P L D 2007 Supreme Court 93

Present: Javed Iqbal, Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi, Raja Fayyaz Ahmed, Dr. Allama Khalid
Mehmood, and Allama Rashid Ahmed Jullundhari, JJ

SHOUKAT ALI---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Shariat Appeal No.23 of 2003, decided on 28th September, 2006.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 1-10-2001 of the Federal Shariat Court passed in
Criminal Appeal No.101-L of 2000).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302/34---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of

1979), S.14---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.203-F---Reappraisal of evidence---
Proverbial Lalkara---Common intention---Friendship or relationship of witnesses with
deceased---Effect---Natural witnesses---Scope---Object of section 34, P.P.C.---Allegation
against accused appellant was that he along with two accused persons committed murder
of deceased---Motive setup in F.I.R. was that as deceased took charge of agricultural farm
from accused, therefore, out of grudge he committed murder of deceased---Accused was
acquitted of charge under S.14 of Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood)
Ordinance, 1979 and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisomnent by Trial Court
under section 302/34, P.P.C.---One co-accused was sentenced to death by Trial Court but
Federal Shariat Court altered death to life imprisonment---Second co-accused was
acquitted by Trial Court---Accused contended that no overt act except proverbial Lalkara,
was attributed to him in F.I.R. and at trial; that motive was not` established on record; that
prosecution evidence was furnished by interested and related witnesses; that prosecution
evidence was self-contradictory and uncorroborated by independent evidence and that
F.I.R. was lodged with delay benefit of which was to go to accused---Validity---
Prosecution had alleged that murder of deceased was committed by all accused with
common intention---Prosecution witnesses were subjected to lengthy cross-examination
but nothing beneficial to accused could be elicited from them who supported each other
on material points---Few minor contradictions having no substantial bearing on merits of
case could be ignored safely---Prosecution witnesses had no enmity to get
accused/appellant involved in heinous offence like murder, abetment and instigation as no
grudge had been alleged against them---Friendship or relationship with deceased was not
sufficient to discredit a witness particularly when there was no motive to falsely involve
accused---In assessing value of evidence of eye-witnesses, it was necessary to examine
whether in facts and circumstances of the case their presence at the scene was to make it
possible for them to witness occurrence and whether there was anything inherently
improbable or unreliable in their evidence---Prosecution witnesses in the present case
were not interested witnesses and their version had been rightly believed by courts
below---Prosecution witnesses furnished plausible justification for their presence at the
place of occurrence as such they could not be labelled as chance witnesses---Object of
S.34, P.P.C., which was incorporated along with S.302, P.P.C. in the present case, was to
meet a case in which it might be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual
members of party or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them in the
occurrence---Reason why all were deemed guilty in such cases was, that presence of
accomplices gave encouragement, support and protection to person actually committing
the act---Appellant, in the present case, had nourished grudge against deceased and it was
he who emerged at the scene along with co-accused duly armed with deadly weapons
which depicted common intention and prior concert of mind and being facilitator and
abettor he remained present at. place of occurrence till murder of deceased was
accomplished---Role of accused/appellant could not be confined to that of proverbial
“Lalkara” but it was more than that and he had been rightly convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment by Courts below---Appeal was dismissed.

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Iqbal alias Bala v. The State 1994 SCMR 1; Nazir v. The State PLD 1962 SC 269; Khalil
Ahmed v. the State 1976 SCMR 161; Allah Ditta and others v. The State 1970 SCMR
734; Muhammad Akbar v. Muhammad Khan and others PLD 1988 SC 274; Shehruddin
v. Allah Rakhia 1989 SCMR 1461; Din Muhammad v. Crown 1969 SCMR 777; Riasat
Ali and another v. The State PLD 1991 SC 397; 1935 Cr.LJ 1393, 1953 All. 214; In re:
Basappa (Vol. 51 Cr.LJ 1950; Sitaram v. State Vol. 59 1958 Cr.LJ 1380; Panduranq Tukia
and Bhillia v. The State of Hyderabad 1955 SCR 1083; NGA Tun Baw and another v.
Emperor 1907 UBR (PC) Crl.LJ 205; Muklesur Rahman and another v. The King Vol. 51
1950 Cr.LJ 945; Queen v. Gorachand Gopee, p.456by Sir Barnes Peacock; In re:
Thipperudrappa Vol. 55 1954 Cr.LJ 481; Panduranq v. State of Hyderabad 1955 Cr.LJ
572; Hidayatullah v. State 1976 P.Cr.LJ 1067; Athar Khan v. State PLD 1972 Lah. 19;
Hasan Din v. Muhammad Mushtaq 1978 SCMR 49; Chutta v. State 1995 P.Cr.LJ 755;
Shahadat Khan v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 and Muhammad Nawaz v. State
PLD 1967 Lah. 952 ref.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 34 & 302---"Common intention" and "furtherance of common intention of all"---

Common intention and similar intention---Distinction, scope and object---Section 34,
P.P.C. was not a punitive section and it did not enact a rule of evidence but enacted a
common law principle of substantive law---Section 34, P.P.C. embodied common sense
principle that if two or more persons intentionally did a thing jointly, it was just the same
as if each of them had done it individually---Two or more persons where jointly caused
injury to another in such a manner that each person engaged in causing the injury was to
know that result of such injury might be the death of injured person, it was no answer on
the part of anyone of them to allege and perhaps prove that his individual act did not
cause death and that by his individual act he could not be held to have intended death---
Everyone was to be taken to have intended probable and natural results of combination of
acts in which he joined---Person not cognizant of intention of his companion to commit
murder was not liable, though his companion indulged in unlawful act---Common
intention implied acting in concert in pursuance of pre-arranged plan which was to be
proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from incriminating facts---Words
"in furtherance of common intention of all" had introduced as an essential part of S.34,
P.P.C. the element of common intention prescribing conditions under which each person
might be criminally liable when there were several actors---Common intention was an
intention to commit crime actually committed and each accused person could be
convicted of that crime, only if he had participated in that common intention---Similar
intention was not to be confused with common intention and partition which divided
"their bounds" was often very thin; nevertheless distinction was real and substantial and,
if overlooked, the same was to result in miscarriage of justice---Common intention did
not mean similar intention of several persons---To constitute common intention, it was
necessary that intention of each one of the accused persons was known to the rest of them
and shared by them.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 33, 34, 35, 37 & 38----`Act' and `criminal act'---Meaning---Term `act'
contemplated a series of acts done by several persons, some perhaps by one of those
persons and some by another but all in pursuance of a common intention---`Criminal act'
meant unity of criminal behaviour which resulted in something for which an individual
was to be punishable, if it were all done by himself alone in a criminal offence.

Dr. Babar Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Ch. Munir Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 2nd January, 2006.

JUDGMENT

JAVED IQBAL, J.---This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment
dated 1-10-2001 whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302/34, P.P.C. and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay sum of Rs.30,000 as compensation
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to legal heirs of deceased and in case of default to further undergo imprisonment for six
months. Benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was given to the appellant.

2. Leave to appeal was granted vide order dated 25-4-2003 which is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference to appreciate the legal and - factual aspects of the
controversy:--

"This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 1-10-2001 of the Federal
Shariat Court dismissing Criminal Appeal No.101/L of 2000 arising from the judgment
dated 24-4-2000 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nankana Sahib whereby the
petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 14 of the Offences Against Property
(Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 but was convicted for life, with benefit of
section 382-B, Cr.P.C. and direction to pay a sum of Rs.30,000 as compensation to the
legal heirs of the deceased or suffer six months' S.T. in default.

2. One Faqir Muhammad was serving at Mian Meraj Din's Agricultural Farm in village
Nonarian. On 28-6-1995 he was transferred to Haseeb Waqas Agricultural Farm at laten
and had relieved the petitioner who was incharge of the farm. He was done to death on
29-6-1995 at about 12-30 a.m. The F.I.R. was lodged at Police Station Saddar Nankana
Sahib on the same day at about 4-30 a.m. by Muhammad Rashid, brother of the deceased,
wherein the petitioner, Habibullah, and Safdar Shah were nominated as the accused. It
was also alleged that Safdar Shah and Habibullah had taken away a .12 bore shotgun
and .222 bore rifle belonging to the farm. The motive set up in the F.I.R. was that the
deceased was taught a lesson for taking over charge of the farm from the petitioner.

3. The petitioner and his co-accused Habibullah were convicted by the learned trial Court
under section 302/34, P.P.C. and while the petitioner was sentenced as stated above,
Habibullah was sentenced to death, which was altered to imprisonment for life by the
Federal Shariat Court. The third accused Safdar Shah was acquitted.

4. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had done
no harm to the deceased and no overt act except the proverbial Lalkara was attributed to
him in the F.I.R. and at the trial. It was further contended. That the motive was imaginary
and had also not been established on record. It was also contended that the manner in
which the occurrence had taken place, according to the prosecution evidence, was odd
and the prosecution evidence was not only furnished by interested and related witnesses
but was also self-contradictory and uncorroborated.

5. Leave is granted to consider the above contentions and to re-appraise the prosecution
evidence in order to ascertain weather the same has been appreciated in accordance with
the principles of appraisal of evidence in criminal matters laid down by this Court."

3. Dr. Babar Awan, learned Advocate Supreme Court appeared on behalf of appellant and
contended strenuously that legal and factual aspects of the controversy have not been
appreciated in its true perspective by the Federal Shariat Court which resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice. It is contended that F.I.R. was got lodged with delay and therefore
the factum of concoction and deliberation could not be ruled out which aspect of the
matter has been ignored by the learned Courts below causing serious prejduce against the
appellant as benefit of the delayed F.I.R. should have been given to the appellant . It is
urged emphatically that none overt act except a proverbial Lalkara has been attributed to
the appellant and hence the question of awarding of the sentence of life imprisonment
does not arise specially in the absence of strong motive and besides that Safdar Ali (co-
accused) whose case is identical to that of appellant has been acquitted and in view of the
principle of consistency the same benefit should have been extended in favour of
appellant. It is argued that the appellant has been convicted on the statements of
prosecution witnesses who could not account for their presence at the spot and being
chance witnesses their version should have been discarded.

4. Ch. Munir Sadiq, leaned Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of
State and controverted strenuously the contentions as agitated on behalf of appellant and
supported the judgment impugned for the reasons enumerated therein with the further
submission that prosecution has established the guilt to the hilt and more so only

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proverbial Lalkara was not attributed to the appellant who had facilitated and participated
in an active manner in the commission of alleged offence.

5. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of the

parties in the light of record of the case, scanned the entire evidence and perused the
judgment of learned trial as well as appellate Courts. The case of prosecution hinges on
the oral evidence, factum of recovery, medical evidence and motive. In order to
substantiate the accusation prosecution has produced twelve prosecution witnesses whose
statements were got recorded at the trial. Statement of Dr. Iqbal Hussain Wattu P.W.5 is
indicative of the fact that death was occurred due to the injuries sustained by the deceased
caused by blunt weapon which resulted in unnatural death of Faqir Muhammad.
Muhammad Rashid P.W.2 has supported the prosecution version and stated in an
unambiguous manner the events culminated into the murder of Faqir Muhammad.
Muhammad Rashid P.W.2 has stated that Faqir Muhammad took over the charge of the
farm which was held by Shoukat Ali (appellant) in the presence of Safdar Ali and
Habibullah and during night at 2-30 the appellant armed with rifle, Safdar Shah armed
with .222 rifle and Habibullah armed with gun .12 bore arrived and caught hold of Faqir
Muhammad and Shoukat Ali (appellant) instigated to his companions that a lesson should
be taught to Faqir Muhammad for taking charge of the farm pursuant to which Safdar
Shah and Habibullah caught hold of Faqir Muhammad and dragged him into maize field
and started beating with fists and kicks when once again Shoukat Ali (appellant) asked
Habibullah to kill Faqir Muhammad by means of firing who made fire with his .12 bore
gun which hit Faqir Muhammad on left temporal who succumbed to the injuries
instantaneously. It is also stated by Muhammad Rashid (P.W.2) that the murder of Faqir
Muhammad was committed by all the accused including appellant with common
intention. He was subjected to lengthy cross-examination but nothing beneficial A could
be elicited in spite of various searching questions. Muhammad Munir (P.W.3) who is also
an eye-witness has supported Muhammad Rashid (P.W.2) on all material points by stating
that at the time of handing over of the charge appellant was present in the farm along with
co-accused namely Safdar Shah and Habibullah and during the night at 12.30 a.m. the
appellant armed with rifle Habibullah armed with gun and Safdar armed with rifle took
Faqir Muhammad to the field at the direction of Shoukat Ali(appellant) from whom the
charge of the farm was taken by Faqir Muhammad. He made it abundant clear that
Shoukat Ali raised Lalkara that a lesson be taught to Faqir Muhammad for taking the
charge of the farm. He further stated that Faqir Muhammad was severely beaten with fists
and kicks when Shoukat All (appellant) asked Habibullah to kill Faqir Muhammad and
on persuasion of Shoukat Ali (appellant) Habibllah fired with his gun due to which Faqir
Muhammad sustained injuries on left temporal who succumbed to the injuries at the spot.
Muhammad Munir (P.W.3) has stated in a categoric manner that the appellant Shoukat
Ali, Habibullah and Safdar committed murder of Faqir Muhammad in furtherance of their
common intentions. Muhammad Munir (P.W.3) was also subjected to exhaustive cross-
examination but nothing advantageous could be extracted except a few minor
contradictions having no substantial bearing on the merits of the case and can be ignored
safely. Muhammad Munir stood firm to the test of cross-examination and his testimony
was not shattered. It is worth-mentioning that the eye account furnished by Muhammad
Munir (P. W.3) and Muhammad Rashid (P.W.2) being confidence-inspiring,
straightforward, free from any dishonest exaggeration and worthy of credence has rightly
been considered and relied upon by the learned trial and appellate Courts. We are not
impressed by the argument of Dr. Babar Awan learned Advocate 'Supreme Court on
behalf of the appellant that being chance and interested witnesses their statements should
have been discarded. It is not out of place to mention here that Muhammad Rashid and
Muhammad Munir had no enmity to get Shoukat Ali (appellant) involved in a heinous
offence like murder and even otherwise no reasoning could be furnished by Dr. Babar
Awan that why c Muhammad Rashid and Muhammad Munir had implicated Shoukat Ali
(appellant) for facilitation, abetment and instigation without having any grouse and
grudge against Shoukat Ali which was even never alleged by them. The second limb. of
the argument is that being interested witness the statements of Muhammad Munir (P.W.3)
and Muhammad Rashid

(P.W.2) should have been discarded. "The concept of "interested witness" was discussed
elaborately in case titled Iqbal alias Bala v. The State 1994 SCMR 1 and it was held that
friendship or relationship with the deceased will not be sufficient to discredit a witness
particularly when there is no motive to falsely involve the accused. The principles for
Page No. 4 of 7
accepting the testimony of even, an interested witness are set out in Nazir v. The State
PLD 1962 SC 269. In Khalil Ahmed v. The State 1976 SCMR 161 the testimony of
deceased's son aged 15 years was accepted as he was not personally involved in any act
of enmity and his statement was consistent, corroborated by the presence of injuries on
his person, human blood-stained articles recovered from the accused and supported by
two other witnesses. In Allah Ditta and others v. The State 1970 SCMR 734 the testimony
of four P.Ws. out of which two had sustained injuries was accepted although they were
related to the deceased because they were natural witnesses, injures sustained by two
P.Ws. proved their presence and involvement in the occurrence and there was motive on
the part of the accused to attack the deceased. Further. their evidence found support from
the medical evidence. Reference can also be made to Muhammad Akbar v. Muhammad
Khan and others PLD 1988 SC 274 and Shehruddin v. Allah Rakhia 1989 SCMR 1461 at
1465 where testimony of injured witness was accepted. In assessing the value of evidence
of eye-witnesses it is necessary to examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case their presence at the scene of occurrence in such a situation as would-make it
possible for them to E witness it should be believed and further that whether there is
anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In Din Muhammad v.
Crown 1969 SCMR 777 it was' observed that to test the testimony of a witness Court
should not only consider whether there is consistency in the narrative, but should also
consider whether the version is probable or not."

6. On the touchstone of the criterion as mentioned hereinabove the statements of

Muhammad Rashid (P.W.2) and Muhammad Munir (P.W.3) have been examined. We are
of the considered view that they were not interested witnesses and their version has
rightly been considered and believed by the Courts below. The contention of learned
Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of appellant that Muhammad Rashid (P.W.2) and
Muhammad Munir (P.W.3) were chance witnesses seems to be devoid of merits as they
had furnished a plausible justification for their presence at the place of occurrence and as
such they cannot be labeled as chance witnesses. In this regard reference can be made to
case Riasat Ali and another v. The State PLD 1991 SC 397.

7. We have also adverted to the prime contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on
behalf of appellant that no role except proverbial Lalkara could be attributed to the
appellant hence the question of the sentence of life imprisonment as awarded to the
appellant does not arise. The above contention seems to have been made in oblivion of
the fact that section 34 was also incorporated along with section 302. We would like to
discuss the import and objects of section 34, P.P.C. The main object for the enactment of
section 34 is `to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of
individual members of a party or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them
The reason why all are deemed guilty in such cases is, that the presence of accomplices
gives encouragement, support, and protection to the person actually committing the act.
The nature of the offence committed by an accused depends upon the act done by him
and the effect produced by it, and the sole object- of this section is to lay down what act
will be deemed to be done by the conspirators. This section is not a punitive section and
does not enact a rule of evidence but enacts a common law principle of substantive law'
1935 Cr.LJ 1393, 1953 all. 214. "This section embodies the common-sense principle that
if two or more persons intentionally do a thing jointly it is just the same as if each of
them had done it individually. If two or more persons combine in injuring another in such
a manner that each person engaged in causing the injury must know that H the result of
such injury may be the death of the injured person, it is no answer on the part of anyone
of them to allege and perhaps prove that his individual act did not cause death, and that
by his individual act he cannot be held to have intended death. Everyone must be taken to
have intended the probable and natural results of the combination of acts in which he
joined. All are guilty of the principal offence, not of obetment. But a party not cognizant
of the intention of his companion to commit murder is not liable, thought in his company,
to do an unlawful act." In re Basappa (Vol 51 Cr.LJ 1950). "common intention implies
acting in concert, existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either 1 from
conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. The leading feature of
this section is the element of participation in action. It embodies a principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal act and the essence of that liability is the existence of a
common intention." (Sitaram v. State (Vol. 59 1958 Cr.LJ 1380) Pandurang, Tukia and
Bhillia v. The State of Hyderabad 1955 SCR 1083. It may not be out of place to mention
here that "the section contemplates the case where more persons than one share in the
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doing of the act and it is necessary to bear in mind the definition of `act' given in 5.33 and
also the provisions ofSs.35, 37 and 38. The term `act' contemplates a series of done by
several persons, some perhaps by one of those persons and j some by another, but all in
pursuance of a common intention. A criminal' act means that unity of criminal behavior
which results in something, for which an individual would be punishable, if it were all
done by himself alone, that is, in a criminal offence" NGA TUN BAW and another v.
Emperor 1907 UBR (P.C.) Crl.LJ 205. "The words `in furtherance of the common
intention of all' have introduced, as an essential part of the section the element of a
common intention prescribing the condition under which each might be criminally liable
when there are several actors. `Common intention' is an intention to K commit the crime
actually committed and each accused person can be convicted of that crime, only if he
has participated in that common intention. The common intention contemplated by this
section is anterior in time to the commission of the crime., and does not refer to the time
when the act is committed. The Privy Council has held that it must be shown that the
criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of
the common intention of all, if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed
on anyone of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.
`Common intention' within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to
convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the
criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. It is difficult if not
impossible to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual; in most case
it has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case.
Same or similar intention must not. be confused with common intention; the partition
which divides "their bounds" is often very thin; nevertheless, the distinction is real and
substantial, and if over looked, will result in miscarriage of justice. The inference of
common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible
from the circumstances of the case. Common intention does not mean similar intention of
several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each
one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. The common intention
ought to be determined from such known facts and circumstances which existed before
the commencement of the criminal act as the criminal act itself is committed in
furtherance of that common intention." Muklesure Rahman and another v. The King (Vol.
51 1950 Cr.LJ 945). "The question whether there was such an intention or not will have
to depend in many cases on inferences to be drawn from proved facts and not on any
direct evidence about a preconceived scheme of plan which may not be available at all.
Mahmood, J., in Dharma Rai's case said "this section was the subject of consideration
impliedly in the case of Queen v. Gorachand Gopee. At p.456, Sir Barnes Peacock clearly
laid down the rule of law that mere presence of persons at the scene of an offence is not,
ipso facto, sufficient to render them liable to any rule such as S.34 enunciates, and that
`the furtherance of common design' was an essential condition before such a rule applied
to the case of an individual person. It was probably in consequence of this expression of
view from such a high authority that the Legislature by S.1 of Act XXVII of 1870,
repealed the original S.34; and in substituting another section therefore, inserted the
important word is 'in furtherance of the common intention of all,' as representing the
condition precedent to each of such persons being held liable for the crime in the same
manner as if it were committed by him alone. This change in the law is very significant,
and it indicates to my mind that the original section having been found to be somewhat
imperfectly worded, these additional words were introduced to draw a clear distinction
that unpremeditated acts done by a particular individual, and which go beyond the object
and intention of the original offence, should not implicate persons who take no part in
that particular act. We have the opinion of an American jurist on the point, whom Mr.
Mayne, in his Commentary on the Penal Code, quotes (Biship, S.439) where that learned
author, lying down the rule, goes on to say:-- `But if the wrong done was a fresh and
independent wrong, springing wholly from the mind of the doer, the other is not criminal
therein, merely because when it was done he was intending to be a partaker with the doer
in a different wrong.' This seems to me to be the right interpretation of the words `in
furtherance of the common intention of all, as they occur in S.34 of the Penal Code" (in
re Thipperudrappa (Vol. 55 1954 Cr.LJ 481). "The Supreme Court has held that it is well-
established that a common intention pre-supposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged
plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another,
the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. The
inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference
deducible from the circumstances of the case. All that is necessary is either' to have direct
Page No. 6 of 7
proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference
or. the circumstances of the case. All that is necessary is either to have direct proof of
prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference or the
incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable
of explanation on any other reasonable hypotheses." (Poandurang v. State of Hyderabad
(1955 Cr.LJ 572).

8. After having gone through almost entire law qua the provisions as contained in section
34, in our considered view the following are the prerequisites of the section 34 before it
could be made applicable:--

"(a) It must be proved that criminal act was done by various persons

(b) The completion of criminal act must be in furtherance of common intention as they all
intended to do so.

(c) There must be a pre-arranged plan and criminal act should have been done in concert
pursuant whereof.

(d) Existence of strong circumstances (for which no yardstick can be fixed and each case
will have to be discussed on its own merits) to show common intention.

(e) The real and substantial distinction in between `common intention' and `similar
intention' be kept in view:

Hidayatullah v. State 1976 P.Cr.LJ 1067; Athar Khan v. State PLD 1972 Lah. 19; Hasan
Din v. Muhammad Mushtaq 1978 SCMR 49; Chutta v. State 1995 P.Cr.LJ 755; Shahadat
Khan v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 and Muhammad Nawaz v. State PLD 1967
Lah. 952."

9. e have examined the case of appellant in the light of the discussion made hereinabove
qua the provisions enumerated in section 34, P.P.C. It transpired from scrutiny of record
that the appellant nourished grudge against deceased having a strong motive against
deceased who substituted him in Haseeb Waqas Agriculture Farm and took over as
incharge of the farm. It is worth-mentioning that it was appellant who emerged at the
scene along with co-accused duly armed N with deadly weapons which depicts. common
intentions and prior concert of mind, being a facilitator and abettor he remained present at
the place of occurrence till the task, i.e., murder of Faqir Muhammad was accomplished.
In such view of the matter his role cannot be confined to that of proverbial Lalkara but it
was more than that and he has rightly been convicted and sentenced by the learned High
Court to undergo life imprisonment vide judgment impugned which being well-based
does not warrant interference.

In sequel to above mentioned discussion the appeal being meritless is dismissed.

S.M.B. /S-70/S Appeal dismissed.

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