November 3, 2018

Acting Chief Justice Antonio Carpio

Supreme Court

RE: Omission of Evidence and Newly-Discovered Evidence in the

Administrative Cases Docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 and A.M. No.
MTJ-13-1821

I thanked President Rodrigo R. Duterte as well as ASEC Jaime llaguno

Mabilin for whatever aid they have given to me and the concerned
government agencies such as GSIS, PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and BIR,
but we all know there is a principle of judicial independence enshrined by
the Philippine Constitution, they are barred to interfere with the workings of
the judiciary yet I sought help from President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s office
because it involved government institutions under his care, my situation is
very desperate, it is a matter of life and death, only the most powerful
public servant can help me.

I am at the mercy of the Supreme Court not of the Office of the President.

The following were my answers and proofs omitted tantamount to

Falsification in the textual Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016
and Resolution promulgated on March 14, 2017 by the ponente Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

A. On the Night Court Protest

With due respect, I did not manifest an uncommon arrogance towards the
Honorable Supreme Court, there was no proof to it.

With due respect, the public knew that I am a lowly ranked Judge, I am
inferior to all Your Honors, the supreme judges, as the final arbiters of legal
cases. There was no proof that I treated myself as a superior to Your
Honors.

With due respect, I protested the night court duty in good faith and my
protest has legal bases. I bowed my head before Your Honors as
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authorities, my pleadings showed it. I also bowed my head before the 1987
Philippine Constitution, my protest to night court showed it. There was no
proof that I did not bow my head before Your Honors.

With due respect, there was no proof that my protest to night court caused
damage and prejudice to the State and taxpayers.

With due respect, I did not disobey A.O. No. 19-2011, I made a protest,
there are differences between the two. There was no proof that I
intentionally and deliberately disobeyed the night court administrative order.

With due respect, I have a privilege to obey the Constitution, I followed it.
That is why, there was a night court protest. There was no proof I
disobeyed the Constitution on the night court case.

With due respect, it was untrue that I have little regard to the Honorable
Supreme Court and its issuances. There was no proof to it.

With respect, I did not commit any wrongdoing to Your Honors in my night
court protest. There was no proof to it.

A proof is an evidence sufficient to establish an allegation as true, or to

produce belief in its truth. There was no proof as opposed to opinion
adduced by the complainants in this night court case that I committed
Gross Insubordination and Gross Misconduct. The basis is my letter. Then
my interpretation should be upheld by Your Honors.

The ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno has mere opinion as
opposed to proof in deciding against me on the administrative matters
before her for adjudication on the merits.

The elements of Insubordination are:

(1) There is refusal to obey;
(2) The refusal to obey is willful or intentional;
(3) The willful or intentional refusal to obey must be characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and
(3) There is lawful and reasonable order of superior officer (Micro Sales
Operation Network vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472
SCRA 328, 335-336).

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There was no refusal to obey because I have a night court protest.
Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 47, Pasay City court employees reported to
night court duties.

There was no willful and intentional disobedience because my night court

protest has legal bases. My letter to the Honorable Office of the Court
Administrator said that I will report for night court duty once I receive a copy
of Your Honors’ Decision on my protest.

There was no willful or intentional refusal to obey that must be

characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude because my night court
protest has legal bases. There was a legal justification for it.

There is no lawful and no reasonable order of superior officer as

expounded in my night court protest supported by a landmark
jurisprudence Luz vs. People, G.R. No. 797788, February 29, 2012.

The charge for violation of Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code filed by
four Judges and seventy court personnel against me was dismissed.

Also, Your Honors can allow my night court protest as an exception to

Himalin vs. Balderian, AM No. MTJ-03-1504 because the factual settings of
our case are different from it, that my protest must be resolved first before I
am required to follow it please. I beg Your Honors to adopt the landmark
case of Ynot vs. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987, the Supreme court
notes that "if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights
as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the taking of
his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait
accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the
present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in
Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness,
would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten
in the limbo of relinquished rights. The strength of democracy lies not in the
rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall
if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights as
weapons must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful
and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society if they are kept bright

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and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them" in this
particular administrative charge.”

The elements of Gross Misconduct are:

(1) There must be corruption;
(2) Clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest;
(3) The intention to violate the law of flagrant disregard of the established
rule must be manifested.

Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an

official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of others (See Salazar, et al.
vs. Sheriff Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 449,
453-454).

There was no corruption on my protest to the night court case. There was
no proof presented by complainants about it.

There was no clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of

established rule that was manifested on my protest to the night court case.
There was no proof presented by complainants about it.

The was no intention to violate the law of flagrant disregard of the

established rule that was manifested on my protest to the night court case.
There was no proof presented by complainants about.

With due respect, I do not deserve to be penalized for my night court

protest due to absence of proofs of all the elements for Gross Misconduct
and Gross Insubordination.

Here, there was no proof presented by all complainants that all the
elements of Gross Insubordination and Gross Misconduct were satisfied to
warrant the penalty of dismissal.

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The foregoing arguments were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

Moreover, our court submitted Night Court Duties Attendance Sheets from
July 8, 2011 until October 7, 2011 to the Office of the Court Administrator to
prove that there are no hearings conducted by night court were omitted as
proofs by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno. Attached is my
letter dated February 7, 2017 that contained omitted answers and proofs
marked as Annex “1” in seriam.

The letter of transmittal received by Assistant Court Administrator Thelma

Bahia on October 13, 2011 was omitted as proof by the ponente Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

The night court operations were suspended upon the recommendation of

Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez that was approved by Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno according to the news report by Manila
Standard Today on January 26, 2015, the print-out of the news report was
previously submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator thus, there are
no factual and legal bases to penalize me for writing the night court protest
copy furnished to the concerned parties as part of due process because
they can also be subjected to administrative, civil and criminal liabilities on
night court operations were omitted as proofs by the ponente Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes Sereno.

The Office of the Pasay City Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion 1. to

withdraw the motion to set for arraignment / hearing; and 2. to admit
amended information dated August 11, 2011 to prove that there is no bail
required for cases covered by Rules on Summary Procedure thus there
can be no hearing of accused arrested and detained during nighttime, it is
illegal to conduct night court hearing. The copy of the motion was
previously submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator. My court also
issued an Order dated August 15, 2011 granting said motion copy
furnished to Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia. The copy of the
order was previously submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator
were omitted as proofs by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno.

The jurisprudence of Luz vs. People, G.R. No. 797788, February 29, 2012
supported one of the legal arguments of my letter dated February 2,2011 to
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court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez and a letter dated February 11,
2011 addressed to former Department of Tourism Secretary Alberto Lim. In
this landmark case, it was held:

XXX “Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and traffic Code, the
procedure for dealing with traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender
but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter. At the time that he
was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of
PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period in which at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to
the police sub¬station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in
front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they
were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. It
also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither
can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. Now to relate this
jurisprudence with the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, one of
the offenses under the same Rules is violation of traffic laws, rules and
regulations [Section 1, B (1) RRSP] that is covered by A.O. No. 192011.
XXX Therefore, the arrest and detention of nighttime violators of traffic law,
rules and regulations for the night court operation under A.O. No. 19-2011
are illegal” were omitted as proofs by the ponente Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

The foregoing omitted answers and proofs by the ponente Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes Sereno belied her textual Resolution promulgated on March
14, 2017 that stated: “The respondent is reminded that her removal from
the Judiciary by reason of her gross insubordination and gross misconduct
did not proceed only from her non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011.
Other acts and actuations were also efficient causes, namely: (1) her
refusal to abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito
that resulted in the disruption of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs
to the prejudice of the public service and public interest; (2) her direct
communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously
breached established protocols, thereby opening an irregular avenue to
publicly broadcast her defiance to the directive of the Court itself; and (3)
her willful disregard of the direct advice by the Court Administrator despite
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the latter being the official expressly authorized by law to assist the Court in
exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel.
Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of
November 22, 2016 the following: In all, Judge Yu exhibited an
unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and gross
misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011,
she deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the
law at all times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be
bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted authority on
court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her
insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part.
She deserved to be removed from the service because she thereby
revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary. (Bold emphasis
supplied) We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the
respondent's recalcitrant streak did not end with her unbecoming
repudiation of and defiance to A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she also
exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the valid appointments of Ms.
Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware that the appointing
powers pertained to and were being thereby exercised by the Court, and
that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the appointments.
Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with the
mantle of good faith in regard to her insubordination and arrogance.”

B. On Sending of Emails as Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

“On pp. 37 to 40, the Decision cited a Facebook name Eliza B. Yu that I
dispute to be tampered or hacked because my Facebook name is Eliza Yu
found on p. 89 of my Motion for Reconsideration. However, complaint of
Judge Emily L. San Gaspar – Gito with attached typewritten alleged
emails coming from my Facebook bore the name Bambi Yu, this is another
proof of tampering or hacking (See Judge Emily L. San Gaspar – Gito
Complaint’s Annex “A” and Annex “C”). Under the Revised Rules of Court,
the remedy to a misleading statement or to a baseless statement that
lacked foundation like the Facebook name Eliza B. Yu that appeared on
the Decision when the Facebook name Bambi Yu is what was introduced
as evidence by complainant Judge Emily San Gaspar – Gito to me at the
onset is to strike it off from the Court’s Decision. The Honorable Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts thus in a trial proper, Judge Emily L. San Gaspar
– Gito must show her Complaint’s Annex “A” and Annex “C”, among others,
the actual print-outs with name Bambi Yu that I will identify and testify then
enter my objection if any. I was not shown the actual computer print-outs of
all alleged emails from start of the complaint until the promulgation of the

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Decision to prove Hearsay Evidence by her against me. She attached
typewritten emails I allegedly sent to her complaint before the Office of the
Court Administrator so there is no reason why I should appear before any
investigating justice. She is into fishing expedition only” were omitted as
answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“The emails subject matter of Facebook given to me as proofs were all

typewritten (See Judge Emily L. San Gaspar – Gito Complaint’s Annex “A”
and Annex “C”). If an email is typewritten, it presupposes tampering and/or
hacking thus inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay” were omitted as
proofs by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“Judge Emily San Gaspar – Gito presented typewritten emails in this

administrative case. If she sues me before the Office of the City Prosecutor
for whatever fabricated criminal act she can think of, with typewritten emails
as proofs, her criminal complaint will be dismissed for lack of evidence. I
failed to identify and authenticate the emails due to lack of actual computer
print outs with unresolved issues of tampering and /or hacking” were
omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“My cited jurisprudence PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. CA

et al. G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998: a letter may be offered in
evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the
observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter
should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation
the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, has no probative value” were omitted as answers by the ponente
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

The violation of my right to privacy that I exhaustively discussed the rules

and principles refers to my Exhibit “1” only that has the name Eliza Yu” not
Eliza B. Yu were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

“My writing style appeared different from the emails with name Eliza B. Yu
stated on Your Honors’ Decision. That is one of the reasons I alleged email
tampering, if not hacking. And I am objecting over those emails now
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because I did not see the actual computer print-outs attached to her
complaint dated July 12, 2010. It is incumbent upon her to prove that I
authored or sent them, she did not prove it” were omitted as answers by
the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“Also the time of the emails cited by Your Honors, I usually send emails
after office hours, past 5:00 p.m. I did not send email past 10:00 p.m. to her
that is my sleeping time, these emails are suspicious to have been sent by
me. I object to their admissibility against me for lack of proof by Judge
Emily San Gaspar – Gito that I was the sender and/or author of them. It is
incumbent upon her to prove that I authored or sent them, she did not
prove it” were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

It appeared from many disputed emails, the time of sending was during
office hours when I was at work as a public prosecutor thus it is
indispensable that I must identify them but I failed to do so because no
actual computer-printouts were given to me, what I have in my possessions
were all typewritten emails.

“My emails to her friend Juliet Tabanao- Galicinao that were printed on
Your Honors’ Decision, my name as a Sender varies. Thus, the possibility
of tampering or hacking sufficient to object to their admissibility, authenticity
and due execution by me” were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“In my emails to her friend Juliet Tabanao- Galicinao, there were written
email disclaimers which is the CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This email and
any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use
of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received
this email in error please notify the system manager. This message
contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual
named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate,
distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-
mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from
your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that
disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited’ were omitted as answers
by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

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“And the email disclaimers were not printed out on Your Honors’ Decision.
Thus, I object all emails to Juliet Tabanao- Galicinao as to their
admissibility for lack of authenticity and due execution by me. Those are
not my emails. I remember writing the email disclaimers to my private
messages to her. Without those email disclaimers, it is fair to conclude, the
emails were tampered or hacked. Thus, they are inadmissible in evidence”
were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno.

“That I apologized to her via email has no proof. There is no proof I was the
sender or author of the email that I questioned to be tampered or hacked.
My testimonial proof is required for its admissibility before Your Honors can
penalize me” were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

“I did not commit any offense to apologize to her. The private conversations
we have did not violate any provision of the Code of Ethics or Code of
Professional Responsibility” were omitted as answers by the ponente
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno.

“My emails that I wanted Judge Emily San Gaspar – Gito to be deleted
many times were not extracted by SC MISO and were not published by the
ponente” were omitted as answers by the ponente Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.

At page 19 of the textual Decision written by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes

Sereno, she wrote these typewritten email:

------------------------------------September 6, 2009----------------------------------

Eliza B. Yu 10:41 a.m.

CLUELESS INQUIRER
Hey what’s the meal stub and 69, got no idea about it? Does my fb send
something to everyone? Am I in a game? Huh, m wondering!

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However, in the typewritten email by Judge Emily San Gaspar – Gito
marked as ANNEX “B” given to me, she wrote:

Emily San Gaspar September 5 at 5:45pm

Hey what’s that meal stub and 69, got no idea about it? Does my fb send
something to everyone? Am I in a game? Huh, m wondering!

The material differences on these compared two typewritten emails made

by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno and Judge Emily San Gaspar –
Gito proved the fabricated charge against me – there are differences as to
the name of the sender, date of sending and time of sending.

It will require Internet Protocol Address to establish first where all these
emails originated because of the differences of the email contents, the
disputed writing style of the sender, the different names of sender as to
spelling that appeared on the Decision, and the time of sending that were
made during office hours when I was at work as a public prosecutor. Thus,
her Decision is fatally flawed, a violation of my constitutional right to due
process.

I am marking them as my Annex “2” and Annex “3” respectively which I

attached the photocopies of them herewith.

Without the Internet Protocol Address of all those typewritten emails

that I objected vehemently, the Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
charge must be dismissed for lack of any basis, factually and legally.

In my letter dated December 27, 2017 to ponente Chief Justice Maria

Lourdes Sereno, I wrote:
“I was informed that there are numerous Facebook accounts with name Eliza B. Yu.
Please see attached Exhibit “1”. There are two Facebook accounts with similar names
Eliza B. Yu, one activated and the other deactivated that appeared at my kin’s friend’s
list. Please see attached Exhibit “2” previously submitted to OCA and SC. What
appeared from a kin’s messenger to a deactivated Facebook account with name Eliza
B. Yu is “Facebook user” not “Eliza B. Yu”, the effect of deactivation previously
mentioned in my correspondences to your respective office. Please see attached
Exhibit “3”. Facebook accounts with similar names and identities are deactivated or
suspended automatically. Please see attached Exhibits “4” and “5”.

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Because typewritten Facebook emails with name Bambi Yu were attached to Judge
Emily L. San Gaspar – Gito’s complaint against me, the absence of my requested actual
computer-print-outs with Facebook name Bambi Yu from start of probe until now denied
me of my constitutional right to due process that calls for the dismissal of the
administrative case without prejudice to its re-filing upon presentation of competent and
credible evidence to be attached with the new complaint thereafter she follows the legal,
right and just observance of administrative processes. Due process entails the adoption
of proper procedure.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction, The violation of a party's right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true
in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by
the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the
same (Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 831, 843).
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more
liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings
(Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil 486, 491 [1999]).”

Lastly, the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno omitted

tantamount to Falsification my legal arguments on the illegal withholding
and illegal forfeiture of my salaries, allowances, payroll premiums and
taxes in her written textual Decision on November 22, 2016 and Resolution
on March 14, 2017 that I believe must be ruled upon by Your Honors on
the merits, with facts and laws to be read by the public, as part of Your
Honors’ constitutional duty to give justice to the parties and government
institutions involved in such serious legal issues.

There were also omitted answers and proofs in administrative cases docketed as
A. M. No. 12-1-09-METC; A.M. No. 11-11-115-METC; A.M. MTJ 12-1815; OCA
IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ; OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ; OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ;
and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ.

The following answers and proofs were omitted tantamount to Falsification from
the textual Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 and / or Resolution
promulgated on March 14, 2017 penned by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno
that supported my complaints of similar omissions in administrative cases
docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 and A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821:

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A. On the Waiver of the Right to Counsel

Rule 115, Section 1 (c) Revised Rules of Court provides: XXX Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears
to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel.

The foregoing provision of the Revised Rules of Court is taken in relation to

Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to quote:

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. –Before

arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de officio to defend him.

The following jurisprudence is instructive:

People vs. Serzo Jr.
G.R. No. 118435. June 20, 1997
Penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban

Right to Counsel De Parte Is Not Absolute

Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be

represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice.
While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure
the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to
balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states’ and the
offended party’s equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus,
the court may restrict the accused’s option to retain a counsel de parte if the
accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a
member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid
reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like (Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-
1994,” Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 83, No. 3, March-April 1995, pp. 1086-
1087).

Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable (2 U.S.
vs. Go-Leng, 21 Phil 426, 427-479 (1912); U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31 Phil 371, 372-373
(1915); People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil 138, 139 (1955); and People vs. Holgado) so
long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
13
good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
(Article 6, Civil Code) and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, 299, February 11, 1986;
and Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 683, August 19, 1968). In
Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680, 690-692, October 28, 1988, this Court held
that the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not mandatory where
the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of
his choice but, when the time for the presentation of the evidence for the
defense was due, he appears by himself alone because of the inexcusable
absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held that the right to be heard
and to reopen the case (and send it to trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so
would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly
administration of justice (People vs. Mendez, 28 SCRA 880, 887-889, July 29,
1969). In the present case, appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time
to engage a counsel de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence
in his defense. In his Brief he adds, but without giving particulars or proof, that
allegedly his counsels de oficio did not exert their “utmost efforts” in representing
him, thus: “x x x The lower court afforded the accused the assistance of counsel
de oficio as early as the arraignment stage but failed to show that utmost efforts
were exerted by said counsel to defend the life and liberty of the accused. The
duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, however, as it should also
see to it that the counsel does his duty by the defendant. Counsel de oficio
should not merely make the motions of defending the accused but exert his
utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.” The Solicitor General,
in his eleven-page Brief, rebuts this, arguing that appellant’s actions during the
trial showed instead a “lackadaisical stance on his own defense.” Appellant had
been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing
this situation to continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of
intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own
presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the
trial court and the orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant did not
demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was
not effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by
counsel of his own choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively
waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years since
appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still
could not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he
cooperate with his court-named lawyers. The facts of this case do not constitute
a deprivation of appellant’s constitutional right to counsel because he was
adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty.
Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the
pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote
the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance
such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial
continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented

14
by counsels who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise
unable to represent him.”
This U.S.A. jurisprudence can enrich the Philippine jurisprudence on the waiver
of the right to counsel. There are many similar U.S. jurisprudences. Right to
counsel in Philippine Constitution was copied from Right to Counsel in U.S.
Constitution so U.S. jurisprudences are applicable in our country:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 02—1541
IOWA, PETITIONER v. FELIPE EDGARDO TOVAR
[March 8, 2004]

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court

The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the

right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process (Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The
entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a
“critical stage” at which the right to counsel adheres (Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 34 (1972); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam).
Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process
generally, must be a “knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty
plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to
representation.

Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to
entry of a plea and to be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court,
specifically: (1) advise the defendant that “waiving the assistance of counsel in
deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked”; and (2) “admonish” the defendant “that by waiving his right to an
attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether,
under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty”? The Iowa Supreme
Court held both warnings essential to the “knowing and intelligent” waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. We hold that neither
warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.

XXX XXX XXX

15
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right
to counsel at all “critical stages” of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224. A plea
hearing qualifies as a “critical stage.” White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60.
Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he
had a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest
the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37.

A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While

the Constitution “does not force a lawyer upon a defendant,” Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), it does require that any waiver
of the right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, see Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in
November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was insufficiently informed, and
therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did
not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney’s advice and
the dangers of self-representation in entering a plea.
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant “knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams, 317 U.S., at
279. We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a
defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel. The information
a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our decisions
indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the
defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of
the charge, and the stage of the proceeding (See Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464).

As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be

allowed to proceed pro se, he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in
Faretta resisted counsel’s aid, preferring to represent himself. The Court held
that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right,
however, we cautioned: “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill
and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is
doing ....”

Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), we elaborated on “the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation” to which Faretta referred. “[A]t trial,”
we observed, “counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to
the rules of procedure and evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire,
examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively, object to improper prosecution
questions, and much more.” Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without
16
counsel, we therefore said, must be “rigorous[ly]” conveyed. We clarified,
however, that at earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal
colloquy may suffice.”

XXX XXX XXX

The questioned order has attained finality. There must be a judicial relief to be
followed before I will be held liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law.

The right to counsel is a right that is personal to the accused. It is only the
accused, and no one else, not the seventy-four (74) complainants, can invoke
such right to penalize me for Gross Ignorance of the Laws.

Their interference to my court is disallowed under the principle of judicial

courtesy and co-equality of courts, it is a contemptuous act. If right to counsel is
violated, the one who has the right to sue is the accused, not anyone else on
behalf of the accused (Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court). None of
the accused in the subject criminal cases filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
filed an Appeal with respect to the questioned lawful orders. None of the accused
complained for violation of their right to counsel against my court. Thus, the
charge of Gross Ignorance has no factual and legal bases.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court states: Parties in interest. — A

real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Seventy-four complainants have no direct, personal and substantial interest to
protect as enunciated in Domingo vs. Carague 456 SCRA 450. They lack the
personality to sue out of the questioned lawful orders thus they have no cause of
action against my court (See Evangelista vs. Santiago 457 SCRA 744). In judicial
review, an important requirement is that the suit must be raised by a proper party
or there must be a locus standi (Ople vs. Torres 293 SCRA 141; Joya vs. PCGG
225 SCRA 568; Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines
vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337; IBP vs. Zamora GR No. 141284, August 15,
2000). More importantly, none of them were prejudiced by the various lawful
orders including internal memoranda.

The unlawful interference, meddling or encroachment of the various lawful

orders, decisions and final orders including internal memoranda:

17
1. Violated the principle of judicial stability (Mars vs. Dumara-og 12 SRA 34;
Gutierrez vs. CA GR No. 82475, January 28, 1991; Villamor vs. Salas 203 SCRA
540; Parco vs. CA 111 SCRA 262; Garcia vs. Aloncel 111 SCRA 178, Sta. Maria
vs. Ubay 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs. Riodique 64 SCRA 494; PICOP vs. IAC 151
SCRA 161; Vide Vlason Enterprises Corp. vs. CA 155 SCRA 186; NEA vs.
Mendoza 138 SCRA 632; Pineda vs. Lantin 6 SCRA 757; Philippine Pacific
Fishing Co. vs. Luna 112 SCRA 604; Paper Industries Corp. vs. IAC 151 SCRA
161; Republic vs. Judge Reyes 155 SCRA 313; Almazar vs. Cenzon 161 SCRA
545; PNB vs. Pineda 197 SCRA 1);

2. Violated the doctrine of immutability of decisions and final orders (Pena vs.
GSIS 502 SCRA 383; Siy vs. NLRC 468 SCRA 154; Sacdalan vs. CA 428 SCRA
586); and

3. Violated the expanded principle of judicial courtesy ( Ramiscal vs.

Sandiganbayan GR Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010; A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
December 27, 2007).

In addition, the lawful orders of the trial court and the subsequent orders prove
the lack of prejudice on the part of the State and litigants regarding the court’s
minutes that were surreptitiously taken by the complainants contrary to judicial
ethics. The trial court staff who did not obtain any permission from the court and
from the parties before furnishing them to the Office of the Court Administrator
showed their discourtesy, unethical conduct over court records and malicious
intent to harm my trial court.

Likewise, it is noticeable that in one of the lawful orders of the trial court, it was
the accused who pleaded that he be re-arraigned without counsel upon learning
the imposable penalty of the offense he admitted to have committed. It was not
the trial court that ordered him to enter the plea. The trial court informed the
accused that there is no public attorney available. Despite of this information,
said accused insisted for his re-arraignment that are reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes on that day of his re-arraignment.

A trial can proceed without a public attorney or a public prosecutor or both but it
can never proceed without a Judge in the dispensation of justice. This shows
how exalted the position of a Judge in a legal profession. The Judge enjoys more
power and better privileges compared to a public attorney or public prosecutor in
the administration of justice as provided by the Rules of Court, Supreme Court
issuances and jurisprudences.

18
I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (d) authorizing the change of
plea by the accused without the assistance of counsel; xxx

A.1. People vs. Lito Manduriao (M-PSY-11-13159-CR for violation of B.P.

Blg. 6)

In the case of People vs. Lito Manduriao (M-PSY-11-13159-CR for violation of

B.P. Blg. 6), my trial court followed the following pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure and jurisprudences:

Rule 115, Section 1 (c) Revised Rules of Court provides: XXX Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears
to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel.

The foregoing provision of the Revised Rules of Court is taken in relation to

Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to quote:

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. –Before

arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in
person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de officio to defend him.

The accused Lito Manduriao waived voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently his
right to counsel.

The seventy (70) complainants failed to provide any proof that the waiver was not
voluntary, knowingly and intelligently made by the accused Lito Manduriao.

The trial court informed the accused of the nature of the charge against him, the
cause of accusation against him, his right to be counseled by public attorney or
private attorney regarding his plea, the waiver of his right to counsel, the range
of allowable penalty attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea to B.P. Blg. 6, and
his immediate release from jail upon his plea of guilty to the charge during his
arraignment in a language or dialect known to him.

19
I as the Presiding Judge apprised the accused Lito Manduriao in Tagalog about
his criminal case which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 known as Illegal Possession of
Bladed Weapon that it is unlawful to carry outside of one's residence any bladed,
pointed or blunt weapon such as "knife” except where such article is being used
as necessary tool or implement to earn a livelihood or in pursuit of a lawful
activity. Any person found guilty of it shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment one
(1) month to one (1) year or a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200) to Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000) or both. Because he has no money to pay the fine, he
can choose imprisonment of one (1) month as a penalty that he agreed so he
can leave jail to join his family who did not visit him due to extreme poverty, they
have no money for fare in going to jail. I told him in Tagalog that the subject
evidence “Knife” marked as “LCM” will be confiscated in favor of government. He
understood what I said to him as to the nature and cause of accusation including
the range of penalty, the minimum penalty and the maximum penalty, and his
release from jail once he entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge.

He waived his right to counsel upon being informed that he has the right to waive
it as long as he can understand that nature of accusation against him, what is the
charge recited by the information, the penalty imposable to his criminal offense,
the consequence of pleading guilty, his release from jail, and the right to appeal.

During his re-arraignment, the criminal charge was re-stated in a language or

dialect known to him by the Court Interpreter together with a policeman who
assisted him during the arraignment. The criminal case is so simple that he
understood his criminal case, his arraignment, his waiver of the right to counsel,
his penalty for his plea of guilty, his release from jail thereafter and other related
matters.
I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (d) authorizing the change
of plea by the accused without the assistance of counsel; xxx

A.2. Waiver of the Right to Public Prosecutor / Waiver of the Presence of

Public Prosecutor

The presence of a public prosecutor can be waived as held in People vs. Arcilla,
GR No. 116237, May 15, 1996; Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992;
and People vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990. I relied upon these
jurisprudences in good faith.
In People vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990, the defense likewise
waived the fiscal’s presence on that date.

20
In People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237, May 15, 1996, the absence of a prosecutor
cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state
witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar.

The public complainant SPO3 George Clavo who represented the State did not
interpose any objection to accused Lito Manduriao’s waiver of the right to
counsel and waiver of the presence of public prosecutor. He also assisted him
who was languishing in jail more or less three (3) months at the time of his
arraignment when the imposed penalty to him was only one (1) month. He was
freed in the same day of his arraignment, thereby he ceased to be a burden of
the State that has to feed him for free in jail.

I remembered the public complainant SPO3 George Clavo mentioned that

policemen prosecuted criminal cases in the absence of public prosecutor in
Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Thus, he agreed to the
waiver of the presence of public prosecutor. He was referring to Rule 110,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions

commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the
case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. XXX
If the presence of public prosecutor can be waived before Municipal Trial Courts
or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, why not before Metropolitan Trial Courts that are
also first level courts?

The public prosecutor received the trial court’s order on People vs. Lito
Manduriao (M-PSY-11-13159-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 6), he or she did not
file any motion to question the waiver of his or her presence during the trial.
Moreover, there was no sufficient justification of his or her absence, his or her
reason for not attending came late to the attention of the trial court.

There was no prejudice to the State, a requirement is that there must be

prejudice before my trial court will be held administratively liable.

Many judges were exonerated with Gross Ignorance of the Law for lack of bad
faith or lack of prejudice to the parties, State and taxpayers.

21
In Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR entitled People v. Ramil Fuentes, et
al. , the public prosecutor received the trial court’s orders, he or she did not file
any motion to question the waiver of his or her presence during the trial.

Moreover, there was no sufficient justification of his or her absence, his or her
reason for not attending came late to the attention of the trial court. His or her
subsequent attendance to the hearing removed any doubt as to the invalidity of
the proceedings attended by the private prosecutor who secured written authority
to prosecute from the Office of the City Prosecutor thereafter. The private
prosecutor also made a meritorious explanation why he obtained late the written
authority to prosecute, it was not his fault.

The public prosecutor made a manifestation in open court that he or she did not
object to the waiver of his or her presence before the involved litigants and
lawyers.

The seventy (70) complainants failed to produce proof of bad faith on my part for
allowing the waiver of the right to counsel and the waiver of the presence of
public prosecutor by the accused and the public complainant, a policeman.

The questioned order has attained finality. An order that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land.

Foregoing legal principles considered, all the complainants are liable for
contemptuous acts under Rule 71, Section 3 (a, c and d) the Revised Rules of
Court to wit:

RULE 71
CONTEMPT

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.

After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:

22
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of
a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an

officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.

Do I need to explain all lawful court’s orders in detail that all the complainants
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator? Under the Revised Rules of
Court, all complainants must observe the proper procedure by filing a judicial
remedy to question my official acts as a Judge who issued the subject orders
with a presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.

I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (c) allowing criminal
proceedings to be conducted without the actual participation of the public
prosecutor (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815); and (d) authorizing the change of plea by
the accused without the assistance of counsel xxx
To reiterate, the presence of a public prosecutor can be waived. Trial can
proceed without a public prosecutor as held in People vs. Arcilla, GR No.
116237, May 15, 1996; Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992; and People
vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990.

23
Anent to the issue of the waiver of the presence of a public prosecutor in a trial, it
was held in People vs. Malinao et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990, the
Supreme Court through its ponente , Justice Carolina Grino- Aquino held,
“Neither was the absence of the fiscal at the trial on February 27, 1980,
prejudicial to the accused for only Dr. Nicanor L. Tansingco was presented to
testify on his autopsy report on the deceased Manang. Since no objection was
interposed by appellant’s counsel, Atty. Paulino Cabello, either to Dr.
Tansingco’s competency or his post mortem findings (Exh. A), the doctor’s
testimony was dispensed with (p. 3, tsn, February 27, 1980). The defense
likewise waived the fiscal’s presence on that date.”

In Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992: Finally, petitioner contends that
there was no fiscal who was physically present during the proceedings of the libel
cases since the entire evidence for the prosecution was presented by a private
prosecutor who had no express authority from the fiscal to represent the State,
thereby rendering the entire trial invalid as enunciated in the case of People vs.
Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976). Petitioner is in error.

In People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237, May 15, 1996: To be sure, appellant
misappreciates the reason requiring the public prosecutor to be present in the
trial of criminal cases. A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section
5 of Rule 110 provides that "all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal
x x x." Only private crimes like adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape
or acts of lasciviousness can be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party.
The presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests at stake in the prosecution of crimes, foremost of
which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the
people. As the representative of the State, the public prosecutor has the right and
the duty to take all steps to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an
accused. It ought to be self-evident that the right belongs to the public prosecutor
and not to the accused. The absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised
by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove
personal prejudice as in the case at bar.

The public prosecutor received the trial court’s orders, he or she did not file any
motion to question the waiver of his or her presence during the trial. Moreover,
there was no sufficient justification of his or her absence, his or her reason for not
attending came late to the attention of the trial court. His or her subsequent
attendance to the hearing removed any doubt as to the invalidity of the
proceedings attended by the private prosecutor who secured written authority to
prosecute from the Office of the City Prosecutor thereafter. The private
prosecutor also made a meritorious explanation why he obtained late the written
authority to prosecute, it was not his fault. There was no prejudice to the State, a
24
requirement before my trial court will be held administratively liable. More
importantly, seventy- four (74) complainants failed to produce proof of bad faith
on my part for allowing the continuation of hearing without a public prosecutor for
which notice was given to the Office of the City Prosecutor informing it that the
right to prosecute can be waived citing People vs. Arcilla, GR No. 116237, May
15, 1996; Bravo vs. CA, GR No. L-48772, May 8, 1992; and People vs. Malinao
et al., GR No. L-63735, April 5, 1990.

Public Prosecutor made a manifestation in open court in the presence of litigants

that he or she did not object to his or waiver of her or her presence as proven by
the transcript of stenographic notes.

Seventy-four (74) complainants have no legal personalities to question the

surreptitiously taken, without permission at all, the order, minutes and transcript
of stenographic notes of a trial court as pieces of evidence for the charge of
gross ignorance of the law and procedure against it because the Supreme Court
held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not a proper remedy for the
correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of
propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists (Fernandez vs. Versola AM
No. CA -04-40, 13 August 2004; Cortes vs. Chico – Nazario Am no. SB 04-11-J,
February 13, 2004).

Now the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may said to
have opened or closed (Flores vs. Abesamis AM no. SC -96-1, July 10, 1997).

Moreover, the order, minutes and transcript of stenographic notes dated March
22, 2011 are the result of the act of this Court in its official capacity. The acts of a
judge in an official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts may be erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice
(Flores vs. Adefuin-De La Cruz, AM no. CA-04-39, October 4, 2004).”

I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (c) allowing criminal
proceedings to be conducted without the actual participation of the public
prosecutor (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815) xxx
25
A.3. Ordering Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte Before OIC who was not
a Member of the Bar

The reception of ex parte evidence by a non-lawyer is allowed under Rule 9,

Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court to quote:
“Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting
the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence
may be delegated to the clerk of court.”
This provision is taken in relation with Administrative Circular No. 35-2004,
Section 21 (e ) as amended that states: “ FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE BY
THE CLERK OF COURT, FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS” that goes to
Special Allowance for Judges (SAJ).
The construction of the Revised Rules of Court is liberal as provided by Section 6
thereof, to quote: “Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.”
Rule 30, Section 9, Revised Rules of Court that states: “Sec. 9. Judge to receive
evidence; delegation to clerk of court. The judge of the court where the case is
pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties.
However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties
agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of
court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule
on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits, which objections
shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts
within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing” applies only during trial
because the heading of Rule 30 of the same rules is TRIAL, and the reception of
evidence ex parte in our court is due to failure to file answer by the defendant
(s), there is no trial conducted thus Rule 30, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of
Court is not applicable in the ex parte reception of evidence in Replevin cases.

Moreover, Rule 30, Section 9 of the same rules applies only to second level
courts not to the first level courts. The bases are:

All branch clerk of courts in the Regional Trial Courts are lawyers; and Rule 5,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court viz:

“Section 1. Uniform procedure. The procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall
be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular
26
provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said courts, or (b) in civil
cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.”
The provision of Rule 30, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Court mentioned of a
branch clerk of court who is a lawyer that is definitely referring to a Regional Trial
Court therefore the import is that it will not apply to branch clerk of court of first
level court because its branch clerk of court need not be a lawyer.

The Supreme Court, particularly all judges were benefited by the lawful orders in
allowing reception of evidence ex parte by an Officer-in-Charge who is a non-
lawyer because the plaintiffs-banks paid the amount of Five hundred Pesos
(P500.00) for each Replevin case augmenting the Special Allowance for Judges
(SAJ). The plaintiffs-banks paid the late unremitted legal fees pertaining to the
reception of evidence ex parte covering the one year period. What is the bad
intention of the four Judges and seventy court employees in charging me
administratively because of the collection of the unremitted legal fees that will
benefit the judiciary, particularly the judges, including them? Instead of them
cooperating and helping me to recover the unremitted legal fees, they mercilessly
subjected me to unfounded and fabricated administrative cases thereby making
my work as a Judge more difficult and more stressful.

An ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court is allowed under

Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No.
35-2004, Section 21 (e ) finds support in Administrative Circular No. 37-93, to
quote:

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 37-93 May 28, 1993

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A
CIRCUIT COURTS ALL PRESIDING JUSTICES/JUDGES AND ALL CLERKS
OF COURT OF AFORESAID COURTS ALL MEMBERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE ALL MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: AMENDMENT TO MANUAL FOR CLERKS OF COURT

RE: DELEGATION OF RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE IN CASE OF DEFAULT

27
Section F, 1. of the Manual for Clerks of Court (pp. 75-76) is hereby amended to
read as follows:

In Default Cases. — When a defendant is declared in default (for failure to file

answers), or considered as in default (For failure to appear at the pre-trial), the
Court may now authorize the Clerk of Court to receive evidence ex parte. The
contrary doctrine laid down in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 1 has been overruled in
Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental. 2

Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial
practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the
several explicitly authorized instances under the Rules where the function of
receiving evidence and even of making recommendatory findings of facts on the
basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court.
These instances are set out in Rule 33, treating of presentation of evidence
before commissioners, etc., in particular situations, such as when the trial of an
issue of fact requires the examination of a long account, or when the taking of an
account is necessary for the information of the court, or when issues of fact arise
otherwise than upon the pleadings or while carrying a judgment or order into
effect; Rules 67 and 69, dealing with submission of evidence also before
commissioners in special civil actions of eminent domain and partition,
respectively; Rule 86 regarding trials of contested claims in judicial proceedings
for the settlement of a decedent's estate; Rule 136 empowering the clerk of court,
when directed by the judge inter alia to receive evidence relating to the accounts
of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees and receivers, or relative to the
settlement of the estates of the deceased persons, or to guardianships,
trusteeships, or receiverships. In all these instances, the competence of the clerk
of court is assumed. Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically
wrong in allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before a Clerk of Court. Such
a procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the party adversely affected
who, for valid cause and upon appropriate and seasonable application, may bring
about the undoing thereof or the elimination of prejudice thereby caused to him;
and it is, after all, the Court itself which is duty bound and has the ultimate
responsibility to pass upon the evidence received in this manner, discarding in
the process such proofs as are incompetent and then declare what facts have
thereby been established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory
to rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed that
any serious error in the ex parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial to any
absent party, will be detected and duly remedied by the Court, and/or may
always, in any event; be drawn to its attention by any interested party. 3
For your information and guidance. May 28, 1993.

(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice

28
Footnotes
1 66 SCRA 453 (1975).
2 L-49396, January 15, 1988 (157 SCRA 200)
3 (Reiterated in Monserrate v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 153 [1989]); Heirs of
the late Jesus Tan v. Sales, G.R. No. 53546, June 28, 1992; 210 SCRA 303.

As observed by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in his ponencia in Laulan
vs. Malpaya, 65 SCRA 494,499-500 — No provision of law or principle of public
policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence
of a party litigant. After all the reception of evidence by the clerk of court
constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the
witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any,
adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the
part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when
the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the
admission of the documentary evidence preferred (Wack Wack Golf and country
Club, Inc. vs. court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501). More importantly, the duty to
render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged
to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported
(Province of Pang vs. Palisoc, 6 SCRA 299) – his observation supported me that
“there is no law expressly prohibiting the delegation of reception of evidence by
the first level court to a branch clerk of court or officer-in-charge”.

The cited jurisprudences by the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator such
as Paco vs. Quilala AM No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003 and Concerned
Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Pornillos AM No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009, are
inapplicable to the facts of our civil cases where the parties have been declared
in default under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court and they were
required to pay ex parte reception of evidence fee under Administrative Circular
No. 35-2004, Section 21 (e).

Our trial court’s ex parte reception of evidence is due to default of the adverse
parties upon motion by the plaintiff-banks.

If the complainants presented trial court’s orders that violated Rule 30, Section 9
of the Revised Rules of Court without my knowledge because Rule 9, Section 3
of the Revised Rules of Court is what applies in the ex parte reception of
evidence in Replevin cases in our civil cases, those are most likely falsified by
them to penalize me or those most likely products of deception by their own
machinations to penalize me that I previously experienced such as attaching and
detaching pleadings by court staff. I must be confronted with those instances that
I did not know as of today. The complainants can manufacture evidence during
my long absence in the trial court to benefit them in these administrative cases.
29
The Office of the Court Administrator upheld our court’s requiring the plaintiffs
with pending replevin cases to pay legal fees for transcripts, pursuant to a judicial
prerogative to ensure that court funds were properly accounted for (p. 53 of the
Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016). Thus, the seventy-four
complainants cannot infringe upon this judicial prerogative of ex parte reception
of evidence whereby corresponding legal fees are paid by suing me without them
availing of proper judicial relief for my trial court to act upon (See Fernandez vs.
Versola AM No. CA -04-40, 13 August 2004; Cortes vs. Chico – Nazario Am no.
SB 04-11 -J, February 13, 2004; Flores vs. Abesamis AM no. SC -96-1, July 10,
1997; Flores vs. Adefuin-De La Cruz, AM no. CA-04-39, October 4, 2004).

My trial court collected five hundred pesos (P500) for ex parte reception of
evidence that was sustained by the Office of the Court Administrator and by Your
Honors, the plaintiffs paid for these ex parte reception of evidence for years, why
should be penalized for it, if I was grossly ignorant of the laws, then all my
collections should all be returned to the plaintiffs but there was no refund made
by my trial court thus my orders were lawful. There is no basis, factual or legal,
to penalize me with ex parte reception by the OIC who is not a member of the
bar.

I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: xxx (b) ordering the
presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC despite his not being a
member of the Bar (OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ) xxx

B. Refusal to Honor the Appointments of Court Personnel

At the time of their appointments, there was a protest made against them.
Therefore, there was no refusal to honor their appointments. There is a big
difference between rejection of appointments and protest of appointments. Your
Honors, I did not reject their appointments, I protested. There are factual and
legal bases.

B.1. On Irregular Appointment of Branch Clerk of Court Leilani Tejero-

Lopez

I exercised the statutory right of a Judge to question the appointment of an

applicant for a branch clerk of court who did not comply with all the basic
requirements under the laws thus it can be considered as an irregular
30
appointment. She did not have favorable indorsement from the Judge and
Position Description Form (PDF) listed as among the basic requirements.

The issue is not the lack of importance of favorable recommendation of Judge, it

is the non-compliance of all basic requirements for application as branch clerk of
court. Did she comply with all the basic requirements? The answer is no.
Therefore, her appointment was irregular.

My lack of ill motive in questioning the appointment can be gleaned from the
various letters pertaining to the questioned appointment filed before the Supreme
Court. I lamented in one of the letters submitted to the Supreme Court that it is
only in the Philippines that an applicant for branch clerk of court, who was
rejected personally and in writing several times, and who previously has
withdrawn her application, signed a petition for my transfer with prayer for her
dismissal, more or less a month prior to her appointment, then criminally charge
me more or less prior to her oath-taking before the Office of the Executive Judge.
It is not a Grave Misconduct to lodge a protest to her. Likewise, there is nothing
on record that I committed insubordination in writing the questioned letter and
subsequent letters thereto because a right to protest an appointment that is
perceived to be irregular is inherent in every court.

Writing a complaint letter and a protest letter on the irregular appointments of

court employees Mariejoy Lagman and Leilani Tejero - Lopez cannot be
considered as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior. It is a legitimate action of a Judge to bring to the
proper authorities the irregularities surrounding their appointments as provided
under The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, CANON 2,
SECTION 3. – Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may have become aware.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular
appointments of court employees are privileged communications that are not
actionable when made in good faith. The complainants failed to adduce any proof
that I was impelled with disreputable motive and bad faith in writing them the
protest letters.

My letters are protected by doctrine of privileged communication thus I must not

be penalized for it.
31
Privileged communications are divided into two general classes, namely: (1)
those which are absolutely privileged; and (2) those which are qualifiedly or
conditionally privileged, as defined in subsequent sections (33 Am. Jur., p. 123).
An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of
the occasion on which or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy
can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon a person who claims
to be injured thereby, and even though it may have been made maliciously (33
Am. Jur., pp. 123-124). A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
where circumstances exist, or are 'reasonably believed by the defendant to exist,
which cast on him the duty of making a communication to a certain other person
to whom he makes such communication in the performance of such duty, or
where the person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests the person
of society that he should tell third person’s certain facts, which he in good faith
proceeds to do. This general idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: A
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even
though it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable, and
although the duty is not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect
obligation. The essential elements of conditionally privileged communication may
accordingly be enumerated as a good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement
limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper
manner and to proper parties only (33 Am. Jur., pp. 124-125).

Newell, in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following
language:

Absolute Privilege — In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of

public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and
speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all
actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even of it be alleged and
proved that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice
(Section 350, pp. 387388).

In the less important matters, however, the interests and welfare of the public do
not demand that the speaker should be freed from all responsibility, but merely
require that he should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the
common good. In these cases the privilege is said not to be absolute but
qualified; and a party defamed may recover damages notwithstanding the
privilege if he can prove that the words were not used in good faith, but that the
party availed himself of the occasion wilfully and knowingly for the purpose of
defaming the plaintiff (Section 389, p. 415).

32
Apart from the occasion in which or the matter in reference to which it is made,
what distinguishes an absolutely privileged communication from one which is
only qualifiedly privileged is, therefore, that the latter is actionable upon proof of
"actual malice", whereas its existence does not affect the exemption attached to
the former, provided that, in the case of judicial proceedings, the derogatory
statements in question are pertinent, relevant or related to or connected with the
subject matter of the communication involved. Under peculiar situations, a few
decisions have required probable cause for the enjoyment of the absolute
privilege, but such decisions not only do not reflect the view of the clear weight of
authority, but, also, have acknowledged the wisdom of such view, although its
non-application was sought to be justified by the special conditions obtaining in
each case (See Harshaw vs. Harshaw, 136 ALR, 1411, 1413).

The reason underlying the general rule on absolutely privileged communications

is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows: "The class of absolutely
privileged communications is narrow and is practically limited to legislative and
judicial proceedings and other acts of state, including, it is said, communications
made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of law, by or to heads of
executive departments of the state, and matters involving military affairs. The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public
service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of
the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise
their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages" (33 Am. Jur., 123-124). It is, thus, clear that
utterances made in the course of judicial including all kinds of pleadings, petitions
and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged
(Newel on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., pp. 388, 391¬392, 407; 53
C.J.S. 165, 167, 173; 33 Am Jur., 142-143, 144-145, 147; Tupas vs. Parreno, L-
12545 [April 30, 19591). As the Supreme Court of Tennessee has put it: "For
reasons of public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, it appears to be the prevailing rule in the United States that statements
made in a pleading in a civil action are absolutely privileged and no action for
libel may be founded thereon when pertinent and relevant to the subject under
inquiry, however false and malicious such statements may be (33 Am. Jur. 144,
145, Libel and Slander 149; 16 ALR 746, supplemented in 42 ALR 878 and 134
ALR 483." (Hayslip vs. Weliford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d
820). Hence, the "Petition for bond" of defendant herein is absolutely privileged,
and no civil action for libel or slander may arise therefrom, unless the contents of
the petition are irrelevant to the subject matter thereof.

The contents of the complaint letter and the protest letter on the irregular
appointments of court employees are protected by my right against self-
incrimination enshrined and guaranteed by Article III, Section 17 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, to wit: “ No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.”
33
In Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969: To
quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of
its citizens." It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed
the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does
all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial
opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus
according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late
Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above,
it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately
raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent. Thus, the subject letters cannot be utilized against me
because it is similar to my taking a witness stand against myself, it will violate my
right against self-incrimination. I as author is the complainant against myself as
the respondent over the questioned letters, there is no proof because I will
always testify in my favor. I will only correct the objectionable words before a trial
court.

Complainant Leilani Tejero-Lopez charged me with Refusal to Obey Court Order

when I refused to administer her oath of office based on an appointment which
the court was not officially notified due to late arrival of official notice by OCA. No
resolution yet of our court’s the pending protest to her application on the grounds
of failure to get favorable indorsement from a Judge and failure to accomplish the
Position Descriptive Form (PDF) which are listed as basic requirements for
application as a court employee.

Was there a Refusal to Obey Court Order? The answer is in the negative.

In Judge Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009:
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior
officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or
intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.

Complainant failed to present any proof to bolster the charge of Refusal to Obey
Court order relative to my refusal to swear complainant as the appointed Clerk of
34
Court without her complying all the basic requirements in her application for the
vacant position. There was no administrative offense I committed because the
Honorable Supreme Court did not issue a verbal or written order to administer an
oath of office to complainant. There is no such order coming from the employer
for me to follow. The official notice by the Honorable Office of the Court
Administrator came late to my court, after she has lodged a criminal complaint
against me. Her criminal complaint was dismissed.

It is only in the Philippines where the complainant charged me with administrative

case with a prayer for dismissal then went to me to administer an oath to her,
when refused on just and valid grounds, criminally charged me before the
Prosecutor’s Office, then took her oath of office before the Executive Judge. She
cannot respectfully wait the formal notice of her official appointment paper by the
Honorable Court Administrator that was received by our court few days later she
went to my chambers? We received late the official copy of her appointment
paper later after she lodged a criminal complaint against us.

Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior

officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or
intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.
Willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must
concur: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The elements of
Insubordination are not present in the protest letter on the irregular appointments
of court employees that I perceived as such.

There was no proof presented by complainant that insubordination was

committed pertaining to the protest letter on the irregular appointments of court
employees that is susceptible to various interpretations.

Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is

definitely not evidence. “The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence.” Considering that complainant has failed to
substantiate her allegations, failing even to attest to her claims before the
investigator appointed by this Court, elementary justice dictates respondent’s
exoneration of the charge.

In Alcuizar vs. Judge Carpio, A.M.-RTJ-07-2068, August 7, 2007: In

administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence would
35
ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the
proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative
proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the
removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino: Inasmuch
as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave
that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof
required should be more than substantial.

B.2. Alleged Intemperate and Disrespectful Language

The words “void ab initio” and “big joke’ described my frustrations experienced
common among people, these were misunderstood. I cannot be penalized for my
wrong choice of word that may be due to my provincial background and highly
stressful working place because my undermanned court was beset with many
administrative problems. I have a poor English due to provincial background
although I received a grade of 99% for reading comprehension and a grade of
98% for verbal ability for my National College Entrance Exams taken in
September, 1992.

As to the alleged disrespectful language, pardon me Your Honors, I employed

the wrong choice of words in a privileged communication that was viewed
negatively. I am sorry, it will not happen again. I did not assail Your Honors’
absolute power of appointment. Such words “void ab initio” and a “big joke” were
utilized in jurisprudences. Your Honors, it is too harsh to conclude the words
“void ab initio” and “big joke” to be a Serious Misconduct.

There is no reason why there will be a double standard on me on this trivial

matter. Thus, I should not be made liable for Gross Misconduct and Gross
Insubordination. I cited examples on how the use of similar words that may be
construed negatively, Your Honors were not made administratively liable:

Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Arturo Brion: xxx Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown
to be without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should have),
the Court should at least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling
that would favor the son of a Member of the Court. xxx If this Court is indeed
SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE
36
ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way described in the speeches of many a
Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind of hasty and imprudent action
that it did in this case. The proper course of action, if the Court indeed honestly
wants to achieve this objective in the present case, is to require the COMELEC
to COMMENT on the petition and to decide matters from that point.

Regina Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013 Dissenting
Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio: The Court's ruling today is a double flip-flop:
(1) it reverses the well-settled doctrine that upon proclamation of a winning
congressional candidate, the HRET acquires sole jurisdiction over any contest
relating to the "election, returns and qualifications" of House Members; and (2) it
also reverses the well-settled doctrine that any question on the validity of such
proclamation falls under the sole jurisdiction of the HRET.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, April 12, 2011, Dissenting
Opinion by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales: Saying that Cojuangco was not a
subordinate or close associate of the Marcoses is "the biggest joke to hit the
century" especially with Cojuangco's own personal admission that he left the
Philippines with Marcos and family on February 25, 1986 on the Marcoses' way
to their exile in the United States following the first EDSA people power revolt.
"Clearly, the intimate relationship between Cojuangco and Marcos equates or
exceeds that of a family member or cabinet member, since not all of Marcos's
relatives or high government ministers went with him in exile on that fateful date.
If this will not prove the more than close association between Cojuangco and
Marcos, the Court does not know what will."

League of the Cities of the Phils. vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and
178056, April 12, 2011, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio: This Court
has made history with its repeated flip-flopping in this case.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM,

ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO, October
15, 2010, Dissenting Opinion by Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno: The unfortunate
ruling of the majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its
failure to distinguish between the determination of the objective, factual existence
of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the determination of the liability that
results from a finding of plagiarism. Specifically, it made “malicious intent”, which
heretofore had not been relevant to a finding of plagiarism, an essential element.
The majority Decision will thus stand against the overwhelming conventions on
what constitutes plagiarism. In doing so, the Decision has created unimaginable
problems for Philippine academia, which will from now on have to find a
disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by students and researchers on
the justification of the majority Decision. It has also undermined the protection of
copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists “lack of malicious intent” as a
37
defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic rights of the copyright owner
committed through lack of attribution. Under Section 184 of R.A. 8293 (“An Act
Describing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual
Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other
Purposes”), or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, there is no
infringement of copyright in the use of another's work in: (b) the making of
quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and only to
the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles
and periodicals in the form of press summaries: Provided that the source and the
name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned. Because the
majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the complaining authors
in the Vinuya decision to editorial errors and lack of malicious intent to
appropriate ─ and that therefore there was no plagiarism ─ lack of intent to
infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may now also become a
defense, rendering the above legal provision meaningless.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, February 8, 2011, Concurring Opinion
by Justice Roberto Abad: Justice Sereno castigates the majority in the Court for
lowering the standards for judicial scholarship, negating the educative and moral
directional value in the writing and publishing of decisions, bending over
backwards to deny the objective existence of gross plagiarism, and condoning
dishonesty in the exercise of a function central to the role of the courts. But our
courts are in the business, not of “judicial scholarship,” but of deciding fairly and
honestly the disputes before them, using precedents and legal literature that,
according to American scholars, belong to the public domain. If this is not honest
work for a judge, I do not know what is. And Justice Sereno has no right to
preach at the expense of the majority about “educative and moral directional
value” in writing published articles. For one thing, her standards are obviously for
work done in the academe, not for the judge plodding at his desk to perform
government work. For another, I note that on occasions she has breached those
very standards, lifting from works of others without proper attribution. xxx The
ideas were from GATT but the presentation was original Sereno. Down the line,
however, without introduction or preamble, she copied verbatim into her work
portions from Understanding on Dispute Settlement, without citing this specific
source. More, she did not use quotation marks to identify the copied portions.
She thus made ordinary readers like me believe that she also crafted those
portions. To borrow a word from the civil code, she “co-mingled” the work of
others with hers, erasing the identity of the lifted work.Justice Sereno’s
explanation is that, since she was drawing from the rules embodied in GATT’s
Understanding on Dispute Settlement, she did not have to make attributions to
those rules at each turn of her writing. She may be correct if she in fact properly
cited those rules the first time she copied from it and, further, indicated a clear
intent to do further copying down the line. But she did not. xxx Further, she did
not identify the portions she copied verbatim in order to set them apart from her
own writing. Under the rule that she foists on Justice Del Castillo, quotation
marks must be used whenever verbatim quotes are made. This requirement is all
38
the more important since, unlike domestic rules, the rules of GATT are unfamiliar
terrain to most readers. xxx Using the severe standards she sets for Justice Del
Castillo in Vinuya, i.e., “objective existence of plagiarism,” I am afraid that any
explanation of good faith or lack of malicious intent on Justice Sereno’s part in
copying without proper attribution from the work of Judge Posner would not be
acceptable. Still I can concede that Justice Sereno may not have intended to
plagiarize the work of others even if she copied verbatim from them without
proper attribution or quotation marks. Her above articles were, taken as whole,
essentially hers. I regret, however, that since she wrote them as an academician
bound by the high standards that she and the University of the Philippines where
she taught espouse, she may have failed, borrowing her own phrase, to set the
correct “educative and moral directional value” for the young.

Do the above- quoted Supreme Court text of the Decisions merit administrative
sanctions? The answer is in the negative.

Citizens of a democratic country have constitutionally protected right to free

speech as held by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bustos, In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen, and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.

The values served by the protection of Free Speech are:

1. The Discovery of Truth - This value was first suggested by Milton, who first
suggested that when truth and falsehood are allowed to freely grapple, truth will
win out.

2. Facilitating Participation by Citizens in Political Decision-Making - It has

been suggested that citizens will not make wise and informed choices in
elections if candidates and proponents of certain policies are restricted in their
ability to communicate positions.

3. Creating a More Adaptable and Stable Community (The "Safety Valve"

Function) - It has been suggested that a society in which angry and alienated
citizens are allowed to speak their mind--"vent"--will be more stable, as people
will be less likely to resort to violence. It has also been pointed out that allowing
the alienated and discontented to speak freely enables government to better
monitor potentially dangerous groups who would otherwise act more
clandestinely.

39
4. Assuring Individual Self-Fulfillment - Free speech enables individuals to
express themselves, create and identify--and, in the process perhaps, find
kindred spirits. Freedom of speech thus becomes an aspect of human dignity.

5. Checking Abuse of Governmental Power - As Watergate, Irangate,

Clintongate (and all the other "gates") demonstrate, freedom of the press enables
citizens to learn about abuses of power--and then do something about the abuse
at the ballot box, if they feel so moved.

6. Promoting Tolerance - It has been argued that freedom of speech,

especially through our practice of extending protection to speech that we find
hateful or personally upsetting, teaches us to become more tolerant in other
aspects of life-¬and that a more tolerant society is a better society.

7. Creating a More Robust and Interesting Community - A community in

which free speech is valued and protected is likely to be a more energized,
creative society as its citizens actively fulfill themselves in many diverse and
interesting ways.

In Marantan vs. Diokno et al., G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014: For a
comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such
does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is,
thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub-judice
rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. The power of contempt is inherent
in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by
publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions
or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the
maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of
the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights. The
"clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that
the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should
not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat. The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly
relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct
of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. As to the merits, the
40
comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their
opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a
reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to
upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on
the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their
petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court. As to the
conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they
were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no
complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed
since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no
attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either. "A public utterance or
publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the
cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct
the orderly and fair administration of justice." By no stretch of the imagination
could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is
wanting.” The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

In Heck vs. Gamotin Jr., A.C. No. 5329, March 18, 2014: Secondly, we cannot
sanction the respondent for having angrily reacted to Heck’s unexpected tirade in
his presence. The respondent was not then reacting to an attack on his person,
but to Heck’s disrespectful remark against Philippine authorities in general.
Any self- respecting government official like the respondent should feel justly
affronted by any expression or show of disrespect in his presence, including
harsh words like those uttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified in
making the utterance is of no relevance to us. Lawyers may be expected to
maintain their composure and decorum at all times, but they are still human, and
their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in unexpected
situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. That is how we now view the
actuation of the respondent in reacting to Heck’s utterance. The Court will not
permit the respondent’s good record to be tarnished by his having promptly
reacted to Heck’s remark. Moreover, Heck could have sincerely perceived the
respondent’s actuations to be arrogant and overbearing, but it is not fair for us to
take the respondent to task in the context of the events and occasions in which
the actuations occurred in the absence of a credible showing that his actuations
had been impelled by any bad motive, or had amounted to any breach of any
canon of professional conduct or legal ethics.

41
B.3 Alleged Issuance of Verbal Threats

Complainant Leilani Tejero – Lopez failed to adduce any proof that I issued
verbal threats, she has allegations that are conflicting with her other allegations
found in her several affidavits and letters to the Office of the Court Administrator.
There are no proofs that I committed Grave Threats, Unjust Vexation, Grave
Coercion, Harassment, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Abuse of
Authority which became the basis for Oppression charge against me. The
elements of the criminal charges and administrative offenses are absent.

There was nothing cruel against her. Based from the facts, she went beyond the
norms of decency by her persistent and annoying application in my court that it
actually became a harassment.

As to alleged verbal threats, there was no proof to it. As to alleged written

threats, it was not my intention to threaten her. I employed the wrong choice of
words in the protest letter. My letters were gravely misinterpreted in violation of
my right to due process.

It was my understanding that she insisted and persisted despite of lack of basic
requirements to apply as a Branch Clerk of Court in Metropolitan Trial Court
Branch 47, Pasay City. My honest belief about the irregularity of her appointment
led to such kind of conversation. I did not oppress her. I was patient with her in
the beginning until I lost my patience coupled by her weird manner of
approaching me several times that became vexatious. She even gave me red
roses despite her application was validly refused, that I use the word validly
“rejected” due to poor English, few times that had been taken advantage of in
these administrative cases.

My old protest letters that have no more relevance today. The letters have no
value after so many years.

There was no proof to abuse, misconduct and oppression against them when I
protested their applications and appointments, the charges were only opinions by
others who are not privy to what truly happened.

Our talk ended well based from their letters that are part of the High Court’s case
records. But Mariejoy Lagman hurriedly left my court after giving her transfer
letter without saying a goodbye to me that I viewed as disrespectful.

42
Again, I am the letter writer who was made as a witness against myself,
therefore, since I cannot be a hostile witness over the letter as evidence against
me, the letter must not be utilized against me for being violative of my right
against self-incrimination. It is enshrined and guaranteed by Article III, Section 17
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution , to wit: “ No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself.” This applies in administrative cases.

I do not think, it is good to penalize a Judge because of the letter with few words
that other people find objectionable, but not to another people. There will an
inconsistency as to the application of a standard to it.

With due respect, she was not intimidated. She kept on annoying and pestering
me about her application that it became a harassment to me. In fact, she will not
be intimidated because she appeared to have a connection to the Honorable
Office of the Court Administrator. And she was appointed despite the lack of
basic requirements that I questioned ever since.

It is not true that the language used in expressing the displeasure is hardly the
kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate rather the language used is a
reasonable expression of grievances of an oppressed and harassed first level
court Judge. The use of the words “void ab initio” and a “big joke” are allowed
under our Constitution, there is no proof that these words cast doubts on the
integrity of anyone.

There was no proof that my words were abusive. Former Assistant Thelma Bahia
even smiled upon reading the letters that were unfairly tagged as offensive. She
was about to laugh, she contained her laughter. She is my witness in that
particular charge.

Moreover, the language I employed in the questioned protest letters are vague
and ambiguous, and this lack of certainty as to their true import and meaning,
should be reason that the complaint must be dismissed for failure to meet the
quantum of proof required to sanction a Judge, that is, the proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

Complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the true semantics of the
words in my protest letters that can be interpreted differently by people coming
from all walks in life. The words “void ab initio” and “big joke’ describe the
frustration experienced by me on the irregular appointments of court employees.

43
The accusations against me are proof-less. She merely alleged without any
proof. My letters can be proof against me because I will be given opportunity to
clarify if not to correct them in a trial proper. Allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not evidence (General
Milling Corporation v. Casio, G.R. No. 149552, March 10, 2010). “The basic rule
is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.”
Considering that complainant has failed to substantiate her allegations, failing
even to attest to her claims before the investigator appointed by this Court,
elementary justice dictates respondent’s exoneration of the charge (Alegria vs.
Judge Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007).

In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the

allegations in the complaint rests on the complainant (Susa v. Pena, A.M. No. P-
03-1740, September 17, 2003, 411 SCRA 182). While substantial evidence
would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different
where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative
proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to
be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the
removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt (Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-
1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428, citing In Re Impeachment of Horrilleno,
43 Phil. 212 (1922). To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575,
January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 27). Inasmuch as what is imputed against
respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail
dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial. In Real vs. Belo, G.R. NO. 146224, January 26, 2007: Petitioner's
bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her favor. It is
basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

The allegations of complainant against me are not only falsity, they are illogical.
The false accusations of Grave Threats, Unjust Vexation, Grave Coercion,
Harassment, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Abuse of Authority
including Oppression, aside that these are mere allegations without evidence,
are belied by complainant’s own allegations, to quote:

1. Sinikap kung hindi mauwi sa hindi pagkakaunawaan ang aming pag –

uusap at minabuti ko na lang na magpasalamat na binigyan niya ako ng
pagkakataon na makaharap at wala akong ibang layunin kundi iparating sa
kanya na gusto kung gampanan ang itinalagang appointment sa akin
(Complainant’s Complaint- Affidavit in June, 2011);

44
2. In fact, I immediately furnished her a copy of my waiver, so that I can
easily move on to the next chapter of my activities (Complainant’s Letter in June,
2011);

3. I executed a Waiver/ Notice of withdrawal in connection with my

application for Clerk of Court III. However, after a thorough soul searching, I
came to realize, that this vacant position for Clerk of Court III is a great
opportunity for my career advancement considering that I had been in service for
more than 10 years (Complainant’s Letter in May, 2011).

Nowhere in the above statements of complainant showed that I committed

abuses, coercion, harassment and threats including Oppression to her.

Logically, complainant will not insist and persist to apply as Clerk of Court, a
position that requires trust and confidence, in my trial court, despite of several
verbal and written valid refusal to her application that is already harassment for
her to kept pestering me, if I committed abuses, coercion, harassment and
threats including Oppression to her. Evidence, to be believed, must proceed not
only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as to
hurdle the test of conformity with the knowledge and common experience of
mankind (Zapatos v. People of the Philippines, G.R Nos. 147814-15, September
16, 2003).

The alleged issuance of verbal threats has been belied with the complainant’s
subsequent letters submitted to the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator. I
forgot also to mention that she would show up in front of my trial court after
securing the irregular appointment for several times as if trying to communicate
with me that I consider it as her bizarre actuations. She thought highly of me and
spoke well of me to my relatives who visited my court to pick up my personal
things inside my chambers last year, to prove I did not harass or oppress her.

B.4. Illegal Appointment of Clerk Mariejoy Lagman

As to my protest to Mariejoy Lagman, my administrative complaint has a bearing

because the charges against her were serious supported by documentary proofs,
that was my honest belief, prior to the resolution of the same.

45
Under Section 34 (b), Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, Mariejoy Lagman has a pending administrative case. Therefore,
she should have been disqualified for promotion.

Also, she did not secure court clearances which are essential requisites for her
promotion. Therefore, my protest against her irregular appointment has factual
and legal bases. I should not be penalized with it.

In A.M. No. P-12-3033, the Office of the Court Administrator did not consider the
administrative lapses on Mariejoy Lagman’s case:

1. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case amend the rationale
of the jurisprudence in Villordon vs. Avila, AM No. P- 2809, August 10, 2012 and
a host of similar cases?

2. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case consider falsifying of

the court's official documents like the court's minutes as simple neglect of duty
and not dishonesty and grave misconduct?

3. Why did the jurisprudence of this administrative case contravened with

Section 1, Chapter VIII, AM No. 03-8-02-SC?

4. Why were the several infractions committed in different dates supported by

evidence on record by the herein respondents merited only a penalty of
Reprimand that contravened the law and jurisprudence?

5. Why was there no administrative hearing conducted for the attendance of

all the parties involved and all the signatories in the falsified minutes committed
to establish the charges of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct not Simple Neglect
of Duty to be incorporated in the agenda report of the Office of the Court
Administrator?

6. Why were there no thorough investigation and administrative hearing

conducted to back up the findings of facts by the Office of the Court
Administrator?

7. Why was there a total disregard of the extraneous factors in this

administrative case like the forced settlement and interference of other four (4)
first level judges on July 26, 2010 as well as the interference of the RTC
46
Executive Judge and RTC Judge of Branch 108, Pasay City who are co-
responsible for the transfer as Clerk to RTC of one of the respondents despite
knowledge of their administrative cases involving grave offenses if the
administrative offenses the respondents committed are not grave and serious
offenses?

8. Why the Office of the Executive Judge forwarded the complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator if the charges are Simple Neglect of Duty?

9. Why was this administrative case mentioned in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ
indorsed on June 7, 2011 filed by Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito et al. who
stated that our court's complaints are baseless against the respondents thereby
they committed perjury?

10. Why was there a fast appointment of one of the respondents despite the
unresolved administrative case involving grave offenses?

11. Why was there no report of the investigation conducted with the fast
appointment of one of the respondents to prove bias on the part of the Office of
the Court Administrator in this administrative matter that was copy furnished to
our court?

12. Why did the Office of the Court Administrator conclude that the explanation
of one of the respondents on the erroneous entries of the court's monthly reports
to be satisfactorily when there was no proof to back this up like the detailed
reports of the monthly cases and the correspondent semi-annual inventory
supporting such finding?

13. Why did the Office of the Court Administrator fail to act on the motion to
change the case title and motion to re-raffle this administrative case filed on
August 6, 2012 before the promulgation of the Decision in this administrative
case?

The foregoing inquiries disprove the unsubstantiated charges of abuse and

oppression against me in this administrative case.

The branch clerk of court Leilani Tejero-Lopez was irregularly appointed while
clerk Mariejoy Lagman was illegally appointed, they performed their functions in
trial courts unlike me, it is too abusive, too harsh and too oppressive if I will still
47
be penalized for protesting to their irregular appointment and illegal appointment
while those responsible for those irregularity and illegality are scot-free, as in no
administrative liability.

I did not commit gross insubordination for her unwarranted refusal to

honor the appointments of court personnel and rejection of the
appointment of Ms. Lagman; I did not commit disrespect toward the Court
for my intemperate and disrespectful language in characterizing Ms.
Tejero-Lopez's valid appointment as void ab initio and a big joke; and I did
not commit grave abuse of authority and oppression for alleged issuing
verbal threats of filing administrative, civil and criminal charges against
Ms. Tejero-Lopez unless the latter withdrew her application, my words
were misunderstood.

C. Allowing on-the- Job Trainees

I did not violate OCA Circular No. 111-2005. Seventy (70) complainants did not
give proof to it. What is penalized is not the making of draft memorandum but the
complying with the final memorandum that violated OCA Circular No. 111-2005.
There is no proof that I violated any provision of OCA Circular No. 111-2005.

There was no proof that Ms. Angelica Rosali followed the memorandum that was
not disseminated to the court staff. The draft memorandum did not bear any
signature of all court staff including Ms. Angelica Rosali to prove their non-
receipt of it.

There was no proof that she performed judicial works upon my order. She was a
court observer. Angelica Rosali denied in her affidavit that she received the
memorandum and performed encoding tasks there is no basis to penalize me for
violation of OCA Circular No. 111-2005.
I did not order her to docket decisions and staple the returns. Her affidavit
did not say so. There was no proof that I ordered her to do those docketing and
stapling. Whoever staff who allowed her to do judicial works must be penalized
not me in the interest of fair play.

There is no proof that Johaya Mababaya, Catherine Sarate and Eduardo

Pangilinan III correct or made the drafts of the court’s Resolutions and
Decisions. Their affidavit did not say so. They denied such false and
malicious accusation in their affidavit from my understanding. They are not
lawyers but students taking up courses not related to law thus they cannot
48
correct or write draft a trial court’s Resolutions and Decisions. They are not
lawyers or law students but students taking up courses that are unrelated to legal
field.

In Abellanosa v. Judge Delorino, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2106, October 19, 2010:

Abellanosa accused Delorino of engaging the services of a certain Socrates
Manarang to draft decisions and/or resolutions for her. Abellanosa claimed that
Manarang was not employed in the RTC of Makati, but Delorino allowed him to
bring home case records for the preparation of decisions. She said that
Manarang was also allowed to stay and work within the premises of the Makati
RTC, Branch 137 and borrow books from its library. Here, there is no sufficient,
clear and convincing evidence to hold Delorino administratively liable. In the
instant case, as found during the investigation, except for Abellanosa’s
allegations, no evidence was adduced to show that Delorino indeed employed
Manarang to draft decisions for her. During cross-examination, Abellanosa even
admitted that she did not have any personal knowledge thereof and she merely
relied on what Manarang allegedly told her. This alone, will not hold. There is no
evidence to support the accusation of complainants against me other than their
self-serving allegations intended to subject me to penalties. There are no names
and dates of the cases allegedly corrected or drafted for decisions and
resolutions by the students as ordered upon them by me.

Also, the Supreme Court Justices and Office of the Court Administrator Officials
must secure copies of all my penned Decisions and Resolutions to note that my
manner and style of legal writing are highly analytical, very legalistic and mostly
philosophical that not even a lawyer or a law graduate can correct or made the
drafts of them.

In Alfonso v. Ignacio, 487 Phil. 1, 7 (2004), Accusation is not synonymous with

guilt. This brings to fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not
evidence. Reliance on mere allegation, conjectures and suppositions will leave
an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on.

There is no proof that I ordered them to perform judicial tasks. Their affidavit did
not state I ordered them to perform judicial tasks. I did not order them to
perform judicial or non-judicial tasks in trial court. They were there as court
observers. I did not know that they attested they were “assistant court
stenographers” because I cannot remember most of the contents of their
affidavit. I have no knowledge with their court observations when I do not see
them most of the time.

49
Thus I must not be penalized for the allegation that they are “assistant court
stenographers”. They can write “assistant Judges” also without my knowledge
and consent. I have no control with what they wrote in their affidavit so no
wrongdoing can be imputed upon me that I deserve a penalty. I did not give them
such designation in trial court. It is not my fault if they put there “assistant court
stenographers”, I have no personal knowledge about it. If the stenographers
ordered them to do their works, they should be penalized not me in the interest of
fair play.

In addition, all the seats were fully occupied by the court staff, it may explain why
I do not see all the court observers most of the time. The stenographers were
located inside a small cubicle at the trial court separated from the court’s
chambers and court staff’s room, it’s too small, around 2 SQM by 2 SQM, without
air-conditioner and with foul smell, it’s good for two persons only, thus it’s unlikely
that court observers Johaya Mababaya, Catherine Sarate and Eduardo
Pangilinan III, will stay there fora brief moment in time. The trial court’s premises
with broken air-conditioner have so many case records that it’s uncomfortable to
stay there for few minutes for the court observation.

There is no proof they as court observers opened case records, there is no

purpose for them to open any case record. The court staff will not allow
them to open any case record. Because the court personnel alleged that it
is a violation of OCA circular that court observers will perform judicial
tasks, they will not allow the court observers do any judicial work. There is
no proof they allowed them to perform judicial works. The court personnel
did not call my attention that all the court observers perform judicial works
and opened case records prior to their filing of the false and malicious
complaints against me.

Also, there are no proofs that they were there in trial court all the time.

From what I heard, they were there for an hour or few hours only, as in three (3)
hours. Their being court observers lasted for few days or weeks with big interval
of the days. I was not aware when Johaya Mababaya, Catherine Sarate and
Eduardo Pangilinan III arrive and/ or leave in trial court. Same is true with
Angelica Rosali except with few times, as in three (3) times, she rode with us.
They attended classes during the time they went to the trial court, their
attendance could be less than thirty (30) minutes. Thus, whatever they do in
trial court as court observers that did not damage the court and the public do not
concern me. There is no basis to penalize me for their being court observers.

I allowed them to be court observers because Judge of RTC Pasay allowed their
classmates to be court observers as proven by their affidavit, there is no ill-
50
motive to agree to their being court observers so the Honorable Office of the
Court Administrator’s recommendation that this charge must be dismissed should
be upheld by Your Honors.

Jurisprudences say that the violation of OCA circular must be flagrant and willful
with evident bad faith before I will be held liable. I did not violate the OCA
circular.

Also, there was a Supreme Court circular that I cited to the Honorable Office of
the Court Administrator in 2014 that the OJT was merely directory, that was the
tenor of it, and that is how the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator should
construe it.

It was announced that “when paralegals and law students will have to be trained
and deployed to help. They can assist in typologizing the cases and identify
those for dismissal or archiving. They should be trained to prepare case briefs to
make it easy for the judges to decide what cases can be dismissed motu proprio
or archived or mediated” in Hustisyeah project of the Honorable Supreme Court.

By allowing paralegals and law students, OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was
impliedly amended. It admits exceptions contrary to the arguments of
complainants that must be given a retroactive effect to this baseless
administrative charge according to jurisprudences.

I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: (a) allowing on-the-job
trainees xxx

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recommended the

dropping of this charge of allowing on-the-job trainees.

D. Designating an Officer-in-Charge

I did not violate CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05. Seventy (70)
complainants did not give a proof to it. I did not have a willful and deliberate
intention to cause public damage.

51
All previous Officers-in-Charge have no educational and professional
qualifications to hold such office in the trial court.

All our court personnel before the appointment of the irregularly-appointed

branch clerk of court who have no Bachelor of laws degree are not qualified to
be an Officer-in-Charge under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05.

Only Clerk Ferdinand Santos has a master’s degree equivalent to a

Bachelor of Laws degree, the minimum requirement for the position of
Officer-in-Charge.

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recognized Ferdinand Santos

who has a Master’s degree with lengthy public and private employment records
as Officer-in-Charge in its several letters, these may be part of case records. He
attended to an activity like computerization as Officer-in-Charge sponsored by
the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator did not revoke his designation,
it’s not anymore my fault. There is no more basis to penalize me about it.

Basing from the action of the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator, the
2002 Revised Manual admits exceptions. Our trial court underwent massive
administrative problems. The Officers-in-Charge who voluntarily left the positions
were accused with dishonesty on court docket records. Such extraordinary
event necessitated extraordinary measure. There was no injury to the State and
to the taxpayers with Officer- in-Charge Ferdinand Santos’ designation.

Jurisprudences say that the violation of OCA circular must be flagrant and willful
with evident bad faith before I will be held liable. Here, the Honorable Office of
the Court Administrator consented to it by recognizing him as the court’s OIC.
Such recognition is my shield against any administrative liability.

I did not commit Gross ignorance of the law for: (a) xxx designating an OIC
who did not possess the minimum qualifications for the position and
without approval from the Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ) xxx

The Honorable Office of the Court Administrator recommended the

dropping of this charge of designating an OIC who did not possess the
minimum qualifications for the position and without approval from the
Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ).

52
E. Non-Approval of Sick Leave of Utility Aide

The complaint filed by Mrs. Josefina G. Labid charging me with oppression,

gross ignorance of the law, and conduct unbecoming of a judge in
connection with the non-approval of sick son Noel Labid, who had served
as Utility Worker I at the MeTC Branch 47, is a falsehood.

Not only complainant Mrs. Josefina G. Labid failed to establish all the
elements of oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge against me, she failed to adduce proof to
substantiate her false and malicious charges against me.

She and the rest of the four (4) judges and sixty-nine (69) court personnel
failed to controvert my arguments and discussions despite notice to them:

I am not a doctor, I have no way of knowing if he, Noel Labid is fit to work
due to his numerous absences. I need those certifications because of my
bad experiences with my court staff that I complained about falsifying court
minutes. The medical certificate and clinical abstracts shown to me were
photocopies of them by his mother. The proof is Memorandum of OIC given
to the mother asking her son to submit the original copy of the medical
certificate found on p. 35 of the Decision.

She may cause undue injury to the State if it turned out she presented
falsified medical certificate and clinical abstract that were mere photocopies
when presented to me? Then I can be liable administratively for not
verifying them and requiring them to submit pertinent documents. I think
there was a jurisprudence that I read and cited about requiring certificate of
fitness to work that I submitted to the Honorable Office of the Court
Administrator in one of my pleadings.

I did not see handwritten letter of her son. What if he is still alive today
because his death certificate was not presented to me to verify such a fact.
Therefore, there may be a possibility that as of today, he is alive, he did not
have any sickness because only photocopies were shown to me way back.
53
As to legal basis, I explained a jurisprudence in Tagalog to the mother thus
she must ensure compliance of the memoranda issued by Officer-in-
Charge prior to the approval of his application for leave of absence to prove
good faith that shielded me from abuse and oppression:

In RE: Memorandum of Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia Against Ms.

Dorothy Salgado A.M. No. 2004-41-SC, January 13, 2005 declares that
the crux of the charge against respondent is her habitual absenteeism.
Although respondent might have had a valid reason for the absences by
presenting uncontroverted medical certificates proving that she suffered an
illness, her failure to exert any effort to inform her office is a contemptuous
behavior that exacts disciplinary action of the Court. Rule XVI, Section 16
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 provides:

Sec. 16. All application for sick leave of absence for one full day or more
shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon
the employee’s return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should
be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the agency head. Application
for sick leave in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a proper
medical certificate.

Also in Judge Misajon vs. Yglesias et al., A.M. No. P-08-2439, June 25,
2013: Indeed all applications for sick leave for 1 day or more shall be made
in prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon the employee’s
return of such leave.

The legal principle of RE: Memorandum of Report of Atty. Thelma C.

Bahia Against Ms. Dorothy Salgado A.M. No. 2004-41-SC, January 13,
2005 and Judge Misajon vs. Yglesias et al., A.M. No. P-08-2439, June
25, 2013 came from Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53
and Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 mentioned by
complainant in her coached affidavit.
54
In Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53 and Memorandum
Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 which provide: "2.2. V Application for
Sick Leave All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or
more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately
upon employee's return from such leave.

The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court governs the approval of an
application for sick leave by court "personnel. Paragraph 2.2.1 Chapter X
of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerk of Court cited by the Court’s
Decision on November 22, 2016 states:

2.2.1 Application for sick leave - All applications for sick leave of absence
for one (1) full day or more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall
be filed immediately upon the employee's return from such leave. Notice of
absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor, and/or
agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five (5) successive
days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

The employee did not return to file his sick leave to me. I must not be
penalized for adhering to jurisprudences, a proof that I am obedient to the
laws and to Your Honors who penned them.

The rationale for filing in person the sick leave is to prove that sick
employee is alive because if other person does it for him, the possibility of
fraud is not far-fetched. How is this so? For example, the mother
suppressed that his son is already dead, and the Judge was able to sign
his leave with pay submitted by the mother claiming that he is still alive
when he is already dead prejudicial to the Office of the Court Administrator
in granting her reliefs out of it. It would appear that the Judge kept on
signing leave of absence with pay of a dead employee who did not file it in
person. So in lieu of his presence, certification of his fitness to work and
other health-related documents are necessary to protect the interest of the
State and taxpayers especially when public funds are disbursed to it.

55
Assume that I allowed the mother to file the leave of absence on behalf of
his son with photocopied medical certificate without certificate of fitness to
work and other health related documents, it will be held liable under
Paragraph 2.2.1 Chapter X of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerk of Court
, Memorandum Circular No. 41, s. 1998, Section 53 and Memorandum
Circular No. 14, s. 1999, Section 54 for doing it in violation of the
command: XXX and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return
from such leave XXX

There were photocopies of his medical certificate and clinical abstract

presented to me by his mother. Why will I be branded as oppressive if I
only expressed the necessity to verify his sickness that is allowed by
jurisprudences please? I should be commended for strictly complying with
the jurisprudences by the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator.

With due respect, if I misconstrued the rules on approval of application for

leave, why I should be penalized? There must be bad faith on my part to be
administratively liable. According to Your Honors, I allegedly misapplied
the ruling of Re: Memorandum Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia against Ms.
Dorothy Salgado, AM No. 2004-41-SC, January 13, 2005, then I am
entitled to good faith thus I cannot be considered as abusive and
oppressive in this administrative case.

I followed the Rules and jurisprudences, it is baseless to hold me liable for

Oppression and the violation of the 2002 Revised Manual for the Clerks of
Court.

There are jurisprudences that can be applied by analogy to my court that

securing certificate of fitness to work and related documents is a valid
exercise of a management prerogative.

“Both tribunals found that after the respondent presented his medical
certificate to the petitioner to explain his absence, he even went back to his
doctor for a certification that he was already fit to return to work.”
56
For all we know, Noel Labid’s sickness render him unfit to work and his
sickness may be contagious so we can notify the Honorable Office of the
Court Administrator. Thus, those documents are necessary, and those are
easy to obtain from the hospital. The refusal of the mother to give the
required documents may prove suppression of an evidence prejudicial to
her.

This administrative matter stemmed from a series of sick leave application

of Castor without any medical certificate. Castor incurred absences on the
following dates: January 10-11, 14-18, 21-25, 28-31, 2013;February 1, 4-8,
11-13, 16, 2013; and March 6-7, 12, 15, 19-22, 2013. Due to his frequent
absences, he was referred to the SC Clinic for medical evaluation to
determine his physical fitness to continue with his duties and
responsibilities (Re: ADMINISTRATIVECHARGE OF MISCONDUCT
RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED USE OF PROHIBITED DRUG ("Shabu")
OF REYNARD B. CASTOR, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office
of Administrative Services, A.M. No. 2013-08-SC, October 8, 2013).

In Opinaldo vs. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013:

Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the right of the employer to
have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion to regulate all aspects of
employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees
and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. This
is a management prerogative where the free will of management to conduct
its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form Even labor laws
discourage interference with the exercise of such prerogative and the Court
often declines to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers.
However, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited.
Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law,
collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and
justice. Hence, in the exercise of its management prerogative, an employer
must ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related
activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the
corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the offense
involved and to the degree of the infraction. In the case at bar, we
recognize, as did the appellate court, that respondent’s act of requiring
petitioner to undergo a medical examination and submit a medical
57
certificate is a valid exercise of management prerogative. This is further
justified in view of the letter-complaint from one of respondent’s clients,
PAIJR, opining that petitioner was "no longer physically fit to perform his
duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health
condition." To be sure, petitioner’s job as security guard naturally requires
physical and mental fitness under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5487, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 100. While the necessity to prove
one’s physical and mental fitness to be a security guard could not be more
emphasized, the question to be settled is whether it is a valid exercise of
respondent’s management prerogative to prevent petitioner’s continued
employment with the Agency unless he presents the required medical
certificate. Respondent argues, viz.: Thus, respondents in the exercise of
their MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE required Complainant to submit a
Medical Certificate to prove that he is "PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY FIT"
for work as Security Guard. Unfortunately, however, up to the present time,
complainant failed to submit said Medical Examination and Findings giving
him clean bill of health, to respondents. Herein respondents are ready and
willing to accept him as such Security Guard once he could submit said
Medical Examination and Findings. The requirement anent the
presentation of such MEDICAL CERTIFICATE by Complainant to
Respondents is but a Management Measure of ensuring Respondents
including Complainant that Complainant is physically and mentally fit for
continued Employment and will not in any manner pose a danger or, threat
to the respondents’ properties and lives of their customers and other
employees as well as to the person and life of Complainant himself (The
Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 377, 398-399, citing St. Michael’s
Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383,
391; Supreme Steel Corporation v. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Supreme Independent Union (NMS- IND-APL), G.R. No. 185556, March
28, 2011, 646 SCRA 501, 525; Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Pawis ng
Makabayang Obrero (PAMAO-NFL), 443 Phil. 143, 149 (2003); The
Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, supra note 34, at 399). His
mother presented photocopies of medical certificate and clinical abstract to
me.

With respect to the side issues, there was no proof adduced by the mother
that I committed oppression and harassment against her son prior to his
untimely demise without furnishing the trial court a copy of his death
certificate, despite the request from the mother because the court’s process
server was asking monetary donations from the trial court thru court staff
for his wake. The death certificate is a proof that will disprove the false and
58
malicious charge by seventy- four (74) complainants that I caused his
death in ordering him to lift the table despite of his sickness in another
related administrative case.

Moreover, the same utility aide requested me to officiate his marriage, few
days before he went on AWOL for two weeks, this will not happen if I
committed oppression and harassment against him in a complaint filed a
month earlier by seventy-four (74) complainants including the utility aide. If
I was oppressive, he will not ask me to solemnize his marriage after he
signed the false and malicious complaint against me. His invitation to
solemnize his marriage belied that charge of oppression against me. The
time and effort I consumed in explaining the jurisprudence to his mother
belied that charge of oppression against me. I have given him so many
small things that mattered to his financial status. For one personal delivery
of letter to the Office of the Court Administrator, I gave him P500 to P1,000,
and there were so many errands he made for me. It was natural to express
a disappointment about him filing of a false and malicious complaint against
me to his mother. I hope, it must not be construed negatively because there
was nothing illegal to what I said to her mother who must have
misunderstood what I said. Also, I was misquoted by his mother. There was
no proof that I made those insensitive and unsavory remarks to her.

There is no reason to retaliate to her son. I will perform a legal act despite
of the bad deeds done to me by her son. A Judge must be professional at
all times. It will be illegal on my part to deny approval of sick leave without
any factual basis or legal basis.

Before the solemnization of his marriage in the trial court, court’s utility aide
only showed up less than (20) twenty minutes before me for work then he
is gone all day in many days while in supposed attendance in court. When I
inquired about his whereabouts, court’s process server answered he was
on errand. When I inquired court utility aide as to his health status because
of the rumors that he is in bad shape, the answer was he is slowly
recovering from his sickness that is unknown to me as to what is his
sickness all about because none of the court employees, including the
utility aide divulged it. With due respect, I do not feign ignorance, there are
many things I do not know and I am not concerned of due to many factors.
For example, one difficult question of law in a case will divert and focus my
mind on it that I as a Judge became forgetful on other matters for weeks or
59
months. If that is a shortcoming of a Judge, I am very sorry. But our court
was very much undermanned which must be considered as a factor on how
I deal with high stress on administrative matters. Your Honors must be
compassionate and merciful to me. I followed jurisprudences here thus
there is no need to penalize me.

In Marcelo vs. CA, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008: “The fundamental
rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. While substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case, or
evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases, it
should be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is
none here.” “The basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be
disregarded.” The mother only alleged without any proof. The mother is not
the proper party to sue me for harassment, oppression, conduct
unbecoming of a judge and gross ignorance of the law committed against
her son who is the alleged offended party in this administrative case under
the existing Revised Rules of Court, laws and jurisprudences. The mother’s
accusations are not supported by any proof other than what others were
allegedly told to her who did not submit any proof nor testify before the
investigating Judge. Her allegations were unsubstantiated. Also, I
expressed my grievance about his son disrespect actions towards me but
my words were misquoted by her. “Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence” (Consolidated Edison Co. vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv.
Op., p. 131). Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the
administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit (Manalabe vs.
Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589; See also
Adajar vs. Develos, A.M. No. P-05-2056, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA
361, 376-377; Ong vs. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, October 22,
2004, 441 SCRA 150, 160; Datuin, Jr. vs. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01-
1640, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 1, 5).

60
The action and allegation of the mother were bizarre because she has all
the time, around two weeks, to secure the requested documents that are
easy to obtain from the hospital, yet she opted to sue me within that period,
from the time of the giving of the Memorandum of OIC until the filing of her
complaint, more or less two weeks, she did not submit any document, not
even the original medical certificate, until now I did not see original copies
of all pertinent documents requested by the court that created a bad
impression that her son has a faked sickness or a faked death.

My cellphone received missed calls and text messages from a certain Noel
Labid who introduced himself as my former utility aide on December 28,
2016, 11:21 a.m. greeting me a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year
from cell number 09978214421. These missed calls and text messages are
still registered and stored respectively on my cellphone to prove them
before the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator.

I did not commit refusal to perform official functions and oppression

for refusing to sign the application for leave of absence despite the
employee having complied with the requirements, and for doing so in
retaliation for the employee's having joined as signatory of
administrative complaint filed against me.

F. Issuance of Show Cause Order

The issuance of a Show-Cause Order against fellow Judges and court personnel
was a valid court action provided by the Revised Rules of Court. It is not even a
ground to place any Judge in an illegal preventive suspension without observing
right to due process under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Civil
Service of 2011.

When I was found liable for the alleged non-recusal as can be gleaned from the
Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016, Your Honors affirmed the legality
of the show cause order I issued thus no oppression and gross misconduct can
be attributed against me. Moreover, acting Judge took over the show cause
order, thus it was a lawful trial court.

61
There was no clear abuse of court processes because such issuance of show
cause has a legal basis. It is my honest belief that anything that is legal cannot
be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding power with unbridled breath. I
will not issue a show cause order without factual and legal bases.

Show cause order for contempt is allowed under the Revised Rules of Court thus
it cannot be considered as cruel, severe and excessive use of authority to qualify
as Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression.

Also, there is no proof presented by seventy four (74) respondents including the
complainants that I was motivated or premeditated, with obstinate or intentional
purpose to do wrong or inflict harm on them to constitute a Grave Misconduct
since contempt is a valid and lawful legal remedy under our Revised Rules of
Court, specifically referring to Rule 71, Section 3 (a) and (d) of the Revised Rules
of Court as stated in the subject court’s order.

In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by

the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court", A.M. No. 10-10-4-
SC, October 19, 2010, the Honorable Supreme Court issued a show cause
order to thirty - seven (37) respondents composed of an incumbent dean, retired
deans and faculty members of the U.P. College of Law. No one of the
respondents accused the Supreme Court of committing Grave Misconduct,
Patent Abuse of Authority and Oppression upon their receipt of a show cause
order.
With due respect, I did not insist on the court’s inherent authority to punish fellow
Judges for contempt of court, it was provided by the Revised Rules of Court.
I knew that my issuance of show cause to them has legal basis although it may
appear odd to others because it involved four (4) Judges and seventy (70) court
personnel as respondents. There is no prohibition to issue a show cause order
against them, no matter how many were they, and notwithstanding they are
judicial workers, under the Revised Rules of Court. It does not say show cause
order of contempt cannot be issued against Judges or court personnel, or it
cannot be issued against four (4) Judges and seventy (70) court personnel.
The bone of contention is, there was a provision of the Revised Rules of Court
that I relied upon in good faith. Without legal and factual bases, I will not and
never issue it against them. Thus the administrative charges must fail against
me. Your Honors must not penalize me for my faithful adherence and
interpretation of the Revised Rules of Court on Contempt. It Your Honors found it
as a misconduct I should not be faulted with it.
There was no proof that I did it out of retaliation to them. There was the Revised
Rules of Court that I faithfully followed.

62
The Revised Rules of Court did not provide any exception to issuance of show
cause order as to the respondents thus the findings that I abused authority to
penalize them lacked a legal basis. If I will be penalized, it must be clear and
convincing that my show cause order was baseless, complainants failed to
provide a proof. In fact, they disregarded the show cause order by them that is
sanctionable under the Revised Rules of Court.

Here are the jurisprudences that justified my issuance of the show cause order:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts (In Re Kelly, 35 Phil.
944). It need not be specifically granted by Statute (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595). It
lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system (Juidice v. Vail, 430 US
327). Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue
of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence,
submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution (Re Robinson, 19 Wall 505; Re
Terry, 128 US 289; Bessette v. M.B. Conkey Co., 194 US 324; Michaelson v. US
ex rel. Chicago, St. P.M. & O. R. Co., 266 US 42; .Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat
204). The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice
(Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 US
378). The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the
institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation (Cornejo v.
Tan, 85 Phil. 772). In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court (17 GS,
Contempt, § 1). The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its
legal signification a variety of different acts (17 GS, Contempt, § 2). The Order
dated December 1, 2011 demands compliance as it has the same force and
effect of law.

In Judge Angeles vs. Sheriff Gernale, A.M. No. P-96-1221, June 19, 1997:
Disciplinary proceedings must be distinguished from contempt proceedings
under Rule 71, since they involve different and separate procedures (Zabala vs.
Judge Dictado, A.M. No. RTJ-89-375, March 6, 1990; Balasabas vs. Aquilizan,
106 SCRA 489,1981). The penalty for one cannot take the place of the other.
Here, the Judge validly issued show cause and contempt order against the
sheriff according to the Supreme Court.

Contempt proceeding and administrative proceeding are two separate and

distinct procedures are the following jurisprudences: In People vs. Godoy, March
29, 1995, G.R. No. 115908-09: Whether or not the Same Contemptuous Conduct
of a Member of the Bar can be the Subject of both a Contempt Proceeding and
an Administrative Disciplinary Action? The answer is yes. With the foregoing
63
discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge, we feel that this
issue with respect to proper remedies against an erring member or the Bar
should consequentially be addressed, by way of reiteration, since conflicting and
erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved tribunals or parties.
The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to
disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude
the exercise of the other (In Re Isserman, 87 A. 2d 903). A contempt proceeding
for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the
other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of
the court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and
the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office (In re Schofield, 66 A. 2d 675). The principal purpose of the exercise of the
power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should
thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle
(Balasabas vs. Aquilizan, etc. G.R. No. 51414, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 489).
The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme
Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as
judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice (In re Daly, 171
NW 2d. 818). Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in
a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct (In re Hawke, 63 NE 2d 553). In the same manner an
attorney’s conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on
essentially the same facts leading to conviction (Howell vs. Tomas, 566 F. 2d
469). It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show
cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that
they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is
established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law
are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. Although apparently different in legal
bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both
inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of the court’s basic
power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of
judicial functions.

As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. Nos.

79690-79707, October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316: There are, in other words, two
(2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here: the
Court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the
power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by
lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court’s disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with
64
which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the court’s exclusive power of admission to the bar.
A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibilities of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes
both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935): for the same act of filing in court
a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was
found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason, two separate
penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and
reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to give due respect to the
Court).

It is basic that “disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,

supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies.” Therefore, the administrative charges
must fail for lack of merit. Complainants essentially questions my orders and
resolutions on matters which are purely judicial in nature since they infringe on
my judicial prerogatives. By its nature, judicial discretion involves the exercise of
judgment on the part of the judge. The Court allows the judge reasonable latitude
in the disposition of a case, allowing him or her to decide based on his or her
appreciation of the facts and understanding of the applicable law on the matter.
The judge’s rulings may only be questioned through the judicial remedies
provided under the Rules of Court, and are therefore not proper subjects of an
administrative complaint. The remedy of an aggrieved party is to elevate the
assailed decision or order (or resolution) to the higher court for review and
correction. The established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings
against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality that the door to
any inquiry into the judge’s criminal, civil and administrative liability may be said
to have opened or closed.

It is also premature that there were of abuse and misconduct on my part because
I have yet to rule if I find their explanation for the show cause order is
satisfactory. There was a prejudgment by the Your Honors that I will rule against
them in the show cause order. I may not hold them liable for contempt at all.
Thus, there is no reason that I will be made liable for the issuance of the show
cause order. They did not comply with it thus what injury did they sustain if any

65
for me to be administratively liable on their charges? The answer is naught
please.

Gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on

the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial
to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such
conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose (Donato vs. Asuncion Jr., A.C. No. 4914, March 3, 2004 citing SPO2
Jose B. Yap vs. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, May 9,
2003, citing Tan Tiac Chiong vs. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-02-33, July 31 2002;
Canson vs. Garchitorena, SB-99-9-J, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 268; Black’s Law
Dictionary, Fourth Ed. at 832, 1150; Words and Phrases, Vol. 27 at 466). In all
of these charges, it must be shown that there is flagrant unlawful conduct,
intentional purpose, manifest partiality or evident bad faith. However complainant
merely presented her bare allegations. Even the substance of the orders
attached to the instant complaint reveal nothing. Basic is the rule that in
administrative cases, “the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial
evidence the allegations in his (or her) complaint. Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if the other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.” Complainant by her
mere allegations and failure to substantiate the same with specific incidents or
provision of law or rule that points out a violation thereof, miserably failed to
discharge her burden.”

Grave Abuse of Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a

public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person
any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority (Rafael v. Sualog, A.M. No. P-07-2330, June 12,
2008, 554 SCRA 278, 287; citing Aranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, A.M. No. P-04-1889,
November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 162, and Stilgrove v. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-
2257, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 383, 400). On the other hand, Oppression
has been defined as "an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or
excessive use of authority" (Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847, 893 (1996);
Golangco vs. Fung, G.R. No. 147640, October 12, 2006).

No Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression in the issuance of the show cause
because show cause was provided by the Revised Rules of Court.

As to the Rules on Disqualification, there must be a process by the complainants

to be followed under the Revised Rules of Court. All the complainants did not
move for my inhibition so that I can properly act upon it. It is premature to
assume that I will not grant their motion for inhibition Therefore, I did not breach
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4
66
because they did not avail of the judicial remedy. Before I will be made liable, I
must be given the chance to rectify my mistakes in a judicial proceeding. There
is no legal basis to sanction me on this matter. Again, it is premature to hold me
administratively liable because there must be a court action that must be made
by me, and my refusal to inhibit will give rise to an administrative offense. I will
rule in their favor if they filed a motion for my inhibition. I granted all motions for
inhibition filed in my trial court.

Also a motion for inhibition by complainants presupposes that my show cause

order against them is a valid court’s order as provided by the Revised Rules of
Court. The suggestion of recusal and finding me liable for the alleged non-
recusal affirmed the legality of the show cause order I issued thus no
oppression and gross misconduct can be attributed against me. Thus, when I
was relieved from my court, the Acting Judge can properly act upon their motion
for inhibition against me.

I cannot be liable for gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code

of Judicial Conduct for not disqualifying myself in acting on the
supposedly contumacious conduct of her fellow Judges and concerned
court personnel in copying the records of her court because I was relieved
from my court without due process of law tantamount to inhibition. Before I
could hear the court’s lawful order, Acting Judge took over it, and he was
not penalized for hearing it. Thus, there is no factual and legal basis to
penalize me with it.

This particular administrative charge was not made by complainants, I was

denied of my due process of being informed of the nature and cause of
their accusation that is not part of their complaint.

The Revised Rules of Court on Contempt did not provide any exception to the
issuance of the show cause order contrary with the recommendation of the
Honorable Office of the Court Administrator. The grounds stated therein were
well-defined. None of the complainants properly raised their objection to it before
my court so I can act properly upon it as mandated by the rules on procedurals.

I did not commit grave abuse of authority and abuse of court processes for
issuing the show-cause order against my fellow Judges and court personnel; I
did not commit gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for not disqualifying myself in acting on the supposedly contumacious
conduct of my fellow Judges and concerned court personnel in copying the
records of our court. They did so many unlawful interference, misbehavior and
abuse of court’s so many lawful orders and processes .

67
Their interference to my court is disallowed under the principle of judicial
courtesy and co-equality of courts, it is a contemptuous act. If right to counsel is
violated, the one who has the right to sue is the accused, not anyone else on
behalf of the accused (Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court). None of
the accused in the subject criminal cases filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
filed an Appeal with respect to the questioned lawful orders. None of the accused
complained for violation of their right to counsel against my court. Thus, the
charge of Gross Ignorance has no factual and legal bases.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court states: Parties in interest. — A

real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.”

Seventy-four complainants have no direct, personal and substantial interest to

protect as enunciated in Domingo vs. Carague 456 SCRA 450. They lack the
personality to sue out of the questioned lawful orders thus they have no cause of
action against my court (See Evangelista vs. Santiago 457 SCRA 744). In judicial
review, an important requirement is that the suit must be raised by a proper party
or there must be a locus standi (Ople vs. Torres 293 SCRA 141; Joya vs. PCGG
225 SCRA 568; Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines
vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337; IBP vs. Zamora GR No. 141284, August 15,
2000). More importantly, none of them were prejudiced by the various lawful
orders including internal memoranda.

The unlawful interference, meddling or encroachment of the various lawful

orders, decisions and final orders including internal memoranda:

1. Violated the principle of judicial stability (Mars vs. Dumara-og 12 SRA 34;
Gutierrez vs. CA GR No. 82475, January 28, 1991; Villamor vs. Salas 203 SCRA
540; Parco vs. CA 111 SCRA 262; Garcia vs. Aloncel 111 SCRA 178, Sta. Maria
vs. Ubay 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs. Riodique 64 SCRA 494; PICOP vs. IAC 151
SCRA 161; Vide Vlason Enterprises Corp. vs. CA 155 SCRA 186; NEA vs.
Mendoza 138 SCRA 632; Pineda vs. Lantin 6 SCRA 757; Philippine Pacific
Fishing Co. vs. Luna 112 SCRA 604; Paper Industries Corp. vs. IAC 151 SCRA
161; Republic vs. Judge Reyes 155 SCRA 313; Almazar vs. Cenzon 161 SCRA
545; PNB vs. Pineda 197 SCRA 1);

2. Violated the doctrine of immutability of decisions and final orders (Pena vs.
GSIS 502 SCRA 383; Siy vs. NLRC 468 SCRA 154; Sacdalan vs. CA 428 SCRA
586); and

68
3. Violated the expanded principle of judicial courtesy ( Ramiscal vs.
Sandiganbayan GR Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010; A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
December 27, 2007).

In addition, the lawful orders of the trial court and the subsequent orders prove
the lack of prejudice on the part of the State and litigants regarding the court’s
minutes that were surreptitiously taken by the complainants contrary to judicial
ethics. The trial court staff who did not obtain any permission from the court and
from the parties before furnishing them to the Office of the Court Administrator
showed their discourtesy, unethical conduct over court records and malicious
intent to harm my trial court.
Foregoing legal principles considered, all the complainants are liable for
contemptuous acts under Rule 71, Section 3 (a, c and d) the Revised Rules of
Court to wit:

RULE 71
CONTEMPT

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.

After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or

in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of
a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this
Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
69
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.

There are no factual basis and legal basis to penalize me with their
fabricated administrative charges.

Thank you.

Judge Eliza B. Yu

70
November 8, 2018

Acting Chief Justice Antonio Carpio

Supreme Court

RE: Omission Tantamount to Falsification Committed by Chief Justice Maria

Lourdes Sereno of my Complaints, Arguments, Answers, and Proofs on
Illegal Withholding and Illegal Forfeiture of Salaries,Allowances, Payroll
Premiums and Taxes in A.M. No. 12 – 1 – 09 – MTJ

The following were my answers and proofs omitted in the textual Decision
promulgated on November 22, 2016 and Resolution promulgated on March 14,
2017 by the ponente Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno:

1. Correspondences and summary of my unpaid and under paid premiums

given to me by GSIS, PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and BIR on various dates;
2. Answers and Memorandum to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno made by
Atty. Lilian Barsibal – Co, the Chief of the Finance and Management Division
on my complaint about payroll fraud and wage theft that showed there is no
law or jurisprudence to support the withholding of a judge’s salaries,
allowances, payroll premiums and taxes;
3. My pay slips from February to July 2012 and income Tax Returns of
2011 -2012 that showed inaccurate entries given to me by the
Office of the CourtAdministrator.

I made the following re-produced allegations taken from my correspondences

and pleadings submitted to the Supreme Court and Office of the Court
Administrator at different dates from 2014 to 2016:

That under the Revised Rules of Court to quote:

REVISED RULES OF COURT

RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND
JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of

the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
1
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following

sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.

The benefits under Rule 140, Section 11 (A, 1) do not refer to illegally withheld
salaries and allowances of Judges because the term was taken from the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations that refers to retirement benefits as accessory
disability or accessory penalty to the principal penalty of dismissal in
administrative case under Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service of 2011, Rule 10, Section 52 that states:

“Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. – a. The penalty of

dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking
civil service examinations.”

For purposes of taxation, salaries and allowances are differentiated from benefits
by Tax Laws.

Also, forfeiture refers to confiscation of the tools and proceeds of crimes. The
illegally withheld salaries and allowances are not fruits of criminal acts of Judges
to be subjected to forfeiture.

A Judge’s salaries and allowances together with payroll premiums and taxes can
only be forfeited if the penalty is suspension without pay that attained finality.

A Judge’s salaries and benefits can be withheld for a fixed period subject to the
pertinent CSC rules and regulations but no government official can withhold the
mandatory taxes and compulsory premiums while the government employee is
still in the government office who is not separated from service. The pendency of
the administrative cases cannot be a ground for the non-remittance of the
compulsory premiums to GSIS, PHILHEALTH and PAG-IBIG because preventive
2
suspension is not a penalty but only a precautionary measure. To suspend the
payments of compulsory premiums of SC employee can be considered as a
penalty that is contrary to the nature of a preventive suspension. This is
supported by:

Section 25 of Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987 that provides: “SEC.
25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under
preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.” Clearly, service of the
preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule
otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and
purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty (Quimbo
v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155620, August 9, 2005); and

Rule 10, Section 53 (c ) on effects of exoneration on certain Penalties

that provides: “In case the penalty imposed is suspension, he/she shall
immediately be reinstated to his/her former post without loss of seniority rights
and with payment of back salaries and all benefits which would have accrued as
if he/she has not been illegally suspended.” Clearly, a preventive suspension is
not a penalty thus it necessitates the payment of payroll premiums and taxes of
respondent Judge all throughout the duration of the probe of administrative case
until the finality of the Decision. And because a suspension as a penalty is
subject to appeal, there must be payment of payroll premiums and taxes
during its duration, if any and if ever, prior to the rendition of final Decision
because it is dependent upon the outcome of the administrative case, so if the
respondent was exonerated eventually, there was no suspension as a penalty to
speak of thus it presupposes the payment of payroll premiums and taxes
of respondent Judge all the time, from the start of probe, during appeal, and
definitely prior to finality of Decision.”

In OCA CIRCULAR NO. 18 -2013 dated 8 February 2013 signed by Court

Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez: XXX10. Non-crediting of salaries and
allowances which are directed to be withheld shall only be for a period of six (6)
months. Thereafter, the name of the judge or court personnel shall already be
excluded from the payroll;

The exclusion of judicial workers from the payroll has no legal basis. According to
Atty. Lilian Barribal – Co, orally and in writing, there is no law or jurisprudence to
support the withholding of payroll premiums and taxes of Judges and court
personnel, more so the withholding of salaries and allowances of Judges in
illegal preventive suspension;

3
The non-payments of payroll premiums and taxes of a Judge who is still an
employee of the Supreme Court and who is receiving salaries and allowances
withheld without legal basis and/ or factual bases by the Office of the Court
Administrator is referred to as Payroll Fraud by American articles;

The Supreme Court as employer is among the national offices exempted for
violation of RA No. 8291 because of Art. VIII, Section 5 and Section 6, 1987
Philippine Constitution and P.D. No. 828, Section 6 that it granted the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), a national office within the definition of GSIS law,
the sole duty and responsibility to remit the compulsory GSIS premiums. By
parity of reasoning is the case of People vs. Castillo et al., Criminal Cases Nos.
27824-28, February 9, 2012, Sandiganbayan held with finality that E.O. No. 190
series of 1999 directed the DBM to remit directly GSIS contributions of the LGUs
to GSIS. The accused should not be liable for failure of municipality to remit the
subject GSIS premiums contributions because the duty to remit said premiums
during said period is lodged with DBM. In Garcia vs. SSS, G.R. No. 170735,
December 17, 2007, “The sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries. This Court will not turn a blind eye on the perpetration of injustice.
This Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made an instrument nor be privy
to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice." The same principle applies to the
non-payments of premiums to PAG-IBIG and PHILHEALTH as well as to the
non-payments of withholding taxes to BIR involving Judges and court personnel
whose salaries and allowances have been withheld legally or illegally by OCA
that has the sole duty and responsibility to remit them to the concerned
government agencies;

Again, there is a difference between suspension as a penalty and preventive

suspension, for one, suspension as a penalty has no pay while preventive
suspension as a precautionary measure has pay under the enumerated grounds
of Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011, Rule 10,
Section 52, Section 29 (a) paragraphs i, ii, iii, iv.

To reiterate, by excluding the judges from the payroll where their salaries,
allowances, compulsory premiums and mandatory withholding taxes were
withheld by the Office of the Court Administrator without any legal basis and/ or
factual basis, they were erroneously misclassified as non-employees which is not
so because the judges are still connected to the judiciary until the final resolution
of their administrative cases, they cannot transfer employment without any office
clearance. It is for this reason that the judges get the back salaries and
allowances with automatic deductions for GSIS, PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and
BIR during their preventive suspension after the fixed ninety (90) days period as
provided by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations so as not to undermine their
constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.

The term is “withholding” that means it does not belong to the State as
represented by the Office of the Court Administrator yet pending the issuance of
4
the final resolution of the administrative case. As such, it is subject to payments
of compulsory premiums and mandatory withholding taxes.

The “withheld” salaries and allowances subject to automatic deductions for GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and BIR belong to the Judge placed in an illegal
preventive suspension whether or not they were penalized later on as provided
by the under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Judges are civil servants
who are covered with the general principles of the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. There is no illegal preventive suspension as a penalty under the
1987 Philippine Constitution, Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Revised Rules
of Court and jurisprudences as of today.

Thus, the State through the Office of the Court Administrator can only withhold
the net salaries and allowances of all Judges placed in an illegal or legal
preventive suspension;

To take away the illegally withheld salaries and allowances of Judges without any
factual basis and/ or legal basis without their consent constitutes Theft or
Qualified Theft and when there is the employment of violence, force or
intimidation, it is Robbery, all are punishable by the Revised Penal Code. The
stealing of illegally withheld salaries and allowances XXX is referred to as Wage
Theft by American articles;

All unclaimed illegally withheld salaries and allowances cannot be declared into
savings to be spent by the Supreme Court, instead it will be turned over to the
National Treasury because Congress appropriated taxpayers’ money for the
plantillas of all Judges solely to pay their salaries and allowances. For the Office
of the Court Administrator to consider as savings and to divert the funds the
illegally withheld salaries, allowances, compulsory premiums and mandatory
taxes of dismissed Judges to judicial projects and programs may constitute as
Technical Malversation, punishable by the Revised Penal Code except when
there is laches or donation by the concerned Judge among others;

That Article VI, Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

5
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations
law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re¬enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress
(1987 Philippine Constitution).

The Arias doctrine exempts all heads of offices to the criminal acts committed by
their subordinates.

In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, 315-316, the Supreme Court, aware
of the dire consequences that a different rule could bring, has aptly concluded:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too
common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments or positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives
of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final
approving authority. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why he
should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda,
vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. The Supreme
Court is aware of an observation made by this Court in People vs. Rodis 105
Phil. 1294 citing Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277 to the effect that a
person may be so held liable as a co-principal if he, be an act of reckless
imprudence, has brought about the commission of estafa through falsification, or
malversation through falsification, without which (reckless negligence) the crime
could not have been accomplished. When, however, that infraction consists in
the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate
upon whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy,
the Arias doctrine must be held to prevail;

A retroactive imposition of penalty is an illegal scheme to forfeit the illegally

withheld salaries and allowances of judicial workers. There is no retroactive

6
imposition of penalties in administrative cases by reason of public policy
according to statutes and jurisprudences;

All Judges placed in an illegal preventive suspension have vested rights over the
illegally withheld salaries and allowances. This bolsters the non-forfeiture of
withheld salaries and allowances of public servants in administrative cases in
consonance with the constitutional policies of our State on Labor;

It is only the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc not the Honorable Supreme
Court First Division that can impose and lift preventive suspension under Article
VIII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 2, Section 3 (g) of A.M. No. 10-
4-20-SC (The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court).

The imposition of preventive suspension upon me issued by the Honorable

Supreme Court First Division upon your office’s recommendation was illegal for
the following reasons:

(1) for lack of jurisdiction by the Honorable Supreme Court First Division;
(2) for denial of due process due to failure to comment the letter of four
Judges who did not give me a copy of it;
(3) for lack of pre-suspension hearing to be undertaken by investigating judge
under Rule 140, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(4) for lack of factual basis due to the judicial audit report clearing me of any
anomaly and irregularity in the court;
(5) for lack of merit and lack of evidence of the multiple complaints filed by
four judges and seventy court employees; and
(6) for lack of factual basis as provided by the promulgated Decision on
November 22, 2016;

The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc cannot ratify the illegal Resolution
issued by the Honorable Supreme Court First Division under the principle of
“quod nullum est nullum producit effectum”. An illegal act is void; it cannot be
ratified (See NPC Dama vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009).
“A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. In
legal terms, the movants have really no interest to protect or right to assert in this
proceeding. Contrary to their allegations, no infraction upon their rights has been
committed” (Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716. May 19, 1999). A court without
subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer a case to another court citing Home
Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R.
No. 192649, March 9, 2011; Igot vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150794, August
17, 2004;

The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc cannot legally reinstate me because the
imposition of preventive suspension was made illegally by the Honorable
Supreme Court First Division. It can issue a “Return to Work” order in this
administrative case because my situation here is akin to a forced vacation leave
with pay not preventive suspension under Section 51 Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title
7
1, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 and the Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Article IX-B, Section 2, par. 3, 1987 Constitution
provides: “No officer or employee of the government can be disciplined or
removed from office except for cause and after due process”, this was violated
with the abrupt release of the questioned Resolution by the Honorable Supreme
Court First Division upon the recommendation of the Honorable Office of the
Court Administrator without the observance of the my constitutional right to due
process;

The following are the jurisprudences on the illegality of preventive suspension

due to lack of due process:

In Lubaton vs. Judge Lazaro, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013:

Respondent Judge now complains about being deprived of her right to due
process of law for not being furnished the four letters-complaint before the OCA
completed its administrative investigation. Respondent Judge’s complaint is
justified. It cannot be denied that the statements contained in the four letters-
complaint were a factor in the OCA’s adverse outcome of its administrative
investigation. Being given the copies would have forewarned respondent Judge
about every aspect of what she was being made to account for, and thus be
afforded the reasonable opportunity to respond to them, or at least to prepare to
fend off their prejudicial influence on the investigation. In that context, her right to
be informed of the charges against her, and to be heard thereon was traversed
and denied. Verily, while the requirement of due process in administrative
proceedings meant only the opportunity to explain one’s side, elementary
fairness still dictated that, at the very least, she should have been first made
aware of the allegations contained in the letters-complaint before the OCA
considered them at all in its adverse recommendation and report. This is no less
true despite the similarity of the statements contained in the four letters-
complaint, on the one hand, and of the statements contained in the verified
complaint, on the other, simply because the number of the complaints could
easily produce a negative impact in the mind of even the most objective fact
finder.

In Rubio, Jr. vs. Paras, G. R. No. 156047, April 12, 2005: The formal charge filed
by the respondent against the petitioner was violative of the latter’s right to due
process; hence, is void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at any
time, without the petitioner being required to first exhaust all administrative
remedies before the respondent: ... [T]he doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by
whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity. A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard. A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any
time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting
such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.1 The Supreme
Court granted the petition. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were
set aside. The Formal Charge against petitioner Engr. Pedro C. Rubio, Jr., dated
March 15, 2002, as well as the Order for his preventive suspension were nullified
8
(See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. L-19748, September 13, 1962;
Layno Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 136 SCRA 536);

In view of the illegality of my preventive suspension, I have an unbroken

government service record and I am entitled to the payments of full back salaries
and allowances from day one of my illegal preventive suspension until the
rendition of the Decision of the consolidated ten (10) administrative cases filed
against her under Civil Service Rules and Regulations Rule 7, Section 29, par. a
(iii) and jurisprudences such as Garcia v. Molina et al., G.R. No. 157383, August
10, 2010; Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of Judge
Philbert I. Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles City, A.M. No. 01-10-12-0, 29,
March 2005;

The forfeiture of withheld salaries and allowances of a Judge placed in an illegal

preventive suspension is not one of the penalties against a respondent Judge
under Rule 140, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Court. Salaries and
allowances are different from benefits mentioned in the Civil Service Rules and
Revised Rules of Court;

In Garcia v. Molina et al., G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010: In the procedure
adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively suspended in the same
formal charges issued by the former without the latter knowing that there were
pending administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice and hearing
are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order (Carabeo v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 178000 and 178003, December 4, 2009). However,
considering that respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal
charges that we now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is
likewise null and void. Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering
the payment of back salaries during the period of respondents’ preventive
suspension. As the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive
suspension meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be
awarded their salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension (Fabella v.
CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953). In granting their back salaries, we are simply
repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents, and unless we can
turn back the hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to them that which is
physically feasible to do under the circumstances (Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416
Phil 1 Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA
246, 580, 594). The principle of “no work, no pay” does not apply where the
employee himself was unlawfully forced out of job;

Preventive suspension, by its term, may be derogatory, but it is not a penalty, it is

only a precautionary measure. According to Decision promulgated on November
22, 2016 that I questioned to be simulated in denial of my constitutional right to
due process upon the slanted and simulated report of the Honorable Office of the
Court Administrator deliberated and voted upon by the Your Honors, I was
placed in preventive suspension because I issued show cause order to four
9
judges and seventy court personnel, it is not a ground to place a civil servant
like a judge to preventive suspension because it was a valid lawful court order
under the 2011 Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service Commission;

The following are the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service of 2011:

Rule 7
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

Section 25. Preventive Suspension, nature. -Preventive suspension is not a

penalty. It is designed merely as a measure of precaution so that the official or
employee charged may be removed from the scene of his/her alleged
misfeasance/ malfeasance/nonfeasance while the same is being investigated.

Section 26. When Issued; Grounds. - Upon petition of the complainant or motu
proprio, the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive
suspension upon service of the formal charge or notice of charge/s, or
immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under his/her
authority pending an investigation, if

A) The charge involves:

1. Dishonesty;
2. Oppression;
3. Grave Misconduct;
4. Neglect in the Performance of Duty;
5. Administrative offenses which are punishable by dismissal from the
service on its second or third offense; or
6. If there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his/her removal from the service.

B) An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the

respondent from the scene of his/her misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance
to preclude the possibility of:
1. exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him/her, or
2. tampering with evidence that may be used against him/her.
C) In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining
authority or head of office, may reassign respondent to other unit of the agency
during the formal hearings.

Section 27. Duration of Preventive Suspension. - Unless otherwise provided for

by law, the disciplining authority may place the respondent under preventive
suspension for a maximum period of ninety (90) days in the case of national
agencies or sixty (60) days in the case of local government units. When the
administrative case against an officer or employee under preventive suspension
is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of preventive
suspension, he/she shall be automatically reinstated in the service unless the
delay in the disposition of the cases due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case, the period of delay shall not be included in the
10
counting of the period of preventive suspension. Any period of delay caused by
motions filed by the respondent shall be added to the period of preventive
suspension. Provided, that where the order of preventive suspension is for a
period less than the maximum period, the disciplining authority undertakes to
finish the formal investigation within the said period and is precluded from
imposing another preventive suspension. Provided, further, that should the
respondent be on authorized leave, said preventive suspension shall be deferred
or interrupted until such time that said leave has been fully exhausted.

Section 28. Remedies from the Order of Preventive Suspension. - The

respondent may file an appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory. A motion for
reconsideration from the order of preventive suspension shall not be allowed.

Section 29. Payment of Back Salaries During Preventive Suspension. - The

payment of back salaries during the period of suspension shall be governed by
the following:

a. A declaration by the Commission that an order of preventive suspension is null

and void on its face entitles the respondent official or employee to immediate
reinstatement and payment of back salaries corresponding to the period of the
unlawful preventive suspension without awaiting the outcome of the main case.

The phrase "null and void on its face" in relation to a preventive suspension
order, imports any of the following circumstances:

i)The order was issued by one who is not authorized by law;

ii) The order was not premised on any of the conditions under Section
26 (A and B) of this Rule;
iii) The order of preventive suspension was issued without a formal charge or
notice of charges;
iv) While lawful in the sense that it is based on the enumerated grounds, the
duration of the imposed preventive suspension has exceeded the prescribed
periods, in which case the payment of back salaries shall correspond to the
excess period only.

b. A declaration of invalidity of a preventive suspension order not based on any

of the reasons enumerated in Section 29(a), shall result in the reinstatement of
the official or employee concerned. The payment of back salaries shall, however,
await the final outcome of the principal case. If the official or employee is fully
exonerated of the charge/s or when the penalty imposed in the principal case is
reprimand, he or she shall be paid such back salaries. Otherwise, no back
salaries shall be awarded.

The phrase "full exoneration" contemplates a finding of not guilty for the offense/s
charged. Downgrading of the charge to a lesser offense shall not be construed
as "full exoneration" within the contemplation of these guidelines.

11
Even if the respondent official or employee be eventually found innocent of the
charge/s proffered against him/her, the same shall not give rise to payment of
back salaries corresponding to the period of preventive suspension in the
absence of any finding of its illegality.

In Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic Benefits of Judge Philbert I.

Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles City, A.M. No. 01-10-12-0, 29, March 2005:
the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire
period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the
Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge
or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively
suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
administrative case against him or her. This is because – [U]nlike ordinary civil
service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may
preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or
complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the
public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the
continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect
the courts’ image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary
consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted
position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against
justice and oppression. However, the judges placed in a preventive suspension
after 90 days are entitled to salaries and allowances what more if the Judges are
exonerated and found innocent of the administrative complaints.

For me, an illegal suspension is not the suspension contemplated by law as

understood by the public. There is no legal suspension in an illegal suspension.
Ergo, an innocent Judge placed in an illegal preventive suspension is not
suspended in the eyes of law. It is always better to get paid without working than
to get paid while working in the government.

My administrative case under A.M. No. 12-1-09-METC falls under Section 29 (a

par. iii) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011
that is, “an order of preventive suspension is null and void on its face entitles the
respondent official or employee to immediate reinstatement and payment of back
salaries corresponding to the period of the unlawful preventive suspension
without awaiting the outcome of the main case. The phrase "null and void on its
face" in relation to a preventive suspension order, imports any of the following
circumstances: XXX

iii) The order of preventive suspension was issued without a formal charge or
notice of charges; XXX

12
Because my preventive suspension is illegal for lack of due process when the
Supreme Court First Division resolution dated February 1, 2012 has no formal
charge or notice of charges to me for me to answer, this is a forced vacation with
pay akin to the status of an employee who incurred vacation leave with pay for
purposes of the grant of step increment.

In an illegal preventive suspension, the employee was forced illegally not to

render an actual service. This forcible illegality is frowned upon by anti-graft laws.
Because my case was an illegal preventive suspension, it will not interrupt
effectively the continuity of my government service because to do so is to
consent to an illegal act of the concerned authorities who curtailed unlawfully my
right to security of tenure as an employee of the judiciary that is protected under
the Constitution;

The jurisprudence of Gloria vs. CA et al., G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999 and its
precursors refer to Section 29 (b), Rule 7 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service of 2011 not to Section 29 (a par. iii) of Rule 7 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011 to which my
case falls. Such jurisprudences penned by the Honorable Supreme Court
promulgated in 1999 were repealed partly by the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service promulgated in 2011.Those
jurisprudences cannot be made to apply in my administrative case docketed as
A.M. No. 12 -1-09-METC that happened in 2012.

Moreover, in an illegal or legal preventive suspension, it is subject to payments of

mandatory withholding taxes because the pay within that period is income that is
not tax exempt. In addition, there must be payments of compulsory premiums
because payment of compulsory premiums is solely determined by the existence
of employer – employee relationship (Insular Lumber Co. vs. SSS, G.R. No. L-
17623, Jan. 31, 1963; Roman Archbishop of Manila vs. SSS, G.R. No. L-15045,
Jan. 20, 1961; Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., et al. vs. SSS, G.R. No. L-16359,
Dec. 28, 1961; Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. SSS, G.R. No.
L¬17361, April 29, 1968, Jalotjot v. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc., G.R. No.
L-19587, May 31, 1965; SSS v. CA et al., G.R. No. 100388, December 14,
2000).

Non-payments of compulsory premiums and mandatory taxes which are

automatic deductions from the salaries of government employees have
corresponding administrative, civil and criminal liabilities under RA No. 8291 (The
GSIS Act), P.D. No. 1752 (Home Development Mutual Fund Law); RA No. 7875
(PhilHealth) and R.A. No. 8424 (The National Internal Revenue Code);

To impose suspension without pay to me during the duration of the administrative

investigation, more so beyond the legitimate ninety (90) days preventive
suspension is contrary to the nature of a preventive suspension that is not a
penalty but only a precautionary measure. The Honorable Supreme Court cannot
impose to me a suspension without pay without finding of my administrative guilt,
and prior to the imposition of any penalty to be meted eventually to me in the
consolidated administrative cases. Otherwise, there will be two penalties
13
imposed upon me in each administrative case with same set of facts, say a
suspension without pay during the period of the probe and the imposed penalty
in the promulgated Decision such as dismissal contrary to laws and
jurisprudences.

Not only that, there is a fine as a penalty for the grave offense thus with more
reason that there is no basis to forfeit withhold salaries and allowances of an
illegally preventively suspended Judge like me because the combined amount to
be paid for each imposed penalty is less than my computed back salaries and
allowances that will surely cause grave injustice to me and all public servants
similarly situated.

Because of the penalty of fine only in the administrative cases of judicial workers,
there is no reason to withhold the compulsory premiums and mandatory taxes of
Judges and court personnel;

In Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 that took effect on July 20, 1989,
part of Supreme Court Circulars and Orders, it declared: Only one penalty shall
be imposed for each case. "Each Case" means one administrative case which
may involve one or more charges or counts. In the determination of penalties to
be imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be considered. If the
respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed
should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest
may be considered as aggravating circumstances. The second or the third
offense committed need not be the same offense previously committed but any
offense of the same classification. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
the disqualifications for re-employment in the government service. The penalty of
forced resignation shall carry with it that of forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification for employment in the government
service for a period of one year. However, where the resignation contains
conditions or disqualification regarding re employment in a class of position, the
respondent shall be disqualified for re- employment in such position;

Under Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011 , Rule
10, Section 52. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. – a. The
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar
from taking civil service examinations.

In Prosecutor Romana Reyes vs. Judge Julia Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623,
September 18, 2009, the dispositive portion of the Decisions states:

WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,

Branch 69, Pasig City, is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

14
In Judge Martonino Marcos vs. Judge Perla Cabrera-Faller etc., A.M. No. RTJ-
16-2472, January 24, 2017, the dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding

Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarinas City, Cavite, GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 3. 01, Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Court imposes the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

Clearly, there can be no forfeiture of withheld salaries and allowances of all

Judges under Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 and Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011, Rule 10, Section 52
whether or not a penalty was meted to them in any administrative case. What are
forfeited retirement benefits not the withheld salaries and allowances of
respondent - Judges in administrative cases. It is a legal safeguard to promote all
public servants’ constitutional right to security of tenure. It prevents the
commission of abuses, excesses and oppression against them by authorities
vested with enormous power since they will receive monetary compensation
during the pendency of their administrative cases the moment the illegality of the
latters’ act sets in under the principle that it is better to get paid without working
than get paid while working hard in the government that gravely prejudiced the
State and severely damaged the public, specifically the taxpayers;

The illegally withheld salaries and allowances of Judges cannot be subject to

forfeiture except for the payment of penalties imposed upon them in
administrative cases specifically suspension without pay;

The Office of the Chief Justice should not allow the conversion into savings and
the diversion for spending of my illegally withheld salaries and allowances,
payroll premiums and taxes. With due respect, this standing policy without law or
jurisprudence as described by the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator
must be stopped;

Because the Honorable Office of the Court Administrator admitted in writing that
it has no law or jurisprudence to support the illegal withholding of salaries and
allowances and the non-payment of payroll premiums and taxes during the
period of my illegal preventive suspension, these should be released to me as
part of Your Honors’ dispensation of justice as a constitutional duty. If my
illegally withheld salaries and allowances are not released to me, it is alright with
me provided there must be an adjudication on the merits, by stating the facts of
the case and the applied laws. I am willing to waive my illegally withheld salaries
and allowances in exchange of my non-disbarment as stated in my letter dated
April 16, 2017;

The duration of my illegal preventive suspension when my salaries and

allowances were illegally withheld is from February 2, 2012 until the finality of the
Decision to remove me from public service simply because there is no forfeiture
15
of illegally withheld salaries and allowances of a judge who did not vacate
officially the office, and the prohibition of imposition of two penalties in same set
of facts. When I was unlawfully dismissed, my status during appeal is akin to a
legal preventive suspension. This must be discussed in a full blown decision to
guide the members of the bar and bar as well as the public about the nature of a
legal preventive suspension as distinguished from illegal preventive suspension
and the operations as well as interplays of the Constitution on security of
tenure, Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Revised Rules of Court and
jurisprudences. It is a beautiful piece of intellectual discussion that deserve to be
written down for the general public. It is a worthy novel and original legal
scholarship to pen by a Judge;

My administrative case A.M. No. 12-1-09-METC contemplates two preventive

suspension, first, preventive suspension pending investigation and second,
preventive suspension pending appeal;

I claimed for back salaries and allowances during my illegal preventive

suspension pending investigation from February 2, 2012 to December 26, 2016
without prejudice to the outcome of my appeal dated July 12, 2017;

The rules on preventive suspension pending investigation and preventive

suspension pending appeal are different;

As to preventive suspension pending investigation, Garcia v. Molina et al., G.R.

No. 157383, August 10, 2010: In the procedure adopted by petitioner,
respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges issued by
the former without the latter knowing that there were pending administrative
cases against them. It is true that prior notice and hearing are not required in the
issuance of a preventive suspension order (Carabeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 178000 and 178003, December 4, 2009). However, considering that
respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we
now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is likewise null and
void. Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of
back salaries during the period of respondents’ preventive suspension. As the
administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or
misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension
meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be awarded their
salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension (Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil
940, 952-953). In granting their back salaries, we are simply repairing the
damage that was unduly caused respondents, and unless we can turn back the
hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to them that which is physically
feasible to do under the circumstances (Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil 1 Uy
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 246, 580,
594). The principle of “no work, no pay” does not apply where the employee
himself was unlawfully forced out of job. In Re: Payment of Backwages and
Other Economic Benefits of Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles
City, A.M. No. 01-10-12-0, 29, March 2005: However, the judges placed in a
preventive suspension after 90 days are entitled to salaries and allowances what

16
more if the Judges are exonerated and found innocent of the administrative
complaints. XXX

The foregoing jurisprudences are in consonance with 7, Section 29, Revised

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service of 2011:

Section 29. Payment of Back Salaries During Preventive Suspension. - The

payment of back salaries during the period of suspension shall be governed by
the following:

a. A declaration by the Commission that an order of preventive suspension is null

and void on its face entitles the respondent official or employee to immediate
reinstatement and payment of back salaries corresponding to the period of the
unlawful preventive suspension without awaiting the outcome of the main case.

The phrase "null and void on its face" in relation to a preventive suspension
order, imports any of the following circumstances:

i)The order was issued by one who is not authorized by law;

ii) The order was not premised on any of the conditions under Section
26 (A and B) of this Rule;
iii) The order of preventive suspension was issued without a formal charge or
notice of charges;
iv) While lawful in the sense that it is based on the enumerated grounds, the
duration of the imposed preventive suspension has exceeded the prescribed
periods, in which case the payment of back salaries shall correspond to the
excess period only.

As to preventive suspension pending appeal, in CSC vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858,
August 9, 2011: The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of
suspension pending appeal, of a government employee who had been dismissed
but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Courts starting
point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle public officials are only
entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from this
general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally
dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional
provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law; to deny these employees their
back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have been
exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or suspension.

The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having

17
been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the
event he wins an appeal.

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries
since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our
established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of
preventive suspension as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its
legality is beyond question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an
employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found
innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning
behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered
under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the
law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his
suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.

The CSCs rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may have
resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our
jurisprudence appears in order.

The foregoing jurisprudence is in consonance with Rule 7, Section 29 of 2011

Revised Civil Service Rules and Regulations to quote. XXX

b. A declaration of invalidity of a preventive suspension order not based on any

of the reasons enumerated in Section 29(a), shall result in the reinstatement of
the official or employee concerned. The payment of back salaries shall, however,
await the final outcome of the principal case. If the official or employee is fully
exonerated of the charge/s or when the penalty imposed in the principal case is
reprimand, he or she shall be paid such back salaries. Otherwise, no back
salaries shall be awarded. The phrase “full exoneration” contemplates a finding
of not guilty for the offense/s charged. Downgrading of the charge to a lesser
offense shall not be construed as “full exoneration” within the contemplation of
these guidelines. Even if the respondent official or employee be eventually found
innocent of the charge/s proffered against him/her, the same shall not give rise to
payment of back salaries corresponding to the period of preventive suspension in
the absence of any finding of its illegality.

During my appeal from the penalty of removal, it is a legal preventive suspension

pending appeal but since my dismissal was illegal for lack of due process, among
others, it is an illegal preventive suspension pending appeal subject to payment
of salaries and allowances if I won (Rule 7, Section 29 (b) of 2011 Revised Civil
Service Rules and Regulations);

In a legal or illegal preventive suspension pending appeal, there should be

payment of compulsory premiums and taxes just like in legal or illegal preventive
suspension pending investigation for the same reasons I cited in my previous
letters and pleadings. The non-payments of compulsory premiums and
mandatory withholding taxes which are automatic deductions from my salaries as
18
a public servant who was forcibly relieved from my office will stop only if a public
office became officially vacant;

During the period of my preventive suspension pending investigation based

on any of the reasons enumerated in Rule 7, Section 29(a) of 2011 Revised Civil
Service Rules and Regulations) in my case lack of notice of charges and beyond
ninety (90) days (pars. pars. iii and iv of the same Rule and Section), these
backs salaries and allowances must be given to me whether or not I lost the
cases during the appeal;

My salaries and allowances were illegally withheld from February 2, 2012 to

December 26, 2016, the duration of my illegal preventive suspension is from
February 2, 2012 to December 26, 2016, it was on December 27, 2016 that I
appealed my administrative cases. The Finance and Management Division of the
Office of the Court Administrator illegally withheld them because Atty. Lilian
Barribal – Co failed to provide a law or a jurisprudence to support this standing
policy that emanated from OCA CIRCULAR NO. 18 -2013 dated 8 February
2013 signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez: XXX10. Non-
crediting of salaries and allowances which are directed to be withheld shall only
be for a period of six (6) months. Thereafter, the name of the judge or court
personnel shall already be excluded from the payroll;

From February 10, 2012 until July 10, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator
paid my compulsory premiums and taxes, I was placed in an illegal preventive
suspension during that period already;

From August 10, 2012 to July 10, 2017 and until now since I have a pending
appeal dated July 12, 2017, the Office of the Court Administrator did not pay my
compulsory premiums and taxes contrary to the provisions of RA No. 8291 (The
GSIS Act), P.D. No. 1752 (Home Development Mutual Fund Law); RA No. 7875
(PhilHealth) and R.A. No. 8424 (The National Internal Revenue Code). Because
there is a penalty of fine only under Rule 140, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
there is no reason not to pay payroll premiums and taxes during the period I am
not yet separated from the service;

My letter dated November 3, 2016 showed my openness to compromise on the

non-payment of payroll premiums and taxes and illegally withheld salaries and
allowances. I am amenable that all the officials and employees of the Office of
the Court Administrator be exonerated from all liabilities arising from these legal
issues. The Office of the Court Administrator may enter into Compromise with
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and BIR to avoid penalties and evade criminal
prosecution. My back salaries that are part to the issues on non-payments of
compulsory payroll premiums and taxes and non-release of illegally withheld
salaries and allowance are subject to Compromise under Rule 11, Section 55 (b)
of the 2011 Rules of Civil Service;

Again, I claim for back salaries and allowances during my illegal preventive
suspension pending investigation from February 2, 2012 to December 26, 2016
without prejudice to the outcome of my appeal dated July 12, 2017, these lawfully
19
belonged to me under the Constitution, Revised Rules of Court, Revised Rules of
Civil Service Commission and jurisprudences. It is not my fault if I did not work
for these back salaries and allowances for no less than the supreme law of the
land guarantees a public servant’s right to security of tenure; and

Going back to preventive suspension pending appeal, there is also a fixed period
of ninety (90) days to decide the case, beyond that, the preventive suspension
pending appeal becomes illegal. I will claim my back salaries and allowances
because of the illegal preventive suspension pending appeal later on. Because I
am on appeal, my status is into preventive suspension pending appeal, I am still
a Judge sans the finality of the Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 that
denied me of due process hence it is erroneous to address me as former judge
after my receipt of the Decision promulgated on November 22, 2016.

XXX XXX XXX

My prayer was to RELEASE of my illegally withheld salaries and allowances

during the entire duration of my illegal preventive suspension pending
investigation from February 2, 2012 to December 26, 2016 for failure of the
Office of the Court Administrator to provide factual and legal bases and to
ORDER the Office of the Court Administrator to ENTER into COMPROMISE with
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, PAG-IBIG and BIR for the late payments of my compulsory
payroll premiums and taxes from February 2, 2012 to December 26, 2016.

That I wrote the Office of the Court Administrator about my plan to donate ₱1
million each to the Office of Presidential Action Complaint, Office of the
Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator once these illegally
withheld and forfeited salaries and allowances are released to me.

Thank you.

Judge Eliza B. Yu

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