Scheier & Carver, 1977, Exper-
iment 2). In this study the reasoning was also extended to the experience of repulsion.
That is, some subjects in this experiment viewed slides of mutilated bodies. Among
these subjects, significantly greater repulsion was expressed by persons high in
private self-consciousness than by those lower in private self-consciousness. A
conceptual replication of these effects, concerning the experience of fear, was
reported by Carver, Blaney, and Scheier (l979a).
Two additional studies extended the reasoning to the experience of elation and
depression. Using procedures developed by Velten (1968), Scheier and Carver
(1977, Experiment 3) induced pleasant mood states in some subjects, and depressed
moods in others. Then all subjects completed a mood self-report scale, either in
the presence of a mirror or with no mirror. Among those given the depression
induction, reliably greater depression was reported by self-focused subjects than
by those who were less self-attentive. But the comparable tendency among subjects
in the elation condition did not attain significance. A final study (Scheier & Carver,
1977, Experiment 4) replicated these effects using individual differences in private
self-consciousness.
There is at least one aspect of these findings that deserves further comment.
Although it is at least plausible to suggest that the experiences of sexual attraction
and repulsion produced mild states of physiological arousal, it seems much less
likely that the depression induction produced any arousal change. Depression seems
more amenable to the argument that proprioceptive cues help to define the exper-
iential state. We should note, in this regard, that the way in which these various
studies were conducted did not preclude the possibility that subjects would gauge
their emotional reactions by referring to proprioceptive cues rather than visceral
cues. To the contrary, subjects in those experiments received a rather general set
of orienting instructions. Their attention may well have gone to proprioceptive
cues.
More recent research lends credibility to this speculation. Lanzetta, Biernat, and
Kleck (1980) showed subjects attractive and repulsive slides (varied within subjects),
and videotaped subjects' facial expressiveness when viewing each slide. Their data
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms 109

showed that group differences in self-reports of emotional reactions that occurred

as a function of self-focus paralleled group differences in facial expressiveness.
Unexpectedly, their data failed to replicate the earlier finding that mirror presence
caused self-reports of more intense affect. In fact, they found a reversal of that
effect, both in self-rated affect and facial expressiveness. Because there were several
differences between their research and the Scheier and Carver (1977) studies, the
cause of the difference in findings is not clear. One reasonable interpretation,
however, stems from the possibility that subjects were aware that they were being
videotaped. As Kleck et al. (1976) have noted, people tend to suppress the public
expression of their feelings. Enhanced self-focus in a situation in which the display
of emotions was public may have led to increased suppression of facial movements.
This, in tum, might have resulted in less reported affect. This reasoning is spec-
ulative, but it would account for the difference in findings. A more complete answer
can only come from further research.

Interpretive sets. A good deal of attention has also been paid recently to the role
of interpretive orientations in the experience of emotions and other internal states.
As Schachter and Singer (1962) demonstrated, equivalent internal states can be
interpreted under two different circumstances as reflecting different emotional ex-
periences. This occurs when the internal states are identified according to different
schemas. If the context suggests a plausible basis for an anger interpretation, there
is a tendency to define the experience as anger. If the context suggests that a
different emotion is more plausible, the experience is defined differently.
This finding has, of course, given rise to a literature of "misattribution" studies,
in which researchers have gone to great lengths to induce subjects to perceive
arousal states according to knowledge structures other than those associated with
the event to which the arousal was initially tied. Thus subjects appear to have been
induced to misperceive exercise-generated arousal as anger (Zillman & Bryant,
1974; Zillman, Johnson, & Day, 1974; Zillman, Katcher, & Milavsky, 1972), pain
and anger as the side effects of pills (Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Younger & Doob,
1978), and fear as a side effect of exposure to noise (Loftis & Ross, 1974).
The argument that internal cues to emotion are largely proprioceptive would seem
to suggest that there wOl..ld be difficulties in producing misattribution, given that
implicit facial movements are relatively specific to the emotion being experienced
(see, e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Misattribution should still be a possibility,
however, for two reasons. Though the patterns of facial expressions differ across
emotional states, the specific components of the patterns overlap somewhat. If
attention were selectively directed to one aspect of the input information rather than
the totality, the person might well lose track of other aspects. This would generate
some potential confusion [though less than is suggested by a theory based on visceral
arousal, in that different parts of the face appear to be more salient as indicators
of different categories of feeling states (cf. Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & Kler-
man, 1976)]. Moreover, in addition to the possibility of errors in processing as a
function of selective attention, there is a cultural norm in our society to suppress
the public expression of our feelings (cf. Kleck et aI., 1976). It seems reasonable
110 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

to suggest that stifling one's reactions causes additional proprioceptive information

to be generated, resulting in a greater degree of "noise" around the veridical "signal,"
thus making it more difficult to detect the signal accurately. Detection of the signal
should be facilitated, however, by the use of some recognitory schema. Thus this
theory is also amenable to the notion that interpretive orientations play an important
role in construing one's emotions.
Misattribution findings do have important qualifications and limitations (see, e.g.,
Calvert-Boyanowski & Leventhal, 1975; Rule & Nesdale, 1976; Tannenbaum &
Zillman, 1975). Nevertheless, a great many people have found themselves con-
vinced of the validity of at least parts of the underlying reasoning: that contextual
cues can influence the way people construe the experiences that they are undergoing.
Consider, now, the role of interpretive sets in the perception of symptoms. Some
symptom sensations (e.g., changes in heart rate) are ambiguous enough that how
they are interpreted-or whether they are interpreted as symptoms at all-may
depend a great deal on the context and the interpretive orientation that it evokes
(see Mechanic, 1972). But a great many symptoms consist of a set of sensations
very closely linked to a pain or distress reaction (e.g., Melzack, 1973; Leventhal
& Everhart, 1979). The closeness of this link between physical sensation and
distress response has discouraged researchers in this area from focusing on the
possibility of inducing people to misconstrue their pain as something else in the
same fashion as was discussed above (i.e., via misattribution). The focus has been
instead on a conceptually related process, but one that occurs at a different level
of analysis.

Schemas and Symptom Distress

In order to discuss these efforts intelligibly, we must now look to a lower level of
the perceptual hierarchy (discussed in Chapter 4) than we have done thus far. And
we must also take up a subject that we have been ignoring for some time, despite
the fact that we have trod all around it. That is, in the preceding section we
discussed influences on the subjectively experienced "end states" of emotional
reactions. But we have not addressed ourselves to the manner in which emotions
are begun.
As promised earlier, we return now to Leventhal's (1980) theory of emotion.
Leventhal has emphasized the distinction that we made a moment ago between the
processes that generate emotion, and the subjective experience of emotion. He
argues that each involves cognitive processes-each indeed involves the use of
schemas-but that the two sets of cognitive events occur at two different times,
and exert their impact in two quite different ways (cf. Lazarus, 1974). One set of
schemas is similar to what we have been discussing. The other set represents a
construction of experience at a lower level of analysis. For ease of exposition, in
the following paragraphs we refer to the former as conceptual schemas, the later
as perceptual schemas.
To state Leventhal's position perhaps too simply, emotions are generated by
preattentive comparison between a stimulus input and perceptual recognitory sche-
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms III

mas. When the perceptual schema includes an emotion-response component (either

by virtue of previous experience, or innately), the emotion is thereby evoked (cf.
Magnusson & Ekehammar, 1978). In essence, Leventhal views the generation of
emotion as a perceptual-motor event. According to this model, emotion-response
information is coded and stored just like any other information (we discuss the
storage of response-specifying information in greater detail in Chapter 7). Leventhal
refers to this level of cognitive activity as "schematic processing." Because per-
ceptual information, subjective feelings, and the instructions to cue both patterned
expressive motor reactions and autonomic reactions are assumed to be integrated
in memory, the stimulus event is assumed to lead simultaneously to the (parallel)
elicitation of all of these components of the emotional action sequence. As stated
above, the process of eliciting these components is preattentive and thus occurs
outside awareness.
The second sort of cognitive event that can influence emotional experience is an
interpretive labeling process much like that assumed by Schachter and Singer. This
process makes use of a conceptual schema, rather than a concrete perceptual one,
and it occurs consciously. Note, however, that whereas the first process may lead
to arousal or expressive movements, this second process treats the arousal and
expressive movements as input information, and interprets them in terms of a
knowledge structure that provides a more abstract, semantic identity for the ex-
perience. (See Leventhal, 1980, for a more complete description.) The fact that
this process lags behind the other process is a natural consequence of the fact that
they take place at different levels in the processing hierarchy. The higher the level,
the slower the time course of the events therein (cf. Chapter 2; see also Powers,
1973a, 1979). This reasoning also helps to account for the observation that affective
reactions appear to occur more quickly than do consciously reasoned judgments
(cf. Zajonc, 1980).
Though Leventhal's analysis has many implications for a variety of emotional
reactions, its most direct application thus far has been to the experience of distress
associated with painful sensory events, an area in which Leventhal and his colleagues
have been especially active. As was indicated above, Leventhal has argued that
people's reactions to painful stimuli represent a composite of physical sensory
experiences and an associated distress reaction. The distress reaction is an emotion
that is evoked as part of the perceptual schema through which the sensations are
experienced. Leventhal has argued that these two components of the experience can
be separated from each other empirically as well as theoretically. The key to doing
so lies in inducing subjects to make use of a relatively nonthreatening perceptual
schema in the initial recognition and encoding of the stress-inducing stimulus. That
is, according to Leventhal, the physical sensations per se do not lead to the distress
reaction. That reaction is produced by the integrated event of physical sensations
recognized via a threatening perceptual schema. If a different schema could be
created, the same sensory information may be encoded in a different form, a form
that does not incorporate the emotional response.
Leventhal, Brown, Shacham, and Engquist (1979) have reported a series of
experiments intended to test this reasoning, using a cold pressor test to generate
112 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

pain. Subjects who were given concrete (but nonthreatening) information as to what
stimulus sensations to expect reported less distress than did subjects given no
information (Experiment 1). Leventhal et al. argued that providing concrete sensory
information allowed subjects to generate a nonthreatening perceptual set for the
impending experience. The use of that orientation to the sensory input prevented
the distress reaction. Leventhal strongly emphasizes the requirement that the sensory
information provided be very concrete. This appears to be necessary in order to
produce a perceptual schema that is usable for processing at the level of sensory
input (cf. Leventhal et aI., 1980).
Though the use of such a perceptual schema can minimize distress, the difference
between groups in this research was eliminated if subjects were also given a pain
warning prior to being exposed to the stressor. The warning of impending pain
apparently enhances the likelihood of using a threatening schema to perceive the
stimulus. Thus it prevented the successful use of the benign schema (Leventhal et
aI., 1979).
Both the fact that benign perceptual schemas could be used to reduce distress,
and the fact that pain warnings reinstituted distress, were consistent with the results
of a variety of previous studies in this and other domains (see, e.g., Holmes &
Houston, 1974; Johnson, 1973; Johnson & Leventhal, 1974; Johnson, Morrisey,
& Leventhal, 1973; Leyens, Cisneros, & Hossay, 1976; Speisman, Lazarus, Mord-
koff, & Davison, 1964). Leventhal et ai. (1979) went beyond the previous data,
however, in providing additional support for the hypothesis that the effects had
been mediated by the use of cognitive structures at the point of encoding sensory
elements (Leventhal et aI., 1979, Experiment 3). More specifically, subjects who
were led to attend to concrete hand sensations (the benign schema) in the early part
of the cold pressor task, and who were distracted during the later part of the task,
reported low levels of distress throughout. (The type of distraction used had been
shown not to reduce distress by itself.) Subjects who were led to attend to the
sensations during only the later stages of the task did not experience a reduction
in distress. According to Leventhal et al., this may indicate that effective distress
prevention requires the engagement of the nonthreatening schema during the initial
construction of the concrete nature of the event. Once an emotional reaction has
developed, it is too late to employ the benign perceptual orientation. Additional
evidence that the schematization is critical in this regard, rather than the sensory
cues themselves, is reported by Morgan and Pollack (1977), and by Leventhal et
al. (1980).

Evoked Schemas and the By-Passing of Awareness

The model of the experience of internal states that was outlined above has much
to recommend it. But one aspect of the model requires additional consideration.
As was implicit in our discussion of Leventhal's work (Leventhal et al., 1979), we
are sometimes led to anticipate internal states before we experience them. This
anticipation, in effect, makes more available a schema corresponding to that state
at either the perceptual or the conceptual level, or both. The prior evoking of that
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms 113

schema may exert a powerful biasing effect on the processing of subsequent input
relevant to the experience. Indeed, sometimes the availability of the schema causes
the input information to be hardly processed at all. The result is that the schema
does not just influence the percept, it dictates the percept. Stated more simply, we
often perceive--even about ourselves--exactly what we anticipate perceiving.

Placebos. The power that such an anticipation can exert is exemplified by the
placebo effect. A placebo is an inert substance. After ingesting a placebo, however,
people often report experiencing whatever states they have been led to expect to
be caused by the placebo (see, e.g., Mechanic, 1968). Apparently the suggestion
provided ahead of time is sufficiently compelling that most people do not direct
their attention to a careful examination of the relevant internal cues when reporting
on their physical states. Instead, they simply report whatever information had been
previously supplied at the verbal or conceptual level. If persons were led to focus
more attention on the sensory input and its relationship to the expected experience,
however, this effect should be minimized.

Self10cus and the placebo effect. A test of this reasoning was reported recently
by Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, and Hormuth (1979). Subjects in this study were
given an oral dose of baking soda, which was either identified as baking soda, or
misidentified as a drug called Cavanol. Subjects in the latter condition were led to
expect the drug to produce changes in heart rate, constriction in the chest, and
sweaty palms-in short, symptoms of arousal. Subjects for whom the baking soda
was correctly labeled were told that they were in the control group, and were not
led to expect side effects. After an intervening task, each subject was asked to
complete a l6-item symptom checklist, which included the items made salient in
the previous stage of the experiment. Half the subjects completed this instrument
in front of a mirror, half without the mirror.
The normal placebo effect is to report the symptoms which were ascribed to the
drug's action. This was what occurred in the absence of the self-attention-enhancing
manipulation. Subjects in this group reported experiencing significantly more
arousal, and more of the specific symptoms ascribed to the drug, than did comparable
subjects who were not led to anticipate arousal symptoms. This placebo effect was
almost completely eradicated, however, by the presence of the mirror. Apparently
the increase in self-focus led to a more thorough search for evidence of the antic-
ipated symptoms. Indeed, there is evidence that this self-examination was quite
specifically for the symptoms that had been mentioned (see Gibbons et al., 1979).
This search revealed the absence of the expected symptoms. And this was reflected
in the self-reports made by this group of subjects.

Self10cus and other suggestibility effects. The placebo effect is one illustration
of a broader class of suggestibility phenomena. The reasoning that found support
in the Gibbons et al. study-i.e., that self-focus would diminish this sort of sug-
gestibility effect-has also been tested with regard to two other suggestibility phe-
nomena (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979).
114 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

The first of these studies investigated the effects of suggestion and self-attention
upon the perception of an emotional state (Scheier et al., 1979, Experiment 1).
Male undergraduates were shown a series of slides of nude women, in the same
fashion as was done in previous studies described earlier in this chapter (Scheier
& ClLfVer, 1977). There were two differences between this and previous experi-
ments, however. First, the slides used in this study were chosen (on the basis of
pilot data) as being only moderately attractive. Second, before showing the slides,
the experimenter made an offhanded remark that led the subject to expect them to
be either extremely attractive and arousing, or extremely unattractive and nona-
rousing. In reality, the slides were identical for all subjects.
The results of this study indicated a powerful suggestibility main effect. Subjects'
ratings were strongly biased by the experimenter's remarks. But this bias was
significantly reduced by an experimental manipulation of self-attention. Subjects
given the anticipation of a lot of arousal tended to report less arousal when self-
focus was high than when it was low, and subjects led to anticipate very little
arousal tended to report being more aroused when self-focus was high than when
it was low. Although the effects of dispositional private self-consciousness were
similar in form to the effects of manipulated self-focus, they were weaker, and did
not attain an acceptable level of statistical significance.
This study extended the results of Gibbons et al. (1979) in indicating that self-
focus caused less suggestibility in response to misdirection when an internal state
(positive affect) was present, as well as when it was absent. But it left some
question as to whether this phenomenon would generalize to dispositional self-
focus as well as manipulated self-focus. In part for this reason, yet another study
was conducted.
This experiment (Scheier et al., 1979, Experiment 2) also extended our reasoning
further, in two respects. First, we set out to determine whether the reasoning would
be applicable to an internal perceptual state that was not emotional-specifically,
the perception of taste intensity. Second, we also attempted to assess more precisely
whether self-focus resulted in more veridical perceptions of the internal state, at
the same time as it reduced suggestibility.
Subjects in this study were persons who were either high or low in dispositional
private self-consciousness. They were given experimental instructions that led them
to expect to taste a series of solutions of peppermint extract. Their task was to
gauge the intensity of each solution (see Scheier et al., 1979, for greater detail).
Each subject was first given a standard solution, which served as a baseline. The
subject rated this solution (verbally) on an II-point scale. Before giving the subject
the second sample solution, the experimenter casually indicated that it should be
"a little stronger" or "a little weaker" than the previous one. Independent of this
information, the second solution actually was either stronger or weaker than the
first one. The subject then tasted the second solution, and rated it on the ll-point
scale. The dependent measure of the study was the degree of change from the first
rating to the second rating.
Analysis of subjects' ratings revealed that those who were high in private self-
consciousness were significantly less misled by the experimenter's remarks (when
Internal States: Emotions and Symptoms 115

those remarks were incorrect) than were subjects lower in self-consciousness. More-
over, subjects high in self-consciousness tended to be particularly sensitive to the
actual intensity of the second solution. This point is made with greatest clarity by
the following analysis. Some subjects who were led to expect weak solutions
actually received weak solutions; some subjects led to expect strong solutions did
receive strong solutions. For these subjects, there was no conflict between their
anticipations and the actual stimulus intensity. Virtually all of these subjects judged
the second stimulus in a fashion consistent with their expectations, and this tendency
did not differ across levels of self-consciousness. But for other subjects there was
a conflict between their anticipations and the stimulus they actually received. Among
these subjects, most persons high in private self-consciousness shifted their estimates
in the direction contrary to the anticipation but consistent with the stimulus intensity
(12 did, 5 did not). Among subjects lower in self-consciousness, the pattern was
reversed. Most subjects gave reports that were consistent with their anticipations
(15) rather than the actual stimulus (5). This difference between self-consciousness
groups was highly significant.

Mediation. Two additional issues should be addressed regarding the mediation

of the effects obtained in these studies taken as a group. The first issue is whether
they were produced by internal self-perceptions or by external, visual self-percep-
tions (cf. Bern, 1972). Subjects could have viewed their faces, inferred from their
expressions the degree of emotion or arousal they were experiencing, and made
their judgments based on those inferences. Such a sequence would be quite different
from what we have postulated: i.e., that self-focus caused subjects to scan the
information being delivered from internal sensory receptors.
There are two sources of evidence that weaken the external mediation alternative,
however. First, in the Gibbons et al. placebo study, the target symptoms (increased
heart rate, sweaty palms, chest constriction) were such that subjects would have
been unlikely to be able to gain information relevant to the symptoms by viewing
their faces. Yet the predicted effects were obtained for those symptoms but not
other symptoms. Second, Scheier et al. 's Experiment 2 made use of individual
differences in self-attention, rather than a manipulation. There is no possibility for
external mediation to have occurred in the latter case. Thus, the inward-focus-of-
attention analysis is the only reasoning that can account for all of the available
data.
Another issue is this: Earlier in the chapter it was argued that self-directed
attention is associated with enhanced access to schemas concerning the self. But
the analysis of suggestibility effects that was outlined above assumes, in effect,
that an evoked schema concerning an aspect of the self will be utilized unless
attention is directed to the self. Don't these two positions conflict with each other?
We suggest that they do not, because of important differences between the two
classes of situations involved. Earlier in the chapter we were discussing the spon-
taneous accessing of knowledge structures about the self in the absence of any
present perceptual information that would be relevant to that structure. The result
of self-focus in that context was to access the knowledge structure more thoroughly.
116 6. Focus on the Self: Perception of Self-Aspects

In the present context, in contrast, subjects were led to perceive their internal
reactions in terms of an anticipatory schema that had been suggested by the ex-
perimenter. In this case, perceptual information relevant to the knowledge structure
was readily available. Given that availability, self-focus apparently led to a more
explicit comparison between the information and the schema, which resulted in a
greater awareness of the mismatch between the two. In both cases the schemas were
used under self-focus, but used in different ways. In the first case they were used
as a source of information about the self. In the second case they were used as a
point of comparison for sensory input information.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have discussed a variety of evidence that cognitive structures
evolve and play an important role in organizing our knowledge about ourselves,
and our perceptions of internal states. These knowledge structures vary in their
levels of abstraction, from the highly conceptual (e.g., our self-conceptions of our
trait characteristics) to the much more concrete (e.g., specific sensory and affective
events).
Research evidence also suggests that focus of attention is important in the uti-
lization of these various knowledge structures. Focus on the self in some circum-
stances causes more thorough access to conceptual schemas about the self. In other
circumstances, such as the suggestibility research discussed immediately above, the
result of self-focus may be more accurately portrayed as a more careful comparison
between the previously evoked schema and the sensory input from within the self
to which the schema is relevant. There are many questions yet to be answered in
this area of work. But the findings discussed in this chapter seem to indicate the
viability of the general perspective from which we began: that the known self may
be usefully conceptualized in terms of perceptual and conceptual schemas, and that
these cognitive structures are most used when attention is directed to the self.
Part III
Attention and Motivation

In Part II, we discussed the development and use of schemas for the recognition
and categorization of perceptions and knowledge. Depending on a person's focus
of attention, these schemas are used to perceive and conceptualize either the en-
vironment or the self.
These recognitory processes are doubtlessly quite complex in their functioning.
For example, a given stimulus array can be perceived at many different levels of
analysis. Despite their complexity, however, these processes are not sufficient in
themselves to account for behavioral self-regulation. They are essentially static
processes, in the sense that they are limited in their scope to the construction of
object and event categories, the use of those categories to recognize new objects
and events, and the retrieval of information previously encoded as being relevant
to those categories.
In brief, the processes discussed in Part II are perceptual and judgmental proc-
esses. What is needed to describe behavioral self-regulation is a model of moti-
vational processes. The description of such a model is the purpose of Part III.
A control-theory approach to motivation requires, at a minimum, two systems.
One system generates a standard of behavior. This standard provides a general
guide, or a goal, to be used in determining subsequent actions. This construct-the
behavioral standard-is discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 7. In that chapter
we attempt to integrate ideas from within cognitive and social psychology with
principles derived from control theory. It is implicit in cognitive theories that
response-specifying information is sometimes encoded along with, or is implied by,
recognitory schemas. Such specification constitutes a behavioral standard. Evidence
consistent with this such assumption is reviewed in this chapter, and a hierarchy
of potential standards is described in detail.
The second system required by a control-theory analysis of self-regulation is one
that reduces discrepancies between an existing state and the previously evoked
standard. As was described in Chapter 2, this sort of system is termed by cyber-
neticists a negative feedback loop. In Chapter 8 we discuss some reasons for
believing that such a feedback loop can be identified in the self-regulation of human
118 III. Attention and Motivation

behavior. We present support for the assumption that self-focus leads to increased
comparison with salient standards, and review evidence that self-focus when a
standard is salient results in the reduction of discrepancies between the standard
and one's present behavior. The possibility that there are circumstances under which
self-focus engages a discrepancy-enlarging feedback loop is also examined, and
findings consistent with that possibility are discussed. Chapter 8 concludes with the
suggestion of a possible theoretical integration between our reasoning and social
comparison theory.
We close Part III with our first consideration of what happens when a feedback
system is not utilized, or is utilized in a maladaptive fashion. We begin Chapter
9 with a discussion of the conditions that lead to an absence of self-regulation. The
literature of de individuation is examined, in light of the possibility that such phe-
nomena represent the absence of regulation, and that they occur when people's
awareness of themselves is unusually low. We also consider here two ways in which
a feedback system can misregulate, that is, regulate behavior using erroneous or
irrelevant information.
Chapter 7

Standards of Behavior

People behave. It is hard to argue with this assertion. And although behavior
sometimes seems spontaneous and not very well thought out, there usually appears
to be one or another kind of purpose behind people's actions. This purposive
character underlies the subject area termed motivation. It is generally agreed that
theories of motivation are intended to account for two aspects of behavior. The first
is the "direction" that behavior takes-that is, the choice of one activity from among
the many possible alternatives. The second is the "intensity" of behavior-the vigor,
thoroughness, or single-mindedness with which the activity is done.
The concepts of motivation are essentially concepts of self-regulation. Self-reg-
ulation can be conceptualized in many different ways, a point that is graphically
illustrated by the diverse range of motivational theories that have been developed
over the years (see, e.g., Arkes & Garske, 1977; Atkinson & Birch, 1978; Korman,
1974; Weiner, 1972, 1980). As was discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, control
theorists or cyberneticists view self-regulation as a process of determining goals,
and then using those goals as reference values for feedback systems, which act to
bring existing states into line with the goals. To a cyberneticist, human motivational
phenomena would be expected to display essentially the same sort of component
processes as would be involved in any other self-regulatory phenomenon.
We are arguing, in this book, for the viability of a control-theory approach to
the understanding of behavioral self-regulation. If we are to be convincing in this
argument, we need to indicate some reasonable basis for postulating the existence
of the component processes just described. We undertake this task in two parts. In
this chapter, we examine the first component: the specification of behavioral stan-
dards. In the following chapter, we consider the existence of discrepancy-reducing
feedback loops.
120 7. Standards of Behavior

Standards

What Is a Behavioral Standard?

We should specify at the outset what implications we do and do not mean to convey
when using terms like "standard." In particular, we do not intend to automatically
connote either a sense of correctness or of excellence concerning standards in
general, although there are specific cases in which each of these connotations would
be appropriate. Rather, we use the word standard as a generic term meaning "point
of comparison." Indeed, throughout our discussion we use the word standard in-
terchangeably with phrases such as "reference value" and "set point," as was the
case in Chapter 2. In most instances, these points of comparison are values that
have been defined as desirable, at least momentarily. But our designation of the
values as desirable does not necessarily imply either a long-standing personal com-
mitment to the value, or that the value derives from a conscious moralistic judgment
[a point of view which differs from that taken by others (cf. Wicklund & Frey,
1980)]. Rather, it simply reflects the fact that the system in which the value serves
as a point of reference is a discrepancy reducing system. (This will become clearer
below.)
We should also point out that designating these values as behavioral standards
does not imply on our part that we think we have suddenly discovered something
new. The kinds of standards that are of greatest concern to us here are things that
have long been familiar to psychologists under other names. Attitudes, for example,
provide behavioral standards. Desires represent standards. So do instructions. And
so do the results of our more elaborate moral reasoning processes. Because we wish
for the moment to emphasize the commonalities of function among these different
classes rather than their differences, however, we will refer to them here by a
common name: standards.
As indicated in Chapter 2, standards are simply specifications of qualities, of
states, or of actions. Recall the simple example of the thermostat. In this kind of
regulating device, the standard is a state: the temperature at which the device is set.
This example illustrates the concept of standard in an electromechanical system.
But the construct is quite amenable to behavioral illustration, as well. When you
reach for your coffee cup, the standard or comparison value is to have the cup
firmly in your hand. When you are driving, your standard is at least in part to keep
the road moving smoothly beneath your car. In a great many cases there are many
potentially available standards. For example, one can drive to arrive quickly, or
safely, or with a maximum of elegance or panache. If you are playing tennis, one
standard is to be playing well enough that the game is at least interesting; another
is to play well enough to win; another is to play well enough to impress the onlookers
on the other side of the court; and yet another is to play in such a way that your
boss just manages to beat you.
These examples illustrate the ease with which behavioral standards can be pointed
out in human behavior. But they also illustrate a general problem that we face here.
With so many potential standards available for possible use, how can we begin to
Standards 121

specify what standard will be taken up in any particular case? In order to even begin
to answer that question, we must return to some ideas from a previous chapter, and
flesh them out a bit more.

Categorization and the Specification of Behavior

The most basic question is how to conceptualize the existence of a standard. Let
us begin by presenting our overall argument in a very simple form. We presume
that behavioral specifications are encoded in memory in the same fashion as is other
information. As schemas develop for the recognition of event categories, some
schemas (though not necessarily all schemas) include behavior-specifying infor-
mation. When a schema that includes such information is accessed and used in the
classification of a stimulus input, the response-specifying information may also be
accessed as part of the schema. That information, then, constitutes the behavioral
standard.
Is response-specifying information encoded as part of recognitory schemas? Sev-
eral people have hinted at or assumed such a relationship. But hard evidence on
the question is mostly indirect.

Cognitive psychology. The truth of the matter is that this question has never
seemed very pressing to cognitive psychologists. Cognitive psychologists are less
interested in the regulation of behavior than in the organization of knowledge
structures. However, many theorists in that area assume as a matter of course that
"how-to-respond" information is part of many (or perhaps most) recognitory sche-
mas. For example, Neumann (1975) makes this point indirectly in discussing "func-
tional" attributes of exemplars, or the schemas with which the exemplars are as-
sociated. A set of functional attributes includes attributes that define the uses of the
exemplar, or the functions that it can perform. But the set also includes attributes
defining functions that can be performed upon the exemplar. Implicitly this includes
all sorts of potential responses on the perceiver's part which the perceiver has
encoded previously in connection with the exemplar.
Additional support for this general assumption-albeit indirect support--comes
from research by Rosch and Mervis (1975), in which subjects were asked to generate
lists of attributes of stimulus exemplars. For our purpose here, what is especially
interesting about their data was the tendency of subjects to list common responses
to the stimuli as being attributes of the stimuli. For example, the exemplar "apple"
might elicit a list including "red, round, grows on trees," and "you can eat it." This
suggests that the specification of behavior is encoded in much the same way as are
other attributes of the category. Indeed, Rosch (1978) has explicitly taken such a
position theoretically on the involvement of motor-activity attributes as attributes
of object categories.

Environment perception. Although cognitive psychologists have rarely addressed

directly the possibility that response-specifying information is encoded as part of
certain recognitory schemas, psychologists in other areas have postulated almost
122 7. Standards of Behavior

precisely that relationship. Theorists interested in the perception of environments,

for example, have explicitly recognized that the functions that occur in an envi-
ronment constitute one set of elements that define the environment (see, e.g.,
Appleyard, 1969; Barker, 1968; Fredericksen, 1972). In fact, this emphasis on
functional attributes provided an important underlying basis for the concept of the
behavior setting (Barker, 1968). That is, as was discussed in Chapter 5, the behavior
setting as a construct was intended from its inception to reflect the diversity of
features that define contexts within which human interaction occurs, and yet to
emphasize the integration of those diverse features. Some of those features are
structural and nonbehavioral-they pertain only to the environment itself. But the
features that define behavior settings also include "standing behavioral patterns":
the action tendencies that are associated with the setting by the majority of people
who inhabit it (see also Appleyard, 1969; Fredericksen, 1972; Wicker, 1972).
Barker's development of the behavior setting as a construct seems entirely consistent
with the argument made above-that the schemas people use to identify their
environments sometimes incorporate behavior-specifying information as well as
simple structural information.
Is there any real evidence that people associate specific behaviors with specific
settings? Said differently, do settings of a given type actually evoke fairly specific
behavioral standards in us? There is at least one research project that bears on this
question. Price (1974) presented subjects with a series of specific behaviors (e.g.,
run, talk, write, eat, read, argue, laugh), taking place in specific settings (e.g., in
class, in church, in an elevator, in one's own room, in a dorm lounge), in such a
fashion that each behavior was paired once with each setting. Subjects were asked
to indicate how appropriate or inappropriate each behavior was in the setting with
which it was paired. Initial analysis of these data indicated a substantial interaction
between settings and behaviors, suggesting that the perceived appropriateness of
certain behaviors varied greatly across settings (Price & Bouffard, 1974). The data
then were subjected to cluster analyses (Price, 1974), which generated two typol-
ogies. One consisted of groups or classes of situations; the other consisted of classes
of behaviors.
These analyses indicated that the settings that had been presented to subjects
were perceived as comprising four clusters, as did the set of behaviors. Of greater
interest, however, were the relationships between classes of settings and classes of
behaviors. Correlational analysis revealed that three of the four clusters of settings
had definite relationships with clusters of behaviors. In Price's phrase, these sit-
uation clusters appear to "demand" or "pull for" behaviors of a particular type. In
our terms, they evoke a behavioral standard. One cluster of situations, however,
was not closely associated with any set of behaviors. Price suggested that that
particular class of situations was defined in part by the inappropriateness of the
behaviors with which subjects had been presented. Presumably those settings either
do not normally have behavioral standards associated with them, or the normal
standards were simply not represented among the behaviors chosen for use in the
study.
Price (1974) noted that these data should be regarded as preliminary, and we
Standards 123

agree. They bear on a relatively small range of settings, and a small range of
behaviors. Nevertheless, they are quite suggestive. In this restricted set of cases,
people do appear to have a strong sense of what actions are and are not appropriate.
And the perception that an activity is appropriate is one kind of behavioral standard.

Person perception. In Chapter 5 we also reviewed a good deal of research on

person perception. These studies suggested that persons, as well as behavior settings,
are categorized by means of schemas. Moreover, some of this research appears to
suggest that classifying a person also leads to the specification of behavior toward
the person.
One very simple kind of classification is to perceive a person as being a member
of one's own group versus being a member of an outgroup. As was indicated in
Chapter 5, use of this simple distinction for viewing other people leads to a bias
in inferring other characteristics of the people. More specifically, ingroup members
are viewed more favorably on a variety of dimensions than are outgroup members,
even when the distinction between groups was made on a relatively arbitrary basis
(e.g, Allen & Wilder, 1979; Doise et al., 1972; Howard & Rothbart, 1978).
For the present purpose, however, what is more important is that categorizing
people in this fashion appears to provide behavior-specifying information as well.
For example, Wilder and Allen (1978) found that this kind of categorization led
to reliable biases in subsequent information seeking. Subjects in that research proved
to be interested in receiving information that would confirm their similarity to the
other members of their own group, and information that would confirm their dis-
similarity to members of the other group. But they were much less interested in
receiving information that contradicted their present cognitive constructions of the
situation. Information seeking may not seem very "behavioral." But other research-
ers have found that arbitrarily created divisions among subjects may also lead to
other kinds of behavioral effects. such as allocation of greater amounts of money
to ingroup members than to outgroup members (e.g., Allen & Wilder, 1975; Billig
& Tajfel, 1973; see also Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980).
Although group membership can be defined quite arbitrarily, as was the case in
these studies, people also make category judgments on the basis of salient physical
characteristics, e.g., a person's physical attractiveness or racial identity. It is a
common observation that these variables influence people's perceptions of each
other (e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1974; Ehrlich, 1973). And they have also proved
to have an impact on people's actions. For example, Rubovits and Maehr (1973)
found that student teachers gave black students less attention, less praise, and more
criticism than white students. Word, Zanna, and Cooper (1974) found that a racial
categorization led to subsequent behavior on the perceiver's part that elicited ster-
eotype-consistent characteristics from the person being perceived, thereby perpet-
uating the stereotype.
Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid (1977) found evidence of the same process re-
garding perceptions of attractiveness. Subjects in that study engaged in a telephone
interaction with a person whom they had been led to perceive as either attractive
or unattractive. This perception apparently influenced the tone of their interaction,
124 7. Standards of Behavior

thereby eliciting stereotype-consistent behavior from the other person. In this case,
as well as the studies described above, the use of an identifying schema appears
to have prompted some variations in the subject's behavior toward another person. I
It also happens, of course, that a single given person can be viewed in a variety
of different ways, using a variety of different categorizational schemas. Depending
upon which orientation is used, the result may be quite divergent acts of behavior
on the perceiver's part. One basic variation in the way we view people rests on the
fact that we sometimes interact with others as individuals, but we sometimes interact
with them merely as inhabitors of roles. Indeed, in the latter case, our perception
may well be less of the person than of the role itself. Carles and Carver (1979)
have reported evidence that this difference in subjects' mental constructions of a
person with whom they had worked can have an important impact on how they
allocate resources to that person.

Social comparison. All of the findings reviewed in the previous section are con-
sistent with the assertion that schemas used to classify persons often suggest to us
ways of acting toward that person. But in talking about the observation of other
people, and the role that this process plays in evoking standards, we can go even
farther. Specifically, it has long been recognized that we sometimes actively seek
out other people for the express purpose of determining a behavioral standard. This
process is the first stage of a sequence postulated in Festinger's (1950, 1954) social
comparison theory.
Social comparison theory begins with the assumption that a great deal of our
social knowledge-in contrast to other kinds of information-cannot be objectively
verified or validated. As a consequence of this, we tum to other people and their
opinions to achieve a sort of social or consensual validation. In some cases, this
process is used to verify the degree of our abilities (e.g., Conolley, Gerard, &
Kline, 1978; Festinger, Torrey, & Willerman, 1954; Hoffman, Festinger, & Law-
rence, 1954; Jones & Regan, 1974; Suls, Gastorf, & Lawhon, 1978). In other
cases, it is used to assess whether our attitudes, emotions, or behaviors are correct
or appropriate (e.g., Darley & Aronson, 1966; Gerard, 1963; Goethals & Nelson,
1973; Radloff, 1961; Schachter, 1951, 1959).
In both cases, the theory assumes that ambiguity leads to a tendency to search
out others and collate information gained from them (through either communication
or observation). The end product of this collative process is a consensually defined
standard. In the case of attitudes, the standard is the group's normative attitude.
In the case of behavior, it is the behavior that the group appears to collectively
deem appropriate to this time and place. This standard, then, will be used to guide
one's subsequent verbalizations and actions.
There appear to be only two differences between what occurs in social comparison

I Indeed, this connection between person perception and the specification of a behavioral

standard is apparently reciprocal. That is, there is evidence that knowing how one is going
to be acting toward another person influences what kind of schema is used to construe the
person (cf. Worchel & Andreoli, 1978).
Standards 125

and what occurred in the examples discussed in the previous sections. First, in
social comparison the individual actively seeks out a consensus from the group, to
serve as a behavioral standard. In the examples discussed earlier, the standard
appears to be provided more or less automatically by the schema that was used to
classify persons. Second, the process of social comparison would seem to require
somewhat more complex classificatory schemas-schemas that are applicable to
groups rather than to individuals-than would be the case in reacting to a solitary
person. Yet presumably the process of identifying group consensus relies on previous
experiences with collections of people, and thus implicitly relies on knowledge
structures.

Self-perception. The preceding paragraphs have been devoted to standards that

are suggested by categorizing the physical and social environment. We should also
note one other possibility, however. Specifically, it seems reasonable to assume
that behavioral standards are sometimes suggested by perceiving some aspect of
the self. This possibility has not yet received a great deal of empirical attention,
but findings from two recent research programs seem to be consistent with such an
assumption. In one project (Sherman, 1980), subjects in three experiments were
asked to predict whether they would do a specific behavior if they should be asked
to do so. Later on, in a different context, these and other subjects (who had not
been questioned) were asked to do the behavior.
For present concerns, the most important finding of Sherman's research was this:
Indicating that they would do the target behavior (hypothetically) increased the
degree to which subjects subsequently did the behavior. In our terms, responding
to the initial question required subjects to examine an aspect of self, i.e., their
attitudes and behavioral tendencies in the domain in question. Doing this, and
specifying a hypothetical intent, may have made that intent salient as a behavioral
standard. This in turn may have caused that standard to have been used later on.
In Sherman's words, "As one thinks about himself/herself in a situation and forms
images of the constraints and behaviors involved, a stereotyped response sequence
will be called up. Subsequently, when the sitution that was imagined is at hand,
the same script will emerge because of its enhanced availability" (Sherman, 1980,
p. 218).
A second research project that is relevant to this issue (Swann & Read, in press)
derived from the hypothesis that people desire to confirm their conceptions of
themselves, and are correspondingly uninterested in information that might conflict
with those conceptions. Both the conceptual basis for this research and the findings
that it produ~ed are strikingly similar to those of studies reviewed a few paragraphs
ago, concerning the behavioral effects caused by categorizing another person. For
example, lal>eling a target person causes a bias in subsequent information seeking,
such that tlJ.e perceivers seek information that would tend to confirm their initial
impressions (Wilder & Allen, 1978). Swann and Read (in press, Experiment 1)
found a similar effect regarding the seeking of information about the self. That is,
subjects in this study preferentially sought information that would confirm their
self-conceptions, and were less interested in information that was potentially dis-
126 7. Standards of Behavior

confirming. (Note that the information seeking effects demonstrated in both of these
studies may be seen as reflecting a more general over-reliance on confirming cases,
a judgmental bias that was first addressed in Chapter 4.)
In a second study, Swann and Read (in press, Experiment 2) found that the
attempt to make reality match one's preconceptions about oneself was also reflected
in overt behavior. More specifically, subjects in this study tended to act in such
a fashion as to elicit from their interaction partners judgments of themselves that
would be consistent with their own self-concepts. Said differently, they induced
their partners to respond to them in ways that would match their ideas of what they
were like. This finding closely resembles the results of studies by Word et al.
(1974) and Snyder et al. (1977) discussed above. In those cases, labeling another
person led subjects to act in ways that would elicit stereotype-consistent behavior
from that person. In the Swann and Read study, labeling the self led subjects to
behave in ways that would elicit behavior from others that would confirm the self
stereotype.

Section Summary
In the preceding paragraphs, we have reviewed support for the assertion that ca-
tegorizational schemas often include behavior-specifying information. This assertion
is consistent with cognitive theories of abstraction, though evidence on this point
from cognitive psychology is sparse and indirect. Environmental psychologists, on
the other hand, have widely incorporated this general assumption into their theories
about the nature of behavior settings. And there is systematic evidence from en-
vironmental research that certain classes of settings do elicit certain classes of
behavior as "appropriate" to the setting. We also reviewed findings from the person
perception literature which are consistent with the assertion that the knowledge
structures used to classify persons often suggest to us ways of acting toward those
persons. And we suggested that social comparison may be construed as an active
process of seeking out a group-defined standard. Finally, we suggested that be-
havioral standards can also be made salient by perception of certain self-aspects.
Taken as a whole, we believe that the evidence discussed above renders quite
plausible the notion that some recognitory schema~ incorporate behavior-specifying
information, and that use of such a schema thereby makes that information salient
as a behavioral standard. There are still many questions to be answered, however.
For example, these various standards differ from each other in a great many ways.
What are the dimensions upon which they differ, and how are these differences to
be conceptualized? Said somewhat differently, how might we approach the devel-
opment of a taxonomy of behavioral standards?
Our answer to this question is a tentative one, based more on theory and conjecture
than on data. Our response has two facets. One of them derives from the fact that
standards--reference values--exist at many levels of complexity. Any meaningful
attempt to create a taxonomy of standards must incorporate a way of dealing with
those different levels. The other facet reflects the fact that even within a given level
of complexity there are important distinctions among classes of standards. There
A Hierarchy of Standards 127

must be a way to conceptualize these distinctions. These two issues are dealt with,
in tum, in the following sections.

A Hierarchy of Standards
Powers (l973a) has proposed that the human nervous system embodies a hierarchy
of control systems. Each level of this hierarchy controls a different aspect of
behavior, and thus a different aspect of perceptual experience. We discussed this
hierarchy briefly in Chapter 4, in considering the mUltiple ways in which a person
can perceive any given stimulus. We must now return to the essence of that dis-
cussion, to consider the multiple ways in which one responds to stimuli. In brief,
we would argue that each level of the hierarchy involves the use of separate types
of behavioral standards.
There are two reasons why the assumption of a hierarchy of behavioral standards
is important. The first reason is that recognitory schemas presumably exist at many
different levels of analysis. Any behavioral standard that is accessed along with a
schema is intimately tied to the level of analysis with which the schema itself is
associated. Thus it is easily possible for the perception of a single stimulus at two
different levels of analysis to evoke two different behavior specifications. In un-
derstanding behavior evoked by a stimulus, it therefore becomes important to know
the level at which a stimulus is being construed.
The second reason why a hierarchy is important in analyzing behavioral self-
regulation stems from the fact that executing most behaviors actually requires the
carrying out of hundreds or thousands of small muscle movements. "Making coffee,"
for example, which most of us would consider to be a fairly simple exercise, is
upon close inspection quite a complex activity. How can one account for the fact
that all of this complexity is executed easily, once one decides to make a pot of
coffee? Most motivational theories don't account for it at all. Control theory accounts
for it easily. But to do so requires a hierarchy.
These two uses of a hierarchical model are considered in the following sections.

Levels of Behavioral Standards

As we indicated earlier, perceptual exemplars can be analyzed, perceived, or men-
tally construed at many different levels of analysis. The visual image of a person,
for example, can be experienced as a pattern of shades and contrasts; as a set of
facial and figural characteristics; as an individual; or as a representative of a culture
or a society. There presumably are separate schemas, or component schemas, at
each of the levels at which an exemplar can be perceived. Some of these knowledge
structures may incorporate behavior specifications, some may not. The reactions
and behaviors specified by schemas applicable at separate levels of construction
differ in a conceptual sense. Moreover, they may sometimes lead to quite different
overt responses.
For example, an audience of Americans viewing a Soviet figure skater may
128 7. Standards of Behavior

construe her as an individual, and feel and express approval for a good performance.
Alternatively, they may construe her as a representative of a repressive political
system (thus presumably at a higher level of abstraction) and view her success with
annoyance and disapproval.
Note that reactions at both of these levels assume relatively complex processing,
in order to perceive the good "quality" of the performance. A person viewing at
a lower level of abstraction might perceive only patterns of color and movement,
and would have no reaction at all to the "quality" of the performance. Any reaction
on this viewer's part would be simply a reaction cued by the color and movement.
Such a reaction might be positive or negative, if the display was experienced as
being either intriguing or overpowering. But in either case it would be a reaction
to attributes encoded at a much lower level of complexity than is involved in
perceiving the skater's "performance."
Thus, the possibility that different behavioral responses are associated with per-
ceptual schemas at different levels of analysis has clear and straightforward impli-
cations. Specifically, in any set of perceptions the level of analysis to which one
is attending dictates the level of the behavioral standard that becomes salient. And
what standard becomes salient dictates what action (if any) is subsequently taken.

Levels of standards in problem solving. Consider one more example. Suppose

you are given a series of problems to try to solve, which requires the mental
manipulation of symbols over trials-for example, a set of anagrams. The task has
been presented to you as being a measure of intelligence and creativity. What
behavioral standard is salient to you as you begin the problems?
At a very concrete level your task is simply to manipulate the symbols on each
trial. Doing this effectively means using some sort of strategy, e.g., mapping out
the possible relationships among letters, and trying them in a systematic order. At
one level, then, the behavioral standard is to try to solve the specific problem that
you are presently confronting, by executing whatever strategy occurs to you.
At a more abstract level, however, your behavioral standard is to achieve a good
score on the task as a whole. There may be considerable variations among people
as to how this standard is defined, of course. For some people, the standard may
be to do as well as possible. For other people, the comparison value that is salient
may be the "average" score. Their goal is merely to do as well as most people do
(the "gentlemen's C"). In any event, at this level we are no longer talking about
the procedures involved in solving an individual problem. Instead, we are now
construing behavior in terms of the overall level of one's performance.
But other considerations may be salient in this behavioral situation, as well. And
it is therefore possible to point to standards at even higher levels of analysis. For
example, it has been argued that this sort of situation creates the potential of looking
bad in front of another person if you do poorly at the task, and thus constitutes a
potential threat to your self-esteem (e.g., Frankel & Snyder, 1978). If the threat
is particularly salient in this situation, you may cast about for ways to protect
yourself, to "cover" yourself in case of failure. The result may be the evoking of
a behavioral standard not to try too hard. That is, by not trying so hard, you create
A Hierarchy of Standards 129

a plausible explanation for not doing well, but an explanation that is only minimally
threatening. "I wasn't motivated" may sound a lot better than "I haven't got the
ability."
This particular case is taken up in more detail in Chapter 13. For the present,
however, our point is simply this: What behavioral standard becomes salient depends
upon the level at which one analyzes one's setting. Analysis at different levels may
result in standards that do not simply differ in their degree of abstractness; if
followed, these standards would lead to opposite effects on actual behavior. It
therefore would seem to matter considerably, in some situations at least, what level
of analysis the person is attending to.

Conceptual Levels and the Physical Execution of Behavior

The second reason for assuming the existence of a hierarchy of behavioral standards
stems from theorizing about the way in which behavior is physically produced. That
is, we use a wide variety of fancy conceptual terms to describe human behavior:
e.g., aggression, helping, problem solving. But these activities are all carried out
through the actions-<:oordinated, but essentially very simple-of thousands of
muscle groups. One doesn't simply "aggress." One has to physically act to create
a situation that another person will find aversive. Intentions must be translated into
actions.
How is this done? The answer that has been suggested by Powers (1973a, 1979)
stems from the assumption that the nervous system consists of a hierarchy of
feedback loops. In Chapter 2 we discussed the fact that feedback loops could be
linked hierarchically, and some of the implications of that fact. To recapitulate
briefly, one can think of any single feedback system as involving the comparison
of an input against a standard, and the emission of an output-if necessary-that
will tend to cause subsequent input to more closely approximate the standard. But
in hierarchical systems, the output from a superordinate loop constitutes the spec-
ification of reference values for the next lower subordinate level of loops. In a
system with several levels in the hierarchy, this relationship is repeated all down
the line, as is illustrated in Figure 7-1. That is, the output from one loop constitutes
a resetting of the reference value for the loop or loops below it. Only at the very
lowest level is the output of the system actually a behavioral output. And at that
level the outputs are very basic elements of behavior: changes in muscle tensions.
Up until that low-level point, however, output of one system always acts by adjusting
a reference signal for another system. Given this arrangement, it is easy to see how
several standards exist and are being matched simultaneously, as a person executes
a behavior.

Levels of the Powers hierarchy. Powers (l973a) attempted to specify in detail

what qualities the various levels of his hierarchy dealt with. We described these
levels in Chapter 4, but let us review them briefly. The lowest level of analysis,
termed Intensity, deals only with intensities of stimulation. This is the most pe-
ripherallevel of the hierarchy, the level that actually interacts with the environment.
130 7. Standards of Behavior

BEHAVIOR SPECIFICATION
THAT WAS CUED BY PRIOR
CATEGORIZATION OF THE
CONTEXT

+
I THIS CONSTITUTES

1:::~:
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 7 DATA INPUT
...
...
CONSTITUTES

1:::~T6
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 6 DATA INPUT
......
CONSTITUTES

....
1
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 5 DATA INPUT
LEVEL 5

1
OUTPUT CONSTITUTES
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 4 DATA INPUT
...... LEVEL 4

OUTPUT CONSTITUTES

.
1:::~:
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 3 DATA INPUT
....
CONSTITUTES

1::::~:
STANDARD FOR ...
LEVEL 2 DATA INPUT
...
CONSTITUTES

1:::~:
LEVEL 1 DATA INPUT
STANDARD FOR ...

~
...
Analysis of

u'1
Sensory Input

~ BEHAVIOR
Senso", In p
Effect on Environment I.
Fig. 7-1. A seven-level hierarchy of control systems, in which behavior implicitly is being
guided by a standard used at the seventh level. Note that one could enter the hierarchy at
any given level and control would be exerted from that level downward; the seventh need
not be superordinate.

At each succeeding level, an integration or abstraction occurs, leading to more and

more complex qualities. Level tw~ensation-transforms sensed intensities into
stimulus qualities. At level three, the qualities are grouped into Configurations,
such as objects. The sense of change or Transition, the perception of Relationships,
and the sense of Sequential order among configurations are abstracted from the
sensory data at increasingly higher levels of analysis.
A Hierarchy of Standards 131

At still higher levels of abstraction are the qualities that are of greatest relevance
to personality and social psychologists. At the Program level are the perception of
strategy use, of events occurring in a branching chain of if-then decisions. As we
indicated earlier, Powers' Program level seems to be nearly equivalent to the "script"
construct of Schank and Abelson (1977; Abelson, 1975, 1976). It is of interest that
the latter authors viewed the script as a dual-purpose construct. It is used to recognize
familiar classes of event sequences. but it is also used to guide one's own behavior
in those classes of situations. Thus, Schank and Abelson have taken much the same
perspective as we have, i.e., that schemas can be used in the production of behavioral
events as well as in the recognition of events.
In either Powers' terms or Schank and Abelson's terms, the program or script
provides a standard for behavior at this level of analysis. It is a complex standard,
unspecified in many respects, because what happens next depends upon what hap-
pened last. But programs are often executed all-at-a-piece, and once entered, a
program can be difficult to interrupt until it is finished (e.g., Abelson, 1978). Thus
it may be concluded that the entire program has a goal, rather than merely consisting
of a string of subgoals. [The same argument, of course, is applicable at any level
(cf. Schmidt, 1975).]
At the Principle level (Powers, 1973a), we are dealing with perceptions that are
more abstract yet: conceptual, logical, or moral principles that could be expressed
in many different behavioral domains, through strategies of widely varying types.
These are more or less equivalent to what Schank & Abelson (1977; Abelson, 1978)
termed "meta-scripts," guiding themes that allow the selection of subsidiary scripts.
Thus standards at this level act by specifying the types of programs at the next
lower level which would tend to satisfy the superordinate goal. 2
Which of these levels serves as the superordinate guide to one's behavior depends
upon what level of analysis one is attending to, a point upon which we amplify
below. But given a superordinate standard, this hierarchical model assumes that
the standards for each subordinate level are set and continually reset by the action
of the superordinate feedback loop. We tentatively suggest, on the other hand, that
levels higher than the one at which the superordinate standard has been specified
do not influence behavior unless attention is refocused upon that higher standard.
Recall that the analysis of sensory input can produce meaningful information at
all of these levels of analysis. As a behavior is being executed, the sensory attributes
that are relevant to each of these levels are presumably being treated as feedback
for the respective loops (see Figure 7-1). The time scales of the functioning of the
loops differ, however, such that lower-level systems act more rapidly than do
higher-level systems (as was discussed in Chapter 2; see Powers, 1973a, for greater
detail). Thus a lower-order system may produce a great many changes in output
in the service of a higher-order system, which is dealing with its own discrepancies
more gradually.

2There is one higher level of this hierarchy that has important implications for human self-
regulation. However, we have chosen to defer discussion of this level of control--control
of System Concepts-to Chapter 13.
132 7. Standards of Behavior

An illustration. The preceding discussion has been quite abstract, and may have
been difficult for some readers to follow. How does all of this translate into a
concrete instance of behavior? Consider the following case. A man is making a pot
of coffee, not just for himself, but for some people who dropped in on him un-
expectedly. He is making the coffee because he perceives himself to be an urbane
and civilized person, and feels that such a person should act in a gracious manner,
even to uninvited guests. He therefore feels obligated to offer his guests some
refreshment.
As we interrupt the man in the midst of measuring the freshly ground beans,
let's analyze his present behavior. What, exactly, is he 'doing? A hierarchical
description of his actions appears in Figure 7-2. This description precisely parallels
the more abstract representation of Figure 7-1.
The superordinate standard for this man at the moment is to act in a gracious
manner. This standard can be seen to exist at the level of Principles or meta-scripts,
in that it can be achieved in many different ways. One specific way to be gracious,
when a person has guests, is to provide them with refreshments. The providing of
refreshments represents a program, or script. The program character is reflected in
the fact that exactly what the man gives his guests depends upon the time of day,
and what there is in the pantry or liquor cabinet. That is, not all of the events are
specified. A chain of implicit decisions will help to resolve the ambiguity about
that, however. Given the constraints of the situation, the subprogram that our subject
has chosen is "making coffee."
The coffee-making program consists of a number of discrete behaviors, some of
which must be executed in a specific sequence. For example, you have to put the
filter into the drip, basket before you add the coffee grounds, rather than after. And
you have to scoop up the grounds before you empty them into the basket. Thus
there are places in this activity where sequences must be controlled. These events
also imply relationships-e.g., the scoop being into the ground coffee-and tran-
sitions-e.g., the movement of the scoop. At lower levels of abstraction, we have
configurations-e.g., the hand grasping the scoop--and sensations-e.g., the phys-
ical essence of grasping. And at the very lowest level, doing all the work, we have
variations in muscle tensions.
As we catch our subject in the act of scooping up ground coffee, what is he
doing: acting graciously? providing refreshments? measuring coffee? putting the
scoop into the ground coffee? moving the scoop? grasping its handle? or exerting
muscle tension? The answer, of course, is that he is doing all of these.
This example appears to illustrate the fact that any complex activity requires a
great many subsidiary functions, in which different qualities of the event must be
controlled. All involve the specification of standards, and all are occurring simul-
taneously.
Moreover, this example also hints at the importance of directing attention to one
level or another of the event's regulation. Attending to one level of the process-
e.g., moving the scoop through the coffee-will ensure the participation of sub-
ordinate systems in the event-e.g., the clasping of the hand on the scoop. But it
does not ensure the participation of superordinate systems. Thus, it is possible to
focus so much on the tactile experience of scooping the ground coffee that one
A Hierarchy of Standards 133

..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _+PRINCIPLE:

Be a gracious person

+
PROGRAM:

Provide guests with

refres h ments

+
SEQUENCE:

Measure coffee

..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
+
RELATIONSHIP:

Scoop into ground coffee

..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . TRANSITION: +
Movement of scoop

+
CONFIGURATION:

Hand clasped on scoop

+
SENSATION:

Grasping
Analysis of
sensory input +
INTENSITY:

Sensory input Muscle tensions

Effect on environment

Fig. 7-2. Application of the logic of Figure 7-1 to a specific behavioral situation: being a
gracious host by making coffee for one's guests.

momentarily forgets why it is being done. The "measuring" sequence may thereby
be disrupted.
There are many questions that can be raised about this characterization of control
processes in behavior, questions that carry us onto relatively thin ice. For example,
although it seems necessary to assume that the participation of lower-level control
systems is guaranteed by the engagement of any higher-level system, it is unclear
how efficient will be the operation of these lower-level systems unless one of the
following conditions is satisfied. Either the operation of the lower-level system is
sufficiently practiced as to be relatively automatic, or some degree of attention is
devoted to the lower-level system as well as the higher-level system. For example,
consider the experience of a moderately practiced runner. Attending to the "flow"
of running facilitates smooth performance. Attending to too Iowa level--e.g., to
the specific orientation of the foot during the components of a stride-<:an disrupt
 134 7. Standards of Behavior

this smoothness. But so can attending to too high a level. That is, a runner could
attend to the abstract standard of displaying the form of a world-class marathon
runner. But in a person who is only moderately practiced, such a standard may not
"connect" with a well-rehearsed set of subsidiary standards. Without that relatively
automatic specification of subsidiary standards, attending solely to this superordinate
reference value will not have a facilitating effect at lower levels, and may even be
disruptive.
We have a bit more to say about the functions of attention in these various
circumstances. But we are going to defer those comments until after we have
addressed one more distinction among standards.

Distinctions Within Levels

As we indicated earlier, the levels of control that are most relevant to the remainder
of this book are what Powers (1973a) termed Programs and Principles, and what
Schank and Abelson (1977) termed scripts and meta-scripts. (We consider these
two terminologies to be essentially equivalent, and will adopt Powers' labels
throughout the remainder of this section for the sake of simplicity.) It is at these
two levels where the standards guiding behavior reflect the sort of constructs that
comprise the working vocabulary of personality and social psychologists. In par-
ticular, here is where we find the behavioral specifications provided by attitudes,
complex reasoning processes, social comparison processes, and relatively abstract
suggestions or instructions. 3 These constructs all seem to imply standards incor-
porating "programs" of action, rather than clearly specified sequences. Moreover,
careful examination suggests that each of them may depend upon the implicit use
of one of two general guiding principles.
One general principle may be characterized as follows: "It is beneficial to use
guides that are suggested by sources external to oneself in deciding how to act in
a given situation." More simply, "take your cues from those around you." The tacit
acceptance of this principle would appear to underlie both the acceptance of a
suggestion or an instruction from someone else, and the use of social 'comparison
to derive a strategy for one's behavior. If there are differences between these two
cases, they would seem to tum on two points. First, social comparison seems to
be a self-initiated process, whereas the suggestion or instruction is more commonly
unsolicited. Second, the use of instructions seems ordinarily to imply a difference
in authority between oneself and the other person, whereas this is not implied as
clearly in social comparison. In both cases, however, there is a reliance on standard-
specifying information that derives from an external source.
In other cases, a different general orienting principle is tacitly invoked, which

3We recognize that instructions range from the very concrete (e.g., do these specific acts in
this specific sequence) to the more abstract (e.g., create this specific outcome, in whatever
way you can). The former constitutes only a sequence, whereas the latter clearly embodies
the lack of specification that is characteristic of a program (script). For the purpose of the
present discussion, we will limit ourselves to the latter case.
A Hierarchy of Standards 135

may be characterized as follows: "People should follow their own beliefs, in deciding
how to act in a given situation." More simply, "make up your own mind." This
general guideline would seem to be implicit in the use of attitudes to guide one's
behavior, and in the use of moral reasoning capabilities to determine one's behavior.
In both of these cases, standards are evoked that do not depend directly upon the
cues emitted by external agents. The behavioral specification comes from one's
own definition of the situation.
In all of these cases, however, what ultimately is specified-whether by attitudes,
instructions, social comparison, or whatever-is not a precise sequence of acts, but
a program. That is, subsequent actions may have a recognizable goal state, but the
specific way in which that goal state is attained is uncertain, and depends upon a
series of intermediate decisions.
We should note at this point that the use of the two specific guiding principles
discussed in the preceding paragraphs has been the subject of a good deal of
attention in both theory and research. Snyder (1974, 1979), for example, has argued
that some people are biased toward the use of social comparison in defining be-
havioral standards for themselves, whereas others are biased toward using the
standards that they have encoded as part of their attitudes. It also can be argued
quite easily, of course, that any given person can make use of either principle at
one time or another, depending upon situational conditions (cf. Greenwald, in
press).
We have a good deal more to say about these two particular guiding principles.
But we have chosen to defer that discussion until Chapter 16, where we discuss
the distinction between public and private aspects of the self. For now, our points
are more abstract: First, it seems obvious that standards at the Program level can
be dictated, at least in part, by considerations at the level of Principles. It seems
unlikely, for example, that a person whose behavior is being guided by the principle
"make up your own mind" will do very much social comparison when deciding
how to act.
Second, there must be social cues that are used to bias the selection of a standard-
even at the Principle level-in one direction or the other. That is, even given the
fact that persons may be predisposed to one or another guiding principle, most
persons can be expected to be somewhat variable in which principle is used. Even
a moderately headstrong person sometimes undertakes social comparison. And even
the very tentative person sometimes relies on personal convictions. There must be
cues in the social contexts that evoke these situational biases.
In effect, we are arguing that these two levels of categorization are usually
implicit when standards become salient in the kinds of situations that are studied
by personality and social psychologists. Some attributes suggest what kind of sit-
uation it is--e.g., a situation calling for personal choices, or an "external influence"
situation. Other attributes, at a lower level of conceptualization, may then suggest
a basis for inferring one specific program of action or another. In some cases, it
is the Principle level that is most conspicuously involved in evoking a behavioral
standard~.g., in cases where the context presents a moral dilemma, and the person
has to decide whether to be expedient or to think the matter carefully through. In
136 7. Standards of Behavior

many instances, however, the level that receives the greatest attention is the Program
level-deciding what script the present situation calls for, and filling in the missing
elements in the script as it is enacted. It is arguable that even here the Principle
level is often implicit in adult behavior. But it is quite possible for the Program
level--or even lower levels yet-to be the highest-order control system that is
actively regulating behavior.

Summary
In the three preceding sections we have made the following points. The standards
that guide actions may be usefully viewed as comprising a hierarchy. Analyzing
the perceptions of surroundings, persons, or events at a given level of abstraction
results in the evoking of a standard at the same level of abstraction. Thus, the level
of analysis at which one's attention is focused dictates what level of standard is
salient. In some instances, perceptual analysis at different levels can be expected
to yield standards that differ quite substantially. When the potential for such a
divergence is very likely, a good deal would seem to depend upon what level of
analysis has been taken as focal. Specifically, the level at which attention is con-
centrated is assumed to be (temporarily, at least) the effectively superordinate
standard for self-regulation.
Regardless of what level has been taken as superordinate, the assumption of a
hierarchical organization has other implications. Below whatever standard is su-
perordinate lies an array of levels of subordinate standards. These are evoked, in
tum, as the outputs of feedback systems at the next higher level of control. The
result is that increasingly restricted component qualities of action are handled by
systems at lower and lower levels of control. The culmination of this reduction in
the abstractness of the qualities controlled is the control of intensities of muscle
groups. Thus, behavior.
Behavioral standards at the levels of abstraction that are most relevant to social
psychologists can be further divided into categories, in a fashion that cuts across
the hierarchy, but is ultimately consistent with it. More specifically, some standards
arise from personal judgments, others from social comparison, instructions, and
other sources. These distinctions may be viewed as partially dependent upon a
difference in general orienting assumptions, which in tum represent standards at
the Principle, or meta-script, level of analysis.

Programs, Principles, and Consciousness

The emphasis that we have placed here on the Program and Principle levels of the
Powers (1973a) hierarchy of control is based on our belief that these two levels are
most commonly involved as superordinate levels of control in the human behaviors
that are studied most frequently by personality and social psychologists. This seems
to be a relatively straightforward conclusion, based on the restricted characteristics
of the levels that are lower in the hierarchy.
It is also our belief that the behaving person's attention is directed largely to the
Programs, Principles, and Consciousness 137

Program level during most behavioral self-regulation. The basis for this inference
is a little less obvious. Moreover, it is easy to point to specific exceptions to this
general rule. Nevertheless, it seems a reasonable rule of thumb. Well-learned action
sequences-habits-demand and receive little attention (cf. Posner & Snyder, 1975;
see also Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977, regarding other aspects of the automatic-vs.-effortful dichotomy in processing
information). Most habits are at the sequence level, where the demands of the
sequence are well specified. As long as these action sequences proceed unimpeded,
focal attention can be devoted elsewhere. The "elsewhere," we assume, is to higher-
level concerns (cf. Chapter 8 in Blumenthal, 1977).
Program-level regulation, in contrast, often requires monitoring, because of the
decision points that it embodies. But even Program-level regulation can become
sufficiently familiar that attention is freed from it for other purposes [cf. Langer's
(1978) discussion of "mindless" execution of scripted behavior]. This would rep-
resent a relatively elaborate kind of habit, involving decision points, but points
where the options and decision bases have been so well encoded that the decisions
are automatic. We would anticipate, however, that the "other purposes" to which
attention is freed in such a case would primarily be other processing at the Program
level or higher.
Action which is relatively automatic is certainly part of the self-regulatory hi-
erarchy, whether it is automatic activity at the Program level, or lower. It still
involves the use of standards. But it is not focal until and unless something interrupts
the activity. This can certainly happen, of course. For example, an unexpected
impediment to an action typically causes an immediate shift in focus from the upper
level (or from the parallel processing at the same level) to the level where the
behavior has been disrupted (cf. Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970; Mancuso, 1977). One's
subsequent focus may be at the level of Sequence, or Configuration, or even lower.
The purpose of such a refocusing is to discern the problem and try to straighten it
out.
For example, driving is a well-practiced activity for most people. To give our
illustration a little more depth, let's consider driving a car with a manual trans-
mission, still a well-practiced activity for many people. When driving to work, little
attention is devoted to the many sequences involved in the operation of the car,
e.g., the pressing of the clutch pedal and shifting of gears at appropriate points,
the braking and turning. Indeed, if the route to work is very familiar, little attention
may be devoted to the entire event sequence making up the trip. (It is occasionally
true that people barely remember driving to work, although the more familiar refrain
is to not remember how one got home after a party.) One's attention in such a case
is freed for devotion to other matters-perhaps a particularly difficult problem at
work, or a decision as to what to do about the leaky faucet at home.
But what happens if one suddenly encounters a barricade in the road, warning
that a bridge ahead is impassible? The well-known program is interrupted. Attention
is redirected to this behavioral program, alternatives are considered, and one is
chosen. If the alternative route is not well known, the leaky faucet may have to
wait until later. Attention may have to remain focused on the "driving to work"
program.
138 7. Standards of Behavior

Now consider a somewhat more drastic tum of events. In second gear, preparing
to shift to third, our driver suddenly discovers an inability to get the shift lever out
of second. The transmission has broken. The "shifting" sequence is disrupted, and
even the appropriate configuration (hand and shift lever in the orientation that
normally implies "third gear") is not obtainable. At this point, focal attention may
now be directed, momentarily at least, to the attempt to achieve that configuration.
Thus attention shifts to a level that is substantially lower than even the Program
level.

Effects of Attending to Well-Learned Behavior

This discussion raises additional questions about the effects of attending to one's
behavior at different levels of analysis. It is commonly argued that focusing on the
components of well-learned behavior disrupts the performance (cf. Kimble & Perl-
muter, 1970), though focusing on the elements of a poorly-learned or novel action
is facilitative, or perhaps even necessary for the behavior to be executed at all (cf.
Blumenthal, 1977). Why should this concentrated focus be useful prior to auto-
matization, but disruptive afterward?
We have two answers for this question. One is simple, the other more complex.
Both are speCUlative. The simple answer is that whether focusing on a behavior
disrupts its performance or not depends to a considerable degree on how one defines
"disruption." Focusing on the components of behavior sows the behavior down.
And it creates effects that are sometimes characterized as loss of smoothness or
coordination (Blumenthal, 1977), in behavioral sequences that are usually executed
all-at-a-piece (cf. Fitts, 1964; Schmidt, 1975). It is precisely this loss of overall
coordination, however, that would be predicted by a hierarchical model such as we
are discussing here. When one is focusing more on low-level, stepwise goals, one
is necessarily being less attentive to higher-level goals. And it is the higher-order
systems that are responsible for the sense of sequence, and so on. Thus, behavior
becomes disjointed if one focuses on component acts. Regulation may then require
attention to shift back and forth between the component goals and the higher-order
goals.
We would disagree, however, with anyone who asserts in general terms that
attending to any well-learned activity is debilitating (cf. Jaynes, 1976; Wicklund,
1975). It is very important to distinguish here between the component acts of an
activity, and the activity as construed at a higher plane. Whereas attending to
components of an activity may create problems, attending to the activity at the level
of control that is superordinate should be facilitative, rather than disruptive.
Consider an example. Playing the piano is commonly used as an illustration of
the interfering effect of attention. But it also provides a good illustration of the
distinction that we are making. We would not wish to argue that having a well-
practiced pianist attend to finger movements would enhance performance. But
attending to the grander scheme of the work being performed, i.e., the nuances of
expression and interpretation, the flow across given passages, and so on, would
seem to be necessary for a high-quality performance. (Indeed, even an indifferent
Programs, Principles, and Consciousness 139

performance would seem to require that one attend at least to the sequences of the
section being performed.) An extremely well-practiced pianist may need little at-
tention at even the level of the flow across passages. But such performers doubtlessly
create a particular set of mind for themselves at a higher level of abstraction, which
attunes them to the stylish execution of the piece being played. 4 These are the levels
of control that are superordinate for this well-practiced activity. And these are the
goals to which attention must be directed. Everything else follows from them.

A second approach. There is a second way to account for disruption of behavior

as a function of attending to its components. But this second approach drags out
a broader issue: the nature of consciousness. 5 We do not intend to offer any deep
personal insights of our own into this issue. But we would like to pass along a
speculation or two made by others. Let us begin with the effects of consciousness
on unfamiliar behaviors, and then return to consider why consciousness might
disrupt familiar behaviors.
Consciously attending to the process of creating an unfamiliar behavior is facil-
itative. Why is this so? Presumably it is because it causes a more careful selection
of appropriate component acts, and a more thorough monitoring of the execution
of the acts than would otherwise be the case (cf. Mandler, 1975). It allows the
"smoothing of the rough edges" from the sequence under active scrutiny, by shifting,
adjusting, considering the possibilities, and encoding the critical components more
thoroughly. This characterization suggests that consciousness is somehow tied to
the creation of organization in behavior. Interestingly enough, a similar process
appears to occur in organizing one's observations of the behavior of other people.
That is, as was discussed in Chapter 5, people's attention is selectively drawn to
particularly informative points in the ongoing sequence of other people's actions,
termed "breakpoints." And encoding is greatest at these breakpoints (Newtson &
Engquist, 1976, Experiments 1,2, and 3), suggesting the imposition of organization
on the observation.
Powers has postulated elsewhere (1973a, Chapter 14) that consciousness has

4It is interesting, in this regard, that Armstrong (1968, p. 82) has characterized consciousness
as "a mental state of a person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour."

SIs "attention" the same as "consciousness?" Perhaps not. Attention may be the process of
placing material into short-term store, to be used for guiding self-regulation at whatever level
is superordinate, but to be used momentarily and then discarded. Consciousness may have
additional implications, involving the simultaneous encoding of the material in long-term
store.
We should note that this distinction between attention and consciousness, while perhaps
important, is not one that we have made before in this volume. Thus we did not intend that
the distinction be embodied in the terminology that we have used in other chapters, in which
we discuss focus on the self. That is, the use of the term "self-consciousness" to identify
a dispositional tendency was intended to connote self-directed attention, but not necessarily
consciousness, as that word is used in the present section.
140 7. Standards of Behavior

precisely this organizational function. His arguments on this point are rather subtle,
and explaining the ramifications of this idea in any detail would require that we
elaborate on an aspect of his theory that we have not addressed thus far. Rather
than attempt to do this in a very limited space (and perhaps lose everyone in the
process), we will concentrate here upon the more general implications of his as-
sertion, and refer interested readers to Powers' own discussion of his reasoning and
its basis (see also Powers, 1980).
If consciousness involves the engagement of a process of organization (or re-
organization, assuming an organization already exists), a number of things should
follow. For example, one would expect "uncertainty" to attract conscious attention.
This indeed seems to be the case. One would also expect consciousness to be drawn
to those aspects of behavior in which obstructions of one sort or another are con-
fronted, or in which there are mismatches between expected and experienced events.
And as we argued just above, disruption of a behavioral event is precisely what
causes a shift of attention from a higher plane to the level at which the disruption
has occurred (see also Kahneman, 1973; Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). In addition,
the reorganization notion suggests that actively concentrating on one's thoughts
about an attitude object should have important consequences for the knowledge
structure that bears on that attitude object. Consistent with such a possibility, Tesser
(1978) has amassed considerable evidence that this sort of concentration results in
increased elaboration of the associated schema, increased consistency within the
schema, and increased polarization of the attitude (see also Clary, Tesser, & Down-
ing, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Finally, one would
expect that consciously attending to an action would cause it to gradually assume
automaticity. And this seems to be exactly what happens.
This postulated reorganizing function provides a second way of accounting for
why consciously attending to components of a well-learned action may sometimes
be debilitating. Specifically, focusing consciously on the components of the behavior
may cause reorganization to begin. Quite apart from the possibility that the reor-
ganization may result in something less efficient than the existing organization, the
fact of reorganization means that something additional is taking place, something
besides the behavior itself. This additional something (the reorganization) involves
the use of more information than is required for the behavior alone. The efficiency
of the behavior thus may be sacrificed to the reorganizing function.
This general line of thought suggests a possible reason why conscious attention
may commonly reside at the Program level in adult behavior, a notion that we
proposed a little earlier. Recall that regulation at the Program level involves a
veritable maze of if-then decisions, a continuously branching chain of choice points.
Which path is pursued at any given choice point depends upon other conditions at
that point. The very nature of self-regulation at this level thus would commonly
seem to require the active imposition of organization upon experience. Uncertainty
would seem to be chronically higher here than at lower levels of control, and the
prescriptions for behavior more variable. Accordingly, consciousness may be in-
volved in events at this level, in a continual process of reorganization, to a greater
degree than at lower levels.
Programs, Principles, and Consciousness 141

We are now skating on very thin ice indeed. Moreover, we have strayed more
than just a little bit from our basic theme. It thus may be time to bring this line of
speculation to a close.

Closing Comment
We think that we have presented a plausible case in this chapter for the existence
of behavioral standards, at a number of different levels of complexity. But the
concept of a standard is useful only if a way is also conceptualized for the standard
to actually be used for something. In this case, the standard must be used for
regulating behavior. That process is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 8

Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

At the beginning of the preceding chapter we noted that a control-theory approach

to self-regulation requires two information processing systems. One system defines
goals or behavioral standards. The other system regulates activity with respect to
those standards. We spent a good deal of that chapter in discussing the standard
as a theoretical construct, and pointing out that many standards are implied in the
execution of any behavior-standards that vary hierarchically in their degrees of
abstraction.
The conceptual issues that we introduced there are important ones, necessary in
order to convey a sense of how behavior is physically produced. But for most of
the remainder of the book, we will be focusing upon only one level of standard at
a time. More specifically, when we speak hereafter of a standard that is salient in
a behavioral context, we mean to denote the comparison value that is presently
salient as the superordinate goal of behavior. We will, in general, disregard the
lower levels of control, all of which operate in the service of the superordinate
level. Thus, we will also disregard the multitude of lower-level standards that are
thereby implied.
Whereas the previous chapter discussed standards and where they come from,
the remainder of this chapter is devoted to a consideration of the process of regulating
behavior with regard to salient standards. The chapter is divided into five sections.
In the first of these we discuss our theoretical perspective on the self-regulation
process, and compare that perspective with Duval and Wicklund's (1972) analysis.
Then we review recently-obtained support for a postulate that underlies our rea-
soning. In the third section we summarize a body of research that demonstrates the
self-regulatory process in action. We then consider the possible existence of dis-
144 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

crepancy-enlarging feedback loops in social behavior. And finally, we suggest some

points of integration between our reasoning and social comparison theory.

DISCREPANCY REDUCTION

Theory
If a behavioral standard has already been evoked in a person-regardless of what
the standard is, or how it has been derived-self-directed attention leads to a
comparison process between that standard and the person's present state or behavior.
In our view, this act of comparison can be meaningfully construed as the "test"
component of a TOTE unit (Miller, G.A., et aI., 1960), or as the action of the
"comparator" of a feedback loop. (Recall from Chapter 2 that these two charac-
terizations are identical.) More self-focus, in such a situation, will generally lead
to more frequent comparisons, or a more thorough comparison, between present
behavior and the standard.
The result of this comparison process is to engage the self-regulating function
of the feedback loop. In Miller et al. 's terms, the test is followed by an operate-
an alteration in behavior. The alteration serves the function of bringing behavior
more in line with the standard of comparison. Thus, as with most self-regulating
systems, the feedback loop as we are discussing it here is typically a negative, or
discrepancy-reducing loop. We believe that there are only occasional exceptions
to this generalization.
This description of self-regulation is quite simple, but it is the essence of the
control-theory approach to behavior. Let us repeat this characterization in slightly
more concrete terms. When a behavioral standard is salient, self-attention leads to
a comparison between the standard and one's present behavior. This comparison,
in turn, leads to a tendency to alter behavior so that it conforms more closely to
the standard.

Duval and Wicklund's Theory

When laid out this concretely, stripped of the meta-theoretical baggage that we find
congenial, this set of statements is virtually identical to the self-awareness theory
that was introduced by Duval and Wicklund in 1972, and subsequently amended
and restated by Wicklund (1975, 1978, 1979). Indeed, we both became interested
in the self-regulatory effects of self-focus through our contact with that theory.
However, Duval and Wicklund's theory carries some meta-theoretical baggage
of its own. It is, at its core, a drive theory. According to Duval and Wicklund,
discrepancies normally exist between our present states and the relevant standards
of comparison. In their view, attending to those discrepancies (via self-focus) creates
an aversive drive state. This is not a generalized drive, but a drive that is specific
to the discrepancy under scrutiny. The aversive drive state serves to motivate
behavior. One way to reduce the drive-the way that is most relevant to our
Theory 145

discussion here-is to alter one's behavior in the direction of the standard. By

reducing the discrepancy, one reduces the aversiveness. 1
Thus, both theories predict that self-focus induces a comparison of one's present
state with the salient standard. And both theories predict (under some circumstances,
at least) that self-focus when a standard is salient will result in enhanced behavioral
conformity to the standard. They differ in the present context largely in their
assumptions about why behavior shifts in the direction of the standard. To Duval
and Wicklund, the shift is an attempt to reduce an aversive drive. To us, the shift
is a natural consequence of the engagement of a discrepancy-reducing feedback
loop.
For purposes of clarity we would like to distinguish between two aspects of this
disagreement. Specifically, we would like to separate the issue of whether self-
focus is phenomenologically aversive from the issue of whether self-focus is drive-
inducing. We acknowledge that these questions are intertwined to a considerable
degree. But we feel that we can most easily deal with one facet of the disagreement
here, and the other facet in Chapter 15.

Phenomenology of selflocus. Is self-focus phenomenologically aversive, or is it

not? A number of researchers have produced evidence that it is not, except under
specific circumstances. For example, in research that we discussed in Chapters 2
and 6 (Carver & Scheier, 1978), subjects were asked to complete a sentence com-
pletion blank under conditions of high or low self-focus. This measure is scorable
as a reflection of attentional focus. Moreover, it also allows one to distinguish
between self-focus that incorporates negative affect and self-focus that does not.
In two studies we found no evidence that self-focus, per se, was aversive to our
sUbjects. The same conclusion has been reached by others who have conducted
studies using similar paradigms (Davis & Brock, 1975; Hull & Levy, 1979).
A reasonable counterargument could be made to all of these data, however, based
on the following fact. In none of these studies did the procedures ensure that subjects
would become aware of a discrepancy between their present states and relevant
standards of comparison. Subjects were simply made more aware of themselves.
If subjects did not thereby become more aware of discrepancies, Duval and Wick-
lund would not necessarily predict self-focus to be phenomenologically aversive.

lTwo other theoretical positions have also been taken concerning the effects of self-attention.
One of these-Buss' (1980) theory-does make some use of the concept of standard. How-
ever, Buss restricts his use of this term to mean standards of excellence. More important,
in the present context, he apparently postulates no specific motivational mechanism by which
standards are used to guide behavior. Thus, although his theory appears to dispense with
meta-theoretical baggage, it is also unclear what conceptual basis it incorporates to account
for the regulation of behavior. The other theory-authored by Hull and Levy (1979)-takes
a different position altogether on the effects of self-attention. Their theory was explicitly
intended to be other than a motivational theory, and partly for this reason it dispenses entirely
with the concept of standards. For these reasons, although both of these theories are mentioned
elsewhere in the book, neither seems germane to the present discussion.
146 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

Thus, the findings could be squared with their theory. Wicklund (1975) has argued,
however, that the attention of a self-aware person will almost invariably gravitate
to dimensions on which discrepancies exist between his or her present state and a
standard. It seems difficult to reconcile this argument with the available data.
On the other hand, there is one class of situations for which there is little or no
disagreement. When there is a discrepancy between one's present state and a stan-
dard-and that discrepancy cannot be reduced-self-focus is aversive. This point
is made by data from several studies (e.g., Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976; Ickes,
Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973; Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979). These studies are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 11, after we have elaborated upon some
additional assumptions in our own model. In all of these cases, however, it appears
to be the case that the subjective aversiveness of self-focus was associated with an
inflexible or irreducible discrepancy.
Our conclusion, then, is that the available evidence is more consistent with our
own position than with the position taken by Duval and Wicklund (1972; Wicklund,
1975, 1978, 1979). In the absence of additional specifications-i.e., that the salient
discrepancy be irreducible-self-focus is not particularly aversive. Whether or not
it is drive inducing is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 15.
Let us tum now to a consideration of evidence bearing on the assumptions that
we hold in common with Duval and Wicklund.

The Comparison of Present State Versus Standard

One assumption that underlies both theories is that self-focused attention, when a
behavioral standard is salient, leads to an active comparison between that standard
and one's present behavior or state. This assumption is quite an important one. But
it has not been subjected to a systematic empirical test until very recently. One
reason for the reluctance to investigate this process is that the postulated comparison
is a covert and internal one, which is not particularly accessible to experimental
measurement.
We have recently conducted a series of studies, however, in which we attempted
to gain indirect evidence of this internal comparison process. The comparison
between one's present state and the standard presumably is a comparison between
two abstract mental representations. Making such an abstract comparison, however,
will usually require the use of information that is much more concrete. Consider,
for example, the situation of the author who is evaluating his day's productivity.
At an abstract level, the comparison is between a standard (e.g., a "highly productive
person") and one's present state. But both the standard and the present state must
be definable in more concrete terms, for example, the number of pages of manuscript
that had been produced in a given period of time. Thus authors who seek to evaluate
themselves compared to the standard of "productivity" may do so by the concrete
expedient of counting the number of pages they have written that afternoon. The
seeking of that information may be viewed as a subcomponent necessary to the
process of comparing oneself to the more abstract standard.
The Comparison of Present State Versus Standard 147

As another example, consider the situation of a person who is attempting to

perform a well-defined task in a psychology experiment. The abstract standard for
this person is to perform the task as well as possible. But what does "as well as
possible" mean? It could mean as quickly as possible, or it might mean as accurately
as possible. In this case, as with the preceding one, the abstract standard and the
behavior both can be defined in more concrete terms.
In brief, we would suggest that the seeking of concrete information about per-
formance criteria may be regarded as indirect evidence of an attempt to compare
one's behavior with a standard at an abstract level. Because we believe that this
abstract comparison is induced by self-directed attention, we would also expect
self-focus to increase the seeking of such concrete information. In order to examine
this process, we sought to create a situation in which we could monitor subjects'
accessing of information that would be relevant to a behavior-standard comparison
at an abstract level. The frequency with which this information was consulted would
allow us to infer the extent to which subjects were engaging in the abstract com-
parison.

Self-Awareness and Information Seeking

We operationalized our reasoning (Scheier & Carver, 1980a, Experiment 1) in the

following way. The study was portrayed as an investigation of the kinds of errors
that people make in attempting to reproduce visual stimuli. The subject would be
viewing photographic slides of two relatively complex drawings, each comprised
of overlaid geometric figures. Subjects were to try to reproduce each drawing on
a separate piece of paper. They were urged to make each representation as accurate
as possible, in terms of the proportions of the various figures, the angles of inter-
section, and so on. Thus, "accuracy" of reproduction was the behavioral standard.
The task was complicated by one additional restriction. When the slide was
presented (for a 5-second interval), the subject was to view the slide but not actually
begin drawing. Once the slide disappeared from view, the subject could begin
reproducing the figure. The subject would be able to look at the slide again at will
(for 5 seconds at a time). But the same restriction held throughout: whenever the
slide was in view, the subject was not to draw. Work on the drawing could
commence only when the slide went off. Subjects were explicitly told that they
could look at the slide as often as they desired. They were told, in fact, to view
it as many times as necessary to be able to copy it as exactly as they could. The
number of times the subject viewed the slides was the dependent measure of the
study.
The slides were rear-projected onto a free-standing device in front of the subject.
As was the case in earlier research with this device (e. g., Scheier & Carver, 1977,
discussed in Chapter 6), there were two interchangeable screens. The screen used
in the control condition was made of ordinary rear-projection material. The screen
used in the mirror condition was made of 50% transmission-50% reflection glass.
Whenever a slide was being projected, the slide was clearly visible on the screen.
But between presentations of the slide, subjects were exposed to reflections of their
faces and upper bodies. This, in tum, should have led to enhanced self-focus. The
148 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

study also included an audience condition. The slides in this condition were projected
on the nonreflective screen, but a third person was in the experimental room. He
was introduced as having had a research background in the area that the study was
investigating, and ostensibly would be interested in how accurate the subject could
make the drawings by the time they were finished.
Recall that we were interested in assessing the degree to which subjects compared
their ongoing behavior to the relevant abstract standard-i.e., being accurate. We
assumed that this would be reflected in the seeking of concrete information relevant
to that comparison. Thus, our dependent measure consisted of the number of times
the subject viewed the slide. It was expected that subjects who were more self-
attentive would do so more frequently than would those who were less self-attentive.
Consistent with this reasoning, subjects in the mirror condition viewed the slides
significantly more frequently than did control SUbjects. But subjects in the audience
condition viewed the slides only marginally more frequently than did control sub-
jects.

Self-Consciousness and Information-Seeking

We subsequently sought to obtain further information on this process by establishing
its generality to individual differences in self-consciousness. Subjects in this study
(Scheier & Carver, 1980a, Experiment 2) completed the Self-Consciousness Scale
several weeks before the experimental sessions. The procedures were nearly iden-
tical to those described above, except that self-focus was not experimentally ma-
nipulated in this study. Because of the long history of empirical parallels between
the mirror manipulation and private self-consciousness, and because subjects were
not overtly being observed, we expected private self-consciousness to be associated
with frequent comparisons, rather than public self-consciousness. Data analysis
revealed a reliable positive correlation between private self-consciousness and fre-
quency of consulting the slides, r = .43, but no reliable relationship for public
self-consciousness. In retrospect, this finding may also help to clarify the weakness
of the audience effect in the study discussed earlier. That is, it is increasingly
believed that observers remind people selectively of the public or social self (see
Chapters 3 and 15), in a fashion comparable to the disposition of public self-
consciousness. And the public aspect of self may simply not be very relevant to
the standard under scrutiny in this paradigm.
There are, however, many kinds of standards available for use in evaluating
one's behavior, some of which are quite social. Two kinds of socially derived
standards are suggested by Festinger's (1950, 1954) social comparison theory.
Festinger postulated that we evaluate our opinions and our abilities by comparing
them with the aggregate opinions and abilities of other people. The consensus of
other people's opinions thus represents a socially defined standard. Similarly, the
performances of others provide a standard to use in determining the adequacy of
one's own performance, and implicitly, in assessing one's ability. Seeking out
concrete information about such norms thus may be seen as an act of comparing
oneself against a socially defined standard. As such, the tendency to make this
The Comparison of Present State Versus Standard 149

comparison should be increased by self-directed attention, in particular, attention

to the public self. Testing this reasoning was the purpose of the next study we
conducted.

Self-Consciousness and the Seeking of Diagnostic Information

Subjects in this study (Scheier & Carver, 1980a, Experiment 3) had completed the
Self-Consciousness Scale in group sessions. Each was led to believe that the research
was being conducted to establish standardized performance norms for a new verbal
ability test. Although data from over 800 persons ostensibly had been collected,
more information was still needed. The experimenter seated the subject at the testing
table, and said that the test consisted of 15 five-letter anagrams. The items were
to be presented one at a time. Upon solving an item, the subject was to say the
solution aloud and then write it down on a data sheet. The experimenter would
time the subject with a stopwatch for each anagram. Once the subject had written
down the solution for the item, the experimenter would indicate how much time
had elapsed, and the subject would record that time next to the solution.
Before actually beginning the task, the experimenter drew the subject's attention
to two booklets on the far portion of the testing table, which contained ostensible
performance norms from previous semesters. After the anagram series had been
completed, the subjects had an opportunity to compare their anagram performances
against the norms in the booklets. The booklets were arranged so that each page
contained the norms for only one anagram, thus ensuring that the subjects had to
turn to a new page whenever they wanted to examine an additional set of norms.
The experimenter explained to the subject what the statistics meant (if the subject
desired to see the norms), but it was up to the subject to decide how many pages
to examine. During this time, the experimenter busied herself with paperwork, but
surreptitiously tallied the number of items on which the subjects compared their
performances to the bogus norms in the booklet. This was the dependent measure
of interest.
The norms in this study were social in nature. That is, comparison of one's own
performance with the norms constituted an implicit act of social comparison between
oneself and other people. Thus we expected the role of self-attention to be reflected
most prominently via the public self-consciousness dimension. As predicted, there
was a significant correlation between public self-consciousness and the comparison
tendency, r = .35. The relationship between private self-consciousness and the
comparison tendency did not attain significance, r = .19. Further analyses indicated
that these relationships were not mediated by subjects' performances on the anagram
task.

Self-Awareness and the Seeking of Diagnostic Information

The reasoning that led to the experiment just discussed has also been tested in
another study. In this study, however, subjects were given the opportunity to seek
social-norm information prior to attempting the task rather than afterward. Consider
150 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

how this might have influenced their subjective experiences. Persons who were
aware of their public self-aspects should still have been inclined to seek performance
norms, because of the fact that they represent socially defined standards. But there
is also some basis for expecting the awareness of the private self to have a similar
effect in this situation. That is, in the previous study subjects had already attempted
the test items prior to being given access to the norms. They already had objective
information available to them about how many items they had solved. Prior to
receiving ambiguously defined items, however, one cannot know whether one's
performances will be very informative by themselves (cf. Trope, 1975; Trope &
Brickman, 1975). Under these circumstances, even focus on the private self might
increase the tendency to seek out socially defined norms for their informational
value.
This reasoning was tested in a study which was portrayed to undergraduates
(tested individually) as an investigation of items from a test of abstract reasoning
skills (Scheier & Carver, 1980a, Experiment 4). The subjects ostensibly were going
to be working on some of the items, after which they would be asked some questions
about the items. The test items were described as being moderately difficult, but
it was indicated that most people were expected to do fairly well at them. The
experimenter indicated further that the subject would have some degree of choice
over what items he worked on.
At this point, the experimenter took the subject to an experimental cubicle,
handed him a printed form, and left him alone to complete it. The paragraph at the
top of this form told the subject that he would be given a total of 10 test items, and
that he was free to choose the items from among four categories. There ostensibly
were two types of item content: spatial reasoning and semantic relationships. The
items also diverged in another respect. For some items, the experimenter would be
able to provide subjects with a complete set of norms from previous semesters.
Thus the subject would be able to have a good idea how his performances on those
items compared with performances of other students. For other items, there were
no norms available.
It was made explicit in this paragraph that the subject could choose his 10 items
from among these four categories in any fashion he wished. That is, the choices
could be spread across categories, or all items could even come from the same
category. Following this paragraph was a list of the four categories, with a blank
beside each. The subject was to indicate how many items he wanted from each
category.
Subjects in the control condition completed their forms on a small table in an
otherwise empty cubicle. For subjects in the mirror condition, a large wall mirror
had been placed on the table and leaned against the wall, at a point directly in front
of the subject's chair. For subjects in the audience condition, another person was
waiting in the room. The experimenter introduced him to the subject, and said that
he was going to be helping out with a second part of the experiment, which would
be explained after the first part had been finished.
The study's dependent measure was the number of items chosen for which norms
were available (combined across content types). As predicted, subjects in both
Behavioral Matching to Standard 151

mirror and audience conditions chose significantly more items for which norms
were ostensibly available than did subjects in the control condition.

Conclusions and Boundary Condition

Taken together, the results of these four studies would seem to provide the basis
for at least two conclusions. The first is that self-attention does seem to promote
an increase in the frequency with which ongoing behavior is tested against relevant
standards, as our analysis of behavioral self-regulation would suggest. Thus in each
study self-directed attention was associated with a heightened tendency to seek out
information that was directly relevant to a salient abstract standard of behavior.
This was true despite the use of two quite different operationalizations of a behavioral
standard, and the use of both manipulated and dispositional self-focus.
The second conclusion prompted by the findings was perhaps a bit more unex-
pected, but in retrospect quite understandable. Specifically, in order for self-attention
to increase the frequency of comparing one's behavior to the salient standard, it
seems necessary that attention be directed to the particular aspect of self to which
the standard pertains. That is, in the first two experiments described, the standard
in question was nonsocial in nature-simply to copy a geometric pattern as accu-
rately as possible. And it was awareness of the private self that was most reliably
associated with the tendency to compare oneself with that nonsocial standard. In
contrast, in the final two studies, the nature of the standard was more socially
defined, and it was awareness of the public self that was most reliably associated
with the comparison tendency. Thus, self-attention seems to promote more frequent
"testing" only to the extent that one's focus is on the self-aspect that is specifically
relevant to the standard in question.
We should note, however, that there is one class of circumstances in which we
would expect the outward manifestations of the comparison process to be reduced
rather than increased by self-focus. This case is the same one as was discussed
earlier in the chapter, when we considered whether self-directed attention is aversive.
Specifically, when the discrepancy between the standard and one's behavior is
apparently not reducible, continued focusing on the discrepancy creates negative
affect, and the person will attempt to withdraw from further comparisons with that
standard. The result should be a diminished tendency to engage in social comparison,
and other acts that reflect the underlying comparison of present self with reference
values (cf. Schulz & Hanusa, in press; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1973).

Behavioral Matching to Standard

The result of the comparison between standard and behavior is normally a tendency
to bring behavior into closer conformity with the standard. This discrepancy-re-
duction or "matching-to-standard" effect has been demonstrated in many studies,
using diverse paradigms and a fairly broad range of subject populations. In order
to give some impression of the range of that research, portions of it are reviewed
in the following sections.
152 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

Nonprovoked Aggression
One early set of studies treated physical aggression as an exemplar of "social
behavior." That is, in all of the studies of this group, subjects received an opportunity
to commit an aggressive act. But subjects were not provoked or angered in any
fashion ahead of time. In the absence of a provocation, aggressive behavior is
regulated in very much the same manner as other instrumental behaviors (see, e.g.,
Baron, 1977). And the existence of a paradigm for easily quantifying aggression
makes it easy to treat nonprovoked aggression as a behavioral testing ground for
broader principles.
The paradigm used in his research masquerades as a concept-formation experi-
ment (see Buss, 1961). Subjects are led to believe that they are teaching a concept
to a cosubject (actually a confederate). An experimental apparatus is used to present
problems, and to give rewards for correct answers and punishments for incorrect
answers. The punishments are electric shocks of varying intensities, delivered by
pressing buttons numbered from 1 (least intense) to 10 (most intense). The con-
federate, who is shielded from the subject's view by a barrier, does not actually
receive the shocks, but is able to unobtrusively monitor their intensities. The shock
intensities delivered for a prearranged number of incorrect responses on the con-
federate's part constitutes the measure of aggression.
The first of the studies of interest in the present context (Scheier, Fenigstein,
& Buss, 1974) made use ofa very general behavioral standard-the widely displayed
norm of "chivalry." That is, all other things being equal, men are commonly not
aggressive toward women (e. g., Buss, 1966). This principle is apparently wide-
spread in societal expectations, and is probably internalized in most members of
our society. Scheier et a1. (1974) reasoned that male subjects who were shocking
females should be more aware of their present level of punishment-and how it
compared to the standard of nonaggression toward females-when self-focus was
high than when it was low.
Self-attention was varied in this research in two ways. Some subjects completed
the aggression procedures in the presence of observers. Others completed the pro-
cedures with a small mirror suspended upon the apparatus (see Scheier et al., 1974,
for greater detail). As expected, mirror-induced self-focus resulted in a decrease
in aggression, compared to a control condition. The presence of observers caused
the same effect, provided that the subject was induced to glance at the observers
occasionally. Thus, self-focus caused increased conformity to the salient standard
of behavior.
It is important to recognize, however, that this finding does not simply mean that
self-focus causes a reduction in aggression. The effect of self-attention is itself
neutral with regard to the direction taken by behavior. This point is demonstrated
quite graphically in the second study of this group. In this experiment (Carver,
1974), female subjects shocked male confederates. The fact that the shock recipient
was male should have removed the potential standard of chivalry. Moreover, after
explaining the "concept-formation" procedure to the subject, the experimenter de-
livered a bit of information that should have made quite a different standard salient:
"Let me tell you some other information that will help you to teach the concept
Behavioral Matching to Standard 153

better. It has been found in the past that higher levels of shock produce better
learning, so you may want to keep that in mind." This should have made salient
a standard of high shock levels as desirable.
The confederate then was brought in, and the subject completed the ostensible
concept-formation procedure, while the experimenter waited in another room. As
predicted, mirror-induced self-attention caused increased conformity to the salient
standard of behavior. In this case, however, matching to standard meant that subjects
gave more intense shocks when self-focus was high than when it was lower. Be-
haviorally, this finding was precisely opposite to that of Scheier et al. (1974). But
conceptually the two findings are perfectly consistent.
The notion that self-focus can cause behavior to shift in different directions under
different circumstances was also supported by the results of other research using
the same basic paradigm. These studies (Carver, 1975) were intended to investigate
the possibility that personal attitudes could act as behavioral standards. More spe-
cifically, subjects were preselected on the basis of their attitudes toward the use of
physical punishment as a teaching technique. One set of subjects were people who
reported having the belief that punishment is effective, and being willing to use it.
Another set of subjects were people who reported having the belief that punishment
is not effective, and being unwilling to use it. Several weeks later these subjects
completed the "concept-formation" procedure under conditions of either high or
low self-attention. The experimenter told each subject that psychologists simply
were not sure of the effects of punishment upon learning. Each subject was therefore
to make use of his or her own opinions in choosing what shock levels to use as
punishment for incorrect responses. Thus the subject's own attitude was the salient
standard.
It was expected that enhanced self-attention would increase subjects' tendencies
to make use of their attitudes in choosing their shock levels. And this is precisely
what occurred. Highly punitive subjects used more intense shocks when self-focus
was high than when it was lower, and subjects low in punitiveness tended to use
less intense shocks when self-focus was high than when it was low. Indeed, the
importance of the role of self-attention is further illustrated by the fact that in the
absence of the self-awareness manipulation there was absolutely no difference
between the shock levels chosen by these very different types of people.

Responses to Erotica
This investigation of the use of attitudes as behavioral standards has since been
conceptually replicated, in research concerning the influence of sex gUilt on re-
sponses to erotic material (Gibbons, 1978). Sex guilt is typically defined as a
tendency toward self-mediated punishment for violating internal standards that con-
cern sexual behavior (e.g., Mosher & Greenberg, 1969). It isn't that people high
in sex guilt fail to become aroused by erotica, simply that they subsequently feel
guilty about having allowed themselves to have that experience (Mosher & Green-
berg, 1969; Ray & Walker, 1973; Schill & Chapin, 1972).
Gibbons (1978) reasoned that enhanced self-focus during exposure to erotica
would cause persons to report reactions to the sexual material that were more in
154 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

line with their own personal standards than when self-focus was low. More con-
cretely, enhanced self-attention should cause subjects high in sex gUilt to rate the
erotic material as less appealing and arousing, and the opposite tendency should
occur among persons low in sex guilt.
These predictions received support in a series of three studies (Gibbons, 1978).
The first study utilized a short ad hoc measure of aversion to pornography as the
attitude premeasure. Several weeks after completing this pretest, male subjects
completed sessions in which they viewed a set of photographs of nude women, and
made judgments about how attractive they were and how much sexual excitement
they provoked. This entire session took place either under conditions of mirror-
induced self-focus, or with no mirror. As expected, the judgments of subjects in
the mirror condition were reliably correlated with their responses to the pretest
questions (rs = .60 for rated excitement, .26 for attractiveness), whereas the
judgments of subjects in the no mirror condition were less consistent with their
pretest statements (rs = .26, - .17). 2
Two additional studies extended the generality of these findings in several ways.
First, a modified version of the Mosher (1968) sex guilt scale was used for subject
selection, rather than an ad hoc scale. Second, subjects in these studies were women
rather than men. Third, the erotica to which they were exposed consisted of passages
from a pornographic novel rather than photographs. Each subject read these passages
and rated how sexually arousing, enjoyable, and well written they were. As before,
the session took place under conditions of high (mirror-induced) or low self-aware-
ness. The results of these studies were quite consistent with the earlier finding.
Correlations between subjects' pretest sex guilt scores and their ratings of the
passages were strong in the mirror condition (for the summed passages, averaged
across two experiments, r = - .57), and much weaker in the no mirror condition
(average r = - .01).
These findings, taken together with those of Carver (1975) discussed previously,
indicate that attitudes sometimes do serve as standards or guides for behavior. But
they also suggest that the guides are utilized reliably only when attention is directed
to the self. The relationship between attitude self-report and behavior is a complex
one, and this is only part of the story. We have treated this subject in more detail
in Chapter 14. For now, however, let us tum to other illustrations of the effect of
self-focus on conformity to behavioral standards.

Children's Use of Standards

One very interesting extension of this research area comes from a pair of field
studies conducted by Beaman, Kientz, Diener, and Svanum (1979). These studies
are interesting for at least two reasons. First, they represent one of very few attempts
to investigate the self-regulatory effects of self-attention among children. In addi-
tion, the method of data collection allowed Beaman et al. to provide evidence of
the simultaneous operation of two quite different behavioral standards.

2High pretest scores in this experiment reflect the absence of sex guilt. In subsequent studies,
high scores reflect high sex guilt.
Behavioral Matching to Standard 155

These studies were conducted on Halloween, using trick-or-treaters as the subject

population. The children ranged from about two years to thirteen years of age. The
research was conducted in several private homes, each of which had been prepared
in the following way. A large table was placed in a room near the front door. Upon
it was placed a bowl filled with individually wrapped candies. Self-awareness was
manipulated by means of a large mirror, which for some groups of children was
placed behind the table, directly behind the candy bowl. Within view of the bowl
had been placed a decorative backdrop, behind which sat an unobtrusive observer.
A behavioral standard was established for the children by the female experi-
menter. 3 After greeting them and commenting on their outfits, she instructed them
to go into the other room to obtain their treats. More specifically, she said "Each
of you may take one of the candies" (emphasis ours). She then excused herself and
left the room, so that the children expected to be unobserved. The dependent
measure was whether or not each child restricted himself or herself to a single
candy, which was recorded by the hidden observer.
There was an additional manipulation in this research, which proved to be quite
important. Beaman et al. had some concern about the possibility that the mirror
manipUlation might serve to make children more aware of their costumes, rather
than of themselves. In order to ensure that the children's identities would be salient
to them, half of them were asked to tell the experimenter their names and where
they lived, after entering the house but before the behavioral standard had been
introduced. (This procedure crosscut the self-attention manipulation.)
The data analysis from this study was somewhat complex. In the interest of
clarity, we will repeat only the highlights here (see Beaman et aI., 1979, for greater
detail). Children in the mirror condition proved to follow the standard to a greater
degree than did children in the no mirror condition. But closer inspection revealed
that this relationship held up only among the childen who had first been reminded
of their identities. Of the children in this "individuated" condition, 37.7% violated
the instruction in the absence of a mirror, whereas only 8% did so in the presence
of a mirror. In the absence of this enhanced salience of their identities, the mirror
manipulation had no effect (about 19% in each self-awareness condition ignored
the instruction). Thus the mirror increased subjects' conformity to the experimentally
induced standard, but only if subjects' identities had been made salient to them
prior to the manipUlation of self-focus.
This study also provided information about the simultaneous use of a second
behavioral standard. Specifically, the observation of another person's behavior often
suggests a standard for one's actions, a process that is commonly termed modeling.
Modeling shares some characteristics with social comparison as a source of a
standard, but it may also be regarded as a reflection of the availability principle.

3It might be argued that trick-or-treaters already have a standard: i.e., to take as much candy
as they can. If this were so, it would conflict with the experimentally induced standard. Data
from a second study indicated, however, that this is not the case. Trick-or-treaters in the
area in which this research was conducted apparently retain a sense of propriety that inhibits
overindulgence.
156 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

That is, viewing a person act in a particular way may "prime" that behavior in
oneself, rendering it more available for one's own use.
In any case, the question arises as to whether the use of even this sort of standard
would be increased by self-directed attention. Evidence gathered by Beaman et al.
(1979) suggests that it is. Overall, there was a strong tendency for children to model
the behavior of the first child in any given group. But in the individuated condition
(which was the only condition in which the mirror influenced subjects' behavior
at all), the tendency to imitate the first child was exaggerated by the presence of
the mirror. This tendency was statistically independent of the effect described
earlier. Thus self-focus apparently enhanced conformity to two quite different stan-
dards simultaneously, within a single experimental context.
Further examination of the data from this study revealed that the effects of the
attentional manipulation were also age dependent. That is, it had little effect on the
youngest children, and its influence increased gradually with increasing age. This
is an interesting finding, although it is open to multiple interpretations. That is,
perhaps the older children had better memories, and thus recalled more reliably the
experimenter's instruction to take only one candy. Alternatively, older children
might have better-elaborated cognitive structures at the Principle or Prograrn level
of control. But it is equally plausible that older children simply have a firmer and
more reliable association between their visual self-images and other self-aspects
than do younger children. If that association is not made in response to the mirror's
presence, the manipulation will not have its "self-focusing" effect. Nevertheless,
despite this ambiguity, the finding is intriguing, and will doubtlessly be pursued
in later research.

Section Summary
In the preceding paragraphs we have reviewed some of the recent support for the
assertion that self-directed attention causes a tendency to alter one's behavior so
that it corresponds more closely to salient behavioral standards. In the studies
described above, manipulations of self-attention led to increased conformity to
standards that varied widely, among subject popUlations that included children as
well as college students. The standards varied not only in terms of the "content"
of the behavior that they prescribed, but also in their "type." That is, the standards
in some cases were derived from observing others, or receiving informational
communications from others. In other cases, the standards came from subjects' own
attitudes and evaluative biases.
These studies are representative of research on this phenomenon. But they do
not exhaust this area of work, by any means. For example, in one of the very
earliest studies of the effects of self-attention, Wicklund and Duval (1971) found
that a self-focus manipulation caused an increase in the speed with which subjects
copied prose, when a standard for fast copying had been established. And a very
recent study by Greenberg (1980) has examined a situation in which an equity norm
was indirectly made salient before subjects allocated earnings to themselves and
a competitor. As one might expect, subjects behaved more in accord with that norm
when self-focus was high than when it was lower. Finally, a variety of other studies
Reactance 157

have incorporated in their designs replications of discrepancy-reduction effects.

Those studies, which addressed additional issues as well, are discussed in detail
in later chapters.
Let us now leave the realm of discrepancy reduction for a moment, and consider
another possibility: that there are circumstances in which self-focus may cause a
tendency to enlarge, rather than reduce discrepancies with salient comparison val-
ues.

DISCREPANCY ENLARGEMENT

As we indicated in Chapter 2, most discussions of control systems emphasize the

self-regulatory functions of negative feedback. Negative feedback loops are so
named because they reduce discrepancies between sensed states and reference val-
ues. Negative feedback loops are stabilizing systems, in the sense that they con-
tinually act to maintain, or to return to, specified goal states.
There is, however, a different sort of feedback arrangement called positive feed-
back, which was discussed somewhat more briefly in Chapter 2. A system that is
functioning as a positive feedback loop is acting to enlarge sensed discrepancies.
Some theorists would argue that the adaptive occurrence of such a system would
be quite rare, for the following reason. Once the system is given an "initial kick,"
or a deviation of the present state from its reference value, there is nothing inherent
in the system's functioning to stop its action. Instead, it will continue to act to
amplify the sensed deviation endlessly. Such a system thus is inherently unstable.
Others have argued, however, that positive feedback systems can be quite adap-
tive, provided certain constraints on their functioning are met (e.g., Brooks, 1969;
McFarland, 1971). For example, it would seem to be necessary that a positive
feedback system be operating in the service of a superordinate negative feedback
system. The positive loop thus would be subject to an interruption or an override
on the part of the superordinate system. As a reflection of this override capability,
the operation of positive loops would probably be relatively short in duration.
In an earlier discussion of feedback systems (Carver, 1979), we took a somewhat
more naive perspective on the existence of discrepancy-enlarging loops, implicitly
assuming that they are relatively common. Though we would now be more cautious
in our assertions in this regard, we still believe that we can point to at least two
phenomena in social psychology that may represent reflections of discrepancy-
enlargement systems. There is a degree of ambiguity about each of these cases.
But we feel that it may be useful to discuss them in these terms.

Reactance
The first of these cases is a phenomenon that is commonly discussed in the context
of reactance theory (Brehm, 1966). Reactance theory holds that people expect to
have certain personal freedoms; when such a freedom is threatened or abridged,
the person is motivated to reassert or regain the threatened freedom. The freedom
in question may, for example, be the freedom to choose one desirable object over
158 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

another (e.g., Hammock & Brehm, 1966), to choose one behavior over another
(e.g., Jones, R.A., 1970; Doob & Zabrack, 1971; Worchel & Brehm, 1971), or
to hold whatever attitude one desires (e.g., Snyder & Wicklund, 1976). The specific
behavior that results from the reactance state varies widely, of course, depending
upon the nature of the threatened freedom (see Wicklund, 1974, for a review of
the reactance literature). In many cases reactance responses involve spuming an
attitudinal position, a behavior, or a choice that is being thrust upon the person.
Regardless of the specific nature of the behavior, however, its central characteristic
is that it counteracts the threat to the person's freectom.
This brief description of reactance phenomena includes three characteristics that
are similar to our description of positive feedback loops. Most obviously, certain
reactance effects appear to involve a "distancing" of oneself from a value or position
that is being urged upon one. Second, this discrepancy enlargement seems to operate
in the service of a discrepancy-reducing system. That is, we probably don't reassert
our freedom for no particular reason, but rather we do so in order to maintain an
image of ourselves (or a public image of ourselves---d. Baer, Hinkle, Smith, &
Fenton, 1980; Brounstein, Ostrove, & Mills, 1979) as people who can't be pushed
around. This is quite consistent with the reasoning that positive feedback loops, to
be adaptive, must ultimately benefit superordinate negative feedback loops. Finally,
the reassertion of one's freedom does not go on endlessly. Once the restoration of
the freedom has been successfully demonstrated, the reactance state ends. Indeed,
the simple exercising of a freedom prior to the threat can prevent reactance from
occurring at all (Snyder & Wicklund, 1976). This is consistent with the argument
that discrepancy-enlarging phenomena are relatively short-lived, tending to function
for a while and then be interrupted.
Throughout this chapter, we have characterized the state of self-focus when a
standard of comparison is salient as leading to the engagement of a feedback loop.
If positive feedback systems exist at the level of analysis that is presently of interest,
one might expect self-focus to be involved in the comparison function of these
systems as well. More specificially, if a positive feedback loop were set up, the
result of self-focus should be increased "distancing" from the standard. This is one
line of reasoning (although there are others) that might be used to suggest that self-
directed attention should exaggerate certain kinds of reactance phenomena.

Self-Awareness and Reactance

Carver (1977) reported research that was intended to investigate the role of ma-
nipulated self-attention in the reactance that results from a high-pressure persuasive
communication. Subjects were told that the study concerned impression formation.
They were led to believe that they would be receiving a series of bits of information
about a candidate for an appointive office. The first information given to subjects
was a biographical sketch of the candidate, designed to produce a relatively favorable
impression in subjects' minds. It is necessary to create a specific evaluative impres-
sion in this paradigm, because reactance is minimal when subjects have already
expressed disagreement with a position subsequently pressed upon them (Worchel
Reactance 159

& Brehm, 1970; Snyder & Wicklund, 1976). In the Carver (1977) research, the
impression created was a favorable one, and the subsequent communication also
favored the candidate. Subjects who did not initially favor the candidate were
deleted prior to data analysis (cf. Snyder & Wicklund, 1976).
After reading the biographical sketch, the subjects made an initial rating of their
support for the person's candidacy. Subjects then moved to a second experimental
room, where they received one of two persuasive communications attributed to an
unnamed "university official." The low threat communication was a straightforward
persuasive message, supportive of the candidate's suitability for the office in ques-
tion. The high threat communication included the same message, but bracketed the
message with coercive statements, which were intended to threaten the subjects'
perceived freedom of determining their own opinions. The second experimental
room either did or did not contain a large mirror.
After receiving one of these messages, the subject completed a second opinion
rating scale. The measure of interest was the subject's opinion change after the
persuasive message. Reactance is expressed in this paradigm by resisting the per-
suasion, even to the point of changing one's opinion in the direction opposite to
what is being urged.
As predicted, mirror presence increased the tendency of subjects to respond to
the high-threat message with attitude reversals. That is, the postmessage opinions
of subjects in the high-threat mirror condition displayed the expected reactance
effect, differing reliably from opinions of subjects in the other three groups (see
Carver, 1977, for more detail).

Self-Consciousness and Reactance

These findings subsequently were followed up in two ways (Carver & Scheier, in
press a). First, in additional studies self-attention was varied dispositionally, rather
than with experimental manipulations. Second, besides conducting a replication
with the same paradigm as was used previously (Carver, 1977), we also extended
the reasoning to a second kind of reactance phenomenon. These studies are discussed
in tum.

Coercive persuasion. The procedures of this study duplicated those described

above, with two exceptions. Most importantly, there was no manipulation of self-
focus. Subjects were selected as being high or low in private self-consciousness,
based on their responses to the Self-Consciousness Scale. Second, because Carver
(1977) had used only female subjects, this study was run with males.
The use of private self-consciousness to divide subjects was based on two con-
siderations. The first was the fact that numerous studies had by that time demon-
strated that private self-consciousness and mirror presence exerted similar effects.
The second was that most of the paths of reasoning that implicated self-attention
in reactance phenomena appeared to involve private aspects of the self (these
alternative paths are discussed in greater detail a bit later on). As it happened,
160 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

public self-consciousness had an important impact on this phenomenon, as well.

But discussion of that impact is deferred until Chapter 16.
The results of this study, when subjects were divided according to their levels
of private self-consciousness, formed a pattern that was very similar to the data
reported earlier. Subjects who were high in private self-consciousness and who had
received the high threat message displayed reliable opinion reversals, but this pattern
occurred in no other subject group. These findings thus replicated the effect caused
by manipulated self-attention.

Self-induced reactance. We then conducted an additional study (Carver & Scheier,

in press a, Experiment 2), in which we investigated the role of dispositional self-
consciousness in a very different sort of reactance phenomenon. Specifically, when
one is asked to make a choice between two positively valued alternatives, an initial
preference for one alternative may represent a threat to one's perceived freedom
to choose the other. Such a self-imposed threat can lead to equivocation-a tendency
of the less preferred alternative to increase in attractiveness, or the initially preferred
alternative to decrease in attractiveness-as the decision time draws near (Linder
& Crane, 1970; Linder, Wortman, & Brehm, 1971).
We predicted that private self-consciousness would be associated with a high
degree of sensitivity to such self-imposed threats. Persons high in private self-
consciousness should be particularly aware of the various choices that have been
offered and the attractiveness of those choices. Thus, they should engage in the
greatest degree of equivocation as the decision time draws near.
Subjects in this study were led to believe that they were taking part in an
interview-based opinion survey under the auspices of a national foundation (this
procedure was taken from Linder et al., 1971). They were led to expect some of
the questions to be intimate. It was stressed that it was therefore important that
there be good rapport between the subject and the interviewer. To facilitate this,
the subject was being allowed to choose which of two interviewers she would
interact with.
The two potential interviewers were both portrayed in a favorable light, in per-
sonality sketches that were given to the subject. But they were portrayed as differing
from each other in their interpersonal styles. Subjects were led to expect to meet
each interviewer during a 3-minute "get acquainted" period. Only afterward would
they make a final choice of interviewer.
Each subject was given the two personality sketches and led to an experimental
cubicle. Along with the sketches was a form on which the subject was to give her
initial impressions of the two interviewers, based on those sketches. These impres-
sions took the form of separate ratings of the two interviewers.
Subjects in the high threat condition were given no further information. Subjects
in the low threat condition were told that the interviewers were running about 7
minutes behind schedule. For these subjects, the actual decision between inter-
viewers thus was more remote in time. The dependent measure of interest was the
absolute difference between the ratings of the interviewers made by each subject.
Subjects who expected to make their decisions very soon should have displayed the
Reactance 161

greatest equivocation, as reflected by small differences between ratings. Those who

saw the decisions as more remote were expected to make more divergent ratings.
Further, this difference was expected to be greatest among subjects who were high
in private self-consciousness.
Data analysis revealed a pattern that was supportive of our reasoning. When
threat was low-i.e., when the decision seemed remote-subjects high and low in
self-consciousness did not differ in their comparative ratings of the two interviewers.
In the high threat condition, in contrast, subjects high in private self-consciousness
rated the two interviewers more similarly than did those low in private self-con-
sciousness.

A qualification. Before leaving this topic, we should note a potentially important

qualification or limitation on the generality of the influence of self-focus in reactance
settings. As has been noted elsewhere (Carver, 1977), certain reactance effects are
implicitly or explicitly hostile (cf. Worchel, 1974). But subjects in psychological
research are also under implicit social pressure to behave in socially desirable ways
(cf. Sigall & Page, 1971). There will probably be circumstances in which the social
desirability standard is more salient to subjects in reactance paradigms than is their
desire to reassert their freedom. In such a case increased self-focus could be expected
to lead to a diminished rather than an exaggerated reactance effect. This possibility
must always be taken into account in evaluating the prospective effects of self-
attention in reactance settings.

Self-Attention, Reactance, and Feedback Loops

Taken together, the findings discussed in the preceding sections make a compelling
case for the involvement of self-directed attention in reactance phenomena. They
do not, however, make an unequivocal case for the assumption that such reactance
effects represent the action of a positive feedback loop. Indeed, there are several
possible ways in which these effects might have been mediated.

Mediational possibilities. Though we introduced this discussion of reactance re-

search by suggesting that reactance effects can be construed as people's attempts
to deviate from options that are being forced upon them, we actually did not enter
the research from that direction at all. Instead, we made the assumption that self-
focus might be involved in perceiving the coercive intent behind a "pushy" com-
munication (see Carver, 1977), or that self-focus would make the person more
aware of the negative affect associated with the reactance state (see Chapter 6, for
findings consistent with this reasoning). These possibilities are still quite viable.
Indeed, it is not altogether clear that they would necessarily be incompatible with
the positive feedback interpretation that we have offered above. Nevertheless, given
the variety of possibilities, that interpretation remains speculative and should be
regarded as such.
Let us now examine an area of theory and research where the discrepancy-
enlargement hypothesis seems considerably less speculative. This area is reference
162 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

group behavior: in particular, the way in which people react to negative reference
groups.

Negative Reference Groups

Reference groups are groups to which we compare ourselves (e.g., Newcomb,
1950, 1958). More specifically, positive reference groups are groups of people
whom we like, and to whom we wish to be similar. Groups of people whom we
dislike, and to whom we do not wish to be similar, are termed negative reference
groups. It is important to note that negative reference groups are not simply people
whom we regard as being irrelevant to us. We actively seek out comparisons
between ourselves and them, in order to emphasize-and even to increase-the
differences between them and us (Newcomb, 1950, 1958).
This function seems to be as close to the realization of a positive feedback loop
in social behavior as might be hoped for. All the elements are there: the comparison
of present state against a reference value, and the subsequent attempt to be increas-
ingly different from the reference value. We have characterized self-focus when
a reference value is salient as causing an increase in the tendency to compare one's
present state or behavior against the standard. According to our reasoning, then,
when a standard provided by a negative reference group is salient, self-focus should
result in increased attempts to differentiate oneself from that standard.
One use to which reference groups are put is determining the expression of our
attitudes. That is, people choose what positions to take on various issues partly by
comparing themselves to their reference groups. Self-focus increases the tendency
to conform to attitudes ascribed to a positive reference group (Wicklund & Duval,
1971). And we have recently tested the possibility that self-attention would likewise
increase the tendency to renounce the attitudes ascribed to a negative reference
group (Carver & Humphries, in press).

Self-Consciousness and Use of a Negative Reference Group

In conducting this research, we took advantage of the availability of a unique subject
population, for which there exists a very salient negative reference group. The
popUlation consisted of Cuban-American students at the University of Miami. The
negative reference group was the Castro government in Cuba. Most Cuban-Amer-
icans view this government as an army of occupation, despise its leaders, and dream
of the day when it will be overthrown.
A pilot study (Carver & Humphries, in press, Experiment 1) indicated that this
government does serve as a negative reference group for Cuban-American students.
In this study subjects' opinions on three issues concerning Cuban-American relations
were assessed by means of questionnaires. The questionnaires took one of two
forms. In the no reference group condition, each issue was introduced by a simple
sentence, and the subject's opinion then was solicited. In the reference group
condition, the issues were introduced in such a way as to make salient a specific
Negative Reference Groups 163

opinion as being the official position of the Castro government. This took the fonn
of ostensible statements on the part of government officials. After this introduction
came the same opinion question as in the other condition. As expected, subjects
for whom the negative reference group had been made salient expressed greater
opposition to the positions attributed to the Castro government than did subjects
for whom those positions had not been mentioned. Thus it appears that the Castro
government does function as a negative reference group for Cuban-American stu-
dents.

Self-attention. Of greater interest, however, was the involvement of self-attention

in the utilization of the negative reference group. Subsequent research addressed
this question. Subjects in this research were Cuban-American students who had
completed the Self-Consciousness Scale earlier in the semester. These subjects
received materials identical to those of the reference group condition in the pilot
study. If self-consciousness were involved in the use of the negative reference
group, it would be reflected by a positive correlation between self-consciousness
scores and attitudinal opposition to the positions attributed to the Castro govern-
ment.
This research also enabled us to investigate an additional question. There are two
ways in which one could conceptualize the use of reference groups to detennine
what attitudes to express. One possibility is that this is a self-definitional phenom-
enon. By adopting the opinions of desired groups, and avoiding the opinions of
undesired groups, one may arrive at a stable and coherent image of oneself. It is
this conceptualization that seems to be implicit in much of the early writing about
reference group behavior (e.g., Newcomb, 1950, 1958). However, it is also possible
that the opinions of reference groups are utilized for self-presentational purposes.
By comparing our opinions to those of our reference groups and expressing an
appropriately adjusted opinion, we may establish a favorable image of ourselves
in the eyes of the persons around us (cf. Goffman, 1959).
The nature of the Self-Consciousness Scale allowed us to compare these possi-
bilities to each other. If the use of this negative reference group is self-definitional
in nature, it should be reflected in a correlation between attitudinal opposition and
private self-consciousness. If it is self-presentational in nature, the correlation should
be with public self-consciousness.
The results of this research (Carver & Humphries, in press, Experiment 2) sug-
gested (a) that self-attention does increase the use of a negative reference group to
detennine one's expressed opinions, and (b) that this phenomenon is self-presen-
tational in nature. Attitudinal opposition correlated reliably with public self-con-
sciousness (r = .27), but not with private self-consciousness (r = .03). This pattern
of findings was subsequently replicated in a third experiment. Additional data also
established that this effect depends upon the salience of the negative reference group
as well as a high degree of self-attention.
We should note that the issue of whether reference group behavior is self-defi-
nitional or self-presentational is a specific example of a broader issue, i.e., whether
human behavior is guided by public or private concerns. We have explicitly noted
164 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

this issue at least once before in the book, in Chapter 7. And it will come up several
times before we have finished. We have reserved our most serious discussion of
that issue, however, for Chapter 16.

Positive Feedback Loop

Let us now consider the fit between these findings and the control-theory construct
with which we began: the positive, or discrepancy-enlarging feedback loop. There
are several respects in which the data are consistent with our characterization of
the adaptive functioning of such a loop. Most obviously, comparison between
present state and the reference value did lead to exaggerated deviations of the one
from the other: i.e., discrepancy enlargement. Second, it seems clear that this
phenomenon operates in the service of a superordinate discrepancy-reducing feed-
back system. That is, by increasing the disparity between oneself and the disliked
group, one thereby brings one's public image into closer proximity with the desirable
public image. Said differently, one attains a goal state at a superordinate level by
deviating from a comparison point at a subordinate level.
The argument could be made, however, that what is actually going on here only
appears to represent discrepancy enlargement, and that this appearance is illusory.
It might be that once people perceive the position taken by the disliked reference
group, they simply pick out a different position (in this case, the other end of the
opinion scale), and proceed to more closely approximate it. That would make the
whole phenomenon one of discrepancy reduction, at both hierarchical levels.
This is a difficult argument to counter effectively. In fact, in some respects our
strongest rebuttal is that intuitively it simply doesn't seem that this is all that
happens. Our introspections (for whatever they are worth) tell us that there really
is an initial impulse to want to be different from disliked groups, to put as much
psychological distance between us and them as possible, and to do so almost without
regard to how that distance is created. On the other hand, we do agree that it is
very likely that eventually the person picks out a desired position and moves toward
it.
This latter possibility is quite consistent with our reasoning, however. As noted
above, we would expect the operation of a positive feedback system to be relatively
short-lived. Such a system by itself is not very adaptive in the longer term, because
it doesn't guide behavior anywhere (unless the dimension in question is clearly
defined and bipolar). It just creates increasing deviations in whatever direction the
present state happens to be leaning (compared to the standard) when the system
begins operating. It seems likely that in the longer run, seeking goals to attain
would be more functional than simply attempting to differ from disliked points of
comparison.
Indeed, this point seems clearly implied in any general examination of reference
group behavior. Although we do choose to portray ourselves (and perhaps define
ourselves) partly on the basis of the characteristics of others we dislike, too much
reliance on this principle is maladaptive. The result of it is a person who doesn't
stand for anything, but simply stands against things. Though situationally func-
Social Comparison: A Theoretical Integration 165

tional, this by itself is not much of a basis for a healthy sense of self. This, in tum,
seems consistent with the position that the adaptive occurrence of a positive feedback
loop is relatively rare, and that its functioning is normally controlled by overriding
systems.

SOCIAL COMPARISON: A THEORETICAL INTEGRATION

We would like to close this chapter with an illustration of the integrative potential
of the constructs which we are discussing. In particular, we would like to take up
a comparison between the ideas we have presented thus far, and the processes
postulated by social comparison theory.
We have written about social comparison processes at several points in this
chapter and the preceding chapter. For example, we have noted that the observation
of other people is one major way in which behavioral standards become salient.
Indeed, it seems likely that there are many circumstances in which people use this
as an active strategy for choosing their actions. This process is an essential com-
ponent of Festinger's (1950, 1954) social comparison theory: the seeking-out of
others to establish consensual standards for what we should be thinking, feeling,
and doing, or what our abilities should be. There is a clear similarity between this
process and the processes that we have postulated in Chapter 7. And as we discussed
earlier in this chapter, there is evidence that the tendency to seek out such social
comparison information is greater when self-focus is high than when it is low. This
further reinforces the link between theories.
As a consensual reference value is being determined through social comparison,
and people come to know where they stand with respect to that value, the social
comparison process may be viewed as entering a second stage. This second stage
is the tendency toward conformity to the group-defined reference value. 4 The tend-
ency to more closely approximate the group-defined standard seems to have con-
siderable similarity to the discrepancy-reduction sequence postulated by Duval and
Wicklund (1972), and by us. Thus there is a second conceptual similarity between
the approaches.
There are, of course, some differences between theories. We have imposed a
two-stage structure upon social comparison theory in the preceding paragraphs. But
that structure is not always apparent in descriptions of the social comparison process.
Festinger dealt largely with the processes by which we come to know, evaluate,
and define ourselves. With regard to evaluating opinions, he assumed that there
would be a good deal of attempted social influence among group members before
a consensus was reached. This influence definitely represents a kind of pressure
toward uniformity. Yet, in our terms, all of this influence is part of the defining
of the standard of comparison. Festinger did note explicitly, however, that pressure

4In cases of ability comparison, Festinger postulated that there would, in effect, be two
reference values salient simultaneously: the group's average, and the "good" end ofthe scale.
Nevertheless, despite this additional complexity, the principle remains the same.
166 8. Self-Focus and Feedback Loops

toward uniformity is also exerted after a consensus has been reached. That is, the
existence of a discrepancy between oneself and a group creates a tendency to change
one's own position so that it is closer to the group's position (Festinger, 1954, p.
126). This aspect of the theory is quite comparable to what we have been proposing.
Another difference between social comparison theory and our approach concerns
the source of the impetus to conform. We have been assuming a self-generated
tendency to reduce discrepancies. Festinger appears to have felt that conformity
results from a combination of internal and external social-influence forces. It is
arguable, of course, that social influence is effective only to the degree that its
target is willing to adopt (or at least display) the position advocated by the influencer.
Thus the effect of even social pressure may be mediated by an internal decision
sequence.
Despite these differences of emphasis, the two theories have a good deal of
similarity. They both postulate a search for a standard to compare with one's present
state or behavior. And they both postulate a tendency toward conformity between
the behavior and the standard. (A third similarity is introduced in Chapter 10.) The
virtue of social comparison theory is that it is aimed at a specific set of cases: those
in which other people are heavily involved in determining the standard. The virtue
of our approach is its generality. Standards are derived from many places. And we
believe that the discrepancy-reduction portion of the theory is applicable across that
wide range of standards.
Chapter 9
Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

In the preceding chapter we focused on how self-attention promotes behavioral self-

regulation. That is our primary interest: the processes by which behavior is guided
effectively. But in emphasizing self-regulatory processes, we have run the risk of
losing sight of the other side of the coin. More specifically, we have ignored the
fact that sometimes people seem to stop regulating themselves, and sometimes they
even seem to regulate in a maladaptive fashion-i.e., "misregulate." This chapter
is intended to balance the slate a bit, in that regard. In the following sections we
discuss what might cause people to stop regulating or to misregulate, and describe
the consequences of each of these phenomena.

A Conceptual Distinction
We have distinguished, in our prefatory remarks, between the absence of regulation
and misregulation. Although these terms sound quite similar, we intend to use them
to refer to conceptually distinct phenomena, which we believe are prompted by two
quite different sets of circumstances. For these reasons we have chosen to use
separate terms. In brief, we see the absence of regulation as reflecting the disruption
of a system's activity. Misreguiation, in contrast, represents a condition in which
a system is actively regulating, but is doing so maladaptively. I
Before attempting to clarify this distinction further, let us briefly review the
processes that comprise the basic unit of analysis that we have used in describing
self-regulation: the feedback loop. Doing this will make clarification easier. The
essentials of the feedback loop are presented in the form of a block diagram in
Figure 9-1. As can be seen from the diagram, there are four basic functions in this
loop, three of which may be conceptualized as taking place within the person who

ISchwartz (1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b) has referred to these two event classes together as
disregulation. We have chosen to adopt two slightly different terms because we believe the
distinction between the categories is an important one.
168 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

•
REFERENCE SIGNAL
(from higher order system)

....
I
COMPARATOR
(TEST)

INPUT OUTPUT
FUNCTION FUNCTION
(PERCEPTION) (OPERATE)

~~

BEHAVIORAL
....
IMPACT ....

t..___ (DISTURBANCE)
from outside the system

Fig. 9-1. The functions comprising a negative feedback loop.

is part of the loop. The discussions of the preceding chapter emphasized two of
these functions: the comparison process that is represented in the uppermost box,
and the behavioral output which is represented in the box at the right. A moment's
reflection, however, will make it apparent that all four functions are intimately
involved in the self-regulation process. That is, whatever behavior is done has an
impact on the "environment" or the situation that the person is in (as represented
by the bottom box). And the new state or situation, in tum, is sensed or perceived
by the person (a process which is represented by the box on the left). Indeed, it
is precisely one's initial perception of the situation that is compared to the reference
value in the first place. (Recall from Chapter 2 that this comparison function is
exactly equivalent to the "test" of a TOTE unit.) If the comparator in this loop
perceives no discrepancy between the two values, no change in output is called for.
If there is a perceptible discrepancy, on the other hand, an alteration is made in the
behavioral output so as to reduce the size of the sensed discrepancy. 2
The closed-loop nature of this system should by now be obvious. There is a

2We should note that perceptual input is also subject to influence from events that are
extraneous to the system itself (represented in Figure 9-1 as "disturbance"). This influence
often results in an increased discrepancy, as the word disturbance seems to imply. Under
some circumstances, however, it can actually produce a decrease in the discrepancy. As an
illustration, imagine that you have reached for your coffee cup (while reading your newspaper)
and have missed by a couple of inches to the right. Normally you would have to note the
discrepancy and correct it. But a helpful friend could also nudge the cup toward your hand.
In either case the final result would be discrepancy reduction, but in the latter case it would
have been caused by an environmental disturbance. No behavior was necessary.
The Absence of Regulation 169

continual cycling of infonnation among these four functions. None of the four can
be dispensed with; all are important. With that understanding, we are now in a
position to specify relatively easily the basis for the distinction that we are making
between the absence of regulation and misregulation.
Consider first the absence of regulation. In a closed-loop system, as long as all
of the links among the components are unbroken, the system continues to operate
and regulate. But if anything should happen anywhere in the loop to cause the
infonnational circuit to "open," the system must effectively cease functioning, due
to the interruption in the flow of infonnation and control. It is that simple: the
system cannot self-regulate without the continued flow of infonnation. A break in
the flow at any point induces an absence of regulation.
A state of misregulation, on the other hand, is one in which the system of interest
is still controlling-still sensing, operating, and guiding behavior-but is doing
so in a manner that is counterproductive. More specifically, we suggest that mis-
regulation often results from the systematic use of faulty, erroneous, or irrelevant
infonnation, either in the input function of the system, or as a reference value for
the system (see Figure 9-1). The loop is still closed, but somehow it has been
closed in such a fashion that errors are created elsewhere by the functioning of this
loop.
In the sections that follow, we examine each of these concepts more thoroughly,
and consider what evidence exists that each of these event classes does occur.

The Absence of Regulation

Causes
As suggested above, the feedback loop ceases to regulate whenever the flow of
infonnation and control within it is disrupted. Such a break in the loop could occur
in at least four places. One possibility is that the system has been provided with
no reference value or standard to attempt to approximate. With no standard, the
system cannot begin to function. Subjectively, this would result in "experience"
but no action (or no change in action, if behavior is already underway for other
reasons). Such a state of affairs would exist if a person literally had nothing to do.
lt would also exist if a superordinate standard did not specify lower-order prescrip-
tions for action. This would be the case, for example, for persons who enter a very
novel situation such as a foreign culture. They wish to behave "correctly," but they
do not know how to do so. It would also be the case for a person who has a very
abstract goal in mind, but does not have the faintest idea where to begin in trying
to attain it.
Behavior regulation would also cease if there were a breakdown in the output
function. Without a way of generating the alterations in behavior that are called for
by the output of the comparison process, the system could not regulate with respect
to the standard. This might occur, for example, if a person lacked the ability or
knowledge needed to execute the behavior, or if there were impediments originating
170 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

outside the system. Note that the example of the person in a novel situation also
illustrates the absence of a behavioral output, as well as illustrating the absence of
a standard. That is, the superordinate system in a hierarchy "behaves" by specifying
standards for lower-order systems (Chapter 7). In that illustration, the superordinate
system does not specify standards to the lower level. The superordinate system thus
does not have a behavioral output.
A third way in which the system might cease to regulate is a breakdown in the
perceptual input function. In the absence of input, the system could not determine
what kind of behavior to generate, because that determination occurs by comparing
the perceptual input to the standard. This situation would be akin to asking a child
to playa game of "hot and cold" without giving the child any feedback information.
There would be no way for the child to know whether his movements were taking
him closer to or farther from the hidden object. The result would be either random
behavior, no behavior, or continuous movement in whatever direction was first
taken.
A fourth condition that would cause the self-regulatory system to cease func-
tioning is a breakdown in the comparison or test process itself. If this process is
not undertaken at all, the result is the same as if there were either no standard or
no perceptual input. Specifically, without the comparison between the two, there
is no way for the system to specify behavioral output. Whatever behavior has
already been specified will continue unaltered, unless it is changed by the action
of another system. The system without an active comparator is not regulating.
These four conditions presumably vary in their frequency of occurrence. It is
probably not too often the case that no behavioral standard of any kind is salient,
though it doubtlessly does occur sometimes. It also seems rare that we encounter
situations in which perceptual input-feedback about the effects of our behavior-
is wholly cut off. There are, on the other hand, many situations in which such
feedback is greatly delayed (consider, for example, the time lag associated with
review of a manuscript). In effect, such a delay in the input function creates a
temporary cessation of regulation. (To continue with the example just introduced,
unless there is input from other sources of information, most authors will ignore
their just-submitted manuscript-not operate on it-until the reviews come in.)
Illustrations of the other two conditions that lead to the absence of regulation are
somewhat easier to point to. It is not at all difficult to think of situations where
there is a problem in the output function, where persons experience a hard time
adjusting their behavior in the direction of the standard. More simply, there are
many times when people can't seem to do the things they are trying to do. This
sort of event is sufficiently common that it represents an important aspect of behavior
in its own right. Moreover, we would suggest further that this particular breakdown
in the self-regulation process leads to a predictable subsidiary sequence of events.
This sequence is important enough, in fact, and our ideas about it are elaborate
enough, that we are going to defer discussion of those events until Chapter 10.
What we are going to focus on in the remainder of this section is the fourth
possibility: that behavioral regulation is reduced if something prevents the com-
parison between perception and standard from taking place. We should begin this
The Absence of Regulation 171

discussion by pointing out that we have already presented research support for this
reasoning, by implication, in Chapter 8. That is, we argued there that self-directed
attention is necessary for the functioning of the comparator of the feedback loop
at the Program and Principle levels of control. A variety of research (described in
Chapter 8) attests to the fact that enhanced self-focus causes increased self-regulation
at those levels. Looked at from another perspective, however, those data also
indicate that the relative absence of self-focus results in the relative absence of self-
regulation. Those findings thus are indirectly supportive of our reasoning. In addition
to those studies, however, there is also a separate body of evidence (which we have
not touched on until now) with more direct implications for this issue. This research
concerns the causes and consequences of deindividuation.

Deindividuation and the Absence of Regulation

Although there has long been an interest in the effects of becoming "psychologically
absorbed" in a cohesive group (e.g., LeBon, 1896; Tarde, 1903) and in the motives
that underlie this tendency (e.g., Fromm, 1941), experimental investigations of
such phenomena have been of relatively recent origin. The first controlled laboratory
examination of deindividuation was probably that of Festinger, Pepitone, and New-
comb (1952), who asked subjects to discuss in small groups their feelings about
their parents. Those researchers found that groups in which the most caustic remarks
were made were also the groups in which subjects were least able to remember
which particular person had said what. They were not any less likely to remember
what had been said, only who had said it. This was taken as suggesting that the
group members were not attending to each other as individuals, but instead focused
on the group as a whole.
Based on these early findings, most subsequent researchers and theorists have
characterized de individuation as a process by which environmental conditions lessen
a person's level of self-attention and concern over the negative appraisals of others,
thereby weakening the proscriptions against the expression of undesirable behavior.
Deindividuation thus has typically been construed as a tripartite construct, relating
certain situational antecedents (e.g., anonymity or group involvement) to specific
psychological processes (e.g., lessened self-focus) which in tum have behavioral
consequences (e.g., the emission of anti normative behavior).
Perhaps the most precise statement of these presumed processes comes from
Diener (1977, 1980). Diener begins his analysis by assuming that monitoring of
one's own behavior and cognizance of oneself as an individual are necessary
preconditions for self-regulation. Consistent with earlier approaches to deindivi-
duation (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969), he further assumes that certain environmental
factors present in some groups can cause persons to be prevented from becoming
self-aware. He differs from previous theorists, however, in the particular factors
that he emphasizes. For example, Diener has stressed the roles of group activity,
cohesiveness, and uniformity in producing deindividuated behavior, and he has
downplayed the role of anonymity. Diener regards all of the former variables as
important because of their tendency to draw attention outward, and their tendency
172 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

thereby to diminish or prevent self-focus. According to Diener, diminished self-

focus is what provides the internal mediating link between the input variables
associated with deindividuation and the antinormative output behaviors that result.
Said differently, deindividuated persons behave the way they do because they are
not self-aware and are thus less likely to regulate their behavior with respect to the
personal and social standards that usually govern it. They are experiencing an
absence of regulation.
What evidence is there that presumed deindividuating variables do cause an
increase in disinhibited behavior? Of perhaps even greater interest in the present
context, what evidence is there that the link between the two is mediated by
diminished self-focus?

Input-output link. Most theorists predict that deindividuation occurs whenever

conditions lessen a person's identifiability and sense of individuality. Zimbardo
(1969) held that anonymity, being part of a large group, sensory overload, and the
sharing, giving up, or diffusion of responsibility can all prompt deindividuated
behavior (cf. Diener, 1980). In general, studies examining the effects of these
variables commonly show that such conditions do produce an increase in undesirable
and disinhibited behavior. Although a large number of studies have now been
conducted in the area, for the sake of brevity we will limit our review to three of
them, but will describe them in some detail (for a more complete review see
Dipboye, 1977).
In one study (Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965), groups of female undergraduates
were asked to read a description of what the Supreme Court considered to be
pornographic, and then discuss and decide on the basis of that definition whether
a particular passage was obscene. Some of the subjects (those in the deindividuation
condition) were made to feel less distinguishable by being made to wear old blue
jeans, smocks, and other nondistinct clothing, whereas other subjects (those in the
individuation condition) were asked to wear dress clothes, were given name tags
to wear, and were led to believe that they would have their pictures taken. Subjects
in the deindividuation condition proved to be more disinhibited in their behavior
than the other subjects. They talked for a longer period of time, and made more
frequent use of obscene words in their discussions than did subjects who were more
individuated .
In another study, Diener, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem (1976) observed trick-or-
treating children, examining the effects of several deindividuating variables on
stealing behavior. When the subjects arrived at certain preselected houses on Hal-
loween night, they were greeted by a female experimenter who led them to a table
containing candy and money. The experimenter admonished the subjects to take
only one piece of candy each and not to touch the money. She then left the room.
Unbeknownst to the subjects, their subsequent behavior was recorded by a hidden
observer.
Some of the subjects had been led to feel less anonymous by asking them for
their names and street addresses, while other subjects were not asked for this
identifying information. In addition, the children who were observed were either
The Absence of Regulation 173

alone or in groups of various sizes. Finally, in some of the groups, one child was
singled out as being responsible for any thefts that might occur, whereas in the
remaining groups each individual child was made to feel generally responsible.
Consistent with expectations, the most stealing occurred when the children were
anonymous, were in groups, and were told that another specific child was responsible
for any transgressions. The least stealing occurred when the children were nona-
nonymous and alone, and therefore personally responsible.
As a third example of deindividuation research, consider the findings of Zim-
bardo's (1969) study of physical aggression. Under the guise of a study on empathy,
Zimbardo had female subjects in groups of three deliver apparently painful electric
shocks to a helpless victim, who was portrayed to them in either a friendly or an
unfriendly manner. Deindividuation was experimentally varied by asking some of
the subjects to put on oversized laboratory coats and face hoods as soon as they
arrived for the session. The lighting in the room for these subjects was kept at a
low level, and they were never referred to by name. In contrast, subjects in the
individuation condition were not asked to don laboratory coats or hoods, were asked
to wear large name tags, and were consistently referred to by name. The lighting
in the room for these subjects was kept at a high level, so that each subject could
readily see and identify all others. The results of this study were conceptually
consistent with results of the other research reviewed above. Deindividuated subjects
administered shocks of significantly longer duration to the helpless victim than did
subjects who were led to feel more individuated.

Mediating state: Diminished self1ocus. Although the results of these studies offer
support for the notion that deindividuating conditions cause an increase in unde-
sirable behavior, they do not establish evidence regarding a mediating state. As
Diener (1979, 1980) has noted, without also obtaining evidence that some inter-
vening variable is responsible for producing these effects, the behavioral findings
can be explained easily without invoking the deindividuation construct at all. That
is, these findings can simply be viewed as indicating that the so-called deindivi-
duating conditions constitute discriminative cues for disinhibited behavior.
Two recent studies have been conducted, however, that attest to the importance
of diminished self-focus as a variable intervening between deindividuating circum-
stances and deindividuated behavior. The first study was conducted by Diener
(1979). Because of its complexity and richness of results, we will go into it in some
detail.
Diener had same-gendered subjects in groups of eight participate in what osten-
sibly was a study on creativity. Six of the members of each group were actually
confederates of the experimenter. When the subjects arrived for the session, they
initially participated in a half-hour of group activities, the purpose of which was
to create three different levels of group feeling and self-awareness (described be-
low). Following this group activity, the subjects were allowed to participate in-
dividually in a number of different activities that would presumably "enhance their
creativity for a later creativity test." In fact, these activities were included to provide
~ measure of disinhibited behavior. Of the 40 activities available to the subjects,
174 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

20 consisted of socially deviant tasks such as playing in mud, writing obscenities,

and sucking on baby bottles; and 20 consisted of more socially acceptable tasks
such as doing crossword puzzles, reading stories, and writing answers to moral
dilemma questions. (Pretesting had shown both sets of tasks to be equally interesting
and fun.) Following this "warm-up" period, subjects completed a questionnaire
that assessed both their perceptions of the situation and the kinds of feelings they
were experiencing.
As previously noted, the intent of the initial half-hour group activities sessions
was to manipulate the subjects' levels of group feeling and self-attention. Subjects
in the self-awareness condition were given name tags to wear and were always
referred to by name. They also participated in a series of activities that were designed
to "get them in touch with their feelings and inner self." For example, they listened
to music and answered questions about how the music matched their personality
characteristics, and they wrote essays about themselves in which they described
what it was that made them unique.
In contrast, subjects in the non-self-aware condition were exposed to a series of
manipulations designed to focus their attention outward. For example, they were
asked to write essays about what universities would be like 100 years in the future,
they rated a number of songs and jokes, and worked on a series of challenging
games and puzzles. Moreover, during collection of the measures of deindividuated
behavior, an attempt was made to distract these subjects by having them rhythmically
push a foot pedal.
Subjects in the deindividuation condition were given yet a different treatment.
These subjects participated in initial activities that were designed to produce feelings
of group cohesiveness and lessen feelings of individuality. The experimenter initially
asked subjects in this condition to adopt a group name and thereafter always referred
to the group by the name they chose. Moreover, the subjects were told that this
name would be used to identify their data-Le., the data were to be treated on a
group, not an individual basis. The activities performed by the subjects in this
condition were also designed to draw the group together. For example, the group
sang songs together, "elevated" a person by lifting him or her into the air, bodily
prevented an assistant from breaking into a circle they had formed, and danced
around the experimental room.
The first notable finding to emerge from the study was that subjects in the
deindividuation condition reported being significantly less self-conscious, acting
more spontaneously without planning, and experiencing a greater loss of a sense
of personal identity than did subjects in the two remaining conditions. Second (and
complementing these findings), compared to the self-aware and non-self-aware
conditions, deindividuated subjects also reported experiencing more feelings of
unity, liking the group more, and perceiving greater similarity to other group
members. Third, and consistent with previous findings in the deindividuation area,
subjects in the deindividuation condition exhibited a greater amount of disinhibited
behavior relative to the other two conditions, as reflected both in their initial choice
of inhibited versus disinhibited tasks and in the total amount of time they spent
working on tasks of each type. Finally, on virtually all of these dependent measures
The Absence of Regulation 175

the non-self-aware condition fell midway between the self-aware and deindividua-
tion conditions, suggesting a continuum of self-focused attention across the three
treatment groups comprising the study.
The fact that these various dependent measures did in fact covary in the manner
implied by Diener's theory is further substantiated by the results of a principal axis
factor analysis that was performed on the data. Two factors emerged from this
analysis. The key elements of deindividuation-Iack of self-consciousness, feelings
of group unity, lessened concern for what others would think, and disinhibited
behavior-all loaded on the same primary factor. A second factor was comprised
of altered internal experiences, e.g., experiencing in an unusual way.
A second study has also been conducted recently, which has conceptually rep-
licated these relationships in the domain of physical aggression (Prentice-Dunn &
Rogers, 1980). The procedures used in this research were similar to the ones used
earlier by Zimbardo (1969). Specifically, college undergraduates were induced to
deliver potentially painful electric shocks to another ostensible subject, who had
volunteered for an experiment on biofeedback. One of the subjects in the four
person group was an experimental accomplice. Prior to the aggression opportunity,
this accomplice was asked to administer a few sample shocks to the biofeedback
subject, in order to determine whether or not the equipment was operating satis-
factorily. In the high aggressive cues condition, the accomplice proceeded to deliver
a series of five intense shocks to the victim. In the low aggressive cues condition,
the accomplice administered a series of low intensity shocks. A control condition
was included in which this checkout procedure was omitted.
In addition to varying the extent to which aggressive cues were present, the
subjects' levels of deindividuation were also experimentally varied. Subjects in the
individuation condition were given name tags, were always addressed by their first
names, were told they would meet the biofeedback subject after the session ter-
minated, and were made to feel personally responsible for any discomfort this
person suffered. Subjects in the deindividuation condition were treated in an opposite
manner. They were never addressed by name, were told that they would not meet
the biofeedback subject nor would that person learn who they were, and were made
to feel that the experimenter would take complete responsibility for their actions.
Immediately following the aggression opportunity, all subjects completed a 19-item
questionnaire, assessing the same self-report deindividuation variables as had been
assessed in the study by Diener (1979).
The results were quite straightforward. There were two significant effects on
aggressive behavior: subjects in the high aggressive cues condition aggressed more
than did subjects in the two other aggressive cues conditions; and subjects in the
deindividuation condition aggressed more intensely than did those in the individ-
uation condition (as assessed by both shock intensity and duration). Of greater
present interest, however, were the results of a principal axis factor analysis per-
formed on the subjects' self-report data. The same two factors as had been obtained
by Diener again emerged in the data collected by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers. One
factor was composed of variables dealing with a sense of self-awareness (e.g., felt
self-consciousness and a heightened sense of individual identity), and the other
176 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

factor was composed of variables dealing with a sense of altered experiences (e.g.,
thinking that was somewhat altered, and emotions different from normal). Subsid-
iary analyses revealed that both of these factors were significantly correlated in the
expected direction with shock intensity.

Summary offindings, and conclusions. Taken together, the results of these various
studies offer considerable support for the model of deindividuation that Diener
(1979, 1980) has proposed. By implication, they also offer support for our own
ideas concerning the absence of behavioral self-regulation. Placing persons into
deindividuating situations does seem to lead to diminished self-focus (see also Ickes,
Layden, & Barnes, 1978), and these variables are also associated with behavior
that is relatively antinormative, unrestrained, and unregulated. This is not to say
that there are no unresolved issues, however. There are. In the next section we
identify two of these unresolved issues, and present some speculations about how
they might best be conceptualized.

Remaining Issues Regarding Deindividuation

Private versus public self-attention. An important question that arises from a
consideration of the deindividuation literature concerns a distinction that we made
in Chapter 3 with regard to the self as a construct. In particular, is it variations in
the degree of attention to the public self that corresponds to varying degrees of
deindividuation? Or is it variations in the degree of attention directed to the private
self? The descriptions of deindividuation that have been offered over the years do
not provide too much assistance in resolving this question. Anonymity, which is
often held to foster deindividuation, would seem to reduce one's attention to the
public self. But immersion in group experiences, another deindividuating element,
seems to involve diverting attention away from the private self.
There are two aspects of the literature of deindividuation, however, which lead
us to suggest that the phenomenon represents a reduction in attention to the private,
rather than the public self. One of the sources of information is a series of studies
which lead to the conclusion that anonymity per se does not consistently induce
the behavioral effects associated with deindividuation (Diener, 1976; Diener, Di-
neen, & Westford, 1974; Diener & Kasprzyk, 1978; Zabrack & Miller, 1972;
Zimbardo, 1969). This lack of consistency has led Diener (1980) to caution against
equating anonymity with deindividuation. By implication this also suggests the
inadvisability of equating deindividuation with the absence of attention to the public
self.
The second source of evidence is a recent article by Diener, Lusk, DeFour, and
Flax (1980). Subjects in the research reported therein were exposed to a variety of
experimental manipulations, each of which was intended to vary the degree to which
subjects were aware of their public self-aspects. Diener et al. found that several of
the manipulations did result in lowered feelings of self-consciousness. But these
variables were not systematically related to deindividuated behaviors. By impli-
cation this also suggests the inadvisability of equating deindividuation with the
The Absence of Regulation 177

absence of attention to the public self. These findings are precisely what would be
expected if deindividuation actually represented reduced awareness of the private,
rather than the public self.
Our conclusion in this regard is also consistent in some respects with a position
taken recently by Lindskold and Propst (1980). They argued that deindividuation
does not necessarily involve a reduction in self-awareness. But in making this
argument, they quite explicitly equated self-awareness with attention to the public
self. Our position does not conflict with theirs regarding public self-awareness. But
by considering the role of the private self, we are able to account for the findings
from two studies which showed that reduced self-attention mediates the effects of
deindividuating antecedent variables on deindividuated behavior (Diener, 1979;
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980). These particular findings do not seem easily ac-
counted for by the Lindskold and Propst (1980) analysis.

Levels of control. A rather separate set of issues should also be considered, which
arises from our assumption that human behavior involves a hierarchy of control.
When we refer to the absence of regulation, we mean the absence of regulation at
some particular level of control. In the experience of deindividuation, the lack of
regulation presumably occurs with regard to what Powers (1973a) termed the Prin-
ciple level (and perhaps the Program level, as well). This does not mean, however,
that behavior ceases altogether. If that were the case, every time people had nothing
to do their breathing and circulation would stop, and this obviously does not happen.
The person whose self-attention is low (e.g., via deindividuating circumstances)
does not cease to behave. He simply ceases to regulate behavior at higher levels
of abstraction. The normal activities at lower levels continue to occur, in a relatively
automatic way. In effect, it is very much as though the higher level system were
temporarily disconnected, leaving the lower level of control temporarily superor-
dinate.
An important question that arises here is this: Where does this lower-level system
get its standards for regulation, now that standards are no longer provided to it by
the upper-level system? The answer is straightforward. The standards are provided
by analyzing the raw material of perceptual experience at the level of abstraction
that corresponds to the level of control that is now superordinate (see Chapter 7).
Note that this level of control has a shorter time scale than do higher levels. It also
has standards that are more discrete and concrete, and which embody less organ-
ization and continuity. This characterization-which follows directly from control
theory-helps to account for the fact that the deindividuated person is more im-
pulsive, more responsive to cues of the moment, than is the person who is not
deindividuated.

Related Issues
This discussion of levels of control also suggests broader issues-issues that have
implications for classes of behavior other than deindividuation. For example, the
reduction of attention to the self which occurs during deindividuation does not
178 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

necessarily entail a concomitant increase in self-attention at lower levels of control.

Rather, the person is simply distracted from attending to the self at the higher levels
of control. But there are circumstances in which the absence of regulation at an
upper level is associated with attention being simultaneously drawn more intensively
downward. One such circumstance was discussed in Chapter 7: the occurrence of
some difficulty in producing matching to standard at a lower level. Another such
circumstance is the experience of a strong emotion (cf. Simon, 1967).
As was argued in Chapter 6, a plausible case can be made that emotional reactions
are pervasive behavioral action patterns (Leventhal, 1980), actions that occur at
relatively low levels of a hierarchy of control. A strong emotion draws attention
to itself, thereby drawing attention to that lower level of control and away from the
higher levels. Sometimes this is a momentary occurrence, and the person quickly
returns to program execution. But if the emotion becomes sufficiently intense,
overall self-regulation may adjust in such a way that the level at which the emotion
is being experienced temporarily becomes superordinate. In effect, self-regulation
is abandoned at the higher level of control. As attention is focused at the lower
level, the person behaves single-mindedly and stereotypically, in a fashion that is
dictated by the emotion. Self-regulation proceeds only at that level and lower levels.
As an example, rising anger in a social interaction impinges on one's awareness.
Ordinarily it can be kept under control by the person who is experiencing it, allowing
the person to deal effectively with higher-level concerns. If it becomes intense
enough, however, the person may "lose his head" and react with an uncivilized
rage response. He may later wonder how he could have let himself do that, and
come to the conclusion that "I just wasn't thinking." In a sense, that is correct. He
was not attending to himself-and thus was experiencing an absence of self-reg-
ulation-at the Program level. 3
Before leaving this discussion of regulation and the absence of regulation at
various levels of control, there is one final issue that we wish to address briefly.
Consider the assumption-implicit in the preceding discussion-that lower levels
of control are sufficiently automated that they do not require much attention in order
to operate effectively. Most people probably would not find this assumption very
remarkable (cf. Chapter 7). It might be somewhat more startling, however, to
assert that the behavior of even low-level systems that are ordinarily thought to be
relatively inaccessible can be influenced by increases in attentional focus on that
system. Yet data recently reported by Schwartz (1980) lead to precisely this con-
clusion.
Schwartz has been interested for some time in applying the concepts of cybernetics
to the process of maintaining healthy self-regulation of physiological systems. He

3Why, then, does physiological feedback sometimes lead to an enhanced awareness of the
self which is more general than simply an awareness of the arousal (Fenigstein & Carver,
1978; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980)? One reason is that in these cases the physiological activity
in question was not emotional in nature. Thus, there was no need to react to it in any fashion.
Once the subjects perceived the arousal, their attention presumably gravitated back "upward"
to a more global awareness of the self.
Misregulation 179

points out, for example, that the use of biofeedback to help restore normal levels
of specific physiological functions represents a closed feedback loop in action (see,
e.g., Schwartz, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b). More recently he tested the notion that
attending to naturally occurring feedback of breathing and heart rate would lead
to increased regulation of those systems.
Subjects in this research were instructed simply to attend to those various feedback
indices (with and without enhancement of the perceptual signals), as their breathing
and heart rates were monitored. In general, the data confirmed Schwartz's reasoning.
More attention led to more self-regulation, defined by decreased variability around
the subject's normal baseline. It thus appears that even low-order systems are open
to the facilitating influence of self-attention, despite the fact that their activity
normally is heavily automated. Note also that this effect is conceptually identical
to the behavioral effects described in Chapter 8.

Misregulation
Let us now tum to the second general topic of this chapter, the phenomenon that
we have termed misregulation. This category of events does not involve the absence
of regulation. To the contrary, it involves a closed feedback loop in which sensing,
comparing, and behavior are all occurring. But the comparison-and thus the
regulation-is based on faulty or irrelevant information. The erroneous information
is being supplied in one of two places: either as perceptual input, or as the reference
signal for the comparator. This process may lead to the reduction of sensed dis-
crepancies within the purview of the system. But it often acts to create problems
elsewhere.

Illustrations from Behavioral Medicine

Some of the most interesting illustrations of this process come from the developing
literature of behavioral medicine. Theorists in that area have increasingly come to
view the person less as a passive recipient of treatment, and more as an intricate
health care system in its own right (e. g., Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Meyer, &
Nerenz, 1980; Schwartz, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b). That is, people typically act
in ways that will maintain themselves in healthy states. When an injury or illness
occurs, the person monitors relevant symptoms, and takes actions that have the goal
of reducing the symptoms and returning the person to a "healthy" status. Clearly
this description sounds very much like the operation of a closed-loop self-regulatory
system (for broader statements of this perspective, see Schwartz, 1978, 1979a,
1979b). And Mullen and Suls (1980) have recently obtained evidence that even
this sort of loop is most efficient among persons high in dispositional self-con-
sciousness.
But this monitoring-and-adjustment tendency sometimes goes awry. For example,
there are many cases in which the person picks a symptom to monitor that is
irrelevant to the disease, and takes as the present goal the elimination of that
180 9. Absence of Regulation. and Misregulation

symptom (cf. Leventhal et aI., 1980). In tenns of the feedback model, this represents
the selection of an inappropriate standard against which to regulate behavior. The
person is guiding behavior by his or her success (or lack thereof) in attaining this
goal. But this goal actually has nothing to do with the superordinate standard that
it ostensibly serves: i.e., eliminating the disease.
As a specific example, it is quite common for persons suffering from hypertension
(which has no perceptible symptoms) to identify their disorder with some symptom
that they can perceive (Leventhal et aI., 1980). They then gauge the progress of
their therapy according to the presence or absence of that (irrelevant) symptom.
This leads to two kinds of problems. First, if the symptom goes away, patients
often assume that they are cured and stop taking their medication. Alternatively,
if the symptom does not go away, patients often become discouraged and leave the
treatment program. The result in either case is that the progress of the disease
continues unimpeded. Thus, misregulation can lead to unfortunate consequences.
Schwartz (1978, 1979a, 1979b) has gone even farther than this, however, in
proposing that with certain kinds of disorders, the very act of taking medication
produces what we are calling misregulation. In hypertension, for example, the
disease and its progress are exacerbated by continually placing oneself in stressful
situations. Effective self-regulation in this case would entail removing oneself from
the stressors, thus leading gradually to decreases in blood pressure, and perhaps
to better control over the internal mechanisms that regulate blood pressure. Instead,
however, the common practice is to take blood-pressure-reducing medication, and
stay in the stressful situation. Blood pressure goes down, but the mechanism that
triggers the rise in blood pressure has not been altered. It is entirely possible that
over time the person in this situation will continue to lose control over this mech-
anism, and become totally unable to regulate blood pressure effectively without
medication.

Illustrations from Social Behavior

It is also possible to point to instances of misregulation in social behavior, though
those instances have typically not been considered in these tenns before. Recall
that misregulation results from either of two circumstances: a reference value that
is erroneous with regard to superordinate concerns, or faulty perceptual input.
Let's consider first the possibility of an erroneous standard. It is easy to think
of illustrations of this principle: the setting of a lower-order goal that turns out to
be completely inappropriate to the attainment of a higher-order goal. For example,
earlier in the chapter we used as an illustration the case of people who were in a
very novel situation-a foreign culture-and did not know how to behave in order
to be "correct." Those people were experiencing an absence of regulation, because
they had no standard to match. Now add to the scenario another group of people
who also want to be "correct." But rather than being in a quandry about how to
behave, these people simply assume that whatever is appropriate at home is also
appropriate in the foreign culture. They have taken up a standard, and are self-
regulating accordingly. Often enough, however, the standard that is chosen happens
to be totally inappropriate to the situation, as viewed by members of the other
Misregulation 181

culture. The result thus is a horrible blunder, creating a bad impression on the
surrounding people. The behavior of these persons is misregulated.
There are also cases in which the feedback is inaccurate or irrelevant, rather than
the standard being inappropriate. Consider, for example, the fact that we gather
information about other people's reactions to us through both verbal and nonverbal
channels. Sometimes the nonverbal cues are more informative than the verbal ones.
But this information is of no use unless the cues are attended to. For example,
imagine the young swain on a blind date with a beautiful woman. She converses
pleasantly all evening, but avoids eye contact, orients her body away from her date,
and otherwise indicates in nonverbal ways her lack of interest in him. Her date,
however, is attending only to verbal cues in trying to gauge his progress with her,
and later is startled when his amorous advances are met with a cold response. His
behavior has been misregulated, because he utilized goal-irrelevant perceptual in-
put.
Much the same thing can happen in other types of social interchange. Consider
the not too uncommon spectacle provided by the individual who wants to create
a specific impression on his peers, but is not too adept at doing so. On the other
hand, neither is the person very skilled at determining what kind of impression he
is actually conveying. Because his peers are kindly souls, they don't let on that he
is widely viewed as an idiot. Instead, when he contributes to discussions, they
usually voice something about his insightfulness, and then proceed to ignore him.
In terms of the feedback-loop model, they are providing this person with the
perception that his behavior is having its intended effect. From the system's point
of view, everything is fine. In reality, however, the perceptual information is
erroneous. The person is not creating the desired impression, except in his own
perceptions of the situation. His behavior thus is misregulated.
A related illustration is the phenomenon of ingratiation (Jones, E.E., 1964). This
phenomenon is usually viewed from the point of view of the person who is trying
to gain favored status by being overcomplimentary. But this strategy also has an
effect on the person who is being flattered. Specifically, the flattery represents
perceptual input for that person about his or her present state. But the input is
erroneous, and may in fact be quite misleading. The result is a fallacious conclusion
about standard attainment-in a word, misregulation.
Finally, we note that several behavioral reflections of psychopathology can easily
be construed in terms of misregulation. For example, it is often argued that de-
pressive~ompared to the nondepressed-have a relatively pessimistic view of
the causal relationships between their behavioral efforts and the outcomes that
result, that they have distorted perceptions of both the good and the bad events that
happen to them (see, e.g., Beck, 1976). This can be viewed as reflecting a distortion
in the perceptual input process, such that behavior is being regulated with regard
to "unrealistic" views of the actual situation. 4 In the examples just discussed,
perceptual input was inaccurate because of the fact that blatantly inaccurate infor-

4Recent data suggest that under some circumstances, at least, the "normals" may be the ones
with the distorted perceptions (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin,
& Barton, 1980). These findings do not alter the applicability of this reasoning, however.
182 9. Absence of Regulation, and Misregulation

mation was being provided by the social environment. In the case of the depressive,
on the other hand, the distortion is inherent in the perceptual process itself. An
even more exaggerated version of this sort of misregulatory process is what occurs
in paranoia. The paranoid's perceptions of even benign and irrelevant events are
greatly distorted, and behavior is consequently misregulated to an even greater
degree.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have attempted to point to ways in which the effective functioning
of the self-regulatory feedback loop can be disrupted. One way in which that can
happen is by the occurrence of a break in the otherwise closed loop. As information
flow ceases, so does self-regulation. The absence of self-regulation at the levels of
Principle and Program control was illustrated by an examination of the literature
of deindividuation. Several side issues concerning the absence of regulation were
also discussed, including the possibility that strong emotions can lead to absence
of regulation at the Program level, and the possibility that attentional processes can
have an impact even on relatively low-level and highly automatic systems. The
remainder of the chapter examined a phenomenon that we have termed misregu-
lation: the active regulation of a system, which results in maladaptive behavior.
This occurs either because an inappropriate standard is provided for the system, or
because the system is utilizing erroneous or irrelevant perceptual input.
Part IV
Interruption, Expectancy, and the
Reassertion-Withdrawal Decision

There is one easily demonstrated fact that has not yet been addressed by the model
of self-regulation presented thus far. Specificall, it is not always easy, or even
possible, to match our behavior or present states to salient standards. The chapters
comprising Part IV address this fact, and expand the model that was presented in
earlier chapters.
Chapter 10 presents our assumptions about what happens when progress toward
a standard is impeded. Stated briefly, we assume that such impediments cause
behavior to be interrupted, and an outcome expectancy judgment to be made.
Subsequent behavior and affect follow from the result of that judgment. In addition
to a broader and more complete statement of these theoretical assumptions, Chapter
10 includes a discussion of the bases of expectancies, and provides concrete illus-
trations of the processes being postulated.
Chapters 11 and 12 are devoted to an extensive discussion of research relevant
to the ideas presented in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 reviews research which indicates
that this aspect of the theory can accurately predict variations in both persistence
and task performance. Research is also discussed which suggests that attributions
for the causes of expectancies are less important for predicting behavior than are
the expectancies themselves. Attributions are quite important, however, in deter-
mining the exact nature of affect associated with favorable and unfavorable out-
comes. These findings are also reviewed in Chapter 11.
In Chapter 12 we examine the implications of the theory for anxiety-related
behavior. Evidence is presented that the awareness of strong anxiety leads to an
interruption of behavior, and that responses to that anxiety-induced interruption
depend upon one's outcome expectancies. Research is also discussed in which the
model is applied to phobic behavior and to test anxiety. A comparison with other
attentional theories of test anxiety indicates that they are subsumed by the present
theory. Moreover, only the present theory accounts for all of the data under dis-
cussion. This chapter closes with a comparison with self-efficacy theory.
Chapter 13 represents an attempt to integrate our ideas with several other areas
of research and theory in personality and social psychology. This chapter includes
184 IV. Interruption, Expectancy, and the Reassertion-Withdrawal Decision

a discussion of achievement motivation, and an attempt to account for aspects of

that literature in terms of the present model. It also includes an examination of
learned helplessness, and of the points of agreement and disagreement between
cognitive models of helplessness and the present model. Chapter 13 closes with a
discussion of tendencies to be ego-defensive or self-esteem protective, and a con-
sideration of how theories organized around such phenomena resemble and differ
from our own approach.
Chapter 10

Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the

Role of Expectancy

"One important set of attributes of (automatic) behavior becomes evident

if the behavior is interrupted: . . . the behavior loses its automatic character
at once; it comes into the focus of attention and one of two things happens.
Either the individual persists in the interrupted act . . . or else he plans
an alternative course of action."
Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970

The model of behavioral self-regulation that has been presented thus far describes
the various processes that are presumed to occur when the self-regulation system
is operating efficiently and smoothly, when there are no obstacles to self-regulation.
To recapitulate, the model holds people to be active (though not necessarily un-
biased) information processors, who go about recognizing and categorizing aspects
of themselves and the various behavioral contexts in which they find themselves.
Sometimes these categorizations imply or have associated with them information
that is used as a standard for subsequent behavior. If attention is self-directed at
that point, it evokes a matching-to-standard sequence, whereby ongoing behavior
is adjusted so that it more closely approximates the standard. Such, we believe, are
the mechanisms by which behavioral self-regulation occurs.
Our model of self-regulation would seem to be complete, but for one final and
important set of considerations. Namely, as was suggested in the opening sentence,
and as was also briefly noted in Chapter 9, the model as presented thus far implicitly
assumes that the self-aware person is capable of adjusting his or her behavior in
the direction of the standard. Although this assumption is often reasonable, some-
times this is not the case. Sometimes there are factors present that interfere with
or impede the active attempt to match to standard. Thus, there are two important
questions to address: What happens when the self-regulation process is disrupted
in some way? And what are the behavioral and affective consequences of such
disruptions? In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss these issues at a conceptual
level. In Chapters 11 and 12, we present some data that we believe support the
theoretical arguments made here.

Interruption of the System: An Example

Let's begin with an example. Consider a student whose standard it is to obtain a
B in her art course. Our "B-minded" student is chosen for several reasons. First,
we feel that such students are not atypical. We should probably add that she is an
electrical engineering major, who doesn't want to spend so much time on her outside
requirements that grades in her primary courses suffer. Yet she does want to maintain
at least a reasonably good overall grade point average.
186 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

A second reason for this particular example is that it allows us to reeemphasize

a point made earlier concerning our use of the word "standard." Standard is used
synonymously with reference signal, a particular value around which a person
regulates his or her behavior. It is not necessarily meant to imply or refer to a
standard of excellence. Our hypothetical student would no doubt agree that an A
constitutes a higher standard of excellence for course performance than a B. But
what guides the behavior of this particular person is the reference value provided
by the B.
The final virtue of this example is that it provides concrete illustrations of what
is meant by interruption of the self-regulation process. We assume that matching
to standard is the normal consequence of self-attention when a behavioral standard
is salient. Thus the effect of self-attention on this student should be to cause her
to regulate her studying behavior so that her course performance is consistently
maintained at approximately a B level. If a self-attention-induced comparison be-
tween the student's reference value and her ongoing course performance were to
reveal a positive discrepancy (e.g., she obtains an A on a weekly quiz), she may
well adjust her studying behavior for this class downward, in order to more closely
approximate what is needed to simply maintain her B. This would allow her to
devote more time to studying for courses in her major. (Note, by the way, that this
also illustrates how we typically deal with multiple goals at the same time, cf.
Simon, 1967.) If a comparison between her present state and standard suggests a
negative discrepancy (e.g., she obtains a C on a weekly quiz), she should begin
to study harder, to reduce the discrepancy.
But what if she studies harder, expending greater and greater amounts of time
and effort, and still doesn't get anywhere? What if subsequent comparisons still
reveal that she is doing only C-Ievel work? At the very least, the student should
begin to become concerned. She may even begin to wonder whether she is capable
of adjusting her ongoing performance to match her reference value. This concern
and wondering is an example of what we mean by an interruption of the behavioral
self-regulation process.
Such interruptions may be quite prolonged, or they may be only momentary. In
terms of our hypothetical student, the interruption could occur in the middle of a
specific part of a specific project, apply only to that part of the project, and last
only a couple of seconds. Or it could occur following the posting of midterm exam
scores, apply to the course as a whole, and last a half hour. (Self-regulation pre-
sumably would continue with respect to other goals, however. Our student probably
wouldn't stand transfixed before the grade sheet, although she might well be preoc-
cupied as she went to lunch.)
In general, we assume that the behavioral self-regulation process will be inter-
rupted whenever a self-aware person experiences (or anticipates experiencing) dif-
ficulty in adjusting his or her behavior in the direction of the reference signal or
standard: that is, whenever discrepancy reduction is or will be difficult to effect.
The interruption can occur prior to the initiation of behavior if, for example, the
person knows ahead of time that the behavior is going to be difficult to execute
successfully. Alternatively, it can occur during the matching to standard sequence,
Response to Interruption: Assessment of Outcome Expectancy 187

if the person encounters difficulty in either selecting or executing the appropriate

operation to move toward the standard.

Response to Interruption: Assessment of Outcome Expectancy

Regardless of the point at which it occurs, an impediment to discrepancy reduction
causes behavior to be momentarily suspended or interrupted. The impediment cre-
ates uncertainty about whether the standard can be successfully matched. The
interruption in behavior is followed by an assessment process, in which information
that would reduce that uncertainty is accessed (cf. Lanzetta, 1963; Lanzetta &
Driscoll, 1968; Swann, Stephenson, & Pittman, in press). This assessment process
yields an outcome expectancy: an estimate of the likelihood that the standard will
be more closely approximated, given the nature of the situation and of the behaviors
available to the person. As was implied above, interruption can occur with regard
to an overall goal, or a component goal. Similarly, the assessment of outcome
expectancy may concern the likelihood of attaining the overall goal, or it may
simply concern the next component goal in the sequence.
As was also indicated above, this assessment of outcome expectancy can vary
greatly in duration, depending upon how much information contributes to the as-
sessment, and how much that information must be manipulated in order to reach
an expectancy judgment. These considerations, in tum, will influence the degree
to which either the assessment process or the expectancy itself is consciously
experienced.
Sometimes an interruption leads to an immediate recognition of how to remove
the impediment, or to the recognition that the impediment can not be removed. For
example, unable to think of the name of a specific artist while writing a paper, our
student may suddenly recall that the artist in question is discussed in a book lying
across the room. The interruption is brief, and the recall of that information causes
an immediate favorable expectancy, which is quickly followed by overt behavior.
It is likely in this case that neither the interruption nor the expectancy will be very
fully represented in awareness.
In other cases, however, the interruption leads to the accessing and examination
of a great deal of information. For example, at midsemester our student may realize
she is buried in the C range in her art course. She seems unable to perceive exactly
what it is that the instructor wants in her written critiques, and wonders if she will
be able to see through the murk in time to raise her grade. While looking over the
comments on her first papers, she finally begins to ascertain a pattern. It looks as
though (a) her prose is too dry and "engineer-like" to suit the instructor, and (b)
she doesn't much care for the instructor's favorite artists. The awareness gradually
dawns that the grade may be salvageable by some judicious changes in her writing
strategy. Knowing how to go about it, our student begins to feel hopeful. And given
the long duration and complex information processing involved, it seems likely that
this assessment process, and the favorable expectancy that results from it, will be
well represented in awareness.
188 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

Bases of Expectancies
Given the importance that we ascribe to expectancy judgments, we should also
devote some attention to the determinants of expectancies. Much of the research
and theorizing on the antecedents of expectancies concern the subjective probabil-
ities of successfully completing particular achievement tasks. In part, this reflects
the central role given expectancies in Atkinson's (1957, 1964) theory of achievement
motivation, from which much of the research stems. We see no compelling reason
to assume that the variables affecting subjective probabilities differ from one domain
of application to the next. Nevertheless, when evaluating the conclusions drawn
in this section, the reader should bear in mind the circumscribed nature of the
experimental evidence.

Prior Success and Failure

If the standard in question is one that a person has attempted to match in the past,
it seems reasonable that prior successes and failures will be major determinants of
expectancies for matching the standard in the future. There is abundant evidence
that this is indeed the case. For example, Feather (1968) asked subjects to complete
15 anagrams. For half the subjects, the first five anagrams were very easy. For the
remaining subjects, the first five anagrams were insoluble. The last 10 anagrams
were of moderate difficulty for both groups. Prior to seeing each anagram, subjects
in each group were asked to estimate their chances of solving it successfully.
Expectancies of success tended to parallel actual performances. The expectancies
of subjects initially given easy anagrams first increased (as they solved the easy
items) and then decreased (as they encountered more difficulty). The opposite
occurred among subjects initially exposed to insoluble anagrams: their outcome
expectancies decreased over the first 5 items and then increased over the last 10.
Nor is this the only study documenting the effects of prior experience on expectancies
(see e.g., Feather, 1966; Feather & Saville, 1967; Jessor & Readio, 1957).
This research establishes a link between prior experience and future outcome
expectancies. Unfortunately, but perhaps not unexpectedly, subsequent research
and theory suggest that this link is not as straightforward as it appears. The com-
plication that arose earliest came from research in the area of locus of control.

Locus of control. The concept of locus of control of reinforcement was introduced

by Rotter nearly two decades ago (Rotter, Seeman, & Liverant, 1962), and has
since remained an integral part of his theory of social learning (for comprehensive
reviews see Lefcourt, 1966, 1976; Phares, 1976; Rotter, 1966). In essence, this
construct concerns variations in the extent to which people believe that they are
responsible for what happens to them. More specifically, locus of control describes
the place (or locus) where the person perceives control over outcomes as residing.
Persons are characterized as having perceptions of internal control if they see their
outcomes as contingent on their own actions. They are characterized as having
Bases of Expectancies 189

perceptions of external control if they see outcomes as being unrelated to their

behavior, and instead caused by chance, fate, or powerful others.
Among other implications of this distinction, it has been suggested that differences
in locus of control may moderate the relationship between prior performances and
future outcome expectancies. Differences in locus of control can arise in two dif-
ferent ways. One of these is situational in nature. That is, situations often contain
cues which suggest that outcomes either are or are not contingent on one's actions.
Phares (1957) studied the effects of this sort of situational variation by having
subjects work on two tasks, one of which was described as being so difficult that
success was largely a matter of luck, the other as depending primarily on the skill
or ability of the person performing it. All subjects received success feedback on
6 of the 13 trials for each task, according to a prearranged schedule. The measure
of expectancy was the number of "chips" subjects were willing to bet on each trial
of the task.
The results of this study were quite clear. Increments in expectancies (following
success) and decrements in expectancy (following failure) proved to be greater and
more frequent when the task was described as skill based than when the task was
described as chance based. Thus, despite the fact that the number and sequence of
successes were identical on each task, prior performances affected expectancies of
future performances only when the outcomes were believed to have been determined
internally (i.e., by skill). These findings have since been corroborated several times
(Holden & Rotter, 1962; Miller & Seligman, 1973; Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne,
1961; Walls & Cox, 1971).
There are also stable individual differences in locus of control. And the mod-
erating effect of this personality dimension on the relationship between prior out-
comes and expectancies has also been examined. In general, the results have been
quite consistent with those deriving from manipulations of locus of control. Internals
adjust their expectancies upward after success and downward after failure to a
greater extent than do externals; indeed externals often exhibit "atypical" expectancy
shifts, i.e., shifts in the direction opposite to the prior outcome (Battle & Rotter,
1963; Feather, 1968; Lefcourt & Ludwig, 1965). Internals also exhibit a tendency
toward more favorable expectancies prior to beginning a task than do externals
(e.g., Strassberg, 1973; Nelson & Phares, 1971). This may reflect an assumption
that people do control outcomes that they are capable of controlling.
The implications of all of these findings seem at first glance to be quite clear.
Based on the data presented thus far, prior performances appear to influence future
outcome expectancies only when the outcomes are perceived as determined by the
person's abilities. This is quite consistent with the procedures of the study which
yielded the basic finding with which we began. That is, Feather (1968) used anagram
solution as his experimental task. It is likely that anagrams are viewed by most
subjects as being ability dependent. Such perceptions may well have been a nec-
essary condition underlying Feather's results.
Although the line of reasoning developed in this section provides a plausible
rationale for the effects of locus of control on the connection between prior per-
formance and subsequent outcome expectancies, it has not gone unchallenged. The
190 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

main critic of this explanation has been Weiner (e.g., Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer,
& Cook, 1972), who contends that the early research in the area confounded two
aspects of causal attribution. It is to a consideration of attribution theory that we
tum next.

Attribution-theory analysis. Attribution theory describes how people attempt to

infer the causes of behavior. Rooted in the theoretical writings of Heider (1958),
this approach has been applied to a broad range of behavioral areas (e.g., Bern,
1967; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Jones & Wortman, 1973;
Kelley, 1967; Schachter, 1964). It is the work of Weiner that is most relevant to
present concerns. His goal has been to develop an attributional model of achievement
motivation, focusing on the causal explanations persons give for their successes and
failures, and how those explanations affect subsequent expectancies and behavior.
The empirical support for his model derives primarily from achievement-related
settings, though he assumes (as have we) that the principles generalize beyond such
settings (e.g., Weiner, 1974).
Weiner begins his analysis by assuming that persons explaining the outcome of
an achievement-related event generally rely on some combination of four causal
elements: ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck (e.g., Weiner, Frieze, Kukla,
Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971). Moreover, these four factors are not used only
to interpret past outcomes, but also to predict future outcomes. Thus expectancy
of success or failure presumably reflects an appraisal of the performer's level of
ability in relation to the difficulty of the task (Heider's "Can"), a consideration of
the amount of effort that is likely to be exerted (Heider's "Try"), and anticipated
luck. The fact that these four elements are readily invoked to explain successes and
failures is now well documented (Elig & Frieze, 1975, 1979; Frieze, 1976; see
Weiner et aI., 1971, for a discussion of how people come to use each factor).
Weiner has repeatedly suggested that these four causes of success and failure fall
within the confines of a two-dimensional taxonomy (Weiner et aI., 1971; Weiner
et aI., 1972). The first dimension is the same as that proposed by Rotter (1966):
Specifically, two of the elements (ability and effort) describe qualities internal to
the person performing the task; the other two elements (task difficulty and luck)
are external to the person. In addition, two of the elements (ability and task difficulty)
are relatively stable qualities, whereas the other two (effort and luck) can be more
variable. Thus the four causal elements in Weiner's model comprise two orthogonal
dimensions: locus of control (internal versus external) and stability (stable versus
variable). 1

lWe should note that these are not the only dimensions on which attributions can differ. A
third dimension, first proposed by Heider (1958), has to do with the extent to which the
cause is perceived as intentional or controllable. Effort is likely to be perceived as intentional;
other causes, like task difficulty and ability, are likely to be viewed as unintentional. Although
this dimension seems to be important in certain contexts (see, e.g., Ickes & Kidd, 1976),
it is at least partially correlated with the stability dimension. That is, intentionality implies
volitional control, which in tum implies instability.
Bases of Expectancies 191

Let us now tum to the question of how attributions of causality influence the
link between prior performance and future outcome expectancy. Weiner assumes
that the magnitude of expectancy shifts following success and failure depends upon
the stability of the attribution made for the prior outcome (Weiner et al., 1971;
Weiner, 1974). When causes are perceived as stable, future outcomes on the task
should be foreseen quite clearly and with a high degree of certainty. If causes are
perceived as changeable, on the other hand, there should be greater doubt that the
prior success or failure will be repeated (see Wollert, 1979, however, for yet
another alternative viewpoint, based on the confidence that the person has in the
expectancy).
Weiner's position on this matter is in direct contradiction to the position taken
by Phares (1957) and Rotter et al. (1961), who maintained that expectancy shifts
were a function of internality versus externality. It is important to note, however,
that the latter theorists had not even considered the stability dimension. Thus their
findings are quite ambiguous in this regard. That is, in both the Phares (1957) and
Rotter et al. (1961) studies, locus of control was varied by inducing some subjects
to believe that the experimental task was either skill related or luck related. While
it is true that skill is an internal quality and luck is external, it is also true that skill
is a stable quality while luck is variable. Thus internality was perfectly confounded
with stability in those earlier studies.
Fortunately, this ambiguity has been resolved to a considerable extent by sub-
sequent research, in which internality and stability have been assessed and/or ma-
nipulated independently. In general, the majority of this research has tended to
support Weiner's position. Stability seems to be a much more important determinant
of expectancy shifts following success or failure than does internality (e.g., Diener
& Dweck, 1978; Dweck, 1975; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973; Fontaine, 1974;
McMahan, 1973; Meyer, 1980; Weiner et aI., 1972; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Gold-
stein, 1976). With regard to the effects of individual differences in locus of control,
the picture is somewhat less clear. One obvious possibility, however (which appears
not to have been addressed empirically), is that the internality and stability dimen-
sions are confounded in the items of Rotter's (1966) scale measuring locus of
control.
Taken together, these various findings add considerable credence to Weiner's
position regarding the importance of causal stability in producing expectancy shifts.
As such, they also indicate a different boundary condition for the
performance-expectancy link uncovered by Feather (1968). That is, prior perform-
ances are likely to determine a person's future subjective probability of success only
to the extent that those prior outcomes are attributed to stable, enduring factors.

Other Bases for Expectancies

In the preceding section we discussed the effects of prior performances on future
outcome expectancy. Although this is the most obvious and perhaps the most
important determinant of future outcome expectancies (cf. Chapman & Volkmann,
1939), it is certainly not the only determinant (see e.g., Jones, R.A., 1977). Indeed,
192 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

if a person has never attempted a task in the past, there is no prior performance
information.
Even if people have had no prior experience at particular tasks, however, they
may still be able to arrive at reasonable estimates of outcome expectancy by taking
into consideration the performances of similar others (cf. Festinger, 1950, 1954).
Norms provide important information concerning the difficulty of the task at hand.
Knowledge of task difficulty in tum should help to assess the kind of outcome one
is likely to receive, even on a task being attempted for the first time. In fact, as
Weiner et al. (1971) have noted, this is usually the way in which outcome expec-
tancies for novel tasks are manipulated in the laboratory-Le., providing subjects
with differential information about the presumed performances of similar others.
The fact that persons do engage in such social comparison processes to arrive at
outcome expectancies is well documented (see e.g., Feather, 1963a, 1965).
We might at this point venture a prediction about the kinds of persons who
should be most likely to use social norm information in formulating outcome
expectancies. At several previous points in the book we have touched on the
implications of private and public self-consciousness for a variety of different
behaviors and processes. One of these dimensions may also be important here.
Research presented in Chapter 8 demonstrated that persons high in public self-
consciousness are particularly likely to compare their own performances to the
performance norms generated by others. It is only a small extrapolation to assume
that persons high in public self-consciousness are likely to use normative infor-
mation in other ways as well. Specifically, perhaps they are also more likely to
utilize social norms in determining outcome expectancies than are persons lower
in public self-consciousness.
Our discussion of task outcomes up to this point has focused in one fashion or
another on ability, effort, luck, and task difficulty as determinants of performances
and thus expectancies. It should be obvious, however, that other variables can have
an impact as well: factors such as fatigue, the actions of powerful others, illness,
mood, and the nature of one's physical setting (Elig & Frieze, 1975, 1979; Frieze,
1976; Triandis, 1972). The importance of some of these variables, e.g., powerful
others, becomes even more obvious when generalizing beyond achievement set-
tings.
Indeed, an examination of this broader range of contexts suggests the importance
of yet additional variables, independent of attributions. For example, an important
consideration is the degree of flexibility of the state or behavior in question. Behavior
that was done in the past and cannot be repeated (or its effects undone) becomes
a permanent part of one's present existence. If the action created or left unaltered
a substantial discrepancy with regard to a salient comparison value, expectancies
with regard to that discrepancy will invariably be negative. (Fortunately, however,
most self-relevant dimensions are such that a variety of actions can contribute to
discrepancy reduction, and there are not too many behaviors that cannot be reat-
tempted.)
There is also a temporal issue to consider here. Some goals are achieved only
over long periods of time, e.g., becoming a successful professional at one's chosen
Consequences of Expectancy Judgments 193

field of endeavor. An expectancy judgment that is made regarding this sort of goal
could take many different forms. That is, the person may take the time dimension
into account (if things keep going this way over the next five years, will I be
successful?); but nothing ensures that the person will do so (I'm only this far; how
can I ever be successful?). The importance of this issue stems from the fact that
outcome assessments on very slowly changing dimensions presumably will yield
quite different results, depending on whether or not the temporal factor is taken
into account in the judgment process.

Consequences of Expectancy Judgments

Regardless of the basis of the person's outcome expectancy, and the factors taken
into account in arriving at it, an expectancy judgment has two potential conse-
quences. One is behavioral, the other affective. These are discussed in tum in the
following two sections.

Behavioral Consequences
Our position on the behavioral reactions to expectancy judgments is quite simple.
We assume a sort of psychological "watershed" among responses. If expectancies
are favorable, the result is a return to the discrepancy reduction attempt. If expec-
tancies are unfavorable, the result is an impetus to withdraw from the attempt (cf.
Lewin, 1935). All responses seem implicitly to fall into one or the other of these
two categories. (Figure 10-1 portrays in schematic form our assumptions about the
interruption of behavior and the behavioral consequences of the expectancy judg-
ments that follow such interruptions.)2
There are several additional points to be made concerning these behavioral effects.
First, given an unfavorable expectancy, if withdrawal is possible and is not asso-
ciated with aversive consequences of its own, physical withdrawal from the situation
that evokes the behavioral dimension or the standard in question is likely to occur.
It should be apparent, however, that there are times and places in which physical
withdrawal is precluded by situational constraints. In such cases, the withdrawal
impetus may not be expressed behaviorally. Instead it may lead to a sort of mental
withdrawal from the dimension, a disengagement from it, a refusal to consider it
further.
Some of the manifestations of this mental disengagement as it occurs in achieve-
ment settings have been well described by Heckhausen (1967, p. 109): "A change
in the valence of the task may occur during the performance period as a function
of (failure) feedback; even a complete reapperception of the situation may take

2We have chosen not to discuss the expectancy assessment process in control-theory terms.
It should be obvious, however, that the resulting judgment is a yes-or-no (binary) decision,
and thus can be viewed as a TOTE process (see Chapter 2 for greater detail on this point,
and see Powers, 1973a, p. 68, for a plausible way of construing the assessment itself).
194 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

+
SELF-FOCUS

ATTEMPT
BEHAVIORAL
CONFORMITY

MATCH
(EXIT)
STANDARD

ASSESS
OUTCOME
EXPECTANCY

YES

WITHDRAW
FROM FURTHER
ATTEMPT

WITHDRAW WITHDRAW
PHYSICALLY MENTALLY

Fig. 10-1. Flow chart illustration of behavioral consequences of interruption of discrepancy

reduction sequence and assessment of outcome expectancy. (Adapted from Carver, 1979.)

place such as 'going-out-of-the-field' ... in the face of threatening experiences

or prospects of failure." Describing the results of of several studies, he goes on
to say that as a result of intensive failure, " ... cognitive functioning deteriorated
greatly. It no longer was possible to divide up the task into problems to be solved,
and the result was ... complete thought disintegration." We would regard this
behavioral and cognitive deterioration as reflecting an impulse to withdraw from
the setting.
Consequences of Expectancy Judgments 195

This mental withdrawal can be reflected in several different ways. It may result
in impaired performance, as task-relevant information is not noticed or utilized. Or
it may lead to an avoidance of stimuli that remind one of the behavioral dimension
or the existing discrepancy. For example, as was suggested in Chapter 8, one might
expect the person with unfavorable expectancies to avoid-rather than seek out-
diagnostic information about his or her abilities on the task-relevant dimension (cf.
Halisch & Heckhausen, 1977; Hanusa & Schulz, in press; Kirschenbaum & Karoly,
1977; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1973).
A second point to be made here is that it is not easy to specify the subjective
probability level at which the discrepancy reduction attempt no longer occurs and
the withdrawal impetus instead takes its place. It seems likely that this will vary
with individuals (cf. Jones, R.A., 1977), with the behavioral dimension in question,
and with the behavioral options available. One consideration that probably plays
a major role is the importance of the behavioral dimension (cf. Rosenberg, 1965).
That is, it seems reasonable to suggest that a goal which subjectively is very
important will continue to be pursued even if the subjective probability of attaining
it is very slim. On the other hand, less negative expectancies may cause one to
withdraw from what is seen as a more trivial goal.
Another aspect of this problem stems from the fact that there are variations in
the degree to which the attainment of a subordinate goal reduces a discrepancy
regarding a superordinate goal. The achievement of one subordinate goal may
entirely eliminate the discrepancy (e.g., in the example with which we began the
chapter, our hypothetical student's grade may be 80% dependent on her final
exam-if she gets a B on it, previous C's don't matter). The achievement of another
goal may be much less effective in doing so (e.g., a B on a given quiz may
contribute only 5% to her grade-a B here is less impactful). The two subordinate
goals thus have very different incentive values. In effect, one is more important
than the other. We would assume that the expectancy watershed would occur at
a lower SUbjective probability of goal attainment for a high-incentive than a low-
incentive goal.
A third point that deserves mention is the notion that more accessible goals may
be substituted for the original goal, if the original goal seems very unlikely to be
attained (cf. Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944). In effect, this represents
a withdrawal from the original standard of comparison, but not a withdrawal from
the behavioral dimension. The initial withdrawal is followed by the specification
of a different standard, and the discrepancy reduction process is then applied to the
new standard.
A fourth point concerns the effectiveness of various goal-attainment strategies
when discrepancy reduction takes place only over very long periods of time. As
suggested earlier, evidence of progress toward such goals is usually quite slow to
accumulate, and must be weighted by temporal considerations. If one fails to take
the time factor into account, the result may often be that a successful outcome looks
less likely than it actually is. This, in tum, dampens one's efforts.
An effective strategy in such cases would seem to be to break the overall goal
down into components or subgoals, each of which may be mastered in shorter
196 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

periods of time, and each of which depends on fewer concrete actions than the
overall goal (cf. Lewin, 1951). It seems likely that expectancies regarding a given
subgoal would be more favorable than those pertaining to the more elaborate goal.
Focus on the intermediate goals thus provides a way of ensuring continued efforts.
Such strategies, which are often quite effective (cf. Freidman, Chodoff, Mason,
& Hamberg, 1963), need not be restricted to goals where time is a major factor,
of course. They are applicable whenever goal attainment requires elaborate actions.
Wright (1978, p. 21) has made this point quite graphically: "The longest journey,
the Chinese say, begins with a single step. I might add that if you think of a journey
as one great step, you'll probably never go anywhere."
Finally, we should note explicitly our assumption regarding the role played by
self-directed attention in these behavioral responses. As is the case when behavior
has never been interrupted in the first place, self-focus enhances the discrepancy
reduction tendency that follows from favorable outcome expectancies. Self-focus
is also assumed to enhance the execution of the withdrawal impulse that follows
from unfavorable expectancies.
To illustrate some of the points made in the preceding paragraphs, let us return
once more to our electrical engineering student, struggling through her art course.
Her goal was to study just hard enough to obtain a grade of B, but subsequent
attempts to regulate her behavior with respect to that reference point were proving
ineffective. Her difficulty in matching to standard caused her to size up her situation.
In a very real sense, our student was faced with an approach-withdrawal decision.
On the one hand, she could continue her attempts to perform at a B level, thereby
matching her standard. On the other hand, she could simply abandon her efforts
and give up. According to our model, if her outcome assessment yields a positive
expectancy-if, for example, she comes to believe that her past inadequate per-
formance was due to not trying hard enough, or due to a problem of misplaced
emphasis-we would expect her to return to her discrepancy reduction attempt with
increased vigor. In contrast, if her assessment of the situation and her capabilities
yields a negative expectancy, we might expect her to stop trying to adjust her
behavior to her previous standard. She might withdraw physically (literally withdraw
from the course). But there might be constraints that prevent that possibility (e.g.,
she can't afford to lose the tuition dollars, or her family would give her a bad time
about dropping a course). In the latter case, we might expect a mental withdrawal
from her course efforts, perhaps followed by the taking up of a less demanding
standard (a C-level performance).
As was indicated earlier, our position regarding the behavioral effects of the
outcome expectancy judgment is quite simple: we assume a dichotomy in behavior,
paralleling a dichotomy in expectancies. But the simplicity of this reasoning also
renders it quite general. That is, it is immaterial whether the expectancy is derived
from an attributional analysis of previous performance outcomes, or from social
comparison, or simply from an examination of the constraints of one's setting or
one's personal resources. What dictates the behavioral response is the person's
outcome expectancy.
Consequences of Expectancy Judgments 197

Relationship to Other Theories

The notion that expectancies play an important role in the determination of behavior
is not new with us, of course. It has enjoyed a long and illustrious history among
theorists interested in motivational issues, or at least among those theorists in the
"cognitive" camp.
The beginnings of a cognitive approach to motivation are probably best traced
back to the work of Tolman during the 1920s and 1930s (e.g., Tolman, 1932,
1938). Briefly stated, Tolman contended that an organism learns by acquiring
knowledge about the likelihood of particular actions leading to particular outcomes.
By virtue of having repeatedly experienced a sequence of events leading to a
consistent outcome in a particular context, the organism comes to anticipate the
goal state even in its absence. For Tolman, this explains why an organism behaved
the way it did: it had learned to expect that its behaviors were linked to predictable
outcomes. This also explains why Tolman at times referred to his theory as ex-
pectancy theory.
Nor is Tolman the only motivational theorist to have emphasized expectancies.
What Tolman initially called expectancy of the goal is discussed as the subjective
probability of attaining the goal by decision theorists interested in economic behavior
(e.g., Edwards, W., 1953, 1954, 1960) and by Lewin and his colleagues (Lewin,
1935, 1938; Lewin et aI., 1944). Lewin and his co-workers, in particular, have
investigated phenomena that bear a strong conceptual resemblance to the phenomena
we are addressing here. There are, however, some difficulties in mapping constructs
from our model directly onto the constructs with which they worked.
The work of Lewin and his colleagues is widely identified with the phrase "level
of aspiration" (see Lewin et aI., 1944, for a review). They did write about goals
and aspirations. But as used in their writing, these terms do not necessarily convey
the same meanings as we wish to convey. Lewin et aI. noted, for example, that
there are many potential kinds of goals that need to be considered. There are "ideal
goals," which represent the outcome the person would really like to attain, even
if knowing that such an outcome is vanishingly unlikely. There are also "action
goals," which represent the level of attainment that the person is presently under-
taking to reach. It is the action goal that is commonly taken as the person's "level
of aspiration" (see Lewin et aI., 1944, p. 335). But neither of these constructs
corresponds precisely to our own image of a goal as a behavioral standard. The
action goal-which seems in most respects the closer---<.:onfounds two things: the
level that the person would like to attain, and the person's expectancy of being able
to attain it. We would prefer to keep these concepts separated. We would argue,
for example, that initial changes in aspiration level that occur as a function of task
outcomes would reflect changes in expectancy rather than changes in desire for the
goal.
There are other problems, as well, in trying to compare these theories (and
research literatures). For example, most early research on level of aspiration made
use of discrete trial-by-trial goal units. This makes it somewhat difficult to know
198 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

how overall goals fit into the theorists' conceptual scheme (cf. Lewin et aI., 1944,
p. 377). Moreover, in assessing levels of aspiration in a given study, there are
problems of measurement associated with subjects' interpretations of the questions
being asked. That is, some subjects apparently viewed such items as inquiries as
to what levels they wanted to attain; others viewed them as inquiries as to the level
they actually thought they would attain, given constraints of ability, task difficulty,
and so on. This again illustrates the need to separate expectancies from the goals
themselves. There are other points at which our model is similar to the ideas
discussed by Lewin et al. (1944), but further elaboration of these similarities is
beyond the scope of this discussion. We wish simply to make two points: First, our
ideas are clearly related conceptually to that previous work. Second, the relationship
is considerably more subtle than is apparent at first glance.
Among more recent theories, there are two that we wish to mention briefly, and
three that we wish to defer for later discussion in greater depth. Stotland's (1969)
analysis of "hope" as a psychological construct warrants some mention here because
it has certain similarities to our positions regarding both behavior and affect (to be
discussed later on in the chapter). Stotland used the term hope to refer to the
perception of a high probability of attaining a desired goal. The perception of a low
probability of goal attainment was termed anxiety. Hope is associated with goal-
oriented striving. Anxiety, on the other hand, is associated with avoidance.
Another theory with indirect relevance to our position regarding expectancies is
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1950, 1954). As we suggested in Chapters 7
and 8, social comparison processes can be viewed as providing a vehicle for the
events that we have treated as basic to behavioral self-regulation. That is, social
comparison provides a basis for the determination of behavioral standards (i. e., via
a group consensus), and for enhanced conformity to those standards (which follows
from examining the discrepancy between one's own position and the group's po-
sition). But social comparison theory also incorporates another facet. If the dis-
crepancy between the individual and the group remains substantial, there is a
tendency for either the individual or the group to withdraw from comparison with
the other (Festinger, 1954, p. 128, ff.). Holding in abeyance the tendency of the
group to reject a deviate (Schachter, 1951), the tendency of the individual to
withdraw from continued comparison with the group's standard seems not unlike
the withdrawal impetus we have postulated here. The person views the probability
of discrepancy reduction as low, and withdraws from the attempt.
There are at least three additional areas of theory and research that share our
emphasis on expectancies as a determinant of behavior. These are the theory of
achievement motivation devised by Atkinson (1957, 1964), recent cognitive anal-
yses of learned helplessness, and Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Because each of
these constructs has been quite prominent in recent years, we have addressed each
in some detail in later sections of the book. Achievement motivation and helplessness
are discussed in Chapter 13, and self-efficacy theory in Chapter 12. Let us now
tum, however, to a final aspect of our own theory.
Consequences of Expectancy Judgments 199

Affective Consequences of Expectancy Judgments

In addition to its impact on subsequent behavior, the assessment of favorable and
unfavorable outcome expectancies can also have affective consequences. (We have
assumed that an uninterrupted discrepancy-reduction process, on the other hand,
is relatively affect-free; see Chapter 8, or Carver, 1979.) The perception that one
cannot alter behavior into closer conformity with the salient standard leads to
negative affect-feelings of frustration, depression, or upset. A favorable expect-
ancy, on the other hand, leads to positive affect-feelings of elation, favorable
anticipation, or hope (cf. Stotland, 1969).3 The intensity of the affect-positive or
negative-produced by an expectancy judgment is presumed to be proportional to
the subjective importance of the behavioral dimension and the magnitude of the
discrepancy.
In this model, it is the person's outcome expectancy that determines the general
tone of the emotion that is experienced-i.e., positive or negative. But the specific
nature of the affect is determined by other considerations. These additional con-
siderations may be viewed most simply as comprising an attributional analysis of
the basis for the outcome expectancy. If outcome expectancy is favorable, the
associated positive feelings can take either of two forms. If the expectancy is viewed
as being a product of one's own efforts or abilities, the feeling is one of heightened
self-esteem (see Table 10-1). If the expectancy is viewed instead as resulting from
aspects of the environment, e.g., powerful and helpful others, or a situation that
happens to be arranged to one's benefit, the feeling experienced is one of gratitude. 4
Similarly, unfavorable expectancies may be reflected affectively in either of two
ways. If the expectancy is seen as a product of one's own inadequacies or personal
failings, the result is lowered self-esteem. If the expectancy depends instead upon
environmental contingencies, e.g., powerful and hostile others, or frustrations pro-
duced by time constraints, the feelings experienced are more likely to be anger and
resentment.
This analysis of the affective consequences of expectancy judgments is quite
similar to a position taken recently (and independently) by Weiner, Russell, and

3This relationship is implicit in a statement by Wolfgang Pauli (quoted in Kuhn, T.S., 1962,
1970) upon the publication of a paper by Heisenberg which suggested a new direction for
theory in physics: " ... (it) has again given me hope and joy in life. To be sure, it does not
supply the solution to the riddle, but I believe it is again possible to march forward." It is
also one implication of Robert Louis Stevenson's statement that "to travel hopefully is better
than to arrive."
4Note that in some cases the goal is specifically to "do it by myself." In these cases any
assistance from somone else would actually induce an unfavorable expectancy regarding the
goal, and would produce resentment rather than gratitude. This illustrates the importance of
knowing exactly what the self-defined behavioral standard is in any given instance.
200 10. Theory: Interrupting the Feedback Loop, and the Role of Expectancy

Table 10-1. Mfective Consequences of Outcome

Expectancies and Attributions Regarding the Bases of
Those Expectancies

Favorable Unfavorable
outcome outcome
expectancies expectancies

Cause Negative feelings Positive feelings

Self-attributed High self-esteem Low self-esteem

Other-attributed Gratitude Anger,
resentment

Lerman (1978, 1979; see also Weiner, 1979). The predictive adequacy of this
position has been investigated by those authors in research discussed in the following
chapter.
The fact that outcome expectancy judgments can have both behavioral and af-
fective consequences raises an additional question about the relationship between
those consequences. Is the behavior a response to the affect generated by the
assessment? Are the two responses relatively independent? Are they perhaps in-
versely related (cf. Leventhal, 1980)? We can make no definitive statement on this
issue. However, it does seem clear that situational variables will playa major role
in determining which mode of response predominates. This seems particularly clear
with regard to the effects of unfavorable expectancies. That is, when the situation
permits withdrawal, the behavioral response should dominate, and affect should be
less prominent. When the situation prevents withdrawal, however, behavior ob-
viously is restrained, and the experience of negative affect should be more pro-
nounced.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have discussed what we believe follows from an impediment to
discrepancy reduction. In such circumstances, behavior is interrupted and an out-
come assessment ensues. The product of this assessment process can depend upon
a great many factors: e.g., perceptions of the situation and one's resources, social
comparison information, and attribution-influenced memories of prior behaviors.
Whatever its basis, however, a favorable expectancy leads to positive affect and/
or a return to the matching-to-standard attempt. An unfavorable expectancy leads
to negative affect and/or a withdrawal impetus. If physical withdrawal is prevented,
the result may be a mental withdrawal from the behavioral dimension. Both the
reassertion and the withdrawal impetus are exaggerated by further self-focus.
Which of these two behavioral responses occurs is held to be a product solely
Chapter Summary 201

of outcome expectancies; other contingencies such as attributions influence behavior

only to the degree that they impact on outcome expectancy. Affective experiences,
however, are specifically predicted to differ as a function of attributions for the
expectancy. Thus the major influence of attributions in this model is to determine
the form of affect that is experienced. Support for the various assumptions of the
model is reviewed in the following two chapters.
Chapter 11

Research: Persistence and Task Performance

In the preceding chapter we described a theoretical model of the interactive effects

of self-directed attention and outcome expectancies. In this chapter we review a
variety of research that directly and indirectly supports that model. This research
utilized several different dependent measures for assessing discrepancy-reduction
attempts and withdrawal, including both persistence and performance measures. In
addition, self-attention was varied both by experimental manipulations and by in-
dividual differences. Finally, outcome expectancies were varied in several different
ways. Thus, there are three different respects in which the research taken as a whole
incorporates a broad degree of generality.
We should note that our theoretical model assumes that behavior is interrupted
spontaneously when progress toward a standard is impeded. Though we believe this
to be the case, none of the research discussed in this chapter examined the inter-
ruption process per se. Some indirect evidence of the existence of such a process
in a different behavioral domain is presented in Chapter 12, however.

Early Research
Two studies that were conducted outside the framework of this model provided an
initial indication that self-attention does not always lead to discrepancy reduction.
At the time they were conducted, the results were generally interpreted as indicating
that self-focus is aversive whenever a large discrepancy is salient. We now believe,
however, that they can be seen as partial demonstrations of an interaction between
self-focus and the person's expectancies about discrepancy reduction. The studies
were conducted by Duval, Wicklund, and Fine (1972) and by Gibbons and Wicklund
(1976).

Discrepancy and the Avoidance of Self-Focusing Stimuli

In the earlier of these two studies (Duval et aI., 1972), subjects were led to ex-
perience either a sizable discrepancy or no discrepancy between their present states
and what was presumed to be salient as a standard of comparison. More specifically,
204 11. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

each subject was given bogus feedback regarding her score on a personality test.
This test-ostensibly taken several weeks earlier-was said to be strongly related
to intelligence and creativity. Subjects were told that they had scored either in the
upper 10% of the distribution, or in the lower 10%.
Before delivering this information, the experimenter had told the subject that
since the study would take only a few minutes, all participants were being asked
to serve in a second brief experiment on visual perception. After delivering the
bogus test score, the experimenter indicated that it was time for the second procedure
to begin. The subject was then escorted to a second room. This room contained
both a large wall mirror and a TV camera, either facing the subject's chair or facing
away. The first experimenter expressed surprise that the other experimenter was
not there, and indicated that the subject should wait for him for about five minutes.
The second experimenter actually never arrived. The dependent measure of in-
terest was the amount of time that passed before the subject left the experimental
room. It was predicted that subjects in whom self-attention had been induced would
leave the room more quickly than less self-attentive subjects, and that this difference
would be greatest among subjects with the largest within-self discrepancies. The
data confirmed these predictions. The large discrepancy-self-focused subjects with-
drew from the room reliably earlier than did subjects in any other condition. The
difference between means in the small discrepancy condition fell far short of sig-
nificance. [Subsequent research has found, in fact, that there is a tendency to seek
out self-focusing stimuli when one has matched one's behavior to personal standards
(Greenberg & Musham, in press.)] The Duval et al. findings thus appear to suggest
that when there is a large discrepancy between one's perceived performance status
and the salient standard of comparison, self-focus enhances the tendency to withdraw
from reminders of that discrepancy.

Discrepancy and Selective Exposure to Self

Additional support for that conclusion came from a study conducted by Gibbons
and Wicklund (1976). In that study male subjects were treated in one of two ways
by an attractive female confederate (in individual sessions). She was either very
friendly, or cold and unfriendly. Among the latter set of subjects this should have
created a discrepancy between their perceived social success and the level of success
they would have preferred. Following this manipulation, subjects were provided
an opportunity to listen to tape recordings of their own voices, which had been
made prior to the encounter with the confederate. Subjects who had been rebuffed
by the confederate listened to their own voices significantly less than did subjects
who had had more pleasant encounters. Again it appears that the presence of a
large discrepancy-in this case exemplified as an apparent unacceptability to an
attractive member of the opposite sex-led subjects to withdraw from focusing on
the self. Additional evidence suggesting that self-focus is aversive when large
discrepancies are salient has also been reported by Archer, Hormuth, and Berg
(1979).
Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy 205

Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy

Later studies by a number of investigators have elaborated upon those earlier find-
ings, however, and made more explicit their limitations and boundary conditions.
One important experiment in this regard was conducted by Steenbarger and Aderman
(1979).

Avoidance and the Flexibility of the Discrepancy

Steenbarger and Aderman noted that the relevant behavioral dimensions in the
previous studies had been such that the experimentally-created discrepancies were
always inflexible. That is, in the Duval et al. study, subjects' perceptions of their
test performances were fixed and unchangeable. It was implicit that the test would
not be retaken. Thus subjects could not expect to be able to reduce the discrepancy,
no matter how much they might wish to do so. In the Gibbons and Wicklund study,
subjects who had been rebuffed presumably felt a similar inability to do anything
about their social failure. They probably would not have anticipated future inter-
action with the woman in question, and if they had, they would hardly have expected
a more successful interaction than had taken place earlier.
The notion that the discrepancy must be relatively fixed in order for avoidance
to occur was implicit in the reasoning behind those studies from the very beginning
(see Duval & Wicklund, 1972). It should be noted, however, that the early oper-
ationalizations of that notion had the effect of creating a perfect confound in those
studies between the size of the discrepancy that had been created and the reducibility
of the discrepancy. That is, the only control groups used were persons in whom
no discrepancy had been produced. As Steenbarger and Aderman (1979) pointed
out, in order to be sure what is causing the effect it is also necessary to examine
the behavior of people in whom a large discrepancy had been induced, but who
perceived the discrepancy as being flexible or potentially reducible. Under these
circumstances, Steenbarger and Aderman argued, self-focus should not be aversive,
and should not lead to withdrawal.
This reasoning was tested in an experiment patterned after the one conducted by
Duval et al. Female subjects were led to perceive relatively large discrepancies on
the dimension of "self-expression." Before this discrepancy was created, however,
the subject was first led to conceive of the self-expression dimension as being either
very flexible or very inflexible. Subjects in the flexible condition were told that the
techniques that would be made available to subjects later on were very effective
ways to alter one's self-expression ability, and were even in commercial use for
that purpose. Subjects in the inflexible condition were told that previous research
had led to the conclusion that one's speaking patterns are fixed for life, and that
the procedures to be used could not really be expected to produce substantial gains.
Each subject then made a 2-minute impromptu speech, which was tape recorded
for later use as a self-awareness manipulation. The tape having been made, the
experimenter gave the subject feedback on her speech, ostensibly based on several
206 11. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

criteria of speaking dynamics. This critique unifonnly indicated that the subject's
perfonnance had been poorer than average.
After a brief reminder of the flexibility or inflexibility of the trait in question,
the subject was asked to work on questionnaires, actually a series of mood ratings.
During the first 45 seconds of this period, self-awareness was manipulated by
playing (under a pretext) a portion of either the subject's just-recorded speech or
the speech of another subject. The experimenter said that he was going to be setting
up some equipment in another room, and that the subject should go to that room
when the fonns had been completed. As in the study by Duval et al., a major
dependent measure was the amount of time that elapsed before the subject left the
room. A second measure of interest was the subject's self-reported mood.
Analysis of subjects' mood reports yielded a significant interaction between the
self-focus and flexibility variables. Subjects in the high self-awareness-inflexible
condition reported significantly more negative affect than did subjects in any other
condition. The other conditions did not differ from each other. Thus even though
a large discrepancy did exist for subjects in the flexible condition, this discrepancy
was such that self-attention did not lead to increased subjective aversiveness. Con-
ceptually similar results emerged from the analysis of subjects' latencies to emerge
from the experimental room. Subjects in the inflexible-high self-focus condition
left the room significantly faster than did subjects in the other three conditions,
none of which differed from each other. Steenbarger and Adennan concluded from
these findings that self-focus is aversive-and prompts avoidance of self-focusing
cues-only if the discrepancy is seen as inflexible.

Self-Focus and Expectancies: Persistence and Withdrawal

The Steenbarger and Adennan study makes an important point. But even that study
is one step removed from our theoretical model. That is, their manipulation of
flexibility would seem to have led to the perception on the subject's part that
discrepancy reduction was not only possible, but very likely (i.e., it would produce
a favorable expectancy). Indeed, Steenbarger and Adennan suggested that subjects
in the flexible condition might have felt that such gains were virtually assured, thus
even reducing their motivation to exert effort. But those researchers did not actually
attempt to manipulate their subjects' expectancies. Because expectancies are central
to our model, however, we subsequently conducted an experiment in which we
focused more specifically on that aspect of subjects' experience. Rather than ma-
nipulate the perceived flexibility of the behavioral dimension, we simply manipu-
lated subjects' situational expectancies of being able to reduce the discrepancy in
question.
This research (Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979b) was portrayed to subjects as
part of an ongoing evaluation of several tests of abstract reasoning that were being
developed by members of the psychology department. It was emphasized that the
dimensions assessed by these instruments are quite important in a variety of be-
havioral domains. Each subject was led to anticipate working on two sets of items,
which would come from different tests. Both sets of items, however, ostensibly
Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy 207

measured the same general capabilities. The experimenter indicated further that
some of the item sets had been tested rather extensively in the past. In such cases,
available information would be printed along with the instructions for the item set.
Each subject then was given a list of anagrams. Along with the instructions for
the anagrams was a set of bogus performance norms indicating that previous subjects
had solved an average of approximately seven anagrams (from a total of nine). In
reality, the anagrams were extremely difficult, and in some cases insoluble. Subjects'
performances on this task were uniformly poor, thus creating a large discrepancy
between their test performances and their desired levels of attainment. The exper-
imenter also commented on the subject's poor performance, thus ensuring that this
discrepancy would be quite salient for every subject.
At this point the manipulation of expectancy was introduced. The experimenter
looked up the second task that the subject had been assigned to work on. In the
negative expectancy condition, after determining that the subject would be working
on "design problems," the experimenter remarked that people's scores on that task
were typically very similar to their scores on the anagrams. The fact that the subject
had done so poorly on the anagrams did not bode well for the second task, and the
subject probably should anticipate not doing very well on the design problems.
In the positive expectancy condition, the experimenter indicated that the subject
had gotten a break on her second task assignment, that even though both item sets
measure the same capabilities, they do so in quite different ways. In fact, she
indicated, people who do poorly on anagrams often do quite well on designprob-
lems. This remark was expected to lead subjects to have favorable expectancies
of being able to make up for their poor anagram performances on the design
problems.
The subject then was escorted to a second experimental room, where a second
experimenter (blind to expectancy condition) took over. This experimenter gave the
subject a set of instructions for the second task, which ostensibly would consist of
four items, only one of which could be attempted at a time. The items (after Feather,
1961) were geometric designs that the subject had to trace in a continuous, non-
overlapping line. The subject was to work on one either until it was solved or until
she wished to progress to the next item. Once she went ahead, she could not return
to a previously unsolved item.
After these instructions had been given to the subject, she was moved to the table
at which she would be working on the test items. On this table there either was or
was not a large wall mirror. After collecting a measure of the subject's expectancy
of doing well on this task, the experimenter gave the subject the first design problem
and told the subject to let her know either when she had solved it or when she
wished to go ahead to the next item. The experimenter then retreated to another
desk, where she busied herself with paperwork. The design problem was in fact
impossible to solve according to the task instructions. The measure of interest was
the amount of time that the subject spent trying to solve it, which was surreptitiously
recorded by the experimenter. When the subject indicated that she wanted the next
problem, the experimenter recorded the elapsed time, and the session was termi-
nated.
208 11. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

Analysis of manipulation-check data indicated that the manipulation of subjects'

outcome expectancies had had its intended effect. Subjects differed reliably in their
self-reported expectancies of doing well on the design problems as a function of
their expectancy condition, and no other effect on this variable approached signif-
icance. There was, however, evidence that the negative expectancy manipulation
had had a larger impact than the positive expectancy manipulation. That is, subjects
in the latter condition were very noncommital, reporting almost exactly "neutral"
expectancies.
Analysis of the persistence data revealed an interaction between the expectancy
and self-attention variable, of the following form. Subjects with unfavorable ex-
pectancies were significantly less persistent in the mirror's presence than in its
absence (see Figure 11-1), a finding that is quite consistent with our reasoning and
with previous findings. Rather than being made more persistent, however, subjects
in the positive expectancy condition were unaffected by the mirror's presence.
There seemed to be two obvious possible explanations for this failure to obtain
the predicted result in the positive expectancy condition. First, as noted above, the
induction of favorable expectancies had apparently been somewhat less impactful
than the induction of unfavorable expectancies. Second, we had imposed an arbitrary
time limit of 10 minutes on subjects' persistence in this study. Many subjects, in
fact, had gone to this limit. This may have artificially imposed a ceiling on the
data.
Consequently, a second experiment was conducted, in which the procedures were
altered in two ways from the procedures of the positive expectancy condition of

- - ------ Unfavorable expectancy, Expt. 1

• • Favorable expectancy, Expl 1

--=
_ . _ . - . Favorable expectancy, Expt. 2

10
,/
12
::s ,/
c

-o
.- ,/
E 10
w ..
. .............
z
--
8
W
t-
en
--- --- ........
en 6
a:
w
Q.
Mirror Absent Mirror Present
Fig. 11-1. Persistence at an insoluble problem as a function of outcome expectancy and
self-directed attention. (Data from Carver et aI., 1979b.)
Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy 209

Experiment 1. First, the expectancy manipulation was strengthened somewhat.

Second, the time limit on the design problem was extended to 20 minutes.
The results of this study were quite supportive of our reasoning. Subjects' self-
rated expectancies were somewhat more favorable than had been the case in Ex-
periment 1. And as can be seen in Figure 11-1, enhanced self-focus in this study
significantly increased persistence. Taken together, the results of these two exper-
iments appear to make a strong case that self-focus enhances attempts to reduce
discrepancies when one's expectancies of being able to do so are favorable, and
hastens withdrawal from such attempts when expectancies are unfavorable.

Self-Consciousness, Prior Outcomes, and Persistence

We subsequently conducted another study (Scheier & Carver, 1980b) to extend the
generality of the findings in this area in yet another direction. The unique contri-
bution of this study was that self-directed attention was varied by assessing indi-
vidual differences in private self-consciousness rather than by using an experimental
manipulation. In addition, we sought to gain indirect information as to what me-
diational chain had been involved in earlier research. That is, this study was es-
sentially a conceptual replication of the Duval et al. (1972) and the Gibbons and
Wicklund (1976) research, but extending the principle demonstrated by those in-
vestigators into the realm of task persistence. Subjects were given a preliminary
success or failure experience, and then were presented with an insoluble task that
was said to be very closely related to the initial task. Subjects' expectancies prior
to beginning the task were collected, and their persistence was measured.
More specifically, each subject in this study was told that the purpose of the
research was to examine several important aspects of people's cognitive-perceptual
functioning. The subjects were going to spend the session working on two tasks
which measured such abilities. The first task was a variant of Guilford's Concealed
Figures Test. On each trial the subject was required to identify from a series of
four drawings the one in which a particular geometric pattern was embedded. After
working on the task for five minutes, the subject was stopped, and the performance
was ostensibly scored.
Some subjects were told that they had performed exceedingly well on this first
task. Others were told that they had done quite poorly. After receiving this infor-
mation, subjects completed a brief questionnaire which included an item asking
how well they expected to do on the next task. The second task was the same design
problems as were used by Carver et al. (1979b). As in that prior research, the
amount of time that subjects persisted on the first design problem was the primary
dependent measure of the experiment.
As expected, the success-failure manipulation proved to have a strong influence
on subjects' outcome expectancies for the second task. Subjects who had received
success feedback reported significantly higher expectancies for the design problems
than did subjects who had received failure feedback. Though not conclusive, this
finding suggests that previous manipulations of task outcomes (e.g., Duval et al.,
1972) had also influenced subjects' expectancies.
210 II. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

Perhaps more importantly, analysis of the persistence measure yielded (as pre-
dicted) a significant interaction between prior outcome (and thus expectancy) and
private self-consciousness: Whereas subjects high in private self-consciousness
tended to persist longer than subjects low in self-consciousness when expectancies
were positive, they tended to persist less long when expectancies were negative.
Thus, consistent with previous findings, persistence behavior was jointly determined
by the degree of subjects' self-directed attention and the outcome expectancies that
had been induced.

Self-Esteem, Self-Attention, and Task Performance

The only individual difference measure involved in any of the research discussed
thus far was the disposition to be self-attentive. All other variables (e.g., task
outcomes, expectancies) were experimentally manipulated. There are, however,
individual differences that are quite relevant to the kinds of processes that are under
discussion here. An example is self-esteem. Brockner has examined the psycho-
logical mechanisms that underlie the effects of low self-esteem on task performance.
And he has recently reported a study (Brockner, 1979) that adds important generality
to the research discussed above, in two respects. First, Brockner collected data that
allow the inference of a relationship between levels of self-esteem and levels of
outcome expectancy following an initial task outcome. This suggests that the same
processes may be involved in his investigations of self-esteem as are involved in
the research that we have been discussing throughout the chapter. Second, Brockner
examined subjects' performances at problems that could be solved, rather than
measuring persistence at insoluble problems. As we suggested in Chapter 10, if
physical withdrawal is prevented by aspects of the situation, we would expect
unfavorable expectancies to result in a mental withdrawal from task attempts. This
should be reflected in poorer task performances. Brockner's data provide important
evidence regarding that possibility.
Brockner began his research with the assumption that persons low in self-esteem
are typically debilitated by self-focus during task performance, whereas this is not
true of persons higher in self-esteem (see, for example, Brockner & Hulton, 1978).
He argued, however, that this need not always be the case. More specifically, he
suggested that if a prior success could be made salient for persons with low self-
esteem, the result of self-focus in those persons would be positive affect (cf. Ickes,
Wicklund, & Ferris, 1973) and positive, goal-oriented efforts.
In an experiment intended to test this reasoning, Brockner (1979) began by
assessing subjects' chronic levels of both self-esteem and self-consciousness, and
by having subjects complete a test of social insight (Gough, 1968), a test that is
sufficiently ambiguous to allow easy manipulation of perceived outcomes. After
allegedly scoring the test, the experimenter told the subject that he or she had done
either very well or very poorly. Subjects then were taken to a different room, where
a second experimenter administered a second task. After being given the task
instructions, subjects made an estimation of how well they expected to do. The
task was a series of concept-formation problems. The concept could involve up to
three characteristics from among five dimensions. Subjects were to determine the
Subsequent Research Concerning Outcome Expectancy 211

concept by checking on the membership or nonmembership of stimulus exemplars

(see Brockner, 1979, or Brockner & Hulton, 1978, for greater detail). Each subject
was asked to be as accurate as possible in determining the concept. Errors (recorded
by the experimenter) served as the primary dependent measure.
During this procedure, self-focus was experimentally increased among half the
subjects by the placement of a wall mirror. The mirror's presence was portrayed
to the subject as being a way for the experimenter to view the subject's behavior
more easily. (In our view, this procedure renders the manipulation somewhat more
complex than would otherwise be the case, by making subjects aware of both the
public and the private aspects of self. There is a broader discussion of this issue
in Chapter 16.)
Analysis of subjects' test performances yielded an interaction between chronic
self-esteem level (split at the median) and the nature of the bogus feedback. As
predicted, subjects high in self-esteem outperformed subjects who were low in self-
esteem when told they had performed poorly on the first task. This difference was
eliminated, however, among subjects told that they had done well on the first task,
almost solely as a product of the enhanced performance rates of subjects low in
self-esteem. Further examination of the data revealed that this pattern of differences
was statistically reliable in the high self-awareness condition, but did not approach
significance in the low self-awareness condition.
Brockner also examined the data to ascertain the interactive effects on perform-
ance caused by dispositional private self-consciousness, prior outcomes, and self-
esteem. Because his experimental manipulation of self-focus had been intended for
maximum impact, Brockner expected the influence of dispositional self-conscious-
ness to be most noticeable in the mirror-absent condition (cf. Mischel, 1973). This
anticipation received support in the data. In the mirror-absent condition only, an
interaction occurred that was quite similar in form to the overall effect involving
manipulated self-focus. Thus the interactive influence seems general to both self-
attention variables.
A variety of self-report data also appeared to substantiate Brockner's reasoning
regarding the interactive effects of prior outcome and self-focus among subjects low
in self-esteem. Subjects' mood ratings (before beginning the concept-formation
task, and thus before the self-focus manipulation) indicated that low self-esteem
subjects- had experienced more negative affect than had high self-esteem subjects,
but only if they had received failure feedback on the first task. Subjects' postex-
peri mental ratings of their anxiety levels and how much they were bothered by the
experimenter's presence yielded a similar pattern. After failure feedback, but not
after success feedback, subjects low in self-esteem reported more anxiety than did
subjects high in self-esteem. Moreover, this effect was reliable only in conditions
of high self-focus.
As we indicated above, Brockner undertook this research in order to examine
the dynamics of self-esteem as they influence performance. However, he also
obtained measures of subjects' expectancies regarding their performances on the
concept-formation task. These data indicated that subjects high in self-esteem had
held more favorable expectancies than had subjects lower in self-esteem, and that
this difference was most reliable following failure feedback. Thus the pattern of
212 11. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

his results was quite consistent with the interactive model we have proposed. When
expectancies are negative (low self-esteem-failure condition), the result of self-
focus is a deterioration in performance. We regard this as reflecting mental with-
drawal from concentration on task attempts.
It is of considerable interest that despite the different origins of the research
hypotheses, Brockner's findings regarding self-esteem are conceptually quite similar
to the findings discussed above, which were based completely on manipulations of
subjects' expectancies (e.g., Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979; Carver et aI., 1979b).
This, in tum, suggests the possibility that a common core of processes may underlie
a variety of phenomena to which diverse labels have been attached over the years.
This is a point to which we return in Chapters 12 and 13.

Self-Awareness, Relevance, and Persistence

At least one other experiment appears to have some implications for this portion
of our theoretical model, an experiment conducted by McDonald (1980). At first
glance, some of the data from this experiment appear to contradict aspects of our
reasoning. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we believe that the data can be reconciled
with the findings discussed above.
McDonald had female subjects complete an "unusual uses" test, which was scored
for creativity. Each subject was given bogus feedback on this test, which indicated
either that she had scored at the tenth percentile or the ninetieth percentile. The
experimenter then introduced a second task, which required subjects to write in
response to an ambiguous TAT picture. The experimenter implied that an appropriate
response to the visual stimulus was to write a lot, though it was not indicated
explicitly that creativity would be reflected by a copious output. The subject was
left alone to write, seated either before the reflective surface of a mirror or before
its nonreflective back. The primary dependent measure of the study was the number
of words written in response to the picture.
Subjects who had been given feedback indicating a lack of creativity tended to
write more when self-awareness was increased than when it was not. We regard
this, as did McDonald (1980), as reflecting an active attempt to reduce the dis-
crepancy between actual and desired performance levels among subjects in this
condition. Somewhat surprisingly, however, self-focus tended to decrease written
output among subjects who had been told that their scores indicated high degrees
of creativity. This finding would seem at first glance to contradict our theoretical
position.
There seem to be two plausible ways to reconcile this finding with our theoretical
model. Both possibilities stem directly from subjects' responses to questions that
were intended to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation of success and failure
outcome. McDonald first asked subjects how well they had done on the initial test.
The effect of test feedback on responses to this item was quite large. But then
McDonald asked subjects to indicate how creative they thought they were. Subjects
who had been told they were very uncreative rated themselves as less creative than
did subjects told they were highly creative. But the difference between groups was
quite small, and both groups fell at about the midpoint of the scale. Both possible
Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy 213

explanations follow from the fact that McDonald posed this question to subjects
in the first place, and the fact that all subjects reported seeing themselves as mod-
erately creative.
McDonald did not assess subjects' expectancies regarding the second task. But
what might he have found had he done so? Based upon the findings of a study
discussed earlier in the chapter (Scheier & Carver, 1980b), one might anticipate
that expectancies for future performance would parallel the outcome of the prior
test, particularly if the tests were seen as related. But there is a potentially important
difference between the two studies. McDonald explicitly reminded subjects of their
self-judged chronic levels of creativity, by asking them about those levels. This
reinstatement of awareness of subjects' chronic perceptions may have influenced
their subsequent task expectancies, in the following way. Subjects given unfavor-
able test scores saw themselves as being considerably more creative than their
scores had indicated. They may thus have expected to produce substantially better
scores on the second test, i.e., may have had favorable outcome expectancies. But
subjects whose initial scores were very high viewed themselves as less creative
than those scores had indicated. Thus they may have seen their chances of main-
taining their good performances as being very limited. The result might have been
unfavorable outcome expectancies, and reduced effort when self-focus was en-
hanced.
A second reasonable possibility also follows from the fact that subjects in the
success condition perceived themselves as having only moderate levels of creativity.
The initial high test scores of subjects in this condition may simply have created
a positive discrepancy between subjects' present states and their desired levels of
creativity (cf. Wicklund, 1975). Having overshot their goals on the first test, they
may have felt no need to establish their creativity on the second test. Such a positive
discrepancy-and the consequent lack of a basis for effort-would have been more
salient under conditions of high self-focus, resulting in a tendency toward reduced
efforts at the task. Indeed, it is possible that these subjects preferred to think of
themselves as only moderately creative, and were actively taking steps to ensure
that continued perception (cf. Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962; Taylor & Huesmann,
1974).
Each of these possibilities should be regarded as speculative, in the absence of
the relevant expectancy data. But either of them would reconcile the findings (which
appear to be unique to the McDonald study) with the model we are discussing.

Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy

In some of the studies discussed above (e.g., Brockner, 1979; Carver et aI., 1979b;
Scheier & Carver, 1980b), subjects' outcome expectancies were explicitly assessed,
and were related to subsequent task performances and persistence. We have inferred
that the effects of earlier research-i.e., the interactive effect obtained by Steen-
barger and Aderman (1979) and the avoidance findings of Gibbons and Wicklund
(1976) and Duval et al. (1972}-were similarly mediated by outcome expectancies:
expectancies regarding the possible reduction of salient discrepancies. In several
214 11. Research: Persistence and Task Perfonnance

of these cases, however, a reasonable argument could be made that the effects
depended not just upon differences in outcome expectancies but differences in
efficacy expectancies (cf. Bandura, 1977). For example, in Brockner's study, the
reason for unfavorable expectancies on the part of subjects low in self-esteem was
not that situational circumstances precluded the possibility of a good performance
(as was the case, however, in the Duval et aI. experiment). Rather, the poor outcome
expectancy presumably was based on a self-perception of an inadequacy in the
subject's own capabilities. Said differently, the poor outcome expectancy followed
from a poor efficacy expectancy.
Another way of discussing this difference is in terms of the attributions associated
with the outcome expectancy. Sometimes good outcomes are expected because of
perceptions of strong abilities and efforts. This corresponds to a positive efficacy
expectancy. Other times good outcomes are expected because of situational factors,
for example, beneficent others or an easy task. In these cases personal efficacy is
not an issue. A comparable similarity between the two vocabularies exists with
regard to the expectancy of an unfavorable outcome, of course.
In considering behavior generally, there are doubtlessly many cases where out-
come and efficacy expectancies are confounded with each other-where the behavior
that needs to be done is clearly defined, and the issue is whether or not one can
manage to do it. But we have argued in Chapter 10 that it ultimately is outcome
expectancy rather than efficacy expectancy that dictates the behavioral response to
self-focus, and the general tone of one's affective reactions (i.e., positive or neg-
ative). In our view, the primary function of efficacy perceptions and related cog-
nitions is to influence the more precise nature of the affect that is experienced.
This position puts us at odds with the stance taken by Bandura (1977), although
it seems generally consistent with positions taken by other theorists (e.g., Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978, 1979). Let us now
consider what evidence exists on the question. There appear to be at least three sets
of research findings germane to this issue. Two of them--conducted by researchers
other than ourselves~id not incorporate the self-attention variable. The third
source of evidence is a study intended to investigate interactions of the relevant
variables with self-focus. These are described in tum below.

Links Between Cognition and Emotion in Achievement

One program of research in this area was concerned solely with the affective con-
sequences of variations in causal attributions for successes and failures (Weiner,
1979; Weiner et al., 1978, 1979V This research began (Weiner et aI., 1978) by
presenting subjects with hypothetical achievement situations in which an outcome
(good or bad) was specified along with a dominant causal attribution (e.g., ability,
effort, other people, luck). Subjects were asked to read these descriptions and then

lWe should note that the Weiner et al. research made use of outcomes rather than expectancies
regarding future outcomes. Though the two obviously are conceptually related, they are just
as obviously distinct. Thus there is need for caution in assuming that these findings are
applicable to expectancies as well as to outcomes.
Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy 215

rate the degree to which the person involved in the situation experienced each of
several different affective reactions.
Analysis of these data made two clear points. First, certain affects were seen as
being experienced solely as a function of outcome, independent of the perceived
cause of the outcome: affects such as pleasure, satisfaction, being upset, and so
on. Second, there were also certain affects that appeared to link reliably to specific
attributions for the outcomes. For example, ability attributions uniquely influenced
subjects' ratings of feelings of competence; effort attributions uniquely influenced
ratings of gUilt and shame; and attributions to other people uniquely influenced
ratings of gratitude and hostility.
Weiner et al. (1978) urged caution in interpreting these data, however, in part
because their subjects had been asked to estimate the feelings of another (hypo-
thetical) individual rather than to report feelings of their own. That is, it was
assumed that subjects would "project" their own reactions into the situations. But
the validity of this assumption could easily be questioned.
For this reason, a follow-up investigation was conducted (Weiner et aI., 1979,
Experiment 1). This study differed from the previous one in two important respects.
First, subjects were led to recreate experiences from their own past histories, which
were framed in terms of achievement outcomes and causal ascriptions. Second,
subjects responded in a free format, rather than using rating scales. For each type
of event, subjects were asked first to describe the incident that they recalled (in
order to enhance its salience to them), and then to indicate how they had felt in that
situation, using three affective labels. A list of labels was provided with the in-
structions, but it was indicated that these should be treated as examples rather than
as a restrictive set.
Analysis of these data (see Weiner et aI., 1979, for greater detail) yielded a
pattern that was quite similar to that obtained in the earlier study. Certain affects
were associated with outcome, independent of attribution for the outcome: e.g.,
happiness, depression, frustration, upset. Other affects were associated with specific
attributions. For example, ability attributions were associated with feelings of greater
or lesser felt competence and pride; attributions to other persons were associated
with gratitude or anger.
It is worthy of some small passing note that the procedures in this latter study
were such that it seems reasonable to assume a relatively high degree of self-focus
on the part of all SUbjects. That is, subjects were led to recall from memory some
incident that fit the outcome and attributional characteristics that had been specified.
Indeed, they were led to access and describe that incident in some detail, in order
to enhance its salience to them. Presumably that also helped to enhance !pe salience
of subjects' memories of their feelings, as well.
The pattern of findings emerging from these two studies is quite consistent with
the position that task outcome dictates a general emotional tone (happiness, frus-
tration), but that the specific character of the affect experienced is determined by
the cognitions surrounding the affect. Attributions or judgments relating to personal
efficacy apparently playa major role in determining whether, for example, failures
lead to reductions in self-esteem or whether they lead to resentment. Both are
negative feelings, but they differ in many other ways (cf. Weiner et aI., 1979).
216 II. Research: Persistence and Task Performance

This pattern of findings is quite consistent with our own theoretical position (see
also Carver, 1979).

Attributions, Expectancy, and Achievement Behavior

Two other recent projects have investigated the influence of attributions on expec-
tancies and actual performance levels, in field settings. These studies appear to
converge on the conclusion that outcome expectancies are closely related to sub-
sequent performances, but that the role of specific attributions in this relationship
is much more ambiguous. One of the studies was conducted by Covington and
Omelich (l979a); the other by Bernstein, Stephan, and Davis (1979). Both inves-
tigated the performances of students in actual psychology courses, using path-
analytic techniques.
Covington and Omelich were interested primarily in investigating the possible
attributional basis for differences in achievement motivation (a topic that we take
up in Chapter 13). They focused on a single instance of test performance in a course
in which students could take a second exam on a given set of course material if
unsatisfied with the outcome of the first exam. By definition, this study focused on
responses to a failure experience, because only dissatisfied students took the second
exam. Subjects' level of resultant achievement motivation had been premeasured.
After the first test but before the second, subjects made attributions to inability,
lack of effort, task difficulty, and chance factors for their poor performances on the
first test. They also rated their shame at doing poorly on the first test and estimated
the grade they expected to get on the retest. All of these variables were used as
predictors of actual retest performance.
Achievement motivation was highly predictive of retest performance in this study,
and the relationship between those two variables was mediated by expectancy. The
role of attributions in this relationship was minimal. Attributions to inability and
lack of effort were related to reported feelings of shame, but no attributional category
was a strong predictor of either expectancy or retest performance (see Covington
& Omelich, 1979a, for greater detail). This latter finding contradicts the results of
earlier research, particularly with regard to findings that expectancies typically
remain high when a failure is attributed to an unstable causal category like effort,
as opposed to a stable category like ability (see, e.g., Fontaine, 1974; McMahan,
1973; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). Covington and Omelich suggest
that this difference in findings may simply reflect the superiority of other variables
in their design as predictors of expectancy. Alternatively, it is quite possible that
their finding in this regard was uniquely influenced by the experimental situation.
That is, subjects had very little time in which to prepare for the second test. Given
a certain degree of inflexibility in their schedules, it seems likely that students who
had not studied much for the first test would be unable to study very much for the
retest. This contingency has the effect of making effort attribution a more stable
category than is normally the case.
Based on the overall pattern of their data, Covington and Omelich concluded
that attributions are reactions to, rather than potent causes of, performance. Though
the primary concern of those authors was the possible role of attributions as me-
Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy 217

diators of the effects of achievement motivation, their point is also germane to the
present discussion. Expectancies were part of the major path predictive of behavior
in their study. But the attributional basis for having those expectancies did not have
such a major influence. This is consistent with the position that we have taken.
The second study that is relevant to this issue (Bernstein et aI., 1979) examined
the behaviors of interest over a longer period of time. Once again the primary focus
of the research was on questions that are somewhat tangential to present concerns.
Bernstein et al. were interested in examining the role of attributions in expectancy
changes over the course of three exams, testing a theoretical analysis put forth by
Miller and Ross (1975). Before taking each of three exams, subjects in the study
were asked to indicate what test scores they expected to attain, and to judge the
effect on their scores that they expected to be exerted by ability, effort, test difficulty,
and luck. After receiving the test score, the subjects were asked to make attributions
for their actual performances, using the same four categories.
This study found that over the course of the semester, expectancies were based
increasingly upon preexam perceptions of effort expended (consistent with previous
literature, and differing from the Covington & Omelich data). Overall, subjects
anticipated that ability would have an important effect on performance, but only
those subjects who also thought they had studied hard actually predicted high scores.
Post-test attributions, in contrast to pretest perceptions, generally were poorly related
to subsequent outcome expectancies, the bases used by subjects to generate those
expectancies, or later performances themselves.
Only two factors were consistently related to actual test outcomes. Expected
scores reliably predicted actual scores on all three exams, as did performance on
the previous exam(s). Perceived effort, which had exerted an increasingly strong
influence on expectancies across exams, was itself reliably associated with actual
performances only on the third exam. Bernstein et al. noted that the pattern of
findings highlights the importance of effort as an attributional category, suggesting
that its importance stems from the fact that only effort (of the four categories
studied) is under the actor's control. But it seems equally noteworthy that these
effort judgments were associated with performances to a greater degree indirectly
than they were directly. That is, the anticipated benefit from effort was associated
with more favorable expectancies in all cases, and those expectancies were asso-
ciated with good performances in all cases. But anticipated benefit from effort was
directly associated with good performance only for the third exam. We mean here
not to denigrate the importance of perceived effort, but rather to highlight the greater
predictive utility of outcome expectancy, regardless of the basis from which it had
been derived. This high degree of predictive utility is consistent with our own
theoretical position.

Prior Outcomes, Attribution, and Maze Performance

In addition to the research described above, one laboratory study has been conducted
to investigate our assumptions about the attributional antecedents of performance
and affect in achievement settings. The procedures of this study (Carver & Scheier,
1980) were designed to vary subjects' outcome expectancies by manipulating their
218 11. Research: Persistence and Task Performance

experiential histories at a given type of task. We also set out to vary subjects'
perceptions of the causes of those outcomes, by giving them different information
concerning the nature of the task. The task had two roles, which were filled by the
subject and an ostensible cosubject. In one set of conditions the subjects were led
to attribute the outcomes to themselves; in the other conditions they were led to
attribute the outcomes to their partner. It was predicted that outcome expectancies,
regardless of attribution condition, would influence subsequent behavior (in inter-
action with self-focus). And it was further predicted that attributional contingencies
would influence the form of the affect experienced by subjects. When outcomes
were self-attributed, the affective consequences should primarily take the form of
shifts in self-esteem and affect concerning the self. When outcomes were attributed
to the partner, the affective consequences should bear primarily on the partner (i.e.,
gratitude or resentment, depending on the outcome).
Female participants completed sessions individually with a female confederate.
The confederate always arrived a few minutes late, providing the experimenter a
justification for assigning the subject to the active role-specifically, that that role
required lengthier instructions. The experiment was portrayed as part of an inves-
tigation of new measures of abstract reasoning abilities. During this phase of the
research, people who did not know each other were ostensibly being asked to work
cooperatively on the tasks. Each item of the present task was a mazelike design,
with a specific end point, but with several different starting points (marked by
numbered arrows). The goal was to draw a line as far into the maze toward the end
point as possible within a one-minute time period. It was noted that no one was
expected to be able to finish the maze completely within that time, and that group
performances were to be assessed by comparing them with previously standardized
norms. The experimenter would be able to do this quickly, by placing a template
over the subject's solution attempt. (A simplified example problem was used to
illustrate all of these points.)
The experimenter indicated that the group would be working on four separate
mazes, which were equivalent in difficulty. She noted further that these mazes
apparently were not too hard, and that other teams had been attaining good scores
on about three out of four tries. The subject's role, once she began, was to try to
reach the end point. She was told that she would not be able to see the maze until
just before beginning it. Her partner's role was quite different. The partner was to
serve as an advisor. She would be given 20 seconds to examine each maze before
the subject began it, and to decide at which of the three available starting points
the subject should begin. These recommendations were to be delivered by intercom,
from a separate room.
Once all the task instructions had been explained to the partner (who had by this
time arrived), she was led to the other room. At this time it was indicated to both
the subject and the confederate that they would not be meeting again during the
session. This was intended to make subjects less reluctant to be candid in their later
evaluations of the confederate. After the experimenter had led the confederate to
the second room and returned, she pointed out to the subject that mazes had been
located at several points throughout the room. To minimize confusion, the subject
Outcome Expectancy and Efficacy Expectancy 219

would perfonn each maze at a separate table. This procedure was actually intended
to allow the easy manipulation of self-attention at the appropriate stage of the event
sequence.
At this point the experimenter introduced the manipulation of outcome attribution,
indicating that she was going to give the subject some infonnation that her partner
would not be receiving. In the self-responsible condition the experimenter said that
it hardly mattered at which of the three starting points the person began the maze.
What really counted was the decisions made after beginning. Thus, the advisor's
recommendations actually had little bearing on the group's perfonnances. In the
other-responsible condition, the experimenter indicated that a good choice of starting
point was critical to good perfonnances. Thus, the partner's recommendation was
actually the major detenninant of a group's outcomes.
The experimenter then led the subject to the first table. Through a system of
signal lights, the ostensible partner was instructed to examine her copy of the first
maze and choose a starting point. After 20 seconds her decision was announced,
and the experimenter timed the subject as she attempted the maze. After one minute
had elapsed, the experimenter stopped the subject and scored her maze.
At this point the manipulation of outcome was begun. Subjects in the success
condition worked on items that allowed at least moderate progress into the maze.
The experimenter also stated to subjects in this condition that the first perfonnance
had been quite good. She indicated that it was at the 85th percentile of the nonns
(and made sure that the subject understood percentiles). Subjects in the failure
condition worked on items which had been slightly altered to prevent easy progress
(based on pilot evidence that the failure manipulation lost credibility if subjects got
very far into the maze). The experimenter also stated that the group's perfonnance
had not been very good. She indicated that it was only at the 30th percentile.
After making one or the other of these statements, the experimenter ushered the
subject to the next maze, where the cycle was repeated. The feedback in this case
indicated an even more extreme score than on the first maze, ninetieth and twentieth
percentiles, respectively. After the third such cycle the experimenter remarked
further either that the group was doing very well overall, or that they were doing
so poorly that even a strong finish wouldn't help their overall perfonnance.
The subject then was led to the fourth table. For half the subjects the table had
a large mirror resting on it facing the subject; for the other subjects the table was
empty. As the subject seated herself, the experimenter gave her a brief questionnaire,
including an expectancy rating. The subject then attempted the fourth maze, which
was identical for subjects in all experimental conditions. The subject's progress
through the maze in a one-minute time period served as the measure of perfonnance.
After working on the maze, the subject completed a questionnaire assessing her
affective reactions to the situation, including ratings of both herself and her osten-
sible cosubject.
Analysis of subjects' perfonnances on the fourth maze yielded only one significant
effect: an interaction between self-awareness condition and prior experience. In the
high self-focus condition, subjects who had had three successes made significantly
more progress toward the goal than did subjects who had had three failures. There
220 11. Research: Persistence and Task Performance

was no difference in the low self-focus condition. The manipulation of self-attention

significantly enhanced performances among subjects who had experienced prior
successes. But the tendency of the same manipulation to depress performances
among failure-condition subjects was not significant. As can be seen in Table Il-
l, the pattern of performance data was quite similar across attribution conditions.
This is consistent with our position that performance toward an instrumental goal
is dictated by an interaction between self-attention and outcome expectancy, and
that the internality or externality of the attributions associated with that expectancy
is not a direct determinant of behavior.
We have assumed, however, that these attributions are an important determinant
of the person's affective experiences surrounding the behavior. If the subject had
been led to ascribe the outcomes to the partner, we expected poor outcomes to be
associated with resentment toward the partner, and good outcomes to be associated
with gratitude toward the partner. Accordingly, all subjects were asked to rate the
partner's competence and intelligence, and to indicate their feelings (very negative
to very positive) toward the partner. Analysis of subjects' ratings of the partner's
competence yielded the expected outcome by responsibility interaction, but the
effect was entirely attributable to the very low ratings made by subjects in the
failure-other responsible condition. The comparable enhancement of the partner's
competence in the success-other responsible condition did not occur. A similar
pattern appeared in the analysis of subjects' self-reported feelings about the partner.
Subjects reported feeling more negative about the co subject when failures had been
ascribed to the cosubject than when the failures had been ascribed to the self. But
the tendency toward a comparable difference in positive feelings toward the co-
subject in the success condition was not reliable. Analysis of the third rating-the
partner's intelligence-yielded only a main effect for outcome. Taken together,
these findings are reasonably consistent with our predictions.
Each subject also rated herself on the same three dimensions. We expected self-
ratings to be affected by a complementary interaction between outcomes experienced
and causal perceptions. That is, when outcomes were self-attributed, good outcomes
should be associated with self-enhancement, bad outcomes with self-deprecation.
Once again, analyses of the relevant data provided partial support for our reasoning.
Each analysis yielded a highly significant interaction among all three variables in

Table 11-1. Performance on the Final Maze as a Function of Prior

Success or Failure, Ascription of Responsibility, and Self-Attention
Condition
Prior outcome Ascription of responsibility Mirror No mirror
Success Other responsible 55.10 42.30
Self responsible 50.40 38.90
Failure Other responsible 41.80 46.50
Self responsible 39.10 48.80
Chapter Summary 221

the design. The form of each interaction was as follows: Subjects in the mirror
condition displayed precisely the pattern of ratings that we had expected. Self-
ratings on each measure diverged as a function of task outcome when the successes
or failures had been self-ascribed (average Ms across the three dependent measures
were 7.40 for success condition, 4.43 for failure condition), and did not do so when
the outcomes had been ascribed to the partner (average Ms = 6.57 and 5.90,
respectively). In the low self-awareness condition, however, the ordering of the
means was exactly reversed. Subjects' self-ratings diverged reliably only when the
outcomes had been ascribed to the partner.
We see no obvious explanation for this reversal in the no mirror condition, and
suggest that this aspect of the data be viewed with caution. We do have one tentative
suggestion, however, that might help to account for the findings. Subjects always
rated the partner on all three scales before rating themselves. It is possible that
subjects in the low self-focus condition established a response set while rating the
cosubject, and then proceeded to apply that set to themselves. Thus the result was
a marked similarity in this condition between ratings of the confederate and ratings
of the self. When self-focus was higher, in contrast, this relatively thoughtless
application of the response set may have been disrupted. As subjects sifted more
carefully through the available self-relevant information, they would have arrived
at the judgments about themselves that we had predicted on the basis of the attri-
butional contingencies. We should repeat, however, that this reasoning is quite
tentative and post hoc, and that the matter deserves additional scrutiny.

Chapter Summary
We began this chapter by reviewing findings which appeared to indicate that people
attempt to withdraw from self-focus when a large discrepancy between present state
and a desired state is salient. We then examined a series of studies that restricted
and elaborated upon that conclusion. One such study found that withdrawal does
not occur when the behavioral discrepancy is seen as flexible. Other research
suggested that self-focus leads to withdrawal from task attempts only when expec-
tancies of reducing the discrepancy are unfavorable. When expectancies are fa-
vorable, self-focus leads instead to discrepancy-reduction attempts. Additional re-
search indicated that comparable processes are involved in responses to failure
among persons low in self-esteem, and that comparable results occur when self-
focus is varied dispositionally rather than situationally.
We then turned to the question of how attributions influence either task-oriented
behavior or the affect associated with such behavior. Consistent with the position
described in Chapter 10, Weiner and his associates have found that the valence of
task outcomes dictates the general tone of the affect associated with the outcomes,
but that attributions determine what specific form that affect takes. In addition, two
field studies found that outcome expectancy was strongly involved in the path of
influence that predicted examination performances, but that the role of attributions
was weaker and more indirect. Finally, a laboratory experiment found that prior
222 11. Research: Persistence and Task Performance

outcomes influenced performances at a target task in interaction with self-focus.

Locus of attribution of the prior outcomes did not influence performances, but did
influence the form of the affect associated with the experiences. All of these findings
appear to be supportive of our reasoning.
In the next chapter, we take up a body of research that applies the same reasoning
to a very different domain of behavior.
Chapter 12

Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

"Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win, by
fearing to attempt."
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure

In presenting our theoretical model of approach and withdrawal in Chapter 10, we

suggested that attempts to reduce perceived discrepancies can be interrupted by
conditions that appear to impede behavior. Subsequent action then is determined
by the result of an outcome assessment process. Sometimes this interruption occurs
because of a disjunction between the behavioral attempt and the environment-a
frustration caused by characteristics of the task, of oneself, or one's setting. This
was the case in the research discussed in Chapter 11. But another stimulus that can
act to interrupt behavior is fear (cf. Simon, 1967). Rising fear commands attention.
It can make people stop what they are doing and consider---even if only for a brief
instant-whether they are capable of doing what they are attempting to do.

Self-Attention and Fear

As was discussed in earlier chapters, self-directed attention enhances the tendency
to conform to salient standards. But self-focus also enhances one's awareness of
relatively strong affective states. As fear becomes intense, self-attention should be
associated with greater subjective awareness of the fear. This, in tum, should lead
to earlier or more frequent interruption of ongoing behavior. If the degree of anxiety
being experienced is relatively weak, on the other hand, behavior should be less
likely to be interrupted, and one would expect the matching-to-standard sequence
to proceed relatively unimpeded.
This reasoning regarding fear and the interruption of behavior has been inves-
tigated in a pair of studies reported by Scheier, Carver, and Gibbons (in press). In
each of these studies an attempt was made to isolate one set of subjects who would
experience relatively intense fear states, and another set of subjects who would
experience relatively weak fear states. It was assumed that the greater levels of fear
among the first set of people would result in quicker or more frequent interruption
of behavior compared to the second set. Moreover, it was also reasoned that high
levels of self-focus would further increase the tendency toward behavioral inter-
224 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

ruption among the first set of subjects, by increasing their awareness of intense fear
cues. Self-focus would not have this effect among the second set of subjects, because
their fear was less intense. Because we chose situations that were intended to be
somewhat forbidding in the high fear conditions, we thus expected subjects in the
high fear conditions to be more likely to withdraw from their behavioral attempts
when self-focus was high than when it was low. This withdrawal would reflect an
interruption of behavior. Such withdrawal was not expected to occur in low fear
conditions, however, because behavior was less likely to be interrupted by awareness
of rising anxiety.

Self-Awareness and Phobic Behavior

In the first of these studies (Scheier et al., in press, Experiment 1) high and low
fear states were operationalized by selecting as subjects persons who differed in
their chronic levels of fearfulness in the presence of snakes. Potential subjects
completed a questionnaire (from Carver & Blaney, 1977a, 1977b) which asked
them (a) to rate the degree of anxiety aroused in them by nonpoisonous snakes
(from among five choices) and (b) to estimate their response to being asked to pick
up a nonpoisonous snake (from among four choices). High fear subjects were
defined as those who responded to each question with either the strongest or the
second strongest indicator of aversion. Low fear subjects were those who responded
to each question with either the weakest or the second weakest indicator of aversion.
Each subject then participated in an individual experimental session, portrayed
as a study of the physical aspects of stressful behavior. Each subject attached a
microphone to his or her chest (ostensibly to record the subject's heartbeat), put
on gloves, and went to a test corridor. There the subject attempted to approach an
aquarium, uncover it, and remove and hold a 3-foot-Iong boa constrictor. This
attempt was made after the experimenter had returned to an observation area out
of the subject's view. Self-awareness was experimentally enhanced for some sub-
jects by the presence of a mirror, suspended behind the aquarium at about shoulder
height.
Nine levels of approach had been predefined, ranging from (1) approaching within
two feet of the aquarium to (9) holding the snake in the air for 15 seconds. Each
subject was urged to go as far along this sequence as he or she could, thus estab-
lishing approach as the salient standard. Analysis of the approach scores revealed,
as predicted, that mirror presence caused high fear subjects to withdraw from their
approach attempts significantly earlier in the behavioral sequence (M = 5.(0) than
their no mirror counterparts (M = 6.88). The tendency of the mirror to facilitate
approach among low fear subjects was not reliable, however. (Nearly all ofthe low
fear subjects in both conditions completed the full range of the behavioral sequence.)
Mirror presence did not lead high fear subjects to report having experienced greater
anxiety in the presence of the snake, perhaps because of a psychological ceiling
on that dimension. Consistent with our reasoning, however, high fear subjects
(overall) did report having devoted more attention to assessing whether their bodily
arousal was increasing than did low fear subjects.
The behavioral data of this study were supportive of our analysis. In order to
Self-Attention and Fear 225

increase the generality of the finding, however, it seemed desirable to extend the
principle to a situation in which fear levels could be actively manipulated rather
than inferred from differences in self-report. We also sought additional generality
by varying self-attention in a different manner: by assessing subjects' chronic levels
of private self-consciousness.

Self-Consciousness, Standards, and Fear

This study (Scheier et aI., in press, Experiment 2) was portrayed to each subject
as an investigation of physiological reactions to electric shock. The experimenter
explained that electricity was frequently used during surgery for cauterization, but
that little was actually known about people's psychological and physiological re-
actions to the experience. The experimenter stressed that the research had important
implications for the practice of medicine. It was assumed that this emphasis on the
humanitarian underpinnings of the study would make salient to the subject a standard
of continuing to participate.
The experimenter continued by saying that he wanted participants to be fully
aware of exactly what would occur during the experimental session, so that their
informed consent might be obtained. The experimenter then indicated that the
subject would be asked to undergo a series of 30 electric shocks to the forearm.
In the low fear condition the shocks were described as "quite mild . . . like someone
squeezing your arm with his hand. Although it might produce some discomfort,
it certainly won't be painful." In the high fear condition, on the other hand, the
shocks were described as "quite intense . . . like someone giving you an injection
with a hypodermic needle. The shock will likely produce some discomfort, and it
has caused slight muscle spasms in some subjects." The experimenter then reminded
each subject of the beneficial nature of the research, and left the subject alone to
decide whether or not to continue with the experiment. This decision provided the
primary dependent measure of the study. Subjects also completed some postex-
perimental rating scales, and then were debriefed and dismissed.
One of these rating scales assessed the presumed mediator of the anticipated
behavioral effect. Specifically, subjects were asked how upset they were at the
prospect of receiving shock. Analysis of these ratings revealed a main effect for
fear level. Of greater interest, however, was the fact that in the high fear condition
highly self-conscious subjects reported significantly more distress than did less self-
conscious subjects. There was no difference between self-consciousness groups,
however, in the low fear condition. These results are entirely in line with our
reasoning.
Analysis of subjects' choice behavior also yielded the predicted interaction be-
tween fear level and subjects' dispositional levels of private self-consciousness
(displayed in Figure 12-1). When strong fear had been induced, significantly fewer
subjects high in self-consciousness volunteered than did subjects lower in self-
consciousness. The tendency for persons high in self-consciousness to volunteer
more frequently than those low in self-consciousness under conditions of lower fear
fell short of significance, however.
The findings of these two studies are consistent with the model proposed in
226 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

100
<.:J
z 90
a:
w 80 ... ------ --- --- ------_ ....
W
t-
z 70
::J
..J
0 60
>
t-
z 50 High Self-Conscious
w Low Self-Conscious
0
a:
w
c..
Low Fear High Fear
Fig. 12-1. Percentages of subjects volunteering to continue the experiment, as a function
of level offear aroused and degree of private self-consciousness. (From Scheier et aI., 1980.)

Chapter 10. But they do not provide a complete picture theoretically. That is, the
experimental situations in this research were purposely arranged so that interruptions
in behavior-which were presumed to result from the awareness of high fear-
would be reflected in an increased likelihood of withdrawing from the behavior in
question. This was the only way that the interruption could be assessed behaviorally.
But this procedure had the unfortunate side effect of confounding high fear with
unfavorable expectancies of being able to cope with the fear. The data provide
support for the reasoning that when fear is high, self-focus increases awareness of
the fear, resulting in interrupted behavior and withdrawal. But the data are equivocal
with regard to the role played by expectancies in such behavior. That is, a highly
plausible alternative case could be made that fear perceptions cause behavior to be
interrupted, and that one then simply responds to the fear without regard to ex-
pectancies.

Expectancies, Fear, and the Approach-Withdrawal Decision

As a consequence of this ambiguity, we conducted additional research on the
question. Subjects for this study (Carver et aI., 1979a) were selected on the basis
of two characteristics: They were equated in their degrees of self-rated fear of snakes
(all reported moderate levels of fear). But they differed from each other in their
chronic expectancies of being able to approach and hold a snake successfully.
Confident subjects were those who indicated that if asked to pick up and hold a
 Self-Attention and Fear 227

nonpoisonous snake ''I'd do it, but I'd feel a little queasy about it." Doubtful
subjects were those who responded "I'm not at all sure that I'd do it." Confident
and doubtful subjects completed the same experimental procedures as were described
above. After strapping on a microphone and donning gloves, each attempted to
approach, pick up, and hold a boa constrictor, under conditions of either high or
low self-awareness (see Carver et al., 1979a for greater detail). The subject then
completed a questionnaire and was dismissed.
The predictions made for this experiment differed somewhat from those of the
Scheier et al. (in press) research, based on differences in the subject samples. All
subjects in this study had reported feeling moderately intense anxiety in the presence
of nonpoisonous snakes. It was therefore expected that self-focus would result in
enhanced awareness of fear among all subjects in the study. This, in tum, should
result in behavioral interruption among all subjects. But subjects had been prese-
lected as varying in their expectancies of being able to cope with their fear suc-
cessfully. It was predicted that self-focus (and thus awareness offear) would interact
with expectancies to determine subsequent behavior. More simply, we expected
mirror presence to lead to earlier withdrawal from the approach attempt among
doubtful SUbjects. But we expected the same stimulus to lead to renewed efforts
among confident subjects. In brief, we suggest that perceived anxiety (at moderate
levels, at least) can lead to a divergence in behavior, depending upon one's ex-
pectancies for successful coping (see also Deffenbacher, 1977).
The results of the study were quite consistent with these predictions. Self-report
ratings of the amount of anxiety felt in the presence of the snake yielded only a
significant main effect for self-awareness condition. Confident and doubtful subjects
did not differ from each other in self-reported anxiety, but greater anxiety was
reported overall in the presence of the mirror than in its absence. Analysis of
approach behavior, in contrast, yielded an interaction between pretest group and
self-focus condition. Doubtful subjects withdrew from the approach attempt at an
earlier stage of the sequence when self-focus was high (M = 6.38) than when it
was low (M = 8.31). As predicted, the means of the confident subject groups were
ordered in the opposite direction, though this difference was not reliable (Ms =
8.47 and 8.23, respectively).
Additional postexperimental ratings made by subjects lent further support to our
reasoning. Subjects were asked to recall the degree to which they had attended to
specific categories of events while engaged in the approach task, two of which are
of particular interest. Analysis of attention devoted to assessing whether or not
bodily arousal was increasing yielded a significant interaction between pretest group
and self-awareness condition. Doubtful subjects reported greater focus on this as-
sessment when self-focus was high than when it was low, whereas the opposite
ordering occurred among confident subjects. Indeed, among doubtful subjects (but
not confident subjects) awareness of anxiety was positively correlated (r = .38)
with the tendency to search for arousal cues.
Analysis of self-reported focus on the comparison between present behavior and
the goal (i.e., picking up and holding the snake) revealed a slightly weaker but
opposite pattern. Doubtful subjects tended to report less focus on this comparison
228 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

when self-focus was high than when it was lower. Confident subjects tended to
report more focus on this comparison when self-focus was high than when it was
lower. Among confident subjects this focus was weakly but positively correlated
with perceived anxiety (r = .19), whereas the relationship was an inverse one
among doubtful subjects (r = - .28).
Finally, it should be noted that these results conceptually replicate earlier findings
by Carver and Blaney (1977b). That earlier research had not investigated the role
of self-focus per se. Instead, subjects (selected according to the same criteria as
were used by Carver et aI., 1979a) were induced to perceive either nonarousal or
rising arousal by means of false heartbeat feedback. Perceptions of rising arousal
hastened the withdrawal of doubtful subjects, but tended to increase the efforts of
confident subjects. And self-reported attention to the behavior-goal comparison
formed a pattern that was entirely consistent with the results described above. Thus,
although arousal perceptions were induced in two different ways in the two ex-
periments, the results were quite comparable. And the results of both studies are
supportive of our position: i.e., that there is an interactive relationship between
arousal perceptions and expectancies, in dictating where one subsequently concen-
trates one's attention and how one behaves.
It is of some interest that Mahoney and Avener (1977), in a study of successful
and unsuccessful athletes, found a similar dichotomy of subjects' "contents of
consciousness." Both confident and doubtful athletes were highly anxious prior to
competition. But confident (and ultimately successful) athletes respOnded to this
anxiety by concentrating on the upcoming behavioral attempt. Doubtful (and ul-
timately unsuccessful) athletes responded with cognitions of self-doubt, and the
desire to avoid the upcoming performance. These findings fit quite nicely with our
analysis.
These various findings also suggest a very sensible basis in logic for the distinction
between "facilitating" anxiety and "debilitating" anxiety (Alpert & Haber, 1960).
This distinction is commonly assumed to reflect differences in arousal level, with
small doses of anxiety presumed to be facilitating and larger doses debilitating. The
results discussed above indicate the very real possibility that the same level of
anxiety can be facilitating for one person and debilitating for another, based on the
person's expectancy of being able to cope with the anxiety and/or to successfully
execute the behavior at hand. Even moderate levels of anxiety are debilitating for
very doubtful people. And, although we have not experimentally addressed the
possibility, it may be that even relatively high levels of anxiety are facilitating for
people who are very confident. The latter possibility is clearly quite speculative,
in that it seems likely that extreme levels of fear would induce changes in one's
expectancy of coping with the fear. The point at which anxiety stops being a cue
to engage in outcome assessment and begins to be an informational contributor to
the assessment process itself is by no means clear, however. Nor is it clear at what
point anxiety might pull attention sufficiently away from the task attempts that the
expectancy-assessment process itself is no longer relevant to the guidance of be-
havior (cf. Chapter 9).
Self-Attention and Fear 229

Self-Attention and Test Anxiety

The influence of anxiety upon behavior can occur in many domains. Having a fear
of nonpoisonous snakes would not create serious problems in living for most people.
But there are other fears that are more problematic. Test anxiety, for example,
creates academic difficulties for a great many students (see Donner & Guerny,
1969; Eysenck & Rachman, 1965; Johnson & Sechrest, 1968). Though early theories
bearing on this phenomenon were based on assumptions about extreme levels of
arousal (e.g., Spence & Spence, 1966), more recent approaches to the understanding
of test anxiety have emphasized cognitive and attentional variables (e.g., Sarason,
1972a, 1975, 1978; Sarason & Stoops, 1978; Wine, 1971, 1980a, 1980b). Indeed,
at least two recent studies have found that persons high and low in test anxiety had
equivalent levels of physiological arousal in testing situations. They differed only
in the cognitions that were associated with the arousal and in their degrees of
awareness of the arousal (Hollandsworth, Glazeski, Kirkland, Jones, & Van Nor-
man, 1979; Holroyd, Westbrook, Wolf, & Badhorn, 1978; see also Holroyd &
Appel, 1980). There are some interesting theoretical comparisons to be made be-
tween recent theories of test anxiety and our own model of self-regulation. But we
are going to defer those comparisons for the moment, and first simply consider how
our approach might be applicable to test anxiety.
Persons who are high in test anxiety do not show performance deficits all the
time. They do so only on tasks in which they are "ego involved" (Mandler &
Sarason, 1952), and in which they feel that they are being evaluated on important
personal dimensions (e.g., Sarason, 1972a). Indeed, this concern over evaluation
has led Wine (1980a) to characterize test anxiety more broadly as "evaluation
anxiety." When evaluative circumstances are created, the test anxious person ne-
glects or misinterprets readily available task-relevant cues (e.g., Geen, 1976; West,
Lee, & Anderson, 1969), and is preoccupied with self-deprecating ruminations
(e.g., Deffenbacher, 1978; Mandler & Watson, 1966; Marlett & Watson, 1968;
Neale & Katahne, 1968; Sarason & Stoops, 1978; Wine, 1971, 1980a, 1980b).
These self-doubting thoughts presumably reflect previous experiences in evaluative
situations in which the person had experienced unpleasant outcomes.
We would agree that the person high in test anxiety who is confronting a highly
evaluative situation is experiencing a good deal of self-doubt (e.g., Many & Many,
1975; Sarason & Ganzer, 1962, 1963). And we would suggest further that such
self-doubts can be characterized as involving unfavorable outcome expectancies.
To the degree that such a person's behavior is interrupted by the impinging awareness
of his or her anxiety or by frustrations inherent in the task, we would expect the
result to be an impetus to withdraw. This would result from unfavorable expectancies
about dealing effectively with the anxiety, and thus (implicitly) unfavorable ex-
pectancies about completing the task successfully. But evaluative testing situations
are usually inescapable, in a physical sense. That is, in most cases there are social
constraints that prevent the person from bolting from the testing room. The result
of such a situation, we have suggested, is a kind of mental withdrawal from
230 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

subsequent task attempts. This may result in ignoring or misinterpreting available

task-relevant information, and in consequent poor performance. The inability to
redirect attention back to task-oriented striving also would appear subjectively as
a protracted state of self-focus, as the person simply remains cognizant of, or
repeatedly refocuses on, the self-doubts that are preventing effective task attempts
in the first place.
Do the performance deficits of the test anxious reflect a mental withdrawal from
the task at hand? If this were so, one might expect that test anxious persons would
also display overt physical withdrawal to a greater degree than the non-test anxious,
provided that such withdrawal was freely sanctioned. We have recently conducted
an experiment to assess this possibility (Carver, Peterson, Follansbee, & Scheier,
1980).

Test anxiety and persistence. As indicated above, we do not think that test anxious
persons are necessarily the first to leave the examination room. But our character-
ization does suggest that the persistence of a test anxious person at any given
element of the test is lower than the persistence of a person who is not test anxious.
That is, the test anxious individual should more quickly withdraw mentally into
self-deprecating ruminations, or perhaps simply move from item to item in a futile
search for obvious answers, answers that do not require lengthy analysis and pro-
longed concentration. This reasoning suggested the basis for the study discussed
in the following paragraphs.
Before describing that study, however, there is one other important theoretical
consideration to be noted. Several theorists other than ourselves have characterized
the test anxious person as being highly self-focused in evaluative contexts (Sarason,
1972a, 1975; Wine, 1971, 1980a, 1980b). The assumption of such theories ordi-
narily is that the state of self-focus impedes the task performances of test anxious
persons by distracting them from the task at hand. No researchers that we are aware
of, however, have tested directly the assumption that self-focus disrupts the behavior
of the test anxious in an evaluative setting. In the study reported below we did so,
by experimentally varying self-focus among persons who were either high or low
in test anxiety. If the widely held assumption that self-focus debilitates the test
anxious is correct, the manipulation should lead to reduced persistence among such
persons. This would be consistent with our reasoning, as well as the positions taken
by others. If our model is correct, however, the same manipulation should have
the opposite effect among persons low in test anxiety. As is discussed below, such
an effect does not seem to be directly implied by other theories of test anxiety (see
also Liebling & Shaver, 1973).
Subjects in this study completed Spielberger's (1979) test anxiety inventory in
group sessions early in the semester. Female subjects were selected for participation
in the study if their scores were in either the top quarter or the bottom quarter of
the pretest distribution. The experiment itself took place in individual sessions
several weeks later. The experimenter described the study as part of an evaluation
of a new measure of intelligence. The test was described as nearing completion,
but requiring a bit more laboratory study. A good deal of emphasis was placed upon
Self-Attention and Fear 231

the importance of the abilities that the test measured, and the test's accuracy in
reflecting those abilities, in order to create a highly evaluative situation for the
subject. This is important because of the fact that test anxious persons display
performance decrements only in highly evaluative circumstances. (Indeed, the im-
portance of this point is illustrated quite clearly in a study that is discussed later
on in this chapter.)
After the introductory remarks, the experimenter told the subject that she would
be working on a set of anagrams. The subject was to write down the solution for
each (numbered) item on an answer form. The subject was also given one additional
restriction: she could only work at one item at a time. The items were printed on
separate cards, which had been placed in a stack. The subject was to work on the
first item until she solved it or until she wanted to go on. She should then place
the item to the side (if she had solved it) or at the bottom of the stack (if she had
not solved it), and go to the next one. It was made clear that she could try each
item as often as she wished, but that they had to be attempted in order. In order
to remind the subject of the evaluative nature of the setting, the experimenter also
noted that these items were among the most difficult items on the intelligence test.
The subject then was moved to a table to begin the anagrams. This table had
some clutter on it which either did or did not include a wall mirror, placed facing
the subject. The experimenter indicated that she herself was going to be working
at another table in the room, and that the subject should tell her when she had
solved all of the anagrams that she thought she could solve. The experimenter then
told the subject to begin working on the first item. This item, in reality, was
impossible to solve. The experimenter surreptitiously measured the amount of time
that passed before the subject reached for the second item. This served as our
measure of persistence. The subject then was interrupted and debriefed.
In addition to examining the effect of manipulated self-focus on subjects' per-
sistence, we also looked at the effects of chronic self-attention. (Self-consciousness
scores had been collected at the same time as test anxiety scores.) Because there
has been some suggestion that test anxiety reflects a more general concern with
evaluation by other people, rather than strictly fear in achievement settings (cf.
Wine, 1980a, 1980b), both self-consciousness dimensions (private and public) were
entered into the analysis, by dividing subjects at the medians of the respective
distributions.
Analysis of subjects' persistence at the anagram yielded two significant inter-
actions, in addition to a marginally significant main effect for test anxiety. These
interactions are displayed graphically in Figure 12-2. The experimental manipulation
of self-focus interacted with subjects' levels of test anxiety, such that the manip-
ulation tended to reduce the persistence of persons who were test anxious, but
tended to increase the persistence of persons who were not test anxious. The
difference in persistence between the two pretest groups Was highly significant in
the mirror condition, but negligible in the no mirror condition.
A second interaction---of the same general form as the first---occurred between
test anxiety and public self-consciousness. When combined across experimental
conditions, the two levels of test anxiety diverged in their persistence if the subjects
232 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

••- - _ . Low test anxious

_ - -. High test anxious

-
IIJ
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c:
8140

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W
.... 100 /
.,.
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1
Mirror present Mirror absent High public Low public
self- self-
consciousness consciousness
Fig. 12-2. Persistence at an insoluble anagram as a function oftest anxiety and self-attention:
(left) subjects divided by mirror versus no mirror condition; (right) the same subjects redivided
by high versus low public self-consciousness.

were also high in public self-consciousness. The difference was not even in the
same direction, however, among subjects who were lower in public self-conscious-
ness. This finding appears to provide support for Wine's (1980a) position that test
anxiety reflects a broader concern with how one is being perceived by others.
Additional support comes from the fact that high levels of public self-consciousness
were more common among the test anxious than the non-test anxious in this sample
(p < .05, by X2 ).
Private self-consciousness did not interact reliably with test anxiety. Indeed, the
pattern of means divided according to those two variables did not resemble the
patterns displayed in Figure 12-2. We should note that this is the only study that
we are aware of in which the effect of a mirror paralleled the effect of public rather
than private self-consciousness. We have no ready explanation for this aspect of
the results, and suggest that they be viewed with some caution pending further
research.
In general, the behavioral effects of this study (with the exception described in
the preceding paragraph) took the predicted form. However, results of an expectancy
self-report failed to provide strong confirmation for our assumption that the behav-
ioral effects were mediated by expectancy differences between high and low test
anxious subject groups, despite the fact that expectancy differences commonly
appear in the literature of test anxiety. Although the group means differed in the
predicted direction, the difference fell short of significance (p < .13).
Self-Attention and Fear 233

One way of interpreting this finding derives from the fact that there is a good
deal of heterogeneity among the test anxious. Some of these persons are highly
motivated to do well, and are concerned because their anxiety interferes with good
performances. Others, however, are less interested in their levels of test perform-
ance, and simply find the anxiety an aversive experience that they would prefer to
avoid. Both groups are concerned with being able to cope with their anxiety, but
the two groups differ in the goals underlying their coping attempts.
Outcome expectancies regarding the task would seem to be far less important for
the latter group of people than for the former group. That is, among persons who
simply wish to avoid the aversiveness associated with testing, self-focus might
result only in monitoring of anxiety levels, and attempting to keep anxiety low (cf.
Hollandsworth et aI., 1979, p. 178). For these people, task outcome expectancy
might be less salient to them than their expectancies of being able to keep their
arousal low (a point to which we return in Chapter 13). This type of subject might
well give little attention to assessing their task expectancies when answering the
self-report item. If the sample of the present study had included substantial numbers
of this type of subject, it might have contributed to the weakness of the difference
in self-reported task expectancies (see Carver et aI., 1980, for another possible
interpretation) .
One additional point should be made regarding the data from this study. The
Spielberger test anxiety inventory had been chosen as the assessment instrument
because it incorporates two subscales measuring separate components of test anxiety
(cf. Liebert & Morris, 1967). These components are "emotionality," a tendency
to react emotionally to the testing situation, and "worry," a tendency to engage in
cognitive rumination. A variety of research has indicated that worry scores (on
conceptually related scales) are inversely related to performance expectancies and
to performances, whereas emotionality scores are considerably less so (e.g., Def-
fenbacher, 1977, 1980; Deffenbacher, Deitz, & Hazaleus, in press; Doctor &
Altman, 1969; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Morris & Liebert, 1969, 1970; Spiegler,
Morris, & Liebert, 1968). It was hoped that examination of the persistence data
according to these separate components would provide an indication of which factor
was involved in the overall effect. In this sample, however, the two factors were
both highly correlated with overall test anxiety. The result was that both subsidiary
analyses produced the same pattern of effects as had the main analysis.

Test Anxiety, Self-Focus, and Facilitation of Performance

There is one more study of test anxiety that we wish to discuss. This study is
important in that it demonstrates an effect that does not appear to be predictable
from other attentional analyses oftest anxiety. The finding is, however, consistent
with our analysis. More specifically, in the circumstances of this study a manip-
ulation of self-focus Jacilitated performances among persons high in test anxiety.
Subjects in this experiment (Slapion & Carver, 1981) were selected as being in
the top and bottom quarters of the pretest distribution of scores on the Spielberger
test anxiety inventory. Each subsequently participated in an individual experimental
session, conducted in a relatively nonevaluative atmosphere, an atmosphere quite
234 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

different from that of the study discussed above. The experimenter simply indicated
that the research concerned the development of an intelligence test and that the
subjects should try to do their best. The subject was given a test booklet and placed
in a cubicle to work for a specific period of time. Then the subject was moved to
a second cubicle, where he or she worked on a different portion of the test. This
procedure allowed a within-subject manipulation of self-attention. Specifically, a
large mirror had been placed either in the first room or in the second room, on the
table where the subject was to be working. The performance measure of this study
was an intelligence test that is used to classify office personnel. The initial items
of each section of the test are quite easy, and the items get progressively more
difficult. The overall difficulty level of the test is not at all high for college students,
however.
This study was conducted before our ideas concerning the importance of expec-
tancies had been fully formulated. Consequently no measure of expectancy was
taken in this study. However, the nature of the conditions of the experimental
session are consistent with the assumption that most subjects held favorable ex-
pectancies. That is, the situation was nonevaluative, and the initial task items were
easy. It seems likely that even test anxious subjects would have anticipated doing
well under these circumstances.
Analysis of subjects' performances indicated that induced self-attention exerted
a facilitating influence upon the performances of subjects who were high in test
anxiety. Moreover, secondary component analyses appeared to indicate that this
effect was primarily a product of subjects' cognitive propensities. That is, an analysis
of performance based on subjects' emotionality scores yielded a pattern that was
quite different from that obtained in the overall analysis. But an analysis based on
worry scores produced a pattern very much like the overall pattern.
It is of considerable interest that it was subjects who were most susceptible to
negative, self-preoccupied rumination (i.e., who were high on the worry subscale)
who were most reliably facilitated by a self-attention-increasing manipulation in
this study. This suggests that the cognitive processes which underlie test anxiety
lead behavior in quite different directions as a function of the nature of the testing
situation. That is, different situations induce different expectancies for coping. As
a consequence, the role of self-focus also can vary greatly from one context to
another.

Theoretical Comparisons

Taken as a group, the studies discussed in this chapter have a variety of theoretical
implications. Some of these implications concern the currently favored interpre-
tations of test anxiety as a phenomenon. But there are also broader implications
that concern the recent reemergence of interest in the concept of personal efficacy,
and the role that that variable plays in behavioral self-regulation. These issues are
addressed in the following two sections.
Theoretical Comparisons 235

Theories of Test Anxiety

As was indicated earlier, recent theories of test anxiety have focused on its cognitive
and attentional aspects, rather than on the role played by emotional arousal (see,
e.g., Sarason, 1972a, 1975, 1978; Sarason & Stoops, 1978; Wine, 1971, 1980a,
1980b). A wide variety of evidence suggests that the test anxious person tends to
be absorbed with self-deprecation in evaluative testing situations, and accordingly
fails to focus fully upon the task at hand (cf. Geen, 1976; West et aI., 1969). The
performance deficits associated with test anxiety are typically interpreted as indi-
cating that this focus on the self simply distracts the person from focusing on task-
relevant cues. In effect, the division of attention between self and task results in
too little attention being devoted to the task. This in tum precludes adequate use
of task-relevant information.
Another possibility stems from the idea that increased arousal causes constriction
in focus (cf. Easterbrook, 1959). This in tum results in a tendency to disregard
some portion of the available task-relevant cues, leading to performance deterio-
ration. The fact that persons high and low in test anxiety have been found not to
differ in the degrees of emotional arousal that they experience in evaluative testing
situations (Hollandsworth et aI., 1979; Holroyd et aI., 1978; Holroyd & Appel,
1980) appears to render this alternative much less viable, however. That is, given
that there are equivalent degrees of arousal between high and low test anxious
persons, there is no basis for assuming an arousal-induced constriction of focus in
one group but not in the other. Thus attention-based theorizing typically assumes
the straightforward model described above: that self-focus disrupts behavior by
spreading attention too thin, thereby preventing full and effective task focus (Wine,
1980a, 1980b).
There are several points at which our own approach differs from this concep-
tualization. First, we assume that it is not self-focus per se that is associated with
performance decrements among the test anxious, but rather a more complex series
of information-processing events that follow from the interruption of ongoing be-
havior. That is, we suggest that when the test anxious person interrupts behavior
to assess his or her likely outcome, the result is often an unfavorable expectancy.
The recognition of unfavorable expectancies, in our model, results in an impetus
to withdraw from the situation. If physical withdrawal is prevented, the result is
a mental withdrawal into task-irrelevant cognitions. In the case of test anxiety, it
would seem likely that those cognitions would be further self-deprecatory rumi-
nation.
The testing situation does not encourage permanent withdrawal, however, or the
test anxious might simply resort to daydreaming in order to remove themselves
mentally from the salient dimension of evaluation. Instead, they eventually return
to the task attempt, although perhaps halfheartedly. They are likely to be interrupted
from task attempts again, either by awareness of physical anxiety cues (to which
they appear to be especially attentive, e.g., Holroyd & Appel, 1980) or by frustration
in the task. This results once again in an awareness of an unfavorable expectancy,
a withdrawal impulse, and a focus on task-irrelevant information.
236 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

When viewed over the course of a long period of time, the result of this sequence
is that test anxious persons may spend proportionally greater amounts of time
thinking about their inadequacies than do persons who are not test anxious. But in
a real sense this difference can be viewed as epiphenomenal, in that it depends on
the outcome-assessment and withdrawal-impulse processes that precede it. Thus we
regard the statement that test anxious persons are self-focused in testing situations
as being too simple a characterization.

Empirical findings. We believe that the picture sketched in the preceding para-
graphs is quite consistent with a variety of existing evidence. Further, it can account
for certain findings that are not easily interpreted by alternative attentional models
oftest anxiety.
Consider the sequence that our model proposes. First, we would assume that test
anxious persons-knowing that the task is difficult, and doubting their abilities to
perform well or to keep their anxiety under control-would be especially likely to
interrupt their task-directed behavior and make outcome assessments. This indeed
appears to be the case. In at least three different studies (Mandler & Watson, 1966;
Marlett & Watson, 1968; Neale & Katahne, 1968) subjects have been asked to
recall "how often during the testing did you find yourself thinking how well or
how badly you were doing?" In each case, highly test anxious subjects reported
a greater incidence of such thoughts than did less test anxious subjects. Such
thoughts appear to be very similar to what we would expect to occur during an
outcome assessment.
The fact that the test anxious utilize a more restricted range of task-relevant cues
than do less test anxious persons is open to a fairly wide variety of interpretations.
One plausible interpretation that would be consistent with our model is that this
reflects shorter periods of task concentration on the part of the test anxious before
being interrupted. With less prolonged concentration, the subjects would be less
likely to fully analyze the task demands, and would less readily be able to isolate
task-relevant information.
Our reasoning is also quite consistent with the findings reported above that
experimentally increased self-focus results in decreased persistence among test
anxious persons, when compared to non-test anxious persons (Carver et aI., 1980).
In our view, enhanced self-focus among the test anxious resulted in a greater
awareness of anxiety or of the task frustration, an increased tendency to interrupt
behavior, and a quicker withdrawal from the attempt to solve a difficult cognitive
problem. These data suggest the possibility that the deficits displayed by test anxious
persons in other settings may similarly reflect the impulse to withdraw from task
attempts, impulses that are put into operation mentally rather than physically.
This study is not the only source of support for this supposition. Additional
evidence comes from a report by Nottelman and Hill (1977) that highly test anxious
children glanced away more frequently from a task being worked on than did less
test anxious children. Commenting on this finding, and the fact that it occurred
most reliably among younger children, Wine (1980b) noted that such behavior is
a kind of physical avoidance of the task. She suggested further that with increasing
Theoretical Comparisons 237

age such avoidance behaviors may become more covert and internalized. This
interpretation on Wine's part is quite consistent with our own reasoning.
Another area in which our model meshes easily with previous research findings
concerns the pivotal role we have ascribed to situational outcome expectancy. Wine
(1980a) overviewed a variety of research in which attempts were made to improve
the performance of test anxious subjects. Some of this research investigated the
effects of "memory supports" on multistage tasks. This research was based on the
argument (Sieber, 1969) that the test anxious have poor short-term memory, a
notion that has also had more recent investigation. For example, Mueller (1979;
Mueller & Courtois, in press) has found that the test anxious engage primarily in
"shallow" encoding, that more "elaborative" encoding is relatively absent. (We
would suggest that these deficits might well reflect the repeated interruption of task
efforts that we believe characterizes the test anxious.) Sieber (1969) conceived of
memory supports as being ways of maintaining attention to the task. Results of
several studies (e.g., Sieber, 1969; Sieber, Kameya, & Paulson, 1970) have con-
firmed the effectiveness of such procedures. We would suggest, however, that the
nature of these procedures is such that they do not simply maintain task focus, but
that they also alter subjects' expectancies. For example, one memory support is the
availability of records of intermediate steps in one's problem-solution attempts.
This would seem to lead to the anticipation of performing better than when such
records are absent.
Similarly, Sarason (1958, 1972b, 1978) has conducted a series of studies ex-
amining the effects of instructional orientations and models with various charac-
teristics. Wine (1980a) suggested that "reassuring" instructions were attention di-
recting, since they induce the subjects to concentrate on the task rather than worry
about how they are doing. But these instructions would also seem to reduce eval-
uative concern, thus diminishing unfavorable expectancies. The same is true of a
"motivating-task orientation," in which subjects were told that the experimenter
was not interested in individuals' performances, and of another condition in which
subjects were given reassurance along with hints on specific problem-solving strat-
egies. In all these cases, performance improved. But we regard the improvement
as depending upon altered expectancies of failure.
Finally, we should note that there are research findings that do not seem amenable
to interpretation by the theory articulated by Wine (1971, 1980a, 1980b). These
findings are, however, consistent with the model presented here. Specifically, as
was discussed above, Carver et al. (1980) found that self-focus tended to increase
persistence among persons who were not test anxious, a finding that replicated
(directly and conceptually) a large accumulation of data discussed in Chapter 11.
Attentional theorists in the area of test anxiety have rarely considered the impli-
cations of their reasoning for the broader range of human behavior. But it seems
difficult to derive from such theories the prediction that self-focus would be facil-
itating to nonanxious persons. On the other hand, it appears to be an important
strength of our approach that it accounts both for normal self-regulation and for the
maladaptive pattern of test anxiety, using a single set of constructs.
There is one other finding that is even a clearer indicator of the difference between
238 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

models. As discussed above, Slapion and Carver (1981) have shown that there are
circumstances in which self-focus facilitates performance even among the test anx-
ious. This is a possibility that does not appear to be predictable from other analyses
of test anxiety.

Test anxiety and focus on the public self. There is one respect, however, in which
our research provides important corroboration for a position taken by Wine (1980a,
1980b). Wine argues that test anxiety is something of a misnomer, that the test
anxious person is actually worried about many sorts of evaluation. She holds further
that such persons are very attuned to the social nature of evaluative settings. Rather
than being task-oriented, the cognitive set of the test anxious is "how is this person
evaluating meT' (Wine, 1980b; see also Sarason & Stoops, 1978).
Wine has pointed to a variety of indirect evidence in support of this contention,
including the following: The range of task cues utilized by the test anxious is
narrowed by the presence of observers (Geen, 1976), but not if the observer is
defined as nonevaluative and helpful (Geen, 1977). Test anxious persons conform
to majority statements more than do less test anxious persons when making per-
ceptual judgments (Meunier & Rule, 1967). Test anxious children have been found
to glance at the experimenter more frequently than less test anxious children (Not-
telman & Hill, 1977), and to be particularly oriented to the social-evaluative figure
in a classroom setting (Potter, 1976).
The results of Carver et al. (1980) provide even more compelling support for the
assumption that test anxiety involves a sensitivity to one's public display. That is,
public self-consciousness (rather than private self-consciousness) was associated
with a persistence deficit among the test anxious. This suggests that it is partly
concern over one's public self-presentation-taken together with doubts about one's
adequacy-that mediates such deficits.

Self-Efficacy
At least one more comparison is warranted between our theory and another analysis
of the regulation of fear-related behavior. This analysis is the self-efficacy model
proposed by Bandura (1977). As was noted in Chapter 10, there are some differences
between Bandura's position and ours. But there are also some important similarities.
Bandura (1977) proposed his theory of self-efficacy as a way of accounting for
the mediation of successful changes in therapy (see also Bandura, Adams, & Beyer,
1977). Although most of Bandura's subsequent writing on the subject has also
focused on the therapy experience, it is clear that the construct has a much wider
range of usefulness (e.g., Avia & Kanfer, 1980; Brown & Inouye, 1978; Mahoney,
1979). Put simply, Bandura argued that the sense of personal efficacy is an important
determinant of (a) the likelihood that coping behaviors will be initiated in a stressful
situation, (b) the degree of effort that will be expended in coping attempts, and
(c) the degree to which such efforts will be sustained when the person is confronted
with obstacles and aversive experiences. He held further that therapeutic procedures
Theoretical Comparisons 239

designed to promote successful coping with stress are effective largely to the degree
that they induce an enhanced sense of self-efficacy (cf. Murray & Jacobson, 1978).
The latter reasoning has been supported in a variety of therapy studies. In one
study (Bandura et al., 1977) phobics were given one of three treatments: a mastery-
based treatment involving first-person experiences, a set of vicarious experiences,
or no treatment. Consistent with prediction, the mastery-based treatment was the
more effective of the two treatments in promoting behavior change. Of greater
importance to present concerns, however, there was evidence that the gains accruing
from both types of therapy were mediated by changes in self-perceived efficacy.
This finding has since been replicated and extended (Bandura, Adams, Hardy, &
Howells, 1980) in a series of studies of the effects of symbolic modeling as a
treatment technique, using a wide variety of fear-related behavioral problems. In
each case, there was evidence that the benefits of therapy were mediated by changes
in efficacy perceptions.
This emphasis on the importance of positive and negative expectancies has con-
siderable similarity to our own model. But there are some differences between the
theories, which have implications for their relative accuracy, generality, and pre-
dicti ve ability.
One major difference between models is the role posited for arousal. Bandura
(1977) initially argued that arousal perceptions were a partial determinant of efficacy
expectancy. More recently (Bandura et aI., 1980) he has argued that arousal is a
consequence of low efficacy perceptions. The latter position appears, however, to
be somewhat at odds with the recent findings (Hollandsworth et aI., 1979; Holroyd
et aI., 1978) that stressful evaluative testing situations produce comparable degrees
of arousal among the test anxious (who presumably have low efficacy perceptions)
and the non-test anxious (who presumably have high efficacy perceptions). On the
other hand, these findings are quite consistent with our own assumptions regarding
arousal. That is, as discussed earlier, we have assumed that (up to moderately
intense levels, at least) arousal serves to interrupt behavior and to cue an outcome
assessment process. The result of that assessment-which depends on factors other
than arousal (cf. Bandura, 1977)-then dictates subsequent behavior. This differ-
ence between theories may reflect the fact that we have focused on understanding
moment-to-moment behavior regulation, whereas Bandura has been concerned with
the underlying bases of longer-term changes. In the longer run, awareness of con-
tinued arousal may well influence concurrent expectancies. And it seems clear that
awareness of repeated arousal can have an impact upon one's perception of one's
chronic level of fearfulness (cf. Carver et aI., 1979a).
A second important difference stems from the fact that the two models have
different referents for the term outcome expectancy. Bandura uses this phrase to
refer to the estimate that a given behavior will lead to specific outcomes (Bandura,
1977, p. 193). Thus, a person who does not know what the outcomes of a given
action typically are cannot have an outcome expectancy regarding the action. We,
in contrast, use this term to refer to the perceived likelihood of a desired outcome
occurring.
240 12. Research: Anxiety-Related Behavior

Both applications of the term have precedents, but we see ours as being the more
useful theoretically, for the following reason. In our terminology, efficacyexpect-
ancy is only one determinant of outcome expectancy, albeit often a critical one
(see Figure 12-3). That is, there are certain situations in which efficacy expectancy
may be virtually the sale determinant of outcome expectancy. Indeed, this may be
so in many of the cases that were of the greatest interest to Bandura. But there are
other cases where this is not true. And in those cases our model allows predictions,
whereas Bandura' s does not.
Specifically, Bandura's analysis makes no prediction about the influence of cog-
nitions that arise from constraints of time pressure or environmental influences. The
analysis that we have proposed clearly incorporates such contingencies as influences
upon outcome expectancies (Figure 12-3). Thus, using a single theory, we can
account both for behavior deficits that are produced by poor efficacy perceptions
and for deficits produced by the perception that progress is being prevented by
circumstances beyond one's control. And, consistent with this position, research
discussed in Chapter 11 has found that overt behavioral attempts follow outcome
expectancies, regardless of the internality or externality of the attributional basis
for those expectancies. Indeed, even in the therapy setting there is evidence that
certain individuals respond better when gains are attributed externally than when
they are attributed to self-efficacy (Chambliss & Murray, 1979). The ability to deal
with all of these cases appears to render our theory more general in its applicability
than is Bandura's. We feel that this integrative capability confers a definite advantage
on our approach.

KNOWLEDGE
OF BEHAVIOR'S
CONSEQUENCES

TIME CONSTRAINTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL 1--+ BEHAVIOR
IMPEDIMENTS

EFFICACY
EXPECTANCY

PRIOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
VICARIOUS EXPERIENCES,
VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS

Fig. 12-3. Hypothesized relationships among efficacy expectancy, outcome expectancy, and
behavior. (Adapted from Carver, 1979.)
Chapter Summary 241

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have discussed the relevance of our theoretical analysis to the
nature of people's responses to fear. Results of two studies suggest that self-focus
enhances awareness of salient fear cues, causing an interruption in behavior. The
findings of two other studies suggest that responses to this interruption are deter-
mined by one's outcome expectancy. Even with fear salient, if expectancies are
positive, the result is renewed efforts and concentration on the goal. If expectancies
are negative, however, interruption leads to withdrawal.
This reasoning then was applied to the experience of test anxiety. It was argued
that in evaluative settings the test anxious are interrupted by rising anxiety or by
task frustrations; that their outcome expectancies are often unfavorable; and that
the response to the interruption is an impetus to withdraw. Because physical with-
drawal is typically precluded, the result is a mental withdrawal from concentration.
Data consistent with this analysis were presented, along with data making a more
unusual point regarding test anxiety. Specifically, under circumstances of low eval-
uation pressure and favorable expectancies, self-focus can facilitate the perform-
ances of the test anxious.
The chapter concluded with two theoretical comparisons. The first bears on the
interpretation of test anxiety. Although there are similarities between our model and
other theories of test anxiety, only ours can account for the facilitation finding, and
only ours represents a model that is general to normal as well as abnormal behavior.
A comparison with self-efficacy theory also indicates areas of similarity. But based
partly on definitional considerations, our theory emerges as the more general, and
the more consistent with certain aspects of recent data.
Chapter 13

Additional Conceptual Issues: Achievement

Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

In Chapter 10 we presented a theoretical model of the consequences of impediments

in self-regulation. In Chapters 11 and 12 we reviewed evidence that indicates the
model's applicability to persistence, performance, and fear-related behaviors. In
this chapter, we stand back a bit from our theoretical position and consider its
relationship to three other areas of research and theory in personality and social
psychology. Inasmuch as many of the applications discussed earlier were to achieve-
ment-related behavior, a comparison between our model and theories of achieve-
ment motivation would seem to be of interest. Aspects of the achievement literature
are discussed in the first section below. A second area in which theories have a
conceptual similarity to our own model is the study of human helplessness. Com-
parison between theories of helplessness and our theory is undertaken in the middle
section of the chapter. Finally, we consider a theory which focuses on the as-
sumption that people choose their actions in such a way as to protect and enhance
their self-esteem. Though that sort of analysis has quite a different starting point
than does our own, there are also important similarities between the two. An
examination of these similarities and differences is undertaken in the final section
of the chapter.

Achievement Motivation

Atkinson's Formulation
Though the present model may be unique in considering outcome expectancies and
self-attention in the same conceptualization, it is certainly not the only theory to
afford outcome expectancies a central role in the determination of behavior. Ex-
pectancy constructs are also quite important in Atkinson's (1957, 1964) theory of
achievement motivation. In this section we explore some of the relationships be-
tween the present model and research stemming from that theory.
244 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

Atkinson (1957, 1958) conceived of achievement behavior as resulting from an

approach-avoidance conflict. According to his model, the resultant tendency to
approach success (TA) is determined by the relative strengths of the component
approach and avoidance tendencies. This is formalized in the following equation:
TA = (Ms X P s X Is) - (MAF X P f X Ie). The terms inside the first set of
parentheses concern the approach tendency; the terms inside the second set of
parentheses concern avoidance.
Consider first the approach tendency. Ms represents a relatively stable personality
disposition to strive for success. It is usually conceptualized as a capacity on the
part of a person to experience feelings of pride in accomplishment, and is typically
referred to as the need for achievement. P s represents the subjective probability of
success, that is, the person's perceived likelihood of being able to solve the problem
or attain the goal. This is similar to what we have termed outcome expectancy. The
final factor influencing the approach tendency is the incentive value of success,
symbolized as Is. This is conceived of as an affect, often labeled "pride."
Atkinson conceptualized the person's need for achievement (Ms) as independent
of both the probability and the incentive value of success, although there is some
evidence that a slight positive relationship may exist between Ms and P s (see e.g.,
Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, & Litwin, 1960; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell,
1953). According to Atkinson's model, however, the incentive value of success is
explicitly assumed not to have an independent existence. Rather it is defined as
being inversely related to the probability of success: Is = 1 - P s. This is because
Atkinson assumed that the amount of pride following success is inversely related
to the sUbjective difficulty of the task attempted. Because the incentive value of
success is defined in terms of the subjective probability of success, and because the
two factors are assumed to combine in a multiplicative manner (as the above equation
conveys), the strongest approach tendency (taken alone) occurs when the probability
of success is .50. This is so because when P s equals .50, Is also equals .50, and
P s X Is equals .25. As P s either increases or decreases from .50, the value of P s
X Is decreases, and so too should the motivation to approach the achievement
context.
The last three elements contained in the basic equation presented above are
analogous to the ones just described, except that they define the avoidance rather
than the approach tendency. Like Ms, MAF also represents a relatively enduring
personality disposition. But in this case it is a capacity to experience shame following
failure in achievement-related contexts (it is assumed that Ms and MAF are inde-
pendent personality dimensions). This is generally referred to as the motive to avoid
failure, and is typically operationalized in terms of the person's level oftest anxiety.
The avoidance counterpart of P s is Pf, which represents the SUbjective probability
of failure (it is assumed that Ps + P f = 1). Ie refers to the shame associated with
task failure and thus defines the incentive value of failure avoidance.
Atkinson presumed that the enduring motive to avoid failure (M AF ) is independent
of both the probability of failure (Pf) and its incentive value (Ie). But Ie was seen
as being dependent on Pf' That is, just as the amount of pride experienced by task
success is affected by task difficulty, so does task difficulty affect the amount of
Achievement Motivation 245

shame experienced with failure. According to Atkinson, the easier a task is perceived
to be, the greater is the shame that accompanies failure. Consistent with these
considerations, Atkinson defined the incentive value of failure as - (1 - P f).
Because of the dependence of the incentive value of failure (Ir) on the subjective
probability of failure (Pf), and because of the multiplicative way in which these
two factors combine, it follows from Atkinson's model that the avoidance tendency
is strongest (as is the approach tendency) when Pf (and Ps) = .50. As the probability
of failure (P f ) decreases or increases from .50, the avoidance tendency diminishes.
The relationship among the six factors affecting approach and avoidance can best
be conveyed by performing a simple transformation on Atkinson's basic equation
for achievement-related behavior. Inasmuch as there is only one degree of freedom
among the four environmental determinants of achievement-related behavior (Ps>
Is. Ph Ir), the basic equation can be transformed as follows: TA = (Ms - MAP)
[P s x (1 - Ps)].
As this transformed equation clearly shows, it is the relative strength of Ms (the
capacity to experience pride in accomplishment) compared to MAP (the capacity to
experience shame in failure) that determines whether achievement tasks are ap-
proached or avoided, or (if a choice is not possible) determines how vigorously
such tasks are pursued. If the strength of Ms is greater than MAP, the approach
tendency will prevail and achievement tasks will be pursued and pursued vigorously.
In contrast, if the strength of MAP is greater than M s , the avoidance tendency will
predominate. In this case the achievement task will not be attempted at all, or will
be attempted only halfheartedly. The difference between Ms and MAP is termed
"resultant achievement motivation."! From what has been said in the preceding
paragraphs, it should also be clear that the effects of resultant achievement moti-
vation will be greatest when the probability of success (and failure) is .50, because
it is at this point where the environmental determinants of both approach and
avoidance exert their strongest effects.
Since Atkinson introduced his theory some 25 years ago, research deriving from
it has flourished. This research has tended to fall into one of four conceptually
related categories. Studies have examined the effects of resultant achievement mo-
tivation on (a) the kinds of tasks (achievement-related or not) that persons decide
to work on, given a free choice, (b) the level of difficulty of the tasks people choose
to work on when they must work on an achievement-related task, (c) the intensity

IThe definition of resultant achievement motivation as the difference between the motive to
achieve and the motive to avoid failure makes perfectly good sense in the context of Atkinson's
theoretical analysis. But the result of this definition is that in most studies test anxiety and
the motive to achieve (which Atkinson saw as independent) are perfectly confounded with
each other. This sometimes makes interpretation difficult. Is it the responsivity to affect
(characteristic of the test anxious) that distinguishes between the two groups, or the desire
to attain achievement goals, or both? We should note as well that this distinction also has
implications for the literature of test anxiety. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the
test anxious vary greatly in their achievement orientations. And these differences may be
important in behavioral self-regulation.
246 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

or quality of perfonnance, and (d) the amount of persistence shown when failure
is encountered. In general, the accumulated results have offered consistent support
for Atkinson's theory. Rather than provide a comprehensive summary of the research
in all these areas, however, we will limit our discussion largely to one area, which
is particularly gennane to our own research: persistence at an insoluble task (for
a thorough review of the entire research literature, see Atkinson, 1964).
As an illustration of the research on persistence, consider a now famous study
by Feather (1961). Feather selected subjects who were either high or low in resultant
achievement motivation, and asked them to perfonn a line-drawing task that was
described to them as being either easy or hard. The task was in fact insoluble.
Consistent with Atkinson's theory, high need achievement-low test anxious subjects
tended to persist longer on the task when it was described as easy than when it was
described as hard, whereas the opposite occurred among low need achievement-high
test anxious subjects.

Relationship to Present Model

On the face of it, certain aspects of Feather's findings appear to contradict aspects
of the present model. How would our model account for these findings? The behavior
of high need achievement-low test anxiety subjects would seem to require no special
explanation. The infonnation about task ease or difficulty should have led these
subjects to hold positive or negative expectancies, respectively. Given this, the
model would predict greater persistence among those in the easy condition, which
is what occurred among these subjects. [Indeed, it is of some interest in this regard
that Heckhausen (1967, p. 105) has characterized achievement-oriented behavior
as being a "model example" of a feedback loop in behavior.] But what about
subjects low in need achievement and high in test anxiety? They persisted longer
when the task was described as hard than when it was described as easy. How
would we account for that?
A potential answer to this problem is suggested by two studies (described in
Chapter 12) examining the effects of self-attention on behavioral reactions to fear
(Scheier et al., in press). In the first study phobics and nonphobics were asked to
approach and hold a snake in the presence of a mirror or with no mirror. In the
second study subjects high and low in private self-consciousness were asked to
submit to a series of either mild or strong electric shocks for humanitarian reasons.
In each case, the presence of fearful affect made subjects more likely to withdraw
from the stimulus producing the affect, regardless of the fact that a behavioral
standard existed that called for an opposite response. This withdrawal tendency was
also intensified by heightened self-focus. We argued that subjects in the high fear
conditions experienced doubts about their ability to deal effectively with the fear,
whereas this did not occur among subjects with less or no fear. This in tum
presumably caused the high fear subjects to withdraw behaviorally from the situation
more quickly.
Consider now the affective experiences of the low need achievement-high test
anxiety subjects in Feather's research. Given their personality dispositions, these
Achievement Motivation 247

were persons who did not particularly care about achieving success. They were,
however, particularly concerned about avoiding the shame of failure (cf. Atkinson,
1964). And when is shame likely to arise from failure? Certainly not when the
failure involves the inability to solve a difficult problem. Rather, shame (and anxiety)
should be most intense when the failure comes on a task that is easy, because it
it here that failure is most likely to call into question the person's ability (Weiner
et aI., 1971; Weiner, 1974). Thus, in Feather's study it is quite likely that the low
need achievement-high test anxiety subjects experienced a greater amount of anxiety
when unable to solve a task described as easy than when the failure came on a task
described as hard. If so, the anxiety may have caused their behavior to be interrupted,
and thus led them to withdraw more quickly in this condition-just as the greater
fear experienced by some of the subjects in the Scheier et ai. (in press) studies
caused them to withdraw more quickly.
One point should be made explicit about the line of reasoning we have just
advanced. Specifically, implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that the standards
guiding the behavior in achievement contexts of persons high and low in resultant
achievement motivation are fundamentally different. Namely, the standard of per-
sons high in resultant achievement motivation is to solve the problem. The standard
of persons low in resultant achievement motivation is to avoid the experience of
anxiety. This assumption suggests that high and low need achievers differ in terms
of (a) the type of event that causes their behavior to be interrupted (i.e., not solving
the problem versus experiencing anxiety), (b) the type of expectancy each tries to
assess (probability of success versus probability of keeping anxiety low), and there-
fore (c) the type of information that is utilized in the assessment process (i.e.,
information about the likelihood of success versus information about the intensity
of the anxiety).
There is only indirect empirical support for this assumption. But it is quite
consistent with the conceptualization of high and low need achievers provided by
Atkinson (1957, 1964), and similar to arguments advanced by others. For example,
Weiner (1974, p. 66), has suggested that "individuals highly motivated to succeed
weight environmental information and future probabilities of success more heavily
than the prior affective consequences of their actions." And a number of authors
have suggested that the test anxious are particularly attentive to their arousal in
evaluative situations (e.g., Hollandsworth et aI., 1979; Holroyd et aI., 1978; Wine,
1971). Thus we regard this assumption as quite plausible.
While providing a rapproachment between the present model and Feather's re-
search on persistence, this analysis is post hoc, and thus requires additional veri-
fication. We have been arguing that the tendency of persons low in resultant need
achievement to withdraw from certain testing situations is due to the anxiety they
experience over anticipated failure. If this is correct, it should be possible to cir-
cumvent their withdrawal either by inducing them to attribute symptoms of their
anxiety to a cause other than their anticipated failure, or by inducing them to
misattribute their anticipated failure externally (thereby eliminating their anxiety).
Weiner and Sierad (1975) have recently conducted a study using the latter technique.
In that study subjects classified according to their levels of achievement needs
248 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

received four failure trials at a digit-symbol substitution task. Prior to the failure,
subjects either did or did not receive a placebo pill, which ostensibly would interfere
with eye-hand coordination. Whereas this manipulation disrupted the perfonnances
of subjects high in resultant achievement motivation (presumably because it caused
them to hold more negative outcome expectancies), it enhanced the perfonnances
of subjects low in resultant achievement motivation (presumably because it lessened
their anxiety over possible task failure). The results of this study must be interpreted
somewhat cautiously, in that neither self-attention nor task difficulty was system-
atically varied. But the findings obtained were exactly as the present model would
predict. As such, they offer considerable (albeit somewhat indirect) support for the
ideas we have advanced.

Choice of task difficulty. If the foregoing line of reasoning offers a plausible

explanation within the confines of our model for the previous findings on persistence,
it also suggests an explanation for a finding from a related area of achievement
behavior. Specifically, when given a choice, persons low in resultant achievement
motivation tend to avoid working on moderately difficult tasks (e.g., Atkinson &
Litwin, 1960).
According to Atkinson's model, these effects simply indicate once again that the
difference between persons high and low in resultant achievement motivation is
maximized at the point of moderate difficulty, due to the multiplicative relationship
between expectancy and incentive. We, in contrast, would approach such findings
by suggesting that moderately difficult tasks are typically the most diagnostic of
a person's ability (cf. Trope, 1975, 1979; Trope & Brickman, 1975; Weiner & Kukla,
1970). As such, they should be the ones that create the most anxiety in those who
are concerned about avoiding the shame of failure. Hence, moderately difficult
tasks should be, and are, the ones avoided by persons who are low in need ach-
eivement and high in test anxiety.
Why do persons high in resultant achievement motivation, on the other hand,
seek out tasks of intennediate difficulty? For precisely the same reasons that persons
low in achievement motivation avoid them: because they are highly diagnostic.
These are the tasks that nonnally provide the most infonnation about one's ability,
infonnation that high need achievers presumably desire (Trope, 1975; Weiner et
al., 1971). This position is quite consistent with results of research by Trope (1975),
who asked subjects to select 25 items to work on, drawn from a larger pool of
items varying independently in difficulty level and diagnosticity. As Trope pre-
dicted, items high in diagnosticity were more likely to be chosen than items lower
in diagnosticity, a preference that was considerably more pronounced among sub-
jects high than low in resultant achievement motivation. Choices based on task
difficulty, in contrast, were unrelated to level of resultant achievement motivation,
contrary to what Atkinson's model would predict. Trope (1980) has since replicated
this difference between motive groups, but at least one study (Buckert, Meyer,
& Schmalt, 1979) has failed to find the effect. Although the data thus are somewhat
mixed, these findings do seem to suggest that it is diagnosticity considerations that
Achievement Motivation 249

govern the choice behavior of those high in resultant need achievement. In terms
of the present model, persons high in resultant need achievement seem to be gov-
erned by a higher-order standard causing them to seek information about their own
capabilities.

The Role of Causal Attributions

At several points in the preceding discussion we have touched on attributional
processes. Our discussion of achievement behavior would not be complete without
describing more explicitly the role that may be played by causal attributions. The
main proponent of an attributional approach to achievement motivation has been
Weiner (see, e.g., Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, 1972, 1974, 1979). In essence,
the task he has set for himself is to explain why it is that persons high and low in
resultant need achievement behave the way they do in achievement contexts. As
such, his intent has not so much been to supplant Atkinson's theory, as to specify
more precisely the cognitive mechanisms underlying the approach-avoidance tend-
encies exhibited by persons high and low in resultant achievement motivation.
At the core of Weiner's formulation is the notion that high and low resultant
need achievers differ quite dramatically in terms of the kinds of attributions they
make for their successes and failures (Weiner et al., 1971). Specifically, he presumes
that persons high in resultant need acheivement rely more heavily on internal
attributions (i.e., effort and especially ability) to explain their successes than do
those lower in resultant achievement motivation. And Weiner assumes that persons
high in resultant achievement motivation attribute failures to lack of effort, whereas
persons low in resultant achievement motivation are more inclined to attribute
failures to lack of ability. A variety of experimental and correlational studies have
documented the existence of these attributional styles (e.g., Weiner & Kukla, 1970;
Weiner & Potepan, 1970; for comprehensive reviews see Weiner et al., 1971;
Weiner, 1972).
How do these differences in causal attributions explain the behavioral differences
in achievement-related contexts between persons high and low in resultant need
achievement? We will focus here on persistence in the face of failure. According
to Weiner, persistence differences occur because of a difference in how the two
motive groups attribute causality for their negative outcomes. Recall that the highs
tend to attribute their failure to a lack of effort, whereas the lows tend to attribute
their failure to a lack of ability. Although both causes are internal, the attributions
differ markedly in terms of their stability. The ability attributions made by the lows
are stable, whereas the effort attributions made by the highs are not. As was
discussed in Chapter 10, there is evidence that prior performance information tends
to determine future expectancies only to the degree that the perceived reasons for
the prior performance are stable. It is this consideration that Weiner uses to explain
the persistence differences between persons high and low in resultant need achieve-
ment (Weiner et aI., 1971). That is, according to Weiner, highs persist longer in
the face of difficulty than do lows because the difference in the stability of the
250 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

failure attributions made by each group causes them to hold different outcome
expectancies. This, in tum, causes them to persist for differing amounts of time.
This analysis seems perfectly reasonable, except for one thing. Although it ac-
counts for the findings of some studies of persistence (e.g., French & Thomas,
1958), it can provide only a partial explanation for the findings of others (e.g.,
Feather, 1961). Recall that Feather had subjects work on an insoluble line-drawing
problem that was described as being either easy or hard. Persons high in resultant
need achievement persisted longer at the task when it was easy than hard, but the
reverse was true for subjects low in resultant need achievement.
These findings are not interpretable by a theory that relies strictly on attributions
and expectancies. Such a theory would seem to predict two additive main effects:
more persistence among high than low resultant need achievers (due to differences
in the stability of their preferred attributions), and more persistence when the task
was described as easy than when it was described as hard. It was precisely this
consideration that led us to analyze the behavior of low resultant need achievers
in terms of affect (see above). In a slightly different context, Weiner (Weiner &
Sierad, 1975) has apparently reached a similar conclusion. Given the assumption
that low resultant need achievers are motivated primarily by affective considerations,
causal attributions should influence their persistence primarily by influencing the
perceived intensity and type of their affective reactions. Any impact that the attri-
butions have on task outcome expectancies should be much less consequential. In
brief, for Weiner as for us, persistence among the two different motive groups is
accounted for in two different ways. A task expectancy analysis fits the behavior
of persons high in resultant achievement motivation. But for lows, an affect-based
explanation seems best.

Section Summary
The preceding section described the essence of Atkinson's model of achievement
motivation, and discussed in some detail the application of that model to persistence
behavior. The behavior of persons high in resultant need achievement is easily fit
to our own analysis of self-regulation: favorable expectancies lead to more per-
sistence than do unfavorable expectancies. The behavior of persons low in resultant
need achievement poses a problem, if addressed solely in terms of task expectancies.
Consequently, we suggest the possibility that such persons are responsive not to
task expectancies (inasmuch as they are not oriented to achieving), but are responsive
instead to anxiety aroused by failure, and by expectancies about successfully min-
imizing that anxiety. The more anxiety is induced, the sooner is the withdrawal
from the task attempt. This reasoning appears to be consistent with Weiner's at-
tributional approach (as applied to high need achievers), and with a position taken
more recently by Weiner regarding the. role of affect among low need achievers.
It is, of course, also consistent with the discussion in Chapter 12 of the effects of
test anxiety, and fear-related behavior more generally.
Helplessness 251

Helplessness
The fact that our model of self-regulation deals with giving-up responses as well
as reassertion, and the fact that it is framed in terms of outcome expectancies,
suggest that there are similarities between our ideas and some of the recent expla-
nations for "learned helplessness" in humans. Helplessness as a research area derives
historically from an interesting finding in the animal learning literature: specifically,
that dogs exposed to uncontrollable aversive stimulation subsequently displayed an
impairment in the learning of a relatively simple escape response (e.g., Overmier
& Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967). A good deal of research has sub-
sequently been conducted to determine whether this sort of effect would generalize
to a variety of infrahuman species and to humans.
A typical helplessness experiment with human subjects incorporates two phases:
a pretreatment, and a test phase. The helplessness-inducing pretreatment is intended
to produce perceptions of noncontingency between the subject's behavior and the
outcomes to which the behavior is directed. For example, the subject may find that
efforts to escape aversive noise bursts are fruitless (Hiroto, 1974), or that attempts
to solve cognitive problems meet with no success (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975).
Subjects in two control groups receive (respectively) no pretreatment and a pre-
treatment in which outcomes are contingent on the subject's behavior. Helplessness
is assessed in the test phase. In this phase subjects are given a task in which
outcomes are always contingent on responses. The dependent variable of interest
is some measure of the ease with which subjects become aware of the contingency,
and reliably generate appropriate escape responses (e.g., Hiroto, 1974) or problem
solutions (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 1975).
The original model of helplessness held that exposure to uncontrollable outcomes
leads to motivational, cognitive, and learning deficits (e.g., Maier & Seligman,
1976; Seligman, 1975). The encoding of response-outcome noncontingency was
believed to cause a decrease in the initiation of controlling attempts, thus creating
an impediment to the learning of new contingencies. This model has stimulated an
enormous amount of research on human subject populations (for reviews of the
literature see, e.g., Abramson et aI., 1978; Miller & Norman, 1979; Roth, 1980).
And it has subsequently undergone several reformulations. These revisions were
intended to sharpen the model's applicability to human populations, to provide a
better fit with existing research evidence, and to take into account variables that
earlier versions had not addressed (see Abramson et aI., 1978; Miller & Norman,
1979; Roth, 1980).
Not all of the issues in the helplessness area are particularly important in the
present context. For example, there has been considerable controversy over the
degree to which performance or learning deficits must generalize to settings other
than the pretreatment setting in order to warrant the term learned helplessness. This
controversy has resulted in the development of two distinctions in reformulations
of the theory. Helplessness is now often labeled either "global" (if it applies to a
252 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

broad range of situations) or "specific," and as either "chronic" (when it is long-

term or recurrent) or "transient" (Abramson et aI., 1978). These variations are
presumed to depend on variations in subjects' perceptions of the causes underlying
the helplessness (cf. Dweck, Goetz, & Strauss, 1980). The degree to which the
helplessness response generalizes to new settings is an interesting one, but it is
tangential to present concerns.
We wish to focus instead on two other facets of this research area, and of the
cognitive analyses that currently dominate the area. The first is the fact that help-
lessness pretreatments sometimes lead to performance enhancement rather than
performance deficit. This sort of finding has led to renewed emphasis on the role
of expectancies in mediating subjects' responses to helplessness training. The second
issue that we wish to address stems from the fact that recent theories have explored
the role of attributional variables in determining both behavior and affect (Abramson
et aI., 1978; Miller & Norman, 1979). This has led to clearer predictions of what
affective and behavioral consequences should result from variations in the way in
which helplessness is induced.
We believe that an examination of each of these areas of research and thought
reveals a considerable similarity between the revised helplessness models and our
analysis of self-regulation.

Reassertion and Giving Up

Researchers have sometimes found that experimental procedures intended to induce
helplessness did in fact lead to performance deficits (e.g., Benson & Kennelly,
1976; Cohen, Rothbart, & Phillips, 1976; Dweck & Repucci, 1973; Griffith, 1977;
Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Jones, Nation, & Massad, 1977; Krantz,
Glass, & Snyder, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Thornton & Jacobs, 1971). But in
other studies identical, or at least conceptually similar manipulations have led to
performance enhancement (e.g., Hanusa & Schulz, 1977; Krantz & Glass, 1977;
Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Thornton & Jacobs, 1972; see also
Roth, 1980, for a more complete review of these findings).
Attempts to integrate these findings (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Wortman &
Brehm, 1975; Roth, 1980) have typically relied on expectancy constructs. In the
Abramson et al. reformulation, for example, the pretreatment's detrimental impact
is presumed to be mediated by the person's expectation of future noncontingency.
Given that the future expectation bears on a desired outcome, this seems not too
different from what we have been calling an unfavorable outcome expectancy. It
is important to note, in this regard, that for all the attention that has been devoted
to the attributional aspects of the reformulation, it is still expectancy that is held
to determine behavior in that model. Attributions are relevant to behavior only to
the degree that they influence expectancy.
Abramson et al. have much less to say about the response enhancement findings
than about helplessness. They indicate that it seems reasonable for compensatory
attempts to reassert control to occur once persons leave the situation in which they
 Helplessness 253

found themselves helpless (Abramson et al., 1978, p. 61). And they acknowledge
the fact that facilitation can occur when subjects have been unable to find a con-
trolling response but have not yet reached the conclusion that they are helpless. But
they offer no real explanation for either tendency.
Wortman and Brehm (1975), in contrast, have provided a model that allows a
more direct integration of these disparate findings. They suggested that threats to
control induce a reactance state, leading to attempts to reassert control; and that
complete loss of control induces helplessness, leading to giving-up responses. In
describing these two conditions, Wortman and Brehm refer to them as involving
"expectancy of control" and "expectancy of no control," respectively. Again, given
that the discussion concerns control over desired outcomes, these terms seem not
too far removed from favorable and unfavorable outcome expectancies. [It should
be clear that in all these cases the perceptions are the subjective perceptions of the
actor. As Roth (1980) has noted, it can be dangerous to assume that objective
noncontingency will be perceived subjectively as noncontingency (cf. Langer,
1975).]
This emphasis on the role of expectancies constitutes a major point of overlap
between cognitive models of helplessness and our model of self-regulation. Help-
lessness pretreatments would appear to create discrepancies between one's present
state and one's standard of comparison. That is, helplessness inductions typically
involve failure in a circumstance where one's standard is to do well. People whc
have favorable expectancies of being able to make up for initial failures-who have
not arrived at either the conclusion that they are unable to perform adequately, or
the conclusion that the deck is stacked against them--can be expected to attempt
to reduce the discrepancy (cf. Carver et aI., 1979b; Dweck, 1975). People who
have unfavorable expectancies-who have come to believe (for whatever reason)
that they cannot reduce the discrepancy-are more likely to give up and withdraw
(physically or mentally) from the attempt.
Our model adds to those other theories in three respects, however. Our most
obvious contribution is the fact that we would point to the mediating effects of self-
directed attention. As was discussed in detail in Chapter 11, self-focus has an
important impact on both reassertion and giving-up responses.
The second point is more subtle. We have argued that the deficits associated with
unfavorable expectancies are a product of a withdrawal impulse, expressed either
physically or cognitively. Our model thus suggests that a withdrawal impulse is
basic to the performance and learning impairments in human helplessness in other
contexts. This position is not particularly inconsistent with existing theories of the
learning decrements associated with helplessness. But we do not know of anyone
else who has made this argument explicitly.
This reasoning is given indirect support from findings reported by Diener and
Dweck (1978), in research on the behavior and verbalizations of children who were
confronted with a series of task failures. Children who had been categorized as
"mastery oriented" monitored their own behaviors, verbalized task-oriented self
instructions, attempted repeatedly to renew their concentration, and made statements
254 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

reflecting a positive prognosis. Rather than focus on the causes of failure, they
focused on potential remedies for failure. Children categorized as "helpless" dis-
played a different pattern. Rather than monitor their behavior or continue to give
themselves task-oriented instructions, they made statements reflecting negative af-
fect, and statements that were irrelevant to task solution (cf. Halisch & Heckhausen,
1977). Similar findings have also been obtained among college students (Brunson
& Matthews, in press). Aspects of these findings are strikingly similar to certain
findings in the test anxiety literature (which was reviewed in Chapter 12). That is,
the test anxious often report the intrusion of task-irrelevant thoughts, or make task-
irrelevant remarks (e.g., Ganzer, 1968; Sarason & Stoops, 1978). As we suggested
when reviewing that literature, and has been suggested by Wine (1980b), such
findings seem to suggest a mental withdrawal from consideration of the dimension
being evaluated by the test or central task.
The third sense in which our model adds to current theories of helplessness is
that it is broader than those theories, addressing behaviors in a great many domains
other than helplessness. We would suggest, in fact, that there apparently is no need
for a special theory of helplessness. Helplessness is simply a restricted illustration
of more general processes (cf. Wortman & Dintzer, 1978). We made similar points
regarding the present model in at least two different contexts in the preceding
chapter. This theory was initially intended to apply to behavioral self-regulation in
general, to normal functioning. But it allows the successful integration of theories
of test anxiety, of personal efficacy, and now of helplessness all within a single
framework. We regard this integrative power as quite important.

Attributions, Behavior, and Affect

As we indicated earlier, the aspect of the Abramson et al. reformulated helplessness
theory that has received the greatest attention thus far is its emphasis on the role
played by attributions. That is, on the basis of attributional contingencies, Abramson
et al. distinguish between "universal" helplessness (where the subject believes that
no one can exert control) and "personal" helplessness (where the subject perceives
the lack of control to be uniquely his or hers). Yet as they took great pains to point
out, "One can be either internally or externally helpless" (Abramson et al., 1978,
p. 54). That is, the prediction of behavior does not depend directly upon the
attributions themselves. Behavior follows from the perception that responses will
not produce desired outcomes, regardless of the reason for that perception. This
position is virtually identical to the stance we have taken regarding the relative
importance of attributional contingencies and outcome expectancy in predicting
behavior. That is, we hold that outcome expectancy is the critical parameter, and
how that expectancy is determined is unimportant.
The importance of attributions in the Abramson et al. model concerns a different
aspect of helplessness: the experience of affect. Specifically, they have suggested
that low self-esteem is associated with personal (self-attributed) helplessness but
not with universal (externally attributed) helplessness. This prediction (which has
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 255

been confirmed by Abramson, 1977) is quite consistent with the position we have
taken here and elsewhere (Carver, 1979). What Abramson et al. failed to add,
however, is that helplessness attributed to an external source is also likely to have
affective consequences. These consequences-which are explicitly represented in
our model-are subjectively experienced as anger and resentment.
Moreover, because Abramson et al. failed to consider in any detail the reassertion
that sometimes follows exposure to noncontingency, they also made no suggestions
about the affect associated with that type of experience. We, in contrast, explicitly
assume the existence of such affects. Self-attributed reassertion behaviors should
be associated with heightened self-esteem; other-attributed reassertion should be
associated with gratitude.

Section Summary
A careful examination of current theories of human helplessness reveals a good deal
of similarity between those theories and the model of self-regulation that we have
discussed in the preceding three chapters. There is a general consensus that the
person's expectancies of controlling desired outcomes play an important role in
helplessness phenomena, with very unfavorable expectancies leading to giving-up
responses, and favorable expectancies leading to reassertion attempts. Our model
appears to contribute to the state of theory in this area (a) by noting the role played
by self-attention in such phenomena, (b) by suggesting that an impetus to withdraw
from the behavioral dimension under scrutiny is basic to helplessness effects, and
(c) by merging an explanation for helplessness with an explanation of a far broader
range of behaviors. Our model also fits with current assumptions about the attri-
butional bases of the affect associated with helplessness. But our model extends
the position of Abramson et al. (1978), in predicting the bases for affective reactions
other than lowered self-esteem.
We tum now to a third important area of theory and research, an area that is in
some respects quite similar to, and yet in other respects quite different from, the
two areas examined thus far.

Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance

Although it is true that most helplessness theories assume expectancies regarding
control to be critical determinants of behavior, there is one important exception.
This exception is the position taken by Frankel and Snyder (1978), who argued that
behavior in such situations is not guided by expectancies at all, but rather by a
desire to maintain or protect self-esteem. They label this general tendency "egotism"
(see also Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976, 1978; Stephan, Bernstein, Stephan,
& Davis, 1979; Stephan, Rosenfield, & Stephan, 1976; Tesser, 1980; Tesser &
Campbell, in press). Discussions by other authors of self-esteem-protective strat-
egies also commonly invoke the terms "defensive" and "self-serving," particularly
256 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

when the discussions concern attributional biases (see, e.g., Bradley, 1978; Carver,
DeGregorio, & Gillis, 1980; Miller, D.T., 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975; Tillman
& Carver, 1980; Weary, 1979).
This area is one that we have left relatively untouched thus far. Though there
have been implicit exceptions, most of our discussion of motivational processes
has assumed a goal-oriented organism which is relatively unburdened by such
problems as threats to its self-esteem. It is now time to address this possibility
directly.
The notion that people alter their perceptions of causality to protect or enhance
their self-esteem (Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Heider, 1958; Wolosin,
Sherman, & Till, 1973) has been applied to several different kinds of phenomena.
Its most straightforward application is to the attribution process that follows the
experience of success or failure. Stated simply, the egotism hypothesis suggests
that people attempt to enhance their self-esteem by attributing their successes in-
ternally, and protect their self-esteem by attributing failures externally (see, e.g.,
Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1976; Beckman, 1970; Bradley, 1978; Sicoly & Ross,
1977; Snyder et aI., 1976, 1978). Similar processes have been invoked in discussions
of the perception of interpersonal influence (e.g., Beckman, 1970, 1973; Johnson,
Feigenbaum, & Weiby, 1964; Schopler & Layton, 1972). And the suggestion has
recently been made that people take attributional contingencies into account when
anticipating the possibility that afuture outcome might pose a threat to self-esteem.
Such anticipations are presumed to lead to "self-handicapping" strategies (e.g.,
Berglas & Jones, 1978; Frankel & Snyder, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978). Self-
handicapping occurs whenever one ensures that a self-protective attribution is avail-
able, e.g., by not trying very hard at a task, or by hampering oneself by lack of
sleep or by a drug. In the event of failure, the availability of such an attribution
reduces self-blame. In the event of success, one gains even more credit than would
otherwise be the case, by virtue of having overcome one's handicap (cf. Kelley,
1971).

Control Theory and Self-Esteem Maintenance

We should begin our discussion of the relationship between the egotism construct
and our own theoretical model by saying two things. First, we assume that self-
esteem protection and enhancement do occur, though the boundary conditions of
such effects are far from clear (see below). Second, we see such phenomena as
being thoroughly consistent with a control-theory analysis of self-regulation. This
latter statement may come as something of a surprise. But there is no reason why
it should. After all, the maintenance of one's self-esteem is a goal, with many of
the same characteristics of any goal.
There is a temptation to leave it at that, to suggest that the self-esteem-protection
goal is the salient standard in some circumstances but not others, and go on from
there. But we would instead like to offer one more suggestion about how to construe
this particular goal.
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 257

In Chapter 7 we discussed the concept of behavioral standard. In the context of

that discussion we presented a hierarchical organization of types of standards, an
organization developed by Powers (1973a). The highest and most abstract level of
that hierarchy that was addressed in that chapter was termed the Principle level,
because standards at that level constitute abstractions that allow the selection of
whole courses of action. For example, one principle that a person might follow in
social interaction is "it is best to go along with other people and not make waves."
A quite different principle is "it is best to rely on one's own judgments." These
two examples were both introduced in Chapter 7, where we pointed out that each
suggests specific behavioral programs that are applicable to a diverse range of
settings.
Powers also proposed an additional superordinate level in his hierarchy, which
deals with the control of System Concepts. While acknowledging that the term
"system concepts" is rather vague, Powers pointed out there is a need to account
for why a person chooses one set of reference principles rather than another. "Human
beings seem to perceive unity in a collection of moral, factual, or abstract principles.
On occasion they alter their choice of principles as a means toward achieving a
more satisfactory sense of systematic unity, or to correct deviations of some per-
ceived system concept from a preferred reference condition" (Powers, 1973a, p.
171). One such system concept, we would suggest, is the sense of coherence and
adequacy associated with the self. This is a superordinate standard, to which one's
present state can be matched by the specification of principles, which lead to the
specification of programs of action, and so on. Perhaps the process of keeping
discrepancies small with regard to this particular superordinate standard is what we
have been calling self-esteem maintenance, or egotism.

Egotism and Attribution

As was noted above, the fundamental tenet of the egotism perspective is that people
tend to take credit for successes and avoid blame for failures (cf. Snyder et al.,
1976, 1978). There have, in fact, been many demonstrations that actors make
internal attributions for their successes and more external attributions for their
failures (e.g., Arkin et al., 1976; Bernstein et aI., 1979; Sicoly & Ross, 1977;
Snyder et al., 1976; Stephan et aI., 1979; Stevens & Jones, 1976; Tillman & Carver,
1980; Wo10sin et al., 1973). However, as has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Heider,
1958; Miller & Ross, 1975; Snyder et aI., 1976, 1978; Tillman & Carver, 1980),
such findings by themselves must be regarded as equivocal on the egotism question.
That is, to demonstrate that such attributional biases constitute egotism requires that
the tendencies occur to a greater degree among actors than among observers. If the
bias is not stronger among actors, it might well simply reflect naive assumptions
about the relationship between intention and outcome, or misperception of the nature
of contingencies (see Miller & Ross, 1975). Thus, in order to have any bearing on
the egotism question, a study must incorporate both actor and observer conditions,
and both success and failure outcomes. To date, relatively few studies have satisfied
258 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

these requirements. The studies that have done so have differed considerably in
their operationalizations of both the success-failure and the actor-observer varia-
bles. And they have led to quite divergent results.
Snyder et al. (1976) had males compete in a game that was described as involving
important business-related abilities. Outcomes were manipulated by the experi-
menter. Each subject served both as an actor (attributing his own outcome) and as
an observ~r (attributing the outcome of a presumed competitor). The pattern of data
from this study reflected egotism. Given that the outcome was success, attributions
were more to skill and less to luck when the outcome was the subject's own than
when it was the competitor's. Given that the outcome was failure, attributions were
more to luck and less to skill when the outcome was the subject's own than when
it was the competitor's. These findings were replicated by Stephan et al. (1976),
though there were some gender differences in the latter research.
Tillman and Carver (1980), in contrast, took a very different approach to this
question. They asked subjects either to attempt a series of puzzles, or to examine
the test booklet of what ostensibly was another subject (thus varying attributor role
between rather than within subjects). Each subject then was asked to make attri-
butions about the outcome of the final puzzle, which had been manipulated exper-
imentally to be either a success or a failure. This study yielded no evidence of
egotism at all. There was instead a very strong bias to attribute success internally
and failure externally, whether doing so as an actor or as an observer (a "positivity"
bias).
Finally, Mirels (1980) asked subjects to attribute responsibility for "typical" (but
unspecified) good or bad outcomes in either their own lives or the lives of "most
people." In an initial study, males made egotistical attributions, but females were
more willing to give attributional enhancement to "most people" than to themselves.
The latter would appear to reflect a positivity bias, if anything. In a second study,
the nature of the outcome was partially specified, to be either academic or social,
and the nature of the others was partially specified as "most students." This time
egotistical attributions tended to occur for "sex-typed" outcome classes, but a pos-
itivity bias (or no bias at all) occurred regarding opposite-sex outcomes. The findings
of the second study were exceedingly weak, however, and should probably be
regarded as only suggestive.
It is not altogether clear how to integrate these findings. One argument (cf. Snyder
et aI., 1976, 1978) is that egotism emerges when people are ego-involved with the
outcomes that are relevant to the attribution. However, inasmuch as there appears
to be no difficulty in obtaining what looks like egotistical attributions among actors,
we suggest that this assertion be amended (at least as it applies to attribution).
Specifically, egotism may emerge when one has a stake in the outcomes of the
other person.
This characterization is consistent with the data just described. In the Tillman
and Carver study, the subjects who made attributions for another person's outcome
were told that they would not be attempting the tasks themselves, and the other
person's outcome had no relationship with their own situation. In the Snyder et al.
research, in contrast, subjects were making attributions for the outcomes of the
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 259

person who had just been competing with them. The outcomes for subject and
opponent in that experiment had a perfect inverse relationship. It is entirely con-
ceivable that that relationship had a corresponding influence on subjects' judgments
of causality, as well. That is, subjects may have reasoned "if I won because of
superior skill, my opponent must necessarily have lost because of (relative) lack
of skill. If I lost because of bad luck, he must have won because of (relatively)
better luck." This possibility, in fact, raises questions about whether that finding
represents egotism at all.
In sum, methodological considerations make it very difficult to know exactly
what it is that prompts egotistical attributions. It seems clear, however, that the
answer lies with an analysis of the relationship between the attributor and someone
else's outcomes (cf. Carver et aI., 1980), rather than simply the subject's ego-
involvement in the task being attempted.
Let us tum now to the application of the egotism construct with which we began
this section.

Egotism and Helplessness

As stated at the beginning of the section, Frankel and Snyder (1978) have recently
suggested that the performance deficits occurring in learned helplessness research
on humans are a product of attributional egotism. According to this interpretation,
subjects are not developing an expectancy of lack of control, or perceptions of
noncontingency during the pretreatment phase. Instead, they are experiencing a
threat to their self-esteem, by virtue of failing on a task that has implications
regarding their ability. The second task then presents the subjects with the possibility
that they might fail again, which would provide additional evidence of their lack
of ability. When confronted with this possibility, according to Frankel and Snyder,
subjects protect themselves by not trying. "By not trying, a subject is able to
attribute failure to lack of effort, a much more palatable explanation than lack of
ability" (Frankel & Snyder, 1978, p. 1416).2 Consistent with this position, there
is evidence from other sources that failures on skill-diagnostic tasks are attributed
to lack of effort (Miller, R. T., 1976), which presumably reflects a defensive posture.
Frankel and Snyder suggested that one way to prevent subjects from using low
effort as a self-protective strategy would be to provide them with another obvious
and plausible excuse for a (potential) poor performance. On the basis of their

2There is an interesting disjunction here between what is presumed to be a self-serving

attribution, and the way in which the same information is perceived by an observer. That
is, to fail because of lack of effort protects one's self-esteem. But there is ample evidence
that observers treat as more blameworthy failures portrayed as due to lack of effort than
those portrayed as due to lack of ability (e.g., Covington & Omelich, 1979b; Weiner &
Kukla, 1970; see Weiner, 1974, for a more extended discussion of this point). This would
appear to suggest that if an effort-attribution strategy is used for self-esteem protection, it
is used privately rather than to protect one's public image, an issue we address later in the
chapter.
260 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

interpretation of previous studies (Feather, 1961, 1963b; Karabenick & Youssef,

1968; Sarason, 1961), Frankel and Snyder reasoned that telling subjects that a
second task was very hard would provide such an excuse. They thus predicted that
the perfonnance decrement associated with a helplessness pretreatment would be
eliminated when subjects were told the second task was very hard.
In the study that was conducted to test this reasoning, subjects were presented
with either a successful or an unsuccessful pretreatment (from Hiroto & Seligman,
1975). They then received a set of anagrams that were described as being either
moderately difficult or extremely difficult. Dependent measures were the number
of anagrams solved and the amount of time taken to reach solutions. Consistent
with predictions, perfonnance deficits occurred only among subjects in the failure-
pretreatment condition who had been told that the anagrams were only of moderate
difficulty.
A postexperimental questionnaire failed to provide support for the assumption
that these subjects had purposely reduced their efforts. But there was secondary
evidence of a difference in persistence between subjects in the two failure groups.
Specifically, subjects in the failure-difficult condition tended to solve more ana-
grams in the second half of the time alloted for each anagram than did success-
condition subjects, whereas the opposite was true of subjects in the failure-moderate
condition (see Frankel, 1977). The groups did not differ in their frequencies of
solution during the first halves of the time periods, however. This suggests a
difference in persistence at each item.
There are several points about the procedures of this study that are worth noting
further. First, a manipulation of perceived difficulty does more than change the
attributiona1 contingencies surrounding one's perfonnance. It also has an impact
on the incentive value of a good perfonnance (cf. Atkinson, 1957, 1964). That is,
doing well on a very difficult task goes a lot farther to make up for a prior failure
than does doing well at a task that is only moderately difficult. Indeed, the statement
that the anagrams were only moderately difficult may have actually reduced their
incentive value, compared to unlabeled anagrams.
As we suggested in Chapter 10, it seems likely that the incentive value of a task
has an impact on how favorable one's task expectancy must be in order for one's
efforts to continue. Presumably a person will keep trying to attain a very valuable
goal even when its attainment appears relatively unlikely. The same person may
abandon a less-valued goal, however, at a point where the perceived probability
of attaining it is less low. If this reasoning is correct, subjects in Frankel and
Snyder's failure-difficult condition should have begun the anagram task by trying
harder than subjects in the failure-moderate condition, even though their task ex-
pectancies were not more favorable.
This is particularly important when a second consideration is taken into account.
Specifically, the anagrams that Frankel and Snyder gave to their subjects were
actually only moderately difficult. To the degree that the persistence of subjects in
the failure-difficult condition paid off in item solutions, their task expectancies
should have become more favorable across items. This, in tum, should have en-
hanced their efforts even further.
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 261

Even the effect of a high incentive should have its limits, however. If task
expectancies become sufficiently unfavorable, the result should be withdrawal from
further efforts. Thus we would argue that expectancies are important in predicting
behavior, even when incentives are high.

Expectancies, Outcomes, and the Effect of Perceived Difficulty

We have recently conducted an additional study, in an attempt to gain more in-
fonnation on this question (Scheier & Carver, 1980c). This study included four
conditions that were designed to provide an experimental test of the reasoning
outlined in the preceding paragraphs. Subjects in one condition were given a suc-
cessful pretreatment experience, and subjects in the other three conditions were
given a failure pretreatment, following the procedures of Frankel and Snyder (1978).
In one of the latter conditions, subjects were led to expect anagrams that were only
of moderate difficulty. In the remaining two conditions, subjects were led to expect
extremely difficult anagrams.
All subject groups, with a single exception, then received the same set of 20
anagrams as had been used by Frankel and Snyder, i.e., anagrams of unifonnly
moderate difficulty. But here our procedures diverged from those of Frankel and
Snyder. In one of the two conditions in which subjects had been led to expect very
difficult items, they first received 10 items that were difficult/insoluble, and then
received the same 10 anagrams as comprised the second half of the set in every
other condition.
The effect of these manipulations was that upon beginning the anagram task some
subjects who expected difficult (i.e., high incentive) items confronted items that
were only moderately difficult. The high incentive should have led to high initial
efforts; the fact that such efforts met with success should have led to more favorable
expectancies; and this in tum should have further enhanced efforts. Subjects in this
condition thus were expected to replicate the effect demonstrated by Frankel and
Snyder.
But other subjects who expected difficult anagrams actually did confront difficult
anagrams upon beginning the task. The initial high efforts of these subjects met
with failure. This should have caused their unfavorable expectancies to become yet
more extreme, thereby leading to a mental disengagement from the task. Subjects
in this condition thus were expected to behave quite differently from the subjects
in the Frankel and Snyder study. The dependent measure of interest was subjects'
perfonnances on the final 10 anagrams, which (as indicated above) were identical
for all subjects in the experiment.
This study also examined the presumed interactive role of self-attention in such
contexts (cf. Chapters 10 and 11). Specifically, it was predicted that the increased
efforts displayed by subjects who anticipated difficult items and received moderately
easy ones would be greatest among subjects high in private self-consciousness.
Similarly, it was predicted that the decreased efforts displayed by subjects who both
expected and received very hard items would be greatest among those who were
high in private self-consciousness.
262 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

The results of this study were quite consistent with our reasoning. Analysis of
the number of anagrams solved (of the final 10) yielded a significant interaction
between experimental condition and dispositional self-consciousness. Of greatest
interest is the pattern of the data in the two failure-difficult conditions. Subjects
who were high in private self-consciousness performed precisely as had been pre-
dicted. Those who expected hard items and instead received moderately easy items
subsequently performed at a very high level. In contrast, those who both expected
and initially received hard items performed poorly when the items later became
easier. Subjects lower in self-consciousness did not perform differently as a function
of experimental condition. In addition to these behavioral effects, expectancy ratings
made during the sessions indicated that both the renewed efforts and the withdrawal
from efforts were mediated by shifts in subjects' expectancies, as a function of their
experience with the initial anagrams.
These findings seem difficult to reconcile with Frankel and Snyder's interpretation
of their data. That is, if task difficulty provides an esteem-protecting attribution for
a potential failure-thereby eliminating the need to "cover" oneself by not trying-
there is no apparent reason for subjects to give up when the task actually turns out
to be difficult. Yet this is exactly what occurred. The findings of this study are,
however, quite consistent with an expectancy-based analysis. In sum, we remain
unconvinced that "helpless" subjects are protecting their self-esteem by not trying,
and thereby providing themselves with a nonthreatening attribution. We think that
they are withdrawing from further attempts to reduce the salient discrepancies,
because of doubts that they can do so.
There is at least one other difficulty with Frankel and Snyder's account of
helplessness phenomena. This difficulty stems from the fact that exposure to a
helplessness pretreatment sometimes leads to performance enhancement rather than
impairment, a point that was discussed earlier in this chapter. The egotism analysis
does not suggest any obvious reason why this should be so. The first failure still
constitutes a threat to self-esteem. And the second task still provides another
opportunity to fail again. Why, then, would one ever find performance enhance-
ment?
This question is particularly problematic when applied to a study by Hanusa and
Schulz (1977). Those researchers presented subjects with a helplessness pretreatment
in which attributions of the failure were varied. They expected to find helplessness
as a result of their pretreatment, but instead found reassertion. Most importantly,
they found the strongest reassertion when subjects had been led to ascribe their
prior failure to lack of ability. This should have been the most self-esteem-threat-
ening condition in the study. Yet subsequent efforts were clearly greatest in this
condition.
Although this finding is interpretable within an expectancy-based analysis (i.e.,
by assuming that subjects had favorable expectancies for reducing the discrepancy),
there is no obvious way to reconcile it with an egotism theory that does not in-
corporate expectancies.
How might expectancies be incorporated into egotism theory? One might argue,
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 263

for example, that lack of effort follows only when the total threat to self-esteem
induced by the initial failure and the second task (together) reaches some critical
threshold. Prior to reaching that threshold one protects self-esteem by trying hard
to make up for the initial failure; after passing the threshold one protects self-esteem
by not trying hard. Such an analysis would be very nearly the same as what is
proposed in our own model. The postulated threshold is equivalent to our psycho-
logical "watershed" regarding one's expectancy of being able to make up for the
prior failure. The major difference between the position sketched above and our
own model is a difference in the emphasis placed on attributions. The egotism
perspective sees lack of effort as an attempt to provide a self-protective attribution.
We, in contrast, see lack of effort as reflecting a mental withdrawal from task
attempts.
The same ambiguity about the role of attributions is also present in other research
on self-handicapping. For example, subjects in research by Berglas and Jones (1978)
received either contingent or noncontingent success feedback, the latter under con-
ditions that emphasized the subject's uncertainty about the accuracy of the response
while it was being made. Subjects then chose either a response-facilitating or a
response-debilitating drug, while anticipating having to take a parallel form of the
test that had been taken initially. Subjects were told that on the second test, unlike
the first test, there would be a penalty for incorrect guessing. Male subjects who
had initially been given insoluble problems, but had been told that they were very
successful, overwhelmingly chose the performance-debilitating drug.
This finding was interpreted by Berglas and Jones as indicating a desire to create
self-protective attributional contingencies. But consider the subjective experiences
of these persons. They had apparently done well at the first test by guessing. And
guessing was to be much more hazardous on the second test than on the first. Thus,
it would seem reasonable that these subjects should have had less favorable ex-
pectancies of doing well on the second test than any other group in the study.
Accordingly, the choice of a performance-debilitating drug might easily have re-
flected withdrawal from task attempts, induced by these unfavorable expectancies.
Consistent with this reasoning, after extensively reviewing research on the cognitive
effects of alcohol, J.G. Hull (1980) has suggested that alcohol [considered by Jones
& Berglas (1978) to be a self-handicapping drug] acts to reduce self-attention. This
implies that the use of such a drug can plausibly be considered to be a way of
removing oneself from attending to the behavioral dimension in question.

Conceptual Similarities
We should note, however, that there is a conceptual similarity between the egotism
position and our own, regarding the self-protective function of withdrawal. Though
we have not presented it as particularly "defensive," it should be obvious that
withdrawal from further task attempts-when further attempts seem fruitless-is
a self-protective response (cf. Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1980). It prevents one
from having to confront an unfavorable expectancy regarding a salient discrepancy
264 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

between where one is and where one wants to be, a confrontation that produces
negative affect. To the degree that the discrepancy concerns an important aspect
of the self, a refusal to consider the dimension further is quite self-serving.
We should note another similarity between models, as well. Specifically, there
is one respect in which the egotism position already relies on an expectancy construct
in generating its predictions. Thus, we do not see that the introduction of expec-
tancies elsewhere in that theory violates any principle that is fundamental to it.
Snyder et a1. (1978, p. 95) explicitly stated that the occurrence of an egotistical
behavior depends in part on the perceived probability that such a behavior will
successfully protect or enhance self-esteem. If the perceived probability (i.e., ex-
pectancy) is low, the egotistical behavior will not occur. If the expectancy is high,
the behavior will occur.
Others (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Frey, 1978) have even gone one step farther, by
suggesting that people in threatening circumstances assess the probability that each
of a wide variety of responses will protect self-esteem. For example, circumstances
vary widely in the degree to which other people are aware of one's task outcomes,
and of one's attributional judgments concerning those outcomes. These variations
can lead to a complex decision process, as one decides how best to maintain self-
esteem. The result may sometimes be egotism--crediting oneself for good outcomes
and denying blame for bad outcomes. But there are also certain circumstances that
induce modesty instead (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Arkin, Appelman, & Burger,
1980; Frey, 1978). Yet it is arguable that such modesty occurs precisely because it
is seen as the best way to protect self-esteem.

Self-Esteem Protection: Public or Private?

This brings us to one final point. There are two quite different ways in which self-
esteem can be threatened, and thus two ways in which it can be protected and
maintained. This distinction depends directly upon a dichotomy to which we have
appealed several times already in this book: i.e., between the public aspects of self
versus the private aspects of self. Miller and Ross (1975) restricted themselves to
assessing whether there was evidence of private distortions in the attribution process
(see also Miller, D.T., 1978), and concluded that there was not. But Bradley (1978)
has since argued that this area of inquiry should be reconceptualized in terms of
the person's concern about maintaining a positive public image, about protecting
or increasing the esteem in which the person is held by others (see also Schlenker,
1975a, 1980; Weary, 1979). It is widely accepted that this sort of self-presentational
strategy does occur (cf. Arkin, Gabrenya, Appelman, & Cochran, 1979; Frey, 1978;
Miller, D.T., 1978). It is, for example, the basis for the previously mentioned
displays of modesty.
Snyder et a1. (1978, p. 95, footnote I) acknowledge the possibility that attribu-
tional biases may be public in nature. Concerning helplessness, however, Frankel
and Snyder (1978, p. 1422; see also Frankel, 1977, p. 32) take the position that
egotism is a private phenomenon. It is interesting, in that regard, that Frankel (1977)
Egotism and Self-Esteem Maintenance 265

was unable to obtain a helplessness effect when subjects' pretreatment experience

was delivered via computer, with the experimenter obviously ignorant of the sub-
jects' outcomes. It was only when the procedures were modified to have the ex-
perimenter ostentatiously examine what supposedly was the subject's pretreatment
data that the effect was obtained. This raises questions about the possible need for
the initial failure to be apparent in someone else's eyes. This, in tum, suggests that
the discrepancy created by the failure may concern one's public image (see also
Sacco & Hokanson, 1978). Tangentially relevant to this possibility is the suggestion
that helplessness inductions create situations more analogous to test anxiety than
to depression (Lavelle, Metalsky, & Coyne, 1979). And as was noted in Chapter
12, there is some evidence that test anxiety represents a concern over one's public
evaluation.
On the other hand, our followup of the Frankel and Snyder research (Scheier
& Carver, 1980c, described just earlier) provided no evidence that that phenomenon
was mediated by public concerns. When subjects were redivided according to their
levels of public rather than private self-consciousness, there was a tendency for
persons high in public self-consciousness to perform more poorly than those who
were lower. But this difference was general to all experimental conditions, including
the success condition. Similarly, the study of self-handicapping strategies conducted
by Berglas and Jones (1978) found no evidence that self-presentational concerns
had prompted subjects' behavior. A resolution of this question thus seems pre-
mature. This doubtlessly will be an active area of research interest in the future,
however.

Section Summary
Egotism is the tendency to take credit for successes and avoid blame for failures.
This can be construed as the attempt to minimize discrepancies regarding a super-
ordinate standard bearing on personal coherence and adequacy. The conditions
under which egotism occurs are unclear, however. The data regarding attributional
egotism are mixed, and methodological questions preclude a satisfactory resolution
of the issue. The data are also mixed regarding egotism as an explanation for
helplessness. However, it does appear clear that without incorporating an expec-
tancy assumption regarding the effects of further effort, egotism theory is unable
to account for the reassertion that sometimes follows helplessness pretreatments.
Similarly, recent data from our own research seem more compatible with an ex-
pectancy-incentive position than an analysis based solely on egotism.
There are similarities between the theoretical positions, however, which suggest
that the two analyses have more in common than is usually recognized. Specifically,
egotism theory does utilize an expectancy construct at one point in the derivation
of its predictions. Moreover, the withdrawal from task attempts that is postulated
in our own model does serve a definite self-protective function. The major difference
between theories would seem to be in the importance that they place on attributions
per se. Egotism theory considers them to be paramount. We do not.
266 13. Achievement Motivation, Helplessness, and Egotism

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have attempted to delineate points of comparison between our
model of self-regulation and theories associated with three other literatures in per-
sonality and social psychology. We first examined the achievement motivation
construct and the relationship of that construct to persistence. This examination
indicated that our analysis accounts easily for the persistence of high need achievers,
but can reasonably account for the patterns displayed by low need achievers only
by making an additional assumption: that the latter motive group is oriented toward
the goal of avoiding anxiety. Our examination of theories of human helplessness
revealed considerable similarities between our model and recent helplessness the-
ories. It also suggested ways in which our model complements and supplements
those theories. Finally, we discussed a theory of attributional egotism, and consid-
ered its adequacy to account for several behaviors to which it is believed to be
relevant. This discussion included a consideration of similarities between that theory
and our own, as well as differences between the theories.
In each of these comparisons, our model has been able to account to a substantial
degree for findings that others have interpreted in terms different from ours. We
regard this as an indication that there is a high degree of integrative promise in the
ideas with which we have been working. Future research will determine the degree
to which that potential is realized.
Part V
Implications for Specific Problems in Social
and Personality Psychology

The book up to this point has been devoted to the development of a theoretical
perspective on behavioral self-regulation and a description of research that bears
on the viability of that perspective. We have discussed how people perceive and
represent their environments and themselves. We have examined how behavioral
standards are elicited and used to guide one's actions. And we have considered how
goal-directed activity can be interrupted by conditions such as frustration and fear,
and have discussed how people respond to those interruptions. In Part V we tum
to a more explicit consideration of the implications of this model for a series of
problem areas that have had a long history in social psychology. Though by no
means exhaustive, these illustrations indicate the breadth of the model's applica-
bility.
Chapter 14 concerns the predictive relationship between self-report and behavior,
a relationship that has often been disappointingly weak. This chapter reviews recent
suggestions about where the correspondence between the two breaks down. Several
of these suggestions relate quite directly to the self-regulatory model described
earlier in the book. Research is discussed in this chapter which indicates that the
general approach we have taken in earlier chapters is a useful tool for dealing with
this problem.
In Chapter 15 we take up what is sometimes regarded as a sort of "proving
ground" for theories of motivation: the area of social facilitation. The relevance of
our model for that subject is examined, and a study is discussed that calls into
question previously gathered evidence of the existence of drive states as a function
of audience presence. This chapter also contains a discussion of the theoretical
relationships between audiences and other stimuli as inducers of self-focus.
Chapter 16 addresses an important dichotomy among self-aspects: the public self
and the private self. The substance of this chapter has been foreshadowed repeatedly
throughout the book. In it, we describe at last a series of studies that demonstrate
quite conclusively that the self influences behavior quite differently depending upon
what self-aspect is being attended to. More specifically, in each of these studies
awareness of the private self caused one influence, awareness of the public self an
opposite influence.
268 V. Implications for Specific Problems in Social and Personality Psychology

The public-private distinction has far-reaching implications. One implication for

a specific type of behavior is addressed in detail in Chapter 17. There we examine
dissonance theory, and the basis from which that theory makes its predictions
regarding the cognitive events that follow dissonance induction. It is argued in this
chapter that focus on the private self causes dissonance reduction to take one path,
and focus on the public self causes it to take a very different path. Results from
two studies are presented which support this reasoning. The chapter closes with a
discussion of the implications of this research for dissonance and impression man-
agement theories.
Chapter 14
Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

An issue that has plagued social and personality psychology for decades is the lack
of consistency between people's self-reports and their overt behavior. Whether the
self-reports be of attitudes or traits, the predictive relationships from such measures
to the actions that they might reasonably be expected to influence is frequently quite
poor (e.g., Calder & Ross, 1973; Mischel, 1968, 1973; Schuman & Johnson, 1976;
Wicker, 1969, 1971). The weakness of such relationships has even led some theor-
ists to question the utility of the attitude construct (cf. Abelson, 1972), and has led
others to suggest that attitudes only follow from behavior, rather than influencing
the course of behavior (cf. Bern, 1972).
In recent years, however, several new approaches to this problem area have
emerged. Evidence from this research promises to reinstate the predictive link from
self-report to behavior by asking whether there are systematic sources of error in
predicting behavior from self-reports, and if so, under what circumstances the error
is reduced. 1 Several discrete sources of error have been isolated, each of which
weakens the relationship between self-report and action. Some of them relate fairly
directly to the model presented in this book.
We would like to suggest the usefulness of a dichotomy (albeit an imperfect one)
in considering this area. Specifically, certain sources of error would seem best
conceptualized as reflecting issues of measurement. Other sources of error appear
to depend more upon conceptual questions regarding the nature of behavioral reg-
ulation.
In the first of these categories we would place the following: (1) Self-reports and
behaviors are not always equated in terms of their specificity. Thus it may actually
be quite inappropriate to expect one to predict the other in a given instance. (2)

lWe should also note that there have been several recent attempts to specify probabilistic
models for predicting behavior from attitudes and other antecedents (see, e.g., Bagozzi &
Burnkrant, 1979; Bentler & Speckart, 1979; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Jaccard, Knox, &
Brinberg, 1979). Explicit consideration of such models is outside the scope of this chapter,
however.
270 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

Though self-reports typically sample the attitude or trait across several items (thus
increasing reliability of measurement), the overt behavior of interest is rarely sam-
pled more than once. This may introduce a high degree of sampling error, which
obscures existing relationships. (3) The designing of self-report measures rarely
takes into account the fact that, on a given dimension, some people believe them-
selves to be consistent and other people believe themselves to be inconsistent. Thus
identical responses to a set of items may have profoundly different meanings to
two different respondents.
In the second category we would include the following: (1) Completing a self-
report instrument requires the respondent to sample memories that are relevant to
the items of the instrument. If the respondent samples too superficially, the report
will not be representative of the encoded information that may later be used to guide
behavior. (2) The circumstances in which the information is encoded may have a
major impact upon its utilization as a guide to behavior. That is, it appears to be
the case that having a behavioral basis for an attitude enhances the subsequent use
of the attitude. (3) Attitudes and traits are not always the most salient standards for
behavior. They should predict behavior only to the degree that they are salient as
being appropriate guides for action. (4) Even when attitudes are salient, they must
be referred to during behavior. Only to the degree that attention is directed to the
comparison between attitudes and actions will correspondence between the two
increase.
In the sections that follow, we briefly review these areas of research and theory,
placing special emphasis on the issues that relate directly to the theoretical position
we have taken throughout the book.

Problems of Measurement
Level of Specificity of Self-Report and Behavior
Several authors have noted that in much of the research which shows a poor
relationship between self-report and behavior, the verbal response has tended to be
very general, but the overt behavior very specific (cf. Chein, 1949; Crespi, 1971;
Fishbein, 1966). It is arguable, however, that if both were either very specific or
very general, a greater degree of correspondence should emerge (cf. Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977). That is, part of the poor correspondence may be attributable to
inappropriately broad sampling at the verbal level, or to insufficiently broad-ranging
sampling at the behavioral level.
Recent research indicates that creating comparability between the two levels does
in fact result in better correspondence between the two. At least two studies have
tested the notion that increasing the specificity of the self-report increases its pre-
dictive power for a specific behavior. Weigel, Vernon, and Tognacci (1974) found
that the degree of behavioral commitment to the activities of the Sierra Club was
highly related to premeasured attitudes about the Sierra Club, r = .60, but only
slightly related to a very general attitude about environmental issues, r = .16.
Heberlein and Black (1976) conceptually replicated and extended this finding, by
Problems of Measurement 271

virtue of the fact that the behavior of interest (choosing unleaded gasoline) was
undertaken spontaneously, rather than as a response to a solicitation from a member
of the research team. This indicates that the accuracy associated with predicting a
specific behavior from a specific attitude occurs even when there is no prompting
by cues built into the research design.
Research has also found that the correspondence between a general attitude and
overt behavior can be increased by expanding the range of behaviors sampled, i.e.,
by using "multiple-act criteria" rather than a single-act criterion (Fishbein, 1973).
Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) confirmed this reasoning in a study in which both
attitudes and actions were self-reported. Behavioral support was obtained in research
by Weigel and Newman (1976). Subjects in this study completed a broad-ranging
survey measuring concern over environmental quality. Beginning three months
later, a series of personal contacts was made in which subjects were given oppor-
tunities to involve themselves in three separate environmental projects. Subjects'
participation was related in various combinations to their premeasured attitudes.
The average correlation of subjects' attitudes with any single behavioral index was
modest, r = .29. As measures were combined, however, the correlation between
attitudes and actions became stronger, culminating in a relationship of .62 between
attitudes and an overall index of behavior.

Insufficient Sampling of Behavior

The notion that behaviors should be sampled repeatedly rather than by the more
common single measurement has been elaborated upon by Epstein (1979). Epstein
makes an even broader case: that consistency in all sorts of behavior across time
and situations is not elusive at all, provided that the behavior is sampled frequently
enough in computing indices of stability. Epstein emphasized not so much the need
to assess a given domain of behavior in diverse ways, but rather the fact that
infrequency of measurement allows the introduction of large degrees of sampling
error (see also Tryon, 1973).
The relationship between self-report and behavior represents a special case of
Epstein's more general point. He assumed that an increase in the sampling of
objective behavior should cause an increase in the correlation between that behavior
and the personality self-reports to which the behavior should be related. In a study
designed to test this notion (Epstein, 1979, Study 4), subjects completed a battery
of personality inventories, including two (specially constructed for this research)
that were intended to closely approximate the behavioral dimensions that would
subsequently be monitored more directly. Over the course of the next 14 days, all
subjects then kept detailed records of their feelings and behaviors, according to a
predesigned format.
Data analysis revealed a pronounced rise in stability as behavior was averaged
over an increasing number of days. For example, correlations of self-reported inner
states from one day to the next averaged .45. Correlations of the same measure for
the seven odd days compared to the seven even days averaged .86. For our purposes,
however, it hardly matters if behavior is stable, if it is also unrelated to subjects'
self-reports. Epstein assessed the validity of subjects' self-reports by comparing the
272 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

recorded events to the personality inventories that had been completed earlier. The
validity coefficients for both forms were quite high (mean for objective events =
.57). Further evidence came from relating the standardized personality inventories
to the full 14 day samples of subjects' records. A coherent and intelligible pattern
of correlations emerged from those analyses (see Epstein, 1979, for detail), with
many of the correlations above .40. Though Epstein did not present complete data
on the relative validity of 14 day samples as compared to 1 day samples, he noted
that far fewer significant relationships emerged from the latter, and that they formed
a less coherent pattern than was the case among the 14 day samples.

Assessment of Behavioral Inconsistency

Another factor that complicates the relationship between behavior and self-report
is the following. The typical self-report instrument asks respondents to present an
"average" judgment about their feelings, behavior, or personality. Rarely, however,
do they ask for any indication of how variable the respondents see their behavior
as being. Bem and Allen (1974) have argued that this is an important source of
predictive error. On any given behavioral dimension, some people-irrespective
of where they fall on the dimension-will see themselves as being highly consistent
in their actions. Other people, however, would say that they were much less con-
sistent. To the degree that people's perceptions of their consistency are valid, the
self-reported traits of very consistent people should be expected to more closely
match their behavior than would the self-reports of avowedly inconsistent people.
Using two specific traitlike dimensions, Bem and Allen presented impressive evi-
dence to substantiate this reasoning.
This finding has recently been replicated and extended by Kenrick and Stringfield
(1980), who argued that most people behave consistently on some behavioral di-
mensions, but that people vary on what dimensions are most stable for them (cf.
Pervin, 1976). Kenrick and Stringfield had subjects complete a self-report measure,
then go back through each dimension and indicate how much their behavipr in that
regard varied from situation to situation. They also indicated the trait on which they
were most consistent, and the one on which they were least consistent. Observers
who had known the subjects for a considerable length of time (parents and peers)
completed the same rating scales, as applied to the subjects. The average correlation
between subjects' self-reports and peer ratings was .27; between self-reports and
parent ratings was .26. When examining only the dimension that the subject viewed
as most consistent, however, the correlations went to .60 and .61, respectively.

Conceptual Problems
All of the sources of error that were considered in the above sections appear to rest
on problems associated with acquiring from subjects information that is both readily
available and necessary for an appropriate test of the self-report-behavior relation-
ship. To summarize, it appears to be important that the self-report be at nearly the
same level of generality as the behavior. It removes error to sample behavior more
Conceptual Problems 273

often. And it helps to have subjects tell you whether or not they should even be
expected to be consistent. All of these are problems of measurement. But now let
us consider at a more conceptual level some of the component processes that link
self-reports to behavior. Specifically, how do we go about answering self-report
scales, and how do we regulate our actions?

Veridicality of Self-Reports
Exactly what happens when a person completes an attitude scale, or a personality
self-description, or a self-report measure of a response tendency? Presumably each
item of the scale cues a search in one's memory for information about oneself or
one's behavior which is relevant to the item. When some reasonable summary of
that information has been procured, the search stops and a response to the item is
then made (cf. Rogers, 1971, 1974).
It seems reasonable to suggest that if the information search is thorough-if the
person is not too easily distracted by atypical recollections, if instead he or she
carefully examines a representative or perhaps simply a highly relevant set of
memories-the item response will be an accurate reflection of what is really inside
the person's mind. To the degree that the search for information is superficial, on
the other hand, the self-report will be a poor reflection of the person's true attitude
or disposition. 2
Recall that we have characterized the knowledge that people have about them-
selves as being organized schematically (Chapter 6). And we have further argued
that self-focus facilitates one's access to this knowledge. This suggests the following
hypothesis: that self-directed attention should be associated with increased veridi-
cality in making self-reports. This hypothesis has been tested in several different
studies, using both manipulations of self-awareness and dispositional self-con-
sciousness.

Self-awareness and self-report accuracy. The earliest research in this area was
conducted by Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, and Hood (1977, Experiment 1).
In this experiment, undergraduate men completed a self-report measure of socia-
bility, while seated in a small cubicle either before a mirror or with no mirror.
Several days later each subject returned to the laboratory and was induced to sit
in a waiting room with an attractive female confederate. The confederate observed
the subject's behavior during this waiting period, and a tape recording was unob-
trusively made of their conversation. The confederate later rated the subject's be-
havior on the dimension of sociability, and the tape was scored for the number of
words the subject emitted during the waiting period.
Because the results were quite comparable for these measures, we will describe
here only the findings for a combined index. Across two replications of this pro-
cedure, Pryor et al. found the following pattern. Among subjects who had made

2In a sense, this is obviously a problem of measurement. But it is not a problem associated
with a measurement or study technique, as was the case with the problems discussed in the
preceding section.
274 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

their self-reports with relatively low self-focus, the correlation between self-reported
sociability and observed sociability was very low (average r = .16). Among subjects
whose self-reports had been made while self-focus was heightened, however, the
correlation between self-report and behavior was significantly higher, and in fact
was quite substantial (average r = .66). Presumably enhanced self-focus caused
subjects to access more completely the memories of past behaviors that were relevant
to the questionnaire items. By considering a more representative sample of infor-
mation, they were able to give more accurate reports of their normal behavioral
tendencies.

Self-consciousness and self-report accuracy. This finding subsequently was con-

ceptually replicated in two additional studies. In one of them (Scheier, Buss, &
Buss, 1978), subjects completed a hostility inventory in group sessions. This con-
stituted a self-report measure of subjects' tendencies to be aggressive generally-
i.e., in the absence of an explicit provocation. Several weeks later subjects came
individually to laboratory sessions in which they were given an opportunity to
administer shocks to an ostensible cosubject as part of a presumed concept formation
procedure. No provocation was delivered to the subjects. Thus, the shock intensities
that were chosen over the course of the procedure can be regarded as reflecting the
person's general level of aggressiveness.
Subjects had also completed the Self-Consciousness Scale during the earlier group
sessions. It was reasoned that private self-consciousness would be associated with
more complete and veridical access to the memories relevant to the items of the
aggressiveness scale. Said differently, it was assumed that persons high in private
self-consciousness would be in better touch with their own behavioral dispositions
than would persons lower in private self-consciousness.
This in fact proved to be the case. When combined across gender (see Scheier
et al., 1978, for detail), the overall relationship between self-report of aggressiveness
and overtly displayed aggression was significant but modest, r = .34. When subjects
were divided into highs and lows in private self-consciousness, however, a clear
difference between groups emerged. The self-reports of subjects low in private self-
consciousness did not correspond to their actual behavior at all, r = .09. The
correspondence among subjects high in private self-consciousness, on the other
hand, was significantly higher, r = .66. Indeed, this relationship apparently ac-
counted almost entirely for the significant correlation overall.
Yet another conceptual replication of these findings comes from research con-
ducted by Turner (1978c). Subjects in this study began their participation by writing
stories (in group sessions) describing their tendencies toward dominance. In par-
ticular, subjects were given a hypothetical situation involving group participation
in a class project. They were instructed to write one description of what they
typically do in such situations, and a second description of what they would do if
they were acting as dominant and assertive as they could act. These two self-
descriptions represent what are called typical and maximal measures of self-per-
ceived dominance, respectively.
Several days or weeks later subjects participated individually in sessions portrayed
Conceptual Problems 275

as an investigation of problem solving. Each subject was introduced to two con-

federates, who ostensibly were coparticipants in the session. The experimenter
indicated that the three would be asked to consider a real-life problem for which
there was no clear-cut answer, and to attempt to arrive at a consensus as to how
to resolve it. The group would have 10 minutes to discuss the problem before
reaching their decision.
During the next 10 minutes the confederates behaved neutrally, and with a mod-
erate degree of assertiveness. They also provided a prearranged series of prods,
prompts, and opportunities for the subject to assert dominance if he or she chose
to do so. While doing this, the confederates were gathering their impressions of
the subject's level of dominance. In addition, the session was unobtrusively tape
recorded, and the tape later scored, in terms of the proportion of the discussion
period in which the subject had been talking.
After an interval in which the subject filled out some rating scales, a second
behavioral task was introduced. This was to be a problem-solving session much
like the first one, but the subject was to have a different role in the proceedings.
Specifically, the subject was instructed to attempt to be the leader of this group,
to be as dominant and assertive as possible. This was portrayed to the subject as
an ability test, in order to elicit as much compliance with the experimental request
as possible. As before, the other group members were confederates, and the session
was tape recorded.
The predictor variables in this study were dispositional self-consciousness and
the subjects' descriptions of their typical and maximal assertive behavior. Judges
rated those descriptions on a five-point scale of dominance. The criterion measures
came from subjects' behavior during the group discussion sessions. A composite
index was computed from the confederate ratings and subjects' monopolization of
the group discussion time. The first session may be seen as reflecting the subject's
typical dominance behavior, the second as reflecting maximal dominance behavior.
On the basis of previous research (Willerman, Turner, & Peterson, 1976), it was
expected that the maximal self-report would be a better predictor of both typical
and maximal behavior than would the typical self-report. 3 This indeed was the case.
Of greater present interest, however, is the fact that both self-reports proved to be
generally better predictors of behavior among subjects high in private self-con-
sciousness (average r = .47) than among those lower in private self-consciousness
(average r = .24). It is of some interest, as well, that high degrees of public self-
consciousness appeared to interfere with the predictive validity of self-reports among
these subjects (see also Turner & Peterson, 1977). Turner speculates that this is a

3The notion that maximal self-reports are the best predictors of even typical behaviors is an
interesting one. It may be that being asked for a maximal report forces one to recall specific
instances of behavior to a greater degree than being asked for a typical report. This, in turn,
might result in a more complete consolidation of one's memories. On the other hand, it may
simply be the case that maximal reports create greater differentiations between people in
their self-reports, differentiations that are typically better reflected in behavior than in ver-
balizations.
276 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

product of the fact that attention to the public self engages self-presentational
concerns, thus influencing self-reports and perhaps behavior as well (see Chapter
16 for an extended discussion of this issue).

Recall of prior behavior. We have assumed throughout this discussion that self-
attention results in enhanced access to memories that are relevant to one's self-
descriptions. More thorough recall should result in greater accuracy of report. This
would be consistent with findings discussed in Chapter 6 indicating that self-focus
is associated with easy access to self-schemas. None of the research discussed in
the preceding paragraphs directly tested this assumption, however. That is, self-
reports of highly self-attentive persons were better predictors of subsequent behavior
than were self-reports of less self-attentive persons. But this constitutes only indirect
support for the position that self-focus provides more accurate recall of self-related
information.
At least one study has yielded more direct support for this assertion. Subjects
in this study (Pryor et aI., 1977, Experiment 2) were simply asked to recall their
combined SAT scores and their percentile ranking on their first psychology exam,
in a format that made the report appear anonymous. These reports were made either
with mirror-enhanced self-focus or with no mirror. Subjects' true scores were then
obtained, and the absolute differences computed. Analysis of the SAT data indicated
that subjects with SAT scores above the median made more accurate self-reports
than did subjects with lower scores. There was also greater accuracy (errors only
one third as large) among subjects for whom the mirror had been present than
among those for whom it had been absent. This difference was statistically reliable
only among subjects with low SAT scores, however, due to the larger errors made
overall by these subjects.
Comparable differences did not appear among the exam percentile data. But this
particular null finding appears to offer additional support for the position that self-
focus enhances accuracy of recall of encoded information. That is, subjects' exam
scores had never been given to them in percentile terms. Thus it is unlikely that
many subjects would ever have encoded their scores in that form. It would be
impossible for self-focus to enhance the accuracy of recall of something that had
not been encoded in the first place. Thus, the groups did not differ on this measure.
This, in tum, strongly suggests that the effect of self-focus on the recall of SAT
scores had been to prompt a more thorough internal search for the data in question,
data which in that case were retrievable.

The Role of Direct Experience in Attitude Formation

In considering the relationship between attitudes and actions, we must also consider
the circumstances in which the attitude has been encoded. Attitudes can be formed
in a great many ways. They can be based on first-person experience with attitude
objects. They can be based on vicarious experiences, in which models behave in
ways that suggest attitudes. And they can also be formed through the verbal trans-
mission of information about the attitude objects.
Conceptual Problems 277

There is now considerable evidence that the manner in which attitudes have been
formed can exert a powerful influence on the degree to which they are subsequently
used to guide behavior. More specifically, attitudes formed on the basis of one's
previous personal involvement with an attitude object appear to be better predictors
of subsequent behavior than are attitudes formed on the basis of nonbehavioral
information (see Fazio & Zanna, 1980, for a more thorough review of this literature).
This hypothesis was first examined in a pair of studies conducted by Regan and
Fazio (1977). The first study was a field study, occasioned by a housing shortage
on a university campus. This housing shortage forced many freshmen to spend the
first few weeks of a semester in temporary quarters. The persons living in temporary
housing had very direct experience with the housing problem. The other freshmen,
on the other hand, formed their attitudes about the shortage primarily through
conversations and articles in the campus newspaper. Regan and Fazio distributed
questionnaires assessing attitudes toward the housing problem among members of
each of these groups. Also distributed were materials that provided opportunities
for the subjects to take action regarding the crisis. For example, each student was
given the opportunity to sign a petition asking the administration to alleviate the
problem, and the opportunity to list recommendations for resolving the crisis.
Data from this study revealed that the two groups of students had equivalently
negative attitudes about the housing shortage. That is, the mean attitudes of the
two groups did not differ from each other. But, as was predicted by Regan and
Fazio, the degree to which subjects engaged in attitude-consistent behavior did
differ across groups. Specifically, the relationships between attitudes and the be-
havioral measures were quite substantial among subjects who had had personal
experience with the housing shortage. But they were extremely weak among the
other subjects.
Regan and Fazio also conducted a conceptual replication of this study, in which
the method of formation of an attitude was experimentally manipulated. Subjects
were exposed to different sets of puzzles in one of two ways. Some subjects were
given previously solved puzzles, along with descriptions of their directions. Other
subjects were provided an opportunity to work on the puzzles, thus allowing them
to form their impressions firsthand. Afterward, each subject rated the interest value
of each puzzle. Finally, all subjects were given an opportunity to work for 15
minutes on whatever type of puzzle they wished. Subjects who had already worked
on the puzzles were expected to tum sooner to, and work for longer periods of time
on, the puzzles that they had found interesting, compared to the puzzles that they
had found uninteresting. This relationship was expected to be attenuated, however,
among subjects who had only observed the puzzles prior to rating their interest
value. The results of the study were very much in line with the authors' expectations.
Whereas the initial act of working on the puzzles did not influence subjects' overall
level of interest in the puzzles, it did increase the degree to which their expressions
of interest were reflected in their subsequent behavior.
Fazio and Zanna (1978a) provided a third demonstration of this phenomenon,
extending the research to yet a third type of behavior. Subjects in this study were
students enrolled in a social psychology course. They were asked to complete a
278 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

survey regarding psychological research. Embedded in this survey was an item

asking subjects how many experiments they had previously participated in, thus
providing a measure of personal experience with psychology experiments. The
students also completed a lO-item semantic differential scale for which the object
of their evaluations was "volunteering to serve as a subject" in psychological re-
search. Subjects' attitudes toward volunteering were computed from these items.
The dependent measure was on the final page of the questionnaire. A paragraph
explained to the students that the psychology department was interested in forming
a pool of volunteer research subjects. If the student was interested in being included
in the pool, he was to give his name and phone number, and indicate how many
experiments he would be willing to participate in. This number served as the index
of the subject's behavior.
Analysis of these data indicated that attitudes predicted behavior at a relatively
weak level overall (r = .32). But further examination revealed that there was a
significant interaction between attitudes and degree of prior experience in deter-
mining behavior. As the amount of direct experience increased, so did the corre-
spondence between subjects' expressed attitudes and the behavior measure (see
Fazio & Zanna, 1978a, for greater detail).
As a final illustration, consider a study by Songer-Nocks (1976) of the association
between behavior in a mixed motive game and attitudes toward cooperation. Subjects
who rated their attitudes after being given some experience with the game subse-
quently behaved in a fashion that was quite consistent with their attitude ratings.
This was not true of subjects who made their ratings in the absence of a personal
experience with the game. Again, personal experience apparently caused the opinion
to be more predictive of later actions.
Fazio and Zanna (1980) have suggested that their analysis is applicable to several
earlier literatures, for example, research on "commitment" and persuasion (Kiesler,
1971). Such research had typically found that the individuals who were most com-
mitted to a given attitudinal position were the most resistant to persuasion away
from that position. Fazio and Zanna pointed out that in many cases the concept of
commitment had been operationalized by giving subjects direct personal experience
with attitude objects, whereas control subjects had no such experience. Consistent
with the studies discussed just above, these manipulations typically did not influence
the average attitude that subjects held. But they did make subjects more likely to
maintain their attitude when confronted with a persuasion attempt. These effects
differ somewhat from those described above, in that they concern resistance to
persuasion, rather than the guiding of overt actions. Nevertheless, they certainly
seem consistent with the reasoning that personal experience with an attitude object
causes one's attitude to be a stronger source for behavioral guidance.

Mediation. How does direct experience cause one's attitude to become a better
predictor of behavior? Fazio and Zanna (1980) suggest two possibilities. First,
direct experience with an attitude object may result in greater confidence or certainty
of one's attitude than is the case when there has been less experience. Second,
direct experience may result in attitudes that are better defined or more clearly
Conceptual Problems 279

focused than would otherwise be the case. There is empirical support for both these
possibilities. For example, in their study of subjects' attitudes about being partic-
ipants in a subject pool, Fazio and Zanna also asked subjects about their certainty
of their attitudes, and their latitudes of rejection on that attitudinal dimension. (The
latter should reflect the degree to which the attitude is clearly focused.) Both of
these variables were correlated with subjects' degrees of prior participation in
research, and both proved to be reliably related to attitude-behavior consistency.
There is also considerable evidence from prior research that behavioral experience
with an attitude object results in greater latitudes of rejection with regard to the
attitudinal dimension (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965).
Finally, Fazio and Zanna (1978b) have reported data indicating that (a) direct
experience with an attitude object leads to greater certainty of attitudes (Experiment
1), and (b) manipulated perception of certainty induces attitude-behavior consis-
tency (Experiment 2). These findings, in fact, have led Fazio and Zanna (1980) to
suggest that confidence in one's attitude-however that attitude has been formed-
may be a particularly important determinant of attitude-behavior congruence.
Fazio and Zanna (1980) have suggested that the existence of such confidence
and clarity in behaviorally based attitudes typically requires three conditions: (a)
that the past behaviors have been consistent enough that an accurate summary is
possible, (b) that the behaviors be perceived as voluntary, and thus attitude related,
and (c) that consolidation or summary actually does take place, resulting in a
coherent attitude. This consolidation would appear to require a thorough search
through memories of potentially relevant behavior. Thus, it should be no surprise
if one were to discover that self-directed attention is implicated in the consolidation
process.
A study which supports this conclusion was conducted by Pryor et al. (1977,
Experiment 3). Subjects in this study were induced to spend some time in a "free
play" context with several different sets of perceptual-cognitive puzzles. Each sub-
ject then was taken to a different room, and was asked to rate each puzzle type,
on a scale ranging from boring to interesting. These ratings were made either in
the presence of a mirror or with no mirror. The ratings were then correlated with
a combined index of the proportion of time the subject had spent working on each
type of puzzle and the order in which the puzzles had been taken up. These
correlations were significantly higher among subjects in the mirror condition than
in the no mirror condition. This appears to indicate that enhanced self-focus led
subjects to undertake a more thorough mental assessment of the degree to which
they had been drawn to the various puzzles. This in turn led them to infer varying
degrees of interest in the puzzles. One or both of these processes occurred to a
substantially lower degree among less self-focused subjects.
Fazio and Zanna (1976) have also reported preliminary evidence that the attitudes
resulting from this kind of self-scrutiny of past behavior are more predictive of
future behavior than are attitudes that are not derived from this process. In one
study that they conducted, subjects either were or were not led to recall and review
their past religious behaviors prior to indicating their attitudes toward religion (a
procedure which would seem to be analogous to experimentally induced variations
280 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

in self-focus in the Pryor et al. study). They then indicated their future intentions
regarding a series of religious activities. The attitudes of subjects who had reviewed
their past behaviors were very predictive of future behavioral intentions, r = .78;
the attitudes of subjects who had not engaged in the review were less predictive
of behavioral intentions, r = .52. Olson and Zanna (1978), pursuing this relation-
ship a step further, had subjects return a month later to complete self-reports of
their religion-related behavior in the interim. Consistent with the previous study,
the correlations between self-reported attitudes and self-reported actions were about
20 points higher among subjects who had reviewed their prior behaviors before
stating their attitudes than among subjects who had not.
These data seem to indicate the importance of reviewing and examining one's
attitude-relevant behavior, in arriving at one's attitude. If Fazio and Zanna (1980)
are correct, this consolidation happens more commonly when a person has engaged
in a good deal of attitude-relevant behavior than when such behaviors are less
frequent. And, consistent with our own reasoning, this review and consolidation
appears to be facilitated by self-focus.

Relevance of Attitudes as Behavioral Standards

We have characterized the regulation of behavior as being a process of evoking
behavioral standards (Chapter 7), and then adjusting behavior in the direction of
closer conformity to those standards (Chapter 8). In considering the relationship
between attitudes and behavior, another important question would seem to be this:
To what degree are people's attitudes commonly evoked or made salient as standards
for self-regulation? At present, knowledge is limited concerning the differential
impact of situations on the perceived appropriateness of basing one's behavior upon
one's attitudes. We know that reliance upon attitudes is diminished when there are
salient normative constraints on one's actions (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973; Warner
& DeFleur, 1969). But we don't know a good deal more than that. On the other
hand, it is known that there are differences among persons in the degree to which
attitudes are salient and thus taken as appropriate guides for their behavior.
Snyder (e.g., 1974, 1979) has argued that people vary widely in the degree to
which they make use of their personal opinions and beliefs to guide their actions.
Some people are primarily interested in creating impressions upon other people that
will suit the needs of the moment. These people are termed high self-monitors.
Other people are primarily interested in presenting themselves as they believe they
really are. These people are termed low self-monitors.4 These dispositions are

"This nomenclature can be confusing to a naive reader. High self-monitoring actually appears
to involve monitoring of environmental contingencies, as much as or more than it involves
monitoring of the self. Snyder (1974) chose to label these people as high self-monitors
because he viewed them as carefully monitoring their public displays of self. An interesting
theoretical question arises from this label, however, in considering the behaviors oflow self-
monitors. Inasmuch as low self-monitors apparently take pains to try to portray themselves
as they believe they really are, it would appear that they are monitoring their actions fully
as much as the high self-monitors. Despite this possibility for confusion, however, our use
of the terms here will conform to the established research literature.
Conceptual Problems 281

measured by the Self-Monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974), which includes items such
as ''I'm not always the person I appear to be" and "My behavior is usually an
expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs."
The operative phrase for persons high in self-monitoring is "all the world's a
stage." Persons low in self-monitoring, on the other hand, appear to follow the
injunction "to thine own self be true." It should be apparent from these character-
izations that persons low in self-monitoring might be expected to exhibit a high
degree of correspondence between their beliefs and opinions (on the one hand) and
their overt behaviors (on the other). In contrast, one would expect far less corre-
spondence among persons high in self-monitoring. 5
This does appear to be the case. In an initial examination of this hypothesis
(Snyder & Monson, 1975, Study 2) subjects read a series of hypothetical situations,
three basic situations presented with nine different contextual variations. Subjects
were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would perform a given behavior in
each variation of the situation. The variable of primary interest was the degree of
variability in subjects' judgments about how they would act. As one might expect,
subjects who were high in self-monitoring were highly variable in their self-reports,
presumably because they expected their actions to be highly influenced by variations
in the behavioral contexts. Variability was much less among subjects low in self-
monitoring, however, presumably because they felt that their own personality char-
acteristics would be the most important determinant of their actions, even when the
context varied substantially.
This study is open to criticism, however, on the grounds that neither attitudes
nor behavior was actually measured in the study. Thus, the support it offers for the
hypothesis regarding the attitude-behavior link is quite indirect. Subsequent research
was conducted to overcome this limitation. In this research, Snyder and Swann
(1976) measured subjects' attitudes toward affirmative action, and then two weeks
later presented subjects with a mock court case involving alleged sex discrimination.
Subjects were given an argument that ostensibly had been advanced in court on
each side of the case. They were then asked to render their own verdicts, and
explain and justify their decisions in essays. These essays were rated in terms of
their favorability to the plaintiff, who had raised the claim of sex discrimination.
The relationship of these essays to subjects' initial opinions was not very strong
overall. But this was largely a product of the very low correspondence among high
self-monitors. Persons who were low in self-monitoring displayed an attitude-action
correspondence that was significantly stronger.
This reasoning has recently been integrated with Bern and Allen's (1974) assertion
that self-reports predict behavior only among people who perceive themselves to
be relatively consistent on the dimension in question. In this study (Olson, Zanna,
& Fazio, 1978) subjects indicated their attitudes toward being religious, indicated
how variable their religious behavior was, and completed the Self-Monitoring scale.
A month later the same subjects completed a self-report of the frequency with which

SIn light of the discussion in the preceding section, it is interesting to speCUlate whether high
and low self-monitors might differ from each other in either their confidence in or the clarity
of their attitudes.
282 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

they had performed certain religious and irreligious actions during the interim.
Attitude-behavior consistency was stronger among low than high self-monitors.
And this effect was tempered by subjects' degrees of self-reported variability. More
specifically, the only group for whom significant correspondence was obtained was
the low self-monitoring-low variability group.
We should note quite explicitly that in our view-and implicitly in Snyder's as
well-both the low self-monitors and the high self-monitors are engaging in the
kind of processes that we have argued for throughout this book. That is, both are
examining the situation they are in, deciding what the situation calls for (i.e., what
behavioral standard is appropriate), and then conforming to that specification. The
difference is that one person is guided by personal values (and a superordinate
standard that holds personal values to be of paramount importance); the other person
is guided by the implicit public demands of the situation (and a superordinate
standard that holds consensually defined behavioral prescriptions to be most im-
portant).
The notion that some people are particularly attentive to the requirements of the
context and others are attentive to more personal considerations is a broader one
than we can deal with effectively in this chapter. We have devoted Chapter 16
exclusively to an examination of that notion. Let us now tum, however, to another
source of error between self-report and action.

Self-Awareness and the Use of Evoked Attitudes

As was indicated in the previous sections, attitudes are sometimes (though not
always) evoked by the behavioral context as being appropriate guides for behavior.
But it is important to recall a principle that we discussed at length in Chapter 8,
because that principle has implications for the use of a previously evoked attitude
to direct one's actions. Specifically, the standard that is salient (be it an attitude
or otherwise) may be utilized to guide behavior only to the degree that attention
is self-directed. With regard to attitudes, this point is made quite clearly by two
series of experiments that were described in Chapter 8 as part of our review of
evidence that self-focus leads to conformity to behavioral standards. Because the
studies were described in considerable detail in that previous chapter, we will review
them only briefly here.
In one of these projects (Carver, 1975), subjects were chosen for participation
on the basis of their attitudes toward the use of punishment as a teaching technique.
Some subjects favored the use of punishment; others opposed it. Several weeks
later each was led to serve the part of a "teacher" while a presumed cosubject
attempted to learn a concept. As part of the experimental procedure, each subject
in this study was explicitly told to make use of his or her own attitude in choosing
punishment levels for incorrect responses on the learner's part. Self-awareness was
experimentally varied across each pretest group. The measure of interest was the
intensity of the punishments that the subjects chose.
Despite the fact that all subjects had been told to use their attitudes as guides to
behavior, the punishment levels of subjects in the low self-focus condition did not
Conceptual Problems 283

correspond to their pretested attitudes. It was only when attention was self-directed
that attitudes were actually used to determine behavior, and the behavior of the two
attitude groups began to diverge (see Figure 14-1). A similar pattern was also
obtained in a replication of this study (Carver, 1975, Experiment 2).
The conclusion that the use of attitudes to guide behavior is mediated by self-
focus can also be derived from the results of a series of studies conducted by
Gibbons (1978). This research examined the behavior of subjects who varied in
their levels of sex guilt. Sex gUilt can be thought of as representing an attitude
toward the experience of sexual arousal, in which high levels of sex guilt reflect
negative attitudes about becoming sexually aroused. One would expect that a
person's attitude about sexual arousal would be evoked when the person is called
upon to examine and evaluate relatively explicit sexually oriented material.
This is precisely what Gibbons asked his subjects to do. He conducted a series
of three studies, which varied in the stimuli used to induce sexual arousal, and in
the gender of the subjects. In each case, however, he presented subjects with some
type of erotica under conditions of either high or low self-attention. Subjects were
asked to react to the material by rating the degree to which it was sexually arousing,
exciting, and so on. These studies all yielded patterns of results that were quite
similar to each other. In each case, when self-focus was high subjects' reports about
the erotic stimuli were significantly related to their chronic levels of sex guilt. Thus
in this condition subjects' behavior-Le., their judgments-was attitude-consistent.
When self-focus was lower, however, the relationships between levels of sex guilt
and the ratings made in the experimental session were significantly weaker. Indeed,
the attitude-behavior relationships in this condition typically were statistically un-
reliable.

_ - _ Oppose Punishment

----4" Favor Punishment

>5 5
-
I-
en
z
w
4

-
~4

-- -
~
o ---.
~3 ...... 3
en 'fi:.........._______- 'f
I I i
Mirror Absent Mirror Present Mirror Absent Mirror Present

EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2
Fig. 14-1. Mean shock intensities as a function of attitudes toward punishment and self-
attention condition. (Data from Carver, 1975, Experiments 1 and 2.)
284 14. Relationship Between Self-Report and Behavior

The conclusion of all of these studies appears to be this: Even if one's attitude
is called forth by elements of one's behavioral context-even if by explicit instruc-
tion-it is not necessarily used automatically. Its use appears to require that some
attention be self-directed, thereby engaging the matching-to-standard feedback loop
that regulates behavior with respect to the salient standard.

Types of Self-Report
Throughout this chapter we have implicitly treated attitudes, habitual behavioral
tendencies, and personality traits as though they were equivalent to each other. To
the degree that all three share the problem of poor correspondence between self-
report and behavioral manifestation, they do share common features. However, we
should also consider what distinguishes them from each other as conceptual con-
structs, and what implications these distinctions might have for the general topic
under discussion.
The simplest comparison-because of the high degree of similarity between the
two-is between traits and habitual behaviors. Self-reports of trait dimensions
typically ask the respondent "what are you like?" on that dimension (cf. Epstein,
1979). Self-reports of behavioral habits ask "how do you act?" on that dimension
(cf. Scheier et aI., 1978). There is a conceptual distinction to be made between
these two questions, but in at least one respect the distinction is easily trivialized.
That is, it is arguable that a fair amount of knowledge about oneself at a conceptual
level is encoded by looking back upon one's prior actions, and deciding what
personal characteristics are reflected therein (cf. Bern, 1972; Carver et al., 1979a).
If this is so, then self-reports of traits probably represent, in large measure, con-
ceptual summaries or consolidations of memories of prior actions. They thus have
similar determinants as do self-reports of habitual behavioral tendencies.
The concept of attitude, on the other hand, introduces an additional element.
Attitudes are commonly conceptualized as being evaluative in nature, as involving
favorable or unfavorable emotional reactions to the objects of the attitude, whereas
many behavioral tendencies are much more neutral. Even here, however, the dis-
tinction begins to break down under close scrutiny. A wide range of behavioral
habits or traits can easily be viewed as reflecting persistent emotional reactions to
sets of stimulus cues. Extraversion, for example, seems to imply a positive reaction
to social encounters and opportunities for involving oneself in diverse activities.
Dominance seems in part to be an aversion to lack of control over the course of
events in which one is a participant. Though strong emphasis on the affective
component is typically reserved for the attitude as a construct, it is not clear that
this distinction is not artificial.
Moreover, despite the stress on the evaluative component of attitudes, it is widely
assumed that attitudes also incorporate predispositions to behave in ways that are
consistent with those affective reactions. To the degree that one infers and con-
solidates one's knowledge about one's attitudes in the same fashion as is true of
Types of Self-Report 285

traits-in this case, by observing one's feelings as well as one's actions-attitudes

then represent summary labels for one's tendencies to feel and act in particular
ways. If the process of inference underlying the two constructs is similar, then the
constructs themselves seem less distinct and separate from each other. It thus seems
reasonable to treat them as comparable, which we have done throughout this chapter.
Chapter 15

Social Facilitation

In what may have been the first experimental investigation in all of social psy-
chology, Triplett (1897) began the area of study that has come to be known as
social facilitation. Research in this area concerns the effects on an individual's
performance that are caused by the presence of other people. The finding from
which the area derives its name is this: the presence of others, whether as coactors
or as observers, often results in enhanced performance. (Sometimes the presence
of others impairs performance, however, resulting in "social interference" effects.
The basis of performance impairment is addressed in a later section of the chapter.)

Drive Theory and Social Facilitation

The most widely accepted interpretation of social facilitation effects is based on the
drive-habit theory of motivation (e.g., Hull, C.L., 1952; Spence, 1956). In tra-
ditional drive theory, a person's set of response potentials, or habits, determines
what behavior emerges in a given setting. These response tendencies are typically
assumed to take the form of a hierarchy, an ordering of the likelihoods that given
responses will be emitted in a given context. Behavior tendencies high in an existing
hierarchy are termed dominant responses; those lower in the hierarchy are termed
subordinate. The level of a response in the hierarchy presumably reflects previous
learning that has occurred in the same or similar circumstances. Because dominant
responses are emitted more frequently than are subordinate responses, the eventual
emergence of a behavior in a given setting depends on its place in the hierarchy.
The "intensity" of behavior, according to this approach, is determined by drive
strength. Any increase in drive leads to an increase in the tendency to emit responses.
Thus responding becomes more frequent, vigorous, or thorough. Initially, at least,
the increased response rate is proportionally greater among responses near the top
of the hierarchy than among those lower in the hierarchy.
This general theory of motivation has received its share of criticism over the
years (e.g., Appley, 1970; Bolles, 1967; Miller, N.E., 1963; Sheffield, 1966;
288 15. Social Facilitation

Weiner, 1966; Young, 1961). Nevertheless, it remains quite influential today among
personality and social psychologists.
Zajonc (1965, 1966) was the first to make use of this motivational theory to
account for social facilitation effects. He proposed that the presence of other mem-
bers of one's own species causes an increase in drive. This, in tum, causes a
differential increase in the probability of emitting whatever is the dominant response
in that situation (i.e., the behavior highest in the habit hierarchy). When the subject's
task is one in which the behavior required for successful performance is well
learned-that is, if the response which is task-appropriate is also dominant-in-
creased drive leads to increased emission of the "appropriate" behavior.

Alternative Drive Theories

Zajonc argued that the mere presence of others is sufficient to heighten drive and
thus produce social facilitation effects. But this assumption has been disputed by
a number of other theorists. For example, Cottrell (1968, 1972) proposed that the
presence of others has an impact on human behavior only to the degree that the
others are identifiable as "evaluative" in nature (see also Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak,
& Rittle, 1968; Henchy & Glass, 1968; Paulus & Murdoch, 1971). The presence
of evaluative others leads to anticipation of either good or bad outcomes (according
to Cottrell), or to apprehension over being evaluated (according to Henchy and
Glass). This anticipation or apprehension contributes to the subject's generalized
drive level, presumably because the anticipation results in physiological arousal.
Sanders and Baron (1975) have also taken issue with Zajonc's assumption that
the mere physical presence of others directly increases drive (see also Baron, Moore,
& Sanders, 1978; Sanders, Baron, & Moore, 1978). These authors suggest that
audiences exert their effects by serving as a source of distraction, which leads to
an attentional conflict. It is this conflict over the allocation of attention-to the task
versus to the audience-that they believe causes the increase in generalized drive.
Although they disagree with Zajonc about the specific mechanism by which
audiences heighten generalized drive, these theorists are in agreement with his
analysis ofthe consequences of heightened drive. In all of these theories, heightened
drive leads to incr~ased emission of dominant responses, which in tum leads to
facilitation of the ongoing behavior.

Control Theory and Social Facilitation

We are arguing in this book for the viability-indeed, the preferability~f a control-
theory approach to human motivation. And the theoretical model that we have been
discussing throughout the book has what we see as important implications for the
area of social facilitation. Specifically, such effects can be viewed as reflecting the
discrepancy-reducing feedback loop that is engaged when attention is self-directed.
According to our analysis, some aspect of the behavioral context-for example,
Control Theory and Social Facilitation 289

information contained in the experimental instructions-makes a standard of be-

havior salient to subjects. The presence of the audience then serves to remind
subjects of themselves, their present states, and the previously established standard
to a greater degree than would be the case with the audience absent. 1 In short, the
audience increases subjects' self-attention in a context in which a behavioral standard
has already become salient. This leads to enhanced conformity to the standard,
resulting in performance facilitation.
This reasoning was first advanced by Wicklund and Duval (1971; see also Duval
& Wicklund, 1972), though their analysis of the effects of self-attention ultimately
rests on a drive postulate (as was discussed in Chapter 8). They argued further that
if audiences function merely to remind subjects of themselves, then performance
facilitation should be demonstrable even in asocial circumstances, provided that
subjects were made self-aware in another manner. Wicklund and Duval (1971)
tested this reasoning in an experiment in which subjects were instructed to copy
as much prose as possible (thus making speed the salient standard), and in which
self-focus was heightened among half the subjects by the presence of a mirror. The
result was a performance facilitation effect-faster copying in the mirror than the
no mirror condition.
A subsequent study (Innes & Young, 1975) cast some doubt upon the self-
attention approach, in one specific respect: In that study, exposure to a mirror
produced effects dissimilar from those produced by an audience. This aspect of
their data appears to contradict the self-attention analysis of social facilitation. We
believe, however, that the two can be reconciled fairly easily. We have deferred
this issue until later in the chapter, however.

Comparisons Among Theories

Duval and Wicklund. There are some interesting comparisons to be made among
the various theoretical approaches to performance facilitation. These comparisons
reveal some similarities between theories, and also help to bring the differences
between theories into sharper focus. The easiest and most straightforward com-
parison is between our approach and that of Duval and Wicklund (1972; Wicklund,
1975, 1978, 1979). With regard to the facilitation situation, our approaches differ
in only one respect. Duval and Wicklund assume a mediating drive state. We, in
contrast, do not.

Cottrell. Our differences with other drive theories are more substantial. Yet even
here there are important similarities. Consider Cottrell's (1968, 1972) version of
drive-habit theory. Cottrell proposed that others influence one's behavior only when
they cause one to anticipate being evaluated by them (cf. also Henchy & Glass,
1968). According to Cottrell, the influence on behavior is entirely a product of

lWe have phrased the remainder of this discussion in terms of audience effects. However,
the same reasoning seems applicable to coaction settings as well.
290 15. Social Facilitation

anticipation-induced arousal, which leads to heightened drive, which in tum in-

creases the tendency to emit the dominant response. The audience presumably is
otherwise irrelevant to the subject's behavior.
But is this really so? If evaluation anticipation is critical in this analysis, to what
degree might Cottrell have characterized the person's subsequent behavior as an
attempt to gain a favorable evaluation, i.e., an attempt to behave "correctly" or
"appropriately?" Does not response dominance in Cottrell's theory implicitly accrue
to whatever behavior is perceived as being "desirable" to one's audience? Though
the question seems not to have been explicitly addressed in these terms (cf. Blank,
1979), the answer would seem to be yes.
Let us assume for the moment that a particular response can be rendered dominant
by virtue of the audience's composition, and further that this process can be char-
acterized in terms of discerning the appropriate behavior for that social context. To
what degree, then, would this differ from the function of classifying a situation and
thereby calling forth a behavioral standard? The latter, of course, is precisely one
of the two major functions that we have assumed underlies behavior regulation (see
Chapter 7). If one were to accept these two characterizations as equivalent, only
one fundamental disparity between the two analyses would remain. Cottrell retained
the assumption that heightened drive causes the behavior to emerge. Our model
holds that self-focus causes the behavior to emerge by engaging a behavior-regu-
latory feedback loop.

Sanders and Baron. Another comparison may also be informative here. As was
indicated above, Sanders and Baron (1975) have held that performance facilitation
results from attentional conflict, created by distraction. According to those authors,
one such distraction is the presence of others, but more particularly others who
might serve as points of reference for social comparison. Based on this reasoning,
they found that having either the motivation or the opportunity for social comparison
led to performance facilitation (Sanders et aI., 1978).
It should be noted, however, that an act of social comparison ultimately involves
a comparison of self against a particular kind of standard (cf. Chapter 8). Comparison
of self against standard is, of course, precisely what we have postulated to occur
as a function of self-focus. Thus, Sanders and Baron's emphasis on the possibility
that subjects might engage in social comparison with an audience has important
similarities to our own reasoning.
Although both their theory and ours thus suggest a process of comparing self
against some standard, there are two important differences between the theories.
First, Sanders and Baron apparently view the social comparison act, to the degree
that it does occur, as essentially a task-irrelevant distraction. Its function in per-
formance facilitation is, to them, merely to create an attentional conflict. We, on
the other hand, would emphasize the importance of that comparison act as a com-
ponent of the TOTE or feedback sequence.
It seems worthy of some note, in this regard, that neither Sanders et aI. (1978)
nor Baron et aI. (1978) were able to find direct self-report evidence that their
Evidence Regarding Mediating States 291

subjects were distracted as a function of social comparison condition. Baron et al.

(1978) found only a nonsignificant tendency toward a difference in self-reports of
"attending to something other than the task"-which could have reflected self-focus
as easily as distraction-and a reliable difference in errors of task recall. The latter
finding, however, is open to multiple interpretations, as is discussed later in this
chapter.
The second difference between the models, of course, is that Sanders and Baron
assume that the comparison tendency serves to increase the subjects' drive level.
Thus, once again, perhaps the most important difference between this cognitively
mediated drive theory and our information processing model is the presence or
absence of the postulate that the audience serves to heighten drive.

Evidence Regarding Mediating States

As is apparent from the above discussion, the various drive theories and our control-
system model make similar predictions for the facilitation of performance that is
caused by audience and mirror manipulations. Thus, any decision as to the theories'
relative adequacy or usefulness must have another basis. One such basis would be
evidence verifying the existence of a postulated mediating process.
Do audience and mirror manipulations enhance self-focus and lead to comparison
with salient standards, as we and Duval and Wicklund have argued, or do they
not? Do they increase drive, as everyone except us has argued, or do they not?
There is evidence available regarding both of these questions.

Self-Focus and Comparison with Standards

The evidence that audience and mirror manipulations enhance self-focus was de-
scribed in considerable detail in Chapter 3. It is easily summarized here. In two
studies (Carver & Scheier, 1978), subjects who filled out a sentence completion
blank either in front of a mirror or in front of an audience made more responses
that were reflective of self-focus than did control subjects. Converging evidence
in support of this conclusion has also come from other sources (e.g., Geller &
Shaver, 1976). Moreover, mirror effects have been replicated on numerous occa-
sions using individual differences in dispositional self-consciousness. This adds
considerable strength to the assumption that mirror presence enhances self-attention,
because of the fact that the disposition has a high degree of both construct and
discriminant validity (see Chapter 3).
We also presented substantial though indirect evidence in Chapter 8 that audience
presence and mirror presence lead subjects to compare their present behaviors or
states with salient standards (Scheier & Carver, 1980a). In one demonstration of
this tendency, subjects sought to view geometric figures (which they were trying
to copy accurately) with greater frequency when self-focus was high than when it
was lower. In other research, subjects chose more test items for which performance
292 15. Social Facilitation

norms were available when self-focus was high than when it was lower. Presumably
both of these behaviors reflected attempts on the part of subjects to evaluate their
performances, i.e., to compare themselves with salient standards.

Drive
And what is the evidence that drive increases when either a mirror or an audience
is present? Though agreement on the nature of drive is not always attainable,
physiological arousal is often suggested as being either reflective of or identical to
the drive state (e.g., Malmo, 1958). Consequently, most attempts to measure drive
have been attempts to measure arousal.
Geen and Gange (1977) discussed most of the existing evidence on the arousal
issue in their recent review of the social facilitation literature. They noted that some
researchers had attempted to relate audience presence to measures such as EMG,
GSR, and heart rate change (e.g., Chapman, 1973, 1974; Henchy & Glass, 1968;
Singerman, Borkovec & Baron, 1976), but that most of the research on the phys-
iological consequences of audience presence (e.g., Cohen & Davis, 1973; Martens,
1969a, 1969b) has made use of a specific measure of palmar sweat.
The palmar sweat index (PSI), derived by Thompson and Sutarman (1953),
involves taking a series of prints from a subject's finger, using a plastic-containing
emulsion (see also Johnson & Dabbs, 1967). The moisture secreted from an active
sweat pore repels the plastic before the print has solidified, thereby causing a bubble.
The PSI score is obtained by counting active sweat pores-i.e., the bubbles-within
a predefined area. On the basis of previous research (e.g., Dabbs, Johnson, &
Leventhal, 1968; Harrison, 1964; Harrison & MacKinnon, 1966; Harrison,
MacKinnon, & Monk-Jones, 1962) an increase in the number of active sweat pores
is believed to reflect arousal, anxiety, or an engagement of attention with the
environment. A decrease is believed to reflect reduced arousal, concentration, and
inward direction of attention (see Dabbs et aI., 1968). Although one may question
the validity of the PSI, it is important to note here that most evidence on the drive-
inducing properties of audience presence in the social facilitation context comes
from studies that have used this measure.
Such studies usually, though not always (cf. Geen & Gange, 1977, p. 1272),
have found that PSI increased as a function of audience presence. The most com-
monly cited of this research is probably the work done by Martens (1969a, 1969b).
His studies are cited in part because the methodology was clear and straightforward,
in part because the predicted behavioral effects occurred as a function of audience
presence, and in part because the PSI results were also very clear. Martens seems
to have demonstrated quite unequivocally that being before an audience while
preparing to perform a task leads to greater palmar sweat than occurs without the
audience.
There is, however, a serious problem with these data. Martens used a trials task,
and he took his palmar sweat measures between trials. As he himself noted (1969a,
p. 373), "the actual response in learning the task required the subject to concentrate
for only a very brief period. Between trials the subject sat idle viewing the spectators.
Palmar Sweat and Social Facilitation 293

Therefore, the subject spent the greater portion of the experiment viewing his
environment and not concentrating on the task." This presents a problem that
apparently has never been corrected in any subsequent study, and it is a critical
one. Because of the timing of the PSI measures in the Martens (1969a, 1969b)
research, it is impossible to know whether or not the PSI increases that occurred
between trials carried over to the trials themselves. Thus it is impossible to know
whether the increase in arousal that existed while sitting passively before the au-
dience had any relationship to the behavioral effect that was caused by the audience.
More specifically, it is possible that the arousal effect may have been entirely
a between-trials phenomenon, attributable solely to the greater complexity of the
subject's environment-and the subject's consequent greater engagement with the
environment between trials-in the audience-present than in the audience-absent
condition. How did we generate this possibility? Recall that Dabbs et al. (1968),
from whom recent use of the palmar sweat measure appears to derive, argued that
palmar sweat increases are not merely associated with arousal but with a readiness
to interact with the environment. Thus, such increases could be expected to occur
in the presence of any environmental stimulus that is attention-attracting. Subjects
in the Martens (1969a, 1969b) research might well have been engaged with the
environment (the audience) between trials. But they may also have been in a
completely different state during the trials themselves.
Indeed, if our reasoning is correct, during the trials themselves subjects were
engaged in a psychological and behavioral feedback loop, which involves self-focus
and a concentration on matching one's behavior to the salient standard. Based on
Dabbs et al. 's (1968) characterization of the PSI (above), we would not expect PSI
scores to remain high during the task. We would expect them to decrease.
One more finding is relevant to this argument. Paulus, Annis, and Risner (1978)
found that introducing a mirror into a task-performance setting led to reduced palmar
sweat values. This seems quite consistent with the reasoning that a PSI reduction
should occur when a person is self-focused, and that mirror presence leads fairly
directly to such a state. The Paulus et a1. demonstration, however, suffers from the
same methodological problem as do those of Martens (1969a, 1969b), in that PSI
data were taken only in the presence of the experimental manipUlation, not during
performance on the task. Thus we can draw no meaningful conclusion from that
study about subjects' physiological states during the task segments of the experi-
mental sessions.

Palmar Sweat and Social Facilitation

Accordingly, we conducted an experiment (Carver & Scheier, in press b) that was

intended to remedy these deficiencies in previous studies. In this experiment we
presented subjects with a social facilitation procedure, but measured palmar sweat
during actual task performance as well as after the introduction of the experimental
manipulation. The reasoning behind the study was as follows.
We assumed that when a clear behavioral standard exists with regard to task
294 15. Social Facilitation

performance, enhanced self-attention leads to greater engagement of the feedback

sequence. This leads to enhanced conformity to the salient standard, and thus to
performance facilitation. This should occur when self-focus is increased by either
an audience or a mirror.
The introduction of an audience into the experimental setting may well produce
apprehension, anxiety, nervousness, or simply a temporary increase in attention
directed outward. This would occur because of the complexity of an audience as
a social stimulus, its potentially evaluative character, and thus the opportunity it
provides for the subject to gather information relevant to social comparison. Presence
of an evaluative audience when a subject is not working on the task thus should
lead to elevated PSI values (as was found by Martens, 1969a, 1969b).
Drive theory would appear to predict that this elevation of PSI should be main-
tained during the performing of the task, because task performance is based on
heightened drive. We disagree. We believe that task performance involves self-
focus, as a component of concentration. We would expect that the attempt to
perform a task would not result in increased PSI, but in reduced PSI, compared
to pretask baselines. Indeed, we would expect this pattern to occur among subjects
of all experimental groups when undertaking the task.
In contrast to the effects of an audience, presence of a mirror should not lead
to apprehensiveness, or thereby to increased PSI. If a mirror serves immediately
as a reminder of oneself, its introduction should lead to reduced PSI values (cf.
Paulus et al., 1978). These values should then remain reduced during subsequent
task performance.
The predictions were tested in an experiment in which subjects copied German-
language prose during two 5-minute sessions. The experimental manipulation was
introduced before the second copying task, and performance was measured within
subjects over trials. Palmar sweat measures were taken before the first task
(baseline), during the first copying task, just after the introduction of the experi-
mental manipulation, and during the second copying task.
At the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter greeted the
subject, escorted him or her to the experimental room, and explained that the study
was investigating the effects of familiarity of material on ease of letter copying.
A second purpose of the study ostensibly was to look at some of the bodily changes
that accompany concentration on this sort of task. The procedure for taking the PSI
then was explained to the subject and an initial "baseline" print was taken from the
subject's nondominant hand. The experimenter explained that he would be taking
prints from the same finger periodically throughout the session, including some
times when the subject might be working.
After asking whether the subject had any questions, the experimenter opened a
book of German prose to a predetermined point and delivered this instruction:
"When I say 'begin,' start copying from the top of this page onto this tablet. Print
the letters rather than writing. Try to work as rapidly as you can. I'll stop you when
the time is up." Thus a clear behavioral standard was established: to copy the letters
quickly.
Mter starting the subject, the experimenter retreated to a desk at the far comer
Palmar Swear and Social Facilitation 295

of the room outside the subject's visual field, where he busied himself with pa-
perwork. When exactly 3 minutes had elapsed, he returned to the subject, and took
a second PSI print, while the subject continued copying.
The experimenter then returned to his desk. After 5 minutes total copying time
had elapsed, the experimenter stopped the subject and told him or her to relax.
The experimenter then paused for about 10 seconds, and did one of three things,
corresponding to the condition to which the subject was thereby being assigned.
In the mirror condition, the experimenter said casually, "We're going to be using
this later on, so I think I'll save some time and put it up now." He then placed a
mirror on the table at which the subject had been working, in such a position that
it directly faced the subject. In the audience condition, the experimenter said, "You
know, mostly I've been letting people work on this without watching, but I think
I'll sit right here and observe you during the second set." He then drew up a chair
opposite the subject, and sat down facing the subject. In the control condition, the
experimenter simply let an equivalent amount of time pass, without saying anything.
About 10 seconds after placing the mirror or seating himself before the subject (or
after an equivalent time period in the control condition), the experimenter took
another PSI print.
The experimenter then opened the book to a second predetermined selection, and
gave the following instruction: "When I say 'begin,' start copying here. Remember,
go as rapidly as you can." In the audience condition, the experimenter remained
seated before the subject, looking on. In the mirror and control conditions, the
experimenter returned to his desk, where he again busied himself with paperwork.
After the subject had copied for 3 minutes, the experimenter took the final PSI
print, and after 5 minutes of total copying time, he told the subject to stop.

Results and Discussion

Each subject's performance on the letter-copying task was scored as the number
of letters copied from each selection. These data were treated with a groups by
trials analysis of variance. Subsequent contrasts established that the performances
of subjects in the audience condition improved from the first to the second trial as
did the performances of subjects in the mirror condition. Performances of subjects
in the control condition did not improve from one trial to the other, however.
A groups by trials analysis of the PSI data (see Table 15-1) yielded a significant
trials effect, moderated by a significant interaction between groups and trials. Com-
parisons within each group revealed a very clear pattern. Compared to their pretask
baselines, subjects in each condition of the study displayed significantly reduced
PSI values when they were actually working on the first copying task. The PSI
measures taken immediately after the introduction of the experimental manipulation
differed markedly between groups. Compared to their baseline values, subjects in
the audience condition experienced significantly elevated PSI values at this point,
consistent with previous results (e.g., Martens, 1969a, 1969b). In contrast, neither
the slight PSI depression in the control condition nor the slight elevation in the
mirror condition approached significance. Finally, the PSI measures that were taken
296 15. Social Facilitation

Table 15-1. Mean Palmar Sweat Values Prior to Task

(Baseline); During Task 1; 10 Seconds after Introduction of
Experimental Manipulation; and During Task 2
Experimental
condition Baseline Task 1 Manipulation Task 2
Control 31.42 8.12 21.52 11.97
Audience 34.03 6.56 50.17 10.53
Mirror 34.30 19.48 39.92 11.22
Note. Data from Carver & Scheier (in press b).

during the second copying period were significantly reduced from the baseline
values among subjects of each experimental condition. In sum, as predicted, despite
the fact that subjects in the audience condition displayed an increase in palmar
sweat when the audience manipulation was introduced, subjects in every group
displayed significantly reduced PSI values during the two times when they actually
were attempting the task.
The pattern of data in the audience condition is quite consistent with the exper-
iential sequence that we had postulated for persons in that condition. We expected
the introduction of the audience to be a complex, attention-engaging, and possibly
threatening event. Thus, the immediate result was a PSI increase in that condition.
The longer-term effect of the event, however, is to cause the subject to focus
attention inward, to concentrate on performing well. Thus, during the following
task-performance period there was a PSI decrease even among these subjects, not
just to their baseline levels, but reliably below those levels.
We did not expect the introduction of the mirror to be threatening or arousing
(although as a novel stimulus in the situation it might have been attention-attracting).
Thus, we did not expect a PSI increase following placement of the mirror, and none
was found. We expected instead that the effect of the mirror would be to tum
attention inward. Thus, we anticipated a decrease in PSI values after its introduction
(as had been found by Paulus et aI., 1978). The fact that this decrease did not
emerge in the present data may have been a function of the fact that we took the
PSI measures so quickly after placing the mirror before the subject. As was noted
directly above, the mirror as an external stimulus object could initially have been
attention-attracting. Only after some time had passed would its character as a
reminder of the self become more salient than its prominence as a physical stimulus
(see Chapter 3). Thus, it might have taken more time than we allowed for self-
focus to be cued among the majority of subjects in the mirror condition.
In general, then, these results supported our reasoning. Performance facilitation
resulted both from audience presence and from mirror presence. And the pattern
of PSI results fit the notion that an increase in self-directed attention occurs as a
normal part of task concentration. Palmar sweat decreased from baseline values
among subjects of all groups during each performance segment, even among au-
dience-condition subjects who had displayed a significant elevation in PSI values
only a few moments before the second task segment.
Additional Questions 297

Some discussion should, however, be devoted to the possibility that the results
of this experiment are interpretable within the framework of a theory incorporating
a drive assumption. There seem to be three possibilities for such an interpretation.
Consideration of each of these possibilities leads us to the same conclusion: that
an explanation of our findings based on a drive postulate must seriously diminish
the usefulness of that postulate.
One possible argument is that any physiological change from baseline reflects
heightened drive. Thus both the PSI increases that resulted from the introduction
of the audience and the PSI decreases that took place during letter-copying represent
evidence of increased drive. We regard this argument as the weakest of the three
possibilities. If an increase in some physiological measure reflects drive and a
decrease in the same measure reflects drive, then the term drive has lost any
identifiable meaning.
A second possible argument is that the only allowable evidence on the presence
or absence of arousal is evidence collected prior to engagement in the drive-influ-
enced behavior. In effect, this position is exactly opposite to the one we have
taken-that during the activity is the time when we should be examining physio-
logical patterning. To argue that only pre-activity measures are acceptable, however,
is to beg the question of whether all drive is anticipatory. If the drive state disappears
as soon as the behavior is engaged in, then what is "driving" the behavior? If
heightened drive still exists when the behavior is being carried out, there should
still be evidence of its presence. Our data, of course, showed nothing of the sort.
The third argument, in many ways the most reasonable one, is that this whole
effort to assess bodily states is misguided, that evidence regarding arousal is in fact
quite irrelevant to the drive question. That is, as Geen and Gange (1977) have
pointed out, the term "drive" does not have connotations of arousal in classical
Hullian theory. And ultimately it is that theory from which most drive models have
evolved, however indirectly. Considered in this light, drive theory and cybernetic
theory would seem to be two parallel metaphorical systems, both of which can
account for behavioral direction and intensity, but which do so in quite different
vocabularies. This perspective suggests a potential rapproachment between drive
theorists and cybernetic theorists.
We do not find this third argument to be particularly compelling either, however.
If there is no correspondence between physiological change and variations in drive
strength, any use of the drive construct is open to the criticism of circularity. That
is, with no independent way to assess drive strength, one must infer it on the basis
of the intensity of the observed behavior-the very phenomenon that the drive
construct was invoked to explain.

Additional Questions

There remain at least three issues that require some further consideration. The first
is how to account for the fact that audience presence sometimes leads to performance
decrements, rather than to facilitation.
298 15. Social Facilitation

Social Interference
A good deal of the appeal of Zajonc' s (1965, 1966) drive theory of social facilitation
stems from its ability to handle within one conceptual framework what had pre-
viously appeared to be two incompatible sets of information. That is, sometimes
audiences and co actors facilitate behavior; but sometimes they interfere with be-
havior. Zajonc argued that these various effects could be accounted for in terms
of the degree to which a situationally "correct" response was also a dominant
response in the person's hierarchy. In all cases, audience presence was assumed
to heighten drive, and thus to differentially increase the emission of dominant
responses. When the task in question requires a behavior that is simple or well
learned, the dominant response is also the task-appropriate response. Increased
drive in such a situation thus results in performance facilitation. If the task requires
a response to be performed that is not well learned, on the other hand, the task-
appropriate response is by definition subordinate, rather than dominant. Heightened
drive still causes differentially increased emission of dominant responses. But be-
cause the dominant response in this case is inappropriate to the task, it interferes
with performance rather than facilitating it.
If a control-systems analysis of performance facilitation is to be viewed as a
viable alternative to a drive-based analysis, it obviously must be able to account
for these performance decrements as well as facilitation effects, in a way that is
internally consistent. There are several possibilities in this regard. For example,
Duval and Wicklund (1972) suggested that self-focus should facilitate performance
only when the task-appropriate response has been clearly specified-i.e., only when
a clear behavioral standard exists. When a novel or unfamiliar task is presented,
one sometimes must determine for oneself what specific behavior is appropriate
prior to engaging in it. In such a situation the self-attentive person may spend
proportionally more time in trying to assess what behavior is task-appropriate than
the less self-attentive person, thereby being distracted from concentration on the
task itself (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). This would cause an apparent performance
deficit, inasmuch as performance is usually assessed over a relatively brief time
period.
A second way in which self-focus might lead to an apparent performance dec-
rement stems from the fact that two incompatible standards are sometimes made
salient for subjects at the same time. Heightened self-attention in such a circumstance
might cause an attempt to conform to both standards simultaneously. Because the
standards are incompatible, however, the result may appear to be behavior that
satisfies neither standard completely, as the person attempts to match first one, then
the other standard. This would be particularly likely to be perceived as a performance
decrement if performance were measured with regard to only one of the two be-
havioral standards.
A possible illustration of this reasoning comes from a letter-copying study by
Liebling and Shaver (1973). Their subjects were told to copy as much as they could,
as accurately as possible. Enhanced self-focus among subjects who were attending
to both standards might have caused them to try to conform to both at the same
Additional Questions 299

time. 2 Inasmuch as speed and accuracy on such a task are usually inversely related,
those subjects might have had to sacrifice some speed in order to increase their
accuracy. But performance in that study was assessed only in terms of speed. Thus
a performance decrement was observed, although it may have been a decrement
in appearance only. This example illustrates the methodological importance of
defining "performance" in terms of the same criteria as were placed before the task
"performers" themselves. [Innes & Young (1975) confronted this same problem,
but from the opposite direction. They made one standard salient, but measured
performance with a combined index of two measures that typically have an inverse
relationship. ]

Expectancies. Yet a third possibility for performance to deteriorate under self-

focus derives from the notion that self-attentive people may sometimes interrupt
their behavior to assess the likelihood of being able to attain the desired outcome,
as was suggested in Chapter 10. This would seem to be particularly likely to occur
(a) when the situation is highly evaluative, thus calling attention to the importance
and/or the uncertainty of the outcome, and (b) when there is evidence that the
person's performance thus far has not been very good. If the person's outcome
expectancy is favorable, the result of this momentary interruption is a return to the
matching-to-standard attempt. In such cases, the result is continued facilitation of
performance. If this assessment is unfavorable, however, the result is an impetus
to withdraw from continued attempts. This may be reflected in decreased persistence
under continued self-focus (e.g., Carver et aI., 1979b). However, recall that some
circumstances do not allow physical withdrawal from the task attempt. In such
cases the effect of an unfavorable expectancy may be a mental withdrawal, which
is reflected in impaired task performance (e.g., Brockner, 1979). Evidence that
these processes do occur was presented in detail in Chapters 11 and 12.
This interaction between expectancy and self-focus has proved to be important
in a variety of behavioral areas. Perhaps it is important in the social facilitation
context as well. That is, subjects performing simple or well-learned tasks would
clearly have favorable expectancies. And it is these tasks in which facilitation
normally occurs. It seems likely, on the other hand, that tasks which are complex
or difficult would induce somewhat less favorable expectancies. And these are the
circumstances in which performance impairment normally occurs. This expectancy-
based argument suggests, however, that it is the expectancy and what follows from
it that results in the different outcomes as a consequence of the manipUlation, rather
than the degree of task complexity per se.
Support for this possibility as applied to audience effects comes from a recent
experiment by Bond (1979). Bond gave some subjects a set of predominantly simple

2Liebling and Shaver's study had a somewhat more complex design than is suggested by this
description. Subjects given one instructional set displayed facilitation under self-focus; those
given a second set displayed impairment. For purposes of the above illustration, we are
making the inference that only subjects given the second instructional set attended to both
standards simultaneously.
300 15. Social Facilitation

items, but mixed in a few complex items. He gave other subjects predominantly
complex items, but mixed in a few simple items. According to drive theory, an
audience-induced increase in drive should facilitate performance on simple items
and it should impair performance on complex items, irrespective of the context in
which those items occur.
Bond argued, however, that subjects working on difficult items should infer after
a while that they were doing poorly. This inference should result in impaired
performance, even on the simple items that had been inserted among the more
complex ones. (Although Bond did not say so, we would view such an effect as
reflecting mental withdrawal.) According to the same line of reasoning, subjects
working on the predominantly easy items should infer that they were doing well.
This should result in facilitation of performance, even on the complex items that
had been inserted.
The results of the study supported Bond's predictions, rather than those derived
from drive theory. Those results are also quite consistent with our outcome-ex-
pectancy analysis. An experimentally induced favorable expectancy, combined with
audience presence, led to facilitation. An unfavorable expectancy, combined with
audience presence, led to impairment. These findings do not by themselves constitute
irrefutable support for the expectancy-based analysis of performance impairments.
They do, however, represent an intriguing point of departure.

Comparisons Among Manipulations

Audience presence and mirror presence. A second issue that merits further dis-
cussion is to what degree we should view various' experimental manipulations as
being equivalent to each other. For example, the presence of either a mirror or an
observer can increase self-focus (Carver & Scheier, 1978). And these two stimuli
exert similar influences upon overt behavior, at least in some circumstances (Scheier
et aI., 1974; Carver & Scheier, in press b, discussed above). Should the two then
be treated as if they were identical?
We think not. One clearly "feels" different when alone before a mirror than when
in the presence of another person. Moreover, the study that was described earlier
in the chapter indicates that people react in different ways physiologically when
confronting these two stimuli. There is evidence that the two stimuli sometimes
exert different behavioral effects, as well (e.g., Innes & Young, 1975).
But there is also a theoretical basis for distinguishing between the manipulations.
We suggest that the two manipulations can be usefully differentiated in terms of
whether they direct attention to the "private self' or the "public self," a distinction
that we addressed in Chapter 3 and discuss in greater detail in Chapter 16. More
specifically, it is arguable that mirror presence typically focuses one's attention
upon one's private self-aspects. Whatever personal standard the individual holds
in the situation (or has adopted from instructions) would be the standard used by
the discrepancy-reducing feedback loop. In contrast, the presence of an audience
may focus attention on one's public self-aspects. As the person becomes more
cognizant of the fact that he or she may be creating an impression on the observers,
Additional Questions 301

it then becomes important to know what behaviors would create a good impression.
Thus, the presence of an audience may in some circumstances lead to more pro-
cessing of information from the environment. This in tum creates the possibility
that a different standard may become salient.
In many cases, whether the person is aware of the public self or the private self
hardly matters for the prediction of behavior, in that awareness of either self-aspect
would produce the same result. For example, when an audience is merely being
evaluative with reference to a previously induced standard, the usual result would
simply be to reinforce the salience of that standard. Thus, in the experiment detailed
above, the audience exerted the same effect on behavior as did the mirror. This
was no accident. We specifically attempted to choose a situation where it would
not matter whether subjects were trying to do well for themselves, or trying instead
to look good for the audience.
In other cases it matters a good deal whether focus is on the private self or the
public self. Indeed, the notion that an audience directs attention to the public self,
and thereby may influence what standard is salient, suggests the possibility that
different audiences may produce quite divergent behavioral effects. Variations in
an audien~e's composition have, until recently, usually been discussed only in terms
of how "evaluative" the audience is. More evaluativeness typically leads to stronger
effects (Cottrell et aI., 1968; Henchy & Glass, 1968, Paulus & Murdoch, 1971).
But we would submit that an equally important question is whether different au-
diences are being evaluative with regard to different behavioral dimensions, or
different standards on a given dimension. That is, the composition or labeling of
an audience may provide some obvious cues as to what behavior they would see
as desirable. Assuming that subjects were capable of discerning and matching
several standards with equal ease, one might expect that different audiences should
produce different kinds of "facilitation."
This, indeed, seems to be the case. For example, Grush (1978) has recently
shown that subjects playing a Prisoner's Dilemma game became more competitive
before an audience described as "previous winners" at the game, compared to a no-
audience control group. However, subjects playing before an audience described
as members of a "Human Relations Council" were less competitive than control
subjects. This was true even though all subjects had been given a pretreatment
experience with the game that had caused them to favor competitive choices, thus
presumably rendering competition dominant as a response tendency. This example
seems to illustrate quite clearly that an audience can exert multiple effects on
subjects' behavior. A similar effect of variations in audience composition, but in
quite a different behavioral domain, has been documented by Borden (1975; see
also Borden, 1980). The notion that an audience sensitizes the person to self-
presentational concerns would also help to account for the finding that the presence
of an observer causes subjects making word associations to avoid responses that
are bizarre, unusual, or potentially embarrassing (Blank, 1980; Blank, Staff, &
Shaver, 1976; Ekdahl, 1929; see also Blank, 1979; Carver & Scheier, in press b).
The question of whether people are motivated by private internal concerns, or
are primarily sensitive instead to public self-presentational demands is a very general
302 15. Social Facilitation

one, with implications for virtually every act of behavioral self-regulation. We have
addressed these implications more completely in Chapter 16. For now, let us simply
restate one point. As viewed from the perspective of our control-theory model, the
two possibilities differ from each other in only one respect: the specific nature of
the goal state that is being matched by the discrepancy-reducing feedback loop. In
the one case it is a goal state that is derived from private considerations. In the
other case it is a goal state derived from public considerations. In either case,
however, it serves as a standard for self-regulation.

Distractors. Earlier in this chapter we indicated that our analysis of social facil-
itation had some similarity to aspects of Sanders and Baron's (1975) drive-based
theory. That theory holds (a) that audience presence leads to social comparison,
(b) that this comparison tendency represents a distraction, (c) that there thus is a
conflict over allocation of attention (i.e., to the task versus to the social comparison),
which (d) leads to increases in drive, and thus to performance facilitation. We, on
the other hand, believe that the social comparison tendency is relevant to perfor-
mance facilitation, but for informational reasons. We see this comparison process
as providing one way in which a behavioral standard can become salient, and by
which the self-attention and performance feedback loop can be evoked.
Our reasoning seems more consistent with findings such as those discussed di-
rectly above (Grush, 1978) than would the position taken by Sanders and Baron.
That is, unless the social comparison act were yielding important information to
the subject, one would not expect divergent influences from the two types of
audiences. And, although Sanders and Baron are quite ambiguous as to whether
people make any use of information gathered through the comparison act, their
central emphasis clearly is elsewhere: that the comparison results in an allocation
conflict, leading to an increase in drive.
Although our reasoning thus seems more parsimonious than theirs regarding the
effect of an audience, we should note that facilitation effects also occur in the
presence of nonsocial distractors (e. g., Agnew & Agnew, 1963; Houston, 1968,
1969; Houston & Jones, 1967). Sanders and Baron's reasoning is quite easily
applied to such cases: i.e., any distractor creates attentional conflict, thereby in-
creasing drive. Our position is that nonsocial distractors influence behavior in a
different way from audience presence, but that the best explanation for even these
distractor effects is an attentional one. One such effect is the finding that the presence
of task-irrelevant noise facilitates performance on a Stroop color-naming test (e.g.,
Agnew & Agnew, 1963). It is arguable (Houston, 1968, 1969; Houston & Jones,
1967) that this effect occurs because subjects actively inhibit attention to the task-
irrelevant stimulus (the noise), and in so doing also inhibit attention to task-irrelevant
cues that are inherent in the task itself (the semantic content of the stimulus word).
Thus the so-called distractor never really distracts at all. Quite the contrary. It
simply serves as a vehicle by which task-focus is increased.
To restate, this reasoning holds that suppression of attention to distractors is
accompanied by a simultaneous increase in focus on the specific behavioral di-
mension that has been made salient as being the subject's task. In our view this
Additional Questions 303

implies increased attentional involvement in a specific discrepancy-reducing feed-

back loop. In this case, however, the person is led to the performance-versus-
standard comparison not by being reminded of present behavior, but rather by being
led to focus more attention on the behavioral standard-the other contributor to the
"test" comparison.
Why is attention focused so completely on matching to that standard? The term
drive is often involved in discussions of phenomena such as this experimental effect
(cf. Kahneman, 1973). But use of this construct seems to have been largely a
function of precedent. It seems just as reasonable to take an informational per-
spective on the question and assume that subjects in such an experiment are reacting
cognitively and behaviorally to the challenge implicit in the experimental setting.
The subjects' response to the challenge of the distractor's presence is to concentrate
harder on the specific task that was their behavioral assignment. However, con-
centration can be discussed as easily in cybernetic terms as in drive-theory terms.
It may be worth noting, as well, that this discussion sheds quite a new light on
one of the findings of Sanders et aI. (1978) and Baron et aI. (1978) regarding the
effects of manipulations of social comparison. Those authors found that subjects
in comparison conditions later made more errors in recalling task materials than
did control subjects. These high error rates were interpreted as evidence that the
subjects had been distracted by the experimental manipulations. Close examination
of what subjects were asked to recall, however, reveals that the questions concerned
task-irrelevant aspects of the experimental materials, "e.g., the fact that two words
(from among the paired associates stimuli) had the first letter-a lower case p--
imprinted in red" (Baron et aI., 1978, p. 819). It seems likely that, far from
reflecting distraction, these data reflect subjects' suppression of task-irrelevant cues,
even those which were contained in the task materials themselves. Subjects were
focusing instead on the task requirements, and thus exhibited performance facili-
tation.

Physiological Response Patterning

A third issue stems from our attempt to measure the physiological states of subjects
in the study that was detailed earlier in the chapter. The palmar sweat index was
used in that study largely because the most widely cited demonstrations of "arousal"
in social facilitation settings made use of that measure. We should give some further
consideration, however, to the meaning of physiological changes more generally
in such settings.
The stereotype that many people hold regarding information-processing analyses
of behavior regulation is that they either deny the occurrence of physiological
changes at various stages of activity, or that they deny the importance of such
changes. Such an impression is not really correct. Control-system theorizing would
note the existence of such changes. But most observable physiological activity
would be ascribed a secondary causal role in behavior regulation. As Guilford
(1965, p. 320) has pointed out, " ... there is a clear distinction between two
functions of energy. There is the energy that carries out the various operations,
304 15. Social Facilitation

where work must be done, and there is the energy that has control functions, where
triggering and release of much greater quantities of energy are involved." Because
cyberneticists are particularly interested in the control functions themselves, the
energy serving control functions would be regarded as most important. This ori-
entation in no way denies the occurrence of major shifts in physiological state as
work-doing energy is released. But it does hold that those shifts in physiological
state are causal only in a secondary sense.
In part for this reason, cyberneticists have not been much interested in measuring
physiological indicants of energy release. This has been true even with regard to
the energy with control functions. This disinterest is not surprising. Variations in
work-doing energy are much greater in magnitude than are changes in energy that
have strictly control functions. Thus, in any physiological index it is likely that the
former would hopelessly obscure the latter. Furthermore, there is no reason to
expect work-doing energy to be proportional in magnitude to the energy that serves
control functions. Thus the magnitude of physiological responses may not be even
indirectly informative about the control-system events that preceded the responses.
But magnitude o/response is only one way to look at physiological events. There
is another way to examine even rather global physiological changes, which is much
more compatible with cybernetic thinking. Many physiological psychologists, rather
than treating "arousal" as a unitary phenomenon which varies only in magnitude,
look at specific autonomic indicants in terms of what function the changes are
fulfilling in the organism, and what the broader implications of that function might
be. That is, the nature of a physiological change tells us something about what kind
of activity is being carried out in that bodily system. Knowing this may, in tum,
indirectly inform us in a general way as to what types of commands (emanating
from high level control systems) are being executed to cause those physiological
changes. Following the chain of control upward, it may be possible in some cases
to make general inferences about even the nature of the organism's conscious
activity. This sort of reasoning is reflected in the notion that physiological responses
form distinguishable patterns, which are associated with different modes of per-
ceptual-cognitive functioning.
Sokolov (1963), for example, proposed that one pattern of physiological tesponses
comprises an "orienting" response, another pattern a "defensive" response. The
orienting response facilitates greater knowledge of an external stimulus by making
the nervous system more receptive to input information from that stimulus. The
defensive response, in contrast, involves a reduction in receptivity to input infor-
mation (cf. also Hare & Blevings, 1975), thereby presumably protecting the or-
ganism from overstimulation. Similar ideas have also been advanced by other
theorists (e.g., Lacey, 1967; Lacey & Lacey, 1970).
This argument has been taken one step farther, by assuming that such function-
specific physiological patterning is a normal concomitant of different kinds of
consciously controlled behavioral involvement. Williams, Bittker, Buchsbaum, and
Wynne (1975) discussed this possibility and presented data on the question. They
reasoned that experimental tasks vary in the types of attentional demands they make.
That is, some tasks (e.g., a visual decoding task) require sensory intake; others
Additional Questions 305

(e.g., mental arithmetic) require sensory rejection. Conceptually, the sensory intake
pattern seems quite similar to Sokolov's (1963) orienting response; the sensory
rejection pattern is not particularly "defensive," but it does seem to embody many
of the same functions as Sokolov's (1963) defensive reaction. That is, receptivity
to sensory input is suppressed, but in the service of concentrating focus inward and
preventing distraction. In a test of their reasoning, Williams et al. (1975) were able
to show that subjects differed as predicted in cardiovascular response patterns as
a function of the type of task they were performing (see also Montgomery, 1977;
Obrist, 1976; Porges, 1972; Williams, R.B., 1978).
In considering this issue of degree of sensory receptivity, it is instructive to note
that theorizing about the meaning of the palmar sweat measure (Dabbs et al., 1968)
has concerned attentional issues fully as much as it has concerned issues of arousal,
although it was the arousal notion upon which social psychologists initially focused.
More specifically, Dabbs et al. argued that increased palmar sweat values were
associated with readiness to engage the environment, as well as subjective feelings
of arousal. They held that decreased values reflected inward-directed attention, and
an attempt to concentrate. These descriptions seem a good deal like Williams et
al. 's descriptions of sensory intake and sensory rejection, as modes of perceptual-
cognitive functioning.
The degree to which the palmar sweat measure corresponds to any component
of such response patterning is far from clear. And it is difficult to map those ideas
directly onto any given social facilitation setting without carefully analyzing the
requirements of the task under scrutiny, though at least one study has apparently
found that audiences disrupt performance on a sensory vigilance task (Moore, Logel,
Weerts, Sanders, & Baron, 1980). Nevertheless, the notion that physiological
changes may form recognizable patterns as a function of shifts in one's mode of
perceptual-cognitive functioning is an intriguing one. It will doubtlessly receive
more careful examination in the future.
Chapter 16

Private and Public Selves

Joan Doe works hard at her job. She spends extra hours in the office on weekends,
and often works through her lunch hour. If you asked her, she would tell you that
she is doing these things in order to establish herself in her career. But in exactly
what way is this helping her career? That is, is she motivated by an internal and
private desire to get things accomplished? Or is she primarily interested in estab-
lishing the image of a hard-working person in the minds of her supervisors?

Self-Completion, or Self-Presentation?
These specific questions exemplify a more general controversy within social and
personality psychology. The question seems to be essentially whether it makes more
sense to construe the human being as guided and motivated by personal concerns
and private needs, or as motivated by the desire to manage successfully the external
display of self. Our field has harbored a disagreement over this issue for many
years, a disagreement that often lies hidden deep beneath the surface, but which
more recently has emerged as a focal issue.
The philosophical roots of this disagreement run deep (see Greenwald, in press).
At least as far back as Freud (e.g., 1920, 1928, 1949) the theoretical position was
formally taken that we are impelled to action by internal and hidden pressures.
Freud saw behavior as undertaken to satisfy those pressures, even if only momen-
tarily and incompletely, and even if we are not aware that that is what we are doing.
External considerations, though not trivial, seem clearly secondary as determinants
of behavior (see also Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).
Although Freud's position on motivation was certainly unique in other respects,
it does seem to embody the assumption that people are motivated primarily by
internal, implicitly private concerns. Later on, of course, many other ideas were
advanced that retained this same perspective on the internal determination of be-
havior, even while differing from Freud in other important ways. For example, a
number of theorists have emphasized the need to maintain internal consistency
308 16. Private and Public Selves

within the self (e.g., Allport, 1961; Lecky, 1945; Maslow, 1970; Rogers, C.R.,
1947). And as discussed in Chapter 13, it has often been argued that people choose
their actions to maintain their self-images or self-esteem (e.g., Snyder et aI., 1976,
1978).
Not all theories assume, however, that private considerations predominate in
predicting behavior (see, e.g., Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934). One of the best-known
proponents of an opposing view is Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1967). He has argued
persuasively that encounters between people are essentially theatrical performances.
Each person involved has "lines" to speak, and each tries to create and maintain
a particular image of himself or herself in the minds of other participants and
observers. What image is chosen for portrayal presumably depends upon the context
of the interaction.
Other more recent theorists have echoed this perspective, while emphasizing
slightly divergent aspects of the social interchange process. For example, Crowne
and Marlowe (1964) have argued that people often choose their actions in order to
gain social approval and the rewards that are obtained thereby (see also Jellison
& Arkin, 1977; Arkin, 1980). Tedeschi and his colleagues (e.g., Gaes, Kalle, &
Tedeschi, 1978; Rivera & Tedeschi, 1976; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971)
have taken a similar position, arguing that people take great pains to attempt to
portray themselves as rational and consistent. This "impression management" tactic
is seen as a way of optimizing the outcomes of social interactions (see also Schlenker,
1975b, 1980; Tedeschi, 1980). In the same vein, Alexander and Knight (1971)
have suggested that people maintain "situated identities," involving different por-
trayals of self in different circumstances.

Impact on Research Areas

This division of opinion-seeing people as being responsive either to internal mo-
tivations or to self-presentational concerns-is reflected in a great many substantive
areas in social psychology (cf. Greenwald, in press). Consider, for example, the
variables that influence people's compliance with requests for help. It has been
argued that subjects accede to such requests more when they are made to feel guilty
than when they are not (Carl smith & Gross, 1969). Guilt is a private emotion,
reflecting a personal sense of failure. Presumably being helpful makes people feel
more acceptable to themselves, and thereby diminishes the guilt. But is this the
whole story? Not at all. Results of other research (Apsler, 1975; McMillen &
Austin, 1971; Wallace & Sadalla, 1966) indicate that embarrassment-which is
associated with inadequacies in one's public display-may be just as important in
such situations as guilt. In these latter studies, subjects seem to have been motivated
primarily by a desire to make themselves look good to others, thus minimizing
embarrassment.
Another example was addressed in some detail in Chapter 13. Specifically, there
is currently a good deal of discussion among attribution theorists about the existence
of self-serving biases in attribution, and what their nature might be (e.g., Bradley,
1978; Miller, D.T., 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975; Weary, 1980). In that context,
Self, or Selves? 309

Bradley (1978) has pointed to an important distinction among the ways in which
such attributions might have an impact on the attributor's esteem. Specifically,
esteem-enhancing attributions form two classes: those that protect our own images
of ourselves, and those that help create favorable images of us in other people's
eyes. Given that a behavior has the goal of protecting or enhancing one's esteem,
the question of concern is once again this: Is the behavior calculated to satisfy
covert personal needs, or self-presentational needs?
Consider as one final illustration the case of helping in emergencies. Piliavin and
Piliavin (1972; Walster & Piliavin, 1972) have argued that the occurrence of an
emergency creates arousal in bystanders. Subsequent responses presumably are
dictated by an analysis of how best to reduce the arousal (see also Latane & Darley,
1970). This arousal is a covert, private state. It can be dealt with either by helping
(and thus eliminating the arousal-inducing emergency) or by leaving the scene (and
thus avoiding the arousal-inducing cues surrounding the emergency).
So far, this treats the emergency-aid decision as a matter of how best to respond
to an internal state. But in deciding what actions will best reduce the arousal, many
other variables become important. And some of these variables are self-presenta-
tional in nature. For example, if there is risk of embarrassing oneself in the act of
helping, helping becomes less likely (cf. McGovern, 1976). Indeed, even the mere
expectation of having to interact with other witnesses to the emergency may have
an impact on behavior. A recent study has shown that bystanders who were led to
anticipate face-to-face interaction with other bystanders intervened more quickly
in an emergency than did subjects who had no such expectation (Gottlieb & Carver,
1980).

Self, or Selves?
It is easy to reconcile these two divergent perspectives on the nature of the moti-
vations that underlie human behavior. That is, it seems quite apparent that people
respond to private needs at some times, and to self-presentational needs at others.
Moreover, people doubtlessly vary in the degree to which they chronically are
responsive to one or the other of these classes of concerns.
There are many promising ways to approach this issue as a problem for research.
But we would like to focus here on two specific approaches. One of them draws
directly on the conceptual analysis proposed in earlier portions of this book. The
other, while not stemming from that analysis, appears to be amenable to discussion
within that framework.

Aspects of Self
As was discussed in Chapter 3, it seems necessary to view the self as a multifaceted
entity. It seems likely, moreover, that different facets of the self are evoked at
different times and in different contexts. A particularly useful distinction in this
regard is the distinction drawn several times previously in the book between
310 16. Private and Public Selves

"private" aspects of the self and "public" aspects of the self (see also Buss, 1980;
Fenigstein et aI., 1975). People differ in the degree to which these aspects are
salient to them. Some persons are especially conscious of their covert, private, or
hidden self-aspects-for example, their feelings and attitudes. Persons with this
disposition are said to be high in private self-consciousness. As was discussed in
Chapter 6, these persons are quite sensitive to variations in their emotions and other
internal states. And as was discussed in Chapter 14, they are quite knowledgeable
about their behavioral tendencies. It seems not unlikely that these individuals would
be highly concerned with and responsive to internal stimuli as determinants of
behavior.
In contrast to this picture, there are also persons who are particularly conscious
of the publicly displayed aspects of themselves. These people are said to be high
in "public" self-consciousness. They are believed to be attuned to the vicissitudes
of social interaction (cf. Fenigstein, 1979), and especially to their own positions
in the social matrix. These people, being particularly conscious of the kinds of
impressions they are making on others, may be especially sensitive to self-pres-
entational needs.
Recall that private and public self-consciousness are relatively independent di-
mensions, however, rather than being opposite poles of a single dimension. Thus,
it is possible for both of these components of self-i.e., both the private self and
the public self-to have impacts on specific behaviors, quite independent of each
other. (The importance of this point will become apparent below.)
In addition to biases in the person, there presumably are also situational pressures
that tend to make either private or public aspects of the self more salient. That is,
in any behavioral context there are cues suggesting whether the situation is such
that one's public image is likely to be open to scrutiny, or whether one's private
feelings and motives are more likely to be relevant. Whether by disposition or
situation, however, when an aspect of self has been rendered salient, it presumably
will be that aspect of self that is accessed when attention is self-directed, and it is
that aspect of self that will subsequently influence behavior.

Implications
This conceptualization of public versus private concerns has testable implications.
But creating a clear test of the implications requires care. In some behavioral
contexts, it is hard to discern whether public self or private self is influencing
behavior, because in these situations both self-aspects would exert comparable
influences. For example, Scheier et aI. (1974) found that unprovoked men shocked
women at lower intensities when highly self-attentive than when less self-attentive.
Was this because the majority of the subjects privately held the attitude that they
should be "chivalrous" and nonaggressive toward women, and matched this private
belief more closely with their behavior when attention was self-directed? Or was
it because they were more conscious of the fact that the socially defined norm is
to be nonaggressive towards women, and were behaviorally responsive to that norm
when attention was self-directed? We cannot tell.
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 311

In order to tease away the differential influences that public and private aspects
of self exert upon behavior, we must choose situations in which the influences of
these two self-aspects ought to differ from each other. Particularly powerful would
be situations in which the two might be expected to exert opposing influences. In
the sections that follow, we detail four studies that examined such situations. Each
appears to offer support for the usefulness of the pUblic-private distinction. In so
doing, each also appears to suggest that both internal motivations and self-pres-
entational concerns are potentially operative in the situation under examination.

The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects

Public and Private Selves in a Compliance Setting

One of these studies (Froming & Carver, in press) made use of a paradigm in which
subjects are exposed to simulated group pressure to make incorrect responses on
a perceptual task (cf. Asch, 1951, 1956; Crutchfield, 1955). Because behavioral
conformity in such situations seems to occur in response to normative pressures of
the group (cf. Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), it is often labeled compliance (see also
Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969), a term that we have adopted throughout the following
discussion.
Recall that private self-consciousness is associated with an awareness of and
responsiveness to one's own feelings and opinions. Indeed, as was discussed in
Chapter 6, persons high in private self-consciousness are so responsive to their own
reactions that they have been shown to be more resistant to external "suggestibility"
influences than persons lower in this disposition. It therefore was expected that high
degrees of private self-consciousness would be associated with a tendency for
subjects to rely on their own opinions, and to disregard the misleading opinions of
other group members. This tendency should be weaker among subjects lower in
private self-consciousness.
Public self-consciousness, in contrast, reflects a consciousness of and a concern
with the impressions that are being made on others. This does not necessarily imply
a desire to please others, however. For example, the public subscale does not
correlate reliably with the Crowne-Marlowe (1964) index of social desirability
(Turner et aI., 1978). In contrast, it may be that public self-consciousness reflects
more of a pragmatic orientation to self-presentation. That is, people who are high
in public self-consciousness may simply calculate their self-presentations in such
a way as to facilitate social exchange, rather than attempting to solicit favorable
personal evaluations.
But in part because public self-consciousness has been studied less than the
private dimension, there was some ambiguity about the specific manner in which
public self-consciousness would affect compliance in this sort of situation. Thus
two alternative predictions were tested. First, public self-consciousness might sim-
ply have a direct positive association with compliance. We know that persons high
in public self-consciousness are more sensitive to interpersonal rejection than are
312 16. Private and Public Selves

persons lower in public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, 1979). Inasmuch as com-

pliance is often viewed as motivated by a desire to avoid rejection (cf. Gerard &
Rotter, 1961), it might be expected that persons high in public self-consciousness
would tend to go along with the incorrect majority, whereas those with less public
self-consciousness would have less of this inclination. Alternatively, a plausible
case could be made that it is the need for social approval that provides the basis
for compliance (cf. Strickland & Crowne, 1962), and that public self-consciousness
simply enhances the degree to which behavior is brought into line with that need.
If this were true, public self-consciousness would be associated with compliance,
but only when taken in combination with a fairly high level of social desirability.
In either case, however, the effect of public self-consciousness was expected to be
opposite to that of private self-consciousness.
Several weeks after completing the Self-Consciousness Scale and the
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale, subjects participated in groups of four
in what was portrayed as a study of auditory perception. An experimental apparatus
allowed each subject to hear (via headphones) experimental instructions, the task
stimuli, and the responses of three other persons, whom the subjects assumed were
the other group members. In reality, all of this was prerecorded.
Subjects were seated around a table, separated from each other by barriers.
Besides the headphones, each was provided with a microphone and a light that
signaled her to respond. The subjects were told that their task was to count, as
accurately as they could, several sets of metronome clicks. After each set they were
to report, one subject at a time, how many clicks they had heard. These reports
were to be delivered when their signal light came on.
The tape-recorded voices of the ostensible cosubjects were always unanimous.
Sometimes they were correct, and sometimes not. The latter were the compliance
trials. On these trials, the unanimous cosubjects were off either by one click or by
two clicks. A set of 12 trials served as a control, to assess subjects' ability to
perform the task accurately. These were all trials on which the subject responded
before any of the presumed cosubjects.
The number of errors made by each subject on the control trials was used as an
estimated frequency of perceptual error for that subject. Compliance was analyzed
by means of partial correlations, partialling out perceptual error first. (In effect,
this procedure controls for "informational" conformity.) Private self-consciousness
proved to correlate quite significantly with total compliance, in the predicted di-
rection, r = - .43, and the relationship held true for both levels of group error.
Public self-consciousness was not related to overall compliance, but was marginally
related (p < .10) to compliance when the group had been incorrect by two clicks.
Additional analyses explored the latter relationship further, in two ways. First,
because private and public self-consciousness were positively related in this sample
(r = .21), it seemed possible that the strong correlation between the private di-
mension and compliance had obscured the influence of the public dimension. A
partial correlation in which the effect of private self-consciousness as well as per-
ceptual error was controlled for gave credence to this reasoning. Using this pro-
cedure, the correlation between public self-consciousness and compliance on trials
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 313

on which the group had made errors of two clicks was statistically significant,
r = .30.
The possibility that public self-consciousness might mediate compliance only
among persons high in social desirability was also assessed. Subjects were split at
the social desirability median, and partial correlations were computed separately
for each set of subjects. This analysis yielded no support for this alternative pre-
diction. Thus, although both public self-consciousness and social desirability en-
hanced compliance, these effects appeared to be independent of each other. (The
personality dimensions were statistically independent, as well, r = .03.)
In brief, private and public self-consciousness had independent and opposing
effects on compliance. Our confidence in these findings is also bolstered by the fact
that they have recently been replicated by other researchers (Santee & Maslach,
1980).

Implications. The results for private self-consciousness were precisely as pre-

dicted. Those for public self-consciousness, though somewhat weaker, were also
supportive of the reasoning behind the study. A question that arises when considering
the latter findings is why the public disposition was related to compliance only on
two-step trials. This result was unanticipated, but it seems consistent with the notion
that the public self-consciousness subscale taps an orientation toward "getting along"
rather than a desire to please others. It seems reasonable that such a pragmatic
orientation would be relevant to behavior primarily when the potential exists to be
seen by others as relatively extreme in one's deviance. This would have been more
clearly the case when the group was wrong by two clicks than when it was wrong
by one. And it was these trials on which public self-consciousness was associated
with compliance.
One final point deserves mention, regarding these findings. Duval and Wicklund
(1972, Chapter 5) reported two studies of conformity in which self-focus was
experimentally manipulated, either by showing subjects their live TV images, or
by playing for subjects recordings of their own voices. The studies both differed
from that of Froming and Carver (in press) in a number of important ways. But
what is most relevant for present purposes is that in each of those studies self-focus
increased subjects' conformity to the opinions of others. In Duval and Wicklund's
view, this indicated that self-focus promotes conformity. They argued that their
findings were consistent with a long line of research (Argyle, 1957; Asch, 1951;
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Mouton, Blake, & Olmstead, 1956; Raven, 1959) which
showed that conformity to a bogus consensus is maximized when the behavior
occurs in public rather than private circumstances. They argued, in effect, that the
public display of one's actions promotes self-attention.
We would agree with this final point, but would suggest the need for an important
qualification on their conclusion. When conformity occurs in public, attention is
likely to be focused not just upon the self, but upon the public aspects of self.
Similarly, both of the manipulations used by Duval and Wicklund (1972) exposed
subjects to unusual views of publicly displayed self-aspects. Thus, we would suggest
that their findings may have depended on the fact that awareness of the public self
314 16. Private and Public Selves

enhances this sort of compliance. Awareness of private self, on the other hand, has
quite different consequences.
The notion that different manipulations of self-attention may direct attention to
different aspects of the self is an important one. It has already come up at several
points in the book (e.g., in Chapters 3 and 15). And it will be addressed in greater
detail later on in this chapter.

Public and Private Selves and Reactions to Coercion

In the Froming and Carver study, subjects were exposed to implicit conformity
pressure. Private self-consciousness was associated with a tendency to ignore the
pressure; public self-consciousness was associated with a tendency (grudging per-
haps) to accede to it. But what happens when the level of the pressure is raised?
What happens when the attempt to influence becomes coercive?
In Chapter 8, we described the effects of private self-consciousness on the ex-
perience of reactance. That research stemmed from a consideration of the nature
of the private dimension. Although we did not address this point in detail in Chapter
8, public self-consciousness also proved to play an important-and independent-
role in that study. The finding that the public dimension was also involved in the
reactance effect was serendipitous. But the nature of the finding lends credence to
the picture we have painted above regarding public self-consciousness. That is, this
disposition appears to function less in the service of gaining social approval than
in the service of avoiding disapproval.
Let us briefly recapitulate the procedures of the experiment in question (Carver
& Scheier, in press a, Experiment 1). Subjects were told that they were participating
in a study of impression formation. They were led to expect a series of bits of
information about a specific person-a candidate for an appointive public office.
After receiving a brief biographical description of the candidate, which was intended
to portray him in a favorable light, subjects rated their initial opinions of his
suitability for the position. Subjects then received a printed persuasive message.
This message was either a straightforward recommendation of the candidate, or a
recommendation that had decidedly coercive overtones. Subjects then completed
a second rating of the candidate's suitability. The measure of interest was the shift
in opinions from the first rating to the second.
We had expected private self-consciousness to be associated with enhanced re-
sistance to the coercive communication, and it was. Persons high in private self-
consciousness reversed their opinions after the coercive communication to a greater
degree than persons low in private self-consciousness (see Table 16-1). But there
was also a significant public by coercion by trials interation. As is clear from
inspection of Table 16-1, this interaction took a form opposite to that obtained from
private self-consciousness. Persons low in the public dimension were persuaded by
the straightforward message, and reversed their opinions in response to the coercive
message. Persons high in public self-consciousness, in contrast, did not respond
at all to either message.
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 315

Table 16-1. Opinions Before and After Receiving a Coercive or

Noncoercive Communication, with Subjects Divided First According to
Their Levels of Private Self-Consciousness, and Then According to Their
Levels of Public Self-Consciousness

Subjects divided by private self-

consciousness

Premeasure Postmeasure Difference

High private Coercive 7.07 6.33 -.74

self-conscious
Noncoercive 6.40 6.53 .13

Low private Coercive 6.47 6.60 .13

self-conscious
Noncoercive 7.00 7.40 .40

Subjects divided by public self-

consciousness

High public Coercive 6.69 6.75 -.04

self-conscious
Noncoercive 6.83 6.83 .00

Low public Coercive 6.86 6.14 -.72

self-conscious
Noncoercive 6.61 7.06 .45

Note. Data from Carver and Scheier (in press, Experiment 1).

Implications. How might one account for this pattern among persons high and
low in the public dimension? We have what we feel is a plausible interpretation,
though it is post hoc. Recall that subjects had been told to expect a series of bits
of information about the candidate. At the point where the opinion postmeasure
was collected, no indication had been given that the series had ended. Thus, we
regard the behavior of persons high in public self-consciousness as reflecting caution
in an ambiguous social situation. For all they knew, several more messages would
be coming from several types of sources. Overreaction to one particular source
would not be advisable, for people concerned with their place in the social matrix.
Persons who are less conscious of this aspect of self would be much less concerned
about the possibility of overreacting. (This reasoning is given indirect support by
the next study to be discussed.)
Consistent with this argument, there is also evidence that the impact of public
self-consciousness in the reactance setting depended upon the "social" nature of the
reactance-inducing stimulus. That is, in the study just described, reactance was
induced by an interpersonal communication. In a subsequent study in which re-
316 16. Private and Public Selves

actance was induced in a non-social fashion (Carver & Scheier, in press a, Exper-
iment 2; see also Chapter 8), the public dimension had no effect at all.
In sum, it is clear that awareness of self plays a role in reactance phenomena.
But it is also clear that when the reactance is socially induced, a great deal depends
upon what aspect of self is taken as the object of that awareness. Awareness of the
private self may enhance the reactance response; awareness of the public self may
inhibit the response.

The Public Expression of Privately Held Opinions

The research that we just described concerned some ways in which people's expres-
sion of their opinions may change after someone has attempted to persuade them.
But people also vary the expression of their opinions for other reasons. Indeed, we
sometimes alter our statements of our beliefs before interacting with people, rather
than after (cf. Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Hass & Mann,
1976). More specifically, people often temper their opinions when stating them,
in order to make them more similar to the opinions of people with whom they will
soon be interacting (see, for example, Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973;
Newtson & Czerlinsky, 1974). This "moderation" of opinions is believed to be a
self-presentational tactic that people use to influence the impressions that they will
convey to others. By shifting our statements so that they correspond more closely
to the opinions of the other people, we create a more favorable first impression on
those people.
This sounds like just the sort of phenomenon that should be mediated by attending
to the public aspects of oneself. If we moderate our opinions with the goal of
creating a specific kind of public image, it seems likely that people who are par-
ticularly aware of their public selves would do this most frequently and most
reliably. People who are primarily conscious of their private self-aspects, in contrast,
should be less likely to moderate their opinions when expressing them publicly.
Recall that these are people who are attuned to their inner selves. They are very
conscious of their real feelings about issues, but not necessarily conscious of the
public displays they are creating by stating their opinions. Indeed, based on this
reasoning, persons who are both high in private self-consciousness and low in public
self-consciousness should be the least likely of all to vary their opinions to suit the
social context.
This reasoning was tested (Scheier, 1980) in a study in which subjects reported
their attitudes twice: first through a survey, and second in a social context where
moderation of attitude might be perceived as a useful impression-management
strategy. It was expected that persons high in public self-consciousness would
temper the expression of their attitudes in the second report to a greater degree than
persons low in public self-consciousness. And it was expected that persons high
in private self-consciousness would represent their attitudes in a fashion that more
accurately reflected their initial self-reports than would persons lower in private
self-consciousness.
Prior to the experiment, potential subjects completed the Self-Consciousness
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 317

Scale, and a scale designed to measure attitudes toward the use of physical pun-
ishment as a training technique. Potential subjects were divided into high and low
groups on the private and public self-consciousness dimensions, and into "pro" and
"con" groups on the attitude measure, by median splits. Several months later,
unacquainted subjects were scheduled for experimental sessions in groups ranging
from two to four. The procedures used in these sessions were modeled after pro-
cedures developed by Snyder and Swann (1976). When the subjects arrived, they
were told that they would be taking part in a social opinion survey. The experimenter
indicated that the survey was unique in that it assessed attitudes in two quite different
ways. First, each subject would express his opinions in a brief essay. Later on, he
would be asked to discuss his views with one of the other students participating in
the study. This discussion would be tape recorded, and would be evaluated by the
research team.
After these remarks, each subject was taken to a separate cubicle, where he was
left alone for a brief period. The experimenter returned, apologized for the delay,
and handed the subject a booklet to complete. In addition to reiterating the intro-
ductory remarks, the booklet informed the subject what attitude topic he was to
write about and later discuss: specifically, the use of physical punishment as a child-
rearing technique by parents. A blank page was then provided for the subject's
essay.
In order to gain additional information about the role of the social context in the
phenomenon under investigation, one additional variable was introduced. Some
subjects completed the opinion survey exactly as described above. For other sub-
jects, the experimental sequence differed slightly from this. Specifically, when the
experimenter returned with the subject's experimental booklet, he told the subject
that his partner had already finished his essay (this was the reason for imposing the
brief delay). The experimenter suggested to the subject that he might want to
examine the partner's essay before he started writing his own, in order to get a
better idea of how to organize and structure his essay. The essay given to the subject
(prepared beforehand by the experimenter) always reflected the opinion opposite
to that expressed by the subject during pretesting. Thus the partner would have been
perceived as holding an attitude different from the subject's.
Subjects in both experimental conditions were given 10 minutes to write their
own essays. Afterward, the experimenter collected the essays and debriefed the
subjects.
The primary dependent measure was the attitude toward punishment that was
reflected in subjects' essays. Two judges (blind tp condition and hypotheses) rated
each essay along a 7-point pro-versus-con scale, and a composite score was created
for each subject. Analysis of these scores indicated that the positions taken in the
essays were an interactive function of subjects' initial opinions, and their levels of
public self-consciousness. The essays of subjects low in public self-consciousness
diverged significantly as a function of their initial opinions. But the corresponding
difference among subjects high in self-consciousness did not approach significance.
These effects were both as predicted.
One might have expected that the moqerating tendency of persons high in public
318 16. Private and Public Selves

self-consciousness would be greatest when they anticipated interaction with a dis-

agreeing partner. The relevant interaction failed to attain significance, however.
Apparently the mere anticipation of discussing one's attitude with another person
was a sufficient stimulus to induce persons who were high in public self-conscious-
ness to adopt a more moderate stance. Knowing that the other person had a different
opinion did not cause any additional moderation.

Consistency across measurements. Measurements of opinions taken at one time

often differ from measures taken at another time and in a different context. Con-
sistent with this, the premeasured opinions of subjects in this study were only
weakly related to the opinions expressed in their essays, r = .27.
But what happens when one takes into account the various combinations of public
and private self-consciousness? The picture then becomes quite different. It was
expected that consistency between premeasure and essay would be highest for
persons who were low in public self-consciousness and high in private self-con-
sciousness. And that was what was found, r = .68. Moreover, the correlation
among high-private-low-public subjects was reliably stronger than for the other
three combinations of public and private dispositions. Stated simply, consistency
in self-portrayal of attitudes was found only among persons high in private and low
in public self-consciousness.
This latter finding indicates once more that persons high in private self-con-
sciousness have an easy and accurate awareness of their beliefs. When such people
were also relatively inattentive to their public self-aspects, their reports of those
beliefs reflected this awareness quite clearly. This finding supplements and extends
earlier findings (see Chapter 14) that persons high in private self-consciousness are
more aware of their behavioral dispositions than are persons low in private self-
consciousness (Scheier et ai., 1978; Turner, 1978c).
But the results of this study also indicate very plainly that awareness of the public
self, in a context where verbal interaction with another is anticipated, is a potent
moderator of the expression of those privately held beliefs. Even among persons
who were also high in private self-consciousness, the cognizance of the more social
aspects of the self caused those opinions to be somewhat disregarded in writing the
essays.

Private and Public Self-Awareness

The studies that were described in the preceding sections all took advantage of
individual differences in the dispositions to focus on certain aspects of the self. But
the public-private distinction raises another question, as well. Do different manip-
ulations also direct attention to different aspects of the self? We considered that
possibility from a theoretical perspective in Chapters 3 and 15. But at least two
research projects appear to offer unequivocal evidence that this is so. One of those
projects is examined in detail in the next chapter. The other is described in the
following paragraphs.
Froming and Walker (1980) set out to test the hypothesis that the presence of
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 319

a mirror makes one aware of the private self, but the presence of an audience makes
one aware of the public self. If this hypothesis is correct, the self-awareness induced
by a mirror should cause increased behavioral conformity to personally held stan-
dards. The self-awareness induced by an audience, in contrast, should cause in-
creased conformity to whatever standard the audience is perceived as holding. If
a situation could be created in which subjects' personal standards were discrepant
from the perceived standards of the audience, the two self-focusing manipulations
thus should exert divergent effects, compared to a no-manipulation control group.
Froming and Walker (1980, Experiment 2) tested this reasoning in quite an
ingenious way. Rather than experimentally manipulating subjects' perceptions of
the standards held by a specific audience, they selected subjects who reported
believing that most people held opinions (on the dimension of interest) that differed
from their own opinions. More specifically, subjects in this study were persons who
satisfied two criteria. First, they believed that punishment is a relatively ineffective
and inappropriate way to produce learning. Second, they also assumed that most
people believe the opposite: that punishment is both appropriate and effective.
Several weeks after the opinion data were collected, subjects participated in
sessions disguised as part of a concept-formation experiment. Subjects were induced
to deliver shocks to an ostensible cosubject as punishments for incorrect answers.
The cosubject surreptitiously recorded the intensity of the shocks that were being
delivered, which was the dependent measure of interest.
Attention to the private self was increased among some subjects by attaching a
mirror to the experimental apparatus. Attention to the public self was increased
among other subjects by the presence of two evaluative observers. These observers
ostensibly were going to be rating the subjects on their effectiveness as teachers.
Subjects in this condition were instructed to pause every 5 trials and wait for the
observers to record their evaluations. A nonevaluative audience condition was also
included in the study, consisting of "advanced students" who wanted to observe
firsthand the conduct of psychological research.
Recall that subjects in this study had expressed personal opposition to the use
of punishment in teaching. It was expected that the presence of a mirror would
make such persons more cognizant of their private standards, thus leading to reduced
aggression. This proved to be the case, a finding which replicated earlier results
(Carver, 1975). On the other hand, the presence of an audience-particularly an
evaluative audience-was expected to remind subjects of their nature as social
objects. This, in tum, was expected to remind them of the standards that they
believed most other people hold regarding the use of punishment in teaching.
Though no information was ever provided to them about the observers' opinions,
it was assumed that subjects would generalize their perceptions in this regard from
"most people" to the audience members. The result should have been-and was-
increased aggression in the evaluative audience condition, compared to the control
condition. Subjects in the nonevaluative audience condition did not differ in ag-
gressiveness from the control group, however. This implies that the evaluativeness
of the audience is an important cue in causing attention to shift to the public self.
This finding has been conceptually replicated in a subsequent experiment. Sub-
320 16. Private and Public Selves

jects in this study (Froming, Lopyan, & Walker, 1981) were selected using criteria
that were opposite to those used in the earlier research. More specifically, these
subjects believed that punishment was an effective and desirable teaching device,
but believed that most people disapprove of its use. In this study, the presence of
a mirror resulted in increased punishment, and the presence of an evaluative audience
resulted in decreased punishment. These results complement the earlier findings
nicely, and in so doing provide compelling support for Froming and Walker's
position.

Reinterpreting Other Research

Taken together, the Froming and Walker (1980) and Froming et al. (1981) findings
make it clear that different manipulations of self-attention can push behavior in
different ways in the same situation, apparently by directing attention to different
aspects of the self. The logic that underlies these data is also helpful in interpreting
the results of several other recent studies. Each of these studies attempted to de-
termine what would happen when two incompatible standards are suggested by
various elements of the behavioral context.
Vallacher and Solodky (1979) examined this question as it applies to honesty in
test performance. Subjects who were given a set of predominantly insoluble puzzles
could have used either of two standards: i.e., to honestly follow the task instructions;
or to cheat in order to create the appearance of a good performance, thereby looking
good to others. When the task outcomes had been portrayed as depending upon
subjects' abilities, self-focus tended to increase cheating. It seems to us, however,
that the manipulation of self-focus in this study was one that may well have rendered
public aspects of the self more salient. Specifically, a tape recording of the subject's
own voice was played (along with exposure to a mirror). Such voice recordings
represent a highly novel portrayal of a publicly observed aspect of the self, and
have been found to have quite a strong impact on research subjects (e.g., Holzman
& Rousey, 1966). If this manipulation had focused subjects' attention on public
aspects of themselves, it would have made self-presentational concerns more salient
for them. This, in tum, may have caused them to violate the task instructions in
order to make their self-presentations more favorable. This reasoning is consistent
with the fact that self-awareness had the opposite effect on cheating when the task
was portrayed as dependent on luck. After all, there is no reason to worry about
one's public performance when the outcome is luck determined.
This interpretation also helps to reconcile a conflict between these results and
those of Diener and Wallbom (1976), who had found a reduction in cheating on
an ability-determined task as a function of the same manipulations of self-focus.
The Diener and Wallbom procedures presented subjects with quite a different sit-
uation, however. Subjects were given a set of soluble anagrams; cheating was
defined as working past a time limit. There is no particular reason to believe that
subjects in this study thought they had done poorly at the task, that they were
thereby embarrassed and concerned over their performances. Thus there is no reason
to believe that subjects would have felt the need to cheat in order to look as though
The Consciousness of Public Versus Private Self-Aspects 321

they had done adequately. On the other hand, with insoluble puzzles (as in the
Vallacher and Solodky study) different pressures may well have been present. In
brief, the results of these two studies can be reconciled by assuming that in each
case the manipulation heightened awareness of the public self, and that different
self-presentational contingencies existed in the two situations.
The reasoning that such manipulations enhance awareness of the public self also
fits with results reported by Diener and Srull (1979). Subjects in this study were
led to compare their performances on a perceptual judgment task either to personally
set standards or to standards that had been socially defined. On various trials,
subjects were told that they had surpassed one, the other, both, or neither of these
standards. Self-focus was increased by a voice recording and by the subject's image
on a TV monitor. In rewarding themselves for their performances on different trials
of the judgment task, subjects' behavior formed a pattern indicating that they had
been much more sensitive to social standards than to personal standards when
attention was self-directed. This is consistent with the assumption that the manip-
ulation had shifted attention to the public aspect of the self, a possibility that Diener
and Srull acknowledged.

Summary and critique. The intent behind each of these three studies was to
determine which of several possible standards would have the greatest influence
upon behavior when attention was self-focused. In none of these studies, however,
was a comparison made between various manipUlations of self-focus. The research-
ers simply assumed that all self-focus manipulations are alike, that all induce a
general focus on the self. This assumption seems untenable, however, as is reflected
by the results of Froming and his colleagues (Froming & Walker, 1980; Froming
et aI., 1981) discussed above, and by data of our own, discussed in the next chapter.
Thus, we must conclude that the results of these three studies of the comparative
influences of different standards upon behavior are equivocal. We say this because
of what we regard as the strong possibility that the manipulations directed attention
not to the self in general, but to public aspects of the self, and that behavior naturally
followed from the standards that were most relevant to that self-aspect.

Section Summary
In the preceding pages we presented results from several studies in which con-
sciousness of the self exerted reliably divergent influences upon behavior, depending
on whether it was public or private self-aspects that were taken as the objects of
awareness. In one study, high private self-consciousness was associated with an
increased reliance upon one's own perceptions, whereas high public self-conscious-
ness was associated with conformity to an incorrect majority. In a second study,
private self-consciousness was associated with increased sensitivity to a "social"
manipUlation of reactance. Public self-consciousness, on the other hand, was as-
sociated with an apparent reluctance to overreact to the manipulation, resulting in
a moderation of the reactance effect. Results of a third study indicated that persons
high in public self-consciousness moderate the expression of their opinions when
322 16. Private and Public Selves

anticipating an interaction on that issue with another person. Persons high in private
self-consciousness, in contrast, were highly responsive to their initial opinions, and
stated them clearly rather than moderating them. Finally, in two additional exper-
iments, subjects facing a mirror used their own opinions as guides in choosing
punishment, whereas subjects in the presence of an evaluative audience used what
they perceived to be the audience's standard.
In each of these studies, consciousness of the private aspects of self was associated
with an increased responsiveness to those self-aspects. Consciousness of the public
aspects of self was associated with an increased responsiveness to the social con-
tingencies surrounding self-portrayal. It seems worthy of some note that in three
of these cases (the individual-difference studies) the divergent effects produced by
the awareness of these two aspects of self occurred independently within the same
group of SUbjects. This set of findings represents important evidence that different
aspects of the self influence behavior in different ways. Moreover, they also suggest
a way of interpreting the results of other research in which the public-private
distinction was not taken into account.

Self-Monitoring
There is another literature that is certainly relevant to the discussion of public and
private aspects of the self: the literature that has developed around the concept of
self-monitoring. As noted in Chapter 14, Snyder (e.g., 1974, 1979) has argued that
some people are particularly sensitive to the social contingencies that surround
behavior, and are responsive primarily to those contingencies. Other people are less
sensitive to such matters, and are responsive instead to their own views of them-
selves. The first group are termed high self-monitors, the second group low self-
monitors.
Effects that are associated with individual differences in self-monitoring have
been assessed in a number of domains. One major area of interest has been dif-
ferences in the predictive relationship between attitudes and behavior, an area that
was discussed in detail in Chapter 14. As we indicated there, low self-monitors
tend to express their beliefs in their actions, whereas high self-monitors determine
their behavior on much more of a situational basis (Snyder & Monson, 1975, Study
2; Snyder & Swann, 1976; see also Snyder & Tanke, 1976).
This difference in sensitivity to variations in the constraints of the situation is
also apparent in other research. For example, Snyder and Monson (1975, Study 1)
asked subjects to engage in group discussions under conditions in which one of two
reference groups would be salient. In a "private" condition this discussion was to
be held privately. The salient reference group in this condition was the other
members of the discussion group. In a "public" condition, the discussion was
ostensibly to be videotaped, and would subsequently be shown to sections of in-
troductory psychology. This manipulation was expected to make the larger student
body salient as a reference group. Because the two groups implicitly held somewhat
different values regarding the appropriateness of certain behaviors during the dis-
Self-Monitoring 323

cussion, this manipulation was expected to cause subjects to modify their actions.
But more importantly, this effect was expected to occur primarily among high self-
monitors, those being the people who are the most sensitive to variations in the
social context. Low self-monitors, in contrast, were expected to be relatively un-
affected by the manipulation. This, in fact, was the outcome of the study.
The effect of situational differences also leads persons high in self-monitoring
to vary the statements of their opinions regarding other people. Turner (1979) had
subjects interact with a confederate who acted in such a way as to create either a
favorable or an unfavorable impression. The subjects then made two ratings of the
confederate: one that only the experimenter would see, and one that both the
experimenter and the confederate would see. The difference between these ratings
was significantly larger among high self-monitors than among lows, and was par-
ticularly pronounced in the negative portrayal condition.
The fact that high self-monitors are especially attuned to social contingencies
suggests that they may also engage in frequent acts of social comparison, in order
to assess and reassess those contingencies. The results of a study by Berscheid,
Graziano, Monson, and Dermer (1976) lends credence to this reasoning. In that
research, subjects were asked to observe a potential date. High self-monitoring
subjects were found to notice and accurately remember more information about that
person than did low self-monitoring subjects.
Presumably the seeking of such information about the other person is done in
the service of influencing the course of future social interaction, in order to manage
the impression that one will be conveying to the other person. Data from a number
of studies are consistent with this line of thought. For example, Ickes and Barnes
(1977) found that high self-monitors were more likely than low self-monitors to
initiate conversation early in a developing acquaintanceship. This directive orien-
tation among high self-monitors was also apparent in subjects' self-ratings, and in
the ratings made by subjects' partners in the interaction.
Indeed, there is evidence that high self-monitors take special pains to prepare
themselves for self-presentational encounters. Elliott (1979) asked subjects to con-
vey an impression of themselves to another person. They then were given an
opportunity to purchase-at some cost to themselves-information about the other
person. High self-monitors purchased more information about the other person than
did low self-monitors. Moreover, this difference was particularly large when the
impression that subjects were asked to convey was inaccurate. Presumably high
self-monitors wanted as much information as possible about the targets of their
presentations, in order to plan their "performances" as well as possible. And this
was apparently seen as particularly important when the role that they were to be
playing was unfamiliar.
This continual seeking of information about others on the part of high self-
monitors could be expected to result in the development of a well-elaborated set
of schemas concerning other people. This in fact seems to be the case. The results
of recent research (Snyder & Cantor, 1980) indicate that high self-monitors do have
richer, better-articulated, and more informative images of others than do low self-
monitors. Recall, however, that if low self-monitors are not well attuned to the
324 16. Private and Public Selves

social matrix, they are well attuned to their own self-images. Accordingly, low
self-monitors tum out to have richer and better-articulated self-images in a wide
variety of behavioral domains than do high self-monitors.

Summary, Critique, and Integration

This brief and rather selective survey of self-monitoring literature suggests that
some people are particularly attuned to their social contexts as a source of guidance
for behavior. As Snyder (1979) put it, these people employ a strategy of deciding
what kind of person the situation calls for, and how best to be that person. Other
people use a different strategy. For them, the issue is how to portray themselves
as they really are. Their guides for action are their attitudes and personal beliefs.
In sum, the first set of people behave in ways calculated to manage their public
displays, the second set behave in response to personal concerns.
This view, of course, has strong similarities to the position that we have taken
throughout this chapter. Indeed, there is a sense in which Snyder's self-monitoring
construct embodies characteristics of both the private and the public dimensions of
self-consciousness. That is, high self-monitors have some similarity to persons who
are both high in public self-consciousness and lower in private self-consciousness.
In the same fashion, low self-monitors seem comparable in some respects to persons
who are both high in private self-consciousness and low in public self-consciousness.
Note, however, that Snyder's conceptualization seems to assume that an inverse
relationship will always exist between an orientation toward the public aspects of
the self and an orientation toward the private aspects of the self. Indeed, the Self-
Monitoring scale forces such a dichotomy upon respondents. But whether this
assumption is warranted or not is open to question. Recall that the private and
public subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale (which measure orientations that
are at least superficially similar to those in Snyder's dichotomy) are invariably
positively related, though the relationship is usually weak. This suggests that the
private-versus-public dichotomy, as expressed in the Self-Monitoring scale, may
be artificial.
Where would persons fall on the self-monitoring distribution, for example, who
are high in both private and public self-consciousness? By virtue of their high public
self-consciousness, one might expect them to be high in self-monitoring. But being
high in private self-consciousness would suggest low self-monitoring. The same
problem in prediction applies to persons who are low on both self-consciousness
dimensions. Indeed, it is difficult to know where on the self-monitoring distribution
any person would fall whose levels of public and private self-consciousness are
similar to each other. This ambiguity suggests that the prediction of correlations
between self-monitoring and the two self-consciousness dimensions might be less
straightforward than would be implied by our description two paragraphs ago. The
problem of prediction is further compounded by the fact that the Self-Monitoring
scale is not unidimensional, as had previously been assumed (see Briggs, Cheek,
& Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980). Given these considerations, it is not
surprising that the correlations between self-monitoring and private and public self-
Self-Monitoring 325

consciousness over a series of large samples have tended to be quite weak (see,
e.g., Briggs et aI., 1980; Turner et aI., 1978).
We have attempted, in the two preceding paragraphs, to fit the self-monitoring
construct to the self-consciousness construct. This attempt is not entirely successful,
for a number of reasons. For example, it is important to note that the two scales
had different theoretical antecedents. The Self-Consciousness scale was specifically
intended to assess attentional focus, whereas the Self-Monitoring scale was not.
The latter instrument assesses a more general orientation to the use of private or
public information for behavior regulation. Indeed, it may be appropriate to think
of self-monitoring as reflecting differences in where people look to determine their
behavioral standards. High self-monitors look to the social comparison information
that is available in their situational contexts. Low self-monitors look to personal
standards.
This possibility suggests a potential integration between the two constructs. Spe-
cifically, self-monitoring differences may predict where subjects look to determine
behavioral standards; and self-consciousness differences should predict the degree
to which those standards are utilized.
Said more concretely, a behavioral context where social comparison cues conflict
with subjects' attitudes should generate some ambiguity about how to act. In such
a situation, high self-monitors should look outward for a standard, low self-monitors
should look inward. Once the standard has been established for each person, how-
ever, the degree to which the person's subsequent behavior will correspond to that
standard should depend upon his or her self-consciousness. High self-monitors
should conform to the group's norm to the degree that they are also high in (public)
self-consciousness. Low self-monitors should be responsive to their attitudes and
personal norms to the degree that they are also high in (private) self-consciousness.
These speCUlations remain to be tested. Nevertheless, they seem to us to represent
an intriguing possibility. They suggest a potentially important integration between
two different, but definitely related, analyses of the effects exerted upon behavior
by the public and private selves.
Chapter 17

Cognitive Dissonance

In 1957, Leon Festinger published a book entitled A theory of cognitive dissonance.

The theory described in that volume provided the impetus for hundreds of exper-
iments, and ultimately came to dominate the literature of attitude change during the
later 1950's and 1960's. The core ideas of dissonance theory are not particularly
complicated. The theory's underlying assumption is that people strive to maintain
consistency among their cognitions (broadly defined). The presence (or the aware-
ness) of two conflicting cognitive elements creates a motivational state called dis-
sonance. The intensity of this state is in direct proportion to the importance of the
subject of the cognitive elements. The experience of dissonance leads to attempts
to reduce the conflict among cognitive elements, by distorting, changing, devaluing,
or denying one of them.
Though the core ideas of dissonance theory are straightforward, use of the theory
to predict an outcome in a particular context can be much more complex. Consider
one of the more popular paradigms used to examine dissonance effects in the
laboratory-the "forced compliance" or "induced compliance" paradigm (Festinger,
1957). Stated simply, subjects are induced to engage voluntarily in a behavior that
conflicts with their attitudes. This creates an internal conflict between awareness
of having done the behavior (on the one hand) and the preexisting attitude (on the
other hand). This conflict is resolved by altering one of the inconsistent cognitions.
But which one? Will the attitude be altered so that it conforms more closely to the
behavior, or will the perceptions of the behavior be distorted, leaving the initial
attitude intact?
In order to answer these questions, and in order to make precise predictions in
the induced compliance paradigm, one needs to consider one more thing: the extent
to which the various cognitive elements are resistant to change. The more resistant
to change is any specific cognitive element, the less likely it is to be altered in the
service of dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976).
This notion of resistance to change is quite important. Indeed, it could be argued
that it is central to the theory's ability to generate testable predictions. Because it
is so important, it is somewhat surprising how little empirical attention it has
328 17. Cognitive Dissonance

received (see Wicklund & Brehm, 1976, for a thorough review of the dissonance
literature). In fact, when undertaking our own research in this area, we were able
to find only two previous studies examining variables directly associated with
resistance to change. One of these studies investigated the effect of reality constraints
on the selection of a mode for dissonance reduction (Walster, Berscheid, & Barclay,
1967). The second dealt with the effect of the availability of different modes of
dissonance reduction on the particular mode chosen (Gotz-Marchand, Gotz, & Ide,
1974).
Our own research on this subject dealt-not too surprisingly-with the effects
of attentional focus on resistance to change and dissonance reduction (Scheier &
Carver, 1980d).

Self-Attention and Dissonance

There are several ways in which focus of attention might potentially influence
dissonance processes. For example, it might be predicted that self-focus would
enhance awareness of the conflict between elements, or the aversiveness which the
conflict theoretically engenders. This reasoning would suggest that the effect of
self-directed attention would be simply to make the experience of dissonance more
salient. The result should be enhanced attempts to reduce the dissonance.
This reasoning turns out to be too simple to fit the data (which we will describe
in a moment). There is, however, another possibility. This possibility stems from
two considerations. The first is the distinction between public and private self-
aspects, upon which we elaborated in the preceding chapter. The second is the
simple argument that the availability or salience of some aspect of self may render
that aspect more central phenomenologically (cf. discussions in Chapters 4 and 5),
and thus more resistant to change.

Public and Private Self-Aspects

As has been discussed at several points in the book, it is often useful to separate
the construct of self into two subcategories: private self-aspects, and public self-
aspects. These two aspects of the self appear to have a considerable resemblance
to the two cognitive elements involved in the induced-compliance paradigm. That
is, in this situation the conflict is between a preexisting attitude (private), and the
recognition of an overt and openly displayed behavior (public). Because focus on
private and public self-aspects can have dramatically divergent effects (as was
discussed in Chapter 16), it seems reasonable to ask whether this difference in self-
focus might also have important implications for predictions regarding dissonance.
Preliminary studies suggested that this might be so.
In one early study of the role of self-focus in dissonance processes (Wicklund
& Duval, 1971, Experiment 2), subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays in the usual
induced-compliance paradigm. Self-directed attention was increased among half of
Tests of the Public-Private Analysis 329

the subjects throughout the experimental session by focusing a TV camera on their

faces. The result was that subjects' attitudes moved into closer agreement with their
counterattitudinal essays. In another study (Insko, Worchel, Songer, & Arnold,
1973), subjects defended a counterattitudinal position, under conditions of either
high or low anticipated effort. Self-focused attention was again varied through the
presence or absence of a TV camera. Although this study yielded several complex
interactions, the findings were generally consistent with those obtained by Wicklund
and Duval (1971, Experiment 2). That is, the camera appeared to enhance attitude
change among the subjects who should theoretically have been experiencing the
greatest degree of dissonance.
In our own first attempt to investigate the effects of self-focus on dissonance,
we used a similar paradigm, but varied self-focus in a different way (Scheier &
Carver, 1980d, Experiment 1). Subjects participated in the usual induced compliance
procedure, but one in which an attitude premeasure was used, as well as a post-
measure. Subjects completed one or the other of these while seated before a mirror
(see Scheier & Carver, 1980d, for more detail). The effect of self-focus in this
study-regardless of its timing-was to diminish attitude change.
The results of this study are nearly impossible to reconcile with the previous
findings of Wicklund and Duval (1971) and Insko et al. (1973), without making
a specific assumption. Once that assumption is made, however, the results of the
three studies are entirely consistent. The assumption is that mirror presence enhances
one's awareness of the private self, whereas a TV camera enhances one's awareness
of the public self (see also Chapters 3 and 16).

Tests of the Public-Private Analysis

The reasoning that these two experimental manipulations direct attention to different
aspects of the self allows an internally consistent interpretation of the earlier lit-
erature on dissonance and self-focus. But it requires additional verification. In the
studies conducted to obtain additional evidence on the question, we tested quite
specifically the notion that salience of different self-aspects would result in different
modes of dissonance reduction. That is, most dissonance theorists would assume
that a hydraulic relationship exists among the various modes for reducing dissonance
(cf. Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). If one element is made more resistant to change,
dissonance should cause a change in some other element. If the mirror does focus
attention on one's initial attitude, and if such focusing does make that attitude more
resistant to change, then dissonance should be reduced by distorting and altering
one's perception of one's counterattitudinal behavior. The opposite should be true
for subjects exposed to a camera. They should resolve dissonance by changing their
attitudes, but not by altering their perceptions of their behavior.
To test this reasoning, we conducted research in which subjects engaged in a
counterattitudinal behavior, and then reported both their attitudes and their percep-
tions of the behavior in which they had engaged.
330 17. Cognitive Dissonance

Self-Focus Manipulations and Dissonance Reduction

Subjects in the first of these studies arrived at the laboratory in groups of two to
four, and were assigned to separate cubicles, where they completed the experimental
procedures. The procedures used were based on those of Bern and McConnell
(1970) and Snyder and Ebbesen (1972). Subjects were told that they were taking
part in a social opinion survey. They received a booklet, and were asked to read
and complete the material in it. The cover sheet of the booklet contained an ex-
planatory paragraph, which said that the present stage of the research project in-
volved collecting specific arguments for and against a variety of positions on issues
of public concern.
On the second page was a statement that constituted a manipulation of choice.
In the no-choice control condition, it simply instructed the subject to write a half-
page essay (on the following page) which argued as convincingly as possible that
students should have very little or no control over the kinds of courses offered by
the University. 1 In the choice conditions, it asked the subject to write an essay
arguing either that students should have complete control over the kinds of courses
offered, or that they should have little or no control. "The choice of which to do
is up to you." In the choice conditions, but not the no choice condition, an extra
page was inserted, which read "We now find that we have enough 'pro-control'
arguments, and are in need of 'anti-control' arguments. Therefore, in this session
we would appreciate it if as many of you as possible would write half-page essays
which argue for the point of view that students should have very little or no control
over the kinds of courses offered by the University."
The next page was blank, except for the heading "essay." On the final page,
along with filler and manipulation-check items, were questions that represented the
study's two dependent measures: (a) "How much control should students have over
the kinds of courses offered by the University?" and (b) "How strong was the
position taken in your essay?" For each question there was a rating scale, with
appropriate labels at five points on the scale.
There were three different "choice" conditions in the experiment. Subjects in the
choice-mirror condition sat facing a mirror while completing the opinion survey
booklet. Subjects in the choice--camera condition were seated before a TV camera.
In this condition, the experimenter explained that he wanted to make videotapes
of some experimental sessions, for use in a paper presentation at a national psy-
chology convention. Thereupon, he flipped the camera switch on, adjusted the
camera so that it faced the subject, and left. In the choice--control condition, neither
manipulation was present.
Because the dissonance effect requires that subjects engage in a counterattitudinal
behavior, only subjects who wrote essays opposing student control were retained

lWe did not measure subjects' initial attitudes in this study. We simply assumed, as have
previous researchers (cf. Snyder & Ebbesen, 1972) that most students would tend to favor
student control over curricula. Thus writing anti-control essays should represent counterat-
titudinal behavior for most people. Note, however, that the inclusion of subjects who initially
opposed student control should simply weaken any obtained dissonance effect.
Tests of the Public-Private Analysis 331

for data analysis (see Scheier & Carver, 198Od, for greater detail). Moreover,
dissonance does not occur unless subjects perceive themselves as having done the
counterattitudinal behavior voluntarily. Thus, manipulation-check data were ana-
lyzed to ensure that choice condition subjects perceived significantly greater choice
over the position taken in their essays than did those in the no choice group. This
proved to be the case.
Mean postbehavior attitude ratings, and ratings of the counterattitudinal behavior
are displayed in Table 17-1. Analysis of attitude ratings revealed, as expected, that
subjects in the choice~ontrol group reported attitudes that were more consistent
with their counterattitudinal actions than did no choice subjects-the normal dis-
sonance effect. Also as expected, the presence of the TV camera was associated
with attitude change that was even stronger than in the choice~ontrol group, and
the presence of the mirror was associated with the least attitude change among the
three choice conditions. The difference between the latter group and the
choice~ontrol group was not statistically reliable, however. Thus it serves as only
a directional replication of our earlier result (i.e., Scheier & Carver, 1980d, Ex-
periment 1).
It was expected that subjects' perceptions of the strength with which their essays
had opposed student control would complement the attitude-change data among
subjects in the three choice conditions. Subjects whose attitudes had changed the
least-i.e., those in the mirror~hoice condition-should have reported writing the
weakest essays. Those whose attitudes had changed the most-i.e., those in the
camera~hoice condition-should have reported writing the strongest essays. The
data formed essentially the predicted pattern (see Table 17-1). Subjects in the mirror
condition perceived their essays to be less strongly anti-student control than did
subjects in the choice~ontrol group; subjects in the camera condition perceived
their essays to be more strongly anti-student control than did the control group.
Further analyses revealed that these perceptions did in fact represent distortions.

Table 17-1. Mean Ratings of Final Attitude and Strength

of Essay
Dependent No choice Choice Choice Choice
measure control control mirror camera
Attitude
ratings'
M 29.44 35.15 33.06 40.68
SD 11.32 8.50 11.10 9.72
Strength
of essayb
M 10.56 14.77 20.48 9.16
SD 10.88 9.95 16.76 7.69
Note. Data from Scheier and Carver (l980d, Experiment 2).
"The higher the number, the greater the shift toward the counter-
attitudinal behavior.
1Yfhe higher the number, the less opposition to student control
perceived in the essay.
332 17. Cognitive Dissonance

A judge who was blind to experimental condition rated the position taken in each
essay, and the differences among experimental groups proved to be negligible.
In brief, subjects facing a mirror displayed a preference for distorted recall of
their behavior as a mode of dissonance reduction, whereas those facing a camera
displayed a preference for attitude change. These findings are consistent with the
reasoning that different cognitive elements had been rendered resistant to change
by the two experimental manipulations. This, in tum, supports the assumption that
the two manipulations direct attention to quite different aspects of self.
This conclusion is given added support by the results of a subsequent study.
Recall that the private-public distinction was first made in the realm of individual
differences. In this study we returned to that realm.

Self-Consciousness and Dissonance Reduction

Subjects in this research (Scheier & Carver, 1980d, Experiment 3) completed the
same induced-compliance procedure as in the previously described experiment. But
self-focusing manipulations were not used in this study. Instead, we chose subjects
whose personality dispositions should have led them to have the same experiences
as had been produced by the manipulations of the previous experiment. More
specifically, we assume that the mirror caused subjects to be particularly conscious
of their private self-aspects. The comparable personality type would be someone
who is high in private self-consciousness and low in public self-consciousness. We
assume that the camera caused people to be particularly attentive to public self-
aspects. The comparable personality would be someone who is high in public self-
consciousness and low in private self-consciousness.
There is some difficulty in defining a subject group that would be conceptually
equivalent to the previous experiment's choice-<:ontrol condition, however. Persons
high in both private and public self-consciousness would be particularly attentive
to both their opinions and their behaviors. Which would be more salient to them
would be hard to predict. Subjects low in both self-consciousness dimensions would
be especially attentive to neither their opinions nor their behavior. Again, prediction
is ambiguous.
Because of this ambiguity, we did not attempt to create a subject group that
would be analogous to the choice-<:ontrol condition of the earlier study. Instead we
tested our predictions by comparing each experimental group (i.e., choice condition)
with an otherwise comparable no choice control group. We expected the two groups
of subjects who were given no choice over their behavior to be equivalent to each
other on every measure. And we expected dissonance-reduction effects to occur in
each experimental group, relative to its control group. But we expected these effects
to occur in different modes for the two experimental groups. High private-low
public subjects were expected to reduce dissonance by perceiving their behavior
as less counterattitudinal (not by changing their attitudes). High public-low private
subjects were expected to reduce dissonance by altering their attitudes (not by
misperceiving their behavior). Such effects would be the same, conceptually, as
those produced by the mirror and camera, respectively, in the earlier study.
Tests of the Public-Private Analysis 333

Subjects had completed the Self-Consciousness Scale in group sessions several

weeks before the experimental session. Self-attention was not manipulated in this
study. But in every other respect the procedure used here was identical to that used
in the previous experiment. Subjects were induced to write a counterattitudinal
essay, which again argued against student control over university curriculum. The
same perceived choice manipulation was used to create a choice and no choice
condition. And the same set of dependent measures was administered. To sum-
marize, this study included four groups of SUbjects: a no choice-high private group,
a no choice-high public group, a choice-high private group, and a choice-high
public group.
As before, subjects in the choice conditions reported perceiving significantly
more freedom of choice over their essay topic than did subjects in the no choice
conditions. Mean postbehavior attitude ratings and ratings of the counterattitudinal
behavior are portrayed in Table 17-2. Analysis of the attitude ratings revealed that
subjects who were high in public self-consciousness and who had had a choice over
the topic of their essays reported attitudes that were more consistent with their
essays than was true of either no choice group, or of the choice-condition subjects
who were high in private self-consciousness. The differences among the latter three
groups were negligible.
Also as expected, analysis of subjects' ratings of their essays yielded an opposite
pattern. Subjects in the choice condition who were high in private self-consciousness
rated their behavior as less counterattitudinal than did comparable subjects in the
no choice condition, and as less counterattitudinal than did subjects in either ex-
perimental condition who were high in public self-consciousness. The latter three
groups did not differ reliably from each other. As in the earlier study, additional
analyses confirmed that these ratings represented distortions, rather than actual
differences in behavior.
In sum, subjects who were high in private self-consciousness reduced dissonance
by distorting their perceptions of their counterattitudinal behavior. Subjects who
were high in public self-consciousness reduced dissonance by changing their atti-

Table 17-2. Mean Ratings of Final Attitude and Strength of Essay

Dependent High private High public High private High public
measure no choice no choice choice choice
Attitude
ratings'
M 24.77 28.54 25.00 35.44
SD 7.28 9.40 7.21 10.40
Strength
of essayb
M 8.23 14.62 24.10 14.39
SD 8.47 12.24 16.16 10.62
Note. Data from Scheier and Carver (1980<1, Experiment 3).
'The higher the number, the grearer the shift toward the counterattitudinal behavior.
lYfhe higher the number, the less opposition to student control perceived in the essay.
334 17. Cognitive Dissonance

tudes. These findings were perfectly consistent with the results of the earlier study.
And this was true despite the fact that private and public self-attention were varied
in a radically different manner, by selecting subjects according to their chronic
levels of private and public self-consciousness rather than by manipulating attention.
The convergence between the effects produced by situationally induced self-aware-
ness and dispositional self-consciousness increases both our confidence in the re-
liability of the experimental findings and our confidence in the explanation that we
have offered to account for those findings (cf. Garner, Hake, & Eriksen, 1956).
We should note that the selection criteria employed in this study artificially
created an inverse relationship between private and public self-consciousness. Be-
cause of the lack of independenre between these two dimensions, the results of this
study would have to be viewed with some caution, if this study were to be taken
alone. As was detailed above, however, our intent in this study was to recreate the
psychological states experienced by subjects in the prior experiment, where the
problem of independence had not existed. Given the fact that the patterns of findings
were quite comparable across the two studies, we feel reasonably safe in assuming
that separate influences were exerted by private and public self-consciousness.

Relationship to Other Dissonance Research

Dissonance theorists would generally agree that persons must first become aware
of existing cognitive inconsistencies before dissonance is experienced (cf. Wicklund
& Brehm, 1976). However, the research described in the preceding pages strongly
suggests that the effects of a person's awareness may be even more subtle. Spe-
cifically, attentional focus also appears to play a role in determining the mode
through which dissonance is ultimately reduced. Dissonance reduction seems to
occur by altering the cognitive element that is least attended to.
Our conclusion, in this regard, is quite consistent with a number of previous
findings in the dissonance literature, in which manipulations were used that bear
a conceptual resemblance to the manipulations of the studies discussed above. For
example, at least two prior experiments (Carlsmith, Ebbesen, Lepper, Zanna, Jon-
cas, & Abelson, 1969; Zanna, Lepper, & Abelson, 1973) have incorporated pro-
cedures designed to enhance subjects' awareness of their counterattitudinal behavior.
This would be conceptually equivalent to our camera manipulation. In both of those
studies, the manipUlations led to increased attitude change, consistent with our
reasoning.
Previous researchers have also used various instructional orientations to make
subjects more aware of their initial attitudes. This would seem to be the conceptual
equivalent of our mirror manipulation. These prior studies vary in a number of
respects, partly because subjects can be made aware of their preexisting attitudes
at several points during the experimental sequence. Making subjects aware of their
initial attitudes before they engage in counterattitudinal behavior has resulted quite
consistently in suppression of attitude change, in two experiments (Snyder & Eb-
besen, 1972; Wixon & Laird, 1976). And at least two studies have found that
Relationship to Other Dissonance Research 335

attitude change was also diminished by reminding subjects of their previous attitudes
after the counterattitudinal behavior (Shaffer, 1975; Wixon & Laird, 1976). These
findings are also quite consistent with our findings and with our analysis.
But in at least two experiments, manipulations that were intended to enhance the
salience of preexisting attitudes have failed to suppress attitude change. And in one
additional study, enhanced salience of an initial attitude caused an increase in
attitude change. A careful examination of the procedures of these experiments raises
questions about their interpretation, however. Ross and Shulman (1973) reminded
subjects of their initial attitude ratings by asking them to transcribe the ratings onto
another sheet "to make our computations easier" (p. 141). This ambiguous phrase
may have had the unintended effect of reminding subjects of the public nature of
the behavioral situation, despite the researchers' attempts to safeguard against this
in other respects.
Wixon and Laird (1976) also found that attitude change occurred among two
groups of subjects who had been exposed to ostensible manipulations of attitude
salience. But in one of these manipulations-indeed, the one that came closest to
being the equivalent of the Ross and Shulman manipulation, according to Wixon
and Laird-the reminder of the initial attitude was thoroughly confounded with a
reminder of the public behavior. That is, the experimenter concluded the manip-
ulation by pointing out explicitly to subjects in this condition-but no other-that
the counterattitudinal behavior was (ostensibly) going to be repeated. In our view,
this simply redirects subjects' attention back to the behavior.
The other failure to suppress attitude change in this study was in a condition
where subjects wrote down a postbehavior opinion, were then reminded of their
preexisting opinion, and finally restated their postbehavior opinion. We would argue
that this procedure clearly introduces the possibility of a psychological commitment
to the position endorsed on the first postmeasure, despite Wixon and Laird's as-
surances to the contrary. Thus, we believe that the finding in this condition must
be interpreted with extreme caution.
Finally, Swann and Pittman (1975) found that enhancing the salience of subjects'
attitudes caused an increase in attitude change. But this study poses special problems
of interpretation. First, the study was conducted with relatively young children as
subjects. It is difficult to know whether this might influence the pattern of thought
in which the subjects engaged. Secondly, the paradigm used-the so-called "for-
bidden toy" paradigm-is inherently biased quite strongly toward attitude change
as a mode of dissonance reduction, which is not true of other induced-compliance
paradigms. That is, the counterattitudinal behavior in this case consists of refraining
completely from playing with a toy. Because this is a qualitative rather than a
quantitative distinction, the awareness of total restraint might be impossible to
distort. This in tum might have created pressure to reduce dissonance in another
way. Thus we regard the Swann and Pittman finding as equivocal on the issue under
discussion.
In sum, then, we disagree with Wixon and Laird's contention that it is the when
of the attitudinal reminder that matters. In our view, it is the how of the reminder
that matters. Some experimental procedures remind subjects only of their initial
336 17. Cognitive Dissonance

attitude, other procedures simultaneously shift attention back to the public aspects
of the subjects' situation.
This point has a very general implication for dissonance research. Specifically,
when one is planning a study in this area, it is important to consider how the
experimental procedures might affect subjects' focus of attention. Features of the
experimental paradigm (or of the subject population) that lead subjects to an aware-
ness of their counterattitudinal behaviors may exert a bias toward attitude change
(cf. Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Features that lead subjects to be aware of
their preexisting attitudes, on the other hand, may exert a bias toward distorting
perceptions of the counterattitudinal behavior. If there is any reason to be uncertain
which of these modes should predominate, both modes should be measured.
The failure to measure both modes of potential dissonance reduction is, in fact,
a widespread problem in the dissonance literature. This raises serious theoretical
questions about the interpretation of previous studies. For example, several re-
searchers (Bem & Funder, 1978; Gaes et aI., 1978) have recently conducted careful
studies in which the dissonance explanation of attitude change was compared to
other explanations. The results of these studies have tended not to support dissonance
theory. But consider for a moment the paradigms that were used. Bem and Funder
asked expert judges to construct Q-sort templates of hypothetical persons who would
be most likely to show attitude change in the induced-compliance paradigm, ac-
cording to various theoretical perspectives. The templates were then used in a real
induced-compliance experiment to predict which subjects would change their at-
titudes the most. The template based on dissonance theory was quite unsuccessful.
In fact, it was inversely related to attitude change (r = - .24).
Superficially, at least, this finding seems to disconfinn dissonance theory. From
our perspective, however, this finding would have been quite predictable, if the
dissonance template constructed by the expert judges had inadvertently been biased
toward selecting persons who were especially aware of their initial attitudes. A
careful examination of the dissonance template suggests that this may very well
have been the case. The items from that template appear to be a good deal like the
items from the private subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale. When that simi-
larity is put together with the findings of the research described above, it is less
surprising that the dissonance template failed to predict attitude change in the Bem
and Funder study. That template might well have predicted distorted recall of the
counterattitudinal behavior. Unfortunately, however, dissonance reduction in that
mode was not measured. In brief, the failure of the dissonance prediction in that
study may have been due less to a failure of dissonance theory than to a failure to
measure dissonance reduction on the dimension on which it actually occurred.
A similar problem may exist in the research by Gaes et al. (1978). Subjects
participated in an induced-compliance paradigm, reporting their attitudes using
either a paper-and-pencil measure or the bogus pipeline technique (cf. Sigall &
Page, 1971). No attitude change occurred when the bogus pipeline procedure was
used, leading Gaes et al. to reject the dissonance-theory explanation of attitude
change. It seems possible, however, that the bogus pipeline procedure may have
Dissonance, or Impression Management? 337

redirected subjects' attention to their initial attitudes. If so, we would have expected
subjects in this condition to reduce dissonance by altering their perceptions of their
counterattitudinal behavior. But again this possibility was not assessed, leaving the
conclusion reached by Gaes et al. much more equivocal than it would otherwise
be.

Dissonance, or Impression Management?

We should, however, devote some attention to another possibility. Tedeschi and

his colleagues (e.g., Gaes et aI., 1978; Schlenker, 1975b; Tedeschi et aI., 1971)
have offered an alternative interpretation of dissonance effects, called impression
management theory. Those theorists argue that subjects in dissonance research don't
really change their attitudes at all. What they do is simply to change their public
displays, in order to manipulate the impressions that they are conveying to the
experimenter. That is, subjects are induced to voluntarily perform counterattitudinal
behaviors, and are then asked about their opinions. In order not to look foolish or
inconsistent, they report opinions that are in line with their previous public actions.
In essence, each is playing a temporary part in a small drama-the part of a stable,
rational, consistent person.
We mentioned impression management theory briefly in our earlier discussion
of public and private selves (Chapter 16). But let us now consider the relationship
between that theory and the dissonance research discussed in this chapter. We said
earlier that doing a counterattitudinal behavior in front of a TV camera emphasizes
its public nature, and thus draws attention to one's public self-aspects. This suggests
that a camera would be an ideal stimulus to arouse impression management concerns.
Indeed, this extrapolation is really not very different from our previous character-
ization of the person whose attention is directed to public self-aspects (see Chapter
16). Thus, the attitude change effects that occurred in the public self-focus conditions
of the two experiments presented above seem readily interpretable in impression
management terms. The support for dissonance theory that is offered by those
findings thus must be regarded as ambiguous in that respect.
It seems more difficult, however, to account in impression management terms
for the distorted perceptions of counterattitudinal behavior among private self-focus
groups. There seem to be two possible ways to attempt such an interpretation,
neither of which is wholly satisfactory.
One possibility stems from the argument that once committed to some particular
display of the self, managing one's impression requires a continued commitment
to that position, even if it makes one appear inconsistent in some other way. Thus
Gaes et al. (1978) found that subjects did not shift the expressions of their attitudes
if they thought the experimenter had easy access to their true attitudes (via a bogus
pipeline manipulation). This was true despite the fact that these subjects had just
performed a counterattitudinal behavior. Their attitude reports thus did create some
inconsistency in their public portrayal. But presumably it is the most salient public
338 17. Cognitive Dissonance

reflection of the self that dictates one's subsequent display of oneself. And in the
subjects' minds, the bogus pipeline manipulation apparently made the "true" or
initial attitude most salient to the observing experimenter.
This reasoning could be applied to our subjects who were particularly aware of
their private self-aspects in the following way. Perhaps they reported their attitudes,
thereby became committed to them, and-in order to maintain as much consistency
as possible in their subsequent outward displays-then distorted their rating of their
essays. This argument seems weak, however, in that subjects in all conditions
reported their attitudes first and then rated their essays. There thus is no ready
explanation for the fact that this effect occurred only among subjects who were
focused on the private self.
Another possibility follows from the argument made in Chapter 16 that self-
presentation motives may become important only when the public self is salient.
Perhaps private self-attention simply takes one out of the impression management
"mode" of self-regulation, and puts one into a different mode. This would be
consistent with the data discussed in Chapter 16, which indicate that focus on the
public self and the private self can cause radically different outcomes, apparently
by invoking different motives or goal states. But it leaves unanswered the question
with which we started: how to account for subjects' distorted perceptions of their
behavior.
The only obvious candidate for explaining that effect is dissonance theory. Per-
haps in reality the results of our research reflect two different processes: dissonance
reduction (a private process) when attention is focused on the private self, and
impression management (a public process) when attention is focused on the public
self. Perhaps behavior in the induced-compliance situation really is a matter of
different processes for different persons, as was suggested by Bem and Funder
(1978). We would have to add, however, that it then must also be a matter of
different processes in different situations. That is, attentional focus is influenced
by situational as well as dispositional variables.
Despite the fact that some of our findings are easily assimilable to impression
management theory, the most parsimonious explanation for the results taken as a
whole remains that of dissonance theory. There is an interesting irony here. Almost
all of the dissonance researchers using the induced-compliance paradigm have
emphasized attitude change, and most have measured only that variable. Indeed,
it has become very easy to forget that dissonance theory is not solely a theory of
attitude change. It is ironic, then, that our attitude-change findings (as are many
other similar attitude-change effects) are quite easily construed as impression man-
agement phenomena. They were not the clearest support for dissonance theory in
our research. Instead, the clearest support came from the all but forgotten alternative:
distortion in the perception of behavior.
Part VI
Conclusion

In the concluding chapter of the book, we examine our general approach to behavior
in a somewhat broader context. Recent years have seen considerable change in the
models of behavior regulation that are tacitly assumed by social and personality
psychologists. People who once were hard-line learning theorists have modified
their approaches, by taking a wide array of cognitive variables into account. There
has also been an increased recognition that the self and the perceived context have
interwoven influences on the management of behavior. We suggest that these various
revisions to learning theory are moving such theories inexorably toward the kind
of model that is suggested by cybernetic theory. In short, the field may be undergo-
ing, or preparing to undergo, a paradigm shift.
Chapter 18

Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory

"Everything of importance has been said before by someone who did not
discover it."
A. N. Whitehead

The sort of model of self-regulation that we have presented in this book represents
a substantial departure in certain respects from other widely accepted paradigms
in human psychology. In particular, the emphasis placed by the learning paradigm
upon drives and reinforcement as explanatory principles (e.g., Hull, C.L., 1952;
Rotter, 1954; Skinner, 1953; Spence, 1956) has been absent here. We have instead
assumed that goal-setting and discrepancy reduction are normal consequences of
the way in which the human being is organized as a self-regulating system. This
departure may seem radical to some readers. But we suggest that many theorists
who have nominally stayed within the framework of the learning paradigm have
already begun to approximate exactly this type of model.

Changes in the Learning Paradigm

Over the past thirty years the shape of the learning-theory approach to the regulation
of behavior has changed considerably (cf. Dulany, 1968). For one thing, there has
been a gradual but pervasive movement to recast learning concepts in much more
cognitive terms, as the awareness has grown that cognitive variables can have a
major impact on self-regulation. Mischel (1973), for example, has discussed at
length the fact that cognitive representations of stimuli are more impactful on
behavior than are the objective stimuli themselves. The meanings that the stimuli
convey-or the ways in which they have been mentally transformed-are critically
important to the prediction of people's responses to them. Bandura (1978, p. 351)
makes much the same point, noting that "people do not simply react mechanically
to situational influences-they actively process and transform them."
The emerging recognition of the importance of cognitive interpretation in per-
ceiving the environment is not the only way in which the focus of the learning
approach has shifted over the years. There have also been subtle changes in how
goal-directed activity is conceptualized. To illustrate these changes, in the following
paragraphs we have summarized the positions recently taken by three prominent
social learning theorists regarding the process of behavioral self-regulation.
342 18. Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory

Mischel (1973) presented what he termed a "cognitive social learning" approach

to personality. Among the variables that are emphasized in that approach are (a)
the ways in which people encode and categorize events, (b) people's expectancies
about the outcomes of their actions, (c) the subjective desirability of the outcomes,
and (d) the person's self-regulatory systems and plans ...... persons set perfor-
mance goals for themselves and react with self-criticism or self-satisfaction to their
behavior depending on how well it matches their expectations and criteria" (Mischel,
1973, pp. 273-274).
These constructs are nearly identical in many respects to the sort of language
that we have used throughout this book: the construction of private representations
of the environment, the evoking of behavioral standards, and the comparison of
behavior against the standards. It is interesting that Mischel (1973) viewed Miller
et al. 's (1960) concept of "plan" as potentially promising, implicitly leaning toward
an information-processing view of self-regulation. But he stopped short of adopting
such an approach. Instead he remained within the language of the learning paradigm
in discussing these constructs, emphasizing the importance of "self-reinforcement"
following one's outcomes, as an influence on future behavior.
Bandura (1978) has also discussed self-regulation in terms that have moved
farther and farther from S-R learning constructs. Indeed, his differences with tra-
ditional learning theory may be exemplified by his argument that self-reward does
not strengthen the responses that preceded it (e.g., Bandura, 1978, p. 350), a
position which seems almost heretical in the context of the learning-theory paradigm.
Bandura has also rejected the mechanistic perspective of environmental determin-
ism, arguing that behavior and the environment in which it occurs are best con-
ceptualized as a system of reciprocal influence. In this view, neither the environment
nor the self can be considered to have causal primacy; the influences of the two are
intertwined.
In its specifics, Bandura's approach assumes the existence of a self system which
includes a set of cognitive structures that provide "reference mechanisms," and a
set of sub-functions for perceiving, evaluating, and regulating behavior according
to "self-prescribed contingencies." To be even more specific, he assumes a process
of self-observation of one's performances, a judgmental process in which behavior
is compared to personal standards, and ultimately "self-responses" to those eval-
uative judgments. This emphasis on personally defined goals, self-reflective com-
parisons between one's actions and those goals, and so on, is very much in line
with Mischel's (1973) position. Bandura has added to that position, however, an
emphasis on the role of expectations of personal efficacy, in determining whether
difficult behaviors will be undertaken (Bandura, 1977). Both the emphasis on
comparison of behavior with standards in guiding self-regulation, and the emphasis
on expectancies, are generally in line with the model presented in this book. In his
language, however, Bandura emphasized (as did Mischel) the role of self-rein-
forcement in the self-regulatory process. Once again, this emphasis keeps the anal-
ysis within the learning paradigm, despite the fact that the analysis is also sharply
at variance with aspects of that paradigm.
Consider now the perspective on self-regulation that has been taken by Kanfer.
Once one of the most behavioristic of theorists in his descriptions of self-regulatory
Meta-Theoretical Issues 343

events (deriving his position from that of Skinner, 1953), Kanfer has now assumed
a stance that is quite comparable to those taken by Bandura and Mischel (see, e.g.,
Kanfer, 1971, 1977; Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981; Kanfer & Karoly, 1972). That is,
he discusses self-regulation in terms of self-imposed behavioral standards, the self-
evaluation of one's actions in comparison to those standards, and the consequences
of those evaluations.
Kanfer has also considered quite explicitly the importance of the person's ex-
pectancies of being able to execute the behavior of interest. An examination of one
of his most recent theoretical statements in this regard (Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981)
reveals a high degree of similarity between his position and our own. One difference
between us is that Kanfer (as Bandura) appears to have emphasized longer-term
regulation of one's actions, whereas we have emphasized the moment-to-moment
regulation of behavior. Nevertheless, the constructs that are central to the models
are generally the same: the size and flexibility of the discrepancies betwee.n present
behavior and the standards of comparison, and thus the expectancy for successful
change.
Though Kanfer appears to have been more aware than other theorists of the fact
that the model he was utilizing represented something of a break with behavioristic
conventions, and though he has in fact utilized some of the language of control
theory (see, e. g., Kanfer, 1977), he has not thus far made the break complete. As
is the case in the models assumed by Bandura (1978) and Mischel (1973), Kanfer's
sequence of hypothesized processes ends with self-reward and self-punishment.
Thus Kanfer, like the others, has remained with at least one foot in the learning
paradigm.

Meta-Theoretical Issues

Reinforcement
The positions on self-regulation that have been taken by those theorists have con-
siderable conceptual similarity to the model we have presented in this book. None
of those authors has dealt explicitly with the importance of attentional focus. But
it is hard to envision a comparison between one's behavior and a salient standard
which does not entail self-focus. Similarly, it is hard to envision a process of
perceiving and categorizing one's environment that does not entail outward focus.
Thus attentional considerations are certainly implicit in all of these models, even
though the theorists may not have attended to those implications.
The remaining major difference between us appears to hinge on meta-theoretical
issues. Perhaps the most salient meta-theoretical distinction between approaches is
the role postulated for self-reinforcement. Mischel, Bandura, and Kanfer have all
emphasized the idea that people reward themselves after goal attainment, and punish
themselves after failures to attain goals. In contrast, as was noted at the beginning
of the chapter, we have generally ignored this possibility. We have assumed instead
that the goal-striving, discrepancy-reduction tendency is inherent in the organization
of the human being as a self-regulatory system.
344 18. Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory

The term self-reinforcement has two related but distinguishable referents. The
more basic of the two is the notion that there is an intrinsic, internal mechanism
by which people reward themselves after goal attainment. Since that internal process
of self-reward is covert and inaccessible, however, researchers have developed
procedures that create external, observable analogs of the process. These procedures
represent the second referent of the term: the act of providing oneself with a
positively valued object or event, something that is readily available but is taken
only under certain self-imposed contingencies (cf. Bandura, 1976).
An example of how this latter description transfers beyond the laboratory is the
behavior of the writer who decides to take a coffee break only after he has written
a certain number of pages. That this sort of thing does happen is beyond dispute,
though its meaning is less clear. Simon (1967), for example, has discussed in
control-theory terms how one act of behavior can be deferred until another behavior
is finished, the behaviors being executed in an order that is established by the
priorities accorded them. Simon's discussion did not require the concept of self-
reinforcement to account for this "queuing" of one's activities.
But let us return to the real focus of our interest, the idea that there is an intrinsic
mechanism by which people reward themselves after attaining a desired goal. Some
theorists clearly make such an assumption about self-regulation (e.g. , Kanfer, 1971).
But is the assumption necessary? Only if one is wedded to the position that behavior
is built in by rewards, and continues to occur only if it continues to be rewarded.
Indeed, the assumption of an internal self-reward mechanism has been a nagging
problem for reinforcement-based theories for a long time. It is often a convenient
assumption. Whenever a behavioral context seems to provide no external support
for an observed behavior, yet the behavior continues to occur, the learning theorist
can appeal to self-reward. To make this appeal, however, begs the following ques-
tions: If we appeal to self-reinforcement sometimes, then why should we not appeal
to self-reinforcement all the time? Why is external reinforcement ever necessary?
Why discuss external reward contingencies at all?
The control theorist would take the position that psychologists too often focus
on the wrong aspect of reinforcers, and thus miss the point. Indeed, even psy-
chologists who attend to the right aspect of the reinforcer often miss the point. Both
Kanfer (1977, p. 18) and Bandura (1976, p. 153) have explicitly noted that rein-
forcers have informational properties, as well as the presumed reinforcing property.
But they both appear to assume that it is the reinforcing property that is most
important.. From the control-theory perspective, on the other hand, it is the infor-
mational property-the knowledge of results that is associated with the reinforcer-
that is critical. This idea is not a particularly new one (see, e.g., Annett, 1969;
Smith & Smith, 1966), but its implications are often ignored. Providing a reward
provides information that a goal has been attained, or serves to make that information
especially salient. That knowledge thus eliminates the need for continued effort
regarding that goal, and in some cases also provides information that will be useful
in guiding future behavior. That information can be provided via an external reward.
But it can also come from other sources, rendering that "reward" unnecessary.
This sort of reasoning helps to account for certain findings that appear, from the
learning-theory perspective, to be quite anomalous: specifically, that adding an
Meta-Theoretical Issues 345

extrinsic reward to what is presumed to be an intrinsically interesting task often

causes a loss of interest in the task (e.g., Deci, 1971, 1975; Lepper & Greene,
1978). Why should a reward lead to decreased interest? Such a finding seems
extremely difficult to account for in learning-theory terms. From the control-theory
perspective, however, it is important to keep in mind that the effect of any reward
can be expected to depend upon what information the reward conveys.
The most commonly accepted explanation for the loss of interest in this situation
is in fact an informational one. It goes as follows. When an external reward is
provided, the reward constitutes an obvious explanation for the person's efforts.
This leads to the secondary inference on the person's part that the task itself is not
very interesting.
There are circumstances, however, in which external rewards not only fail to
undermine intrinsic motivation, but actually enhance it. Specifically, when such
rewards are perceived as reflecting personal competence at the activity, the presence
of rewards in greater amounts has been found to produce increases in task interest
and task involvement (Rosenfield, Folger, & Adelman, 1980; see also Williams,
B.W., 1980). This finding is quite consistent with an information-based analysis.
In this case, the reward provides quite different information than in the other cases.
And in this case the reward therefore acts like it is "supposed" to act.

Control Theory
The issue of how so-called reinforcers influence behavior is often acknowledged
to be a problem for the learning-theory paradigm. It is a sufficiently compelling
problem that Bandura (1976) has even suggested that it may be useful to abandon
the term reinforcement altogether, and talk instead simply about self-regulation. In
this respect, as in his growing emphasis on the closed-loop nature of
person--environment interaction (Bandura, 1978), he is clearly moving closer and
closer to the cybernetic perspective on behavior, while making his position more
and more difficult to reconcile with the learning paradigm. Yet Bandura, and others
with similar theoretical perspectives, have resisted the acceptance of that fact. It
may be useful to examine the reasons for that resistance.
Among prominent learning theorists, Bandura has been the most explicit in
considering in print the viability of the cybernetic paradigm. He appears to have
made what are essentially three arguments against its usefulness. All of these, we
believe, rest on misunderstandings of the nature of control theory. And all of these
misunderstandings appear to be easily rectified.
First, Bandura has failed to make the conceptual connection (as do many people)
between information-processing systems and cybernetic systems. Thus he argues
that information-processing models of human functioning provide no basis for active
behavior (Bandura, 1978, p. 356). Once one accepts the assumption that infor-
mation-processing events are related to feedback systems, that they provide the
basis for reference values for such systems, as well as the perceptual input infor-
mation that is used to assess present states, this argument loses its force.
Even given the assumption that feedback loops can account for behavioral activity,
however, Bandura (1978, p. 352) has viewed such systems as being inherently too
346 18. Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory

inflexible to be an appropriate model for behavioral self-regulation. This position

follows from at least two misimpressions about the nature of cybernetic control.
Both of these misimpressions are easily corrected by assuming the existence of the
sort of hierarchy that has been proposed by Powers (1973a, 1973b), and by observing
what follows from that sort of organization.
Bandura's first error was in assuming that reference values for feedback loops
are wired in. "To automate a self-regulating system one would have to pre-pro-
gram . . . a comparator that contained all the possible reference standards derivable
from the various comparative factors in the relational network" (Bandura, 1978,
p. 352). Once a hierarchy of feedback systems is assumed, however, this argument
becomes meaningless. Reference values in a hierarchical system are not wired in.
They are provided to subordinate systems as the outputs of superordinate systems,
a point that we discussed in detail in Chapter 2. As was noted there, people do not
buy new thermostats every time they want to change the temperature of their houses.
They simply adjust the settings of the thermostats that they have.
Bandura's second misimpression in this context was the assumption that error
correction in all cybernetic systems is instantaneous. It is not. There are time lags
in virtually all such systems. Moreover, a hierarchical organization of cybernetic
systems imposes the need for greater and greater time lags at successively higher
levels of control (see Chapter 2). Thus, the operation of a high level system can
appear quite sluggish, with the relevant changes in behavior occurring only over
very long periods of time (cf. Powers, 1973b). It is, in fact, an indirect source of
support for the assumption of hierarchical organization that self-regulation is typ-
ically much slower with regard to abstract standards than with regard to concrete
lower-level standards.
Bandura's final criticism of the cybernetic paradigm has been that it has no place
for processes of self-reference. "People are not only perceivers, knowers, and actors.
They are also self-reactors with capacities for reflective self-awareness that are
generally ignored in information-processing theories" (Bandura, 1978, p. 356).
"It is the reflective and self-referent processes that figure prominently in human
thought, affect, and action but that are lacking in (cybernetic) models" (Bandura,
1979, p. 441). We believe that this book stands as a relatively thorough refutation
of that argument. Self-reflection is very much inherent in the effective functioning
of feedback loops in behavioral self-regulation. What had been missing from earlier
models was simply an awareness of the important role played by attentional focus
in the process of self-regulation.

Conclusion
We perceive the evolving ideas of theorists such as Bandura, Mischel, and Kanfer
to be more appropriate to the cybernetic paradigm than the behavioristic paradigm.
And we suggest that the time may be ripe for a broader awareness of the utility of
the assumptions of control theory as an underlying meta-theory bearing on the
nature of self-regulating systems.
Conclusion 347

In addition to the problems with the reinforcement concept mentioned above,

there are at least two characteristics of the field of personality-social psychology
today that have been associated in the past with changes in paradigm (Kuhn, T.S.,
1970). First, the field does currently have something of a crisis of confidence, for
a variety of reasons. There has been a good deal of recent debate over the problems
of the field, how to resolve them, and indeed whether they are resolvable (e.g.,
Deutsch, 1976; Gergen, 1973, 1976; Greenwald, 1976; Harris, 1976; Hendrick,
1976; Lewin, M.A., 1977; Manis, 1975, 1976; Nelson & Kannenberg, 1976;
Rychlak, 1976; Schlenker, 1974, 1976; Secord, 1977; Sherif, 1977). This crisis
of confidence is now sufficiently pervasive that many tend to view it as permanent,
as the normal state of affairs.
Second, this is a period in which the ideas of the new paradigm are being put
to effective use in other areas of psychology, and personality-social psychologists
are becoming increasingly aware of those applications. For example, information-
processing ideas dominate theory construction in cognitive psychology, and the
possible relevance of those theories for understanding social behavior is becoming
more and more apparent (see Mischel, 1979). Another illustration comes from the
developing literature of health psychology and behavioral medicine. Theorists in
that area are increasingly coming to view the human being as an intricate health
care system, in which various functions are monitored and self-regulated at a variety
of levels (e.g., Leventhal et aI., 1980; Schwartz, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b). The
importance of these applications of control theory to areas other than personality-
social psychology stems from the fact that, historically, one determinant of whether
a new paradigm is given serious consideration is its degree of success in other fields
(Kuhn, 1970).
The awareness of anomalies for which the existing paradigm does not account
well, a sense of crisis and loss of confidence, and the availability of a potential
successor-all of these conditions suggest the possibility of a change in paradigm.
But whether the change actually occurs in such circumstances depends on whether
the relevant scientific community can be induced to adopt the challenger. There are
three potential inducements. In some cases, the proponents of a new paradigm may
be able to offer resolutions of long-standing anomalies. And it has been argued
elsewhere (see, e.g., Annett, 1969; Powers, 1973a, 1973b) that control theory
offers just that potential with regard to anomalies in the learning paradigm.
Even if direct resolution of a long-standing anomaly is not forthcoming, a new
paradigm may gain credibility by leading to the prediction of phenomena that had
thus far been unsuspected, phenomena that would not have been predicted from
the old paradigm. We suggest that aspects of the data discussed in this book fall
into precisely this category. For example, in research discussed in Chapter 15 we
predicted that the "arousal" increase caused by an audience in a social facilitation
setting was actually a momentary fluctuation, and that physiological states during
performance periods would be quite different. No other perspective that we are
aware of would have made that prediction.
Scientists are most easily persuaded when long-standing problems are resolved,
or when new information is predicted and found. But Kuhn has argued that there
348 18. Afterword: Theory and Meta-Theory

is one other important source of persuasion for the scientific mind. ''These are the
arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the individual's sense of
the appropriate or the aesthetic-the new theory is said to be 'neater,' 'more
suitable,' or 'simpler' than the old" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 155). This aesthetic appeal is
not just a helpful supplement in the adoption of a new paradigm. In Kuhn's view,
such considerations may often be decisive. "Something must make at least a few
scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track, and sometimes it is only
personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that." (Kuhn, 1970,
p. 158). Ultimately, the new paradigm must be supported by a great deal of sys-
tematic evidence, in order to be regarded as the more useful perspective. But the
scientific community often must grant it a grace period, to allow that usefulness
to become apparent. And the successful obtaining of such grace periods may depend
on such nonscientific considerations as confidence in the aesthetic rightness of the
assumptions.
Why is such a period needed? Put quite simply, the data do not always convince
the adherents of the preexisting paradigm that the new paradigm is superior. This
is not necessarily a matter of reluctance on the part of the establishment to admit
an "error." In point of fact, data are often subject to mUltiple interpretations. In a
very real sense, the two competing groups are perceiving different things when they
look at the same set of information bearing on a theoretical question. Each makes
certain assumptions that the other is unwilling to grant. Moreover, even though the
assumptions of the two paradigms are in some respects fundamentally incompatible
with each other, it does not necessarily follow that these assumptions can easily
be tested against each other. All too commonly, such tests will be viewed by one
or the other side as a test of a straw man. The result is that adherence to one or
the other paradigm may often become a matter of loyalty to one or another aesthetic.
Will the control-theory perspective develop that sort of acceptance and following?
It is much too early to say. The concepts of cybernetics have been available for the
field's use at least since Cannon's (1929, 1932) discussion of homeostasis. They
were explicitly introduced some time ago to people interested in human learning,
in an ambitious book by Smith and Smith (1966). But the field of personality-social
psychology either has not yet really been exposed to such ideas, or has not yet been
ready to give them serious scrutiny. We hope that the discussion of cybernetic
concepts in this book marks the beginning of such scrutiny.
In this book we have presented an outline of one kind of control-theory approach
to the understanding of human behavior, based partly on variations in attentional
focus. It is certainly not the only approach to human self-regulation that could be
derived from control theory. And, despite its integrative potential, it is far from
being completely articulated. We believe, however, that it is a promising beginning.
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Author Index
Abelson, R.P. 70-71,90, 131, 134,
269, 334, 349, 354, 376, 386
Abramson, L.Y. 181,214,251-255,
349
Adams, N.E. 238, 239, 351
Adelman, H.F. 345, 375
Adennan, D. 146, 205-206, 212-213,
380
Agnew, I. viii, 35, 351
Agnew, M. 302, 349
Agnew, N. 302,349
Ajzen, I. 269-271,280,349,360
Alexander, C.N., Ir. 308, 349
Allen, A. 82,272,281,352
Allen, V.L. 89, 123, 125, 349, 384
Alloy, L.B. 181,349
Allport, G.W. 308, 349
Alpert, R. 228, 349
Altman, F. 233, 357
Anand, D.K. 11,349
Anderson, C. 84, 381
Anderson, I.R. 15, 60, 64-66, 349,
358
Anderson, T.H. 229, 235, 384
Andreoli, V. 124,385
Annett, I. 344,347,350
Annis, A.B. 293, 294, 296, 373
Appel, M.A. 229, 235, 363
Appelman, A.I. 264, 350
Appelman, A.S. 264, 350
Appley, M.H. 28,287,350
Appleyard, D. 122, 350
Apsler, R. 308, 350
Archer, R.L. 204, 350
Argyle, M. 43, 313, 350
Arkes, H.R. 119, 350
Arkin, R.M. 102, 256-257, 264, 308,
324, 350, 360, 364
Annstrong, D.M. 139, 350
Arnold, M.B. 104, 350
Arnold, S.E. 329, 364
Aronson, E. 124, 213, 350, 356
Asch, S.E. 311,313,350
Astin, A.W. 79, 350
Atkinson, I.W. 119, 188, 198,
243-249, 260, 350-351, 369
Austin, G.A. 59, 353
Austin,I.B. 308, 369
Avener, M. 228, 368
Avia, M.D. 238, 351
Avis, N.E. 73, 369
Badhom, E. 229,235,239,247,363
Baer, R. 158, 351
Bagozzi, R.P. 269, 351
Balakrishnan, A.V. 11,351
Bandura, A. 20, 198, 214, 238-240,
341-346, 351
Bannister, D. viii, 35, 351
Barclay, A.M. 328,383
Barefoot, I.C. 105,107,351
Barker, R.G. 77-79, 122, 351
Bames, R.D. 176, 323, 364
Baron, R.A. 152, 351
Baron, R.S. 288, 290-292, 302-303,
305,351,370,376,379
388
Bartlett, F.C. 59, 86, 351
Barton, R. 181, 367
Bastian, J.R. 244, 350
Battistich, V.A. 79, 351
Battle, E. 189, 351
Baumeister, R.F. 264, 351
Beaman, A.L. 154-156, 172,351,357
Beasley, C.M., Jr. 64,349
Beavin, J.H. 307,383
Beck, A.T. 181,351
Beck, R. 79, 351
Beckman, L. 256, 352
Bern, D.J. 82, 115, 190, 269, 272,
281,284, 330, 336, 338, 352
Benson, J.S. 252, 352
Bentler, P.M. 269, 352
Berg, J.H. 204, 350
Berglas, S. 256, 263, 265, 352, 365
Berkovitz, L.D. 11,352
Berlyne, D.E. 34, 52, 352
Bernstein, W.M. 216-217,255,257,
352,380
Berscheid, E. 86, 123, 126, 323, 328,
352, 379, 383
Beyer, J. 238-239, 351
Biernat, J.J. 108, 367
Billig, M. 123, 352
Birch, D. 119, 350
Bishop, G.D. 85, 362
Bittker, T.E. 304-305, 385
Black, J.S. 270, 363
Blake, R.R. 313, 371
Blaney, P.H. 105, 108,206,209,
212-213, 224, 226-228, 239, 253,
284, 299, 354
Blank, A. 70, 366
Blank, T.O. 290,301,352
Blashfield, R.K. 78, 374
Blevings, G. 304, 362
Block, J. 82, 352
Blumenthal, A.L. 137, 138, 352
Bois, J. 91, 372
Bolles, R.C. 287, 352
Bond, C.F., Jr. 299-300, 353
Bonoma, T.V. 308,337,381
Bootzin, R.R. 252, 375
Borden, R.J. 301,353
Borgida, E. 72, 372
Author Index
Borkovec, T.D. 292, 379
Bouffard, D.L. 122, 374
Bourne, L.E., Jr. 34-35, 353
Bower, G.H. 64,74,80,97, 353,374
Boyes-Braem, P. 79, 82, 375
Bradley, G.W. 256, 264, 308-309, 353
Bransford, J.D. 62, 64, 80, 353, 360
Brehm, J.W. 157-160, 252-253,
327-329, 334, 353, 362, 368,
384-385
Brewer, M.B. 89, 353
Brickman, P. 150, 248, 263, 364, 382
Briggs, S.R. 324-325, 353
Brinberg, D. 269, 364
Broadbent, D.E. 34, 353
Brock, T.C. 44-45, 53, 145, 356
Brockner, J. 210--214, 299, 353
Brody, N. 12, 353
Brooks, J. viii, 35, 104, 367
Brooks, L. 61, 353
Brooks, V.B. 24, 157,353
Brooks-Gunn, J. viii, 368
Brounstein, P.J. 158, 353
Brown, D. 111-112, 367
Brown, I., Jr. 238, 353
Bruner, J.S. 59, 83, 353
Brunson, B.1. 254, 353
Brush, C.A. 172, 379
Bryant, J. 109, 386
Buchsbaum, M.S. 304-305, 385
Buck, R. 105, 107,353
Buckert, U. 248, 353
Buckley, W.F. viii,353
Burger, J.M. 264, 350
Burnkrant, R.E. 269, 351
Buss, A.H. 45-48, 50, 54-55, 145,
152-153, 274, 284, 300, 310, 318,
324-325, 353-354, 359, 370, 377
Buss, D.M. 102,274,284,318,354,
377
Calder, B.J. 269, 354
Calvert-Boyanowski, J. 110, 354
Campbell, J. 255, 381
Cannon, W.B. 26, 348, 354
Cantor, N. 79-82, 85, 87-89, 95-96,
323, 354, 379
Cardoze, S. 73, 369
Author Index
Carles, E.M. 124, 354
Carlsmith, J.M. 55, 213, 308, 334,
350, 354, 358
Carroll, J.S. 74, 354
Cartwright-Smith, J. 105, 107, 109,
366-367
Carver, C.S. 37-38, 45, 48-49, 53-54,
101,105, 108-109, 113-115, 124,
145, 147-150, 152-154, 157-163,
178, 194, 199, 206, 208-209,
212-213,216-217,223-228,230,
233,236-240,247,253,255-259,
261,265,282-284,291,293,296,
299-301,309, 311, 313-316, 319,
325, 328-329, 331-333, 354-355,
359-361,377,379,381-382
Ceely, S.G. 95, 369
Chambliss, e.A. 240, 355
Chanowitz, B. 70, 84, 366
Chapin, J. 153, 377
Chaplin, W. 181,367
Chapman, A.J. 292, 355
Chapman, D.W. 191,355
Chapman, J.P. 74, 82, 355
Chapman, L.J. 74, 82, 355
Charis, P.C. 105, 370
Cheek, J.M. 324-325, 353
Chein, I. 270, 355
Chodoff, P. 196, 360
Chomsky, N. 62,355
Cialdini, R.B. 316, 355
Cisneros, T. 1I2, 368
Clark, R.A. 244, 369
Clary, E.G. 140, 355
Close, M. 84, 381
Cochran, S.T. 264, 350
Cohen, C.E. 88-89, 95, 355
Cohen, J.L. 292, 355
Cohen, S. 252, 355
Colby, C.Z. 105, 107, 109,366
Collins, B.E. 94, 336, 366, 381
Conlee, M.e. 140, 381
Conolley, E.S. 124, 355
Cook, R.E. 190-191,384
Cooley, C.H. viii, 308, 356
Cooper, J. 123, 126, 385
Cottrell, N.B. 288-290,301,356
Courtois, M.R. 237, 371
389
Covington, M.V. 216-217,259,356
Cox, J. 189, 383
Coyne, J.C. 265, 367
Craik, F.I.M. 97, 356
Craik, K.H. 78-79, 356
Crandall, R. 72, 372
Crane, K.A. 160, 368
Crespi, I. 269, 356
Crocker, J. 80, 82, 85, 94, 381
Crowne, D.P. 48, 189, 191,308,
311-312, 356, 375, 380
Crutchfield, R.A. 311, 356
Csepeli, G. 89, 123, 357
Czerlinsky, T. 316,372
Dabbs, J.M., Jr. 292-293,305,356,
365
D' Agostino, J. 82, 381
D'Andrade, R.O. 82,378
Dann, H.D. 89, 123, 357
Darley, J.M. 124, 309, 356, 367
Davis, D. 44-45, 53, 145, 356
Davis, J.H. 292, 355
Davis, K.E. 85, 190, 365
Davis, M.H. 216-217,255,257,352,
380
Davis, M.H.A. 11, 356
Davison, L. 112, 380
Day, K.D. 109, 386
Deci, E. 345, 356
Deffenbacher, J.L. 227,229,233,356
DeFleur, M.L. 280, 383
DeFour, D. 176, 357
DeGregorio, E. 256, 259, 354
Deitz, S.R. 233, 356
Dembo, T. 195, 197-198,367
Dermer, M. 86, 323, 352
Deutsch, M. 311,313,347,356
Devlin, A.S. 79, 357
Dienet, C.1. 191,357
Diener, E. 154-156, 171-177,
320-321,351,357
Dineen, J. 176, 357
Dintzer, L. 254, 385
Dipboye, R.L. 172, 357
Doctor, R.M. 233, 357
Doise, S. 89, 123, 357
Dominowski, R.L. 34-35, 353
390
Donner, L. 229, 357
Doob, A.N. 109, 158, 357, 386
Dovalina, I. 73, 369
Downing, L.L. 140, 355
Dransfield, P. 11, 357
Driscoll, J.M. 187,367
Dulany, D.E. 341,357
Duncan, B.L. 88-89, 357
Dutta, S. 88, 357
Duval, S. 31,33,35,41,43,53,
102-103, 143-146, 156, 162, 165,
203-206, 208-209, 213-214, 289,
291, 298, 313, 328-329, 350, 358,
384
Duval, V.H. 102, 358
Dweck, C.S. 191,252-253, 357-358
Earl, R.W. 244,350
Easterbrook, J.A. 235, 358
Ebbesen, E.B. 93, 151, 195,330,334,
354-355, 370, 379
Edwards, A.L. 48, 358
Edwards, W. 197,358
Ehrlich, H.J. 123, 358
Einhorn, H.J. 72, 74, 75, 82, 358
Ekdahl, A.G. 301,358
Ekehammar, B. lII, 368
Ekman, P. 109, 358
Eiig, T.W. 190, 192, 358
Elio, R. ~5, 358
Elliott, G.c. 323, 358
Ellsworth, P.C. 55, 358
Engquist,G. 90-91,111-112,139,
367, 372
Epstein, S. 82, 96, 271-272, 284, 359
Eriksen, C.W. 49, 334, 361
Erikson, E. viii, 359
Estes, W.K. 75, 359
Etcoff, N.L. 89, 381
Evans, M. 86-88, 93, 375
Evenbeck, S. 316, 355
Everhart, D. 106, 110, 367
Exner, J.E., Jr. 45,359
Eysenck, H. 229, 359
Fair, P.L. 109, 378
Fazio, R.H. 273,276-281,359,372,
374
Author Index
Feather, N.T. 188-189, 191-192,207,
246, 250, 260, 359
Federoff, N.A. 103-104, 359
Feigenbaum, R. 256, 365
Fenigstein, A. 45-47, 50, 53-55,
152-153, 178,300,310,312,359,
377
Fenton, M. 158, 351
Ferris; C.B. 41, 146, 210, 364
Festinger, L. 124, 148, 165-166, 171,
192,195, 197-198,327,359,360,
363,367
Fine, R.L. 203-206, 208-209,
213-214, 358
Fink, D. 105, 361
Fishbein, M. 269-271,280,349,360
Fiske, S.T. 74, 84-86, 89, 93, 94,
360, 366, 381
Fitts, P.M. 138, 360
Flax, R. 176, 357
Folger, R. 345, 375
Follansbee, D.J. 230, 233, 236--238,
355
Fontaine, G. 191,216,360
Frankel, A. 128, 255-256, 259-262,
264-265, 360
Franks, J.J. 62, 64, 80, 353, 360
Fraser, S.c. 172, 357
Fredericksen, N. 79, 122, 360
Freibergs, V. 88, 357
Freidman, S. 196, 360
French, E.G. 250, 360
Freud, S. 307, 360
Frey, D. 103, 120, 264, 360, 384
Friedman, H.S. 55, 358
Friesen, W.V. 109,358
Frieze, I.H. 190-192, 247-249, 358,
360,383
Froming, W.J. 49,311,313-314,
318-321,360
Fromm, E. 171, 360
Fulero, S. 86--88, 93, 375
Funder, D.C. 336, 338, 352
Gabrenya, W.K., Jr. 264,324,350,
360
Gaes, G.G. 308,336--337,360
Galanter, E. 16, 30, 144, 342, 370
Author Index
Gange, 1.1. 292, 297, 361
Ganzer, V.J. 229,254,361,376
Garner, W.R. 49, 334, 361
Garske, J.P. 119,350
Gastorf, J. 124, 380
Geen, R.G. 229,235,238,292,297,
361
Geller, V. 44,53, 100--101,291,361
Gerard, H.B. 87-89, 124, 311-313,
355-356, 361, 386
Gergen, K.J. viii, 36, 48, 347, 361,
371
Gibbons, F.X. 37,113-115,146,
153-154, 203-205, 208, 213,
223-227, 247, 273, 276, 279-280,
283, 361, 374, 377
Gibson, E.J. 36, 361
Gifford, R.K. 85, 362
Gilligan, S.G. 97,353
Gilliland, L. 100, 382
Gillis, R. 256, 259, 354
Ginosar, Z. 73, 361
Giuliano, T. 53-54, 178,383
Glass, D.C. 48, 252, 288-289, 292,
301,355,363,366
Glazeski, R.C. 229, 233, 235, 239,
247,363
Gleason, I.M. 256-257, 350
Glucksberg, S. 60, 369
Goethals, G.R. 124, 361
Gotz, J. 328, 361
Goetz, T .E. 252, 358
Gotz-Marchand, B. 328, 361
Goffman, E. 163, 308, 361
Goldfoot, D.A. 107, 365
Goldsmith, R. 62, 373
Goldstein, D. 105, 361
Goldstein, M. 191,216,384
Golledge, R.G. 79, 371
Goodnow, J.J. 59,353
Gordon, C. viii, 361
Gottlieb, J. 309, 361
Gouge, C. 89, 123, 357
Gough, H. 210, 361
Gray, W. 79,82,375
Graziano, W. 86, 323, 352
Greenberg, I. 153, 371
Greenberg, J. 156, 204, 361-362
391
Greene, D. 345, 367
Greenwald, A.G. 95, 135, 307-308,
347,362
Griffith, M. 252, 362
Gross, A.E. 308, 354
Grush, J .E. 301, 302, 362
Guerny, B.G., Jf. 229,357
Guilford, J.P. 30,48,209,303,362
Gump, P.V. 79,362
Guyton, A.C. 25, 362
Haber, R.N. 228, 349
Hagerman, S. 353, 365
Hake, H.W. 49, 334, 361
Halisch, F. 195, 254, 362
Hamberg, D.A. 196,360
Hamilton, D.L. 85, 88-89, 362
Hammock, T. 158, 362
Hanusa, B.H. 151, 195,252,262,362,
377
Hardy, A.B. 239, 351
Hare, R.D. 304, 362
Harris, R.J. 347,362
Harrison, J. 292, 362
Harvey, J.H. 103-104, 359
Harvey, O. 98, 364
Hasher, L. 13 7, 362
Hass, R.G. 51,316,362
Hassenstein, B. 26-27, 362
Hastorf, A.H. 80, 82, 256, 363
Hayes-Roth, B. 61, 363
Hayes-Roth, F. 61,363
Hazaleus, S.L. 233, 356
Head, H. 59, 363 .
Hebb, D.O. 83, 363
Heberlein, T.A. 270, 363
Heckhausen, H. 190-191, 195,246,
254, 362-363, 384
Heider, F. 90, 190,256-257,363
Helson, H. 28, 363
Henchy, T. 288-289,292,301,363
Hendrick, C. 347, 363
Hensley, V. 102,358
Hepburn, C. 123, 368
Herman, c.P. 316, 355
Hestenes, M.R. 11, 363
Higgins, E.T. 73,83,84, 101,363
Hill, K.T. 236, 238, 372
392
Hinkle, S. 158, 351
Hiroto, D.S. 251-252, 260, 363
Hiscock, M. 48, 363
Hoffman, P.J. 124, 363
Hogarth, R.M. 74-75, 82, 358
Hokanson, J.E. 265, 376
Holden, K.B. 189, 363
Holland, J.L. 79, 350
Hollandsworth, J.G., Jr. 229,233,235,
239,247,363
Holmes, D.S. 107, 112, 363, 369
Holroyd, K.A. 229,235,239,247,363
Holzman, P.S. 320, 363
Hood, R. 273, 276, 279-280, 374
Hormuth, S.E. 113-115,204,350,361
Hornstein, H.A. 89, 363
Hossay, J. 112,368
Houston, B.K. 112, 302, 363
Hovland, C.1. 98, 279, 364, 378
Howard, J.W. 89, 123, 364
Howells, G.N. 239, 351
Hoyt, M.E. 55, 358
Hubbard, M. 84, 92-93, 369, 375
Huesmann, L.R. 213, 381
Hull, c.L. 49,287,297,341,364
Hull, J.G. 37-38, 99, 103-104, 145,
263,364
Hulton, A.J.B. 210-211,353
Humphries, C. 162-163, 355
Hunt, J. MeV. 30,364
Ickes, W. 41,48-49, 146, 176, 190,
210,311,323,325,364,382
Innes, J.M. 289, 299-300, 364
Inouye, D.K. 238, 353
Insko, C.A. 329, 364
Irle, M. 328, 361
Ittelson, W.H. 79, 364
Izard, C.E. 104, 364
Jaccard, J. 269, 364
Jackson, D.D. 307, 383
Jacobs, P.D. 252, 381
Jacobson, L.1. 239, 371
James, W. viii, 34, 364
Janoff-Bulman, R. 263, 364
Jaynes, J. 138, 364
Jellison, J. 308, 364
Jenkins, H.M. 74-75, 364, 383
Author Index
Jessor, R. 188, 364
Johnson, D. 79, 82, 375
Johnson, J.E. 112, 292-293, 305, 356,
364-365
Johnson, M.K. 35, 374
Johnson, M.P. 269, 377
Johnson, R.C. 109, 386
Johnson, S. 229, 365
Johnson, T. 256, 365
Johnston, S. 256-257,350
Joncas, A.J. 334, 354
Jones, A. 30, 365
Jones, C.R. 73, 83-84, 101, 363
Jones, E.E. 85, 181, 190,256-257,
263-265, 351-352, 365
Jones, G.E. 229,233,235,239,247,
363
Jones, R.A. 158, 191, 195,365
Jones, R.W. 26, 365
Jones, S.C. 124, 365
Jones, S.L. 252, 365
Jones, T.M. 302, 363
Kahneman, D. 34, 72-74, 140, 303,
365,382
Kalle, R.J. 308, 336-337, 360
Kameya, L.J. 237,378
Kanfer, F.H. 107,238,342-344,346,
351, 365
Kannenberg, P.H. 347,371
Kanungo, R.N. 88, 357
Karabenick, S.A. 260, 366
Karoly, P. 195,343,365-366
Kasprzyk, D. 176, 357
Katahne, M. 229, 236, 371
Katcher, A.H. 109, 386
Keele, S.W. 61-63, 80, 373
Kelem, R.T. 172,357
Kellerman, H. 105, 373
Kelley, H.H. 85, 190, 256, 366
Kelly, G.A. 59,366
Kendzierski, D. 97, 366
Kennelly, K.J. 252, 352
Kenrick, D.T. 82, 272, 366
Kidd, R.F. 190, 364
Kiesler, C.A. 278,311,336,366
Kiesler, S.B. 311,366
Kimble, G.A. 137-138, 140, 185, 366
Kirker, W.S. 97,99,374
Author Index
Kirkland, K. 229,233,235,239,247,
363
Kirschenbaum, D.S. 195, 366
Kleck, R.E. 105, 107-109, 366--367
Klein, H.M. 100, 382
Kientz, B. 154-156, 351
Klerman, G.L. 109, 378
Kline, P.J. 64, 349
Kline, T. 124, 355
Knight, G.W. 308, 349
Knox, R. 269, 364
Konechi, V.J. 108, 366
Korman, A.K. 119, 366
Kozlowski, L.T. 316, 355
Krantz, D.S. 252, 366
Kriss, M. 86, 374
Kubal, L. 252, 375
Kuhn, A. viii, 366
Kuhn, T.S. 4, 199, 347-348, 366
Kuiper, N.A. 96-97,99,374
Kukla, A. 190-192,247-249,259,
383-384
Labov, W. 60,366
Lacey, B.C. 304,366
Lacey, J.1. 304, 366
LaCross, K. 92, 372
Laird, J.D. 334-335, 385
Langer, E.J. 70,84, 137,366
Lanzetta, J.T. 105, 107-109, 187,
366--367
Larsen, K. 89, 123, 357
Laszlo, E. viii, 367
Latane, B. 309, 367
Lavelle, T.L. 265, 367
Lawhon, J. 124, 380
Lawrence, D. 124, 363
Layden, M.A. 176, 364
Layton, B. 256, 377
Lazarus, R.S. 110, 112, 367, 380
leBon, G. 171,367
Lecky, P. 308,367
Lee, J.F. 229, 235, 384
Lefcourt, H.M. 188-189, 367
Leone, C. 140, 381
Lepper, M.R. 74,84,87,334,345,
354, 367-368, 375, 386
Lerman, D. 199-200, 214-215, 384
Leventhal, H. 105-107, 1l0-1l2,
393
178-180, 200, 292-293, 305, 347,
354, 356, 365, 367
Levi, L. 104, 367
Levy, A.S. 37-38,99, 103-104, 145,
316, 355, 364
Lewin, K. 193, 195-198,367
Lewin, M.A. 347,367
Lewinsohn, P.M. 181,367
Lewis, M. viii, 35, 104, 367-368
Leyens, J. 112, 368
Liebert, R.M. 233,368,371,380
Liebling, B.A. 44, 230, 298-299, 368
Linder, D.E. 160, 368
Lindskold, S. 177,368
Lingle, J.H. 84, 368
Litwin, G.H. 244, 248, 350-351
Liverant, S. 188-189, 191,375
Lockhart, R.S. 97,356
Locksley, A. 123, 368
Loehlin, J.C. 30, 368
Loftis, J. 109, 368
Loftus, E.F. 34-35, 353
Logel, M.L. 305, 370
Lopyan, K. 320-321, 360
Lord, C.G. 36,87,93,368
Lowell, E.L. 244, 369
Lublin, S.C. 172, 379
Ludwig, G.W. 189, 367
Lusk, R. 176, 357
MacKinnon, p.e.B. 292, 362
Maehr, M.L. 123, 375
Magnusson, D. Ill, 368
Mahoney, M.J. 88, 228, 238, 368
Maier, S.F. 251,368,378
Malmo, R.B. 292, 368
Mancuso, J.C. 30,95, 137,368-369
Mandel, M.R. 109, 378
Mandler, G. 48, 139, 229, 236, 369
Manis, M. 73,347,369
Mann, R.W. 316, 362
Many, M.A. 229,369
Many, W.A. 229, 369
Markus, H. 97-98, 100, 369
Marlett, N.J. 229, 236, 369
Marlowe, D. 48, 308, 311-312, 356
Martens, R. 292-295, 369
Maruyama, M. 22, 369
Maslach, C. 313, 376
394
Maslow, A.H. 308,369
Mason, J.W. 196, 360
Massad, C.M. 92-93, 369
Massad, P. 252, 365
Matthews, K.A. 254, 353
McCaul, K.D. 107, 369
McClelland, D.C. 244, 369
McCloskey, M.E. 60,369
McConnell, H.K. 330, 352
McDonald, P.J. 212-213, 369
McFarland, D.J. 24, 157,369
McGill, D. 30, 365
McGovern, L.P. 309, 369
McMahan,I.D. 191,216,369
McMillen, D.L. 308, 369
Mead, G.H. viii, 308, 369
Mechanic, D. 106, 110, 113, 369-370
Medin, D.L. 61,370
Melzack, R. 110, 370
Mervis, C. 79, 82, 121, 375
Metaisky, GJ. 265, 367
Mettee, D.R. 105, 361
Meunier, C. 238, 370
Meyer, D. 106, 112, 179-180, 347,
367
Meyer, J.P. 191, 370
Meyer, W. 190-191,248,353,384
Miezin, F.M. 24, 371
Milavsky, B. 109,386
Miller, D.T. 217,256-257,264,308,
370
Miller, F.D. 85, 379
Miller, G.A. 16, 30, 144, 342, 370
Miller,I.W. 251-252, 370
Miller, J.G. viii, 12, 370
Miller, L.C. 46, 370
Miller, N. 176,336,366,386
Miller, N.E. 287,370
Miller, R. 92, 372
Miller, R.S. 63, 375
Miller, R.T. 259, 370
Miller, W.R. 189, 370
Mills, J. 158, 353
Minsky, M.A. 70-71,90,370
Mirels, H.L. 258, 370
Mischel, W. 79-82,85,87,89,95-96,
151, 181, 195,211,269,341-343,
346-347, 354, 367, 370
Misovich, S. 105, 370
Author Index
Monk-Jones, M.E. 292, 362
Monson, R. 86, 323, 352
Monson, T.C. 281,322,379
Montgomery, G.K. 305, 370
Moore, D.L. 288, 290-291, 303, 305,
351,370,376
Moore, G.T. 79, 370-371
Moos, R.H. 77,79,371
Mordkoff, A. 112, 380
Morgan, W.P. 52, 106, 107, 112,371
Morris, L.W. 233,368,371,380
Morrissey, J.F. 112, 365
Morse, S. 48, 371
Mosher, D.L. 153-154, 371
Mouton, J.S. 313, 371
Mueller, J.H. 237, 371
Mullen, B. 179, 371
Murdoch, P. 288,301,373
Murphy, R. 46, 370
Murray, E.J. 239-240, 355, 37l
Musham, C. 204, 362
Myerson, J. 24, 371
Nation, J.R. 252, 365
Neale, I.M. 229, 236, 371
Nebergall, R.E. 279, 378
Neely, R. 102, 358
Neisser, U. 36, 86, 93, 371
Nelson, C.E. 81,347,371,375
Nelson, P.C. 189, 371
Nelson, R.E. 124, 361
Nerenz, D. 106, 112, 179-180,347,
367
Nesdale, A.R. 110, 376
Neumann, P.G. 64-65,121,371
Newcomb, T.M. 162-163, 171,360,
371-372
Newell, A. 30, 372, 379
Newman, L.S. 271,383
Newtson, D. 90-93, 139, 316, 369,
372
Nierenberg, R. 191,216,384
Nisbett, R.E. 72, 109, 190, 365, 372
Norman, D.A. 34, 43, 372
Norman, W.H. 251-252, 370
Nottelman, E.D. 236, 238, 372
Obrist, P.A. 305, 372
Ogata, K. 11, 372
Author Index
Oldfield, R.C. 59, 372
Olmstead, J.A. 313, 371
Olson, J.M. 280-281,372
Omelich, C.L. 216-217,259,356
Orne, M.T. 49, 372
Ortiz, V. 123, 368
Ortony, A. 67, 376
Osmond, H. 77,372
Ostell, A. 89, 123, 357
Ostrom, T.M. 84, 368
Ostrove, N. 158, 353
Otis, A.S. 48, 372
Overmier, J.B. 251,372
Page, R. 161, 336, 379
Paulson, F.L. 237, 378
Paulus, P.B. 288,293-294,296,301,
373
Pennebaker, J.W. 106,373
Pepitone, A. 171,360
Perlick, D. 55, 358
Perlmuter, L.C. 137-138, 140, 185,
366
Pervin, L.A. 272, 373
Peterson, L.M. 230, 233, 236-238, 355
Peterson, M. 275, 382, 385
Petty, R.E. 316, 355
Pew, R.W. 24,373
Phares, E.1. 188-189,191,371,373
Phillips, S. 252, 355
Piliavin,I.M. 309, 373'
Piliavin, J.A. 309, 373, 383
Pindyck, R.S. 11,373
Pittman, T.S. 187, 335, 380
Plomin, R. 48, 354
Plutchik, R. 104, 373
Polefka, J. 80, 82, 256, 363
Pollock, M.L. 52, 106-107, 112, 371
Porges, S.W. 305, 373
Posner, M.1. 34,61-63,80, 137,373
Potepan, P.A. 249, 384
Potter, E.F. 238, 373
Powers, W.T. 11,15, 17,20,22,25,
68-69, 71, 76, 104, 111, 127, 129,
131,134,136, 139-140, 177, 193,
257,346-347,373
Prentice-Dunn, S. 175, 177,373
Pribram, K.H. 16, 30, 144, 342, 370
Price, R.H. 78, 122, 373-374
395
Propst, L.R. 177, 368
Pryor, J.B. 86, 273, 276, 279-280, 374
Rachman, S. 229, 359
Radloff, R. 124, 374
Raven, B.H. 313, 374
Ray, R.E. 153, 374
Raye, c.L. 35, 374
Read, S.J. 125-126, 380
Readio, 1. 188, 364
Reed, H. 72, 372
Reed, L. 190-192, 247-249, 383
Reed, S.K. 59, 61-62, 374
Regan, D.T. 124,277,365,374
Reitman, J.S. 63-64, 80, 374
Repucci, N.D. 191,252,358
Rest, S. 190-192, 247-249, 383
Reyes, R.M. 74, 374
Rholes, W.J. 73,83-84, 101,363
Rindner, R.J. 92, 372
Risner, H.T. 293-294, 296, 373
Rittle, R.H. 288, 301, 356
Rivera, A.N. 308, 374
Rogers, C.R. 308, 374
Rogers, P.J. 96-97,99,374
Rogers, R.W. 175, 177,373
Rogers, T.B. 96-97,99,273,374
Rosch, E. 60,63,66,79,82, 121,
374-375
Rosenbaum, R.M. 190-192, 247-249,
383
Rosenberg, M. 195, 375
Rosenberg, S. 81,375
Rosenfield, D. 255-259, 264, 308,
345, 375, 379-380
Ross, L. 74, 76, 84, 87, 109, 368, 375
Ross, M. 102-103,217,256-257,264,
269, 308, 335, 354, 370, 375, 378
Roth, S. 251-253, 375
Rothbart, M. 86-89,93, 123, 252,
355, 364, 375
Rotter, G.S. 312, 361
Rotter, J.B. 188-191,341,351,363,
375
Rousey, C. 320, 363
Rubovits, P.C. 123, 375
Ruderman, A.J. 84, 89, 381
Rule, B.G. 110, 238, 370, 376
Rumelhart, D.E. 67,376
396
Russell, D. 199-200, 214-215, 384
Rychlak, J.F. 347,376
Sacco, W.P. 265, 376
Sadalla, E. 308, 383
Salt, P. 109, 378
Sanders, G.S. 288,290-291,302-303,
305,351,370,376
Santee, R.T. 313, 376
Sarason, LG. 229-230, 235, 237-238,
254, 260, 376
Sarason, S.B. 48, 229, 369
Saville, M.R. 188, 359
Schachter, S. 104-107,109, Ill, 124,
190, 198, 372, 376
Schaffer, M.M. 61,370
Schank, R.C. 70-71,90, 131, 134,376
Scheier, M.F. 37,45-50,54-55,
101-102, 108-109, 113-115, 145,
147-150, 152-153, 159-160, 206,
208-209, 212-213, 217, 223-228,
230,233,236-239,247,253,261,
265,274,284,291,293,296,
299-301, 310-3Il, 314-316, 318,
325, 328-329, 331-333, 354-355,
359,361, 376-377, 382
Schill, T.R. 153, 377
Schlenker, B.R. 264,308,337,347,
377, 381
Schmalt, H. 248, 353
Schmidt, R.A. 131, 138, 377
Schneider, D. 80, 82, 256, 363, 377
Schneider, W. 137,377,378
Schopler, J. 256, 377
Schroder, H.M. 30, 377
Schulz, R. 151, 195, 252, 262, 362,
377
Schuman, H. 269, 377
Schwartz, G.E. 27,109, 167, 178-180,
347, 377-378
Sears, P.S. 195, 197-198, 367
Sechrest, L.B. 229, 365
Secord, P.F. 347,378
Seeman, M. 188, 375
Seiler, M. 44, 368
Sekerak, G.J. 288,301,356
Seligman, M.E.P. 189, 214, 251-255,
260, 349, 363, 368, 370, 372, 378
Sells, S.B. 79, 378
Author Index
Shacham, S. Ill-lI2,367
Shaffer, D.R. 335, 378
Shallice, T. 24, 378
Shannon, C.E. 12, 378
Shaver, P. 44,53, 100-101,230,291,
298-299, 301, 352, 361, 368
Shaw, J.C. 30, 372
Sheffield, F.D. 287, 378
Sherif, C.W. 279, 378
Sherif, M. 98,279,347,364,378
Sherman, S.J. 125,256-257,378,385
Shiffrin, R.M. 137, 377, 378
Shulman, R.F. 335, 375
Shumaker, S.A. 78-79, 380
Shweder, R.A. 82,378
Sicoly, F. 102-103, 256-257, 375, 378
Sieber, J.E. 237,378
Sierad, J. 247, 250, 384
Sigall, H. 161, 336, 379
Simon, H.A. 30, 178, 186,223,344,
372,379
Simpson, C. 63, 375
Singer, J.E. 104-107, 109, Ill, 172,
376,379
Singerman, K.J. 292, 379
Skelton, J.A. 106, 373
Skinner, B.F. 341, 343, 379
Slapion, M.J. 233, 238, 379
Smedslund, J. 74, 379
Smith, E.R. 85, 379
Smith, K. 158, 351
Smith, K.U. 344, 348, 379
Smith, M.F. 344, 348, 379
Snyder, C.R.R. 137,373
Snyder, M. 48, 82, 88, 123, 126, 135,
280-282,317,322-324,330,334,
379
Snyder, M.L. 128, 158-159, 252,
255-262, 264-265, 308, 360, 366,
379-380
Sokolov, Y.N. 304-305, 380
Solodky, M. 320-321,383
Solomon, S. 107, 369
Songer, E. 329, 364
Songer-Nocks, E. 278, 380
Speckart, G. 269, 352
Speisman, J.C. Il2, 380
Spence, J.T. 229, 380
Spence, K.W. 49,229,287,341,380
Author Index
Spiegler, M.D. 233, 380
Spielberger, C.D. 230, 233, 380
Sprinzen, M. 85, 94, 381
Srull, T.K. 73,83,84,87-89, 101,
321,357,380
Staff, I. 301, 352
Steenbarger, B.N. 146, 205-206,
212-213, 380
Steinmetz, J. 74, 84, 375
Stephan, C. 255, 257-258, 380
Stephan, W.G. 216-217,255-258,
264, 308, 352, 379-380
Stephenson, B. 187,380
Stevens, L. 257, 380
Stokols, D. 78-79, 380
Stoops, R. 229, 235, 238, 254, 376
Stotiand, E. 198-199,380
Strack, F. 74, 84, 375
Strassberg, D.S. 189, 380
Straub, R.B. 105, 107,351
Straus, A. ll, 380
Strauss, N.L. 252, 358
Strickland, B.R. 312, 380
Stringfield, D.O. 82, 272, 366
Stroop, J.R. 44,53,101,380
Suedfeld, P. 30, 377
Suls, J. 124, 179,371,380
Sutarrnan 292, 381
Svanum, S. 154-156, 351
Swann, W.B., Jr. 82, 125-126, 187,
281,317,322,335,379-380
Tajfel, H. 123, 352
Tanke, E.D. 123, 126, 322, 379
Tannenbaum, P.H. 110, 381
Tarde, G. l71,381
Taylor, D.W. 30, 381
Taylor, S.E. 74, 80, 82, 84-86, 89,
94, 213, 366, 381
Taylor, T.H. 35, 374
Teasdale, J.D. 214, 251-255, 349
Tedeschi, J.T. 308,336-337,360,374,
381
Tesser, A. 140,255, 355, 381
Thomas, F.H. 250, 360
Thompson, E.G. 79, 351
Thompson, M.L. 292, 381
Thompson, S.c. 94, 381
Thompson, W.C. 74, 374
397
Thome, A. 82, 352
Thornton, J.W. 252, 381
Till, A. 256-257, 385
Tillman, W.S. 256-258, 381
Tognacci, L.N. 270, 383
Tolman, E.C. 7, 197,382
Tqrrey, J. 124, 360
Treisman, A.M. 34, 382
Triandis, H. 192, 382
Triplett, N. 287, 382
Trope, Y. 72-73, 150,248,361,382
Tryon, R.C. 271,382
Tulving, E. 97, 356
Turing, A.M. 19, 382
Turner, R.G. 48-49, 100-102,
274-275,311,318,323,325,382,
385
Tversky, A. 72-74, 82, 365, 382
Uranowitz, S. 88, 379
Valins, S. 105, 107, 382
Vallacher, R.R. 80,82,93,320-321,
382-383
Van Norman, L.R. 229, 233, 235, 239,
247,363
Vaughan, K.B. 105, 107, 109,366
Vaughan, R.C. 105, 107, 109,366
Velten, E. 108, 383
Vernon, D.T.A. 270, 383
Vivekananthan, P.S. 81,375
Volkmann, J.A. 191,355
von Bertalanffy, L. viii, 383
Wack, D.L. 288,301,356
Walker, C.E. 153, 374
Walker, G.R. 318-321,360
Wallace, J. 308, 383
Wallbom, M. 320, 357
Walls, R.T. 189, 383
Walster, E. 123, 309, 328, 352, 383
Walters, A. 107, 383
Ward, W.c. 74-75, 364, 383
Warner, L.G. 280, 383
Warren, R.E. 44, 101, 383
Wason, P.C. 74, 383
Watson, D.L. 229, 236, 369
Watzlawick, P. 307, 383
Weary, G. 256, 264, 308, 383
398
Weaver, W. 12, 378
Weerts, T.C. 305, 370
Wegner, D.M. 38,53-54,80,82, 178,
383
Weiby, M. 256, 365
Weigel, R.H. 270--271,383
Weiner, B. 119, 190--192, 199-200,
214-216, 221, 247-250, 259, 288,
383-384
Weiss, D.S. 82, 352
Welton, K.E. 62, 373
West, C.K. 229, 235, 384
Westbrook, T. 229,235,239,247,363
Westford, K. 176, 357
Wheeler, L. 107,376
Wicker, A.W. 78, 122, 269, 384
Wicklund, R.A. 31,33,35,41,43,53,
102-103, 120, 138, 143-146, 156,
158-159, 162, 165, 203-206,
208-210, 213-214, 273, 276,
279-280,289,291,298,313,
327-329,334,358,361,364,374,
380, 384
Wiener, N. 11,23,384
Wilder, D.A. 89, 92, 123, 125, 349,
384
Willems, E.P. 79, 385
Willerman, B. 124, 360
Willerman, L. 275, 385
Williams, B.W. 345, 385
Williams, R.B., Jr. 304-305,385
Wine, J.D. 229-232, 235~238, 247,
254,385
Winkler, J.D. 85, 94, 381
Author Index
Wittgenstein, L. 63, 385
Wixon, D.R. 334-335, 385
Wolf, M. 229, 235, 239, 247, 363
Wollert, R.W. 191,385
Wolosin, R.J. 256--257, 385
Wood, D. 79, 351
Worchel, S. 124,158-159, 161,329,
364,385
Word, C.O. 123, 126, 385
Wortman, C.B. 160, 190, 252-254,
365, 368, 385
Wright, L. 196, 385
Wyer, R.S., Jr. 73,83-84,87-89,
101,380
Wylie, R.e. viii, 37, 385
Wynne, L.C. 304-305, 385
Young, P.T. 288, 386
Young, R.F. 289, 299-300, 364
Younger, J.e. 109, 386
Youssef, Z.1. 260, 366
Zabrack, M. 158, 176, 357, 386
Zacks, R.T. 137,362
Zadney, J. 87-89, 386
Zajonc, R.B. 111, 288, 298, 386
Zanna, M.P. 123, 126,277-281,334,
354, 359, 372, 385-386
Zeiss, A.R. 151, 195,370
Zillman, D. 109-110,381,386
Zimbardo, P.G. 171-173, 175-176,
386
Zimmerman, W.S. 48, 362
Subject Index
Absence of regulation 169-179
deindividuation and 171-177
Abstraction
of categories 60--65 (see also
Category formation and use)
hierarchical organization of
elements 67-70
nervous system and 13
Achievement behavior, emotional
concomitants 214-216
Achievement motivation
Atkinson's theory 243-246
cognition and affect in 247-248
Weiner's attributional
analysis 249-250
Action perception 90--93
Adaptation-level theory 28
Aggression 152-153, 175,319-320
Anxiety (see Emotion)
Attention (see also Self-focus,
Environment focus)
aspects 34-35
effects on well-learned
behavior 138-140
involvement in organization of
attitudes 140
Attitude change, via dissonance
reduction 329-334
Attitudes
as behavioral standards 120, 153,
280-284, 319-320
relation to behavior 269-284 (see
also Self-report)
role of direct experience in formation
of 276-280
Attribution
achievement motivation and 249-250
affective experience and 199-200,
214-215,217-221,254-255
effect of attentional focus 102-104
ego-defensiveness 257-259, 308-309
(see also Egotism)
influence on task
expectancies 190--191
positivity bias 258
Automatic processing 132-134,
137-139
Availability (see Judgmental heuristics)
Behavioral medicine 179-180
Behavior setting
attributes and organization 78-79
definition 77-78
incorporation of behavior
specification 121-122
Breakpoints in perception 90-93
elimination of uncertainty 91
imposition of organization 139
Category formation and use 60--65 (see
also Abstraction)
frequency distribution theories 63-65
incorporation of behavior-specifying
information 121-126
instance theories 61
prototype theories 61-63
400
Cognitive dissonance
impression management theory
and 337-338
self-focus effects 329-334
Comparator 16, 144, 168, 170
Compliance behavior 311-314
Consciousness, speculations on the nature
of 139
Control
definition 15
hierarchies 20, 129-133, 346 (see
also Hierarchical organization)
sequential versus continuous 17
Cybernetics, definition 11
Decision chains 18-20
Deindividuation 171-177
antecedents 171-172
consequences 172-173
mediation 173-175
Depression
self-focus and 108
influences on perception 181
Diagnostic information, seeking of
achievement motivation and 248
self-focus and 149-150
Discrepancy enlargement 157-164 (see
also Positive feedback loop)
Discrepancy reduction 144-145,
151-156,206-221,226-228,
230-233, 252-254, 261-262,
282-292 (see also Negative
feedback loop)
Disregulation 167
Distractors, effects of 302-303
Drive 144-145, 187ff., 292-293,
297
Efficacy (see Outcome expectancy)
Egotism 255-265
as a control process 256-257
attribution and 257-259
helplessness and 259-263
self-handicapping and 256, 263
Emotion
as interruptor of behavior 178,223,
228
debilitating and facilitating
anxiety 228
Subject Index
effects of self-focus on
experience 108-109, 145-146,
161, 206, 223-228
Leventhal's theory 110-111, 178
misattribution 109-110
test anxiety 229ff. (see also Outcome
expectancy)
three sources of influence 104-110
Environment focus
definition 35
limitations on definition 36-38
necessity for environment
perception 93-94
Expectancy (see Outcome expectancy)
Feedback loop (see Negative feedback
loop, Positive feedback loop)
Frames 70
Helplessness 251-255
affect associated with 254-255
behavioral effects 251-254
egotism theory 259-263
Heuristics (see Judgmental heuristics)
Hierarchical organization
among attributes of categories 67-70,
79
among behavioral standards 127-134,
143, 177, 180
among control structures 20, 346
production of physical behavior
and 129-132, 346
self-esteem protection and 256-257
Homeostasis 26-28
Hope 198-199 (see also Outcome
expectancy)
Implicit personality theory (see Person
perception)
Impression management interpretation of
dissonance effects 337-338 (see
also Self-presentation)
Incentive 195, 260-262
Information
definition 12
involvement in
reinforcement 344-345
Information seeking
achievement motivation and 248
Subject Index
self-focus and 146-150
self-monitoring and 323
Ingratiation 181
Interruption of self-regulation
assessment of outcome expectancy
and 186-187
by frustration 137, 235-236,
185-186
illustration 185-186
by rising emotion 178, 223
Judgmental heuristics and resulting
biases 71-75
approximation 73
availability 73-74, 83-84, 100-102
and modeling 156
effects on person perception 81-84,
86-89
effects on self-perception 100-102,
112-1I3
illusory correlation 74-75, 81-82
representativeness 72-73
Locus of control
influence on expectancy
changes 188-189
influence on therapy 240
Meta-theory 4, 343-346
Misattribution 109-1I0, 247-248
Misregulation
behavioral medicine and 179-180
social behavior and 180-182
Modeling
availability heuristic and 156
effect of self-focus 156
Negative feedback loop (see also Self-
focus, consequences)
behavioral medicine and 179-180
components 168-169
definition 16-17
interruption 185-186
Negative reference group 162-163
Norms
behavioral 152
equity 156
performance 149-150
expectancy judgments and 192
401
Outcome expectancy
achievement behavior and 216-217
bases
locus of control 188-189
performance norms 192
prior outcomes 188, 208-209
stability of attribution 190-191
time scale 192
consequences
affective 199,214-221,254-255
behavioral withdrawal 193,
203-220, 226-228, 230-233
mental withdrawal 193, 210-212,
216-221,236-237,252-254,
261-262
reassertion 193,203-221,
226-228, 233-234, 252-254,
261-26~
relationship between behavior
and affect 200
definition 187
efficacy expectancy and 198,
213-214, 238-240
egotism and 259-264
eliciting conditions 186-187
importance of behavioral
dimension 195
incentive and 260-263
influenced by self-esteem 210-212
in other theories 197-198
social facilitation and interference
and 298-300
test anxiety and 229-238
Palmar sweat index 293-297, 303-305
Performance, task 210-212, 216-221,
233-234 (see also Achievement
motivation, Outcome expectancy)
Persistence 206-210, 212-213 (see also
Outcome expectancy)
test anxiety and 224, 226-233
Person perception
across time 90-93
consequences of initial category
placement
encoding bias 86-88
implicit personality theory 81-82,
89
retrieval bias 88-89
402
Person perception (cont.)
determinants of initial category
placement 82-86
role of self-monitoring 323
salience effects 84-85
specification of behavior
and 123-124
traits as schematic knowledge
structures 80-89
Placebo effect 113
Positive feedback loop
definition 21
instability 22-23
self-focus and 157,161,164
Principle level of control 69, 131, 177
Program level of control 69, 131,
177-178
Prototype (see Category formation and
use, schema)
Reactance 157-161, 314
Reference group behavior 162-163
Reference value (see Standard)
Reinforcement 341-345
information and 344-345
Relationship level of control 68, 130
Schema (see also Category formation and
use)
definition 59-60
incorporation of behavior-specifying
information 121-126
relationship to prototype 66-67
use in person perception 80-89
use in self-perception 96-102,109-113
Scripts 70-71 (see also Programs)
Self, aspects 36-37, 104,309-311,
328-329
Self-awareness (see Self-focus)
Self-consciousness (see also Self-focus)
distinction between self-awareness
and 45
measurement 45-47
validation 47-50
public-private distinction in 45-47,
100,176-177, 192,238,
264-265, 308ff., 328-329,
332-334, 338
Self-efficacy (see Outcome expectancy)
Subject Index
Self-esteem
consequences for task
performance 210-212, 308
interactive product of expectancy and
attribution 200
maintenance and protection (see
Egotism)
public versus private
determinants 264-265
Self-focus
arousal-induced 52-55
consequences (see also Outcome
expectancy)
behavioral discrepancy
reduction 144-145, 151-156,
206-221, 226-228, 230-233,
252-254, 261-262, 282-292
comparison with
standards 146-151, 291-292
discrepancy enlargement 157-164
disruption of environment
perception 93-94
dissonance reduction 329-334
experience of emotion 108-109,
145-146, 161, 206, 223-228
increased access to self
schema 99-102, 273-276
increased veridicality of self-
reports 273-276, 318
information seeking 146-151
reactance 157-161, 314--316
reduction in placebo effect 113
reduction in
suggestibility 113-115, 311-314
reference group behavior 162-163
self-attribution 102-104
convergence between manipulation and
disposition 49-51
definition 35
limitations 36-38
ecological validity 51-55
individual differences (see Self-
consciousness)
issues in operationalization 40-43
manipulations of 43-45
age-dependence 156
validation 44--45
public versus private
distinction 50-51, 103,
Subject Index
109-110,313-314,318-321,
328-329, 334-336, 338
reduction of in
deindividuation 171-176
reduction of via alcohol 263
Self-handicapping 256, 263
Self-monitoring
expression of opinions and 322-323
measurement of 280, 324-325
perception of self and others
and 323-324
specification of behavioral standards
and 280-282, 325
veridicality of self-report
and 280-282
Self-perception
self-monitoring and 323-324
specification of behavioral standards
and 125-126, 135
traits as schematic representations of
self 96-99
accessing the self schema 99-102
Self-presentation
as a behavioral strategy 308-309
cheating and 320-321
compliance and 311-314
expression of beliefs and 316-318,
322-323
impression management theory
and 337-338
reference group behavior and 163
Self-regulation (see Self-focus,
consequences)
absence 169-179
Self-reinforcement 342-345
Self-report
issues in measurement
conceptualization 273
degree of sampling 271-272
levels of specificity 270-271
self-rated consistency 272,
281-282
thoroughness of access 273-276
used to guide behavior 125,
153-154, 280-284
Sequence level of control 68, 130
Sex guilt 153-154, 283
Social comparison
effect of unfavorable expectancy 198
403
in social facilitation
phenomena 290-291
specification of behavioral
standards 124, 134, 165,
301-303
theoretical processes compared to
present model 165-166
Social facilitation
control theory and 288
drive theory 287-288, 292-293,
297
response patterning and 293-297,
303-305
social interference 298-300
theoretical comparisons 289-290,
300-303
Standards of behavior (see Attitudes,
Person perception, Self-perception,
Social comparison)
definition 120-121
hierarchical organization 127-134,
143, 177, 180
specification for one system by higher-
order system 20,27, 129-133
use in feedback systems 16-17
Symptoms 106, 110-112
role of schemas in symptom
construction 110-112
use in monitoring disease 179-180
System concept level of control 257
Test anxiety 229ff.
facilitation of performance
and 233-234
persistence and 230-233
theories of 235-238
Time
impact on hierarchical
organization 24, 346
influence on control processes 21,
170, 346
influence on expectancy
judgments 192
influence on goal-attainment
strategies 195
organization of perceptions as a
function of 90-93
TOTE unit, definition 16 (see also
Negative feedback loop)