G.R. No.
200242 July 17, 2012 RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C.
CORONA, Petitioner,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an
IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS
BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS,
NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN
TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES
(ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS
FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing
the impeachment case initiated by the
respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being
conducted by respondent Senate of the
Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by
the majority bloc of the HOR during which a
verified complaint for impeachment against
petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation,
on the same day, the complaint was voted in
session and 188 Members signed and endorsed
it, way above the one-third vote required by the
Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was
transmitted to the Senate which convened as an
impeachment court the following day, December
14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a
copy of the complaint charging him with culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and graft and corruption, allegedly
committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice,
TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD
MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND
SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE
ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME
OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS
APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF
JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR
BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE
FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS
STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17,
ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution that "a public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and
as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and
officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law."
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public
his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth
as required by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties
of Respondent are not included in his declaration
of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation
of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and
accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,
acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank
accounts with huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, among others, a
300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Mega World Property development at the Fort in
Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is
constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of
the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this
acquisition sustained and duly supported by his
income as a public official? Since his assumption
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
has he complied with this duty of public
disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY
FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE
STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT
PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE
JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN
COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND
INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE
SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE
LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH
CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING
DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY
CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO
THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE
TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH
LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN
HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER
AGAINST THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN
OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-
GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST THROUGH WANTON
ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES
INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED
CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT
ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF,
AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO
IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY
AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED
BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN
GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO
IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY
TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO
FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN
DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND
REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL
ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ)
COLLECTIONS.1
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his
Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by
which the impeachment complaint was signed by
the Members of the HOR and immediately
transmitted to the Senate. Citing previous
instances when President Aquino openly
expressed his rejection of petitioner’s
appointment as Chief Justice and publicly
attacked this Court under the leadership of
petitioner for "derailing his administration’s
mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to
impeach him was the handiwork of President
Aquino’s party mates and supporters,
including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by
his ouster. As to the charges against him,
petitioner denied the same but admitted having
once served the Offices of the President and
Vice-President during the term of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted
the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante
Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde
appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior
permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at
length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses
imputed to him were either false or baseless, and
otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for
the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing
to meet the requirements of the Constitution or
that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of
acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of
respondent Representatives held a press
conference revealing evidence which
supposedly support their accusations against
petitioner. The following day, newspapers
carried front page reports of high-priced
condominium units and other real properties in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly
owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors
led by respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The
prosecution told the media that it is possible that
these properties were not included by petitioner
in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN) which had not been made
available to the public. Reacting to this media
campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors
reminding them that under the Senate Rules of
Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not
allowed to make any public disclosure or
comment regarding the merits of a pending
impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions
have already been filed with this Court by
different individuals seeking to enjoin the
impeachment trial on grounds of improperly
verified complaint and lack of due process.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the
Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court,
commenced trial proceedings against the
petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary
hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty.
Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in
compliance with a subpoena issued by the
Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and
submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years
2002 to 2010. Other prosecution witnesses also
testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the
previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records
Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty.
Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of
Quezon City).
In compliance with the directive of the
Impeachment Court, the prosecution and
defense submitted their respective memoranda
on the question of whether the prosecution may
present evidence to prove the allegations in
paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties
in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
and failure to disclose in SALN such bank
accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m.
Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig) under
Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged
failure to disclose to the public his SALN as
required by the Constitution).
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court
issued a Resolution5 which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and
accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence
in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II
of the Articles of Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in
support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of
Impeachment, with respect to which, this Court
shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal
presumptions on the nature of any property or
asset which may be proven to belong to the
Respondent Chief Justice as provided under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section
2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6
In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6,
2012, the Impeachment Court granted the
prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to
the officersof two private banks where petitioner
allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar
currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s
Requests for Subpoenae to the responsible
officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank)
and Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI), for them
to testify and bring and/or produce before the
Court documents on the alleged bank accounts
of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of
the instant impeachment proceedings, as
follows:
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine
Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV
Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is
commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00
p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and
certified true copies of the account opening
forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-
8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and
the bank statements showing the balances of the
said account as of December 31, 2005,
December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007,
December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2010.
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized
representative) of Philippine Savings Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola
Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring
before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8,
2012, the original and certified true copies of the
account opening forms/documents for the
following bank accounts allegedly in the name of
Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing
the balances of the said accounts as of
December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008,
December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
089-19100037-3
089-13100282-6
089-121017358
089-121019593
089-121020122
089-121021681
089-141-00712-9
089-141-00746-9
089-14100814-5
089-121-01195-7
SO ORDERED.8
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238)
seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the
HOR prosecutors from implementing the
aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its
authorized representative to testify and to bring
the original and certified true copies of the
opening documents for petitioner’salleged
foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to
render judgment nullifying the subpoenas
including the bank statements showing the year-
end balances for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed
arguing that the Impeachment Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to
trial on the basis of the complaint filed by
respondent Representatives which complaint is
constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of
probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges
discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside
from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges,
do not constitute allegations in law, much less
ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion
and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the
retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the
Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively
allows the introduction of evidence under Par.
2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its
earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow
relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3)
allowed the presentation of evidence on charges
of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth
which violates petitioner’s right to due process
because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and
corruption" or unlawfully acquired wealth as
grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear
under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft
and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground
from "culpable violation of the Constitution" and
"betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the
subpoena for the production of petitioner’s
alleged bank accounts as requested by the
prosecution despite the same being the result of
an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree")
considering that those documents submitted by
the prosecution violates the absolute
confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of
R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act)
which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue
a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining: (i) the
proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii)
implementation ofResolution dated 6 February
2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI
and PSBank from testifying and submitting
documents on petitioner’s or his family’s bank
accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception
and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3
and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render
judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null
and void ab initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and
admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and
2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s
Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6
February 2011 [sic], as well as any Subpoenae
issued pursuant thereto; and
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise
prayed for.9
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices
Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno on the ground of partiality, citing their
publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner
aside from the fact that they have been openly
touted as the likely replacements in the event
that petitioner is removed from office.10
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in
G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from
implementing the Resolution and subpoena ad
testificandum et duces tecum issued by the
Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both
dated February 6, 2012. The Court further
resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the
inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the
absence of any applicable compulsory ground
and of any voluntary inhibition from the Justices
concerned."
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to
due process is being violated in the ongoing
impeachment proceedings because certain
Senator-Judges have lost the coldneutrality of
impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.
Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge
Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had
sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail.
He further called attention to the fact that despite
the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012
Resolution which disallowed the introduction of
evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II,
from which no motion for reconsideration would
be entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in
the Senate abused their authority and continued
their presentation of evidence for the
prosecution, without fear of objection". In view of
the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s
Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding
Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution
could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of
Article II -- for which President Aquino even
thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the
prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates the
reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex
Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the
respondents, the Solicitor General argues that
the instant petition raises matters purely political
in character which may be decided or resolved
only by the Senate and HOR, with the
manifestation that the comment is being filed by
the respondents "without submitting themselves
to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme
Court and without conceding the constitutional
and exclusive power of the House to initiate all
cases of impeachment and of
the Senate to try and decide all cases of
impeachment." Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend
that to allow a public official being impeached to
raise before this Court any and all issues relative
to the substance of the impeachment complaint
would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious
process that may even go beyond the terms of
the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment
case. Such scenario is clearly not what the
Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition,
respondents assert that the Impeachment Court
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion; it
has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings
judiciously. Respondents maintain that
subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to
judicial review defeats the very essence of
impeachment. They contend that the
constitutional command of public accountability
to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his
assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his
claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the
subpoena subject of this case were correctly and
judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing
impeachment proceedings, which was initiated
and is being conducted in accordance with the
Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle
of public accountability and ensure that the
transgressions of impeachable public officials
are corrected, the injury being claimed by
petitioner allegedly resulting from the
impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis.
It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well
as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a
TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked
to assail matters or incidents arising from
impeachment proceedings, and to obtain
injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to
due process of the person being tried by the
Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable
weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and
enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions
with the greatest danger that "the decision will be
regulated more by the comparative strength of
parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."15Given their concededly
political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of
utmost importance to ensure the effective
functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance
in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction,
the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally
entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave
abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to
remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A
mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was
adopted in the United States (US) through the
influence of English common law on the Framers
of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on
impeachment were adopted from the US
Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through
the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3,
in a manner that he claims was accomplished
with undue haste and under a complaint which is
defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner
likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with
the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-
Judges who were apparently aiding the
prosecution during the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the
issues raised in the Supplemental Petition
regarding the behavior of certain Senator-
Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are
issues that do not concern, or allege any violation
of, the three express and exclusive constitutional
limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases. They argue that
unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not
exercise its power of expanded judicial review
over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings. By the nature of the functions they
discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to
propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of
partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But
whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were
followed or not, is a political question that is not
within this Court’s power of expanded judicial
review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this
Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the
power of judicial review in this jurisdiction
includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the
Court resolved the question of the validity of the
simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which
was allegedly a violation of the due process
clause and of the one-year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks
this Court to determine whether respondents
committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives that could
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
would require corrective measures from the
Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been
concluded with the conviction of petitioner by
more than the required majority vote of the
Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening
applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period
from among those candidates shortlisted by the
JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner had been mooted by supervening
events and his own acts.1âwphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof
would be without practical use and value.18 In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief
to which the petitioner would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were
petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2
Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the
Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary
execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a
review board modified the panel’s finding
and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner,
charged as principal, and herein petitioner-
intervenors, charged as accessories. After
a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was
charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or ore of the “principal accused”
are government officals with Salary Grade
27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7
which provides that the said law shall apply
to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due
process and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as the provisions seemed
to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng
case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be
considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of
the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is
essential to the determination whether the
case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or
Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
RULING:
1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.
Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that
Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their
right to equal protection of the law is too
shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant such a declaration.
Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when the
following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it
shall apply “to all cases involving” certain
public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all
cases pending in any court.” Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but
also in “any court.”
2.) NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
Ex post facto law, generally, provides
retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their
punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal
law, but clearly a procedural statute, one
which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
3.) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an
offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender
and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the
information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However,
upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation
of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody. The stringent requirement
that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the
exact offense which the accused is alleged
to have committed in relation to his office
was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the
amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged
in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and
not the Sandiganbayan.
Gonzales III v Office of the President
FACTS:
 There are two petitions that
have been consolidated
because they raise a
common thread of issues
relating to the President's
exercise of the power to
remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of
independence of the
constitutionally-created
office to which they belong -
the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 1st case -> G.R. No. 19623:
Petition for Certiorari which
assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision dated
March 31, 2011 rendered by
the Office of the dismissing
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales
III, Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, upon a
finding of guilt on the
administrative charges of
Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct
constituting a Betrayal of
Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the
President the power to
dismiss a Deputy
Ombudsman of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
 2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232,
is a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside
(1) the undated
Order requiring petitioner
Wendell Barreras-Sulit to
submit a written explanation
with respect to alleged acts
or omissions constituting
serious/grave offenses in
relation to the Plea
Bargaining Agreement
entered into with Major
General Carlos F. Garcia; and
(2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of
Preliminary Investigation,
both issued by the Office of
the President the
administrative case initiated
against petitioner as a
Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition likewise seeks
to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2)
of R.A. No. 6770 giving the
President the power to
dismiss a Special Prosecutor
of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 Cause of 1st case: Hostage
Drama involving Rolando
Mendoza and Hong Kong
nationals in a tourist bus.
Rolando Mendoza
demanded his
reinstatement. Sometime in
2008, a formal charge for
Grave Misconduct (robbery,
grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical
injuries) was filed against
him and other police
officers.
 Office of the Regional
Director of the National
Police Commission turned
over, upon the request of
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales
III, all relevant documents
and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative
adjudication
 The administrative case
against Mendoza was
dismissed upon a finding
that the material allegations
made by the complainant
had not been substantiated
"by any evidence at all to
warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses
charged.
 However, upon the
recommendation of
petitioner Emilio Gonzales
III, a Decision finding P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct
was approved by the
Ombudsman
 They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration followed by
a Supplement to the Motion
for Reconsideration. The
pleadings mentioned and
the records of the case were
assigned for review and
recommendation to Graft
Investigation and Prosecutor
Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who
released a draft Order for
 appropriate action by his
immediate superior, Director
Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in
turn, signed and forwarded
said Order to petitioner
Gonzalez's office on April 27,
2010. Not more than ten (10)
days after, more particularly
on May 6, 2010, petitioner
endorsed the Order,
together with the case
records, for final approval by
Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, in whose office it
remained pending for final
review and action when P/S
Insp. Mendoza hijacked a
bus-load of foreign tourists
on that fateful day of August
23, 2010 in a desperate
attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police
service.
 Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC):
found Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious
and inexcusable negligence
and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine
(9) months without any
justification, in violation of
the Ombudsman prescribed
rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days
from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged
inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-
taking
 Case was elevated to OP. OP
instituted a Formal Charge
against petitioner Gonzales
for Gross Neglect of Duty
and/or Inefficiency in the
Performance of Official Duty
under Rule XIV, Section 22 of
the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292 and other pertinent
Civil Service Laws, rules and
regulations, and for
Misconduct in Office under
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
 OP Dismissed Gonzales from
his office.
 2nd case: the Acting Deputy
Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife
Clarita D. Garcia, their sons
Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo
Garcia and Timothy Mark
Garcia and several unknown
persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before
the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
 Whether the Office of the
President has jurisdiction to
exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who
belong to the fact, the Constitution itself, under
constitutionally-created Section 2, authorizes Congress to
Office of the Ombudsman. provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy
Ruling: Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
who are not subject to impeachment.
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove The Power of the President to
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
Special Prosecutor, Congress and a Special Prosecutor is
merely filled an obvious gap in Implied from his Power to
the law. Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987
power to appoint carries with it the
Constitution confers upon the
power to remove.48 As a general rule,
President the power to appoint the
therefore, all officers appointed by
Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
the President are also removable by
him.49 The exception to this is when
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his
the law expressly provides otherwise
Deputies shall be appointed by the
- that is, when the power to remove is
President from a list of at least six
expressly vested in an office or
nominees prepared by the Judicial
authority other than the appointing
and Bar Council, and from a list of
power. In some cases, the
three nominees for every vacancy
Constitution expressly separates the
thereafter. Such appointments shall
power to remove from the President's
require no confirmation. All vacancies
power to appoint. Under Section 9,
shall be filled within three months
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
after they occur.
the Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be
While the removal of the
appointed by the President. However,
Ombudsman himself is also expressly
Members of the Supreme Court may
provided for in the Constitution,
be removed after impeachment
which is by impeachment under
proceedings initiated by Congress
Section 244 of the same Article, there
(Section 2, Article XI), while judges of
is, however, no constitutional
lower courts may be removed only by
provision similarly dealing with the
the Supreme Court by virtue of its
removal from office of a Deputy
administrative supervision over all its
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article
for that matter. By enacting Section
VIII). The Chairpersons and
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply
Commissioners of the Civil Service
filled a gap in the law without running
Commission Section 1(2), Article
afoul of any provision in the
IX(B), the Commission on Elections
Constitution or existing statutes. In
Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the
Commission on Audit Section 1(2),
Article IX(D) shall likewise be
appointed by the President, but they
may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the
President (Section 9, Article XI) but
may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, Congress simply
laid down in express terms an
authority that is already implied from
the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the aforesaid
officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
6770 granting the President the
power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally
frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a
protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of
the Ombudsman is, essentially,
political independence. This means
nothing more than that "the terms of
office, the salary, the appointments
and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from
the whims of politicians."52 And so it
was that Section 5, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution had declared the
creation of the independent Office of
the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman and his Deputies, who
are described as "protectors of the
people" and constitutionally
mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or
employees of the Government
Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent
provisions under Article XI prescribes
a term of office of seven years
without reappointment Section 11,
prohibits a decrease in salaries during
the term of office Section 10, provides
strict qualifications for the office
Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy
Section 14 and ensures the exercise of
constitutional functions Section 12
and 13. The cloak of independence is
meant to build up the Office of the
Ombudsman's institutional strength
to effectively function as official critic,
mobilizer of government,
constitutional watchdog53 and
protector of the people. It certainly
cannot be made to extend to
wrongdoings and permit the
unbridled acts of its officials to escape
administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional
imperative of shielding the Office of
the Ombudsman from political
influences and the discretionary acts
of the executive, Congress laid down
two restrictions on the President's
exercise of such power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman and (2) that there
must be observance of due process.
Reiterating the grounds for
impeachment laid down in Section 2,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6770 states that the Deputy
Ombudsman may be removed from
office for the same grounds that the
Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely,
"culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust." Thus, it
cannot be rightly said that giving the
President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would
diminish or compromise the
constitutional independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is,
precisely, a measure of protection of
the independence of the
Ombudsman's Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their
duties that their removal can only be
had on grounds provided by law.